In the Name of Nationalism: A Feminist Security Critique on Indonesia's State Violence (1965-1999)

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10.22146/globalsouth.113052

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This study analyses the gendered dimension of Indonesia's idea of nationalism using feminist security perspective. Contested idea of nationalism had resulted in state securitization, conducted by Indonesia's security forces in 1965-1999. However, this study found that such securitization did not take women's security into account. The 1965-1966 political genocide, the military operations in Papua and Aceh, the 1998 May mass sexual violence, and the occupation in East Timor had shown that women were put in further insecurity than they already were. This can be seen from the fact that sexual violence with women as majority of the victims took place during those situations. As Indonesia's social order was already a patriarchy, this gap of gender power relations became more affirmed when state securitization took place. Additionally, this study shows how Indonesia's idea of nationalism reflects the subordination of women in the society.

Keywords: *feminist security; state violence; nationalism; securitization; sexual violence; sexuality*

Introduction

Defending nationalism has always been a prominent theme in the state's decision-making process since Indonesia proclaimed its independence in 1945. Not only that nationalism was a contributing factor that tied people together in their struggle against colonialism, it remains as a justification used by the state for the state-building process post-colonialism. In fact, the contested idea of nationalism had resulted in several measures of state securitization. These securitization measures are largely what Malik (2015) called as securitization as a social process, that is "the process that leads to certain issues becoming a matter of security" after meanings of threats were previously constructed and attached to material objects. In Indonesia's case, the state constructed the narrative of threats. These are through the formation of understandings that certain parties carried different interests in which such interests are against the state's interest—after reciprocal interaction with those parties—thus consequently attaching the sense of threats on the said certain parties. In other words, the state constructed its own insecurity, echoing what Wendt (1992) said on anarchy, that *it is what the states make of it*.

However, this construction of state security and insecurity is in fact top-down and narrow in and of itself. These securitization

measures and, particularly, the state's response to its insecurity turned into state violence against its citizens, as several formal inquiries and investigations found. These formal inquiries and investigations are *pro justitia* inquiries conducted by the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM), truth-seeking investigation by the Aceh Truth and Reconciliation Commission (KKR Aceh) and Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation (CAVR), documentation published by the National Commission Against Violence Against Women (Komnas Perempuan), and report from Joint Fact-finding Team (TGPF) for May 1998 established by the president at that time, B. J. Habibie. They reported that these securitization measures and the state's responses to its insecurity resulted in the occurrence of human rights violations and casualties among its people. Thus, suffice it is to say that the state securitization measures were top-down and narrow in a sense that it was state-centric and did not consider individual security of its people. On the contrary, the state became the one that put its people in individual insecurity.

Furthermore, the state security measures put women in further insecurities than they already were under the patriarchal structure. The patriarchy already put them subordinate to men and the security measures taken by the state worsen the oppression they experience. Women with or accused of affiliation with the group of state's perceived enemy frequently experienced sexual violence committed by Indonesian security forces due to their identity linkage. In this sense, women became the very locus of state power projected against the perceived enemy. Borrowing the words of Lentin (1999), women's bodies became the tool to draw the boundaries between the state and the enemy.

With that being said, this study seeks to analyse the gendered dimension of Indonesia's idea of nationalism using feminist security perspective. It will discuss how Indonesia's state violence from 1965 until 1999 reflects the subordination of women in its response to state insecurity. According to Tickner (1992, p. 66), a feminist definition of security means the absence of violence, be it military, economic, and—especially—sexual. Tickner further argued that a universal discourse of national security includes the multiple experiences of both women and men, thus eliminating any hierarchical social relations including gender relations. As various feminist schools of thought argue that women are not homogenous and consist of varying identities thus call for intersectional analysis, this study extends such methodology by exploring how women's identities are positioned within the state security paradigm hence creating a condition of insecurity for themselves. Such way of analysis is aimed to contribute to the efforts of gendering international relations in general and the state in particular. This is because the traditional security studies only define the content of security and the means to achieve it without "any consideration of the experiences and status of women" while never question whether such value is, in fact, "partial rather than universal" (Stokes, 2015, pp. 48-9).

