The Cosmopolitanism of Y.B. Mangunwijaya

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Abstract
This paper aims to explain and analyze the idea of post-nationalism/post-Indonesia (pasca-nasionalisme/pasca-Indonesia) provided by Indonesian architect, clergy, social activist, and writer, Y.B. Mangunwijaya. Through his idea of post-nationalism, Mangunwijaya criticizes the Indonesian nationalism which tends to ask for an unconditional loyalty of the people to the state. This “shallow nationalism”, according to Mangunwijaya, is well expressed in the slogan of “right or wrong my country” (Mangunwijaya, 1999). Mangunwijaya further argues that the state should only be defended as long as the state defends “truth” since the purpose of human life is not to protect the state; but to defend truth and humanity. However, it is a mistake to understand Mangunwijaya simply as an anti-nationalist thinker. Instead, his idea of post-nationalism is rooted in his experience of third world nationalism, especially Indonesian nationalism. According to him, Indonesian nationalism did not emerge to resist the Dutch. It emerged to resist colonialism and its inhuman nature; and then attempted to restore human dignity. In other words, humanization is the essence of Indonesian nationalism (Mangunwijaya, 1995; 1999). This paper argues that Mangunwijaya reinterpretation of nationalism lays the foundation of his post-nationalism: post-nationalism is an effort to expand the essence of Indonesian nationalism to the world. Mangunwijaya directs Indonesian nationalism not only to humanize his polis, i.e. Indonesia, but also to humanize the cosmos, the world. This cosmopolitan aspect of Mangunwijaya post-nationalism is unique compared to that of Kantian or Levinasian-Derridean cosmopolitanism. Instead of placing nationalism as an obstacle to build a cosmopolitan world, Mangunwijaya places nationalism in the heart of his cosmopolitanism.

Keywords: Y.B. Mangunwijaya, post-nationalism, post-Indonesia, nationalism, cosmopolitanism

Abstrak

Kata kunci: Y.B. Mangunwijaya, pasca-nasionalisme, pasca-Indonesia, nasionalisme, kosmopolitanisme


**Introduction**

In 1970s, the world had witnessed a great transformation of Third World nationalism. According to Vijay Prashad’s *The Darker Nations*, Third World nationalism before 1970s was characterized by its commitment to justice and anti-colonialism. Third World nationalism was also cosmopolitan in its very essence since it viewed another Third World nation as fellows instead of enemies. Soekarno once said:

> Let us remember that the highest purpose of man is the liberation of man from his bonds of fear, his bonds of poverty, the liberation of man from the physical, spiritual, and intellectual bonds which have for long stunned the development of humanity's majority. And let us remember, Sisters and Brothers, that for the sake of all that, we Asians and Africans must be united (Sukarno in Prashad 2007: xvii).

This spirit was dominating the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, sixty years ago. This spirit also marked the difference between Third World nationalism and European-style cultural nationalism. While European nationalism attempted to organize a nation based on a given “people” or “race”, the people of Third World was united by their desire to be free of colonial rule.

Unfortunately, this sort of nationalism was diminishing in 1970s. The government of Third World nations were no longer committed to anti-colonialism spirit. In several countries, the bourgeoisie governments annihilated the people movement to assure their position in the power structure. Instead of making a close connection between elite and the mass, Third World nations after 1970s tended to exclude the mass from distribution of power. Facing a powerless mass, the elite—which was more interested in making profit than fighting against colonialism—put the idea of Third World solidarity aside and thus removing the cosmopolitan nature of Third World nationalism. Third World nationalism then gradually moved closer to European cultural nationalism and even fascism—leaving behind the dream of a united Third World (Prashad 2007: Chapter 1).

In the midst of such conditions, Y.B. Mangunwijaya offers a different perspective on how contemporary Third World nations should craft their nationalism. By criticizing the New Order Indonesian nationalism, Mangunwijaya shows that the foundation of Indonesian nationalism has been seriously misunderstood. Mangunwijaya then attempt to reconstruct it and recover the cosmopolitan nature of Indonesian nationalism.

