

Strengths and Interests Between Actors in Collaborative Governance: Review of the Riverside Settlement Revitalization Policy in Banjarmasin City

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Abstract

This study aims to analyze and identify the strengths and interests of state actors and non-state actors in the revitalization of residents' houses in the riverside area of Banjarmasin City from the perspective of Collaborative Governance. This study used a qualitative approach by collecting data through observation, in-depth analysis, and document analysis. The findings of this study explain that collaborative governance is an alternative to public policy as an interactive process involving state and non-state actors autonomously who use shared rules and norms carried out collectively to solve societal problems. Collaboration involving actors in power with interests in decision-making might fail during its implementation. This research contributes to the scientific literature on interactions between actors and collaborative governance because the problems faced by the public are fought for, and collaborative governance implementation cannot be separated from the presence of actors involved in advocating for issues of public concern.

Keywords: *collaborative governance; riverside slum handling; policy; actors; interest*

INTRODUCTION

This study analyzes whether actor interactions prioritizing strength and interest centered on one actor will cause failure in collaboration. Success in collaborative governance is determined by how much the actors want to collaborate, and the low capacity of actor resources will affect the quality of the policy (O'Flynn & Wanna, 2008). The study by Sørensen & Torfing (2017) found interesting findings that collaboration will not be successful without a strategy to stimulate innovation from actors involved in the public policy process. Bianchi et al. (2021), Bingham (2011), Emerson & Nabatchi (2015) introduced discursive localism as a framework for understanding better collaborative governance. They argue that ideas are important in motivating collective action, channeling policy resources, and shaping governance relationships.

Collaboration among stakeholders is a form of new public governance with basic values (Osborne, 2006; Peters et al., 2022). That basic value becomes its characteristic as well as its main content. In other words, that basic value is the emphasis point. Clark (2021) and Doberstein (2016) explained that in the times and advances in technology, the government as the main actor in the policy process cannot only be carried out independently, but it is crucial to involve non-state actors to help the success of the policy process. By definition, collaborative governance is an instrument used to address a public problem involving two types of policy actors: state and non-state (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Zambrano-Gutiérrez et al., 2022). Undeniably, the involvement of actors with differing insights and knowledge will encounter obstacles in implementing collaboration because it allows for actors who are more dominant and have more ability (power) compared to other actors.

Although research on collaborative governance is not new, almost no one has discussed issues specifically regarding the strengths and interests of actors in collaborative governance. Based on previous studies, many have been carried out, such as collaborative planning and participatory actor government (Westerink et al., 2017); socioeconomic collaboration and community institu-

tions (Keyim, 2018); governance system and actor contribution (Vodden, 2015); actor authority collaboration (Kathrin, 2019); the role of the collaborative governance actor (Yildirim & Onder, 2019); collaborating actor leadership (Djosetro & Behagel, 2020). Previous studies from Indonesia are as follows: supporting factors in implementing collaboration (Garvera et al., 2021); its basic value is in implementing collaborative governance (Luh & Dewi, 2019); the right strategy for collaborative governance in the government (Bila & Saputra, 2019); development of a collaborative governance model (Prabowo et al., 2021); analyzing the application of collaborative governance (Noegroho & Arif, 2023); collaborative governance innovation (Wulandari et al., 2019).

Previous research shows that there are still many opportunities to conduct research and criticize collaborative governance theory, especially on the strength and interest among actors in collaborating to formulate public policies. This previous study requires further research that comprehensively analyzes and identifies the strengths and interests of actors in formulating policies for revitalizing the riverside houses in Banjarmasin City, which are carried out in collaboration and put forward in the public interest. The fundamental problem in the collaboration process is the imbalance of authority among state and non-state actors involvement in policy formulation (Robertson & Choi, 2012; Stone, 2017). Furthermore, Torfing (2019) emphasizes that the actors involved can use their power in the deliberation process, giving rise to interest motives on the policy agenda.