For this article, the analysis will focus on the 1965-1966 political genocide, the military operations in Papua[1] and Aceh, the 1998 May mass sexual violence, and the occupation in East Timor.[2] These cases are chosen given the clear, identified perceived enemy in each of the cases—showing the state's justification for such securitization measures. They also occurred for many years in extensive and massive manners. It should be noted, however, that the 1998 May mass sexual violence presented a different pattern of means and a different circumstance in demonizing the perceived enemy, but still remains relevant in showing how the women's body were used as the locus of state's power projection. Furthermore, as this article will later show, these cases are chosen for the analysis in this article because they had left significant impact in present-day Indonesia, especially among the victims, as no thorough and substantial settlement has been made by the state.

The discussion in this article will begin by assessing how state insecurity can take turn into state violence against its own citizens in Indonesia. While the discussion is not intended to illustrate a thorough picture of state violence, it offers a situation in which state violence is made possible with state insecurity as the starting point. The discussion then proceeds into an analysis of how women's bodies became the locus of power contestation and, most importantly, power projection by the state. In this section, the discussion focuses on each case mentioned above. It should be noted by the readers that this section contains many mentions of sexual violence hence reader discretion is advised. Finally, the last section looks into the structure of gender control in Indonesia as a framework to understand gender-specific insecurity in the cases studied. It offers a specific analysis of Indonesia's situation in the feminist security study discourses.

The period of 1965 until 1999 is chosen for the analysis scope of this article for three reasons. First, it was the period when former authoritarian-president Soeharto held his presidency, with a strong security approach and military influence.[3] There were several excessive uses of the security approach against what was perceived by the state as a threat to nationalism and unity during this period. Although Soeharto already resigned from his position as the president in 1998, the time frame analysis in this article extends to 1999 because the case of East Timor, which initially began during

1 Papua here refers to the west side of Papua island under Indonesia's governance. It is the same with what the international community usually calls West Papua. It should not be confused with an Indonesian province named West Papua, as it is only a small portion of the whole west side of Papua island under Indonesia's governance.

2 The use of East Timor here refers to the period of time when the area was under Indonesia's occupation and a province of Indonesia. Meanwhile, the use of Timor Leste refers to the period of time when the state gained independence from Indonesia.

3 Soeharto had only been formally inaugurated as president in 1968 and ended his presidency in 1998. However, in 1965, Soeharto led the operation to eradicate the communists. Under this context, he assumed *de facto* power in 1966 through what he claimed as the March Eleventh Letter (*Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret*) issued by then-President Soekarno. The whereabouts of the letter remains unknown today. The period of human rights violations in 1999 in East Timor was an excess of his policy to invade and occupy the area.

his presidency, had only ended in this year. Second, Soeharto's presidency—which is also known as the New Order regime—was inherently patriarchal as seen from its various measures to systematically embed patriarchy into the state's system (Suryakusuma, 1996; Wieringa, 2002), something that lasts until today although the New Order regime had ended. This patriarchal point of view resulted in women never being considered as human beings but rather merely objects vis-a-vis the state, particularly in terms of state's response to its insecurity which is the focus of this article. Last but not least, this period is worth analysing given the current condition of Indonesia that shows similar conditions as to that during the New Order era—that is the increased militarisation and declining democracy, making state violence even more possible to happen for the first time after the 1998 Reform.

From State Insecurity to State Violence

Traditional security studies believe that state is the sole referent object. In this sense, security and survival only can be achieved and maintained through an interstate solution. Realists view that, since conflict is inevitable, the means to achieve security are by increasing military capabilities (Smith, 2015, p. 14). Liberals, on the other hand, view that conflict is not inevitable, thus can be managed through various interstate measures such as "legally-defined collective security" and cooperations (Smith, 2015, p. 19). To sum up, traditional security studies only place their concern solely on state behaviour. However, the case of Indonesia's state violence from 1965 until 1999 showed that what the state perceived as the appropriate means to respond to threats did not always align with the security of its people, thus turning into state violence. At first glance, it may be questioned how the state can conduct such violence to its people. As Bushnell et al. (1991, p. 7) noted, in the twentieth century, the state had attacked its own citizens, those who claimed to be its master. Such state violence is a result from a severely distorted and one-sided relationship between the state and the citizens (Bushnell et al., 1991, p. 9) The 1965-1966 political genocide, the military operations in Papua and Aceh, the 1998 May mass sexual violence, and the occupation in East Timor are clear examples of how Indonesia attacked its own citizens, putting them in insecurity, through the means it deemed appropriate to respond to its own insecurity.