This paper is an effort to explicate the link between Indonesian nationalism and cosmopolitanism embedded in Mangunwijaya’s concept of “post-nationalism” (*pascanasionalisme*) and “post-Indonesia”(*post-Indonesia*). This paper argues that those concepts—which are originated in Mangunwijaya’s critique toward New Order Indonesian nationalism—contain an important nexus between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Those concepts also become a powerful reply for those who argue that nationalism and cosmopolitanism are incompatible. By comparing Mangunwijaya’s concepts with Kantian and Levinsonian-Derridean cosmopolitanism, that argument hopefully will become clear. As far as the writer knew, there is no research that attempts to read Mangunwijaya’s thought in the light of the debate of international political theory—especially cosmopolitanism. However, the writer admits that several writings on Mangunwijaya’s post-nationalism/post-Indonesia already exist.

This paper will be divided into several sections. Firstly, this paper will give a short biographical sketch on Mangunwijaya’s life and several foundational assumptions of his thought—especially on the critical role of conscience. Secondly, this paper will examine Mangunwijaya’s critique toward Indonesian nationalism. Thirdly, the concept of post-nationalism/post-Indonesia will be explained. Fourthly, this paper will compare Mangunwijaya views on nationalism-cosmopolitanism link with those of Kant, Levinas, and Derrida. A conclusion will put an end to this paper. This paper will use Mangunwijaya’s writings—
including his essays and novels—as the main source of analysis.

The Foundation
Yusuf Bilyarta Mangunwijaya was born in Ambarawa (now a city in Central Java) in 1929 and passed away in 1999. He was trained as a clergy and an architect but was also well-known for his social activism and writings. Mangunwijaya was an Aga Khan awardee for his role in rebuilding Kali Code slum in Yogyakarta. Mangunwijaya also received Ramon Magsaysay award for his outstanding novel, Burung-Burung Manyar. Thus, the works of Mangunwijaya were so wide ranging. He is a man with many faces: he was a clergy, an architect, a social activist, and a writer at the same time. In this paper, we will even see that Mangunwijaya was also a political thinker. Y.B. Mangunwijaya is usually called as “Romo Mangun”. However, in this paper, I want to treat him as a serious political thinker. Hence, I will call him Mangunwijaya—although I am quite sure that Romo Mangun will refuse my decision.

Although it is evident that Mangunwijaya was working in several fields altogether, all of Mangunwijaya works was united in a single commitment to serve humanity. In his essay, “Sastrawan Hati Nurani”, he explained the mission that he had set for his works. He wrote that a writer should fight for truth, justice, human dignity, peace, brotherhood, humanity, and civilization. In order to do so, a writer must be able to utilize his own conscience. However, Mangunwijaya did not conceive conscience as something that is permanently embedded inside human being. Instead, he thought that conscience is gradually growing and developing. It is also possible for someone to have a damaged conscience. In that case, someone will tend to feel nice although he has actually violated the principle of humanity. In Mangunwijaya’s perspective, it is the task of writers and teachers to nurture the conscience. It should be done not by telling the students what good conscience is, but by “waking the conscience up” or by “touching the conscience” and then letting it grows by itself (Mangunwijaya, 1999, p. 39-45).

Mangunwijaya’s further adopted the concept of human proposed by Blaise Pascal. Pascal argues that human is not only equipped with rationality. There is something higher than rationality. Pascal names it “le coeur” (heart). Different from rationality which attempts to prove the existence of truth by utilizing logic, le coeur is able to grasp the existence of truth intuitively. It is able to distinguish the good from the bad without any logical reasoning. Instead of being subordinated by rationality, le coeur produces the axioms from which rationality is working. Although le coeur is not always able to produce a scientific truth, Pascal argues that le coeur could lead human to reach the truth without taking a mistaken path. Even, Pascal further argues that moral truth—on what is good and bad—could only be grasped using le coeur. In that case, rationality finds its limit. Mangunwijaya adopted this Pascalian position. He agreed that human being contains two faculties inside them: the heart and the mind. The operation of mind will always presuppose the operation of the heart. However, Mangunwijaya emphasized that the heart will not be able to work fully without the support from the mind. In some cases, the heart will start working only after the mind finds its limit. The inability of mind to find the truth will give the heart a signal saying that perhaps we are dealing with a moral truth instead of a scientific truth (Mangunwijaya, 1999, p. 221-224).

