The Social and Political Aspects of Permanent Housing Provision for Earthquake Tsunami and Liquefaction Casualties in Palu City, Central Sulawesi

An earthquake that struck Palu City, Central Sulawesi Province on September 28, 2018 rose potential problems. One of them is the permanent housing (huntap) provision for 6,504 earth-quake-affected households. With a descriptive qualitative approach, this research focuses on the social and political aspects of providing permanent housing for disaster victims. Public opinion, both conveyed by refugees targeted for permanent housing and NGO activists and media workers, is expected to improve the policy of providing permanent housing for earthquake victims in Palu. The public hopes that the houses built for earthquake victims are to replace their lost homes and function as a place for psychological recovery. Therefore, the social aspects of housing provision are essential to receive government priorities, such as guaranteeing a sense of security, comfort, and relocated land status. Assistance and advocacy for displaced victims to obtain their rights should be appreciated, exceptionally due to the lack of political function of Regional House of Representative Council (DPRD) roles in guarding disaster victims. Legislators are unable to make a greater effort due to their status as part of the regional government. Simultaneously, the mass media’s attention to housing provisions is still vital for the government to formulate, implement and evaluate its policies. This study also discovered conditions where local governments have limited authority to provide shelter for displaced victims. Centralized government authority forces local governments to rely on the president and his staff.


INTRODUCTION
The 7.4 magnitude earthquake followed a tsunami and liquefaction on Friday evening, September 28, 2018 caused 4,845 casualties, consisting of 3,124 who passed away, 705 missing, and 1,016 buried (The Disaster Data and Information Center/ Pusdatina, 2019). Meanwhile, the National Disaster Relief Agency's (BNPB) report said that the earthquake causes 20.89 trillionrupiah material loss and damage. The damage and loss included infrastructure, social, economic, settlement, and other crosssectors. Based on BNPB, there were 55,102 houses damaged and lost after the disaster in Palu which cost more than Rp2.1 trillion. The damaged house is even greater if it is accumulated with Sigi, Donggala, and Parigi Moutong. A summary of the community houses condition in the four disaster areas can be seen in Table 1.
The most obvious housing damage can be seen in the residential area of Perumnas Petobo, South Palu District, and in Perumnas Balaroa, Balaroa Village, West Palu District. In Perumnas Petobo and its surroundings, the liquefaction area reaches 180 hectares with 2,050 houses damaged, of which 744 houses have sunk. Meanwhile, the liquefaction that occurred at Perumnas Balaroa sank 1,747 houses with an area of 47.8 hectares (Adji, 2018;Nugraha, 2018).
The data of housing damage areas indicate that massive damage occurred in the areas prone to earthquakes, tsunamis, and liquefaction. The lack of information causes victims to feel helpless in the face of disasters and post-disaster. According to Mirza (2008), it is a central problem faced by victims, as in the earthquake and tsunami earthquake in Aceh in 2004. The lack of public knowledge about disasters has led to the widening of areas affected by the earthquake, triggered by the local government's negligence. In the case of the earthquake in Palu and its surroundings, the Central Sulawesi Provincial Government and the Palu City Government had previously received information about the big potential of earthquakes, tsunami, and liquefaction. However, the information was neglected.
Furthermore, Dwiyanto (2018) stated that natural disasters' vulnerability needs the government's attention in providing essential public services. One of the central governments and local governments' responsibilities is to ensure the fulfillment of the rights of communities and refugees affected by disasters in a fair manner and according to minimum service standards. Government participation is described in Government Regulation Number 21 of 2008 concerning the Implementation of Disaster Management, which was re-enumerated in Presidential Regulation Number 17 of 2018 concerning Disaster Management in Certain Conditions. In this connection, the government has issued Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs Number 101 of 2018 concerning Technical Standards for Basic Service Minimum Services in the District / City Disaster Management Sector.