The phenomenon that hinders collaboration among actors in the policy of revitalizing the riverside houses in Banjarmasin City is due to differences of opinion and conflicts of interest among the actors involved, so the collaboration that is built does not go well. Policy collaboration must be influenced by many stakeholders (Clark, 2021; Woldesenbet, 2020). The refusal of residents living on the riverside to participate in the revitalization policy is a problem faced by the Banjarmasin City government, prompting them to approach the community as an object of policy (Afdholi, 2017). The




Figure 1. Example of stakeholder analysis framework
 Source: (Start & Hovland, 2004), reprocessed by the author

residents refused the policy because they had lived on the riverside for generations, even before the regulation prohibiting riverside settlements.

This difference is also found between communities; for example, the cultural community wants the houses of residents who live on the riverside by arrangement, but not the community concerned about the river, which wants the river to be free from the houses of residents living on the riverside. In fact, this case also occurred in the Banjarmasin City government environment, where there were differences in interests between the Public Works and Spatial Planning Office and the Housing and Settlements Office in the policy of revitalizing the riverside houses in Banjarmasin City. Of course, the existence of different interests among the actors involved will hinder the collaboration process.

This phenomenon of different interests is similar to regional and central policies in revitalizing the riverside houses in Banjarmasin City, which conflict with each other. Regulations in the central government oblige the houses of residents who live on the riverside in Banjarmasin City to be evicted and made into river borders. In contrast, the regional regulations regarding the handling of

the riverside houses are carried out with a zoning system. Such a system regulates a zone for riverside houses to be maintained and developed into tourist attractions along the river and another zone for the houses to be relocated.

Problems emerge between regional and central policies, or the tug-of-war of government authority in administering between the central and regional governments in a unitary state (Sambanis & Milanovic, 2014; Talitha et al., 2020). If the revitalization policy, initially developed to form a pattern of cooperation among the central and regional governments, ignores the region's characters and potentials, it will certainly cause problems of socioeconomic excesses, complicated politics, and extremely high development costs. Regional regulations related to the history of an area at least have the right to protect the area's character. Even though the regional regulations governing this matter are no longer relevant to today's times, they have shown the values and development of regional culture, so they must be maintained (Salmon & Ismail, 2019). For example, regional regulations regarding the formation of villages or regions need to be maintained because these regulations have become the legal basis for the history of the existence of

these areas, including the cultural value of the residents' houses residing on the riverside in Banjarmasin City.

In the context of the revitalization policy, it is interesting to see how actors collaborate to find the best decisions in the policy process. The actors have important roles at every stage of the policy process. In collaborative governance theory, it is explained that the involvement of actors is mandatory in the implementation process. Collaborative governance is implementing policies or programs involving stakeholders in finding efficient and effective solutions to public problems. The main goal of a collaborative governance process is to produce citizens who are more informed and involved, more inclusive participants in decision-making, more stakeholders in community partnerships, better methods of deliberation, and greater accountability and trust in government (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Collaborative governance offers a different governance strategy from privatization and regulation, which have been used to address the challenges governments face (Bianchi et al., 2021; Sher-Hadar et al., 2020).

The problems in implementing the revitalization policy indicate that actually many actors are involved in a policy, meaning that many interests are also involved among them, resulting in policy conflicts and policy dilemmas that exacerbate the collaborative management process (Guttman et al., 2018; Krott et al., 2014; Stadtfeld & Block, 2017). Formulating policies from a collaborative governance perspective requires knowing the actors' responsibilities, motivations, beliefs, knowledge, and experiences to deliberate collectively (Patton et al., 2015). The implementation of collaborative governance needs to know how actors have the motivation and confidence to collaborate without any motive or interest in the decided policies (Vining & Weimer, 2002; Weimer & Vining, 2017). Furthermore, Dunn (2018) also explained that solving public problems requires the involvement of non-governmental actors as providers of recommendations in formulating public policies.

From the various expert opinions described above, it is evident that success in conducting collaborative governance re-

quires actor commitment, actor responsibility, actor motivation, actor trust, actor confidence, actor knowledge, and actor experience. However, the theoretical position of this study emphasizes that there are two types of arrangements in public policy design: the regulation of power and the regulation of actor interests in the collaborative process. Therefore, this study focuses on the theoretical position of the power and interests of actors in Collaborative Governance.

