
The Role of Patronage in Shaping Indonesia's Political Landscape

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Abstract

This article presents a systematic literature review on the role of patronage in shaping Indonesia's political landscape. Using a systematic literature review approach, the article analyzes 30 selected articles out of a total of 250 articles that underwent identification and screening processes. The main focus of this review is to explore how political patronage influences power structures, political participation, and the dynamics of relations between political elites and the public in Indonesia. Drawing on Michel Foucault's theory of power and knowledge, the article explores how patronage not only functions as a tool for distributing resources but also plays a crucial role in the construction and dissemination of political knowledge. According to Foucault, power is not just imposed from above but operates through networks of relationships, shaping the way knowledge is produced and legitimized. Patronage systems produce specific truths that validate the power structures and create a discourse that legitimizes inequality and exclusion. The findings suggest that patronage remains an essential tool in political mobilization, influencing both the distribution of resources and the strengthening of social and political networks. However, the complexity of patronage also poses challenges for the development of an inclusive and transparent democracy. This article provides a deeper understanding of the influence of patronage in Indonesian politics, offering insights for the development of more just and sustainable political policies, while reflecting on Foucault's ideas about how knowledge and power intertwine to shape political realities.

Keywords: Indonesia; Literature Review; Patronage; Politics

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Introduction

The Indonesian political system is characterized by a persistent reliance on patronage, which has evolved significantly since the fall of Suharto in 1998. This system, often referred to as "*patronage democracy*" is marked by the intertwining of political power and material incentives, where political actors maintain their influence through the distribution of resources and favors to their supporters. This phenomenon is not merely a remnant of the past but has adapted to the contemporary political landscape, influencing governance, electoral behavior, and public policy.

One of the defining features of Indonesian patronage politics is its deep-rooted nature in the governance structure. Blunt et al. argue that patronage has remained a central aspect of governance in Indonesia, contributing to a political environment where factions at the center make concessions to protect their interests, thereby perpetuating a cycle of patronage and political stability (Blunt, Turner, and Lindroth 2012). This is further supported by Gyene, who notes that personal patronage and clientelism dominate party politics, overshadowing ideological confrontations (Gyene 2019). The political landscape is thus shaped by the need for political actors to secure patronage positions, which has become a primary motivation for various parties, including Islamist factions (Gyene 2019). Scott made a definition that underlies the client-customer relationship, which focuses on the unequal exchange between the two parties rather than descriptive standards (Scott 1972). Thus, the sponsor has the status of a sponsor. In a patron-client relationship, someone with a higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his power and resources to protect and help someone with a lower socioeconomic status (client). In return, the client provides general support and assistance, including services tailored to the client's needs.

The implications of this patronage system extend beyond electoral politics into the realm of public administration and service delivery. Rosser et al. argue that the political elite in Indonesia have historically utilized the education system as a tool for resource accumulation and political control, rather than for fostering skilled human capital (Rosser, King, and Widoyoko 2022). This reflects a broader trend where public resources are

mobilized to sustain patronage networks, undermining the effectiveness of governance and public service delivery. This action will clearly erode democracy in Indonesia. Democracy is a means or instrument to achieve prosperity society, so that its effectiveness and productivity depend on the conditions of the society in which it is used (who holds power). In other words, good democracy requires education, economy, and culture (respect for rights and obligations). In this context, adequate political education is essential to shape public awareness and participation in the democratic process. Without a good understanding of their rights and obligations as citizens, people will be vulnerable to manipulation and negative influence from certain parties who seek to exploit the democratic system for personal or group interests. In addition, stable economic conditions also play an important role in supporting a healthy democracy. Economic instability often triggers social dissatisfaction that can lead to conflict and distrust of political institutions.

Furthermore, the persistence of patronage is also evident at the local level, as illustrated by Haryanto's study on urban politics, which reveals that patronage remains dominant in the distribution of infrastructure projects and state-business relations (Haryanto 2024). This local manifestation of patronage politics underscores its pervasive nature across various levels of governance in Indonesia. In conclusion, the Indonesian political system is deeply entrenched in patronage, which shapes electoral behavior, governance practices, and public service delivery. The interplay between political actors and their constituents, driven by material incentives, continues to define the dynamics of Indonesian democracy. As the country moves forward, addressing the challenges posed by patronage will be crucial for fostering a more equitable and effective political system.