In the 1965-1966 political genocide, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was perceived as a threat to Indonesia's "unitary" and "nationalism" (Melvin, 2018; Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019). The military operations in Papua launched under Soeharto's presidency were aimed to counter the liberation movement (Kelompok Kerja, 2010, pp. 6-7; Easton et al., 2012, p. 3) as well as in Aceh (KKR Aceh, 2025, p. 24). The 1998 May mass sexual violence occurred with the identification of Indonesian of Chinese descent as the enemy (Sadli & Yentriyani, 2008, p. 9). Finally, the occupation in East Timor was initially launched by Indonesia to prevent the establishment of leftist power nearby (CAVR, 2010a, p. 202), with several

military operations were present at later times aiming to counter the liberation movement (CAVR, 2010a, pp. 353-4).

The identification of perceived threat in these cases above present a "severely distorted and one-sided relationship between the state and the citizens" as Bushnell et al. explained. However, what initially were intended to defend the national unity were in fact committed in disproportional manners. They resulted in many victims from the citizens that were neither in any way affiliated with the groups of perceived threat by the state or present an actual threat to the state, highlighting the element of state violence. These cases showed how state insecurity turned into state violence.

The justification to protect national security has instead turned to put the individuals within the state under threats and insecurity. Traditional security studies are not sufficient to explain the 'unnecessary' deaths in these cases. The concept of human security thus becomes more relevant to explain this phenomenon, as it arose due to the fact that threats and insecurity of individuals and communities remain even when interstate conflicts have diminished (Tripp, 2013; Acharya, 2014). In Indonesia's cases mentioned above, the individual insecurity itself, ironically, came from the state itself.

Yet, human security alone is not enough to explain one same pattern from Indonesia's cases above. This pattern is the fact that women were specifically targeted and attacked sexually (CAVR, 2010b; Kelompok Kerja, 2010; KKR Aceh, 2025; Komnas HAM, 2020; Pohlman, 2015; TGPF, 1998). Thus, not only the situation of state violence led to insecurity of individuals, it also led to insecurity of women. In fact, the insecurity of individuals was not genderless. It was strongly gendered. This, in general, means that certain gender identity is more insecure than the others. In Indonesia's cases, as we will see in the next section, it is women who were in more disadvantaged situations. They experienced certain, specific insecurity due to their gender identity.

Women's Bodies: The Locus of Power Contestation

It is, although unfortunate, not uncommon to find women being subjected to sexual violence in conflict and violent settings. Among various forms of conflict and violent settings, Enloe's term of militarised rape is best suited to describe the cases of Indonesia analysed in this article, as compared to, for example, rape in warfare time. According to Enloe (2000), militarised rape is a wider condition in which rape occurs in a militarised setting, which is circumstance controlled by either the military institution or militaristic ideas. Enloe argued that there are three forms of militarised rape, with one of them is applicable for the analysis in this article, the "national security rape" as an instrument for bolstering a nervous state (Enloe, 2000, p. 111). She explained that rape is used systematically as an instrument of national security to ensure *what they thought* to be national security (Enloe, 2000, p. 123, emphasis added).

This section will discuss how rape is used as an instrument to national security in Indonesia, thus consequently creating a gender-specific individual insecurity among women. Such utilisation of rape can actually be found as well in other countries, for example Chile and Argentina in the 1970s, the Philippines in the 1980s, as well as India in the 1980s and 1990s (Enloe, 2000, p. 123). However, little exploration has been made on how Indonesia's notions of nationalism and national security have been built on the subjugation of women, manifesting in a form of national security rape. In particular, discussion and analysis of past national security rapes in Indonesia become more relevant with the recent institutionalized increase of militarisation since Prabowo's presidency—such as the revision of the military law that allows more civilian government positions to be hold by active military personnels, the increase of military personnel deployed in several areas, and the increased military presences in civilian spheres (see Section 4 of Putri et al., 2025). As Enloe (2000, p. 123) pointed out, discussion of national security rape will allow us to understand better the impact that state militarised power struggle has on women under regimes preoccupied with what they constructed as threats to the national security.