But, what is truth? Mangunwijaya had a very simple answer for this question. Truth is everything that enriches humanity and lifts up human dignity. Truth is everything that develops humanity, justice, freedom, peace, and brotherhood. Mangunwijaya presupposed that there is a single “expression of human conscience” that unites all human being. Since we have a common conscience, it is therefore possible for us to find a common truth that reflects the principle of justice and humanity. However, Mangunwijaya admitted the diversity of human being. First, Mangunwijaya argued that both “positive” and “negative” human exist. There is human who cheers others up. But, there is also human who disgusts others. Second, Mangunwijaya also emphasized that there is no single and
universal human culture—human culture is diverse. Although such variation exists, Mangunwijaya argued that a common human conscience could overcome it. By utilizing their heart, humanity could finally come to a common truth—a common belief on what human should and should not do. Mangunwijaya did not imagine a world without difference. Instead, he imagined a world where different human beings dare to fight for the greatness of common humanity (Mangunwijaya, 1995, p. 78-79; 1999, p. 77-88).

In this section, we have discussed the foundation of Mangunwijaya’s thought. In order to understand the idea of post-nationalism/post-Indonesia, it is important for us to understand this foundation first. To summarize, Mangunwijaya’s thought is built upon a belief that conscience should take a dominant role in directing human behaviour and decision. By reading Blaise Pascal’s idea on ‘le coeur’, Mangunwijaya believes that conscience could lead human beings to find the truth that will help them to disseminate humanity on the surface of the earth. Although Mangunwijaya admits that human being is diverse, he strongly argues that a common conscience lies inside every human being. However, such conscience is not static or given. It is constructed and developed by a good, humanist, and liberating education.

The Critique

Although Mangunwijaya was involved in Indonesian independence war as a soldier, Mangunwijaya was very uncomfortable with how Indonesia crafted its post-colonial nationalism. Mangunwijaya tended to be suspicious with Indonesian nationalism and finally delivered a powerful critique towards it. Mangunwijaya argued that Indonesian nationalism was detached from its humanist spirit—which was colouring Indonesian war for independence—and moving closer to fascism.

Mangunwijaya’s suspicious attitude toward nationalism-fascism nexus started to arise when he gave a critical comment toward Japanese education system in Indonesia. By comparing it with Dutch education system, Mangunwijaya felt that Japanese education system is less concerning with the development of human conscience. The Japanese education limited students’ability to make and offer a critical question. It was, at the same time, unable to nurture both students’consciences and rationalities. To put it in Pascal’s terminology, Japanese education system failed to develop both le coeur and rational mind. Mangunwijaya openly declared that he preferred Dutch education than Japanese education—though several national figures such as Sukarno and Hatta were standing on Japanese side. In Mangunwijaya’s perspective, Dutch education, in some extent, was good in provoking students to utilize their own mind and nurturing their hearts to feel the grievance of others—although it was a paradox since Dutch colonialism was the main producer of grievance in Indonesian society at that time. Despite of this difference, Mangunwijaya saw a common character from both education system: both of them was built upon fascism—and Mangunwijaya even also saw the same tendency among Indonesian elites; he called it ‘feudal fascism’. Mangunwijaya further warned Indonesian society to be careful with the rise of new fascism, that is when Dutch and Japanese fascism are combined with feudal fascism (Mangunwijaya, 1999, p. 127-130). This unique position adopted by Mangunwijaya—a covert support for Dutch education system and a suspicious attitude toward Indonesian elites—lead him to an ambiguous position toward Indonesian nationalism. This ambiguity was clearly expressed in his novel, Burung-Burung Manyar. The main character—Teto—was trapped in a dilemma between protecting the young Indonesia and remained faithful to the promise of independence; or to struggle on the side of anti-fascism forces at that time—the Allies—and fight against the new republic (Mangunwijaya, 2014).