However, the policy regarding permanent housing (hunian tetap) is still not clearly described in the relevant regulations, especially when linked to the principle of decentralization, which gives regions the authority to determine their policies. Law Number 9 of 2015, as the second revision of Law Number 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government, contains Mandatory Government affairs related to public services such as public housing and settlements, does not explicitly describe permanent residence for disaster victims. In terms of post-disaster preparedness, the central government, through the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) and Regional Disaster Management Agency (BPBD) as its local representation, merely focused on preparing evacuation sites (PP 21/2008 Article 16 paragraph e). The fulfillment of basic needs for shelter during the disaster emergency response period is carried out by the government, local governments, communities, business institutions, international institutions, or foreign non-governmental organizations per the minimum standards as stipulated in the provisions of laws and regulations (PP 21/2008 Article 52 paragraph (1) and (2). Unfortunately, the details of standards and procedures of permanent housing for earthquake victims are not described.
Furthermore, in facing the emergency, the Governor of Central Sulawesi as the rep-resentative of the central government issued four policies to overcome the earthquake, tsunami, and liquefaction disasters in four districts/cities in Central Sulawesi Province. However, the decrees only emphasize the victim verification and the provision of permanent housing and overlooked the description of permanent housing provision standards for earthquake victims. It includes standards for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) involvement as outsiders in post-disaster recovery.
In the case of natural disasters in Palu, various NGOs plays important roles in emergency response and disaster recovery. However, the local government's reliance on NGOs to provide permanent housing after the earthquake in Palu showed the weakness of budget authority and the regional government's policy sovereignty. The presence of NGOs or social workers fills the gap for the state's delay in meeting refugees' needs, which Widyanta (2011) viewed as the state's negligence in dealing with victims of natural disasters. The NGOs and intellectuals' presence has long been recognized as the forces controlling power (Budiman, 2001).
The limited capacity of local governments in Central Sulawesi to respond to emergency and post-disaster recovery is noticed by the central government. Although the disaster in Palu was not declared as a national disaster, the central government still took over providing permanent housing for the victims. However, the regional government was only tasked to provide permanent housing land and obligated to coordinate with central government agencies in the re-gions during the process Malaha, 2019).
The availability of shelter for earthquake victims is one of the essential stages of disaster management to ascertain the casualties' recovery. The housing provision needs to consider the social aspects of housing which fulfill the concept of safe, comfortable, and healthy housing (Rdn, 2019). Thus, supervision is needed to maintain the housing provision quality according to the government's minimum standards.
The response given by local governments in providing permanent housing for disaster victims is a form of public policy that should be evaluated in order to find the right public policy. In recent studies, policy implementation has developed as a dynamic process in which the government must be adaptive to public needs. Adaptation to public demand generates an acceptance factor at the organizational level that allows public service providers to innovate. Butler & Allen (2008) stated that stakeholders' adaptive capacity at the local level is a concept of policy implementation as a self-managed process. This concept departs from the new public management (NPM) that has been practiced by local governments in the UK since 1992. Policy implementation is self-regulated as national policies are reinterpreted at the local level, with each local organization mixing national policy elements with their needs.
The consequence of this concept is that local public organizations are challenged to be at the forefront of solving public problems. Unfortunately, the concept of selfmanagement makes policy implementation  at the local level unpredictable. Likewise, the compliance of local organizations with national policies is becoming more obscure. Interestingly, the concept of selfmanagement is the nature of forcing the central government to local organizations to adopt practices that are believed to improve their performance. Local governments can take advantage of formal and informal structures to achieve their desired goals. The role of policy actors can be maximized in this area. It is known, in policy, implementers can come from the government and society. The bureaucracy and the legislature are the main policy actors. Butler & Allen (2008) staed that the alliance of legislation from bureaucrats and legislators could increase compliance. Meanwhile, pressure groups and community organizations can become representatives of the community. In developing countries, interest groups in society, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) must be involved, especially in implementing foreign-funded policies (Anderson, 1979in Kusumanegara, 2010. 's (1975's ( , in Kusumanegara, 2010 theory of public policy implementation can be used as an analytical tool to study the social aspects of providing permanent housing for disaster victims. Handling natural disasters in Indonesia, which still relies on the central government, is commensurate with Van Meter and Van Horn's policy implementation theory, emphasizing a top-down approach or direct pol-icies from the central government to the community. In this theory, there are six factors in implementing public policy, one of theme is the social, economic, and political conditions of the policy. Although it is the last factor, the external environment is an integral part of measuring the extent to which a policy is effective or ineffective in its implementation. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) in Kusumanegara (2010) view social and political aspects directly affecting the implementing agency's characteristics and the individual attitudes of implementing policies. Nugroho (2018), who helped develop this theory, stated that to determine whether the external environment supports or suppresses public policy, it is imperative to map these social and political aspects' conductivities.

