Not So Ambitious? Indonesia's Coal Dependence Amidst The Era of Energy Transition

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10.22146/globalsouth.81488

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Indonesia ratified the Paris Agreement to combat climate change and pledged to reduce its carbon emissions. This commitment, however, contrasts Indonesia's development plan under Joko Widodo's administration. His policy has enabled the development of additional power plants, hence perpetuating Indonesia's reliance on coal. Thus, it is essential to examine why Indonesia is still struggling to break free from its dependence on coal, despite its ambitious goal to tackle climate change. This paper will apply the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory to explore how security is defined and shapes Indonesia's energy transition process. Furthermore, this research will use distributive and procedural justice theory to examine the decision-making process and climate change policy implementation. In order to accomplish so, we will employ qualitative methods such as desk studies, which will comprise academic literature as well as government statements and regulations. This paper argues that Indonesia's energy transition is impeded by how other security issues are prioritised above climate change. In addition, the lack of justice principles in the climate policy formulation and implementation has contributed to Indonesia's reliance on coal. Since Indonesia is the world's largest coal exporter and one of the top ten global polluters, this study intends to contribute to identifying challenges in the transition to renewable energy.

Keywords: *Indonesia; coal dependence; energy transition; securitisation; distributive and procedural justice*

Introduction

To combat climate change, Indonesia, under the administration of President Yudhoyono, ratified the Paris Agreement and pledged to reduce its carbon emissions by 26% from the business-as-usual level and 41% under the condition of international assistance by 2030 (Soesilo, 2014). This commitment is further enhanced under President Joko Widodo "Jokowi", who has targeted emission reduction by 29% of the business-as-usual scenario and has shown his willingness to lead in climate protection on multilateral forums. Forestry and the energy sector are the two highest Indonesian emission contributors (Elliot & Setyowati, 2020). Thus, Indonesia has targeted a reduction of 17% in forestry and 11% in the energy sector (UU No. 16/2016). However, domestic energy demands have risen as the Indonesian economy is constantly growing, followed by population growth and rising living standards (Fünfgeld, 2020). This means the energy sector will soon be the most significant car-

bon emissions source.

Historically, Indonesia has relied on coal to fulfil its domestic energy demand and coal-fired power plants are seen as the cheapest means to supply electricity (Ordonez et al., 2021). This reliance on coal is perpetuated under Jokowi's development plan that aims to build 35.000 MegaWatt (MW) of power plants, of which 25.000 MW are from coal (Detik Finance, 2015). The increase of coal-fired power plant (PLTU) construction contrasts with Indonesia's commitment, further destructing the environment, leading to land conflicts, and even increasing the impoverishment of the already marginalised community. This raises the question of how Indonesia will balance its development plan with its commitment to transform its energy sector into renewable energy to achieve its environmental targets.

The fact that transforming the energy system is very complex, comprising the elements of science and technology, social, political, economic, and environmental, also poses challenges for governments or stakeholders to implement the program. This complexity is mainly experienced by developing countries like Indonesia, which still need significant assistance in funds, technology, and knowledge to support the progress of the energy transition. Indonesia also faces a geographical challenge with uneven potential for renewable energy resources and population distribution.

Moreover, the complexity also comes from the uncertainty of international politics, making developing countries vulnerable. For instance, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 brought the whole world into shock, slowing down economic activities and disrupting the energy transition agenda since the government needs to prioritise the health and socioeconomic sectors first (Wahyuni, 2022). The world is recovering from the pandemic, and many countries, including Indonesia, are trying to bounce back the economy; thus, energy demand is projected to rise significantly to support global development (Wahyuni, 2022). Furthermore, the dynamics at the domestic level also exacerbate the government's effort to break free from the coal industry. These dynamics include many interests in the coal industry from lobby groups and oligarchs shaping energy security in Indonesia.

Hence, in this research paper, we would like to explore and examine Indonesia's commitment to energy transition and its dependence on coal from the perspective of securitisation. We argue that Indonesia's energy and development policy is different from its commitment to cut down emissions from the energy sectors because the pro-coal discourses dominate the securitisation of energy and have shaped Indonesia's energy dynamics. While the government justifies that coal is more beneficial than other energy sources, civil society discourse offers different perspectives which reveal injustices due to coal dependence.