Michel Foucault's theories of power and knowledge provide a critical framework for understanding the dynamics of political patronage in Indonesia. Foucault posits that power is not merely repressive but is intricately linked to the production and dissemination of knowledge, which shapes identities and social relations (Chen and Zhang 2023). In the context of Indonesian politics, patronage functions as a mechanism for distributing resources while simultaneously constructing and legitimizing political knowledge. Patronage in Indonesia operates within a network of power relations that Foucault describes

as "governmentality," where political actors use their resources to influence and control the behavior of individuals and groups (Titeca 2006). This aligns with Titeca's exploration of political patronage as a form of governmentality that shapes political values and behaviors within communities (Titeca 2006).

Methods

Secondary data is used in this study, which is a type of qualitative research and a literature study approach. This research was conducted using a qualitative method. The steps of this literature study are starting by searching for keywords, collecting related literature, identifying literature, and making a summary of the literature. This step is also recommended by qualitative research experts (Creswell and Poth 2016). It nyebegins by looking at the concept of patronage according to various experts, and then looking at preventive actions reviewed in terms of education and awareness of active community participation.

Figure 1: Prisma Diagram



The initial step involved identifying 250 articles from the Scopus and PubMed databases using the keywords "patronage," "Indonesia," and "political corruption." Out of the 250 articles, 180 were selected after filtering. Seventy articles were excluded due to their

lack of relevance to the topic. In the feasibility stage, 20 articles were further removed for not meeting the criteria. Fifty articles were then chosen based on the following criteria: they were peer-reviewed studies and focused on patronage in Indonesia. Finally, 30 articles were selected for qualitative analysis.

Results

Patronage in Indonesia

The phenomenon of patronage in Indonesia is a complex and multifaceted aspect of its political landscape, deeply embedded in the fabric of governance and electoral processes. Patronage, defined as the distribution of material benefits by political actors to secure loyalty and support, has evolved significantly since the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998. This evolution reflects a shift from a highly centralized system of patronage to a more fragmented and decentralized model, yet the core principles of clientelism and material exchange remain prevalent. One of the primary characteristics of Indonesian patronage is its integration into the electoral process. Political candidates often rely on patronage to secure votes, particularly in a fragmented multiparty system where ideological differences are less pronounced than personal and material connections. Shin highlights that voters, especially those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, tend to prioritize immediate material benefits over broader policy proposals, which reinforces the cycle of patronage politics (Shin, 2015).

In addition, (Gray and Crichton 2014) point out that the spread of corruption is due to the environment that supports it, not because their society is different from societies elsewhere. Scientists have done their best to investigate the external factors that contribute to corruption. Political scientists argue that corruption is actually caused by an irrational political system. They argue that corruption is caused by the power of the government or strong officials.

Corruption is identified as a result of lack of transparency in administration and democracy, favoritism, sectarianism, and development that represents interests. Corruption, according to Collin Nye's classic definition and general definition, is an act that deviates from the normal duties of a public role because it is related to financial matters for personal gain or to gain a position; or violating regulations to exercise certain influence related to personal interests. Education is one of the important supporting factors in realizing participation in society (Nye 1967). Why is this so important? The CSIS survey also shows that young people's interest in participating in political parties is low; only 1.1% of them currently participate in political parties. On the other hand, there are a large number of young people who participate in youth organizations, namely 21.6% (Rizaty 2022).

In addition, the cultural dimensions of patronage in Indonesia cannot be overlooked. Cahyati and Lopo highlight how incumbents cultivate patronage networks not only during elections but also through everyday interactions with constituents, employing various strategies such as benevolence politics and monetary incentives to maintain loyalty (Cahyati and Lopo 2019). This cultural aspect of patronage reinforces the notion that political support is transactional, further entrenching the practice within the societal fabric. The challenges posed by patronage politics are significant, as they hinder the development of a more accountable and transparent political system. Aspinall notes that Indonesia's democratic model has been shaped by an inclusionary elite settlement, where powerful actors benefit from access to patronage, often at the expense of marginalized groups (Aspinall 2015). This dynamic contributes to ongoing issues of economic inequality and social disempowerment, as the benefits of patronage are not equitably distributed.