METHOD

This study uses a qualitative approach. The qualitative research in this study intends to explore information related to facts and informants' opinions regarding the policy of revitalizing the riverside houses in Banjarmasin City, which is carried out in collaboration. Creswell (2015) emphasized that in conducting a qualitative research, accurate data is believed to be extracted to provide a theoretical meaning to the findings. Data is then collected in this study according to the rules of the qualitative method, using observation carried out directly at the field or research location (Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña, 2014). Then, semi-structured in-depth interviews will be conducted using an instrument or interview guide (Hennink et al., 2020). The author uses this type of semi-structured, in-depth interview because it is more flexible, and researchers can develop research questions according to the desired information needs. Besides collecting data through direct observation and in-depth interviews, the authors conducted document analysis to complete the data and information that had been collected. As for the analysis of this document, it can be used as a comparison and a means of re-checking the truth of the results of interviews conducted with informants (Berg & Lune, 2017; Mack & Woodsong, 2005; Neuman, 2011). On this basis, of course, this document analysis will guarantee the completeness and validity of the data obtained.

The determination of informants in this study is not based on statistical calculations. Informants were selected to function to obtain accurate information and not to be generalized (Smith & Osborn, 2007; Sofaer, 2002). Informants in this study are fully ca-

pable because of their experience and can articulate their experiences and views about something that the author questions. Each of these informants was interviewed for their opinion on providing accurate information. This study divided informants into two categories: informants from the government, such as the Housing and Settlement Area Office, the Public Works and Spatial Planning Office, and the Regional Planning and Development Agency. Then, informants from non-government organizations such as business people, universities, social communities, mass media, and residents who live on the riverside in Banjarmasin City. Analyzing and interpreting data in this study uses the data analysis proposed by Miles et al. (2014), namely analyzing data in three steps: data condensation, data presentation, and drawing conclusions or verification.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

In practice, the dynamics of collaboration among state and non-state actors in revitalizing the riverside houses in Banjarmasin City must adapt to the policy environment. This means understanding contextual conditions directly related to various problems with existing problem conditions. As explained by Ansell & Gash (2008, collaborative governance is a management process consisting of more than one public institution that is deeply involved in non-state actors with every policy provision that is official and integrated and aims to achieve long-term development programs. The role of actors in the collaboration process in determining a policy is critical (Bingham, 2011; Stadtfeld & Block, 2017). The role of actors provides a broader meaning, especially how these actors compromise in making decisions for the public interest (De Zeeuw, 2001; Guttman et al., 2018). The function of interaction among actors in the public policy process is to deal with actors' conflicts of interest (Anderson, 2011; Lieberherr & Ingold, 2019). The interaction among actors in the collaboration process involves stakeholders formulating public policies and exchanging information by consensus to solve problems faced by the public (Gilbert & Ripley, 1986; Saoutal et al., 2014).

In principle, actors in the process of implementing collaborative governance are state and non-state actors meeting to collaborate in a consensus manner by not prioritizing the domination of power to influence weak actors in the policy process (Lai, 2011). The main topic of discussion in this paper is to analyze the mapping of actors and then analyze the strengths and interests of the actors in collaborating. From this analysis, it will be seen how actors in the social process explain that these actors are people or subjects who have thoughts, have ideas, meet, compete for influence, and have the ideas of actors in the policy of revitalizing the riverside houses in Banjarmasin city.

Actor Map Analysis

An actor mapping analysis is intended not only to classify the key, primary, and secondary actors but also to explain the roles, functions, and interests of actors in general (Hermans & Thissen, 2019; O'Flynn & Wanna, 2008). The explanation and analysis of the mapping of these actors make it easier to understand the strengths and interests of the actors in the implemented program related to the revitalization policy of the riverside houses in Banjarmasin City.

1. Position of Each Actor

Public policy involves actors outside government agencies designing a rule with written legality to solve community problems (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Stewart, Jr., J., Hedge, D. M., & Lester, 2008). Then, Michaele Howlett et al. (2009) define public policy as a set of rules the government has set. In public policy, the Government of Banjarmasin City positions non-government actors as important in decision-making (formulation), implementing parties, and objects receiving policy impacts (output-outcome). This provides an earlier explanation of the who, what, and how conclusions of the actors' actions in the revitalization policy of the riverside houses in Banjarmasin City.