Mangunwijaya even developed a powerful critique toward Indonesian post-colonial nationalism. The main point made by Mangunwijaya was that Indonesian nationalism became more and more shallow (dangkal). The shallowness of Indonesian nationalism was reflected in the belief on “right or wrong my country” slogan. This slogan, Mangunwijaya argued, contained a serious mistake. This slogan assumed that truth is adhered to someone’s nationality.
Something is true not because it is true, but because my country believes that it is true. Therefore, the criteria to classify something as truth is no longer depends on the truth itself, but on our identity and nationality. Mangunwijaya pointed out that this slogan should be replaced by “right or wrong is right or wrong”. Different from the previous slogan, the latter slogan presupposed the autonomy of truth from someone’s nationality (Mangunwijaya, 1999, p. 41). As discussed in previous section, for Mangunwijaya, the right or wrong is decided based on its contribution to the enrichment of humanity. The right is what gives the greatest contribution to humanity and the wrong is what denigrates humanity. The task of human being, for Mangunwijaya, is not to fight for the country but to fight for the truth. It is a mistake to follow the state’s order or even to protect it if the state has violated the principle of humanity. If the state is unable to protect human dignity, it is therefore not necessary to protect the state. Unfortunately, the shallow nationalism has obscured this mission. Instead of leading human beings to protect humanity, shallow nationalism tends to make human beings unable to distinguish their interest as human and the interest of the state. Under the flag of shallow nationalism, it is possible for human beings to remain faithful and loyal to the state although their dignity is denigrated by it.

Further, Mangunwijaya also argued that shallow nationalism would grow an ultranationalistic sentiment among citizens. It would encourage them to think that their point of view, culture, or interest is superior compared to other nations. Thus, it would be hard for the ‘superior’ nation to build a bridge to remove the gap between it and other nations since the ‘superior’ nation was unable to treat all nations equally. Therefore, politics among nations were coloured not by solidarity or egalitarianism. Instead, it would be dominated by a willingness to defeat others in international competition (Mangunwijaya, 1995, p. 30).

This condition was the implication predicted by Mangunwijaya—and he had already seen the indication that this condition existed. Indonesian citizens, for example, tended to be happy and proud whenever their national team could defeat, let us say, China in Thomas Cup. For Mangunwijaya, this phenomenon indicated that shallow nationalism had overcame the function of human conscience. Mangunwijaya believed that Indonesian people should not be happy and proud because their national team defeated others. They should be proud if the match was reflecting the principle of humanity and, in the end, developed it to a higher stage. Therefore, for Mangunwijaya, our decision to be happy and proud should not be linked with the achievement of our nation, but with achievement of our humanity in advancing the values it held (Mangunwijaya, 1999, p. 44).

For Mangunwijaya, such view is not alien to Indonesian history. Instead of being alien, Mangunwijaya attempted to show that Indonesian physical revolution was closely related more with the spirit to preserve humanity than with a shallow nationalism. At this point, Mangunwijaya actually tried to offer a new perspective in reading Indonesian nationalism. The mainstream perspective on Indonesian nationalism said that Indonesian nationalism was rising as a respond to the brutality of Dutch and Japanese colonialism. The independence war was an effort of Indonesia to liberate itself from their control. To put it in other words, the independence war was an effort to fight against foreign nations (asing). Mangunwijaya tried to read Indonesian nationalism more closely than the mainstream reading offered. In Mangunwijaya’s perspective, it was actually not the Dutch or the Japanese that exploited Indonesian society. Rather, it was the colonialism that made a “exploitation de l’homme par l’homme” possible (Mangunwijaya, 1999, p. 54–55).