Theoretical Framework

This study applies the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory to comprehend how Indonesia constructs its energy security, which is strongly related to Indone-

sia's progress in its energy transition and efforts to tackle climate change. Securitisation theory argues that security is socially constructed through discursive practices. Instead of focusing on security, it focuses on how a problem becomes or is transformed into a security threat (Hough et al., 2015). In order to construct a shared social understanding of threats, securitisation theory, therefore, places a strong emphasis on process. Hence, when an issue is understood as "*posing an existential threat, [it opens] the way for the state to mobilise…… or to use whatsoever means are necessary to block the threatening development*" (Buzan et al., 1998, as cited in Hough et al., 2015). According to securitisation theory, constructing a threat is done through speech acts, in which elites declare a problem a security issue. This speech act should be followed by the audience's acceptance that the issue is essential.

Energy security rhetoric is frequently used to frame the building of coal-fired power plants as part of the development agenda. Unfortunately, as previously indicated, this narrative only marginalises climate change as a security issue. Therefore, the application of securitisation theory in this research is intended to understand how the concept of energy security shapes Indonesia's energy and development policy and becomes prioritised over climate change policy.

Research Methodology

This paper utilises a qualitative approach to provide a comprehensive elaboration of ideas behind the making of policy regarding expanding the coal-fired power plants or development plan established under Joko Widodo's administration that perpetuates Indonesia's reliance on coal despite the demand for renewable energy. The method used to collect data in this research is desk studies. We obtain information from secondary resources such as academic literature reviews, articles, and journals, as well as government reports, statements, and regulations. Moreover, we get deeper into discussions and conversations on the current state of Indonesia's energy transition by analysing news reports, statements, and research findings from grassroots and NGOs. Then, we analyse the data that mainly discuss energy transition, coal dependence and the effort to shift energy use in Indonesia to examine the commitment and challenges of energy transition from the perspective of securitisation.

The Securitisation of Indonesia's Energy Sector

The energy sector is the second largest contributor to carbon emissions in Indonesia. As more coal-fired power plants have been built under the Jokowi administration, the government's commitment to the carbon reduction target is viewed as purely symbolic. Unfortunately, coal-fired power plants are responsible for up to 97,22% of Indonesia's energy sector's overall emissions (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Republic Indonesia, 2019). The government frequently uses the rhetoric of energy security behind its infrastructure or development policy. Thus, it is crucial to comprehend how the energy sector is "securitised" and how this affects the government's decisions to build more power plants.

For Indonesia, being energy secured means being energy independent. According to the former Minister of Defence of the Yudhoyono administration, Purnomo Yusgiantoro, energy independence consists of the ability to respond to the dynamics of global energy changes and the ability to ensure the availability of energy at home at reasonable prices (Ministry of Defence of Republic Indonesia, 2012). This view is also adopted by the current government, which is reflected through the National Energy General Plan (*Rencana Umum Energi Nasional*/NEGP), which stresses the paradigm of energy resources as domestic development capital to achieve energy independence (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Republic Indonesia, 2017). This unusual position is corroborated by the belief that the country has abundant natural resources, especially coal.

Indonesia now plays a central role as the world's biggest coal exporter (Esterman, 2021). In 2015, Indonesia produced a total of 461,6 million tons which 79,3% was exported while only 20,7% was supplied to the domestic market and mostly directed toward power plants (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Republic Indonesia, 2017). In 2021, according to the Special Staff of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Irwandy Arif, Indonesia's coal reserves are still abundant, reaching 38.8 billion tons (Liputan6.com, 2021). As a result, coal is put at the centre of energy security, and it creates a sense of urgency for the government to maximise the use of coal for domestic needs considering the uncertainty about global markets and the fact that too many exports will threaten Indonesia's energy supply and self-sufficiency. Within the previously mentioned paradigm, coal is thus seen as an essential national energy resource for domestic economic development. In other words, the abundant domestic supply of coal is the cheapest and the most affordable option to foster national economic development compared to the alternatives. This is one of the significant factors in Indonesia's dependency on coal.