Van Meter and Van Horn
1. The social aspect referred to the opinion conveyed by society, including in this case whether sufficient economical resources are available to support policy implementation. 2. The political aspect is a response given by interest groups to a policy. The indicator is whether the elites support or oppose the implementation of a policy.
The conditions for providing permanent housing for earthquake victims in Palu as described above invoked the author to study the nature of the implementation of the Van Meter and Van Horn (1975)  cies. It is essential to capture and illustrate how regional policies should embrace the needs of shelter victims of disasters from a social aspect. Thus, the study aims to comprehend the social and political aspects of the policy of permanent housing provision for earthquake, tsunami, and liquefaction victims in Palu City, Central Sulawesi. Therefore, the question that needs to be answered in this research are: 1. How does the response of disaster victims, interest groups, and government actors on permanent housing provision in Palu? 2. Does the permanent shelter which the local government struggles for by relying on NGOs also provide a sense of security, comfort, and function socially as a place for their psychological and trauma recovery from a disaster?

METHOD
The research was conducted in Palu City, Central Sulawesi, using a qualitative descriptive approach. Palu City is suitable for the research setting since it was the epicenter of the earthquake, tsunami, and liquefaction, which caused massive residential damage (see Table 1). Data collection was held from January to December 2019. The primary data was extracted from three informants sources: informants from government officials, the earthquake survivor community, and the mass media (see Table 3). Government officials referred to the Secretary of Central Sulawesi Province, Palu City members of the regional house of representative council, Palu City Secretary of the Regional Disaster Management Agency, Palu City Technical Manager of Permanent Shelter, Permanent Shelter facilitator of Ministry of Public Works and Housing, and sub-district heads.
Informants from the earthquake survivor community are representatives of survivors from Balaroa subdistrict of West Palu District and survivors from Lere  Furthermore, secondary data extracted from the 2019 City Government report, Central Sulawesi Provincial Government Disaster Data and Information Center (Pusdatina), and online mass media reports. The latter contains statements from central government officials, local governments, members of the regional representative council, permanent housing providers, survivor residents, and volunteers (Table 2). There were 26 articles published from January to December 2019 that were used as references. Data analysis in this study refers to Miles and Huberman (1980), namely data analysis from the stages of summarizing, sorting, eliminating irrelevant ones, then presenting them in tables and figures, describing them, and reaching conclusions.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
A total 16 participants were interviewed. They consist of six government officials, two mass media editors, four earthquake survivors, two volunteers and two construction workers (Table 3). The variety of participants allow us to obtain comprehensive understandings on this issue through their perspectives.

Public Opinion about Permanent Housing Provision
Law No. 4 of 1992, related to Housing and Settlements, describes a house as a building that functions as a place to live or occupy and a means of fostering a family. It is also explained housing as a group of houses that function as a residential environment or a residential environment equipped with environmental infrastructure and facilities. Turner (in Yunus, 2000) describes four dimensions that must be considered in under- standing the dynamics of housing demand, namely: 1. The location dimension refers to a particular place considered suitable by a person/ group to live. Location is related to distance and place of work. 2. Housing dimensions: those with low incomes will prefer or rent rather than own the house considering their income level. 3. The life cycle: the further the life cycle, the higher the income, so that the connection with the two previous dimensions becomes clearer. 4. Dimensions of income; dimensions regarding the amount of the income obtained by a unit of time. The longer a person stays, the more stable his job position and the more stable his income.