Colonialism is a very good example of an alienated and defunctioned human conscience. Mangunwijaya argued that a tendency to exploit others for the preservation of our self-interest was embedded in our human nature. It was actually natural. However, a well-developed conscience would tell human beings that they should not exploit others although they were able to do so (Mangunwijaya, 1999, p. 43–44). The phenomenon of colonialism indicated that human
conscience was neither functioned nor developed well. Indonesian nationalism, therefore, was not containing a spirit to expel the influence of 

section. It was reflecting the spirit of humanization: the restoration of human conscience. Mangunwijaya did not see the Dutch as a diabolic oppressor, but more as human beings that was alienated from their own consciences. On the other hand, the Indonesian elites were not automatically called as liberator since many of them remained unable to use their consciences and became a new oppressor—substituting the position of the Dutch and the Japanese.

This spirit—humanization—is the only possible and legitimate foundation of Indonesian nationalism. Mangunwijaya once wrote that the essence nationalism was “fighting for the poor, the oppressed, and helping the vulnerable”. Sadly, in its development, Indonesian nationalism became more and more detached from its foundation. It became narrow and shallow. This critique toward Indonesian nationalism will lay the foundation for Mangunwijaya’s concept of post-nationalism/post-Indonesia.

**The Recovery**

We have discussed Mangunwijaya’s view on Indonesian nationalism in previous section. Mangunwijaya, by criticizing current interpretation on Indonesian nationalism, found that Indonesian nationalism was detached from its foundation. Mangunwijaya saw that the spirit of Indonesian nationalism was not rooted in anti-foreign nations sentiment, but rather in a spirit of humanization mediated by the utilization of human conscience. The idea of post-nationalism/post-Indonesia was simply a move further from that critiques. *First*, post-nationalism/post-Indonesia attempted to recover the essence of nationalism as provided by the critiques. *Secondly*, post-nationalism/post-Indonesia also attempted to widen and transcend the essence of Indonesian nationalism. The first step has already been explained in the previous section. Its summary also has been provided in the earlier part of this section. Therefore, this section will only concern with the second step.

There are two important points from the previous section that should be reemphasized before we start our discussion on post-nationalism/post-Indonesia. *First*, Mangunwijaya refused the position that prioritize the protection of state rather than the protection of humanity. Mangunwijaya refused the “right or wrong my country” and replaced it with “right or wrong is right or wrong”. In Mangunwijaya’s view, protecting the state that forgot to protect humanity is an erroneous decision. By doing this evaluation, Mangunwijaya detached truth from nationality and identity, and then adhered it to humanity. *Secondly*, Mangunwijaya also refused the argument that said that Indonesian nationalism reflected an anti-foreign nations sentiment. For him, such interpretation is misleading. Indonesian nationalism was not built upon a spirit to eliminate the influence of Dutch or Japanese, but rather a spirit of humanization. Indonesian nationalism attempted to restore the conscience of the oppressor by forcing them to stop the colonialism. On the other hand, Indonesian nationalism also recovered the humanity since it also liberated Indonesian society from inhuman exploitation.

Post-nationalism/post-Indonesia is an effort to transcend and widen the nature of Indonesian nationalism. It is an effort to direct the spirit of Indonesian nationalism to the world. But, at this point, we should offer a question: why then Indonesian nationalism should be directed to the world?

Mangunwijaya said that the emergence of post-nationalism/post-Indonesia—including its worldly orientation—is unavoidable. The world has been experiencing a gradual evolution that encouraged us to widen our perspective on space and interaction. Human interaction, at first, was developed on a relatively small area among relatively homogeneous people. It started on a village level among people with similar ethnicity, and now, finally, arrived on a stage in which people that come across the world interact on a global level. The definition of North, South, East or West, for Mangunwijaya, is no longer relevant (Mangunwijaya, 1999, p. 117). Post-nationalism/post-Indonesia is a response to this condition. Nationalism—even if it is not a
shallow one—will not be sufficient to engage with such globalized world. Therefore, for Mangunwijaya, post-nationalism/post-Indonesia should be directed to the world not because Indonesian nationalism has a certain virtue that could civilize international politics, but rather because it is a proper response toward the actual character of the contemporary world (Mangunwijaya, 1999, p. 39-40). By providing such arguments, Mangunwijaya assured that his taught is steril from any hidden fascist or narcistic assumption.