This paper analyses the Joko Widodo (Jokowi) administration's development policy to see how this plays out. We found that to maximise the domestic use of coal; the Jokowi administration has released The Mid-term National Development Plan 2015-2019 (RPJMN 2015-2019) that elaborates the government plan to build 35,000 MW power plants, of which 25,000 MW are from coal (Ministry of National Development Planning of the Republic of Indonesia, 2015). This development program is necessary since economic growth and electricity demand are predicted to increase over time. Furthermore, this ambitious development project also intends to make electricity more accessible for rural communities. The rural electrification program has set targets of 97.35% electrification by 2019 and 100% by 2024 (Ordonez et al., 2021). This phenomenon correlates with the findings presented by Kim & Yoo (2016) about coal consumption and economic growth in Indonesia, in which they found that economic growth stimulates coal consumption—the increase in GDP will increase coal consumption.

Furthermore, they also found that among many factors, coal consumption in Indonesia also leads to a high GDP (Kim & Yoo, 2016). This explains the government's rationale for its RPJMN 2015-2019. Due to the belief that the coal supply is abundant and is the cheapest means to supply electricity compared to renewable energy, Indonesia heavily relies on coal as its energy-development capital.

The reliance can also be seen in the speech act of government officials. Luhut Binsar Panjaitan, Indonesian Coordinating Minister of Maritime and Investment Affairs, during a pers conference regarding Just Energy Transition Partnership:

"We believe that we must not sacrifice our economic development, but we must also build a more sustainable economy for future generations." (Wahyudi, 2022)

The speech act presented economic development as the main priority above energy transition. In this sense, Indonesian coal dependence is inevitable to maintain and accelerate economic development. Hence, it is understandable when the Indonesian government emphasises maintaining economic growth more than energy transition.

This dynamic of securitising the energy sector for development needs hinders Indonesia's effort to reduce carbon emissions. Suppose we observe the speech act from the government to reduce carbon emissions in the coal sector, compared to the urgency to maximise it. In that case, the government does not mention coal and the development of coal-fired power plants in its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) (Atteridge et al., 2018). Emission reduction mainly focuses on forestry and land-use issues by tackling deforestation.

Furthermore, in the proposed new and renewable energy bill (RUU EBT), new energy, which includes energy sources derived from the processing of fossil fuels using modern technology, is frequently regulated alongside renewable energy. For instance, coal gasification, coal liquefaction, and coal bed methane are new energy sources. Developing these energy sources may be detrimental because it diverts attention away from completely developing renewable energy while reducing low carbon emissions (Anindarini, 2020.).

The government recently pledged that no new coal-fired power facilities will be built between 2021 and 2030. However, they will continue to operate coal-fired power facilities that have begun construction or have reached a financial close (Umah, 2021). According to Greenpeace Indonesia, this choice could hinder the growth of renewable energy sources and result in significant carbon emissions while the power plant is still operating (Intan, 2022a). It could complicate efforts to comply with the Paris Agreement because research indicates that Indonesia's emissions should peak by 2025 (Institute for Essential Services Reform, 2021).

Moreover, the government is focusing more on attracting investment as a financial source for energy transition (Merdeka.com, 2022) because, without financial assistance, Indonesia's progress in transforming into renewable energy will be stagnant. The lack of international climate financing is a factor in

Indonesia's slow adoption of renewable energy. This can be seen from the speech act of the government officials. The administration has frequently stated the necessity for a considerable amount of money to shut down fossil fuel facilities and build the infrastructure for renewable energy sources. Luhut explained that Indonesia is ready to reduce its carbon emissions between 41% and 50%, but with a condition: Indonesia receives enough international funding (Primadhyta, 2021). The Indonesian Fiscal Policy Agency estimates that Indonesia requires Rp266.2 trillion annually to combat climate change but has only raised Rp89.6 trillion, or 34% (Ministry of Finance of Republic Indonesia, 2022). The government uses this speech act to emphasise that energy transition is costly and needs the budget to move from coal with funding from other sources.

But why is there a lack of climate financing? The main problem is a disparity between Global North commitments and financial transfer realisation. At the COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, rich nations promised to contribute $100 billion annually by 2020. (Kinley, 2016). This pledge was emphasised throughout the Paris Agreement.

Nevertheless, the goal still needs to be met. The total amount of the climate fund in 2018 was US$78.9 billion (OECD, 2020). Many developed countries boosted their climate finance commitments at COP 26 in Glasgow, even though countries such as the United States continue to fall short of their historical duty for emissions (Mitchell, 2021). However, there are a few things to remember regarding the climate fund. First, a large portion of the prior support came in the form of non-concessional loans and other non-grant instruments, increasing the debt of developing nations (Carty *et al.*, 2020). Second, developing countries will require as much climate money as feasible because funding will be allocated to different countries and challenges, such as mitigation and adaptation. The latter is essential for least-developed nations, which have already experienced a climate catastrophe and require immediate financial assistance (Carty *et al.*, 2020).

