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Global South Review is an academic journal published by Institute of International Studies on behalf of the Department of International Relations Universitas Gadjah Mada dedicated to provide academic and policy platform to exchange views, research findings, and dialogues within the Global South and between the Global North and the Global South. The Journal is designed to be a media to examine all the issues encountered by Global South in the context of current international justice, security, and order. Issued twice a year every June and December, contributors of the Journal are open for those who share concern on south – south cooperation.

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The editorial board of Global South Review would like to express our utmost gratitude to all the peer reviewers that participated in this edition's articles review process.

Editor's Note

Mohtar Mas'oed
Suci Lestari Yuana

We are delighted to present the latest issue of Global South Review, featuring a collection of scholarly articles that delve into significant international issues through the lens of the Global South. These articles not only provide unique insights into specific topics but also demonstrate the interconnectedness of global dynamics and the collective experiences of Global South countries. Through diverse research methodologies and theoretical frameworks, these articles shed light on the complexities, challenges, and responses of Global South nations in a rapidly changing world.

One overarching theme that emerges from these articles is the critical role of state and non-state actors in addressing key issues. From ensuring access to education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore to navigating the multilateral response to the Russo-Ukraine crisis, the involvement and collaboration of various actors are essential in shaping outcomes and achieving common goals. These articles emphasize the importance of multi-track diplomacy, shared values, and humanitarianism in forging partnerships and generating positive responses from governments and institutions.

Moreover, these articles highlight the nuances of the Global South's perspectives, interests, and actions within the international arena. While the Global South is diverse and encompasses a wide range of nations, common threads emerge in their responses to global challenges. These include a cautious approach, an emphasis on historical experiences and differing international societies, and a commitment to preserving national sovereignty. The Global South's reactions to conflicts, such as the Russo-Ukraine war, reveal a complex interplay of factors shaped by their unique historical and geopolitical contexts.

In the article titled "The Effort of State and Non-State Actors in Ensuring Access to Primary and Secondary Education for Indonesian Citizens in Singapore" by Diah Ayu Wulandari, the author addresses the pressing issue of access to education for Indonesian citizens residing in Singapore. By examining the policy framework of Singapore's Ministry of Education and the challenges faced by international students, particularly in terms of prioritization and costly fees, the research highlights the crucial role of both state and non-state actors in ensuring equitable access to quality primary and secondary education. Through an amalgamation of qualitative research methods, including interviews and a literature review, the study sheds light on the establishment of multi-track diplomacy involving the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore, Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises, professionals, entrepreneurs, and college students. The collaborative efforts and shared values of humanitarianism have received positive responses from Singaporean government agencies and educational institutions, signifying a step toward enhancing the quality of education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore. The study emphasizes the significance of recognizing and promoting shared values, such as solidarity, humanitarianism, and fostering cooperation between state and non-state actors to address educational disparities and support the educational aspirations of Global South populations.

We received three articles investigating the Global South dynamic in response to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine. First. the article "Global South Perspective on the Threat to Multilateralism in G20 Post-Russia's Invasion of Ukraine" by Maudy Noord Fadhlia and Azza Bimantara, this article sheds light on the intricate dynamics of solidarity within the Global South in the context of political conflicts. The authors delve into the implications of the Russo-Ukraine conflict on multilateralism within the G20. Drawing upon qualitative research methods and discourse analysis, the study examines the divergent responses of Global South countries vis-à-vis the Western narrative promoted by G7 members. While the West rallied for support in condemning Russia, many Global South nations exhibited a more cautious and neutral stance, emphasizing their own historical experiences and differing international society. Through an exploration of the complexities and power dynamics within the G20, this research provides valuable insights into the challenges facing multilateralism and the battle of narratives among diverse actors within this global forum.

Second, the article titled "The Distinction Between BRICS and G7 in Responding to the Ukraine-Russia Crisis: G20 Multilateral Crisis?" authored by Ica Cahayani, Ahmad Mujaddid Fachrurreza, and Agata Nina Puspita, also analyzes the contrasting responses of BRICS and G7 countries to the Ukraine-Russia crisis. Employing interest-based theory and discourse analysis, the study examines the intricacies of trading relations and varying interests within the G20. The research reveals the complexities of consensus and compliance within the G20 framework, particularly in addressing global issues such as the food crisis resulting from the Ukrainian conflict. By shedding light on the dynamics between the BRICS and G7 nations, this article contributes to a deeper understanding of the challenges and potential crises facing multilateralism within the G20.

Third, the article "The Perilous Road Towards World Society (?): Global South in The Russo-Ukraine War" by Diandra Ayu Larasati offers a nuanced exploration of the Global South's response to the Russo-Ukraine war. Drawing upon the English School perspective and employing qualitative research methods, the author examines the lukewarm reactions exhibited by most Global South states toward the conflict. The research uncovers a perceived detachment of the conflict from the international society of the Global South, which has distinct models of interaction shaped by historical events unrelated to Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, the article highlights shared norms and values among Global South countries that oppose interventionist policies advocated by the Global North. Through this analysis, the study underscores the complexities surrounding the notion of "World Society" and emphasizes the continued importance placed on the principle of nation-state sovereignty by Global South nations.

The findings from these 3 articles contribute to our understanding of how political issues can disrupt solidarity and cooperation among Global South countries. Despite their shared history of military aggressions and occupations, the Global South nations in this context choose to maintain a more neutral stance, prioritizing their own national interests and relationships with superpowers. This demonstrates the delicate balancing act that Global South countries navigate in the face of political conflicts, considering their unique contexts and aspirations. These articles enriches our understanding of the Global South's perspectives and responses to geopolitical challenges. It underscores the importance of recognizing the diversity of viewpoints and interests within the Global South and the need to foster inclusive dialogue and cooperation. The study also highlights the significance of narratives in shaping the dynamics of multilateral forums such as the G20.

Finally, the article titled "Narrative Policy Framework (NFP) Electronic System Operator Policy: Surveillance and Cyber Security" by Ambar Alimatur Rosyidah and Farah Fajriyah explores the political dynamics of technology within the Global South context. This study examines the implementation of the Minister of Communication and Information Technology's policy in Indonesia regarding Private Electronic Systems (ESO) to achieve digital sovereignty. The policy has received negative public sentiments due to concerns about its impact on human rights and freedom of information. This qualitative study aims to understand the narrative of digital sovereignty constructed by Kominfo (the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology) within the ESO policy and explores strategies to reinforce that narrative. The research applies the Narrative Policy Framework (NFP) and collects data from reliable online sources, including the official Kominfo website, online media, and press conference videos. Agency Theory is employed to analyze the relationship between the Indonesian people as principals and Kominfo as their agent in implementing ESO policies. This study about ESO adds to our knowledge of the political dynamics of technology in the Global South and offers insights for policymakers, scholars, and stakeholders involved in shaping technology policies. It underscores the importance of aligning economic narratives with the goals of digital sovereignty and advocates for co-regulation to strengthen the narrative and address potential concerns related to human rights and freedom of information.

Overall, a key takeaway from these articles is the ongoing struggle for multilateralism within global institutions like the G20. The complexities and divergent interests among member countries pose challenges to achieving consensus and addressing global issues effectively. The articles highlight the potential crises and the battle of narratives that arise from differing perspectives and responses within these multilateral frameworks. They also underscore the importance of understanding the power dynamics and trading relations between different groups, such as BRICS and G7, in shaping multilateral outcomes.

Lastly, these articles emphasize the significance of the Global South's voice in shaping global discourse and decision-making. They challenge dominant narratives and offer alternative perspectives that reflect the diverse experiences and interests of Global South nations. The Global South's insistence on preserving its own international society, while engaging in the global arena, reinforces the importance of recognizing and valuing the unique contributions of these nations.

We express our gratitude to the authors for their insightful contributions and to the reviewers for their valuable feedback. It is our hope that this issue fosters further academic dialogue, inspires new research endeavours, and advances knowledge in the field of Global South studies.

Sincerely,
Mohtar Mas'oed - Editor in Chief
Suci Lestari Yuana - Managing Editor

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The Effort of State and Non-State Actors in Ensuring Access to Primary and Secondary Education for Indonesian Citizens in Singapore

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Singapore's Ministry of Education (MOE) policy in the Singapore local schools admission that places international students as the last priority after Singapore citizens and Permanent Residents, coupled with the expensive school fees for international students are the main problems in accessing primary and secondary education faced by Indonesian citizens in Singapore. Efforts from various parties are needed to ensure the fulfillment of access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian Citizens in Singapore. This research explores state and non-state actors' efforts to ensure access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore. Data collection was obtained through interviews and a literature review. This research shows that multi-track diplomacy is established between state actors consisting of the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore and Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises as representative of track 1, and non-state actors consist of professionals (track 2), entrepreneurs (track 3), and college students (track 5). The multi-track diplomacy is reflected in the establishment of Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. and Pusat Kegiatan Belajar Masyarakat (PKBM) KBRI Singapura. The multi-track diplomacy is established because of shared values of humanitarianism. The collaboration of multi-track diplomacy and the spirit of humanitarianism has received positive responses from Singapore Government agencies and educational institutions, which aim to improve the quality of education at Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. and PKBM KBRI Singapura.

Keywords: *primary and secondary education; state actor; non-state actor; multi-track diplomacy; humanitarianism*

Introduction

Access to primary and secondary education is a basic need for every citizen. It even applies to citizens outside the country. The Indonesian Ambassador to Singapore states that Indonesian citizens living in Singapore in 2017 are around 216.000 people (Salim, 2017). Due to the large number of Indonesian citizens living in Singapore, access to primary and secondary education is essential for the citizens.

The effort to ensure access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore is carried out collaboratively by state and non-state actors representing multi-track diplomacy. Through multi-track diplomacy, the authority held by state actors collaborates with the capacity of non-state actors into an effective combination in ensuring access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore. The collaboration emerged because of shared values regarding the importance of humanitarianism.

Meanwhile, Singapore's school entrance selection system for primary and secondary education, enforced by the Ministry of Education (MOE) Singapore, places Singaporean citizens as the main priority, permanent residency as the second priority, and international students as the last priority. Furthermore, international students get a more expensive tuition fee than Singaporean citizens and permanent residents (Ministry of Education, 2021).

The Indonesian Embassy in Singapore needs to conduct diplomacy with the Singapore Government to guarantee access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore. The contribution of non-state actors is needed for the efficiency of the efforts made by the state actors and to find solutions that cannot be fulfilled.

The role of non-state actors in ensuring access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore can be carried out by various groups, ranging from students and people in business to professionals. Various efforts made by non-state actors are essentially a representation of other tracks outside track 1 in multi-track diplomacy.

Previously, several studies have been conducted concerning the effort made by the government to ensure education access for Indonesian citizens living abroad. First, Yuliandri and Muslim (2016) identified the role of the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore in protecting Indonesian Migrant Workers in Singapore. The study results show that the Indonesian government determines salary standards, quality of life standards, and legal regulations with related agencies. Another study by Murtadlo (2018) found that education services facilitated by the Government of Indonesia for Indonesian citizens abroad include formal and non-formal education.

Lastly, a study conducted by Dewi (2018) shows the Indonesian government's strategy for solving the education problems for Indonesian living abroad covers three things, namely establishing cooperation with the Ministry of Education regarding school operations, cooperation with the local education ministry, and establishing cooperation with the Indonesian diaspora in the country.

According to the evaluation of the literature review that has been done, this study is dedicated to filling in the gaps that have yet to be extensively covered in earlier studies. The focus of prior studies has been on the government's role in addressing the issues faced by Indonesian living abroad, as well as the challenges faced by the government in resolving these issues. Although there has been research that examines the educational issues faced by Indonesian living abroad, only some have chosen Singapore as a location for their studies. Despite Singapore being one of the primary destinations for Indonesian migrant workers, making access to education is an essential need.

Given that Singapore is known for its high-quality education and the selection system in Singapore's local schools that puts international students as the last priority after Singaporean citizens and permanent residents, the study done by the author is crucial to understand in detail the educational issues faced by Indonesian citizens in Singapore and the efforts of state and non-state actors in ensuring the access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore.

This study can be used as a reflection regarding the Indonesian government's policies for Indonesian citizens abroad. In the educational sector, the problems faced are nearly the same. The finding of the studies can be used as a reflection regarding the focus on improving education services in countries where Indonesian citizens live. It should be emphasized that the Government of Indonesia has built a Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. to accommodate Indonesian citizens living abroad to achieve education.

Methodology

This research was conducted using the qualitative method. Using the qualitative method enables the researchers to explore, describe and explain a social phenomenon (Leavy, 2017). The authors discuss the collaboration between state and non-state actors in ensuring access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian Citizens in Singapore. This method was chosen to fit the need for the analysis of the multi-track diplomacy and humanitarianism used in the research. To answer the research question, the author used the literature review and interview approach with the Education and Culture Attache of the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore, the headmaster of Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd., and the Practice Field Experience students as the informant.

Theoretical Framework

Multi-track diplomacy, foreign policy, and humanitarianism were used in the research. Multi-track diplomacy deeply elaborates on the collaboration between state and non-state actors in ensuring access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore. Foreign policy is used to analyze the response of the Government of Indonesia to the obstacles faced by Indonesian citizens in Singapore in accessing primary and secondary education. Furthermore, humanitarianism is used to analyze the motivation of the efforts made by non-state actors in ensuring access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore.

Multi-Track Diplomacy

The central concept used in this research is multi-track diplomacy. Multi-track diplomacy is a concept of diplomacy that explains the process of world peace in international relations, which is established through a combination of government diplomacy, group diplomacy, and individual diplomacy. Multi-track diplomacy involves all aspects of mediation, from the most basic level of citizens to the highest level of the state (Diamond & McDonald, 1996).

Figure 1. The Tracks in Multi-Track Diplomacy



Source: Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy

In addition to the efforts made by the Government of Indonesia as a Track 1 representative, collaboration from other tracks is needed to increase the efficiency of the efforts carried out by Track 1. Collaborations from state and non-state actors are needed to maximize the efforts in ensuring access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore.

Foreign Policy

To analyze various discussions in this research, the concept of foreign policy is used to analyze the efforts made by state actors in ensuring access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore. Foreign policy is a strategy or plan of action made by state decision-makers in dealing with other countries or other international political units in the terminology of national interests (Plano & Olton, 1999).

All efforts made by state and non-state actors in Singapore must be in accordance with the foreign policy determined by the Government of Indonesia and the Government of Singapore. Establishing Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. is a foreign policy implemented by the Government of Indonesia to ensure access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore.

Humanitarianism

This research uses humanitarianism to analyze the factor that encourages non-state actors to participate and collaborate with state actors in ensuring access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore. Humanitarianism is a set of beliefs, practices, categories, discourses, and procedures carried out on a humanitarian basis. Humanitarianism is not just a reaction to a crisis. Furthermore, humanitarianism is a global ethos driven by good faith to meet human needs in extraordinary or unequal circumstances (Lauri, 2020).

Qualified quality education is a right that should be accessible to all citizens. In practice, the efforts made by non-state actors in ensuring access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore are driven by a humanitarian factor. A sense of concern for others encourages non-state actors to participate and collaborate with state actors in ensuring access to education so that others can access education.

The Access to Primary and Secondary Education for Indonesian Citizens in Singapore

The Primary and Secondary Education System in Singapore

Education in Singapore is under the auspices of the Ministry of Education (MOE) Singapore. Regarding the level of education from primary to secondary, MOE Singapore distinguishes it based on age. Preschool is offered for children aged 4-6 years. Meanwhile, primary school level, primary school is offered for children aged 7 years. Primary school lasts for 6 years, starting from Primary 1 to Primary 6—lastly, secondary school. Secondary education can be completed within 4-6 years, from Secondary 1 to Secondary 5.

Singapore's education services owned by the Singapore authorities consist of local and private schools. There are three phases of admission for the primary school level (P1). Phase 1 is only for Singapore Citizens, Phase 2 is for Permanent Residents, and Phase 3 is for international students. International students can only register for P1 during Phase 3 of the P1 Registration Exercise after all Singapore Citizens and Permanent Residents have been allocated a place under the earlier phases. As for secondary schools, secondary schools in Singapore can be selected based on the interests and talents of the students concerned. The Primary School Leaving Examination (PLSE) score is vital in selecting secondary school admission.

Table 1. The School Fees at Singapore Local Schools

2023				
Level	Nationality	School Fees Per Month (SGD)	Miscellaneous Fees Per Month (SGD)	Total Fees Per Mont (SGD)
Primary	Singapore Citizen	Free	6.5	6.5
	Permanent Resident	255	6.5	261.5
	International Student (IS) ASEAN	515	6.5	521.5
	IS (Non-ASEAN)	875	6.5	881.5
Secondary	Singapore Citizen	5	10	15
	Permanent Resident	500	10	510
	IS (ASEAN)	900	10	910
	IS (Non-ASEAN)	1750	10	1760

Source: Singapore's Ministry of Education

The monthly fees include school fees and miscellaneous fees. The amount will differ based on your child's nationality and the type of school they attend. The child's nationality differs from Singapore citizens, Permanent residents, and international students. Singapore citizens get the lowest tuition fees, while international students get the most expensive tuition fees. To secure a place in a local school, international students must take the Ministry of Education-mandated Admissions Exercise for International Students (AEIS). This exam is conducted in English and taken in September or October each year. Fees for the test are around 670 SGD (485 USD) and are non-refundable (InterNations, 2019).

The Educational Problems Faced by Indonesian Citizens in Singapore and Indonesia's Foreign Policy

The excellent quality of education affects the strict admission for Singapore schools. Ministry of Education Singapore policy that takes international students as the last priority after Singapore Citizens and

Permanent Residents have been allocated a place under the earlier phases narrows the opportunity for Indonesian as international student. Furthermore, the high school fees for international students challenge Indonesian living in Singapore.

In response to MOE Singapore's policy regarding access to primary and secondary education, the Government of Indonesia established educational facilities accessible to Indonesian citizens in Singapore. The educational facilities consist of Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. and Pusat Kegiatan Belajar Masyarakat (PKBM) of the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore (KBRI Singapura).

Table 2. School Fees at Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. in 2022

Level	Admission Fees (Paid once in the first year)	School Fees (Per Month)
Primary School	SGD 500	SGD 95
Junior High School	SGD 400	SGD 145
Senior High School	SGD 400	SGD 170

Source: Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy

Regarding the school fees, Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. offers cheaper school fees than Local schools and private schools. The establishment and operation of Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. and PKBM KBRI Singapura embody track 1 in multi-track diplomacy. The Government of Indonesia owns Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. and PKBM KBRI Singapura under the auspices of the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore.

In comparison to other Sekolah Indonesia Luar Negeri (SILN), Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. and PKBM KBRI Singapura collaboration to address the educational issues for Indonesians in Singapore with the details of PKBM KBRI Singapura provides Package B and Package C Equivalency Programs for Indonesian Migrant workers in Singapore and Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. provides educational facilities from primary to high school level using Indonesian Curriculum makes it unique.

State and Non-State Actors Strategies in Ensuring Access to Primary and Secondary Education for Indonesian Citizens in Singapore

Under the multi-track diplomacy paradigm, the efforts in ensuring access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore are not only carried out by the Government of Indonesia as a track 1 representative but also carried out by other tracks such as students appointed by the university as a track 5 representative, entrepreneurs as track 3 representatives, and professionals as track 2 representatives. Furthermore, the efforts made by these non-state actors are bound by the spirit of humanitarianism. The humanitarian factor encourages non-state actors to take part in ensuring access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore.

The Efforts of the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore in Ensuring Access to Primary and Secondary Education for Indonesian Citizens in Singapore

The Indonesian Embassy in Singapore is the official representative of the Government of Indonesia in Singapore. Diplomacy between the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore and the Government of Singapore was realized by establishing Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. and the Pusat Kegiatan Belajar Masyarakat (PKBM) KBRI Singapura as a learning center for Indonesian citizens in Singapore.

Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. was established in 1969 with the opening of a kindergarten program. After that, in 1970, the Elementary School program was opened. This was followed by the opening of the Junior High School program in 1971 and the opening of the High School program in 1974. Meanwhile, PKBM KBRI Singapura, established in 2009, provides Package B and Package C Equivalency Programs for Indonesian Migrant workers in Singapore (Sekolah Indonesia Singapura, 2021).

The management of Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. and the PKBM KBRI Singapura is the existence of track 1 in multi-track diplomacy. It also shows the commitment of the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore as the state actor in ensuring access to primary and secondary education for all Indonesian citizens in Singapore. Nonetheless, the learning process at the Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. and the PKBM KBRI Singapura involves contributions from various parties from non-state actors as the manifestation of multi-track diplomacy.

Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. and PKBM KBRI Singapura received a positive response from Indonesian citizens in Singapore. In 2022, 121 students attended education at Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd., including 50 primary school students, 39 junior high school students, and 32 senior high school students. Meanwhile, at PKBM KBRI Singapura, from its inception until 2021, PKBM KBRI Singapura has graduated 282 Package B equivalency students and 38 Package C equivalency students. The 20 students out of 38 graduates have continued their education at the Universitas Terbuka. Meanwhile, the number of students attending education in 2021 has reached 98 (Sekolah Indonesia Singapura, 2021).

The Grants from State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) for Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd.

Grants provided by SOE for Indonesian Schools (Singapura) Ltd. is another form of track 1 in multi-track diplomacy. As business entities owned by the Government of Indonesia, SOEs have the duty and authority to contribute to the national interest. As an extension of the Government of Indonesia, SOE can carry out various activities to achieve national interests. Suppose the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore, through track 1 in multi-track diplomacy, can agree with the Government of Singapore to establish Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. and PKBM KBRI Singapura. In that case, SOEs can support the Indonesian Embassy's efforts by improving educational quality at Singapore's Indonesian Government's learning center.

To improve the quality of education at Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd., SOE assists in the form of grants. Bank Negara Indonesia in 2016 provided grants for purchasing and repairing infrastructure at Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. of SGD 21,800. In addition, several Indonesian SOEs in Singapore, such as Bank Indonesia, Bank Rakyat Indonesia, Bank Negara Indonesia, and Garuda Indonesia, launched KIPIN ATM for Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. KIPIN ATM is a digital technology that provides learning media in the form of various electronic books, learning videos, educational comics, and try-out questions that can be downloaded without using internet quota.

Practice Field Experience and Real Work Lectures by Indonesian Students

When the state actors such as the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore and Indonesia State-Owned Enterprises strive for access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore through track 1 in multi-track diplomacy by issuing foreign policies and conducting official diplomacy with the Singapore Government, Indonesian students with the capacity and legitimacy of the university can show their contribution in the form of teaching, training, and researching by conducting Practice Field Experience at Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. and Real Work Lecture at PKBM KBRI Singapura.

Furthermore, Practice Field Experience and Real Work Lectures conducted by students appointed as representatives from various universities in Indonesia represent track 5 in multi-track diplomacy. Practice Field Experience and Real Work Lecture in Singapore were realized because of the collaboration between universities in Indonesia and the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore. The Singapore Government approved the program through the Ministry of Manpower (MOM). The involvement of educational institutions proves the success of the fifth track in multi-track diplomacy between universities in Indonesia, the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore, and MOM Singapore.

Several universities in Indonesia, such as Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia, Universitas Negeri Semarang, Universitas Sebelas Maret, Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta, Universitas Negeri Malang, and Universitas Negeri Surabaya, supported this activity by sending their best students to carry out Practice Field Experience and Real Work Lecture at learning centers owned by the Indonesian Government in Singapore (Sekolah Indonesia Singapura, 2021).

The students must teach at Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. for three months. Meanwhile, in the Real Work Lecture program at the PKBM KBRI Singapura, students teach the Package B and Package C Equivalency Programs for Indonesian Migrant Workers and hold workshops according to the themes needed by the equality students (Indonesia's Ministry of Education and Culture, 2021). The participation of Indonesia's best students in improving the quality of teaching and education at Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. and PKBM KBRI Singapura demonstrated the commitment of students and various universities in Indonesia to show their contribution as track 5 representatives in multi-track diplomacy.

Entrepreneur's Grant for Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd.

In addition to grants from SOE, entrepreneurs from several Indonesian-owned companies with offices in Singapore agreed to provide grants for Sekolah Indonesia

(Singapura) Ltd. in the form of 60 units of Personal Computer (PC). These companies include PT. Triputra Group, PT. Barito Pacific, PT. Harum Energy, PT. Great Giant Pineapple, PT. Indosiar Visual Mandiri, PT. Mas Main Wing, PT. Cinema 21, and the Hartono Family. The computer grant handover was held on March 9, 2021, at Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. which was attended by the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore, representatives of Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd., and representatives of grant-making companies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021).

A grant provided by an Indonesian entrepreneur for Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. represents track 3 in multi-track diplomacy. The third track, multi-track diplomacy, is carried out by the business sector through various business activities and social activities carried out by business people to solve problems experienced by society (Diamond & McDonald, 1996). The entrepreneurs realize the third track in multi-track diplomacy to improve the quality of education, especially in terms of school infrastructure.

Socialization and Training from Professionals for Students and Educators at Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd.

Apart from students and entrepreneurs, professionals have also contributed to ensuring access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore. Professionals from various fields held socialization and training for educators and students at Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. This shows the successful implementation of education at Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. not only because of the success of track 1 diplomacy carried out by the Government of Indonesia. Moreover, non-state actors from various paths in multi-track diplomacy have also shown their role in realizing access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore.

Furthermore, socialization and training professionals provide for Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. represents track 2 in multi-track diplomacy. Non-state actors carry out the second track of multi-track diplomacy as professionals and act based on capacity and professionalism. The second track in multi-track diplomacy has the advantage of finding solutions to problems the government cannot reach (Diamond & McDonald, 1996).

Aiko Ishida, a Kumamoto College, Japan teacher, conducted programming training at Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. Other professionals, such as Erlangga Ariadarma Mangunkusumo, senior physician at Singapore National University Hospital and clinical lecturer at the National University of Singapore, also conducted socialization for Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. students on March 26, 2021. The socialization was related to COVID-19 and the human respiratory system considering COVID-19 transmission.

Humanitarianism, the Encouraging Factor of Non-State Actor's Effort

Different motivation encourages the strategy undertaken by state and non-state actors in ensuring access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore. When the state actors through track 1 in multi-track diplomacy are motivated by the duties and responsibilities to guarantee access to education for their citizens, non-state actors as representatives of various tracks outside track 1 in multi-track diplomacy ensure access to education due to the encouragement of humanitarianism.

Various efforts made by non-state actors, such as Indonesian students carry out Practice Field Experience at Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. and Real Work Lecture program at PKBM KBRI Singapura as a representative of track 5 in multi-track diplomacy, entrepreneurs grants for Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. as a track 3 representative in multi-track diplomacy, as well as training conducted by professionals as a track 2 representative in multi-track diplomacy driven by the spirit of humanitarianism. This was confirmed by the Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia to Singapore, H.E. Suryo Pratomo, that based on social concern, various parties have contributed to improving the quality of education at learning centers owned by the Government of Indonesia in Singapore (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021).

Based on the Overseas Development Institute report, humanitarian actions must comply with the principles of humanitarianism, namely humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence (Overseas Development Institute, 2000). In the case of the efforts made by non-state actors in ensuring access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore, humanity is reflected in the willingness of various parties to ensure access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore. The neutrality is reflected in the efforts aimed at all Indonesian citizens in Singapore, regardless of ethnicity, race, religion, place of residence, and economic level. The impartiality is reflected in the cooperation of various parties without bringing internal interests. Lastly, independence is reflected in the various efforts made by non-state actors independently without being ridden by the interests of outsiders.

Meanwhile, the United Nations (UN) Code of Conduct, signed by more than 492 aid organizations, provides a set of common standards for organizations involved in providing aid and a commitment to the four principles. The code establishes humanitarian assistance as a right to be provided to all citizens, regardless of race, creed, or nationality, without political agenda and with preserving the recipient's dignity and respect for the recipient's culture (Rybasack-Smith, 2020).

The UN Code of Conduct is under the purpose of the establishment of School Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. to provide access to primary and secondary education for all Indonesian citizens in Singapore without exception and the purpose of the establishment of PKBM KBRI Singapore to provide Package B and Package C Equivalency program for all Indonesian migrant workers in Singapore as general regardless the background of the Indonesians.

Singapore Government's Response to the Effort Made by State and Non-state Actors

Multi-track diplomacy involving the commitment from various parties to ensure access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore received positive responses from the Government of Singapore and Singapore's educational institutions. Nonetheless, some challenges must be surmounted in this endeavor.

Challenges Faced by State and Non-State Actors in Ensuring Access to Primary and Secondary Education for Indonesian Citizens in Singapore

License and land provision for Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. becomes an essential point in organizing education at the school. Since education is held in Singapore territory, the learning process needs official legitimacy from the Government of Singapore. The result of the author's interview with Ms. Veronica Enda Wulandari as the Education and Culture Attache of the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore and Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd., the principal task executor stated that in the history of the establishment of Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd., the issue of licensing and land provision was the leading points faced at that time (Wulandari, 2021).

That is because Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. is projected to be established in Singapore under the sovereignty of the Government of Singapore. The efforts made by the Government of Indonesia to obtain the land and license from the Government of Singapore are through lobbying in diplomacy carried out by the Government of Indonesia through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore (Wulandari, 2021).

Veronica Enda Wulandari also stated that Indonesian schools abroad certainly have various problems. Currently, the problem faced by Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. is the need for more educators. The problem is caused by procuring education staff which takes quite a long time. The absence of teacher competency development forums exacerbates the lack of educators.

Regarding the practice field experience students, the obstacle faced by the students is the issuance delays of the Training Employment Pas. This aligns with the information obtained from the author's interview with Maria Qori'ah, the Universitas Negeri Surabaya student who conducted a practice field experience at Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. from April to June 2017. During that period, the practice field experience was carried out by students from Universitas Negeri Surabaya, Universitas Sebelas Maret, and Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta. At Singapore's departure time, only Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta students had received a Training Employment Pass from the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) Singapore. Meanwhile, students from Universitas Negeri Surabaya and Universitas Sebelas Maret must leave Singapore on the 31st day of staying in Singapore and return to Singapore the following day. (Qori'ah, 2021).

Government of Singapore Response Regarding the Efforts of State and Non-State Actors in Ensuring Access to Primary and Secondary Education for Indonesian Citizens in Singapore

The efforts made by state and non-state actors as representatives of various tracks in multi-track diplomacy in ensuring access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore have received a positive response from the Government of Singapore. Multi-track diplomacy, which involves the commitment of many parties, gets positive feedback from the Government of Singapore as the authorized holder of Singapore.

The Indonesian government, through the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore, agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Ministry of Education (MOE) Singapore on May 20, 1969, regarding the establishment and operation of Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. Regarding land provision, the Government of Singapore provided 8,054 m² of land for the construction of Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. The support from the Government of Singapore is essentially reciprocity for the Government of Indonesia's commitment through track 1 in multi-track diplomacy, assisted by non-state actors as representatives of various tracks in multi-track diplomacy.

Apart from the MoU, other supports were provided by the MOE for Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. The results of the author's interview with Ms. Veronica Enda Wulandari, the Education and Culture Attache at the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore, show the excellent collaboration between the Indonesian government and the Singapore government. Singapore government's positive response is due to previous Indonesia's multi-track diplomacy strategy. The Singapore government guarantees the Indonesian Curriculum to be implemented at Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd.

Regarding education, the Government of Singapore does not interfere with Indonesian policies. However, in terms of education governance, because Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. is officially registered as a private educational institution at MOE and supervised by the Committee for Private Education (CPE) Singapore, the regulations at Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. has to follow Singapore's rules. The Singapore government, represented by the MOE, is also open to dialogue if there are policies that Indonesian schools in Singapore cannot fulfill.

Furthermore, Veronica Enda Wulandari stated that licensing from the Singapore Government was not a problem anymore because the MOM was always swift in issuing Student's Pass for Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. students and Employment Pass for Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. educators as well as Training Employment Pass for Indonesia college students attending the Practice Field Experience and Real Work Lecture at the school (Wulandari, 2021).

The Support from Educational Institutions Owned by the Government of Singapore for Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd.

Multi-track diplomacy carried out by state and non-state actors in ensuring access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore has received a positive response from the Government of Singapore and educational institutions owned by the Government of Singapore. Nanyang Polytechnic is a public university in Singapore that contributed to improving the quality of teaching at Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. Through Nanyang Polytechnic International (NYPi), Nanyang Polytechnic carried out training for Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. educators to improve learning innovation and motivation. The training was held at the Nanyang Polytechnic campus with Nanyang Polytechnic educators as training instructors (Sekolah Indonesia Singapura, 2021).

Apart from higher education, Mrs. Veronica Enda Wulandari, an Education and Culture Attache of the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore, stated that Singapore local schools openly cooperate with Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. For example, Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. is often involved in events at Maha Bodhi School and Victoria School during the International Friendship Day event. Singapore's local schools also support the quality improvement of Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. teaching staff (Wulandari, 2021).

The support from educational institutions owned by the Government of Singapore shows positive feedback for the commitment of Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd to improve the quality of education. This commitment is in line with the support given by state and non-state actors in ensuring the quality of education and teaching at Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. The excellent collaboration between state and non-state actors through multi-track diplomacy encourages positive feedback from various parties.

Conclusion

The Singapore Ministry of Education (MOE) policy that places Singapore citizens as the main priority, permanent residents as the second priority, and international students as the last priority in the Singapore local school admissions have become a challenge Indonesian Citizens in Singapore face. In addition, MOE's policy regarding the highest school fees for international students among Singapore citizens and permanent residents is another problem faced by Indonesian citizens in Singapore in accessing primary and secondary education.

In dealing with the problem, state actors collaborate with non-state actors through multi-track diplomacy. As a state actor and representative of Track 1, the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore shows its commitment by establishing Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. The government of Indonesia owns the school, which facilitates access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore.

In addition, the advocacy between the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore and the Government of Singapore has had a positive impact realized by establishing Pusat Kegiatan Belajar Masyarakat (PKBM) provides Package B and Package C equivalency programs for Indonesian migrant workers in Singapore. Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises (SOE), as another representation of track 1, shows its contribution by providing grants to improve the quality of education at Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd.

Apart from the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore and the Indonesian SOE as the representatives of Track 1 in multi-track diplomacy, the efforts to ensure access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore are also carried out by non-state actors. Indonesian students appointed by universities as the representatives of track 5 show their commitment by collaborating with the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore and the Singapore Ministry of Manpower (MOM) to carry out Field Experience Practice at the Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. and work lecture program at PKBM KBRI Singapura. Entrepreneurs carried out other efforts from non-state actors as representatives of Track 3 by providing grants to Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. and professionals as representatives of Track 2 by providing training for Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. students and educators.

The shared values of humanitarianism encourage the collaboration between state and non-state actors in multi-track diplomacy. Social concern and belief in the importance of humanity encourage the efforts of state and non-state actors to ensure access to primary and secondary education for Indonesian citizens in Singapore. Various efforts made by state and non-state actors comply with the principles of humanitarianism, namely humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence.

Moreover, the efforts made by state and non-state actors follow the United Nations (UN) Code of Conduct, which provides a set of common standards for organizations involved in providing aid and a commitment to the four principles. The code establishes humanitarian assistance as a right for all citizens. In line with the UN Code of Conduct, Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. and PKBM KBRI Singapura were established with the goals of providing equal access to primary and secondary education for all Indonesian citizens in Singapore and providing Package B and Package C Equivalency programs for all Indonesian migrant workers in Singapore regardless the background of Indonesians.

Furthermore, multi-track diplomacy, which involves the commitment of various parties, gets positive feedback from the Government of Singapore. The positive feedback was manifested by a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore and the Ministry of Education (MOE) Singapore regarding licensing and the granting of land for Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd.

Other responses were shown by various positive collaborations between the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore and MOE, the invitations to cultural activities organized by the Government of Singapore, as well as various supports provided by the Singapore Immigration & Checkpoints Authority (ICA) and MOM Singapore. Other support was provided by Singapore educational institutions such as Nanyang Polytechnic, Maha Bodhi School, and Victoria School, which provided training and participation invitations. It opened the dialogue with Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd.

On the other hand, the efforts made by state and non-state actors encountered obstacles. The main obstacles were the license, land provision, and the need for educators at Sekolah Indonesia (Singapura) Ltd. The need for educators is caused by procuring education staff which takes quite a long time. The absence of teacher competency development forums exacerbates the lack of educators.

In the broader study of international relations, multi-track diplomacy becomes the practical solution to the problems faced by governments and citizens, especially the problems related to the authority of other countries. The collaboration between state and non-state actors that involves the commitment of various parties encourages problem-solving more effectively and communicatively. With their authority and capacity, supported by non-state actors from various backgrounds and expertise, state actors become an effective combination in the problem-solving faced by the government and citizens in the broader scope.

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Global South Perspective on the Threat to Multilateralism in G20 Post-Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

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The G20 is set up to foster cooperation among states while sharing common principles and values. Even though it was first created to handle the global financial crisis, G20 has become a big multilateral forum covering other strategic developmental issues. At the beginning of this year, Russia's invasion of Ukraine came unexpectedly and created commotion among the G20 members. Some members assume it threatens multilateralism in G20 since Russia ignores international law. This paper uses a qualitative approach through a case study, collects the data from a literature review, and looks at different dimensions of multilateralism. Furthermore, the discussion will focus on the perspective of the Global South regarding the multilateralism crisis by overviewing the characteristics of multilateralism in crisis. The result of this paper indicates that the division among the West, Russia, China, and other members showed that the consensus and compliance in G20 no longer exist. It is considered a sign of the deficit of multilateralism where Russia and the West challenged and then pressured the multilateral system. On the other hand, most Global South countries took a different perspective and stance when the West and its allies heavily condemned Russia. While the other countries busily try to expel Russia from G20, the Global South representative countries remain neutral to maintain their relationship with the superpowers. The different perspectives and actions among the G20 members emphasize the crisis of multilateralism that reflects a battle of narratives.

Keywords: *crisis of multilateralism; consensus; Global South; Russo-Ukrainian conflict; G20*

Introduction

The age of multilateralism resulting from the current liberal international order is under pressure. It is a reality—if not a fact—that liberal international order triumphed after the end of the Cold War, right after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc. Therefore, the post-Cold War international order was supposedly founded with at least three expectations:

1. The establishment of unipolarity in the international system led by the US and its allies
2. The perpetuation of liberal pillars (e.g., open trade regime, liberal wealth, human rights promotion, the proliferation of democratic governance, and the reliance on multilateralism for global problems

co-management)

3. The transformation of world politics from Westphalian international politics to post-Westphalian global politics (McGrew, 2020, p. 31)

The last one consists of two modalities: (1) the intensification of the globalization process brought by the liberal capitalist economic system and technological revolution, especially in communication, and (2) the emergence of a global polity instead of a mere international community—the rise of new non-state actors co-exist and co-work with nation-states (Owens, Baylis, & Smith, 2020, p. 16).

In reality, 21 years after "the wall was torn," such promises have been turned upside down. We have seen economic crises and turbulences shown by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis, the European debt crisis, the Sino-US trade war, and the COVID-19 recession. There are increasing global security threats coming from geopolitical tensions (e.g., in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Indo-Pacific), non-state "insurgences" (e.g., religious terrorists, cybercriminals), and even bioecological crises (e.g., climate change and the pandemics). The emergence of new great power (China and Russia) and a group of middle powers shifts the international system into multipolarity and brings about norms and values that either openly defy liberal international order or show how the latter ignore Global South's diverse perspectives (Pinto, 2022; Narlikar, 2022, pp. 66-67). Not to mention the rise of the illiberal populist regime in democratic countries—e.g., the US under Donald Trump; the post-Brexit UK, Hungary under Viktor Orbán, Brazil under Jair Bolsonaro, Turkey under Erdoğan, India under Narendra Modi, and Indonesia under Widodo; all mentions are the G20 members in one way or another (Zürn, 2021, p. 146; Anugrah, 2020).