As the need for housing continues to grow, many houses have developed in disaster-prone areas. The reality also shows that migrants, both low-income and uppermiddle-income earners, initially no longer think about whether the inhabited area is at high risk of natural disasters. Correa-Velez and Gifford (2011) stated that settlements with a high risk of disasters are usually found in the most environmentally sensitive areas, such as settlements surrounding the hydraulic system area or in mountainous slope areas that play an essential role in ecosystem dynamics. However, the absence of land-use planning as a guide in determining the location where humans can live, institutional weaknesses in enforcing relevant laws and regulations, and the absence of housing programs for low-income communities are likely to result in human settlement in highrisk areas.
In the case of the disaster that occurred in Palu City on September 28, 2018, Correa's conclusion was related, however, there are exceptions to the residents' economic background. In two places where liquefaction occurred, namely Petobo (South Palu) and Balaroa (West Palu) villages, these are generally houses inhabited by middle to upper-income earners. It was discovered that the government, housing developers, especially the community, did not have enough information about the residential area's liquefaction potential risks.
The shelter is an urgent need for refugees in Palu. However, the regional governments at the provincial level of Central Sulawesi and Palu City have not provided an adequate response. The powerlessness of local governments in providing housing may result from the absence of a disaster management plan at the regional level. Kusumasari (2012) suggested this phenomenon was a result of lack of disaster preparedness by local government officials. As a result, whenever a disaster occurs, local governments JKAP (Jurnal Kebijakan dan Administrasi Publik) Vol.26 (2), November 2022 ----https://journal.ugm.ac.id/jkap

Figure 2. Map of Proposed Residential Relocation
Source: Google Maps immediately depend on the central government. Luckily this time, the central government provided a fast response building shelter for disaster victims in Palu.
By encompassing State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN), the central government, through the Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing, established temporary shelters (huntara) close to the refugee area. Meanwhile, the local government is in charge of preparing the temporary shelters. Shelters were also built by nongovernmental organizations, companies, or humanitarian care foundations in places close to refugee areas. In general, the type of temporary shelter built is a stilt house. One tenement consists of six to 12 compartments or chambers. A refugee family occupies each chamber. Huntara is a temporary shelter for refugees while waiting for the permanent house-building process. The house is also called permanent residence (huntap).
By relying on Law Number 9 of 2015 as the second revision of Law Number 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government, the Governor of Central Sulawesi, on behalf of the representatives of the central government has held meetings with four heads of affected areas, namely the Mayor of Palu, the Regent of Donggala, the Regent of Sigi, and the Regent of Parigi Moutong at the end of January 2019. During the meeting, the regional heads agreed to provide housing in new places for victims whose homes were destroyed or lost and who live in the red zone or areas severely affected by the disaster. The agreed policies are as follows: were 100 to 200 meters on the shoreline. 3. People who are entitled to huntap facilities or stimulant funds are the house owner or one of his heirs. Every house owner only gets one huntap unit or receives stimulant funds for one housing unit. 4. All prospective residential recipients must be proven by a certificate of ownership or a house certificate from the local government and a certificate from the assessment team.