Actors in the policy formation process can be divided into two groups: official actors and unofficial actors. Official actors are government agents (bureaucracy), the president (executive), the legislature, and the judiciary. Meanwhile, unofficial actors include

interest groups, political parties, and individual citizens. In general, these actors can be categorized into three categories: public actors, private actors, and society (Stadtfield & Block, 2017). Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers (2003) also mentioned two categories of actors in the policy formulation process: state and non-state actors.

Collaboration among actors in the revitalization policy in Banjarmasin City does not all work according to what is conceptualized as collaborative governance. Indeed, in terms of what is conceptualized by collaborative governance with the involvement of various state and non-state actors, it will provide convenience and the best way to complete the revitalization policy. However, the findings in this study conclude that the many actors involved actually slow down the collaborative governance process. The results of this study clearly explain that collaboration among state actors and non-state actors raises conflict of interest debates because, in the process, state actors and non-state actors meet collectively and compromise to formulate policies for revitalizing the riverside houses in Banjarmasin City.

The emergence of the interests of the actors involved in collaboration is caused by differences in the power of actors in formulating a policy (Krott et al., 2014). For example, the initial condition for collaboration between actors is an interesting phenomenon, that is, actors have different interests and visions, and this is found within the Banjarmasin City Government's internal environment, such as different opinions from the Office of Public Works and Spatial Planning and the Office of Housing and Settlements in revitalizing riverside houses in Banjarmasin City. Surprisingly, this difference of opinion also occurs in social communities. There are certainly differences of opinion between the involved actors, hindering the collaboration process.

This difference of opinion stems from the existence of conflicting regulations among the central government and local governments. As this study concluded, the local government wants the houses of residents who live on the riverside not to be evicted but to be arranged or rejuvenated. This is because the Banjarmasin City Gov-

ernment views the houses of residents who live on the riverside in Banjarmasin City as having their own local wisdom. Banjarmasin City grows from the riverside houses. However, it is different from the existing regulation, which is ordered by the central government and requires that the houses of residents who live riverside in Banjarmasin City be evicted and made river borders.

The description of the problem regarding the policy of revitalizing the riverside houses in Banjarmasin City can be understood to mean that regional policies with central policies or the tug of war on government affairs authority in administering government among the central government and regional governments in a unitary state are not uncommon. If the policies built into forming a pattern of cooperation between the central and regional governments ignore the region's characters and potentials, they will certainly cause socioeconomic excesses, complicated politics, and costly social costs. Regional regulations related to the history of a region at least have the right to protect the region's character. Even though the regional regulations governing this matter are no longer relevant to the current era, they show the values and development of regional culture, so they must be maintained. For example, regional regulations for forming villages or territories need to be maintained because these regulations have become the historical legal basis for the existence of these areas, including in Banjarmasin City. It can be understood that there are conflicts between the center and the regions due to differences in perceptions of the regional autonomy policy, especially in terms of authority between the center and the regions.

2. Actor's Level of Interest and Power

In understanding the public policy process, writers need to understand the actors involved in the public policy-making process, both official and unofficial (Chikowore, 2018; Dunn, 2017). The classification of stakeholders in collaborative governance is divided into two categories, namely based on their interests and influence in the policy process (Saoutal et al., 2014; Weible et al., 2011). In line with the findings in this study, the policy of revitalizing the riverside houses in Banjarmasin City ex-

plains that the role of actors is one of the keys to success in developing collaborative activities. These roles differ according to the characteristics of the organization they represent.

Stakeholder role analysis begins with compiling stakeholders' interests and power to influence the policy (Guttman et al., 2018; Krott et al., 2014; Stadtfeld & Block, 2017). Interest is the interest that stakeholders have in policy-making, while power is the power possessed by stakeholders to influence or make public policies or programs. (John et al., 2004).