However, by directing the spirit of Indonesian nationalism to the world, Mangunwijaya actually has made a great leap. At least, the changing orientation of Indonesian nationalism will produce some implications. Directing Indonesian nationalism to the world means that Indonesian citizens now obligate not only to protect humanity in Indonesia, but also in the world as well. A post-Indonesian-nationalism instructs its citizens to give attention toward the grievance of all human beings. Post-Indonesia/post-nationalism will also encourage Indonesian citizens to remain responsive to any denigration of human dignity in the world. In short, by transforming its nationalism to post-nationalism, Indonesia also has to change its orientation: from polis to cosmos.

The Cosmopolitan View
The previous section has discussed the main character of post-nationalism/post-Indonesia, the reason for its emergence, and the implications of its application. Post-nationalism/post-Indonesia is a widened and transcended Indonesian nationalism—with reference not to the shallow nationalism but to the humanist spirit of it. It emerges as a proper response of globalization and will give important implications to how Indonesia—and its citizens—should behave in the world. This section attempts to explicate the link between Mangunwijaya’s post-nationalism/post-Indonesia with cosmopolitanism. But, in order to do that, we have to make a preliminary conception on what cosmopolitanism is. Despite of the debate revolved around this topic, this paper will use a minimalist conception provided by the Stoic—which is amplified later by Martha Nussbaum and David Held. Cosmopolitanism is a theory of international politics which emphasizes the importance of the world (cosmos) than the polis, or at least, give a special attention or orientation toward the cosmos than to the polis. It posits human not as merely a citizen of the polis, but also the citizen of the cosmos (Held, 2005; Nussbaum, 1994).

Mangunwijaya’s thought provides an interesting example on how relation between cosmos and polis could be formulated. The concept of post-nationalism/post-Indonesia is a bridge which connects the cosmos-oriented tendency and the polis-oriented tendency inside Indonesian nationalism. On the one hand, post-nationalism/post-Indonesia is rooted in a specific historical experience of Third World anti-colonialism struggle. Based on Mangunwijaya’s experience and observation during the independence war, Mangunwijaya concludes that Indonesian nationalism is built upon a spirit to restore and recover humanity and human conscience. Its mission is not the elimination of foreign forces in Indonesia, but to liberate both the oppressor and the oppressed from any constraint that prevent them to sense the conscience and live in a just world. This position encourages Mangunwijaya to take a critical standpoint on Indonesian nationalism which—in his own perspective—tends to obscure the relation between human beings and their conscience. On the other hand, although the idea of post-nationalism/post-Indonesia is rooted in a local and specific context, it has a global implication. Since Indonesian nationalism reflects the spirit of humanization, and since human beings does not only live in Indonesia but also all over the world as well, then it follows logically that Indonesian nationalism will encourage its citizens not only to remain responsible in protecting human dignity in Indonesia, but also in the world. Further, it means that to be a good Indonesian citizen (read: to be a good polis citizen), someone also must be a good cosmos citizen. The concept of post-nationalism/post-Indonesia, therefore, not only removes the gap between polis and cosmos, but also makes that distinction becomes blur.
In order to explicate this character more, this paper will attempt to briefly compare Mangunwijaya’s post-nationalism/post-Indonesia with Kantian and Levinasian-Derridean cosmopolitanism. Since this paper does not intend to focus on Kant’s, Levinas’, and Derrida’s thought, this paper will not explain their concept systematically—by exploring their philosophical assumptions first and then move to analyze the concept built upon those assumptions—like this paper does on Mangunwijaya’s thought.