Land Swapping Issue
In Selection or Election, Syariati (1979( , in Ibrahim, 2016 states that the ideal society is a community, where each individual is an independent person and is selfcontrolling of his choice. In the context of earthquake casualties' relocation, the public opinion needs to be voiced to the surface as a form of support for the disaster victims. Some of the earthquake victims welcomed the regional government relocation program. Some of them refused to move due to the unclear status of their land. In Lere Vilage for example, even though the location had been classified as red zone, from 205 households 30 of them refused to be relocated. Unclear procedure and information about relocation policy rose the rumor of land swapping where they believe that their previous disaster-affected land (see Figure 1) would be exchanged with the location of the huntap. This suspicion arose because the residents were asked to attach several conditions related to administering their respective land ownership. When submitting a form of willingness to inhabit huntap, prospective residents are also asked to include a house certificate or at least a Certificate of Land Ownership (SKPT) at the location of their house that was hit by the tsunami. The government was expected to explain the huntap compensation case, including responding to residents' concerns about land status in the current location and the relocation land, not just directly offering relocation readiness letter. Furthermore, according to SN, there was an explanation given by the city government representative that their tsunamiaffected land will be exchanged for overthrow. The explanation is as follows: "Yesterday the subdistrict head convinced us to show our land boundaries witnessed by the BPNB (Disaster Management Agency) representatives and the Palu City Land Service. They stated that the selling price of our land would be high. There will be investors willing to pay. I have also conveyed this information to the residents of Jalan Cumicumi. Unfortunately, the certainty of payment and which investors will pay is unclear. It is because the information is not official from the government," (interview, 2 October 2019).
According to SN, Lere residents support the relocation should remain in the vicinity of Lere Village, which is considered safe, such as in the location of the Simple Rental Flats (Rusunawa) or in the field which is the soccer field on Jalan Pangeran Hidayat. Permanent housing areas that are still in the area where residents live will make it easier for victims to be still able to access daily work after a disaster (see Figure  2). Moreover, most of the earthquake victims in Lere Village were fishermen and depended on fishing.
Meanwhile, the earthquake victims who were not willing to move into the residence still argued that emotionally there had been ties between the victims and their bloodlines, community groups with a background of similar customs and culture, as well as economic activities. The phenomenon can be seen in the decisions of some refugees who prefer to live in homes or refugee camps rather than going to permanent housing facilitated by local governments and NGOs. "The people here have lived here since they were born; this is what made many family heads decide to stay here. As far as I know, about 30 families do not want to move." (Interview with SN, September 2019).
Another view also came from the disaster victims met in the mosque courtyard of Agung Darussalam Palu. In this place, it has been nearly a year that hundreds of residents from Lere Village and Baru Village -also Palu Barat District -have lived side by side as refugees. One of the survivors admitted that there was no problem with the policy of providing huntap. He only highlighted the government's support for repairing damaged houses, where the initial information was in the form of cash assistance, replaced with raw materials. The survivor also admitted that he was tired of being visited by the data collection officer.

Civil Rights of Disaster Casualties
The local government has responded to criticism from potential residents and pressure groups against the provision of huntap. Head of Emergency and Logistics at the Regional Disaster Management Agency (BPBD) Palu City, BS, denied that the government or the huntap provider would take over land belonging to the community. He said the civil rights to the land remained the property of the victims. It is as the author's interview at the Palu City Hall, October 2, 2019.
"However, if they decide to stay in a permanent residence, it is because they are following the government's advice, not coercion. We just want residents to no longer stay on the former disaster land because the location has been categorized as a disaster-prone zone. The place is no longer a residential area. So, there is no land exchange. Their ownership of the land remains their right".
Meanwhile, concerning residents' requests to relocate to the safe areas, BS confirmed that the government is still considering it. The reason is that this is related to the clarity of land status, including negotiations with the community who owns the land that is claimed to be safe. BS also dismissed the notion that local governments did not involve the community in providing shelter. The following is an excerpt from the interview with the author: "If people say they are not involved, that is not true, they were involved from the beginning. For example, in the construction of temporary shelters, the government accommodates all affected subdistricts. We built a shelter for them. Of course, this temporary shelter must be in a safe zone, and to build it, we need to borrow land. Although we have provided temporary shelter, many people do not want to live there and prefer to stay in the disaster area. Currently, the problem is determining the location of the permanent housing development." BS added that the provision of huntap is a partnership between donors, humanitarian agencies, local governments, and the central government. A total of 7,000 huntap will be built. The Buddhist Tzu Chi Foundation is willing to build 1,425 shelters measuring 10 x 15 meters on the land behind a State College in Tondo Village, Mantikulore District, including public facilities and special facilities. The huntap was built by the Buddhist Tzu Chi Foundation and made of iron as a frame with artificial boards (kalsiboard) as building walls.