G20, one of the latest and most trending global political-economic fora, cannot escape from the current debate on multilateralism's relevance. On the one hand, G20 is nicknamed "the most significant advance in multilateral policy coordination since the end of the Cold War" (Patrick, 2010). G20 is expected to bring together the Global North (G7+EU+Australia) and the rest of the members from the Global South in addressing major global economic issues such as financial stability, climate change mitigation, and sustainable development. Even Indonesia's G20 presidency in 2022 scrutinizes those themes into global health architecture problems to prepare the international community for future global health crises, digital transformation to bolster post-pandemic economic recovery, and sustainable energy transition to mitigate climate change effects (Government of Indonesia, 2022).

On the other hand, G20 has shown several poor performances in demanding times. G20's fragmentation between the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and the European Debt Crisis led to the inability to consistently produce a set of coherent policies and the promised Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) on fiscal stimulus and restraint, currency valuation, trade and financial protectionism, the Eurozone, and financial regulation—harmonization versus differentiation (Cooper, The G20 is Dead as a Crisis or Steering Committee: Long Live the G20 as Hybrid Focal Point, 2019, p. 511; Monticelli, 2019, pp. 60-61). Regarding macroeconomic policy discussions, the Global North and Global South perspectives of pertinent G20 members are rarely bridged (Monticelli, 2019, pp. 73-74). G20 also failed to lead international cooperation in collectively mitigating COVID-19 during its peak moments (Wolf, 2021). The relevance of the G20 has been and will be tested as G20 finance ministers and central bank leaders must resolve global inflation, credibility, currencies issue, Global South soaring debts, food security, oil price, and trade (Jamrisko & Condon, 2022). Not to mention the antagonism between Global North and Global South within G20 appears during the current G20 Presidency: While there is a thrust from the former to respond to the emergence of the Russia-Ukraine Crisis, the latter remained vague and did nothing specific to maintain their relationship with Russia (Crawford, Marsh, & Sguazzin, 2022). Unsurprisingly, the international community questioned G20's existence, especially during Indonesia's presidency.

A set of literature reviews has been conducted on G20's multilateralism regarding its institutional effectiveness and legitimacy. It is essential because the multilateral nature of G20 is now facing several existential challenges and obstacles in achieving its global economic and financial governance objectives. Tenets on discussions about it include the notion of the G20 as an emergence of a new form of multilateralism (Wade, 2011; Woods, 2010; Cooper, 2010; 2015), its political legitimacy (Gronau, 2016; Kirton, 2021), limitation (Wihardja & Wijaksana, 2022; Litman, 2017). However, the literature review infers that no primary literature assesses the G20 within the framework of its potential crisis of multilateralism, even after several economic, geopolitical, and pandemic crises. This paper's objective to offer a novelty in analyzing the G20 as a multilateral institution during these trying times, combined with our effort to commemorate the Global South leaderships within the G20 (Indonesia this year and India next year), is justified for this paper to discuss whether G20, as an embodiment of multilateralism, is under crisis and what Global South perspectives have to say about it.

The division within the members of G20 – the West, Russia-China, also Global South – proves how the crisis of multilateralism is indeed correct. The G20 members failed to reach a consensus and stand by their arguments regarding the issue of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. The impact of this issue led to a more significant economic, food, and energy crisis, which enraged the West. The political power competition between the West and Russia-China made other members wary of the situation. Global South decided to take no side and was keen on making the G20 agenda successful.

This paper's structure will begin by introducing two analytical frameworks and their operationalization: multilateralism and its characteristics during a crisis. It will also introduce the research method used in this study—[…]. Next, this paper will dissect the "anatomy of G20" based on its institutional evolution and functionality. In this stage, this paper will also show how the Global North (G7)-Global South (emerging economies) dichotomy within the G20 membership shapes the current affairs of pertinent multilateralism. After that, the discussion continues how the emergence of the Russia-Ukraine Crisis gets its relevance within the G20 discourse. At this point, this paper will examine whether the crisis characterizes the undermining of G20 multilateralism. Lastly, before concluding this study, this paper will explore and articulate the Global South's standpoint (s).

Methodology

The Anatomy of Multilateralism

This paper follows John Gerard Ruggie's conceptualization of multilateralism and sees it as:

"a generic institutional form of modern international […] that coordinates national policies [and inter-state] relations among three or more states based on certain generalized principles of conduct—that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence" (Ruggie, 1992, pp. 567,571).

From this definition, we can identify three dimensions of multilateralism. The first one is its modality. According to Ruggie (1992, p. 571), multilateralism constitutes two modalities: indivisibility and diffused reciprocity. Indivisibility is the first and foremost reason for its member to participate in multilateralism. Diffused reciprocity refers to the contingent, long-term mutual gain expected from members of multilateralism. In short, after members find the ultimate reasons to establish multilateralism, they will do what it takes to maintain and sustain it in the longer term.

The second dimension is its actuality. Because Ruggie sees multilateralism as another form of institution, we can expect that multilateralism exists through institutionalization. According to him (1975, pp. 569-570), this process goes through three levels. The most abstract one is the "epistemic community." Borrowing from Peter Haas (1992, pp. 2-3), an "epistemic community" is understood as a network of stakeholders having similarities in beliefs and specific perspectives/paradigms toward the world/reality (*episteme*). Their encounter in such a manner, added Ruggie (1975, p. 570), will create a collective response that, if furtherly agreed upon, will be translated into "a set of common goals and expectations, rules and regulations, work plans, and financial commitments"—the true meaning of a regime. The last and the most concrete stage of institutionalization is an institution or organization—the "house" of the regime where its planning, implementation, and evaluation occur.

The third and last dimension is functionality. This dimension borrows John James Kirton's conceptualization of six elements of institutional performance—6 Ds (Kirton, G20 Governance for a Globalized

World, 2013, pp. 56-60). They are domestic political management (of hosting/being members of a multilateralism), deliberation (of spilled-over cooperation/diplomacy), direction setting (of a complex, adaptive system), decision making (in determining multilateral issues), delivery (of commitment and effective implementation of multilateral decision), and development of global governance (in terms of multilateralism's continuity). These elements can be used to assess an institution/multilateralism based on its performance's spatiality and/or temporality (Kirton J. J., 2013, p. 60).

Nevertheless, multilateralism can be under pressure or even crisis. According to Edward Newman (2007, p. 27), there are four circumstances in which a multilateral institution can objectively be in crisis:

1. The constitutive principles upon which the arrangement is founded and operates are consistently challenged by the activities and declarations of its leading members.
2. There is an epistemic consensus that the values and institutions of a particular form of multilateralism are no longer compelling or legitimate and that the multilateral arrangement consistently fails to achieve the principal objectives for which it was created.
3. There is an epistemic consensus that the ineffectiveness and illegitimacy of a particular multilateral form are permanent as long as the constitutive principles of the organization remain the same.
4. Multilateral institutions are challenged by significant alternative arrangements that perform the same task, to which member states can transfer their diplomatic attention and material resources.

The operationalization of the conceptual framework to "dissect" the "anatomy of G20" will be conducted based on an interpretative case study design (Lijphart, 1971, p. 692). It aims to illustrate and interpret a specific case—post-Russia-Ukraine crisis G20 multilateralism—based on a chosen conceptual or theoretical framework—multilateralism—to illuminate the pertinent subject. The operationalization can be divided into three steps. The first step will focus on the modality and actuality of G20, which explains its evolution and *raison d'être*. The second step will be allocated to its functionality. This part will be divided into two parts.

On the one hand, it will provide the explication of the G20 governance directly applied to the concern of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, especially on whether and how the crisis was brought to the table of the G20 discussion. However, on the other hand, it will also explore Global South countries' roles and standpoints on the pertinent issue/crisis. The latter will be positioned right after the final part of the operationalization, which will examine whether and how the G20 is under crisis as a multilateral institution. All data required in this study, which are dominantly qualitative (non-numerical forms like images or texts), are obtained from academic books and journal articles, press releases, and (online) media news through desk study (Lamont, 2015, pp. 79-91). This research tendency goes to content and discourse analysis, which focuses on explicitly stated in a text or image and digs into its implicit and "hidden" meanings that should be primarily contextualized (Johannesson & Perjons, 2014, p. 65).

The Evolution of G20

We must discuss G7 to talk about the actuality (i.e., emergence and evolution) of G20 institutions, as the former was born out of the womb of the latter. G7 was established in 1973 as an ad hoc gathering club of finance ministers from major industrialized/developed/capitalist countries, i.e., the US, the UK, France, and Germany. This so-called "Library Group"—named after the US White House Library as the initial place for their informal meetings (Bayne & Putnam, 2000, p. 20)—expanded to seven members after Japan, Italy, and Canada joined; they held their first summit in 1975. It was once G8 after the inclusion of Russian membership in 1997, despite being reversed to G7 after Russian membership was suspended following the 2014 annexation of Crimea. G7 was purposed for its members to share and coordinate their neoliberal macroeconomic policies in response to three economic crises at that time: the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the 1973 Oil Crisis, and the 1973-1975 Recession (Harvey, 2005, p. 33; Bradford & Finn, 2011, p. 1).

Crises in Asia, Russia, and Latin America during the late 1990s raised concerns about the legitimacy of G7/8 in "steering" global economic architecture. It was realized, especially by financial ministers Paul Martin (Canada), Hans Eichel (Germany), and Larry Summers (the US), that G7/8 could not do it alone, and they had to move on from neoliberal orthodoxy and accommodate other emerging economies' perspective (Watubun, 2022; Kirton J. J., 2013, p. 47). We can see that the coagulation of what will become the "epistemic community" of the G20 regime started with the evolution of the G7, which was triggered by economic crises. Such an "ideational consensus" on global economic governance was passed down to establish the first G20 Financial Ministers and Central Bank Leaders Meeting in Köln in 1999. Therefore, the new G20 regime becomes a group of major industrialized/developed economies from the Global North and emerging ones from the Global South. As a consequence, the G20 discussion expands from mere global financial-monetary stability (in terms of crisis management/mitigation) to challenges on globalization, combatting terror financing, development and aid, financial abuse/crime, financial-sector institutional building, demographics, regional economic integration, domestic policies (especially on surveillance), trade, and fiscal policies (Bradford & Finn, 2011, p. 4).

The G20 regime finally got its intact institutional form as a multilateralism after holding its first summit in 2008. Several institutionalization processes include the annualization of summitry and the expansion of ministerial sectors of working groups coordinating with the sherpa—e.g., finance, central bank, health, agriculture, labor, trade and industry, energy, foreign affairs, digital transformation, education, tourism, environment—and engagement groups—i.e., B20, C20, L20, S20, T20, U20, W20, Y20 (ISPI, 2016; SHERPA G20 Indonesia, 2022; Hajnal, 2019, pp. 37-54). The scope of discussion also expands to anti-corruption, mutual assessment process (MAP), financial inclusion, investment and infrastructure, labor market and employment, agriculture and food security, global value chain, MSMEs, corporate governance, banking, human resources, gender and development, energy, digital transformation, health system, sustainable development, and climate change (SHERPA G20 Indonesia, 2022).

Turning to its modality, G20 also reflects its indivisibility and reciprocity. Undeniably, the G20 identity is built based on the fact that they are the largest economies today. 16 out of 19 member states (excluding the European Union/EU) are among the top 20 largest economies in the world (IMF, 2021). Their economic size represents 85% of global GDP, 75% of international trade, and 2/3 of the world's population (OECD, 2022). Aside from the fact that institutional development of G20 (and even G7) has always been triggered every time the world economy is under economic crisis, several G20 members from the Global South had, at least once, suffered the pre-G20, 1990s economic crises (e.g., Indonesia, South Korea, China, Japan, Brazil, Argentina, Russia, Mexico, India)—most of them in terms of government debt crises.

On the one hand, it shapes the G20's existential solidarity to fight any economic crisis in the future through multilateral cooperation and coordination. On the other hand, it confirms the aforementioned "G7 could not do it alone" premise; in terms of global political-economic governance, Global North countries need "collective legitimacy and support" from Global South countries to as much as the latter need "benefits spillover" from the former. Therefore, G20's indivisibility comes from its member states sharing existential fear of economic crisis and desire for sustainable development and growth in the face of ever-expanding issues.

Regarding (diffused) reciprocity, because the G20's economic size statistically represents the majority of the world economy, it is safe to say that the politics of global economic governance will be determined based on its ability to satisfy G20's economy and development agenda. Therefore, G20 member states are interested in setting and implementing any economic and development agenda they will mutually/collectively gain from this multilateralism. To confirm this, the expansion of the G20 agenda each year seeks to explore and exploit sites of mutual/collective gains. Not to mention that being members and even annual hosts of G20 events can increase their political and economic profile and leadership internationally and domestically. In short, this paper must agree with Robert H. Wade's argument (2011, p. 355) that G20's economic weight and broad membership generate a high degree of legitimacy in front of its members to manage the global economy and financial system.

Russia's Invasion of Ukraine: How it creates division within G20 Members

The G20 Indonesia's presidency held by Indonesia focuses on the recovery post-pandemic and thus tries to work together to encourage and create a more sustainable recovery even though the pandemic continues. Next, we know that the G20 members committed themselves to achieving those goals before Russia's invasion of Ukraine occurred. The notion of this issue was brought first by the many G20 members, particularly the G7 members. They unfavoured the aggression and condemned Russia for its serious action. They even thought of bringing the talk about the economic sanctions to the table and then strongly voiced it out.

On the other hand, the members, such as China and India, abstained from this issue and did not show any reaction. Moreover, Indonesia clearly stated that they want to avoid the issue and solely focus on the current priorities (Alexander, 2022). That shows the divisions among the members of G20.

Following the issue, the G7 members supported removing Russia from the G20 in G7 and NATO meetings (Llewellyn, 2022). The same thing happened in 2014 when Russia first launched its annexation of Crimea. At that time, most of the G7 members, especially the United States, agreed to suspend Russia from the G7. After the suspension, Russia walked out of the meeting in 2017. This year, the same thing happened during the G20 foreign ministers meeting in Bali, Indonesia. On July 7 and 8, the foreign ministers' meeting was held face-to-face for the first time after the invasion. The representatives from China, Russia, and other state members have come together for this high-level meeting. The agenda of this meeting includes the global food and energy crisis, the war in Ukraine, and the crisis of multilateralism. The concrete outcomes did not proceed well despite the talks and agreements concluded before Russia invaded Ukraine. In the previous G20 summits, the members agreed on approaching food security and conflict issues. However, the agreement fell short after Russia invaded Ukraine, and the Bali meeting did not produce any joint communique.

Despite low expectations, the G7 foreign ministers even boycotted the reception during the Bali meeting. They made it clear that they did not welcome Russia to get back into the business (Sinaga, 2022). The cold reaction from the Western leaders was highly aggressive and caused the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, to leave. This time, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine had more impact and was possibly prolonged. The attendance of the Russian foreign minister at the meeting was intended as a way to meet other G20 members and break the international isolation of Russia. However, Russia was only left with a cold shoulder from some of the members. Besides Russia's actions in attacking Ukraine, the impact of the conflict is felt worldwide, especially regarding budgets, energy, and food. Europe and many developing countries directly felt the heavy consequences. There was even a talk about the risk of global food shortage and soaring energy prices, thus why many countries in the G20 condemned this issue and called for Russia to end the war.

To explain how the G20 operates and responds to this issue systematically are looking at six dimensions: domestic political management. This dimension generally outlooks the economic gains from prestige, such as how the increased image while participating as a member of G20 or becoming the chair of the annual meeting could balance the financial and political costs. Since the last G20 summit in Rome in 2021, the mandate of the presidency has been transferred to Indonesia. Indonesia focused on digital transformation, global health architecture, and energy transition. With various activities planned by the Indonesian government, there are some strategic benefits of the G20 presidency. One of them is that the G20 presidency could earn Indonesia credibility and global trust in leading the global recovery efforts since it can initiate cooperation and concrete result for recovery (Lee, 2022). Credibility is fundamental in Indonesia's diplomacy and foreign policy. That explains Indonesia's stance on staying neutral about Russia-Ukraine in the G20 meeting despite the pressure from Western members. Indonesia managed its domestic politics to show the image of a peacemaker and enforce the pragmatic approach in foreign policy. In the recent G20 Foreign Ministers meeting, Indonesia was keen on inviting Russia and Ukraine to show that they listen to Western concerns while avoiding supporting Russia blatantly.

Second, the dimension of deliberation comprehends the internal and private opportunity in the G20 summit that leads to bilateral cooperation. Despite the recent event, China keeps backing Russia in G20 and openly supports it. Chinese officials even lobbied Indonesia to take this issue off the agenda, focusing solely on economic recovery issues instead. However, choosing to only focus on this year's G20 agenda, Indonesia decided to visit Russia and Ukraine. This visit came with a positive result, after which Putin agreed to provide a security guarantee on food and fertilizer supplies from Russia and Ukraine (Dharmaputra, 2022). The agreement between Indonesia and Russia brought the concerns over the global food crisis lower and ensured the stability of the G20 agenda. Third, the dimension of direction setting is about the G20's ability to foster the complex adaptive system. Due to pressure caused by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, G20 Sherpa plays a vital role in directing the setting standard and navigating collaborations within the G20 framework. Sherpa also paves the way for G20 leaders to agree on the issue. During the C20 meeting, it was concluded that the current economic, food, and energy crisis directly resulted from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, thus raising awareness about it (Pratama, 2022). The crisis needs immediate measures; otherwise, the global threat and severe economic consequences will alleviate poverty. This direction setting urged the G20 members to prioritize dialogue and consider the humanitarian aspect of the conflict to find solutions.

Fourth, the decision-making dimension refers to the soft applied law that could set a credible joint commitment. The soft law is an excellent moral source for all members of G20 and any related parties. In G20, a joint communique is a soft law representing all members' commitment. However, in this issue, the foreign ministers of the G20 had difficulty achieving consensus on efforts to mitigate the economic, food, and energy impacts of the Russia-Ukraine conflict or producing a joint communique. With Russia and China in the room and the US insisted on holding Russia accountable, other members were wary and could not push the decision. Fifth is the delivery dimension, which covers the actions executed by G20, from the commitment delivery to the implementation of practical solutions. This mechanism sustains in the summit even though the presidency changes every year. Committing to the group and building conformity is the basic principle (Kirton, Warren, & Rapson, 2021). The G20 members generally comply with the summit commitment since it has a high compliance rate. Information sharing and policy coordination are the characteristics of collective actions by the members. Today, the commitment and compliance of the members are questionable. The last dimension is the development of global governance. It covers the development of G20 as an internationally recognized group and its ability to keep this identity and develop as a global network hub. G20 has evolved into a multilateral framework for the past 23 years, but the aggravation of the deficit in multilateralism is showing in this critical time. Russia's aggression exacerbated the global food and energy crisis and raised the power politics within the group. It looks like G20 face obstacles to developing further as G7 unites and gains traction with their values of open societies (Sobel, 2022)

The G20 is a crucial institution that includes the G7 and emerging economic countries for addressing global governance challenges. The critical actors in G20 can get involved in every aspect of the forum processes or advance further in the subsequent summits. The original intention is to use the G20 processes to advance the global agenda, promote multilateralism, interact professionally, and address global issues. The priorities and concerns over global issues, including international finance, climate change, and the so-called Coronavirus, are what this forum is for, not geopolitics rivalries. The friction of the Russia-Ukraine issue is best to be left aside from the G20 discussion, even though that is not true.

Crisis of Multilateralism

Effective and fair multilateral mechanisms are fundamental in G20. The G20 plays a much-needed and crucial role in implementing the agenda and strengthening multilateralism. Inefficiencies and contradictory actions among the members have let the group down (Narlikar, 2022). This multilateral group is seen to be overambitious over its unrealistic goals despite the difficulties in reaching a consensus.