Figure 1 explains the quadrants for mapping actors. In this quadrant, it is explained that on the vertical axis of the quadrant, each actor has a level of interest in the issue of the revitalization policy of the riverside houses in Banjarmasin City. On the horizontal axis in the quadrant is the level of power, which means to what extent the actor's power vetoed such a policy.

Figure 1 is a map of the classification of actors involved in such a policy:

1. Quadrant A (Monitor-Minimum Effort) Low Power-Low Interest: That is, actors who have power over policy are weak, and the level of interest in policy issues is also low. Actors in this quadrant position are from the private sector and the media and are not actively involved in policy. Actors from the private sector and the media do not even know and do not want to know more about the policy.
2. Quadrant B (Keep Informed) High Interest-Low Power: These are actors with a level of interest in policy issues but have weak power over the policy. Actors in this quadrant position are from local and social communities actively involved in policy as providers of information on the problems faced by people who live on river banks as recipients of policy targets.
3. Quadrant C (Managed Closely) High Interest-High Power: These are actors with a level of seriousness and interest with high policy values to solve public problems and actors with high power so that authority in setting policies is more dominant. The actors in this quadrant position are from the City and Provincial governments, as well as the Central Government

and the legislature, who are active in and authorized for the core decisions of the policy of revitalizing the riverside houses in Banjarmasin City.

4. Quadrant D (Keep Satisfied) High Power-Low Interest: These are actors with high power in policy but low interest. Actors in this quadrant position are from universities who participate actively and have authority in making decisions on a policy.

This research has implications for explaining the findings of Chris Ansell and Alison Gash (2008) in their article entitled *Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice*. Their article shows that one way to assess good collaboration is determined by how state and non-state actors sit together in a collective forum, focusing on 'small wins' or the kind of wins that can deepen trust, commitment, and shared views among the parties involved. Then, they also see that collaboration is a forum for giving birth to innovations in governance, especially in serving the community using direct dialogue, commitment, and building trust to achieve success from collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2008).

Research by Ansell & Gash (2008) revealed that a decision-making approach carried out in collaborative governance is a series of joint activities in which state and non-state actors compromise to solve policy problems. Then, they also see that collaborating is the best way to obtain good policies. However, this study argues that not all decision-making by the many actors involved causes delays in the policy process because the many actors involved allow differences of opinion to occur and are influenced by the dominant actors having power over the policy outcomes that are decided. This study also explains that budgetary issues raise the interests of actors.

This study provides an assessment that the fundamental thing of the collaboration process is structured negotiation in decision-making, and consensus is the result of a collective decision-making process because the collaboration process brings together different levels of character and strength of each actor, which might give rise to motives and interests of the actors involved. Thus, the formation of a consensus is the result of a

process that is democratic, requires structured participation, and requires time and patience. Conditions will significantly influence the steps in carrying out the collaboration process in the field. Changes and adjustments will occur depending on the dynamics that occur. The actors involved in the collaboration process understand the planning process and the characteristics and habits of the people who build houses for residents who live on the riverside in Banjarmasin City.

Power is used in collaborative processes to influence who participates, the nature of the process, and how discussion content is framed to reach an agreement (Gilbert & Ripley, 1986). Collaboration among actors in the policy to revitalize the riverside houses in Banjarmasin City is driven by the initial conditions of each actor's different strengths and resources. In this case, government institutions have the power and resources to create empowerment programs and fund them.

It can be understood that if there is a significant imbalance of power and resources among actors and the weaker party cannot participate meaningfully, the collaborative governance process requires a commitment to empower and represent the more vulnerable group, in this case, the Mayor of Banjarmasin. The role of the Mayor of Banjarmasin is needed to overcome disputes among the actors involved because the collaboration process requires the presence of a collaboration leader to make the policy process successful (Anderson, 2011; De Zeeuw, 2001; Stadtfeld & Block, 2017).

The task of the mayor of Banjarmasin as the leader of the collaboration is to maintain the legitimacy and credibility of the collaboration among the actors involved. To that end, collaboration leaders must help partners devise strategies to reach substantive consensus and identify how to manage collaboratively. Its essential role is clarifying, building transparency, and developing sustainable strategies for evaluating and resolving stakeholder discrepancies (Anderson, 2011). In collaborative governance, the selection of leadership must be appropriate and be able to help direct the collaboration in a way that will maintain the horizontal structure of governance while en-

couraging the building of relationships and the formation of ideas (De Zeeuw, 2001; Stadtfeld & Block, 2017).