Recognizing this reality, Stiglitz encourages national and global leaders to continue to develop better policies at the national, regional, and international levels to respond to the various impacts of change. (Beck 1992) observed that the progress of science and technological innovation is currently overshadowed by various positive and negative risks in social, economic, and political life, law, culture, and ethics. These risks have spread across geographical boundaries and can be experienced and felt by anyone who participates in the

dynamics of global life. Here we see a contradiction between the benefits (advantages) and challenges of globalization.

The world of education is part of the service, in the sense of educational services, which aims to make humans intelligent, expert, competent, innovative, creative, and so on. Various models and modes of education are offered, both domestically and internationally. All of this also happens because of the need for workers. The need for quality workers is also increasing. Therefore, every university strives to meet the needs of the industrial world in terms of the number of users of college graduates. For this reason, the Indonesian government has also implemented regulations so that universities in Indonesia become universities with reliable quality and can even compete with foreign universities. Giddens describes globalization as a process that has changed the world, while Ritzer describes it as the spread of emptiness.

According to Ritzer, globalization brings social and cultural changes in addition to economics, through the spread of global capital (Azkia 2019). This can be felt in personal experience through changes in learning media that have used paper since the beginning, switching to using media such as files on computers (paperless). At first, this was not easy, due to the constraints in ownership of commodities that encouraged this access. This is also felt by most people in my environment. Moreover, the term "*gaptek or gagap teknologi*" has emerged which is a stigma for those who do not master technology. It is no secret that there are still many Indonesian people who live below the poverty line. Of course, to get a quality education requires a lot of money. And this is one of the things that reasons why all levels of society have not felt the globalization of Education. For example, when I was in high school, in computer science and computer engineering classes, students in my school had to bring their own laptops. So this could only be done by the group of owners. My friends and I who do not have laptops or computers now share with those who have them by sitting next to each other. In addition, there are often seminars in class held outside of school to attract students to participate. These courses are usually language-oriented courses or other courses that tend to be expensive. In other words, progressive groups will continue to grow, while marginalized groups will be increasingly marginalized and drowned in the current of

globalization that may lead them to the abyss of poverty. At a time when people from lower economic groups have to work hard to get their children into public schools, people from upper-class economic groups send their children to fancy schools.

Discussion

Political Reform: Towards a More Transparent and Accountable Government System in Indonesia

Indonesia has many general elections such as legislative elections (to elect senators and council members in the three levels of government), presidential elections (to elect the president and vice president), regional elections or regent elections (to elect regents in provincial and district governments), and village head elections or village head elections (to elect village government heads). Regional elections were introduced in 2005 as an integral part of the decentralization policy in Indonesia. Regional elections are an autonomous phenomenon because they are not influenced by ideological polarization (Baswedan 2007) and the context of political institutions at the national level. Although party officials at the national level still have a large influence in determining who will run as candidates in regional elections, political parties do not influence the process of coalition formation and the struggle of local actors to win regional elections (Choi 2007) at the local level. At the same time, regional elections have given rise to new political actors that influence voter preferences such as polling institutions (Trihartono 2014), social organizations and local mass media (Choi 2007). Local mass media often adopt elements of traditional political language to claim leadership in the country, terms derived from local traditions (MacRae and Nyoman Darma Putra 2007).