Firstly, the G20 principles are constantly challenged by global challenges, such as COVID-19, the food and energy crisis, and also the biggest one, Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, China's unending support of Russia and its illiberal influence in international organizations put G20 under profound structural shifts. These global challenges certainly endangered the multilateral arrangement in the G20. As an example of a multilateral forum, G20 relies on trust and commitment within the framework of international cooperation to recover and manage the risks through joint solutions and solid and effective institutions, yet is afraid of losing their impact (Le Drian & Maas, 2019). The G20 is what Richard Haass called *a la carte* multilateralism, where different multilateral forums and organizations are merely instrumental spaces for superpowers (Haass, 2008). Russia's invasion of Ukraine proves how the G20 is a group that empowers big powers. This declining multilateral arrangement could be ugly and damage the trust forged among states for good.

Secondly, the values of G20 are no longer effective in achieving the principle's objectives since the constant global challenges hit in the last two years. Recently, multilateralism seems to be declining since the backlash over the predominance of the Global North and the rising of populism have eroded the liberal values in the multilateral system (Geneva Graduate Institute, 2020). The notion is supported by what happened during the last G20 Foreign Ministers' meeting in Bali, Indonesia. The G20 members failed to reach a consensus on Russia and Ukraine issues, which ended up without any joint communique following the Global North boycott and Russia's walkout from the meeting. The increased transnational problems and the emergence of Russia and China as other international power centers made consensus more complicated in G20. A deadlock in this multilateral structure shows how it becomes the platform for geopolitical contests with the risk of challenges that G20 tried to tackle (L, Fattibene, Hackenesch, Sidiropoulos, & Venturi, 2020). The declining competency of G20 also brought concern about its accountability and transparency. The decisions are taken behind the table because it is an informal forum without a formal multilateral arrangement. Even though G20 has succeeded in keeping and protecting the market, it is a tool for the Global North to secure access to emerging markets (Tedesco & Youngs, 2009). In a way, many are pondering whether G20 is an ultimate effective multilateral forum or the opposite.

Thirdly, the constitutive principles of G20 remain the same to prove its ineffectiveness and illegitimacy. The importance of G20 has grown significantly, especially in the crisis management of the global economy. It receives much attention, and the G20 development is considered the rise of the Global South or emerging economic countries. As the forum reflects, the role of the West or other major developed economies has diminished. The growing importance of Brazil, China, and India in the global economy and the G20 forum demonstrates the shifting international order to a multilateral one (Moreland, 2019). Even though the G20 has been recognized globally due to its importance, the G20 process has yet to be established by any multilateral treaty. This then sparks concerns about how the formal multilateral arrangements have declined. The G20 serves as an instrument to make global governance more legitimate and a platform to reach a consensus among the players. However, it is essential to note that multilateralism is not equal to global governance but defined as a particular organizing principle of global governance. It is often understood as the essential management of any transnational issues by multiple parties, which operate based on mutually agreed and shared principles of conduct (Ruggie, Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution, 1992). Nevertheless, these mutually agreed principles have eroded and divided the members of G20 into different sides.

Fourthly, the G20 is challenged by BRICS as both are committed forums to reform the global governance architecture. As a group of emerging economies, BRICS has advanced to global governance and has grown its collective discourse power. Some BRICS members are also part of G20, and the other four members of BRICS did not follow the Global North to impose economic sanctions on Russia, which indicates the basis of consensus and common interests in the group. Looking deeply into the BRICS principle's values, it is much more consistent than G20. The interests, rules, and values among BRICS countries represented their direction in approaching the international order that is cooperative, peaceful, and developing (Huang, 2022). Furthermore, the Global North plans to build a new exclusive multilateral arrangement to surpass the G20. The Global North has intended to reshape a Western-led world order and exclude BRICS and the Global South (Pinto, The failures of multilateralism, 2022).

In the end, recent events from Russia demonstrated that multilateralism is indeed in crisis, specifically in the G20. Not only caused by the latest challenge, but the erosion of multilateralism was shown through the dominance of one party, which proves how the principles do not work anymore. It goes stagnant and thus gets threatened by the grown existence of BRICS. The Global North is no longer shaping the global norms and has control over it. At the same time, China and Russia have joined hands and expanded their influence while defying the international liberal order principles. Meanwhile, the Global South put a neutral position on this matter and got entangled between these superpowers. The crisis of multilateralism shows how it still cannot replace sovereign states, yet cooperation is beneficial.

The Global South Standpoint on The Issue

Regarding the issue of war in Ukraine, many G20 members thought about how to deal with Russia. Most Western members strongly condemned Russia and supported severe economic sanctions in the hope of Russia ending the war. On the other side, the rest of the members abstained from the situation. Many emerging economies and developing countries were not prepared to suspend Russia. Even now, Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey would not support the exclusion of Russia from the summit (Alexander, 2022).

Western countries pressed Russia over the issue of military assault and accused Moscow as the leading cause of the global wave of crisis post-invasion of Ukraine (Ricard, 2022). The shock in the global economy was allegedly the direct effect of the invasion and attack committed by Russia. The crisis worsens, especially after the significant setback of COVID-19, which hit the world over the past two and a half years. Russia's attack against Ukraine slowed the global recovery, most notably in the economic sector. That becomes a solid reason why many members strongly opposed Russia and decided to put an economic sanction on it.

As the chair of this year's presidency, Indonesia focuses more on the importance of the forum to avoid the boycott. The narrative relied on the matter of recovery, which did not only involve the slow-down process but also how the interests of middle and lower-income countries could become very costly if the agenda of G20 is not going through as planned. Plans to establish a more vital global collective leadership, ensure inclusive and sustainable growth, and maintain stability and security are what the G20 seeks (Jokela, 2011). Furthermore, the boycott pressure reminded Indonesia of the domestic struggles in ASEAN, where it failed to convince Myanmar to end the conflict through similar measures. In this case, the Indonesian government fears a similar approach to Russia would become a boomerang for the G20 members.

Therefore, most emerging and developing economies have become a part of the Global South. Over the past two decades, the global economic transformation impacted the economic growth in developing countries. China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, and South Africa become the economic center and pillar of the Global South. This remarkable achievement boosted the cooperation between developing countries, including their roles in the G20. While the Western standpoint and narrative about condemning Russia were primarily agreed upon, the global diversity created the Global South. The Global South acknowledged some countries' increased vulnerability and the consequences they had to bear from the prolonged impact of colonialism (Bailey & Nanton, 2022). Analyzing the Global South perspective on the war between Russia and Ukraine demonstrates some more considerable factors related to their responses in G20.

As the most influential actor in the forum, China did not join the boycott and chose not to condemn Russia (Llewellyn, 2022). On the opposite, China instead condemned the Western sanctions on Russia. The close ties developed between China and Russia have a long history. Nonetheless, the Global South in G20 – Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey – the decision to not take sides shows a more complex picture of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Most of these countries abstained during the General Assembly vote back in April (Sidiropoulos, 2022). The abstentions showed how non-alignment became reinvigorated. It was not simply about neutrality but putting forward the agenda of developing countries caught between the superpowers. The Global South members in G20 clearly emphasize the importance of solidarity and its non-aligned position in pursuit of mediation between Russia and Ukraine.

Source: (Adler, 2022)

The standpoint of the Global South towards Russia could be overviewed through two elements: the fundamental foreign policy principles and the solidarity. From the critical foreign policy principles, we understand that most Global South members resisted embroiling in significant power conflicts. They do not consider the current situation solely a war between Russia and Ukraine but a proxy war between Russia and NATO. Regarding the issue, Global South reignited the non-alignment movement principles to seek their independent views and promote peaceful resolution through dialogue, mediation, and negotiation. Peaceful resolution of disputes has been a core principle to many of Global South, even though in the case of Russia-Ukraine, it was challenging to push for a negotiated settlement (Guyer, 2022). Other foreign policy principles are about a fair and consistent multilateral system and general opposition to imposing unilateral sanctions by the West. The Global South believes that the UN, as the apex of the global governance system, should be overhauled for its inability to respond effectively to the crisis in Ukraine. Moreover, the imposition of sanctions by the West on Russia was seen as a double standard in handling different conflicts. Many of Global South showed skepticism about how West members handled the issue.

The main feature of Global South's foreign policy is solidarity with struggling countries. Like it used to be during the Cold War, it was hard for the Global South members to choose a side, especially when some countries looked fondly at Russia, even though its interests were often overlooked. Due to this solidarity, China pursued a contrary and complicated way but still sought cooperation. Meanwhile, Indonesia acted in the middle as a fence-sitter, yet Saudi Arabia hedged the bet to the extreme, and India carefully observed and navigated the situation. Solidarity might be one of the reasons, but it would also be because the Global South chose to avoid the side to secure the position in case Russia wins over Ukraine.

Aside from the two elements, the reasons related to economics and trade and broad skepticism towards the West become more relevant. Russia is the primary producer and exporter of energy (gas and oil), food, fertilizer, and many more (Guyer, 2022). Due to economic reasons, the Global South hesitated and could not afford to cut its ties with Russia. The current food and energy crisis also directly impacted the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Going against Russia would not do the Global South good, adding to their skepticism towards the West. In the end, the resistance to taking sides does not entirely mean that the Global South will sit out the conflict. They wanted to mediate to help Ukraine while maintaining a neutral stance towards Russia.

The point of view of the Global South relied on solidarity and the idea of peace. However, the differences between G7 and Global South inside G20 on how they see and respond to the issue of Russia-Ukraine, clearly illustrate the rupture among members. The principles of multilateralism are being neglected, in which some Global South countries tend to navigate themselves by being neutral.

Conclusion

Generally speaking, the multilateral nature of G20 is on the verge of falling apart due to what happened in Ukraine. This matter urges the members to deal with Russia, even though the root of this crisis is beyond the event. Responding to the issue, the Global South narrative focused more on the West's hypocrisy instead. Many Global South countries exercised their rights for a non-aligned foreign policy and would not take any side, especially in a conflict in which they have no direct interest. The stance of Global South is not necessarily because they condoned Russia's action. This proxy becomes the example of West's failure to deliver the rules expected to be followed by others. However, the Global South countries no longer wanted to be pushed by great powers. It means that the West would not take any support from emerging and developing countries for granted. Thus, the Global South looked at this matter to determine their actions. The division within the G20 members becomes the constellation of interests driven by big powers. It leads to a crisis of multilateralism among the G20 members even though strengthening multilateralism is necessary since it is the only way to deal with other issues, such as the food and energy crisis, climate change, and increased poverty. The complex issues require multilateralism for it to be effective and inclusive. Otherwise, if the crisis of multilateralism in G20 continues, the path to a sustainable peace and prosperous world will be difficult.

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The Distinction Between Brics And G7 In Responding To The Ukraine-Russia Crisis: G20 Multilateral Crisis?

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Introduction/Main Objective: This research discusses the differences in BRICS and G7 responses to the Ukraine-Russia conflict, where these two groups consist of countries with different political interests. Following the results of the G7 and BRICS Summits, both responded differently to the Ukraine-Russia crisis. Background Problem: Differences in response are proposed because the G20 has the vision to achieve the resolution of policy issues on problems that hinder world economic growth, one of which is the food crisis caused by the Uraina-Russia conflict. The selection of the G7 and BRICS's different responses is the right strategy to determine how much potential the G20 has. It is difficult to achieve its goal of providing solutions for the world economy thanks to the structure of its members, who have diverse interests and responses to the Ukraine-Russia crisis. Novelty: This study uses interest-based theory to analyze the differences in the responses of the G7 and BRICS. This theory seeks to explain the formation of the G20's international regime by dismantling aspects of the fundamental interests behind the cognitive states that decided to establish the international regime of the G20. Method: The method used in this research is the discourse analysis method in a case set because this study wants to see changes in discourse related to the multilateral G20. Findings/Results: The complexity of trading, namely the BRICS and G7, with different responses and interests in responding to the Ukrainian crisis, can encourage a multilateralism crisis in the G20. The research results prove that the complexity of reporting generates different interests, so the response to the Ukrainian-Russian crisis tends to differ. Conclusion: The G20 has not been able to overcome the different interests of its members in solving the problem of the world food crisis because the discussion of the world food crisis is linked to the discussion of Ukrainian-Russian security politics.

Keywords: *G20; G7; BRICS; multilateralism crisis; Ukrainian-Russian crisis*

Introduction

G20 is a cooperation forum with an agenda to increase world economic growth. The G20 has a membership system consisting of 19 countries plus the European Union. The G20 has a membership structure consisting of developed and developing countries. Informally, the G20 at each G20 Summit

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will involve many other countries and several other international organizations that fully support the agendas held by the G20 at each Summit. Views on the G20 tend to differ significantly depending on their ability to solve a problem. The success of the G20 in achieving policies that provide equality without differences among member countries, for example, in climate change mitigation policies. The G20 as global governance does not only accommodate but represents the interests of all member countries. The G20 focuses on the interaction of governance equality, divided into three dimensions: political governance, economic governance, and institutional governance (Wen et al., 2022). The G20 facilitates studies on global climate change and provides practical settings for closing gaps in the Paris Agreement (Report Climate Transparency, 2018). The G20, as a cooperation forum with a complex network, as an international economic cooperation forum, takes a central position with the actors involved, including the International Governmental Organization (IGO). The G20 plays a leading role in promoting central issues. This shows that the G20 is cooperative governance (He, 2019).

The complexity of G20 membership is considered regime complexity that produces inclusive policies. The G20 succeeded in uniting key countries and developing countries into an integrated forum to achieve common interests, especially in solving world problems that hinder global economic growth (Berger, Cooper, & Grimm, 2019). The G20 is even considered a relevant vocal point that emphasizes forum connections at various levels of actors in the global governance agenda. The G20 acts as a liaison for various stakeholder networks to inclusivity (Cooper A. F., The G20 is dead as a crisis or steering committee: Long live the G20 as a hybrid focal point, 2020). The G20 understands the complexity of its membership because, from the start, it has been an entity with a cross-forum feel. The G20 has a broader scope, not just a meeting of world leaders with substantive progress in networking through structured dialogue with various levels and even the community level (Slaughter, 2019). The G7 and BRICS have pro-global order policies on health and environmental issues in several situations. However, they still have the same commitment and emphasize equality by adopting a rights-based approach (McBride, Hawkes, & Buse, 2019). Referring to Rosenau's opinion, the G20 as global governance emerged to solve problems of inequality, exploitation, and class struggle (Soederberg, 2006).

Nevertheless, apart from this discourse, the G20 has another side, challenging the complexity of membership, which is considered a weakness and triggers a crisis of multilateralism within the G20. The complexity of membership in the G20, especially the G7, dominated by the West, especially the US, is considered power-based policy making. While on the other hand, there are BRICS with different membership components and, even on a large scale, have different policies responding to global issues (Garret, 2010). Thus the G20 can be said to have a tendency to experience multilateral crises, which is illustrated by the policies and responses of its members in various world crises, one of which is regarding the world food crisis as a result of the Ukraine-Russia conflict. The G7, with all of its members, has a policy response to support sanctions against Russia.

In contrast, the BRICS and all of its members provide force support to Russia to fight against sanctions imposed by the US and European Union countries. Therefore, the author is interested in further discussing how BRICS and G7 membership in the G20, but both BRICS and G7 member countries have different responses to the food crisis arising from the Ukraine-Russia conflict. At the G20 Summit, Indonesia pointed out that both the G7 and BRICS, the two groups agreed to restore the food and economic crisis due to the conflict. At the G20 Summit, Indonesia emphasized that global food security policies are a major concern because Ukraine and Russia are food supply countries and energy supply routes to Europe. So that the conflict that occurs will hamper world economic growth, which is still in the recovery process due to the Covid 19 pandemic (G20, Indonesia, 2022). The G20 was able to align the goals of different groups, such as the G7 and BRICS, because they have inclusive governance (He, 2019).

The complexity of the membership of the G20 Summit seeks to resolve the Ukraine-Russia conflict that caused the world economic crisis. The G20 shows a significant policy trend in responding to the Ukraine-Russia conflict. G20 Indonesia succeeded in holding a global communication forum that resolved the causes of damage to the world economy. Even though at the G20 Summit meeting, Indonesia experienced tension due to discussions on the Russia and Ukraine conflict, which became the center of attention, with most members strongly condemning the military action. Responding to this, the Russian foreign minister said that the G20 Summit was not the place to discuss security issues, but what must be prioritized were world economic problems (Aljazeera, 2022). Thus, in the discussion at the G20 Bali Summit, Indonesia concentrated on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which triggered economic problems. Geopolitical and geoeconomic tensions will make it more difficult to overcome the challenges of the global food crisis (World Economic Forum, 2022).

G20 with a consensus policy-making system, the presentation of compliance, if the difference is too significant, then the potential for success and state compliance in implementing policies taken at the Summit will likely be small. At the G20 Indonesia Summit in Bali, the Indonesian government's efforts as the G20 presidency provided the answer that not all differences in response would fail because several members were neutral and balanced a complicated situation. Indonesia is negotiating with the Russian government to open access points to be able to distribute food ingredients throughout the world. Even though the G20 Summit provides an economic communication forum, specifically discussing world food issues that have pushed back the world economy, the Russia conflict still exists today.

The condition of being unable to answer the reality of the end of the world food crisis so that the existence of the BRISC and the G7 in the G20 was extensive in determining the end of the world food crisis due to the conflict. The two political camps have different political directions; even in several situations, the two groups show threats to each other. The contribution made by this article is to: provide a more inclusive and up-to-date analysis of the complexity of the G20 membership, which includes two country-level groups that have different interests.

Method

This article uses a qualitative method concerning discourse analysis in the case of settings because it sees a change in discourse related to how to see the complexity of membership in the G20, which consists of two large groups with different interests. The existence of the G7 and BRICS in the G20 has made it difficult for the G20 to formulate a consensus regarding the world food crisis caused by the Ukraine-Russia conflict. The special significance of using this methodology is to assess power based on increasing multilateral crises in the G20 due to differences in the responses of G20 members to the food crisis due to the Ukraine-Russia conflict. In conducting the analysis, the resources studied revolved around the official G20 documents, G20 Summit reports, books, journals, and the G20 official website. Other sources are also used to enrich the analysis, such as newspaper articles in the mass media. This article interprets the information gathered from these various sources to understand how the complexity of the G20 membership and the power-based of each of the G7 and BRICS affects the G20 multilateral crisis.

Literature Review

In this research, the researchers use two research variables, namely the G20 multilateral crisis and the power-based of G7 and BRICS. The G20 is a significant international forum that brings together leaders from the world's major economies. At the same time, the G7 and BRICS countries, which have diverse economic, social, and political interests, can create challenges in coordinating actions within the G20. As such, it significantly impacts global economic policies and decision-making processes. Understanding the factors that influence the G20's ability to respond to crises is therefore crucial for policymakers, academics, and other stakeholders interested in the power dynamics of the G20. However, research highlighting multilateralism's failure, as exemplified by the recent development in G20, still needs to be developed in more in-depth research. Therefore, this literature review discusses previous research to understand the G20 policy directions.

First, Jokela, through his writing entitled "The G20: A Pathway to Effective Multilateralism?" also conveyed the tendency of interest-based multilateralism in the G20 because of its legitimacy and explicit commitment to reforming multilateral arrangements that have been established (Jokela J., 2011). This can be seen through the initiatives of the G20 members to address global challenges, such as the involvement of the US in providing a platform to overcome the challenges of a multipolar world together with Europe. However, Jokela's writing views that the US considers the failure of G20 to overcome the main challenges of global problems, such as China's monetary policy and global imbalances. Furthermore, the involvement of developing countries in the G20 has shown a strong relationship in the degree of multilateralism based on the national interests of each member.

With the G20 process in meeting the needs of members and reaching the needs of non-members, Jokela said that this has contributed to sustainable development both in the informal and formal regions. On the other hand, this has increased the interest of developing countries to try to duplicate the role of the United Nations by maintaining the United Nations system as a source of legitimacy in the global governance structure. The G20 countries also expressed their commitment to maintaining their commitment from the protectionist tendencies of world trade by reforming global finance and structures in global economic governance. In other words, this development has allowed the G20 process to be based on the norms of multilateralism and greater global responsibility.