The 1965-1966 political genocide

In the 1965-1966 genocide, Pohlman (2015, p. 63) found the occurrence of "sexualised forms of violence" during the massacres and the mass political detentions following the 1 October 1965 coup. This violence took many forms, such as rape, gang rape, sexualised mutilation and torture, sexual humiliation, enforced prostitution, sexual slavery, and forced abortion (Pohlman, 2015, p. 63). She proposed that sexual violence occurred for four main reasons: opportunism, perceived sexual excess on the part of the PKI, as a way to mark the boundaries of groups, and as a deliberate strategy to destroy. In its attempt to eradicate the PKI, the state, mainly led by the army, established a propaganda narrative defaming the Gerwani (*Gerakan Wanita* Indonesia, the Indonesian Women's Movement)—a women's organisation with close link to the PKI—for its accused involvement in the killings of the army generals, by mutilating the generals' penis, gouging their eyes out, and dancing naked around their corpses (Wieringa, 2002). It was argued that communism is so bad that "(i)nstead of being loyal wives and good mothers, obedient to the state ideology of Pancasila and religion, they were becoming politically active and morally loose, unleashing their frightful sexual powers in indecent ways and committing unspeakable atrocities" (Wieringa, 2002, p. 301).

In this respect, it can be seen that sexual violence had resulted from interplaying factors, namely the prior context of patriarchal point of view in the society added with the propaganda specifically targeting communist women. Pohlman further elaborated that the use of violence in itself served as "an identity marker to delineate" the PKI and their supporters—in other words, the identified enemy. This

is specifically prominent from the common practices of stripping women off of their clothes during detention, in order to search for the 'communist mark' on their bodies (Pohlman, 2015). Sexual violence thus "mediated both gendered and politicised constructions of their identity" (Pohlman, 2015, p. 74). Additionally, the propaganda left a long-lasting impact on the lives of the survivors. After being released from the prisons, many of them could not bear the perpetuated stigma of being communist women built from the state propaganda that they had to move to a different city and live with a whole new identity (Nadia, 2007). The excess of such stigma includes, among others, the rejection from their family upon their releases from detention centres, the exclusion from their neighbours, and the need to make administrative changes of their children so that they would not be detected as affiliated to communist women (Nadia, 2007).

Military operations in Papua

In Papua, during the period of 1963–1998, women experienced various forms of violence perpetrated by Indonesia's state apparatus in regards to the use of a security approach against civilian resistance (Kelompok Kerja, 2010, p. 21). These included sexual violence in forms of rape, sexual torture, rape, sexual slavery, sexual exploitation, and forced contraception (Kelompok Kerja, 2010, p. 20). The Komnas Perempuan stated that sexualised forms of violence against women happened as a symbol of conquest (Kelompok Kerja, 2010, p. xvi).

Based on the report of documentation from a working group with the Komnas Perempuan as a part of it, the Commission stated that the attack against women's bodies symbolises the attack against the enemy's community due to the common view that the community's purity is imposed on the women. The Commission further highlighted that the attacks occurred in areas that are considered to be the bases for Papua liberation movement. This shows that a gender-specific and sexualised violence represents as means of addressing the threats to national security, in this sense countering the Papua liberation movement. It specifically shows how Papuan women's bodies are located as the locus for power projection of the state.

Additionally, the Papua case is also racialised to some extent, if not thoroughly. Eichhorn (2023) explored the racial, colonial-like dimension of the state's perception towards Papua, both of its people and the whole land altogether. Although his analysis focused on resource extraction, he pointed out the weaponry used by the state against opposition in Papua as well as the divergence that represents what are constructed by the state as threats to national security. Such divergence is built on

> (a)ge-old colonial views of superiority, a lack of an acceptance of the same development trajectories as the indigenous people, and frameworks that do not allow for the true identities of indigenous Papuans to flourish. Moreover, it attaches differential values to the need to exploit and extract wealth and assigns a form of paternalistic development to indigenous Papuans. … The culture and livelihoods of indigenous west Papuans are framed within both violence and oppression,

> adding to the sense of racialised difference, and thereby racism. (Eichhorn, 2023, p. 1011).

Furthermore, the militarised nature of the state's response to its perceived threat in Papua also extends beyond 1999, the timeframe of this article. Throughout December 2024—November 2025, there were at least 53 occurrences of violence against civilians, with 25 were perpetrated by military forces and the other 19 by police officers (Putri et al., 2025). Within the same period, there are also 5.406 non-organic military and police personnels deployed to Papua, with some of them are stationed to civilian affairs (Putri et al., 2025).