In several cities, regional elections allowed ethnic Chinese to appear as candidates and win the election (Tanasaldy 2015). At the candidate-voter level, regional elections were marked by the strengthening of patron-client relationships. One of the foundational aspects of improving government accountability in Indonesia is the implementation of performance management systems. Erawan et al. discuss the application of the Balanced Scorecard (BSC)

in Indonesian government organizations, which aims to enhance performance accountability by providing a structured approach to measuring and managing performance (Erawan, Putra, and Sentanu 2022). The BSC framework allows government institutions to align their strategic objectives with performance metrics, thereby fostering a culture of accountability. Similarly, Jurnal and Khalid emphasize the importance of performance measurement systems in local governments, arguing that these systems are essential for bureaucratic reform and good governance practices (Jurnal and Khalid 2015). They highlight the need for regulatory frameworks that support the effective implementation of performance measurement, which can lead to improved service delivery and accountability. Theoretically, the intellectual debate on the relationship between administration and politics has begun since (Wilson 1887) wrote the *Study of Administration*. In the article, (Wilson 1887) emphasized that bureaucracy (a symbol of the world of government) must be separated from politics. Because, the both carry out different functions: politics is how to make policy decisions and administration is how to implement policy decisions. In short, Woodrow Wilson demanded bureaucratic neutrality.


However, the path to reform is fraught with challenges, particularly due to the entrenched nature of oligarchy in Indonesian politics. Tambunan argues that the legislative process is often influenced by oligarchic interests, which can stifle genuine democratic engagement and accountability (Tambunan 2023). This oligarchic influence complicates efforts to implement reforms aimed at increasing transparency and accountability, as political elites may resist changes that threaten their power and privileges. Moreover, the cultural dimensions of governance in Indonesia play a crucial role in shaping accountability practices. Novianti notes that the complex cultural, historical, and social factors in Indonesia complicate the implementation of effective human resource management practices, which are essential for fostering a culture of accountability (Novianti 2018). This cultural context must be considered when designing and implementing reforms to ensure that they are sensitive to local norms and practices.

Bureaucrats as professional workers are still considered by local politicians as an instrument to approach voters; Second, from the demand side, bureaucrats have high motivation to participate in regional elections as part of the candidate's winning team because it protects their interests. As a result, all efforts of the central government to reform regional bureaucracy through various instruments, namely: salary increases, job auctions, and new rules in personnel management will be faced with an atmosphere of patronage at the regional level. The looting system will be maintained by local political elites and local bureaucrats as a mechanism for implementing staff placement in the bureaucracy. However, because of the need for political elites to Maintaining their popularity and electability in front of voters, the spoils system is not a reason for bureaucrats to leave high performance. When bureaucrats do not work optimally, their patrons can be threatened in the next election. At this point, especially in the Indonesian context, it is important to investigate whether the spoils system and the merit system have a positive/negative impact on bureaucratic performance.

We suspect that the spoils system has a positive effect on bureaucratic performance in the regions because it is in line with the characteristics of society, political elites, and bureaucratic elites in the regions (as shown by Sintang Regency and Ketapang Regency). We can also investigate how and what are the prerequisites for the merit system in patronage conditions. Of course, this assumption still needs to be proven through empirical research. Finally, we suggest the importance of investigating the influence of the patronage relationship between politicians and bureaucrats on public interests. Theoretically, the bureaucracy was born as a guardian of public interests. However, the spoils system makes the bureaucracy a tool for certain groups to control state power only. In this situation, it is important to question what happens to the public interest. Is there still room for public interests to damage the government? At the policy level, we can ask how many policies are produced by a spoiled government that will promote and improve public interests? How do elected candidates and local bureaucrats compromise their interests with the public interest? We believe that answering these questions is important to increase scientific knowledge about the dynamics of local politics in Indonesia.

According to Foucault, power and knowledge are intertwined in shaping social and political structures. In the case of political patronage, politicians and bureaucrats function as agents who not only control access to power and resources but also produce knowledge that justifies the patronage and clientelism systems themselves. This knowledge is not limited to practical information about voters or policies but also includes the ways in which "*political loyalty*" and "*allegiance*" are defined as legitimate forms of knowledge in the eyes of society. Bureaucracy, as a political actor, plays a dual role in this context. As agents of the state, bureaucrats are responsible for implementing policies, but in practice, they are also part of a larger patronage network. In other words, they are not merely policy implementers but also producers of knowledge about how policies should be executed, based on their interests in maintaining their political positions and benefits. Foucault's concept of "*governmentality*" can be used to describe how bureaucrats and politicians govern and manage the population (in this case, voters and local communities) through the production and control of legitimate knowledge, including bureaucratic policies and resource distribution.