Second, Nascimento's research entitled "Twenty Years of Climate Policy: G20 Coverage and Gaps" analyzes the G20 climate policy from 2000 to 2019 (Nascimento, 2022). In his writing, Nascimento adds that the existence of policy adoption has made about half of the policy options offered cannot be adopted comprehensively. In addition, the poor implementation of policies, such as eliminating coal and oil, reducing industrial process emissions, and using renewable energy to remove fossil fuel subsidies and support the elimination of carbon dioxide, still require substantial improvement. Departing from filling this climate policy, policy options are needed to advance a clean global transition from greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, Nascimento, in his research, provides valuable insights into the G20's ability to coordinate action on a complex and pressing global issue, which focuses on how the complexity of G20 membership and the power dynamics within the organization affect crisis management.

By implementing cross-sectoral policies, Nascimento argued that this could be used to examine power dynamics within the G20, particularly between the G7 and BRICS countries, and how they have influenced climate policy. Furthermore, if sectoral climate policies are combined with a comprehensive pricing instrument, it will significantly reduce long-term barriers to mitigation. As it is known that each country has a different climate policy, it highlighted gaps in G20 coverage of climate policy, particularly concerning adaptation and climate finance. In other words, emphasizing power dynamics is directly relevant to provide valuable insights into the role of the G20 in climate policy and the factors that influence its ability to coordinate action on global issues.

Third, in research entitled "The Role of China and India in the G20 and BRICS: Commonalities or Competitive Behavior?", Cooper and Farooq examine the relationship between China and India, which shows the degree of difference in the G20 and BRICS

(Cooper A. F., 2016). The Indian leadership has a specific orientation towards development issues in response to China, whereas the Chinese approach focuses on the United States and the rest of the West. Both China and India show their potential to represent the interests of all developing countries. Both are expected to become powerful agents of change in multilateral forums to benefit the Global South. Furthermore, Cooper and Farooq said that in the G20 and BRICS, China and India tried to reshape their international political contours by promoting "change" so that differences in national interests between China and India in the BRICS to the G20 had influenced the G20 agenda.

By adopting a precautionary approach and institutional reforms by China and India, Cooper and Farooq convey that India is trying to find its position to catch up with China. Within the BRICS, India adjusted its national policy to actively participate in New Development Bank (NDB) projects, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). On the other hand, China continues to show its hegemony among developing countries through its involvement in other international forums, such as the China-Africa Cooperation Forum. Then, China also conveyed its position to the G7 forum, which impacted the US to maintain its capacity in currency and balance. In other words, while India has been able to adapt to any changes in the BRICS towards a security orientation, China has undertaken various non-traditional agenda initiatives beyond national financial security.

Fourth, in another writing entitled "China, India and the Pattern of G20/ BRICS Engagement: Differentiated Ambivalence between 'Rising' Power and Solidarity with the Global South", Cooper highlighted that China and India, as the two prominent members of the BRICS grouping, exhibit a pattern of ambivalent engagement with the G20 (Cooper A. F., 2021). It is, then, shaped by their desire to assert their rising power status on the one hand and their commitment to solidarity with the Global South on the other. He argued that China and India had used their participation in the G20 to enhance their global status. However, they have also sought to maintain a distance from the G20 to signal their solidarity with developing countries outside the G20. This ambivalence has led to a complex engagement pattern characterized by selective cooperation and resistance to specific G20 initiatives. For that reason, through his writing, Cooper has provided insights into the role of BRICS countries in the G20, which affected the power-based of each of the G7 and BRICS and the crisis management in the G20.

As explained from several studies above, four studies contribute to the sustainability of this research, especially in explaining the reality of the existence of BRICS and G7 as essential players in the G20. Understanding their role within the organization is vital for evaluating the effectiveness of the G20 as a forum for international cooperation and addressing global challenges. The research that has been submitted is sufficient to contribute to the research that will be carried out in the complexity of the G20 interests and the national interests of each member. Therefore, it is hoped that this research can provide an analysis related to the complexity of the G20 membership, which includes two country-level groups with different interests.

Discussion

G20 Membership Complexity and Differences of Interest

Since established as a forum that addresses international economic issues in 1999, the G20 has been responsible for countries' needs in providing cooperation and a platform for economic policy-making. To facilitate this urgency, the G20 forum seeks to involve countries in membership of the world's largest advanced and emerging economies. The membership is expected to include countries that represent more than 60% of the world's population, 85% of global GDP, and 75% of global trade.

At the beginning of the G20, the forum seemed quite ambitious, as the spirit of addressing global economic problems was maintained as a continuation of the G7. When the previously formed G7 was deemed unsuccessful in solving economic problems, the G20 came into force with other countries such as Russia, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Argentina, and South Africa (in the first phase), and then added Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Indonesia (in the next phase) (Jokela J., 2011). The presence of these various countries adds multilateral value, especially in the policy formulation process.

Although the formation of the G20 is considered a forum that can fulfill the interests of all actors in producing new solutions to economic problems, oligarchic tendencies in global governance can be seen in its membership. Cooper and Pouliot (2015) argue that the G20 has arbitrary membership rules because it is self-determined and dominated by the power of former countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France (Cooper & Pouliot, How much is global governance changing? The G20 as international practice, 2015). This raises new concerns that the G20 cannot strengthen its position as a platform that can accommodate various interests but collides with the limitations formed at the beginning of its presence, also known as "multilateralism of differences" (Cooper A. F., 2015).

The G20 has a complex membership structure as a form of a cooperative group. This is based on the group of developed and developing countries and the group of Western countries, usually called the G7 and the BRICS group, which consists of various countries. The two groups, especially the G7 and BRICS, have different policies in responding to various global issues, even attacking and criticizing each other a little because they both have sufficient power to achieve their respective interests and existence in global politics. The G20 also has informal members with a prominent role, such as the involvement of regional organizations such as ASEAN, the African Union, and others. In addition, there is the involvement of other international organizations such as the International Monetary Forum (IMF), the United Nations (UN), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD) (Hajnal, 2022).

The involvement of various international organizations is a form of strength and weakness of the G20 in achieving its goals. The conflicting actors that are involved in the G20, each of which has a different group. Ukraine is under the support of G7 countries led by the United States and the European Union, while Russia is a member of the BRICS. The Ukraine-Russia conflict has become a battle for the interests of the United States and its Western allies with Russia and its allies. This can be seen in several UN sessions discussing the Ukraine-Russia conflict, namely, from the emergence of a humanitarian crisis to a food crisis that threatens the world; both have different responses (United Nations, 2022).

As part of the BRICS member countries, Russia and other BRICS member countries have contributed significantly to influence countries in the region. This can be seen in terms of a reasonably large population (40%), land coverage (30%), global nominal GDP (25%), and world trade (18%) (Smith-Boyle, 2022). Another critical point of interest is the ability of the BRICS countries to spread their influence and interests as recently as 2022, which can even be compared to other powers such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia possesses more warheads than NATO countries, which is 6,257 (Doyle, 2022), which poses a more severe threat. Moreover, if it is added with two other nuclear powers, such as China and India, the warheads that BRICS can produce can be estimated to be as many as 6,763 (Doyle, 2022). With this data, BRICS certainly has the advantage of being able to voice its interests in various forums.

On the other hand, the G7 member countries consisting of Western countries, continue to voice their support for Ukraine. Issues related to human rights and the position of Ukraine, a victim of the war and attacks carried out by Russia, continue to be echoed in strengthening its position against Ukraine. Some assistance was also provided to help Ukraine bounce back after being attacked by Russia. The assistance is distributed through food, moral support, a safe place for displaced persons and refugees, financial and economical, and sanctions that will be given to Russia (G7 Germany, 2022).

For the G7, the issue of the Russo-Ukrainian war is a top priority so that it can be resolved immediately. The G7 meeting in Germany on 26-28 June 2022 proves this issue is still crucial and is feared to have a much more significant impact, especially for the world economy. Western powers that are members of the G7 strengthen their position in opposing the aggression carried out by Russia (International Crisis Group, 2022). The G7 sees that the severe threat posed by the war will significantly affect global commodity prices and other economic crises. The G7's concern about the crisis has expanded to become a crisis of multilateralism that will impact the global economy in the future (International Crisis Group, 2022). To that end, some of the proposals made during this period also focused on aspects of the crisis in other parts of the world, such as most African and Middle Eastern countries (International Crisis Group, 2022).

The Russia-Ukraine conflict is a challenge for the G20. The economic threats resulting from the war have forced the G20 countries to develop practical solutions to restore the global economy. The role of the BRICS countries is essential to underline, especially for India and China. The two countries have proven significant economic improvements for the prospects for future BRICS cooperation. The formation of cooperation carried out by the countries of the Global South is a new hope in breaking the domination and hegemony created by Western countries. Important actors, such as India and China, are expected to be able to contribute to a world order that is based on rules, is stable, and can also respect the diversity of political systems and development (Cooper & Farooq, The Role of China and India in the G20 and BRICS: Commonalities or Competitive Behaviour, 2016). Both countries' position provides more expectations for the BRICS countries to bring the Global South's interests to multilateral forums such as the G20.

India risks pushing the boundaries of the coexistence of exceptionalism (as emerging powers) and universalism by choosing a strategy for the G20 and the BRICS that prevents the suspended equipoise between dualistic self-identities from being redefined (as part of the Global South). In other words, ambivalence becomes uncertain when India is perceived as lacking the capability, not just the commitment, to take on this enhanced role as a status-seeking rising power. Comparatively speaking, China's style of ambivalence allows for an impressive ratcheting up of state agency in managing coexistence by keeping sensitive to the need to balance, if not reconcile, its dualistic self-identities and its self-interest. By applying superior material resources, China remained connected to other countries in the Global South via the BRICS while increasing the advantages of inclusion as a privileged insider via the G20 (Cooper, A.F., 2021). In comparison to India, which continues to struggle to reconcile in practice the strained coexistence between its two minds of national status-seeking and collective solidarity, China's combination of flexibility and instrumentality, with greater attention to locating equilibrium between its dual identities, allows China to perform within a broader range of possibilities (Cooper, A.F., 2021).

Differences in G7 and BRICS Responses to the Food Crisis due to the Ukraine-Russia Conflict and the G20 Challenge

The different interests of the two groups pose a significant burden to the G20 in overcoming the problem of a declining world economy. The G7 is a group of countries that support Ukraine, while the BRISC is a group that supports Russia. These two groups have different perspectives on the Ukraine-Russia conflict and the resulting impact of the conflict, namely the food crisis. G7 calls for unity against Russia (Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office & The Rt Hon Elizabeth Truss MP, 2022). As a result of this difference in response, the food crisis is getting longer, so various regions are facing the threat of a massive food crisis. The United Nations voiced concern about the adverse effects for many countries on the impact of the Russian invasion on global food availability because Ukraine and Russia are not only producing countries for wheat and sunflower seed oil, but Ukraine has ports and international trade routes. So that the conflict also hampered the exports and imports of other countries. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said that the conflict between Ukraine and Russia created the perfect storm for developing countries. The conflict resulted in soaring food and energy prices. Thus making it difficult for all countries to mobilize financial resources (UnitedNations, 2022).

This situation makes the G20 a massive challenge to the problem of declining world economic growth. At the beginning of 2020, the world experienced an economic recession due to Covid-19 which until now has not been resolved. Trade flows were hampered during the pandemic due to policies breaking the chain of Covid-19. This problem took time for the G20 to resolve, with only two summits being held in Saudi Arabia and Italy. Therefore it must be reformulated with inclusive policies at the Bali Indonesia Summit in October 2022. However, in February 2022, the conflict occurred in the European region with an enormous scale of influence on the world economy. This has dramatically burdened the G20 to double recover the world economy.

Several countries are facing the threat of a food crisis, which has hampered world food supplies because each country has decided to withhold its domestic food exports. One of the countries that responded was India. India is a member of the G20 in response to the wheat crisis in May 2022. The increase in world wheat prices has driven the world's demand for wheat to be giant. India, as a wheat-producing country, issued a policy not to export wheat on the grounds of guaranteeing its basic domestic needs. Banning wheat exports adds to the reduced supply of world wheat, and many countries do not agree with India's efforts to issue this policy. However, India found unexpected support for the change in export policy. China, previously facing challenges from the WTO in export restraint, turned out to support India and underlined that India has contributed as a global supplier of wheat. Support for the export ban policy is carried out by China as a form of diplomacy so that China accepts the use of applications being developed in China. China's behavior as a member country of the G20 shows that support for India is not to solve the global grain security problem but that there is China's interest in India (Chakraborty, 2022). On the other hand, the responses of the G20 countries at the UN session to resolve the Ukraine-Russia conflict were very diverse. As a G20 country, China has not provided a response that could make it easier for the G20 to achieve the goal of boosting the world economy, but domestic interests are prioritized.

India and China are BRICS member states and, at several UN conferences, abstained from UN efforts to encourage Russia to stop its attacks on Ukraine. Unlike the case with the G7 countries that support international sanctions against Russia. At the June 23, 2022, BRICS Summit, which took place in China, President Xi Jinping, in his speech, criticized the Western boycott of Russia. Xi Jinping considered it a form of abuse of international sanctions (Aljazeera, 2022). This proves that China is in alliance with Russia and supports Russia in the Ukraine and Russia wars. When the economic situation was damaged due to international sanctions imposed by Western countries, President Putin stated that the BRICS countries had helped the Russian economy. This is a stark reminder that Russia, China, and the other four BRICS countries also support the war. During the meeting, President Xi Jinping also emphasized that Western countries are using global economic policies as a weapon to punish enemy countries, including Russia. Putin emphasized that Russia is ready to fight for years for the territory of Ukraine and is supported by the BRICS countries (Aljazeera, 2022).

Meanwhile, on the other hand, the June 2022 G7 Summit expressed full support for Ukraine and encouraged Russia not to attack Ukraine. Based on the G7 Annual Report states that the G7 is committed to helping Ukraine uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity by trying to meet Ukraine's needs, both military and economic needs (Elmau, 2022). In addition, the G7 emphasized that Russia must be responsible for the increasing threat to global food security because it has blocked trade routes and Black Sea ports and damaged Ukrainian agricultural products. The G7 will actively exert international economic and political pressure on Russia (Elmau, G7 Statement on Support for Ukraine, 2022). Thus the conflict between Ukraine and Russia was considered by the G7 countries as a whole to be Russia's fault. Therefore, differences of opinion regarding the Ukraine-Russia conflict sparked differences regarding how to end it, making it very difficult to resolve the crisis if it cannot be resolved. The two countries in conflict have different power and political support. This conflict triggered a world food crisis, making it difficult for the G20 to boost the global economy. Therefore the differences between the two camps have caused a multilateral crisis within the G20. Thus it will be difficult for the G20 to take appropriate steps to end the world food crisis.

Discussion of the food crisis in Indonesia's G20 continues to be linked to security issues, so at the G20 Bali Summit in November 2022, representatives of the Russian government refused to discuss security as the leading cause of the food crisis. The G20 Indonesia Summit experienced tension due to discussions on the Russia and Ukraine conflict, which became the center of attention, with most members strongly condemning the military action. Responding to this, the Russian foreign minister said that the G20 Summit was not the place to discuss security issues, but what must be prioritized were world economic problems (Aljazeera, 2022). Further discussions on security and conflict issues triggered a major food crisis. It is known that Ukraine and Russia are the countries that produce about one-third of the world's wheat and two-thirds of sunflower seed oil. Several countries experienced difficulties meeting their domestic needs due to the conflict, which resulted in inflation in several countries. One of the regions most vulnerable to these conflicts is the African region. Africa is an area that is prone to conflict, so hunger is very much lurking in the fate of African countries (Filseth, 2022).

This discussion regarding the food crisis gave rise to clear pros and cons between the BRICS and the G7 because, on several occasions, the G7 and BRICS meetings did not seek a solution to the conflict but criticized each other for who was wrong and who was right. At the June 23, 2022, BRICS Summit, which took place in China, President Xi Jinping, in his speech, criticized the Western boycott of Russia. Xi Jinping considered it a form of abuse of international sanctions (Aljazeera, 2022). Meanwhile, on the other hand, the G7 Summit, which was held in June 2022, expressed full support for Ukraine and encouraged Russia not to attack Ukraine. For the G7, the one most responsible for the problem of food crisis or food security problem is Russia due to the conflict caused by that country (Elmau, 2022). Based on the G7 Annual Report states that the G7 is committed to helping Ukraine uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity by trying to meet Ukraine's needs, both military needs (Elmau, 2022). The need for military power supply against Ukraine is still a priority for the G7 countries instead of emphasizing how to resolve the conflict so that a food crisis does not occur in order to save the world from a food crisis due to the conflict.

The food crisis in various regions due to the Ukraine-Russia conflict has become a fact for the world community. At the beginning of the conflict, European countries faced the threat of not fulfilling their domestic energy needs, threatening several German companies to close as it is known that Russia supplies 40 percent of Germany's gas needs. German Economy Minister Robert Habeck warned that his country is experiencing a gas crisis because Russia's exports to Germany are meager. Robert Habeck said that if the gas crisis continues, it will cause the German industry to experience significant paralysis. The Ukraine-Russia conflict also had an impact on Middle Eastern countries where the imposition of economic sanctions against Russia by the West made it difficult for the Arab Gulf countries to import food grains from Russia because it was difficult to transfer funds to Russian companies and ensure merchant ships (Hiltermann, Esfaniary, Fabiani, & Vaez, 2022). Apart from Africa and the Middle East, South Asian countries are also experiencing an economic recession. One is India; to meet its domestic needs, the Indian government issued a policy banning wheat exports on May 13, 2022. The increase in wheat prices started from US$ 325 to US$ 450 after Russia decided to attack Ukraine (Chakraborty, 2022). If the policy to increase India's wheat exports occurs, it can compensate for the supply shortage from Ukraine during April 2022. However, seeing that the world is increasingly vulnerable to a food crisis, the Indian government issued a policy to ban wheat exports. Another reason for India's wheat export ban policy is to maintain South Asia's regional food needs (Chakraborty, 2022). Despite this, the South Asian countries' need for wheat did not gain access to wheat exports.

Southeast Asian countries also face a food crisis. Based on data from the World Bank in June 2022, it was stated that inflation in developed countries had increased to 6.95% this year, and the inflation rate in developing countries had increased to 9.37%. The Ukraine-Russia conflict threatens developing countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and several European countries with different dependency models. The crises occurring in several areas above are not a paramount concern. Instead, claim the truth and attack each other because of the political interests of each G7 and BRICS countries. This conflict of interests makes it difficult for the Indonesian G20 to make effective policies because there are different interests and focus on other problems of the G20 members, which become an obstacle to making effective policies. This difference in interests makes it difficult for the G20 norm-setting to formulate policies against the world food crisis.

Despite the political sentiments arising from the Ukraine-Russia conflict, BRICS, and G7 at the G20 Bali Summit, Indonesia did not show political sentiment; for example, not many BRISC and G7 members attended the G20 Summit. However, what happened was the opposite; all member countries attended the Bali G20 Summit even though Russia did not attend the Summit. Even countries that contradict each other and openly differ in opinion, namely China as a member of the BRICS and the United States as a member of the G7, did not show a contradictory reaction in the discussion of the food crisis at the G20 Summit in Bali. Nevertheless, the G7 is still pressing Russia and helping Ukraine until now. Both BRICS and G7 member countries support world economic recovery and push for a solution to the food crisis but cannot resolve sentiment and conflicting political interests towards the Ukraine-Russia conflict as one of the causes of the food crisis, so these different political interests trigger a food crisis that is difficult to resolve.