The lack of funding from international actors stems from the need for more justice in the international climate regime. Throughout the years, justice has emerged as one of the most critical factors to consider when developing global climate policy. This approach is driven by climate change predominantly triggered by wealthy nations while disproportionately hurting developing countries. According to Hickel (2020), the Global North—the United States, the G8 nations, and other industrialised nations—controls 92% of the world's excess carbon dioxide emissions. Hickel (2020) examined whether the national fair portions of the carbon budget were consistent with the planetary boundaries of 350 ppm using cumulative carbon dioxide emissions data from 1850 to 2015. This method demonstrated how the Global North bears greater responsibility for the climate crisis and, as a result, should assist the Global South in dealing with climate catastrophes in their countries.

This justice aspect is the background of the speech act by President Jokowi during the S20 High-Level Policy Webinar on Just

Energy Transition, which was held as part of Indonesia's G20 Presidency. He stated that countries with heavy burdens should be assisted, while countries with stronger capacities should aid other countries (Primadhyta, 2022). This speech act echoes the narratives usually used by Global South countries regarding energy transition. Global South countries–including Indonesia–call for just transition by highlighting the barriers, especially funding problems, that they face. Without help from international donors, it is difficult for them to transition their energy. Hence, the government tries to justify the status quo by appealing to the justice aspect of international funding.

To sum up, this section has discussed the concept of Indonesian energy security. We found that the Indonesian government is securitising energy due to economic considerations. In this case, Indonesia's economic growth will increase domestic energy needs. Thus, energy resource needs to be securitised due to the potential threat of insufficient energy resources to fulfil domestic needs. Consequently, the government suggests reducing coal exports and redirecting the use of coal towards the economic development agenda to meet the rising domestic energy demands. The justification for this decision is the belief that Indonesia has an abundant supply of cheap and affordable coal. Furthermore, Indonesia's lack of financial capability has also justified the perpetuation of the use of coal.

Discursive Struggle: Coal Dynamics in Indonesia

While the government argues in favour of coal's advantages over other energy sources, civil society discourse highlights various perspectives that expose the injustices resulting from dependence on coal. The Indonesian government believes that coal is seen as necessary for economic growth. Establishing coal power plants has also reduced local communities' income opportunities. According to Fünfgeld (2019), the proximity to coal mines has detrimental effects on crop yields and fish breeding, as it destroys farmland (sometimes through mudding), pollution of fish ponds, and water contamination. Moreover, the presence of large coastal areas designated for power plants also poses a threat to fishing communities, as they are restricted from accessing their traditional fishing grounds and experience altered water temperatures due to the cooling systems of the power plants.

Consequently, there is a decrease in the availability of fish in the area, which significantly impacts small-scale fishers who rely on shoreline fishing and seafood collection. Additionally, in the same community in West Java, the operation of the power plant has forced many salt-makers to cease production, causing a decline in their income (Fünfgeld, 2019). This aligns with Greenpeace Indonesia's findings in 2014 which state that coal development carries a trail of environmental destruction and local communities get little economic benefits (Greenpeace Indonesia, 2014).

At the same time, grassroots or community perspectives offer a contrasting outlook from the government's. They contend that the government's commitment to

advancing renewable energy in Indonesia needs to be improved, as evidenced by their continued operation of coal-based power plants until 2050. The proponents of energy transition in Indonesia also recognise the challenges that hinder the advancement of energy transition; lack of funding is one of them. However, Dila, a Climate and Energy Campaign Researcher at Greenpeace Indonesia, stated that the government's efforts to find support or alternative financing to develop renewable energy are still not optimal (Intan, 2022b). She argues that this is in contrast to the government's efforts in seeking funds and establishing a legal basis for the creation of a Sovereign Wealth Fund for the Ibu Kota Nusantara (IKN) or the Indonesian capital city project (Intan, 2022b).