Figure 2: The Cycle of Political Patronage and Knowledge



Indonesia has suffered losses due to corruption in no small amount considering the large number of poor and illiterate people in Indonesia. Corruption cases in Indonesia were recorded by Indonesia Corruption Watch, the seizure of state land for a 37,095-hectare oil palm plantation in Indragiri Hulu Regency, Riau, was the largest corruption in recent years. Throughout 2003-2022, the land was cultivated without permission from the Duta Palma Group. In this case, the state suffered a loss of Rp104.1 trillion. Then followed by corruption in the processing of illegal condensate at an oil refinery in Tuban, East Java which caused state losses of up to 35 trillion. Then followed by corruption in the management of pension funds at PT Asabri which causing the state a loss of 22.78 trillion, and other major cases (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi 2023). This condition is very concerning when compared with the picture of poverty in Indonesia. If traced together, this is the impact of patronage that occurs in Indonesia. In order to move towards a more transparent government, we need to refer to the concept of Good Governance.

Based on Presidential Instruction Number 1 of 1995 concerning the Improvement and Improvement of the Quality of Civil Servant Services, standards for public services are set. Public services still have many different problems such as the difficulty of accessing services, the complexity of using procedures, having to apply for certain permits, unclear costs, which are characteristics of the low quality of public services in Indonesia. In addition, there is a tendency for injustice in public services, where groups of people who are considered poor, financially disadvantaged, or not close to service providers have a greater chance of getting these services. Conversely, it will be easier for the rich, powerful, or close to service providers to get these services. This discriminatory service can cause conflict in national life if these differences and injustices continue to occur. Second, there is a tendency in many central government agencies to be reluctant to delegate greater authority to autonomous regions, resulting in public services becoming less efficient, effective and economical, and this does not eliminate the possibility that service units tend to lack the resources to provide responsible, responsive and unrepresentative services, according to the needs of the community.

Therefore, public services must be carried out transparently and accountably by each service unit of government agencies, because the quality of the performance of the public service bureaucracy has not had a broad impact on achieving community welfare. Sub-district offices and offices Population services as a place for the community to obtain various community services, must be able to provide excellent service to every community, and the apparatus must demonstrate good performance. Public service providers must consider the principles of public service when providing services (Dewi and Tobing 2021), namely: a) Transparency, namely the provision of public services must be open, easy and accessible to all parties for all parties in need, must be available in full and easy to understand; b) Responsibility, especially public services must be responsible in accordance with the provisions of laws and regulations; (c) Conditional, namely the provision of public services must be in accordance with the conditions and capabilities of the service provider and recipient, and meet the principles of efficiency and effectiveness; d) Participatory, namely encouraging community participation in the provision of public services, by paying attention to the aspirations, needs, and ideals of the community; e) Non-discrimination (right to equality), namely the provision of public services must not be discriminatory, in the sense that it does not cause differences between ethnicities, races, religions, social classes, genders, social and economic status; and (f) Balancing rights and obligations, especially providers and recipients of public services must respect the rights and obligations of each party. Regulation of the Minister of State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reform Number 36 of 2012 concerning Technical Guidelines for the Preparation, Determination, and Implementation of Service Standards, Chapter II Point A clearly states that “service standards are reference documents used as guidelines in providing services and as references for evaluating service quality as obligations and promises of organizational units to community customers in the context of fast, easy, affordable and measurable quality services.