Military operations in Papua, indeed, had begun during Soekarno's presidency, that is the *Tiga Komando Rakyat* (the People's Three Commands) in 1961 (Kelompok Kerja, 2010, p. 6; "The Neglected Genocide," 2013, p. 4), and this article does not intend to diminish his idea or involvement in conducting military operations in Papua. It is, however, worthy to note that significant, increased military operations in Papua occurred since Soeharto's presidency. It was when Soekarno's idea of 'integrating' Papua into Indonesia as a means of defending national unity ("The Neglected Genocide," 2013, p. 4) found its further underlying, material justification when Soeharto and the foreign mining company Freeport signed their first contract in 1967 to operate in Papua—something that was made possible through interplaying factors of international politics, such as the Cold War and the mining boom, and domestic politics, that is the country's bankruptcy and the genocide against communists in 1965 (Leith, 2003, pp. 2-3).

Officiated by Soeharto in 1973, the first Freeport mining complex in Tembagapura resulted in environmental destruction and violated the traditional belief of the indigenous people there—the Amungme people—regarding their sacred connection with the mountain that became the location of mining (Utama, 2025). In 1977, the Papua liberation movement showed its disapproval of the mining by attacking the local police station and by bombing Freeport's pipeline, in which was responded by Soeharto through the launching of military operations (Utama, 2025). In other words, the Freeport mining is severely important to the state that its protection required such military operations.

Occupation and military operations in East Timor

In East Timor during the occupation period of Indonesia, the CAVR found four major categories of sexual violence were committed by Indonesian security forces. These categories are rape, sexual torture, sexual slavery, photographing of detainees, and other sexual violence used as tool of terror and degradation (CAVR, 2010b, pp. 2034-40; Loney & Pohlman, 2022). The CAVR found that the occurrence of sexual violence increased during times of military operations, suggesting the systematic use of sexual violence as an instrument to attack and deter opposition, ensuring national security. Although there were rapes also committed by members of the local political parties—Fretilin, UDT, and Falintil, they

were isolated and not systematic, whereas those committed by Indonesian security forces were widespread and systematic (CAVR, 2010b, pp. 2033-4).

From their process of statement-taking, the CAVR concluded that victims of sexual violence due to "their low status and the sexual stereotypes imposed on them" (CAVR, 2010b, p. 1913). Such sexual stereotypes included the view that women are only property of the men or their communities, with their primary roles are handling domestic chores and as sexual objects of men. This can be seen from the CAVR report that

> (v)ictims of sexual torture were usually women perceived by the security forces to have a connection to the pro-independence movement. Often these women were the targets of proxy violence. That is, because the woman's husband or brother who was being sought by the military was absent, the woman would be raped and tortures as a means of indirectly attacking the absent target (CAVR, 2010b, p. 2035).

Pattern of sexual stereotypes among the practices of sexual violence can also be seen from the fact that the Indonesian security forces practiced sexual slavery for a prolonged period of time (CAVR, 2010b, p. 1696), indicating a sense of ownership by the militarised, perpetrator men towards the militarised, victim women for sexual purpose. There were some cases where the victims who were held as sexual slaves were also obliged to do unpaid domestic chores (CAVR, 2010b), showing the sexual, gender-based stereotypes of women being responsible for domestic affairs.

Additionally, the imposed sexual stereotypes on women can be recognised from the photographs of women torture victim. Smuggled out of Indonesia in the late 1997, the photographs are deliberate shots staged by the soldiers "to capture the violence being perpetrated on the bodies of their victims" with 70 out of 262 features women and teenage girl victims (Loney & Pohlman, 2022, pp. 51-2). In these photographs, the victims had been stripped off of their clothes and tortured with apparent injuries, with series of messages and images written and drawn on their bodies. These writings include "This is what happens to enemies of the Republic of Indonesia" on the chest above her breasts, "Stupid champion" on the front of her upper left thigh, "This is so you feel the consequences" on her upper back, and "Cat shit hero, dead like a rat" on the back of her upper right thigh and buttock (Loney & Pohlman, 2022, pp. 56-7). In their final analysis of these photographs, Loney & Pohlman (2022, p. 74) emphasised that the sexual and gendered violence were "essential methods of destroying" not just the enemies, but their families and any potential descendants as well. These shows the way women's bodies are turned into the site of the state's power struggle to maintain the so-called national unity.