On the other hand, the operation of coal-fired power plants is detrimental to the community because besides polluting the land—which serves as their livelihood, as mentioned above—the construction of power plants also negatively impacts public health. Data from Climate Council (2023) found that not only does coal contribute to greenhouse gas emissions, but coal combustion also releases harmful substances into the air, water, and land, posing risks to the health of miners, workers, and neighbouring communities. The harmful substance released in coal ash contains heavy metals, such as mercury, arsenic, and lead (Gokkon, 2021). A report from Greenpeace Indonesia estimates that coal power could harm the lives of 15.700 people every year in Indonesia (Greenpeace Indonesia, 2015).

Thus, it can be argued that energy exploitation in Indonesia has resulted in various injustices suffered by local communities, ranging from environmental destruction to health risks. Some cases have gained national coverage and public support, but only minimal reparative measures have been undertaken (Sekaringtias et al., 2023). This has caused certain community members to express their powerlessness compared to the influential energy institutions in Indonesia (Sekaringtias et al., 2023). Because when the local communities protest, they are frequently subjected to threats from both private and public entities, and in some cases, even criminalised by the government (Fünfgeld, 2019).

For example, in 2020, residents in Mekarsari Village, Indramayu, faced criminalisation for opposing a coal-fired power plant in their area as a struggle to live without coal smoke. The cases include criminal violence, desecration of the state flag, and land tenure issues, seen as attempts to silence the community (Rachmawati, 2020). While there are legal umbrellas for the community to object when their livelihoods and living space will be taken away, these cases are considered a means to suppress the voices of the community. Additionally, in 2023, a land conflict in South Kalimantan between a coal company and a landowner who protested by blocking the road tragically resulted in losing the landowner's life. The victim, Sabriansyah, an older man, lost his life by being slashed with a sharp weapon and shot in the head (Kurniawan, 2023). It was allegedly caused by PT Jaya Guna Abadi (JGA), who reportedly ordered beatings accompanied by shootings resulting in the victim's death (Kurniawan,

2023). In that case, the local police officers will summon the coal mining company for further investigation and have already arrested four suspected perpetrators (CNN Indonesia, 2023). The worst thing is that PT JGA is not even registered in the Lembaga Pengembangan Jasa Konstruksi (LPJK) or the construction development agency under the Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing. Also, it does not have a construction business entity certificate, which is vital for the company's legal basis for running a business (Micko, 2023). Therefore, it may provoke a question regarding the government's role in supervising the land concession and the government's actor who granted the permission. More importantly, this case also raises questions about the government's role in protecting the rights of citizens.

It can be argued that these cases reflect the absence of public participation in Indonesia's coal dynamics decision-making process. For instance, Walhi West Java discovered several irregularities in the construction plan of the Indramayu 2 Power Plant, including the need for more community involvement in the planning and formulation of licensing documents (Rachmawati, 2020). Therefore, it can be learned that discourses of energy security coming from local communities and NGOs are calling for an energy transition as a means to ensure social and economic prosperity for all that stems from inclusivity and equality, in which marginalised communities can participate in the decision-making processes and advocates their interests. In other words, it can be concluded that local communities and NGOs are calling for the government to stop the construction of more power plants and invest more in transitioning Indonesia's energy resources. As stated by Tata Mustasya, the Head of the Climate Campaign at Greenpeace Indonesia, a day prior to the G20 Summit in Bali,

"The process and mechanism for this [energy] transition must also involve public participation, adhere to democratic principles, and be just. FOR EXAMPLE, the G20 must be a solution to accelerate the energy transition through a financing platform. There is no just and sustainable energy transition without democracy." (Greenpeace Indonesia, 2022).

However, the current energy governance in Indonesia needs to reflect those arguments. Instead, due to the lack of public participation in decision-making, political elites and lobby interests successfully create dominant discourses influencing Indonesia's current energy governance. As aforementioned, one interesting example to illustrate and highlight the need for more public participation in Indonesia's policy formulation is the RUU EBT. While according to energy experts, creating and using gasified coal generates more emissions than just burning solid coal for the same amount of energy (Jong, 2022). In addition, energy experts have slammed the idea, saying it contradicts the Indonesian government's pledge to phase out coal use at the COP-26 climate summit in Glasgow in 2021 (Jong, 2022). Allowing for such a contradiction in that bill exposes the parliament's lack of comprehension of the need for energy development in the energy transition context. It indicates a lack of

inclusivity in which opinions from certain parties with less political power are ignored.