Meanwhile, in Talise Village, there are two huntap locations. The first area is behind the Regional Police Headquarters before the Peace Gong. Meanwhile, the second land is around Talise Market. The government estimates that 2,000 huntap will be built here. Meanwhile, in Duyu Village, the government will establish about 300-400 huntap. Until the research was conducted, 40 huntap had been built as illustrated in Figure  3.

Multitude Bureaucracies' Actors
A strong country cannot be separated from the existence of a robust civil society. Civil society's existence is needed to control the domination of power controlled by the authorities so that there is no totalitarianism in the country. For example, Jurgen Habermas (1996in Sobur, 2017 states that the existence of civil society is meaningful because of its way of providing ordinary citizens with an effective way to influence public policy. In civil society, personal or group interests coalesce into the public interest. It means that the public interest is a manifestation of personal and group interests. In Marxist theory, civil society becomes the next phase after traditional society, characterized by feudalism. Habermas (1996( in Sobur, 2017 said that in civil society, a person's political participation is determined by the quality of the arguments developed in the rational and free discourse, not based on their social status or identity (Suryakusuma et al, 1999: 42). Civil society, which can be defined as an association seeks to convince policymakers that the public interest that is being fought for is represented in the debate on policy (Scott, 2006in Sobur, 2017. Meanwhile, in Indonesia, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are more associated with civil society (Hidayat, 2020).
One of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that concerned with earthquake, tsunami, and liquefaction victims in Palu is the Pasigala Center. General Secre- tary of the Pasigala Center, Khadafi Badjerey, suggested that the main problem of providing shelter remains with the Central Sulawesi Earthquake Task Force, which the President had formed. Khadafi, who has been accompanying refugees in Palu, considered the Central Sulawesi Earthquake Task Force ineffective and created a complicated bureaucratic path.

Nursamsir, Jamaluddin, Iqbal & Ismanto -The Social and Political Aspects of Permanent Residence Provision…
Moreover, according to Khaddafi, the Task Force only gave a small portion of the role of local government authority, limited to being the proponent of collecting data and assisting earthquake victims. As a result, disaster management in Palu still relies on an administrative perspective and formalities (Australia, 2019). Moreover, based on the results of interviews and observations, the local government's role overlaps with the central government's role, which also collects data on refugee victims, such as the data collection on candidate housing recipients conducted by the Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing.
The institutional structure's complexity in permanent housing provision for refugees indicates a poor disaster management system. It strengthens the assumption that Indonesia's disaster management is one of the weak points in the government or state administration system (Mirza, 2008). In Palu's post-earthquake response model, disaster casualties are still positioned as policy targets that rely on central government assistance. Consequently, it neglected its role and involvement in the disaster recovery process. Such a view, however, is inaccurate. Disaster casualties require intervention through the concept of empowerment.
People at the lower levels have social capital that can be relied on to solve social problems. If there is an intervention from the state, social institutions, or supporting groups, social capital in traditional values, norms, beliefs, participation and networks can create solidarity (GBC, 2001;Grootaert, 1998in Widayani & Rachman, 2013. Thus, the government should involve disaster casualties in the decision-making, implementation, and supervision of new permanent housing locations. It is believed that disaster victims' involvement in the provision of per-manent housing will also oversee housing providers. In this context, NGO advocacy is needed to build community capacity independently (Sulistiyani, 2007). Such conditions also emerge abroad, such as the difficulties experienced by the refugee community in Finland and how the formal status given to refugees is translated into actual participatory activities and relationships in society (Valtonen, 2004). In Leeds, England, refugees are very motivated to work. Meanwhile, in South East Queensland, Australia, some low-income refugees want better jobs in the future. (Willott & Stevenson, 2013;Hebbani et al, 2016).