Military operations in Aceh

In Aceh, the initial report of sexual violence was provided by the Fact-finding Team in 1998 and the *pro justitia* investigation by the Komnas HAM in 2018, both covering the period of Military Operation Zone from

1989 until 1998 (Komnas HAM, 2013; Komnas HAM, 2020). Komnas HAM concluded that rape and other forms of sexual violence were used by Indonesian military as means to systematically and widely attack civilians, amounting to crimes against humanity under Law Number 26 of Year 2000 on Human Rights Court (Komnas HAM; 2020, p. 635).

The occurrence of sexual violence did not stop when the Military Operation Zone status in Aceh was revoked, but continued after until 2004, as reported by the KKR Aceh (KKR Aceh, 2025, p. 86). Indeed, the Military Operation Zone in Aceh was revoked a few months after Soeharto resigned from presidency. However, the militarised area and situation in Aceh remained, with several military operations took place (KKR Aceh, 2025, p. 44). It was then under Megawati's presidency that the status of Martial Law was imposed in 2003 (KKR Aceh, 2025, p. 47). The fact that several military operations still occurred and the status of Martial Law was announced even after Soeharto no longer in power showed two legacies of his presidency, that are the remaining perceived threats of the Aceh Liberation Movement (GAM) constructed during Soeharto's presidency and the militarised approach in responding to local dissents and disappointment.

Throughout 1989-2004, sexual violence took forms in sexual harassment and assault, rape, sexual torture, sexual slavery and forced marriage, and killing and sexual mutilation (KKR Aceh, 2025, p. 151). Out of 198 perpetrators identified by the Aceh Truth and Reconciliation Commission (KKR Aceh), 195 were Indonesian security forces (KKR Aceh, 2025, p. 164).

Sexual violence was experienced both by men and women. However, women victims of sexual violence were treated differently by the perpetrators, in a sense that the perpetrators sought for opportunities to commit sexual violence towards women (KKR Aceh, 2025, p. 152). Women became victims of sexual violence not only because they were seen as sexual objects, but because they were alleged to be linked to GAM members as well (KKR Aceh, 2025). There were even cases where young girls were sexually harassed to look for signs in their bodies whether they had been touched by GAM members or that their family members were GAM members (KKR Aceh, 2025, p. 158).

1998 May mass sexual violence

The case of 1998 May mass sexual violence presented a slightly different circumstance. In cases that had been previously discussed, sexual violence was actively committed by Indonesian security forces personnel. However, in 1998 May sexual violence, Indonesian security forces were absent, making them responsible for the negligence of the sexual violence crimes and human rights violations in such widespread manner (TGPF, 1998, p. 19; Komnas HAM, 2020, pp. 208-16).

The TGPF established by former President Habibie found that sexual violence occurred in various cities, such as Medan, Jakarta, and Solo with majority of the victims were women of Chinese ethnicity

(TGPF, 1998). The targeting of Chinese women was not coincidental, but was specifically designed and conditioned (Sadli & Yentriyani, 2008, pp. 20-3; Tempodotco, 2025). In the 1998 May case, the ethnic Chinese was targeted due to interplaying factors. The ethnic Chinese had been long considered as an 'outsider' in Indonesia—a legacy of the colonial Dutch discriminatory legal system which persisted in Indonesia's state-building process post-independence and became increasingly severe following the 1965 anti-communist genocide (Lindsey, 2005; Purdey 2005; Melvin, 2018). Such discrimination, even since the colonial Dutch era, took turned into putting the blame on ethnic Chinese for economic hardship—something that previously had occurred repeatedly before the 1998 May event (Purdey, 2005). The common perception among the people that the ethnic Chinese is not a part of Indonesia was clearly seen during the 1998 May event, as many houses were written with "owned by natives" (*milik pribumi*) to avoid attacks from the masses (Sadli & Yentriyani, 2008, p. 22). In other words, the ethnic Chinese is consistently being viewed as contradicting with the notion of Indonesia's unity and nationalism, both by the state and by the people.

In this case, as the Chinese ethnicity was constructed to be responsible for the multidimensional crisis at that time (TGPF, 1998, pp. 21-3), the Chinese women were seen as property of the community thus attacking them sexually equates to attack, humiliation, and conquest of the Chinese community as a whole (Sadli & Yentriyani, 2008, p. 23; Anggraeni, 2014, p. 161). From the security perspective, the absence of security forces to intervene the acts of sexual violence committed against women means that the sexual security of women does not count as the referent object of security.