Conclusion

The complexity of membership in the G20 has advantages and disadvantages; on the one hand, the complexity of membership will trigger the success of G20 policies in formulating economic problems and the causes of hindering world economic growth. Discuss how to deal with the problem of food crisis and other problems that trigger a downturn in the world economy. However, in the frame of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, some G20 countries have different perspectives because these countries have different interests and have enough power to survive their respective existences. The G20 has not been able to resolve the problem of conflict of interest, primarily related to the interests of Western countries represented by the United States towards Russia with their respective interest groups. In the G20, the existence of the G7 and BRICS, especially in response to the Ukraine-Russia conflict, shows that the complexity of membership is also a weakness for the G20 because countries still ensure the political interests of each country. Even so, in a regime, there must be black and white where the regime's complexity is an advantage; on the other hand, it can also be a weakness. The complexity of membership triggers the multilateral crisis of the G20, especially in dealing with the Ukraine-Russia conflict. The countries involved in the conflict are no longer two sovereign countries but a cooperation group where each country in conflict has an interest that triggers the difficulty of reaching a consensus in the G20. The position of the G20 in the Ukraine-Russia conflict is a major challenge that is considered to lead to the ineffectiveness of the G20 consensus. The G20 Bali Indonesia in 2022 will experience difficulties in achieving its goal of encouraging efforts to recover the world economy after experiencing a recession due to Covid-19.

The weakness in this article, namely assessing the complexity of membership as a weakness of the G20, is seen in only one issue: the world food crisis due to the Ukraine-Russia conflict.

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Narrative Policy Framework (NFP) Electronic System Operator Policy: Surveillance and Cyber Security

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Indonesia, as one of the Global South countries, has responded to digital transformation by launching the policy of the Minister of Communication and Information Technology Number 5 of 2020 concerning the Implementation of Private Electronic Systems (ESO) for the realization of digital sovereignty. The policy reaped negative sentiments from the public. Several articles considered 'rubber articles' indicated to weaken human rights in obtaining and conveying information, as stated in Article 28F of the 1945 Constitution. This study aims to understand the narrative of digital sovereignty built by Kominfo in the ESO policy and strategies to strengthen that narrative. The research method uses a qualitative approach to the Narrative Policy Framework (NFP) by collecting reliable online data from the official Kominfo website, online media, and press conference videos. This study was studied using Agency Theory, where the Indonesian people, as the principal, delegate authority to the agent, Kominfo, related to ESO policies. The results of the NPF found economic narration from the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology. This narration contradicts the narrative of ESO's policy with the goal of its existence, which is the realization of digital sovereignty. This study also underscores the importance of co-regulation with ESO to strengthen the narrative of digital sovereignty.

Keywords: *Narrative Policy Framework; ESO policy; digital sovereignty; surveillance; cyber security*

Introduction

As one of the Global South countries, Indonesia responds to digital transformation by launching the Regulation of the Minister of Communication and Information (Permenkominfo) for Electronic System Operators (ESO) in the private sphere to achieve digital sovereignty. The Ministry of Communication and Information (Kominfo) of the Republic of Indonesia announced through a press conference that the deadline for private ESO registration is to end on July 20, 2022. Based on Government Regulation Number 71 of 2019 and Minister of Communication and Information Technology Regulation Number 10 of 2021 concerning the Amendment to the Regulation of the Minister of Communication and Information Technology Number 5 of 2020 (ESO, 2020). Unfortunately, this policy reaps negative sentiments from the public.

Drone Emprit Publication, through news and conversations on Twitter with #BlokirKominfo, reported that negative public sentiment reached 81% while positive sentiment was only 12% (Rahman, 2022).

Negative sentiment contains tweets related to criticism of the steps of the Ministry of Communication and Information when blocking the Steam site, Paypal, and online game applications. In addition, the public said that Kominfo's steps had killed livelihoods and content creators' freedom of expression, and the people also compared them with not blocking gambling sites. Public digital rights threaten the public, which is related to privacy violations and restrictions on activities using social media (Rahman, 2022).

The policies that have the potential to violate Human Rights are the application of governance and moderation of information and/or electronic documents in Act 9, paragraphs 3 and 4, requests for termination of access to Act 14, and recommendations for access to data, information, and/or private conversations Act 36 Permenkominfo No. 5/2020 (SAFEnet, 2022). This situation has deviated from democratic values and human rights in obtaining and conveying information as stated in Act 28F of the 1945 Constitution. In addition to receiving information, the public as information transmitters is also faced with ambiguity because no policy specification regulates content.

According to IT expert Teguh Aprianto, the ESO policy raises the assumption of a 'rubber act' (Riyanto, 2022). Rubber Act or rubber law is an article on statutory regulations whose interpretation is subjective and originating from law enforcers or other related parties (Wulandari *et al.,* 2021). The rubber article has been indicated in the ITE Law, which is also the basis for creating ESO policies; the article is in Article 27, paragraph 3 on defamation, and Article 29 on threats of violence.

In terms of violence, this has happened to PSE loans or online loans. LBH Jakarta stated that these crimes consisted of bills committed with various criminal acts, such as threats, fraud, dissemination of personal data, and even sexual harassment (LBH Jakarta, 2021).

The case involved misuse of personal data by online lending ESO and was deemed to violate human rights. Moreover, indirectly there has been a crime in the digital space. Then the function of ESO is questioned as a third party present to fix people's problems in the digital space.

The above phenomenon is the background for this research to emerge. The ESO polemic, initially presented as a response to the problem of Indonesia's digital sovereignty, has raised questions about "whose digital sovereignty belongs to?". As a democratic country that uses the law as a guide, this polemic signifies the urgency of evaluating policies that have the potential to violate the purpose of its formation, digital sovereignty. Therefore, this study aims to find out the narrative of "digital sovereignty" built by the government regarding ESO policies and formulate strategies to strengthen ESO policies in Indonesia.

Adonis (2019) carried out critical research on digital sovereignty literature to discover the digital sovereignty narrative. Adonis (2019) classifies literature taxonomically into four main themes: conceptual development of digital sovereignty, actors in digital sovereignty, digital sovereignty and global internet governance, and categorical issues. Of these four categories, the narrative of 'digital sovereignty' is dominated by the state's central position in the political security field. Meanwhile, the political-security narrative is far from social and economic civil rights.

Lambach and Oppermann (2022) researched digital sovereignty narratives on German political discourse using narrative analysis methods on three structural elements: setting, character, and employment. The study's results found seven overlapping and partially contradictory digital sovereignty narratives, summarized in five: economic prosperity narrative, security narrative, "European way of life" narrative, modern state narrative, and individual empowerment narrative (Lambach & Oppermann, 2022). These five narratives have different elemental structures.

In the narrative of economic prosperity, Germany emphasizes the global struggle to win economic competitiveness. The main character is the government, specifically the Ministry of Economy and Energy and the Ministry of Transportation and Digital Infrastructure, with a digital transformation setting. At the same time, the narrative plot comprises five pillars: market-oriented law, reducing dependence on non-European actors, German and European digital industrial policies, digital education, and the importance of cooperation across Europe (Lambach & Oppermann, 2022). The main characters are the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, various security agencies where the 'criminals' characters are transnational criminal networks and powerful economic actors (Google, Facebook, Amazon). Chinese companies (Huawei and Alibaba) and foreign state actors (regimes). Chinese and Russian authoritarians, and US intelligence agencies) (Lambach & Oppermann, 2022). Then the narrative plots that this is the government's effort toward strategic autonomy in cyberspace in security technology (Lambach & Oppermann, 2022).

Next is the security narrative with the setting of digital sovereignty in cybersecurity. Cybersecurity refers to practices that ensure three important points called the CIA Triad. As mentioned by Warkentin & Orgeron in the book Digital Technology-Based Teaching by Sandirana Juliana Nendissa, The three points are confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Basmatulhana, 2O22). President Obama also 2009 proclaimed, "I call upon the people of the United States to recognize the importance of cybersecurity and to observe this month with appropriate activities, events, and training to enhance our national security and resilience" (The White House, 2009).

The national security issue is the question of digital sovereignty. As a regulation in Indonesia, ESO tries to provide a solution that still has many inequalities, both in terms of the basis of the law and its implementation. From the phenomena and facts discussed regarding data security issues in the internet world, this research is essential to present, especially in the Indonesian context, ESO policies.

Understanding Digital Sovereignty

The researcher focuses on the category, namely Digital Sovereignty, Government, and The State. This category is one of five categories of digital sovereignty, according to Couture & Toupin (2019), based on the actors involved and related issues. In digital sovereignty, the government and the state emphasize the importance of the state enacting regulations to control cyber activity.

The mobilization of the idea of 'sovereignty' that has existed since ancient Roman times (Hinsley, 1986) to the 'digital' realm has resulted in new terminology, digital sovereignty. The modern concept of sovereignty relates to the state (Couture & Toupin, 2019), which in the Cambridge Dictionary is defined as 'the power of a country to control its government' (Cambridge, 2022). Philpot mentions four essential aspects of sovereignty in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2020), namely:

1. the holder of the sovereign has authority,
2. the holder of the sovereignty derives authority from several mutually recognized sources of legitimacy,
3. the highest authority, and
4. this authority lies over an area.

Another definition is from Pierre Belanger, a CEO of a radio station in France. Pierre defined digital sovereignty in 2011 as 'control of our present and destiny as manifested and guided by the use of technology and computer network' (Gueham, 2017). The discussion of digital sovereignty depends on the perspective used because it will determine the meaning of this terminology.

The term 'digital sovereignty' started with the emergence of 'cloud technology. This technology allows someone to have a virtual space to store internet data. Raises several problems related to cross-border data, which the government responds to by regulating cyberspace. Regarding the relationship between national sovereignty and cyberspace, The Economist (2012) states that the state is divided into two camps: "One consists of the more authoritarian states, who want to turn back time and regain sovereignty over parts of the world. Others want to keep their national internet and its governance as it is".

Powers and Jablonski (in Couture & Toupin, 2019) exemplify China and the Western Government as two different camps, China with the discourse of information sovereignty and the Western Government with internet freedom. From the political economy perspective, globalism is considered beneficial for the Western economy, so it is necessary to control the information network. However, this raises the issue of excessive government surveillance. According to Hao Yeli (2017), it results in three debates from a virtual space perspective: contradictions with the spirit of the internet, human rights, and contradictions with multi-stakeholder involvement in internet regulation.

Indonesia responds to the digital world by trying to realize "digital sovereignty" through the PSE policy. Digital is conventionally defined, meaning technologies, infrastructures, data, and content based on and using electronic computing techniques (Peters, 2016, p. 94). Looking at the Cambridge Dictionary and the development of cyberspace, researchers define *digital sovereignty* as 'the power of a country to control its government by regulating cyberspace to avoid problems related to cross-border data.'

The idea of "sovereignty" concerning digital is then mobilized by various actors, starting from the head of state and other parties involved. In this article, the Ministry of Communication and Informatics promotes goals as diverse as state protectionism, multi-stakeholder Internet governance, or protection against state surveillance.

<u>Understanding Government as Agents</u>

In analyzing this study, researchers used Agency Theory. Agency theory was introduced by Jensen and Mecking (1976), who are economists. This theory explains the relationship between an individual or group of individuals (principals) employing one or more people (agents) to delegate responsibilities/jobs. Jensen and Mecking give an example of principals, such as shareholders who give authority, while agents are company managers responsible for running the company. In line with the Agency Theory, the Indonesian people are the principals who delegate authority to agents, namely Kominfo, related to ESO policies.

According to Eisenhardt (1989), there are three assumptions of this theory, namely, assumptions about human nature, namely self-interest, bounded rationality, and risk aversion. This self-interested nature plays an essential role in policy and even affects the implementation of the policy itself (Rahayu, 2018). Agents controlling this system do not guarantee that they will obey the principal because there is an interest in maximizing profit (Rahayu, 2018).

There is an information gap between the agent and the principal, or what Scott (2000) calls information asymmetry. Agents have more information to act according to their self-interest, while principals with less information struggle to control agents. This causes differences in the direction and goals of the principal and agent, thus potentially creating conflict (Rahayu, 2018).

Methodology

The power of narrative in public policy illustrates the importance of language, examines discourse, and displays hidden ideologies (McBeth & Jones, 2010). Narrative research plays an important role, especially in analyzing public policy. Hukkinen, Roe, and Rochlin (1990) mention Narrative Policy Analysis (NPA) which aims to seek consensus and policy solutions. Jones and McBeth (2010) introduced the Narrative Policy Framework 2010 as a 'quantitative, structuralist, and positivist approach as a study and theory of policy narrative development.' Gray and Jones (2016) state that NPF is compatible with qualitative research. This qualitative NPF adapts previous studies regarding elements or components of policy narratives: setting or context, plot, characters, and story morals. The researcher uses this qualitative Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) method to analyze the ESO policy narrative.

In NPF research, there are three levels of analysis according to the focus of the analysis. At the macro level, the analysis focuses on institutional and cultural policy narratives; at the meso level, with groups and coalitions, micro influences policy narratives on individuals (Gray & Jones, 2016). This micro-level focuses on how individuals create and are shaped by narratives, such as public opinion about a policy. At the meso level, policy actors build and communicate narratives to actors who influence the policy process. Then, at the macro level, the research elaborates on the research question of how policy changes or stability in the context of cultural and political institutions (Ristyastuti & Rofii, 2021). The researcher analyses this policy narrative at the meso level of analysis, namely the Ministry of Communication and Information (Kominfo) as the actor of the policy.

Researchers used secondary data from press releases on the Kominfo website, Kominfo press conferences on the Youtube platform, and online media relevant to the research topic. There are four main keywords that researchers use in determining research data' digital sovereignty', 'ESO policy,' 'surveillance,' and 'cybersecurity.' Several relevant literature sources from scientific journals, books, or reports support this research.

Results and Discussion

The Private Electronic System Operator (ESO) policy is a response from the Ministry of Communication and Information, which is narrated to protect digital sovereignty and the rights of Indonesian citizens. It is an initial effort to create a more accountable digital ecosystem. Act 47 of the ESO Policy states that Private Scope ESOs have a registration deadline of no later than 6 (six) months since this Ministerial Regulation comes into effect on July 20, 2022, to be precise (Kominfo, 2020). ESOs who have yet to register will receive a warning and a letter and block access if they do not respond. In a press release dated July 29, 2022, Kominfo explained the evaluation results, where 10 of the 100 most popular SE in the mandatory registration category had yet to register (Kominfo, 2022). The result was 7 ESO blocked on July 30. After that, ESO policy was in the spotlight. The Kominfo Block hashtag has gone viral, with various negative opinions. Then, through a press release, Kominfo denied the issue.

For this reason, the setting of this research is on the role and involvement of Kominfo in handling digital sovereignty through the ESO policy. Meanwhile, the time setting follows the mention of the keywords 'digital sovereignty' and 'ESO' on the Kominfo website, from December 9, 2013, to August 6, 2022. There are 26 acts in the form of media highlights and press releases related to 'digital sovereignty, which are the primary data. For ESO, the researcher took a video of the Virtual Press Conference conducted by Kominfo.

Kominfo shows the narrative that they are heroes in their press release because they can maintain digital sovereignty by solving the problem of protecting people's rights in the digital world. These narratives can be seen in most press release headlines such as 'Fight for Digital Sovereignty,' 'Maintain Digital Sovereignty,' and 'Realise Sovereignty.' Electronic System Operators are criminals because they are considered owners of illegal systems in Indonesia. In its press release, Kominfo stated that blocking and terminating access occurred at several ESOs because they had not registered, and some were online games with gambling elements (Kominfo, 2022). The public is a victim of the lack of sovereignty in the digital space, as seen in Table 1.

Table 1
Identification Results
Narrative Framework Policy

Narrative Framework Policy	
Level analysis	Meso: Ministry of Communication and Informatics
Settings	• Handling Digital Sovereignty • The role and involvement of Kominfo • December 9, 2013 - August 6, 2022 • Indonesia
Charac-ters	Heroes: Kominfo (press release) Villain: Electronic System Operator (ESO dominant narrative) Victims: Indonesian Society (Counter Narration)
Plot	• Initial: Issuing a termination sanction for unregistered ESO • Middle: Blocking unregistered ESO • End: Responding to public sentiment regarding ESO
Moral of the story	Co-regulation with the electronic system operator (ESO)

<u>The Settings: Narrative of Digital Sovereignty</u>

Kominfo started the ‘digital sovereignty’ narrative on the official website kominfo.go.id on December 9, 2013. Before, ‘digital sovereignty’ referred to frequency sovereignty related to cellular operators. 2017 was the starting point for the ‘digital sovereignty’ issue to be included in the discussion. On January 20, 2017, the Kominfo website again included digital sovereignty, quoting the Indonesian Internet Service Providers Association (APJII) chairman. He stated that email and cloud-based in Indonesia were related to increasing digital sovereignty. The discourse of this term developed along with internet penetration, reaching 54.68% or 143.26 million people (Kominfo, 2017). On August 20, 2017, Press Release, Kominfo presented a discourse on redefining ‘digital sovereignty. Through the Minister of Communication and Information Rudiantara, he stated:

“What do we need to do to redefine digital sovereignty? Because sovereignty in cyber media is different from others. I believe in added value; as long as there is added value from a business process. It does not have to be all in Indonesia because digital technology is already global, so we must formulate this sovereign mindset. In formulating sovereignty, we must not be chauvinistic in the digital world.” (Kominfo, 2017)

Kominfo, through the Minister of Communications and Informatics Rudiantara, defines digital sovereignty as ‘...processes related to digital technology, applications, devices, ecosystems, and networks. These value-added processes must exist in Indonesia…’ (Kominfo, 2017). Digital sovereignty is considered to impact the national economy by mentioning added value. The value is related to the magnitude of a commodity’s increasing value at its production stage (Koedel, 2015). The solution offered by Kominfo at that time was to encourage the development of local applications focused on education and health. In addition, the expansion of the Kominfo function is not only as a regulator but also as a facilitator and accelerator (Kominfo, 2017).

After the redefinition narrative, Kominfo uploaded media highlights which began to present a narrative of national borders in the digital world, considering that Indonesia is a profitable market. There is a discussion of the Draft Government Regulation (RPP) on e-commerce trade transactions to application developers and foreign OTT regarding taxes and royalties as material restrictions. Until 2018, digital sovereignty narrated on the official Kominfo website was still within the scope of economic and infrastructure issues.

Digital sovereignty is the ability to control digital assets, such as data, content, or digital infrastructure or the use of those data assets (Snowden, 2013). In 2019, Kominfo began narrating this data sovereignty-related digital sovereignty. Digital HR competence and data security are essential issues besides infrastructure issues. Data is a new wealth for the nation, giving rise to discussions and regulations on Personal Data Protection (PDP) with a narrative to benefit the state and the people (Kominfo, 2019).

Kominfo's narrative is in line with the statement from the Chief of Staff of the President, Dr. Moeldoko, who stated that digital sovereignty is a critical factor in protecting the country's economic growth and realizing national cybersecurity (Kantor Staf Presiden, 2022). Likewise, the statement of Muhammad Arif Angga, chairman of APJII, said that "defending cyber sovereignty is equivalent to defending the sovereignty of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI)" (APJII, 2022).

The pandemic has increased the discussion of digital sovereignty more comprehensively. Apart from the Government and APJII, Telkomsel, a state-owned telecommunications operator, also issued a statement linking digital sovereignty to the economy. First, Whisnutama, Main Commissioner PT Telkomsel, mentioned 'digital sovereignty to create opportunities and potential for service actors and local Indonesian products to be competent in the digital era' (Wijayanti, 2021). Next is Fajrin Rasyid, Digital Business Director of Telkom Indonesia, who underlined digital sovereignty as a critical factor in protecting the country's economic growth and security with online transactions (Chew, 2021).

The increased discussion of digital sovereignty is related to the increase in Indonesia's internet penetration and the government's plans for digital transformation. Internet penetration has increased from 64.8% in 2018 to 73.7% in 2019-2020 (APJII, 2022), and the commercial implementation of 5G technology in Indonesia in 2021 (Sugandi, 2022). In the 2020-2024 Kominfo Strategic Plan, Kominfo accelerates digital transformation around 5G infrastructure and implementation, digital literacy, and equitable access to communication and information technology regulations (Kominfo, 2021). Digital sovereignty is said to be the key to accelerating this digital transformation.