Achievement of Results from the Implementation of Collaboration

The collaborative involvement of several parties in the policy to revitalize the riverside houses, which the Banjarmasin City government expects to have various positive impacts, including increasing the commitment of the local government to achieving a livable city, increasing the sense of belonging and community responsibility in utilizing and maintaining development results, ensuring sustainability, and improving public and private trust in the Municipal Government of Banjarmasin, are the initial conditions that determine collaborative success.

As mentioned, the collaboration of state actors and non-state actors in the revitalization policy is important. This means that the involvement of actors in public policies will facilitate the process of implementing these policies, especially those dealing with public problems, and policies involving non-government actors will produce policies that impact the public interest.

The involvement of the private sector and the community is undoubtedly the key to the success of the policy of revitalizing the riverside houses in Banjarmasin City. The Office of Housing and Settlement Areas of Banjarmasin City is assigned to lead the main sector and must be able to see the opportunities in providing customized policies. The revitalization policy aims to provide better economic value than before.

Formulating the policy involves multiple stakeholders or a policy from the perspective of collaborative governance. Following Anderson's theory, which sees public policy as a step that an actor or several actors deliberately carry out about a problem that occurs, this means that in understanding the public policy process, it is necessary to understand the actors involved, both official and unofficial. State and non-state actors interact with each other to influence decisions on the revitalization policy of the riverside houses in Banjarmasin City in accordance with the interests of each actor.

Collaboration among actors in formulating the revitalization policy brings together the interests of each actor, taking place throughout the process of formulating and implementing public policies. This collaboration mechanism causes opportunities to accommodate each actor's interests to occur more easily mutually (Lai, 2011). A crucial factor in preparing such a policy is what should be considered a problem and what needs a policy strategy to solve the problem. The policy-making process is a series of activities inseparable from the policy process, meaning they occur simultaneously. In the policy-making process, there is a process of bargaining that occurs among policy-making actors by using power and authority not to synchronize the interests of the people but to gain their own interests and power (Anna-Karin Lindblom, 2016; W. A. Thissen & Warren E. Walker, 2013).

The findings and results of this study confirm that implementing collaborative governance will largely determine the intensity of interaction among actors to understand each other's interests so that the public policy process is the result of negotiations among actors involved in the collaborative process. All of this can happen because the interaction mechanism among actors in the collaboration process will become a consensus arena, which allows for the motives of actors interests in the policy formulation process and the revitalization of riverside houses in Banjarmasin City.

Measuring the success of implementing collaboration among actors in the revitalization policy is not only from the size of commitment and firmness among actors to interact but also a measure of success in carrying out this collaboration, namely how the actors involved respect each other's opinions in decisions. As Gilbert & Ripley (1986) said, the actors involved carry out good collaboration in formulating public policies. It does not put forward the authority of power and ulterior motives. The local government must provide public space so that the actors involved can collectively deliberate to solve the problems the public faces. However, in the findings of this study, the deliberation process was not carried out collectively in the policy of revitalizing the riverside houses in Banjarmasin City. The discussion fo-

rum does not gather all the actors involved in one space to deliberate. As an example of the case in the meeting forum, the discussion of the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) program is private without any collective process involving other actors such as the community and social organizations. If the collaboration process is not done collectively, it will lead to conflicts of interest (De Zeeuw, 2001).

The involvement of the private sector in the collaborative process serves as a donor to support the revitalization policy. Interestingly, in the findings of this study, the private sector seems to ignore the administrative process in the CSR program. For example, the CSR mechanism in Banjarmasin City is handled by the leading sector of the Banjarmasin City social service to input data on the types of CSR program activities. In this case, the private sector must coordinate the types of CSR program activities. Still, the private sector is not responsible for reporting the types of CSR program activities to the Office of Social Affairs. It can be understood that the CSR provided by companies in Banjarmasin City so far is only for fulfilling the obligation to give or tends only to highlight social action. Even though, in terms of its meaning, collaboration is an instrument to achieve national development goals and improve development results.