Women's bodies and national security

The cases presented above provide us an insight on how the Indonesian state views women in situations of threats and state insecurity present. These cases demonstrate that women were seen as tools with no dignity, autonomy, and agency of their own bodies. They were seen as tools to protect the idea of nationalism, the idea of Indonesia's unity. Only through the subordination of women can the aim for state security and nationalism be pursued. In other words, following Enloe's argument addressed earlier in this section, sexual violence is used as an instrument to ensure national security. From this respect, the notion of state security and nationalism themselves are constructed from patriarchal norms and hegemonic, toxic masculinity. It is important to add the phrase "toxic" in defining the state's masculinity, as masculinity was not merely hegemonic in a sense that it dominates and becomes the standard of state's decision-making (see Jordan, 2022, p. 181), but it is toxic as well that such masculinity must be proved by committing sexual violence. The masculinity is toxic because sexual violence is "a primary vehicle by which men establish dominance over women *and* also over other men" (Jordan, 2022, p. 191, emphasis added), specifically by engaging into the sexual stereotypes that

patriarchy imposed on women—focusing on the sexual objectifications of women on the basis of women's reproductive and sexual functions.

As Lentin (1999) emphasized, rape—or any other forms of sexual violence—committed against women times of conflict—or wartime, in the Lentin's illustration—not only tells us about the social construction of gender, but also tells us about the gendered construction of nation. Following Lentin's argumentation, the fact that women were attacked sexually in the cases presented here tells us about the social construction of gender that the Indonesian state adopted. This social construction, in particular, is resulted from sexual objectification of women. Women were only seen from its sexual organs or sexual functions, as the only thing that entirely represents them (Bartky, 1990). Such sexual objectification is intertwined with the goal to subjugate the enemy community, making sexualised attacks committed against its women appropriate. Women's bodies are seen as a part of the community's territory (Lentin, 1999). It becomes the symbolic battlefield. Furthermore, in analysing the cases above, things should be seen from the context that former President Soeharto had systematically integrated patriarchal views into the state system. It is not an exaggeration to conclude that his whole presidency was founded on the subordination of women, as Wieringa (2002) also argued.

Subjugation of Women during Soeharto's Presidency

To understand the gender-specific insecurity of women in Indonesia from the cases studied in this paper, it is worthy to consider the gender structure of control at the state level at that time—which such structure left quite a legacy in post-Soeharto Indonesia. Julia Suryakusuma (1996) coined the term "state ibuism" to define the gender ideology that became the basis in which the state operated during Soeharto's era. By state ibuism, she means that women are defined by the state "as appendages and companions to their husbands, as procreators of the nation, as mothers and educators of children, as housekeepers, and as members of Indonesian society—in that order" which "encompasses economic, political, and cultural elements" (Suryakusuma, 1996, p. 101).

In other words, state ibuism addresses women as bearing sole responsibility in taking care of the communities that they are in—her family and the nation. The sexual stereotypes of women are also imposed by state ibuism, that procreation and child-bearing are women's ends in their existence. State ibuism took its manifestations, although not exclusively, in the form of Dharma Wanita—the association of wives of civil servants, the PKK (Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, Family Welfare Guidance), the Ministry of Women's Affairs, and the Kowani (Kongres Wanita Indonesia, Indonesian Women's Congress) (Suryakusuma, 1996). These institutions were formed specifically to ensure state's control over the people's sexual life, particularly women and the implementation

of their role assigned by the state. This gender ideology was invented with the vision not only to control sexuality, but to create a hierarchy order within the sexuality aspect as well (Suryakusuma, 2021, p. 13). Within this respect, state ibuism is Indonesia's ideology of hegemonic masculinity. Furthermore, Indonesia's hegemonic masculinity during Soeharto's presidency should be seen in comparison with the fact that Indonesian women were politically active before the 1965 political genocide (see Stuers, 1960), as the attack and propaganda against the Gerwani during this genocide portrayed that the ideal image of women is to be obedient with their role in domestic affairs (Wieringa, 2002), subsequently created the fear among women to engage in any political activities.