The year 2022 is a recovery period for Indonesia after the pandemic, as stated in the Day of National Awakening tagline 'Heal Faster, Rise Stronger. The narrative of 'digital sovereignty' is increasingly echoed by the eight press releases on Kominfo's website related to these keywords and the mention of digital sovereignty in the Kominfo press conference at ESO. Kominfo began to take several steps by implementing the Private Scope Electronic System Operator (ESO) policy. It was ratified last November 2020, migration of analog to digital broadcasts, development of digital infrastructure from upstream to downstream, and HR training through the National Digital Literacy Movement.

Dominant Narrative and Counter-Narrative ESO Policy

The researcher identified two dominant narratives of the digital sovereignty narrative related to ESO policies: surveillance and cybersecurity.

Surveillance,

The narrative of digital surveillance in Indonesia was delivered by the Director of Aptika Kemkominfo, Samuel Abrijani Pangerapan, in a Press Conference on Youtube Kemkominfo TV. Pangerapan stated regarding state control, 'We will always open opportunities for anyone who wants to be a part of Indonesia's digital ecosystem; we open them, both domestically and abroad. We are open, but rules are rules. We stand where the sky is upheld' (Kemkominfo TV, 2022). The Private Scope ESO Law for those who do not register, as referred to in paragraph 1, is that the Minister provides administrative sanctions in the form of Termination of Access to Electronic Systems (access blocking) (Permenkominfo 5/2020).

Kominfo's narrative is not by the conditions in the field. From the news regarding the impact of the implementation of the ESO policy, LBH Jakarta, as of August 30, 2022, has received 182 public complaints. The complaint post is intended for disadvantaged people due to arbitrary blocking and repression of freedom in the digital realm due to the enactment of Regulation of the Minister of Communication and Information Technology No. 5 of 2020 (Permenkominfo 5/2020). There are four patterns of problems from the LBH Jakarta report. It is, first, reduced in the form of loss of access to services that are entitled to be obtained. Second, loss in the form of loss of income. Third, losses in the form of loss of work. Fourth, complainants who are doxed as a result of protesting and rejecting the blocking (LBH Jakarta, 2022). Still, in the same press conference, Pangerapan narrates about personal data, not as a form of monitoring feared by the public.

'We cannot see personal data, or we can monitor it; that is not monitoring that way. So the conversation could not let alone ask for the data not carelessly. It cannot be done merely if law enforcement officers, officials, or agencies have the authority. Yesterday I explained that it could all be done if a crime incident requiring additional data to reveal the crime or PT PPATK indicated that there was money laundering. However, those who request data must have authority first. Kominfo is not for that' (Kemkominfo TV, 2022).

The narrative is based on the relevant ESO policy being obliged to provide access to Electronic Systems and Electronic Data to Ministries or Institutions in the context of supervision. Following laws and regulations and must provide access to Electronic Systems and Electronic Data to Law Enforcement Officials in the context of law enforcement by statutory regulations (Permenkominfo 5/2020).

Cyber security expert and founder of Ethical Hacker Indonesia, Teguh Aprianto, called this a dangerous act because the rubber act uses the phrase "disturbing the public and disturbing public order," which has no explanation. This practice is common in Electronic Information and Transactions Law (ITE) cases. Later it can be used to 'turn off' criticism even if delivered peacefully. What is the basis? They (the government) are only responsible for disturbing public order (CNN Indonesia, 2022).

Regarding personal data, the Head of the Division of Freedom of Expression of SAFEnet, Nenden Sekar Arum, said the rules made by Kominfo are too lax. With that, there are gaps and opportunities for authority holders to access and monitor the specific data of ESO users. It is also exacerbated by the absence of an independent agency appointed to oversee Kominfo in implementing the regulation. According to Nenden, the Permenkominfo has had problems since its inception. He saw that Kominfo only involved the public a little, so the regulations produced seemed only for the government and the ESO. Meanwhile, the rights and losses of ESO consumers should be considered in the current regulations (Sugandi, 2022).

Cybersecurity

The ESO policy's cybersecurity narrative relates to the digital space's security. Pangerapan, at a press conference, explained that 'Every country has its rules, and these rules are to create a digital space that is conducive, safe, and comfortable. Indonesian people can feel digital economic growth and benefit Indonesia' (Kemkominfo TV, 2022). ESO policy prohibits electronic information. As referred to in paragraph 3, electronic documents are classified as: a. violate the provisions of laws and regulations, disturbing the public and disturbing public order, and notifying the way or providing access to Electronic Information Electronic Documents that are prohibited.

Contrary to statements regarding digital security, the current insecurity of the digital space threatens the public. It is proven by the leaks of government-managed data, such as the case of the leak of Indonesian population data from the KPU and BPJS (much, 2021). Likewise, in 2022 there were three data leaks. The data leak of 17 million customers of the State Electricity Company (PLN) in mid-August, browsing history data for Indihome on August 21, and 1.3 billion SIM Card registration data in September, claimed to have come from Kominfo (Saptohutomo, 2022).

Digital Sovereignty: Surveillance and Cybersecurity

In agency theory, agents are assumed to be self-interested. Kominfo, as an agent, raises a discourse on digital sovereignty, which suggests that this ESO Policy is for the benefit of the Indonesian people. However, judging from the narrative built, Kominfo has economic and political motives as a policy agent. It can be seen in the initial mention of 'digital sovereignty' by the Minister of Communication and Informatics Rudiantara (2014-2019), which was based on the concept of 'added value. Then the discussion about the ESO tax was mentioned by the Director General of Aptika Kominfo Samuel Abrijani Pangerapan. In the Kominfo Press Conference on July 19, 2022, Pangarepan emphasized why he had to register the ESO 'This is governance because it is mandatory. They must pay the tax if there is a complaint or profit'' (Kemkominfo TV, 2022).

People, as principals, want a digital space that provides freedom of expression and security for their data. The origins underlie the creation of the internet with the ideology of liberalism, which opposes all forms of control, both state and commercial entities (Castells, 2001). This misalignment of interests between the public (principal) and Kominfo (agent) shows vulnerabilities in surveillance and cybersecurity. Regarding surveillance, the Head of the Division of Freedom of Expression at Safenet, Nenden Sekar Arum, considers that the rules made by Kominfo are too lax. ESO creates gaps in opportunities between authority holders to access and monitor ESO user-specific data. It refers to the definition of specific personal data 'as health data and information, biometric data, genetic data, life/orientation sexual, political views, children's data, personal financial data, and other data by the provisions of laws and regulations.

Apart from supervision, the public, as principals, is also faced with cybersecurity threats with data leaks. Regarding the security of personal data, Kominfo's performance was questioned after three cases of data leaks throughout 2022. The narrative of 'creating a conducive, safe, and comfortable digital space.' What the Director General of Aptika Kominfo said contradicted reality. The hashtag #TuntutKominfo is trending on Twitter in response to the leak of 1.3 billion data that has touched 8,579 tweets since September 8, 2022.

Kominfo responded with a narrative that this was the authority of BSSN, not Kominfo. However, in Government Regulation Number 71 of 2019, Kominfo has the authority as a regulator, accelerator, and facilitator in data management. At the Kominfo Press Conference, Samuel Abrijani told hackers, 'Yes, if you can, do not attack. Because every time there is a data leak, the public is harmed; it is an illegal access act' (Saptohutomo, 2022). For this response, Kominfo also received criticism from the Deputy Chairperson of the Indonesian House of Representatives Coordinator for People's Welfare (Korkesra), Abdul Muhaimin Iskandar, that Kominfo cannot provide personal data protection (Hidayatullah, 2022). Likewise, members of Commission I DPR Nico Siahaan and Nurul Arifin questioned the credibility of Kominfo (Dirgantara, 2022; Astian, 2022).

Concerning data leaks, apart from the credibility of Kominfo in handling cases, the public loss of this data leak is a paramount concern. Kominfo published 'Public Perception of Personal Data Protection 2021', and the public appears to suffer an economic loss. The thing they experienced the most was a reduction in savings in bank accounts (44.1%) and reduced balances in e-wallets (32.2%) to transfers or purchases because they were contacted by certain people or companies (28.1%) (Mutia, 2022). In the scope of cross-border data, on November 2022, a cybersecurity news site Cyber News reported that WhatsApp user data was leaked and sold in an online forum, of which 130,000 were active WhatsApp user numbers from Indonesia (Clinten, 2022). Even though it received objections from Meta, the parent of Whatsapp, this event certainly raises potential impacts detrimental to the state if looking at the Kominfo narrative of data as national wealth.

Policy Middle Way

Dominant narratives and counter-narratives shape digital sovereignty in Indonesia, where there is a gap between the two. This gap is in the form of different perceptions regarding digital sovereignty, information that is less specific from the government, and there needs to be a definition of what kind of crime constitutes a violation of digital sovereignty. From these results, the counter-narrative considers that the termination of access is not part of digital sovereignty because it causes harm to the public (principal), which in the narrative is a protected party.

Table 2
Results, Cons, Dominant and Narrative Differences

Counter Narrative	Dominant Narrative	Cause Difference
There are complaints from people who have experienced arbitrary blocking and repression of freedom due to the implementation of the ESO policy.	Kemkominfo opens opportunities for anyone who wants to be part of Indonesia's digital ecosystem by following existing regulations.	There are different perceptions that the termination of access by Kominfo is considered a process towards a sovereign state. However, it has a significant impact on various sectors.
Indonesia's digital security conditions are filled with hackers, user data leaks, and insecurity in expressing opinions in the digital space.	The narrative of Kemkominfo is that they created rules to form a conducive, safe, and comfortable digital space.	The Kemkominfo narrative is not followed by further detailing, which results in the use of data by some people who take personal advantage.
The ESO policy does not consider the rights and losses of ESO consumers with the opportunity for authorities to access and monitor user-specific data and the absence of an independent agency appointed to supervise.	Kominfo stated that requesting personal data is not a form of supervision. The party accessing it must also have authority for reasons of law enforcement.	Kominfo assumes that public data access and monitoring are related to digital space crimes without specifics on what is considered a crime, so it has the potential to be a policy with gaps to be used by the authorized person.

Minister of Communication and Information Rudiantara said this digital sovereignty relates to the economic concept of 'added value' (Kominfo, 2022). However, if the public suffers a loss due to this termination, the government's narrative makes the meaning of digital sovereignty far from social and economic civil rights.

In agency theory, the imbalance of policy interests between the principal (public) and the agent (Kominfo) causes differences in the direction and objectives of the ESO Policy. Kominfo as an agent controlling the ESO policy, does not guarantee that it will obey the public as the principal because of the interest in maximizing profit. Due to the conflict, the researcher recommends a middle-ground policy based on the facts analyzed from the ESO policy narrative.

Surveillance of information/data plays an essential role in global political economy relations, where its power should be the state's focus (Comor, 1996). In its implementation, there are two modes mentioned by Comor (1996). First, the problem of facilitation, empowerment, and creation, then the mode of control, exclusion, and prevention functions. The narrative shown by Kominfo is dominant in the control function. The termination of access by the Ministry of Communication and Informatics and the clause providing access to personal data if there are legal issues are two regulations showing state control over private sector ESO.

However, policies related to digital sovereignty need to look at from the perspective of the 3 (three) actors involved, namely the state, citizens (citizens), and the international community (Yeli, 2017). This unilateral blocking and access to personal data are not seen from the citizens' perspective. Regarding the blocking, the Indonesian people, as SE users, suffered material losses. Even though it only takes days, termination of applications without socialization with citizens is an unstructured form of the registration system. It shows the facilitation problem in ESO's policies regarding supervision. If this system has not been established, there will be the possibility of the same incident happening again. The public is again at a loss, digital sovereignty is again an issue, and the benefits are questioned for whom.

Next, regarding granting access to specific personal data, which in Act 1 paragraph 1 is defined as "... health data and information, biometric data, genetic data, sexual life/orientation, political views, child data, personal financial data, data other by the provisions of the legislation" (Permenkominfo 5/2020). This understanding shows the complete control of the state in the digital space, in this case, Kominfo. This act also contradicts Act 28G paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution, which states that "everyone has the right to personal protection (privacy), family, honor, dignity, and property (including personal data)" (UUD 1945). Several parties against this control question whether they have adhered to the principles of human rights, which in this case are citizens as netizens. Moreover, there is no facilitation; for example, there is no legal entity, the authorities access the data, and no neutral legal entity to examine or file an objection. The narrative of protecting citizens' rights contradicts the insecurity about implementing the ESO policy.

Cyber security is an essential point for ESO policy in realizing digital sovereignty. Like the Kominfo statement that data is state property, data loss is defined as loss of wealth. In addition, this also relates to cross-border data. Maintaining its security is like maintaining Indonesia's relations with other countries. In this regard, the Global North countries already have a strong cybersecurity foundation.

Meanwhile, Indonesia implements ESO registration without providing an institution that guarantees data security; in addition to the security system, the narrative of the Code of Ethics on Security also needs to be discussed. Russia, China, and Central Asian countries proposed two Codes of Conduct on Information Security at the UN General Assembly in the interest of the country's greater digital ownership (Wood et al., 2020). Indonesia and Southeast Asian countries should have a digital interpretation and jointly build their security infrastructure.

Collaboration is the ideal middle ground. The issue of digital sovereignty is cross-sectoral, so the collaboration of ministries, other government agencies, and related industries is needed. Germany does this by holding a Digital Summit, a joint government-industry discussion forum to advance Germany's digital transformation (Lambach & Oppermann, 2021). Regarding ESO, self-regulation does not work because there is a market blind spot regarding digital privacy and the lack of government control. In contrast, government regulations have political barriers, and the ability to overcome digital problems is also questioned (Hirsch, 2011). Collaboration with industry (in this case, ESO) with the information capital and experience to create a digital sovereignty narrative related to ESO's digital policy has been strengthened.

Regarding policy, Kominfo can use an alternative approach, namely co-regulation, in which the government and industry share responsibility for drafting and regulating (Hirsch, 2011). The European Union uses this approach to implement personal data protection, where the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR-General Data Protection Regulation) applies. Another country, Australia, has also responded by passing the News Media Bargaining Code Law, which aims to address the imbalance between Australian news publishers and the two Silicon Valley giants (Riyanto, 2021).

Conclusion

The virtual world is an inseparable part of all aspects of Indonesian people's life. The presence of the internet forms a digital pattern and ecosystem, forming a living space that moves massively and dynamically on social media. These activities are diverse and worldwide. No longer national but also international. Digital problems arise until digital sovereignty varies from a safe and conducive digital ecosystem. Kominfo responds to this by implementing an ESO policy and a private scope. However, this policy has many interpretations and is considered a rubber act that can be codified and utilized.

Based on the results and discussions related to the ESO policy narrative with the NPF approach, the researchers found that the dominant narrative built by Kominfo is that the ESO policy was carried out to protect people in the digital space for the creation of digital sovereignty. Second, the counter-narrative that hinders the dominant narrative is that excessive surveillance threatens human rights and the reality of personal data protection in Indonesia, which is not yet ideal.

Third, strategic recommendations strengthen the narrative of digital sovereignty related to ESO policies by prioritizing protecting the public's data as the principal rather than the interests of agents with control functions. The first recommendation to Kominfo is to revise the ESO policy, especially in acts related to specific personal data and the prohibition of content that disturbs the public. Then, Kominfo as a facilitator, helps companies from Indonesia, especially in terms of financing, to improve the quality of digital infrastructure facilities in the form of 'cloud' so that data storage as a state asset is located in Indonesia. Kominfo, as the executor, issued an independent institution authorized to protect personal data. Next, collaborate with other ministries and government agencies like Germany did because the issue of digital sovereignty is cross-sectoral. Finally, co-regulation with ESO in making regulations will become a reference for self-regulation platforms operating in Indonesia.

Furthermore, further research is needed in future studies related to digital sovereignty. By knowing the predictions of cyberspace problems, we can take preventive steps, such as preparing regulations that are a priority as the embodiment of digital sovereignty. This regulation will affect the self-regulation platform that will operate in Indonesia.

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The Perilous Road Towards World Society (?): Global South in The Russo-Ukraine War

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This paper addresses the lukewarm reaction exhibited by most of the Global South (GS) states regarding the Russo-Ukraine war. Despite the massive campaigning from the West for the world to side with Ukraine and go against Russia, only a few of the GS states follow through with this narration. Most of them choose to pledge neutrality instead, which is unexpected if one considers that the majority of the GS also experienced military aggressions and occupations in the past. By employing qualitative research methods, this paper is written to provide an interpretation of this phenomenon through the English School perspective, precisely its argument regarding the concepts of the 'International System,' 'International Society,' and 'World Society' spectrum. This paper finds that this condition happens because the GS perceives the Russo-Ukrainian conflict as an 'alien' conflict largely detached from the GS' own international society, which has a separate model of interactions built upon a long span of historical events unrelated to both Russia and Ukraine. This sense of viewing the conflict as 'foreign' emerges from the perspective of this conflict being fought amongst the 'Global North' states. This means that both belligerents are conceptually equal in terms of being actors from 'outside' the international society of the GS. Other than that, the GS also has shared norms that go against the interventionist policies advocated by the GN states. However, the loose notion of 'World Society' is still viable, as, despite the North-South divide, both societies share the expected value of a nation-state's sovereignty.

Keywords: *Global South; Global North; English school, Russo-Ukraine war*

Introduction

Russia started its military aggression on Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Since then, there has been no foreseeable end to the armed conflict, with both belligerents staying firm in their stances. Aside from the United States (US) and states from the European Union (EU) that express their support to Ukraine's cause and are willing to do interventionist actions, there are also a few Asian countries that follow through the steps, namely Japan (Michito, 2022), Singapore, and South Korea (Anonymous, 2022b). A few countries in the Southern Hemisphere also put sanctions on Russia, such as Australia (Anonymous, 2022c) and New Zealand (Anonymous, 2022f). Some experts saw this as proof that the international order led by the US is alive and well (Beckley & Brands, 2022) and that states from all around the world are united by their mutual commitment to the protection of freedom and democracy for all nation-states in the world (Beckley & Brands, 2022).

However, the same could not be said about the rest of the world, particularly from the Global South (GS) states. During the time this paper was written, there has been no clear stance from the GS as a whole or from individual states; this also applies to the tremendous democratic states that are expected to agree with the stance, such as India or the countries in South America (Menon, 2022) that choose to pledge neutrality and urge the commencement of two-way dialogue to resolve the conflict promptly instead of encouraging the currently ongoing assaults to Russia commenced by the Western powers (Anonymous, 2022g). However, on the other hand, they also do not express overt support for Russia's actions either, choosing to focus more on the conflict's effects on the global economy (Anonymous, 2022g). This raises an inquiry about the underlying consideration behind GS states behavior and this research is intended to enrich the scholarship, especially regarding the GS literature.

There is already some literature about how countries in the GS respond to international phenomena outside their territory, especially regarding their response to international conflicts between the Global North (GN) states. When summarised, a few perspectives constantly appear in the body of literature. First, there is the mainstream argument about the realpolitik nature of the decision and how GS states usually respond to the conflicts about the GN, especially those fought between the US, Europe, and aspiring great powers such as China and Russia (Ciorcaori, 2009; Wohlforth, 2009; Herring, 2013; Trenin, 2014; Murphy, 2017; Beehner & Collins, 2020). Meanwhile, some experts argue about the possibility of absolute gain as the main driving factor of the GS states (Oğultürk, 2017; Miskimmon & O'Loughlin, 2017).

However, in that body of literature, there exists a gap: there has been a scarcity in the literature that views this phenomenon specifically through the divergence in how GS states view the world from the concept of 'Global North' and, consequently, how states can deal with armed conflicts according to the GS' norms and rules, that were developed separately from norms and values adhered to by the GN. Aiming to bridge that specific gap, this paper is arranged to answer this research question:

> How did GS develop essential values and norms distinct from those known by the GN states? Which characteristics help explain GS' overall different response compared to the GN regarding the Russo-Ukraine war?