Furthermore, multitude bureaucratic actors who are involved in providing shelter makes miscommunication between actors unavoidable. Each actor initially had different perceptions about the status of permanent housing land. The distrust among actors also exists and become public consumption. In May 2019, the two officials at this institution even quipped each other in the print and online media. The Mayor of Palu, Hidayat, advised the Governor of Central Sulawesi to ignore the involvement of the Central Sulawesi BPN in determining housing locations. He also implied BPN's absence in the permanent housing land provision. The statements then denied by Andry Novrijandi, the Head of the Central Sulawesi BPN Regional Office: "We do not have the authority to change the Governor's Decree regarding the determination of the location of the huntap. What has changed is the pattern of land acquisition. Initially the provision of land for the huntap was in the form of procurement in the form of assistance from the central government so that Bappenas submitted a land acquisition request preceded by a determination of the location by the governor. However, in the middle of the process, state finances did not allow it so that the land acquisition activity which already had a decree from the governor could not be realized. Instead, a method called land provision was adopted in which the Central Sulawesi BPN Regional Office was given the responsibility of administering land provision administration. The local BPN has communicated to landowners (a number of landowners with land use permits HGB) to donate their land by relinquishing their rights to part of their land. Now, because this is a form of donation, the position of land to be released is determined by the landowner," said Novijandry (Wednesday edition of Antaranews.com, 18 September 2019).
Apart from NGO activists, the journalist community also influences public policy. The local press in Palu also voiced their opinion in providing permanent housing for earthquake victims. Deputy Chief Editor of Alkhairaat Media and Editor of MALonline, Abdul Rifay, identified a lack of communication between the Mayor of Palu and Head of the Central Sulawesi BPN Regional Office. It consequently would be very detrimental because, as it is known, the land is critical in providing huntap. Furthermore, he states that, based on the collected information, huntap land in Tondo was also prone to problems since there were still ownership claims from the community. He believes that this problem needs to be discussed between the city government and the central government, in this case, BPN, as the authority in land matters. In a telephone interview with the author, Thursday, September 26, 2019, Rifay admitted to have received information about the community's claim to the land, which is belong to a company. Therefore, the government needs to ensure that the huntap land is clean and clear so that later there will be no more problems with the status of the land once the huntap is occupied. Other information stated that there were residents who claimed the huntap land.
In contrary, The Regional Secretary of Central Sulawesi Province, HL, guaranteed that the land provided by the regional government would not be problematic and would not be rejected by the community. He also ensured that the Central Sulawesi provincial government had determined the location of the permanent residence and reported it to the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (written interview Friday, 4 October 2019).
At the time research was conducted, the National Land Agency had provided 459 hectares of land for permanent housing. The company has handed over 97 ha of land in Palu City, namely PT Palu Valley Nagaya (30 ha), PT Duta Dharma Bhakti (37 ha), and PT Sinar Waluyo / PT Sinar Putra Murni (30 ha). Meanwhile, in Talise Village, an area of 23 ha is still in the completion stage. The land authority believes that all the land is sufficient to accommodate at least 8,500 earthquake victims who lost their homes.
Regarding the number of government actors in disaster management, local governments, both district/city governments and provincial governments can strengthen civil servants' capabilities (PNS) to work under a collaborative ecosystem. This step is an effort to mitigate and manage disasters to reduce the losses incurred. (Alamsyah et al., 2019;Hidayat, 2020).

Regional House of Representative (DPRD) Dilemma
Since the reformation, political parties have had great power in influencing government policy. The government and political parties are conditioned to maintain the status quo to protect their shared interests, an oligarchic model (Budiman, 2001). Hence, the legislative, in this case, the Regional House of Representative Council (DPRD), played a role in implementing the policy of providing shelter for earthquake victims in Palu City. They have more roles as supervisors than the regional heads in producing strategic steps to provide permanent housing. Reporting from the Friday edition of Antaranews.com, January 11, 2019, Central Sulawesi Regional House of Representative Council member YB asked the government to build permanent shelters or permanent housing for earthquake victims in Palu and its surroundings and stop the construction of temporary shelters (huntara). The chairman of the Special Committee for Disaster Management Supervisory (P3B) of the Central Sulawesi Regional House of Representative Council said that the community independently built shelters at several evacuation points without waiting for shelters built by the Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing (PUPR).