Another finding in this study is that the CSR program in Banjarmasin City is focused on Infrastructure and Community Empowerment, for example, related to waste management and the arrangement of riverside areas. Indeed, the obstacle to the CSR program is raising awareness among companies of their social and environmental responsibilities for the development of Banjarmasin City.

In its implementation, there are still many companies that tend to be reluctant to run CSR programs. This is because some companies in Banjarmasin City consider CSR an extra expenditure that is not profitable in the short term. CSR in Banjarmasin City also requires companies to allocate their resources to implement and manage CSR programs. On the other hand, some companies do not understand the CSR program, so they do not do it. This attitude

tends to occur in local companies that have not been able to adjust to environmental and community accountability.

In this context, CSR is also one of the policies set by management. CSR has a significant potential for non-government funds as an embryo of transformation toward community self-reliance (Matten & Moon, 2004). It can be an alternative solution for solving social welfare problems if it can be optimized for allocating funds and the utilization process. CSR is a program that the Municipal Government of Banjarmasin requires for the private sector. In supporting development, the private sector as a provider of CSR assistance is listed in Article 74 of Law Number 40 of 2007 concerning Limited Liability Companies. Then, regarding CSR in Banjarmasin City, it is regulated in Regional Regulation Number 14 of 2016 concerning Corporate Responsibility to the Community. Based on this regulation, the Mayor of Banjarmasin invited companies in Banjarmasin City to distribute CSR funds for the development of Banjarmasin City. To remind companies to fulfill their obligations in providing CRS programs, the Mayor of Banjarmasin always holds meetings with companies scheduled at the beginning of each year.

Another finding in this study is the existence of protests from policy beneficiaries. The protest was because the community did not agree with the government's program to renovate their houses. From the results of interviews with the community beneficiaries of the policy, it was explained that they agreed with the policies implemented by the government. Still, they wanted their involvement in the discussion forums conducted by the government because they only involved village officials and community leaders. In contrast, if the community was the direct beneficiary of policies and was not involved, it will cause misunderstandings of policy decisions.

These findings imply that it is essential that the deliberation process be carried out collectively so that policy decisions are based on consensus. The importance of formulating policies that are consensus-based will have a positive impact on society, such as increasing support and trust in the policies

to be implemented. As previously explained, building trust among actors involved in the collaborative revitalization of the riverside houses in Banjarmasin City is the most important thing to do by agreeing on a will and strengthening the legitimacy of development through a Collaborative Governance pattern. It aligns with what Chris Ansell and Alison Gash (2008) explained, emphasizing the importance of building trust in successful collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2008).

CONCLUSION

The key to successful collaboration must emphasize the value of mutual trust, honesty, no secrecy, and confidence in each other's commitment among the actors involved. Building collaboration among actors in the policy to revitalize the riverside houses in Banjarmasin City certainly requires a long process, but through a foundation of cooperation by understanding each other's positions, duties, functions, and structures. In addition, they understand each other's abilities, contact each other, approach each other, are willing to help and be assisted, encourage and support each other, and respect each other. Collaboration involving actors in power with interests in decision-making might fail during its implementation.

The conclusions in this study provide an understanding that the power and interests among actors cause failure in carrying out collaborative programs. Conceptually, collaboration is an alternative to public policy as an interactive process involving an autonomous group of people who use rules, organizational norms, and structures to solve problems. Likewise, stakeholders can't work alone without the community and government's help and support. On the other hand, the community cannot work alone to fill development with its role as a subject without government support and establishing partnerships with several interested parties, such as the private sector and social community organizations.

This study proposes that in carrying out public programs, one should rely on actors' ability and maintain harmony among actors when collaborating. This research inspires the development of more in-depth sci-

entific research in the future, especially scientific developments regarding collaboration. This research emphasizes the importance of understanding the collaborative governance agenda because it is on this agenda that the problems faced by society are fought for, and the process of implementing collaborative governance cannot be separated from the presence of actors involved in advocating for these issues.

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