Therefore, this paper argues that the legitimacy of the Jokowi administration's securitising move for the energy sector through coal is a complex issue because Indonesia's coal industry has been politicised for so long. Even many politicians within the current government circle have a political interest in the coal sector. This aligns with the statement made by Agus Sari, an environmental expert and lecturer at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), who stated,

"There is a strong political power which does not like the development of renewable energy in Indonesia," "They do not want to lose the opportunities of securing profits from running the non-renewables." (Krismantari, 2021).

For instance, the powerful politician and a key supporter of Jokowi, Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, who is also the Coordinating Minister of Maritime and Investment Affairs, holds significant assets in the coal mining business (Ordonez et al., 2021). Another influential figure in Indonesian politics, Aburizal Bakrie, owns the largest coal mining companies such as Bumi Resources, Kaltim Prima, and Arutmin. Furthermore, the coal sector plays a large role in elections as a source of funds or a means to attract popularity for the next election. For example, Jokowi's power plants development program and rural electrification program can be observed as means to meet his electoral promises to secure popularity for the 2019 election (Mietzner, 2015). Moreover, by imposing a price cap on fossil fuels, the government artificially keeps their prices low, posing a challenge for renewable energy producers to compete.

Consequently, this leads people to believe that specific influential entities with political power are against the progress of renewable energy in Indonesia because it could potentially disrupt their business interests. Thus, the coal dynamic in Indonesia—the rhetoric of energy security that leads to the decision to build more coal-fired power plants is being legitimised by and serving the lobby's interest in the coal industry. Thus, It is understandable how coal's role in Indonesia's energy security becomes dominant and weakens the government's commitment to energy transition.

Another critical factor that significantly influences Indonesia's energy policy is the state-owned electricity company, PT Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN). PLN has a role in shaping the future coal demand and, with its significant political power, has actively opposed the suggestions for expanding renewable energy (Atteridge et al., 2018). Atteridge et al. (2018) reflect this on the delay of the National General Energy Plan that was caused by the incompatibility between the plan's target share of renewables (23% by 2025) with the target in PLN's Electricity Supply Business Plan or RUPTL (less than 15% by 2025). Furthermore, PLN needs help regarding higher operational costs in transitioning to renewable energy. Therefore, PLN favours coal more than renewable energy as a source of running electricity.

This section highlights the contradiction between the Indonesian government's

justification for using coal and its harmful impacts on local communities, the environment, and health. The cases of criminalisation and violence against communities who oppose coal development further demonstrate the lack of public involvement and protection of citizens' rights. It undermines the government's commitment to renewable energy and marginalises the voices advocating for change. It also implies that the process of securitising is mainly done by the policymakers and, with the influence of the interested entities, through the government's National Development Plan, the National Energy Plan, and the government's official statement. In short, policymakers are trying to convince others that coal is central to Indonesia's energy security. Ironically, however, putting coal as the centre of energy self-sufficiency means that Indonesia will depend on coal in the long run. As a result, the call for Indonesia to prioritise renewable energy and move away from coal continues to face challenges.

Conclusion

Indonesia's commitment to transition its energy into renewables needs to be more ambitious, given that coal is still to become the primary energy source in the following years ahead, and renewable energy remains challenging to be developed. This paper has found that pro-coal discourses advocated mainly by the political elites and business interests successfully dominate Indonesia's energy dynamics, shaping Indonesia's concept of energy security, overshadowing other discourses that highlight many injustices local communities face and thus perpetuating Indonesia's reliance on coal. By entering discussions and conversations on energy dynamics from both political elites and grassroots communities, specifically regarding the current state of Indonesia's energy transition, we offer novelty in understanding the interplay between the discourses of those two entities. In this regard, power relations have played a crucial role in defining the interaction between the two camps of discourse–the entity closer to the political circle is the more powerful one. It has the privilege of influencing the securitisation of Indonesia's energy. When in fact, grassroots communities' discourses represent reality more accurately.

Opening more room for public participation, especially for the marginalised and vulnerable groups, is important to break away from coal dependency and ensure Indonesia's just energy transition. In this case, transitioning energy into renewables should take a holistic approach–not only about reducing carbon emissions but also ensuring that the rights of the people to prosperity and equality are guaranteed. This paper has discussed the impact of Indonesia's coal dependence on the community according to the NGO's findings. Departing on that fact, further research can analyse deeper what just transitions should be for those marginalised communities taking into account social, economic, and equality aspects–which lies beyond the scope of this paper. Discussing this matter is important to build a solid foundation and direction for Indonesia's energy transition.

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