According to Y, the government's slow construction of shelters is a form of neglect because the government is reluctant to involve the community, especially earth-quake victims, in the first months after the earthquake when they need emergency shelters. Another particular committee member, M asked for the latest data on earthquake victims who needed a place of refuge (Hajiji, 2019). Both YB and M were elites of the one party. The Palu City Regional House of Representative Council also did not want to lose momentum in advocating for earthquake victims' needs. Member of Commission C of Palu City Regional House of Representative Council, MS said the post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction process in Palu was chaotic . Quote the statement as follows: "Besides disaster victim protection issues, where it was found that the permanent house was built with non-standard stimulant funds, residents who work as construction workers have also not received wages for two months. The Regional Disaster Service or PUPR (Public Works and Public Housing) needs to oversee the rehabilitation and reconstruction process because there are so many complaints that have been reported to me," he said as quoted by the Tuesday, December 10, 2019 edition of Antaranews.com.
However, further explanation from the chairman of the Palu City Regional House of Representative Council is still needed to determine their involvement in permanent housing provision for victims of the earthquake, tsunami, and liquefaction. Furthermore, the supervisory role taken by the Central Sulawesi Regional House of Representative Council and the Palu City Regional House of Representative Council in providing huntap shows that the regional house of representative institution is more of a waiting and forwarding nature of complaints. If we look deeper, substantively, the House of Representative Council is in a dilemma. Law Number 9 of 2015, in conjunction with Law Number 3 of 2014 concerning Regional Government, places Regional House of Representative Council as the regional government's organizer (Article 1 paragraph 4). Even so, with Articles 60 and 76 of Law Number 22 of 2013 in conjunction with Law Number 7 of 2014 concerning the Position Structure of the Regional House of Representative Council, it is stated that the provincial and city Regional House of Representative Council are people's representative institutions that have the position of regional government institutions. Rahayu (2018) states that the unitary state system does not recognize legislative institutions in the regions, so the Regional House of Representative Council is not a pure legislative institution. Due to the same position as regional heads, Regional House of Representative Councils are in the same domain as the central government. As a result of this position, the Regional House of Representative Council has become less strict with local governments. Thus, it is difficult to add greater contributions for regional legislators in providing permanent housing for earthquake victims in Palu.

CONCLUSION
The conclusion of this research highlights two substantive points. First, survivors hope that the housing built for the victims of the Palu earthquake can replace their lost house and serve as a place for psychological recovery. The assistance and advocacy carried out by NGOs for earthquake victims to obtain housing rights should be appreciated because political parties, through their representatives in the Regional House of Representative Council (DPRD), have not maximized their function of escorting disaster victims. Meanwhile, because they can reach a broad audience, the mass media are effective in building public opinion in overseeing policies for providing permanent housing to help the government formulate, implement and evaluate permanent housing policies.
Second, the local government in Central Sulawesi has limited authority to provide housing for survivors and is dependent on the president and his staff. The author suggests that local governments prioritize social aspects in their policies on providing housing for disaster victims, such as guarantees of a sense of security, comfort, and the status of relocation land.
Furthermore, this research has two limitations. First, researchers experienced difficulties in reaching vital informants, such as the Chairperson of the Regional House of Representative Council, in finding out their involvement in providing permanent housing for victims of natural disasters. Second, this research was more focused on the sociopolitical aspects of the permanent housing provision and disregarded the management aspects of the procurement of permanent housing. Thus, future research is expected to focus on management perspectives such as planning, organizing, directing, and supervising local governments in providing permanent housing.