Conceptual Framework

This paper uses the perspective of the English School to answer the research questions, specifically about its tenets concerning the spectrum of the 'International System,' 'International Society,' and 'World Society.' In this school of thought, it is presumed that there is a 'spectrum' to categorize the degree of 'cohesion' of shared norms and rules between states (Viotti & Kauppi, 2012): 1) International system indicates a sense of detachment between states; that is, closer to realist assumption, the state view each other merely as another state with one shared characteristic of the need for survival; 2) International society acknowledges the existence of certain groups of states that have shared values and norms, that create a unique way on how each state interacts within and outside of their pocket; 3) World society, in which this name posits an expectation for the existence of universal values and norms that is adhered universally by all the states. Thus, as a whole, the English School argues that the relations between states are not only fueled by the all-encompassing concepts of 'power' and 'interest' (Viotti & Kauppi, 2012). This perspective is also essential to highlight the societal and historical aspects to understand how particular dynamics may be formed between states that bring forth a distinct set of norms and rules that states adhere to in various degrees.

To carefully examine the particular issue this paper aims to address, this paper explicitly uses Barry Buzan's approach to the English School as the reference to answer the research questions. Based on one of Buzan's articles, "From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School" (1993), he emphasizes examining the difference between 'system' and 'society.' While 'system' connotes the fundamental form of inter-state relations based on power and interest, he argued that the term 'society' imbues such rudimentary inter-state relations with a shared understanding of norms and rules between states. This posits Buzan should be preceded by forming a 'sense of community' between the states that thus enables the emergence of a 'norm of reciprocity.' This very concept of 'community' that does not exist in the calculation of realist and liberal views, argues Buzan, opens up the 'hidden' factor that underlies the formation of such a community with mutual recognition: political foundation needed to motivate the emergence of 'regime' between states.

Buzan also stressed other points about the existence of international societies and their relation to the concept of world society. A few different international societies with varying levels of cohesion between their member states might exist simultaneously. In these societies, state actors are the main actors in the anarchical world setting (Buzan, 1993, pp. 337-339). He also highlighted a peculiar idea that the world society can still exist. At the same time, there is more than one international society because he believes that 'world society' only needs the existence of a typical, universal value to exist (Buzan, 1993, p. 339), one prime example being the notion of national self-determination which has become a worldwide norm after the World War II.

Main Argumentation

This paper posits that the possibility of the GS states' lukewarm response by not taking sides in the Russo-Ukraine war is motivated by the basis of 'foreign' ness of the way GN states to resolve conflict and spread their value. This contrast is especially evident in the regimes born through GN Western states' own experiences, using military campaigns and harsh economic sanctions as the go-to instruments to deal with conflicts and spread their value across the globe.

This paper is arranged into two steps of analysis in order to answer the research question. This paper places the current GS' stance regarding the Russo-Ukraine war as the dependent variable (DV). This variable is influenced by the divergence of the long historical process of the formation of GN and GS, which brings along specific different rules and norms about international conflict, about what is considered a 'dire' security problem, and how the international society should deal with it as the independent variable (IV). Through the description of historical occurrences experienced by both GS and GN and the comparison of divergence between their rules and norms in viewing international conflict resolution, the argument is built around the idea of two co-existing yet having considerable differences in their basic rules and norms.

Research Method

The writing of this paper is conducted through a qualitative research method that employs a literature review as the primary data collection method. Thus, it focuses on the interpretative methodology of the paper and aims to emphasize an ideational point of view why the GS states that consist of developing countries situated in the southern part of the globe, in contrast to their northern counterparts, have been advocating the use of peaceful negotiation between Russia and Ukraine as equal belligerents instead of putting both military and economic coercion towards Russia and its people that we and its allies have done for the time being. This research employs second-hand qualitative data that revolve around 1) Official statements and reports of conferences, proceedings, and action about the Russo-Ukraine war from pivotal GN states, pivotal GS states, and the UN; 2) News websites regarding how states around the world are reacting to the ongoing Russo-Ukraine war; 3) Analysis taken from various policy briefs about how the GS states handle international conflicts, especially of conflicts between GN states, be it as individual states or as a whole community of GS states; 4) Analysis taken from books and journal articles about the background of GS states' involvements in GN-focused conflicts; 5) Online op-ed articles written by experts regarding the GS states' way of dealing with conflicts fought between GN states.

Discussion

Global South: Its Conception, Intent, and the Meaning Behind It

Before talking about the correlation between GS states' stance towards the currently ongoing Russo-Ukraine war to their identification as the 'South,' it is paramount first to establish what the term 'Global South' means in this paper. One important concept is often associated with the term 'Brandt Line.' This term was coined after Willy Brant, the chair of the initiation of a publication titled "North-South: A Program for Survival" (Lees, 2021, pp. 86-87). The publication is a report from experts originating from both 'North' and 'South' parts of the world, containing several recommendations to advance the South after the surge of narration about the North's obligation to help their recently independent, ex-colonial territories to reach prosperity (Lees, 2021, p. 87). Based on the description from "World Politics: Trend and Transformation" written by Shannon E. Blanton and Charles W. Kegley (2017:117-118), three main ways become the concept's core tenets. First, 'Global South' refers to a specific group of states categorized as 'poor,' that is, underdeveloped compared to the 'Global North' states. Second, the description is also based on an imagined geographical 'dividing line' based on the equator, from which the terms 'North' and 'South' came. Then the third, which this paper argues is an essential distinction between the 'North' and 'South,' is the historical background of colonialism, more specifically, the colonization of the 'South' done by the 'North.'

Why does the factor of colonization history become the essential building block in constructing the meaning of 'Global South'? This paper reasons that in the long centuries of colonization, the colonized territories, more precisely those situated outside of the Northern hemisphere, shared the experience of being 'conquered' by colonizers, mainly those from European states. This thus helps to explain the reason why the 'Global South' classification is still very much in use today, despite today's wide variety of the GS states' level of income, stability, ethnicity, and geographical condition (Blanton & Kegley, 2017, p. 119).

While the sub-region of North America also experienced a period of being 'colonized' by the European powers, commonly referred to as the 'first wave' of colonization, there is a particular tenet of the colonization process GS experienced (referred to as the 'second wave' of colonization) that separates it from the first wave: the economic orientation that shaped the motive of colonization itself (Blanton & Kegley, 2017, pp. 120-121). If the first wave was motivated by the mercantilist strategies employed by European states for the sole purpose of filling their national coffers, the second wave had two underlying motivations: 1) To make the economic system of capitalism thrive by providing cheap natural resources and opening up new markets to sell the finished products, and; 2) An attempt at power projection between the fellow European states.

However, just the coincidence of sharing that particular brand of historical background could not possibly create such a robust identity and perception of 'oneness' as a distinct international society that persists until today; there have been conscious efforts to build upon the idea of 'South' as a distinct international society from those states positioned in the 'Global North.' As a relatively novel concept in the long history of international politics, it came into existence in massive decolonization in the aftermath of World War II. At the same time, the end of said colonization also set the stage for the prelude of another global contest: the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union.

Due to this bipolar conflict between the then-superpowers of the world, two international societies were formed between states, the Western Bloc led by the US and Eastern Bloc led by the Soviet Union. Consequently, this division also created other terms to describe the two blocks; 'First World' and 'Second World' (Blanton & Kegley, 2017, p.

118). While these two groups vied for ideological domination over the other and aimed to urge all states to follow either of the blocs, there existed several states that, for their reasons, refused to join either bloc. This group of states would later be called the 'Third World,' consisting of states deemed 'less developed,' spanning across the regions of Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America (Blanton & Kegley, 2017, p. 118).

Those 'Third World' states then banded together under the initiative of Indonesia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan through the commencement of the Bandung Conference, sometimes referred to as Asia-Africa Conference, on April 18-24, 1955 ("Bandung Conference," 1998). This conference, attended by 29 countries that represented more than half of the world's population at the time, brought upon a particular narrative that rejects any forms of imperialism and colonialism, including but not limited to the practice of establishing spheres of influence practiced by both the US and Soviet Union at that time (Blanton & Kegley, 2017, p. 121). From this conference, the Third World states coined a set of norms to be acknowledged among them, called Bandung Dasasila (Ten Principles of Bandung) (National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia, 2014:18):

1. To honor the basics of human rights and to uphold the goals and principles stipulated in the UN Charter;
2. To honor the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nation-states;
3. To recognize the equality of all nations, irreverent to the nation's magnitude;
4. To not commit intervention in the matters of other nation's domestic problems;
5. To honor the right of each nation to defend itself, be it through the might of its own or doing collective measures to do so, as stipulated in the UN charter;
6. To not utilize collective regulations and defense arrangements to advance certain great powers' specific interests; 2) To not exercise pressure onto other nations.
7. To not conduct actions or threats of aggression nor the usage of violence to the territorial integrity or political independence of all states.
8. To resolve every international dispute through peaceful means, such as through negotiations, agreements, arbitrations, judicial approach, or other peaceful means according to the involved parties' preference in accordance with the UN Charter.
9. To advance collective interests and cooperation.
10. To uphold the rule of law and international obligations in the utmost respect.

As the Soviet Union dissolved, the terms of 'first,' 'second,' and 'third' world countries became obsolete, thus giving way to the usage of North-South terms widely used today. Despite that, this paper argues that the effect of the rules and norms of the Bandung Conference still lingers. It is also reflected in the GS states' foreign policy, specifically their stances regarding the

Russo-Ukraine war.

Global North Definition Revisited: Two Enduring Different Principles

Other than examining the historical process of formation of values and rules of the GS, this paper also aims to provide the same scrutiny for the GN society. Starting from the most 'obvious' one, the Brandt Line released in the 1980s (Lees, 2020, pp. 86-87) categorized the 'North' as the territories belonging to the Western and Eastern blocs as the main contending parties in the Cold War. One peculiar thing about this labeling is that after the dissolvent of the Soviet Union, all of the states that were a part of it are still automatically recognized as part of the GN society (Anonymous, 2022a).

Suppose we are talking about the main factors that help 'build' the sense of 'community' in the GN. In that case, the process is inseparable from the existence of three international regimes: the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Warsaw Pact, and the European Union (EU). This section delves into the historical and ideational background of these three regimes as the most apparent manifestations of the North's cohesion dan division shown through the emergence and relations of these international societies. The process already started by the end of World War II. In the aftermath of said war, there was an enormous change to the society of European countries, which were heavily damaged and lost their centuries-long domination over the world (Gabellini, 2016). In comparison, on the opposite, the US experienced a big boom in its economy due to the wartime industrial revival, due to its workforce being immensely revitalized for the war effort, and succeeded in transitioning into the peace-time industry (Pruitt, 2020).

Due to Europe being in shambles after the war, it is reasonable that even colonial powerhouses such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands were forced to forfeit their possessions and, to some degree, influence their colonial subjects (Gabellini, 2016). Then, they were forced to turn back and look after the situation in their war-torn home continent. During this time, the US and the Soviet Union rose as the world's two superpowers, thus giving them a chance to contribute significantly to reshaping the dynamics of relations between the weakened European states. Other than giving various forms of help to rejuvenate war-torn Europe, these two superpowers also created their sphere of influence through the formation of different international societies: while the US formed NATO out of the Western Europe sub-continent (Mudge, 2022), the Soviet Union formed the Warsaw Pact out of the Central and Eastern Europe sub-regions, along with the sub-region of Central Asia in 1955 (Cavendish, 2005). These two international societies, then, became what we know as 'First World' and 'Second World,' respectively.

To compare how the two differ significantly, this paper provides more context regarding these two organizations' values and purposes. First, this paper delves into NATO's history, purposes, and core values. Mentioned on its website (Anonymous, 2022d) that NATO's establishment in 1949 is based on the "common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law" (Anonymous, 2022d) held by the US and its allies. Also, said the organization is also intended to drive the point across that North America is also involved in European security (Anonymous, 2022d), thus linking said sub-region with Western Europe to create an international society that operates under the same norms and rules mentioned before.

Meanwhile, Warsaw Pact operated under different norms and rules. Built upon the idea of creating solidarity between communist states and spreading the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, it was created after NATO decided to facilitate the remilitarisation of West Germany and later admitted the state into NATO (Robertson, Dixon & Schleich, 2015). While NATO based its activity based on its stated commitment to uphold the norm of keeping its member states' liberty and democracy, Warsaw Pact used norms and rules that aimed to bind its member states to the Soviet Union's leadership, which explained the quick crumble of said organization after Gorbachev deprived the organization of its centralistic principles (Robertson, Dixon & Schleich, 2015).

Those divergent international societies with starkly different values and norms co-existed in Europe throughout the Cold War. They contributed significantly to shaping the region's sense of cohesion between political entities inside its borders. However, as the Cold War slowly proceeded and the Soviet Union gradually declined over the years, there were some attempts at regime-building by the European states, done through various treaties and agreements such as the European Coal and Steel Community created in 1951, Treaty of Rome that led to the creation of European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, and culminated in the Treaty of Maastricht that became the base of the EU's formation in 1992 (Valls, 2016). After the Soviet Union's collapse, the EU started its enlargement program to Central and Eastern Europe, slowly unraveling the international society built on the bipolar balance of power. However, the change only happens in the de jure sense because, de facto, the perception of First-Second world division still perseveres today. It impacts various things, including how the GS, as an 'outsider' international society, perceives the Russo-Ukraine war. That part will be elaborated on in the next section.

Looking At the North-South Divide: The Context of Russo-Ukraine War

As a continuation of the previous section, in this section, the paper discusses the connection between the underlying context of the 'North' and 'South' labels elaborated in the previous sections and uses the correlation to theorize about its influence on the GS' states behavior in the middle of the ongoing Russo-Ukraine war. Despite the end of the Cold War, this paper argues that the lingering sentiments of politics and belonging still lingers today. One such intriguing sign is that most of the post-Soviet states, including Ukraine, are still categorized as the 'Global North' despite their status as developing economies (Anonymous, 2022a).

Based on the Brandt Line and GDP per capita division comparison, it is evident that the North-South division is more about the political factor than about perceived economic disparity. We can see that the division is based on two distinct international societies, with the 'North' primarily including states that were part of the First and Second World states in the Cold War. Meanwhile, the 'South' mainly comprises the states that were part of the Third World international society. This division, this paper argues, brings about inevitable normative consequences even these days. As mentioned in the previous section, the Third World countries coined Bandung Dasasila during the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference. From those ten principles, this paper posits a few central values that underlie how the Third World states position themselves as a community. Bandung Dasasila's ten points revolve around independence, nationhood, non-intervention, peaceful negotiation to resolve international disputes and the prevention of excellent power dominance at the expense of other states. Those values are stark in difference compared to most international regimes of the 'North.' For example, NATO encourages military intervention as a means to safeguard its members' territorial integrity, be it originating from the member states' direct borders or far from NATO's territorial scoop, as long as there is enough pretext to do so. The EU also employs a super-state government to rule over various member states, influencing how vital aspects of the members' domestic and international policies are made. Those unique values make sense in how both NATO and EU involve themselves in the current Russo-Ukraine war. This background then explains NATO's active involvement in Ukraine (Anonymous, 2022e), the EU's snap decision to quick-start Ukraine's previously slow initiation process to said super-state entity (Parker, Inwood, & Rosenberg, 2022), and economic sanctions imposed on Russia are primarily sanctions from the GN states and enterprises (Funakoshi, Lawson & Deka, 2022). Based on such occurrences, this paper posits that those actions are already ingrained deep in their values as an international society in the first place. This paper posits that the rift, as mentioned earlier, of norms and rules between the GS and GN is suitable to understand one of the reasons why the GS states respond to the Russo-Ukraine war the way they do. Hill and Stent (2022) observed that during the few years leading up to the current conflict, Russia had been steadily building its relations with various GS states based on three things: 1) Economic cooperation, 2) Arms trade, and help in the defense sector; 3) The recognition of Russia as a power committed to realizing Soviet Union's post-colonial national liberation movement, and that Russo-Ukraine war is not a conflict that requires the GS' direct involvement in an ideological sense. The third instrument is especially indicative in showing how not only the North-South division as different international societies still persevere but also that of the enduring First and Second world international society divide. It still has relevance as one of the factors to drive across the point on the herculean task of realizing the notion of 'World Society' that Kant visualized as the one final form of state relations in which every single state in the world share a single value and abide by the same norms and rules. However, if using Buzan's looser definition of 'World Society' that only needs one underlying global value, this definition is still viable to be reached.

Conclusion

This paper contains an in-depth contextual, interpretive analysis of how the English School perspective could be used to explain how GS' lukewarm response towards the GN's campaign to side with Ukraine in the ongoing Russo-Ukraine war. This paper finds that different norms and values adhered to by the GN and GS influence the difference between how the GN and GS respond to said war. GS, in particular, only views itself as an 'outsider' in the conflict through the ideological perspective. Thus, it could only offer suggestions to resolve the conflict through two-way negotiation of the conflicting parties.

Through the process of writing this paper, the writer noticed that the discourse about how the GS states' unique norms and rules could be utilized to formulate alternative solutions to bridge the North-South gap in their methods of seeing and dealing with international conflicts. The standard norm of state sovereignty also could bolster the negotiation between the conflicting parties. Hence, the writer sees much potential in different research areas about how that particular value's significance in bridging the North-South divide could be implemented.

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Must be brief and informative, between 15-20 words (16pt, bold, single pharagraph spacing, 0 before-after)

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Abstract should be typed in italic, font size 10pt, single-spacing format and justified. The abstract should briefly summarize the aim, findings, or purposes of the article. Authors encouraged to write clear explanation on methodology or conceptual framework used in the article, followed by short summary of the research findings. The end part of the abstract should give conclusion that indicates how this paper contributes to fill the gap in previous studies, or any practical implication that might occurs. The abstract should be written in one concise paragraph of no more than 250 words.

Keywords: *contains; three to five; relevant keywords; separated by semicolon; written in lower case, italic 10pt*

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The manuscript should be written in English on A4-sized papers (21x29.7 cm), with custom margins as follows: left 2.5 cm, right 2 cm, bottom 2 cm, and top 2 cm. The manuscript should use Callisto MT, 12pt font size, 1.5 line spacing. Manuscript should consist of 4,000—7,000 words (research article) and 3,000—4,000 words (book review). Referencing and citing technique used is APA 6th edition, with in-text citation format

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All sources quoted or paraphrased should be listed in the reference list. Cite source using APA in-text citation format, by writing author's last name followed by the publication year, for example: (Hudson, 2014). Direct quotations, tables, or figures referred should include the page number, for example: (Hudson, 2010, p. 44).

The introduction part should explore these elements: (1) Explanation about the research background and the general theme or topic; (2) Provide clear and convincing answer to the question: Why is this article is important? (3) A concise literature review of available literature or research. Please cite the most imperative part, theories, or debates from existing studies; (4) Indicate how your article will contribute to fill the gap to the current studies. This is also important to show that your idea is original; (5) Offer explanation on specific problem or question[1] and hypothesis that will be the main point(s) of the article.[2] We encourage authors to bring only one or two questions.

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Author is encouraged to describe methodology clearly. Put it in a dedicated subchapter if necessary. This part should contain a brief justification for the research methods used.

This part should contain enough detail to enable the reader to evaluate the appropriateness of your methods and the reliability and validity of your findings.

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[1] Fewer question or hypothesis is better, we encourage author to bring only 1-2 questions

[2] Footnote may be used to provide additional description (terms, concept, specific event, etc.) that might be too excessive to be included in-text.

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- Sed sit amet massa felis. [This is an example te xt for 2nd level subchapter]

Guidelines - Conclusion

Conclusion is a brief summary of findings and discussion. It is strongly recommended to avoid mere repetitive statements or phrase from the previous section. Author may also discuss implication of the findings and point out prospect for further research.

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