During political cleavages, the sexual stereotypes and domesticated views on women became heightened. Such views on women mediated the "us versus them" cleavage, especially when the cleavage later escalated and became even more politicised. Lentin (1990) gendered analysis of genocide may offer some useful insights here. She argues that in times of genocide, wars, and other conflict situation, women are targeted in specific ways both due to their sexual identity and their ethnic or national identity. In other words, the specific targeting of women is influenced by the social construction of their positioning.

In Indonesia's cases analysed in the previous section, it was clear that women were targeted of sexual violence both due to their sexual identity and their identity or affiliation with the state's perceived threats. The sexual stereotypes and domesticated view on women imposed by state ibuism assume women as the property of their groups that are perceived as threats by the state, instead of as human beings with their own autonomy and agency over their own bodies. Although Lentin's analysis is drawn from genocide cases thus the emphasis is heavily put on ethnic-based cleavage, the similar cleavage can actually be found in Indonesia's cases as well where they mostly represent political-based cleavage and feature enemy construction too. It is from this point of view that Indonesia's hegemonic, toxic masculinity became apparent in the state's decision-making and its implementation, particularly in terms of national security. As the sexual hierarchy is already a politicised social construction, the subjugation and domestication of women are further politicised that it became state's instrument in the form of sexual violence in ensuring national security.

Catharine MacKinnon (1983) emphasised how men's point of view on women is institutionalised, formalised, and legalised into the state structure. She observed that men's perspective is "systemic and hegemonic" within the state structure that she argued that "the state is male in the feminist sense." For MacKinnon (1983, p. 644), "the law sees and treats women the way men see and treat women." Her critics are indeed aimed at the objectivity principle of the state's legal design, which MacKinnon observed is, in fact, gendered and full of male totality. Nevertheless, MacKinnon's concept of male totality within the state structure

remains useful for the analysis in this article.

Drawing from MacKinnon's argument, the male totality is integrated into Indonesia's state structure embodied within its security perspective, particularly justified by the notion of national unity. The Indonesian state "sees and treats women the way men see and treat women in the feminist sense." The state ibuism is the embodiment of this perspective, meaning that "the state is male" as MacKinnon argued. This masculinity further became "systemic and hegemonic" in its toxic form, manifesting as an instrument to defend what it constructed as national security. Here, it becomes clear how the state's definition of national security did not include women's individual security. Instead, the state's definition of national security is derived from hegemonic masculinity that became heightened during political cleavages tension. In other words, the Indonesian state's definition of national security is built on the construction of sexual hierarchy that subjugates women and put them inferior to men.

Conclusion

For modern-state Indonesia, nationalism is undeniably derived from the idea of maintaining and preserving state security. The efforts to maintain state security and defend it from the perceived threats—as we have seen—were built on the construction of women's subordination and subjugation. From feminist security studies, the situation of Indonesia's state violence aimed to respond to state insecurity throughout 1965 until 1999 posed the opposite of security for women. This must be seen from the context of Soeharto's gender ideology and structure of control, namely state ibuism. Such ideology serves as the framework of how the state views women, including in its measures to respond to state insecurity. The constructed enemy positioning of these women was due to the identity of their husbands, fathers, or community as a whole. However, the gender-specific insecurity and gender-based violence committed by the state apparatus were made possible by the existence of hegemonic, toxic masculinity view adopted by the state.

Women's bodies were used to project the state's power in efforts to defeat the enemy. Under the justification of protecting national unity and defending national security, sexual violence against women were used by the Indonesian security forces as an instrument to pursue it. This challenges the core concern of traditional security studies that is placed on state behaviour, how state-centred security may not always align the individual security of its people, especially of the women whose experience of sexualised forms of violence indicates a specific gender-based form of violence. Instead, women's insecurity is the exact tool to ensure state security. Such conclusion invites us to rethink the way we view state not as a unitary entity and the way we understand international relations. In particular, the analysis in this article offers us some insight on the way state-formation, state-building, and nation-building can take place.

It thus becomes clear that Indonesia's idea of nationalism reflects the insecurity of women—that their security never mattered

to the state in the first place. It reflects that women's identities became precisely the reason for their insecurity vis-a-vis the state. Finally, it shows us the case where state-centred security approach contradicts the security of women, highlighting the patriarchal nature of the state. This brings us to the question that Cynthia Enloe asks in analysing international relations: "where are the women?"

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