Kantian cosmopolitanism is based on assumption that human beings will be able to craft a law to regulate conflict among themselves. In the case of international politics, a common belief in the importance of international law is constructed by, at first, providing what Kant called as “a right to visitation”. This right guarantees that everyone—as a guest—should not be received with hostility by the host. Everyone has a presupposed right to present themselves in front of the other nations and make a contact with them. This right is essential for Kantian cosmopolitanism since this right will help the humanity to foster communication among themselves, increase understanding to each other, and finally, develop a common will to build a law on the international level regulated by world federation which—despite of its limited authority—is able to overcome conflict and war among nations (Kant 2006). Derridean cosmopolitanism departs from Levinas’s concept of ‘the ethical’ and a re-reading of Kant’s key texts on cosmopolitanism. Derridean cosmopolitanism emphasizes that the host should receive the guest with hospitality. The host should not make any “metaphysical violence” to his guest by forcing them to follow the rule, tradition, or language of the host—although Derrida also underlines the difficulties of this concept since by letting the guest makes their own rule, the relation between the host and the guest will be inverted (Derrida, 2000; 2000, 5:3; 1993: 2001; 2006).

From a brief explanation above, we could see how Kantian and Levinasian-Derridean cosmopolitanism formulate the relation between cosmos and polis. Kantian cosmopolitanism makes a clear distinction between cosmos and polis and attempts to mediate the interest of the latter by crafting an institution on cosmos-level. The world federation is made, according to Kantian cosmopolitanism, to mediate the conflict that arise among the nations—among the polis. Therefore, we could argue that for Kantian cosmopolitanism, the interest to build cosmos-level institution is actually reflecting the interest of the polis to overcome conflict among themselves. Since the polis is only interested in managing war, the world federation therefore is only equipped with the authority that support it to manage the war. We could interpret this position as an effort of the polis to maintain its sovereignty and thus make a distinction between cosmos and polis remains clear. Derridean cosmopolitanism has a different standpoint compared to Kantian cosmopolitanism. Derrida’s “On Cosmopolitanism”—which is written in the midst of massive discrimination against immigrant in France—tends to prioritize the cosmos above the polis. Derrida argues for a law that can maintain a preservation of humanity: that is a law that can encourage all nations in this world to receive their guest without hostility. Derrida also tends to be suspicious with any a priori conceptions—such as nationalities—that will potentially lead to what Levinas called as “thematization” or Derrida as “metaphysical violence”. Those a priori concepts, for example, could lead human beings to stereotype against each other and, in the end, prohibit the possibility of a hospitable relation between the host and the guest. In short, Kantian and Derridean cosmopolitanism are prioritizing the cosmos over the polis or vice versa.

At this point, the uniqueness of Mangunwijaya’s post-nationalism/post-Indonesia becomes clear. While the discourse on cosmopolitanism is still busy in mediating the universal and the particular or the cosmos and the polis, Mangunwijaya overcomes this condition by offering a concept which obscures and deconstructs that distinction. As mentioned before, by offering the concept of post-nationalism/post-Indonesia, Mangunwijaya finally could say: to love your polis is to love the cosmos.
Conclusion
This paper uses Vijay Prashad’s book as an entry point and it will use The Darker Nations again as an exit point. After the demise of Third World solidarity, people movement across Third World nations are facing difficulties to amplify their ideas and struggle to the international level. The movements across continents and cultures become fragmented and disconnected to each other.

This paper is best read in this context. Despite of its major weakness, this paper is an effort to find a solution—on philosophical and theoretical level—to reconnect and redevelop Third World solidarity. By assessing Y.B. Mangunwijaya’s thought, this paper concludes that shallow nationalism which divides humanity could be overcame if we read our Third World experience closer and interpret it creatively—exactly as Mangunwijaya had done during his life. The relation between our polis and cosmos—between a love to our nation and a desire to make a Third World solidarity—could be rethinked and reformulated. It remains possible to imagine a united Third World that dare to struggle against global injustice. It is not an unreachable dream.

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