Foucault's concept of biopower, which refers to the regulation of populations through various forms of governance, is particularly relevant in analyzing how patronage operates in Indonesia (Means 2021). Political patronage often involves the management of social

welfare and public resources, where the distribution of benefits is tied to political allegiance. This creates a dependency that reinforces the power of political elites while simultaneously shaping the political consciousness of the populace. As noted by Chen, Foucault's insights into the relationship between power and knowledge highlight how political actors manipulate knowledge to maintain control (Chen and Zhang 2023). In this way, patronage becomes a tool not only for resource allocation but also for shaping the political narrative and identity of citizens. The implications of this patronage system extend to the broader political landscape in Indonesia. The intertwining of power and knowledge through patronage fosters a political culture where loyalty is rewarded, and dissent is marginalized. This is evident in the way political parties and candidates engage in clientelistic practices, offering material incentives in exchange for support. As Pappas discusses, patronage is an enduring feature of contemporary politics, reflecting the choices made by political actors to consolidate power (Pappas 2009). This dynamic complicates the relationship between citizens and the state, as individuals navigate a political environment where their participation is often contingent upon their alignment with patronage networks. Furthermore, the role of knowledge in this patronage system cannot be overstated. Foucault emphasizes that knowledge is a form of power that shapes how individuals understand their social reality. In Indonesia, the narratives constructed around political patronage influence public perceptions of governance and accountability. Political elites often frame their actions within a discourse of benevolence and development, obscuring the underlying power dynamics at play. This manipulation of knowledge serves to legitimize patronage practices and reinforce the authority of political actors, as citizens come to view these exchanges as normative rather than exploitative.

Public trust in democracy is declining, one of the many challenges facing established democracy in Indonesia. This is due to the large amount of corruption carried out by high-ranking government officials, members of parliament, and political party officials. This situation has made the public no longer trust the current government. The public will become increasingly concerned with the actions and decisions of the government. The resulting sense of indifference seems to have divided the government and the public, making

it appear that they are working separately. Good, honest, clean, and fair leadership is essential to addressing this problem. Indonesian democracy, which is still very young, has many weaknesses and seems stable. It is proven that giving power to the masses increases the possibility of corruption. If reforms are carried out without a strong legal basis, it will pave the way for corruption in the economic sector.

The Importance of Class Political Awareness in Curbing Patronage

In this study, the wider community needs to understand the class politics that political entrepreneurs often do. Developing countries, where clientelism and wealth inequality make it difficult for lower-class citizens to run for office. Politicians in Indonesia have much higher levels of education and income than citizens, they tend to have professional backgrounds. To explore this, (Warburton et al. 2021) used a survey method and compared the positions of politicians and voters on various economic policy issues. The views of Indonesian politicians are generally more in line with the views of upper-class voters. There is variation and agreement across classes on state policies such as price controls, which partly reflects politicians' dependence on the state, the gap between voters and politicians is widening on the content of economic redistribution. The upper-class bias in the Indonesian legislature thus obscures the large lower-class constituency that supports a more redistributive economic regime, a constituency that is largely unrepresented by Indonesian parties.

The case of European and American countries that are already established democracies shows that the socio-economic background of legislators has little effect on their attitudes, ideological positions or behavior in office, politicians adjust to party programs. However, there is also evidence that socio-economic differences between politicians and voters have an effect on how lower-class interests are channeled into the political system. Investigation of the background of Indonesian legislators shows that they not only have higher incomes and education than their constituents, but also are highly skewed towards upper-class professional backgrounds. The main findings of this article, first, are that general patterns and variations across economic policy issues indicate that the

policy preferences of upper-class people are better represented overall compared to the lower classes. Second, there are substantial differences in the conformity of voters and politicians, there is a very large gap between politicians and society in terms of distribution, welfare, and foreign immigration. Third, legislators, while rejecting interventions for economic egalitarianism, in accordance with their class position, also support so-called economic statism in accordance with their dependence on bureaucratic power.

It is important to describe this because social class, which is generally measured using one's income, education, or professional background, or a combination of these three indicators, has long been associated with different types of socio-economic political preferences. In developing democracies, in particular, where parties tend to be poorly institutionalized, and their policy platforms on social and economic issues are difficult to distinguish, descriptive inequalities become important for the representation of lower-class interests. In this case, class differences can blunt the representational quality of democratic institutions, especially in conditions where pro-establishment parties are weak and the party system is not oriented along the left-right spectrum.

Qualitative research shows that Indonesian democratic institutions politicians are on average richer, more educated, and their professional backgrounds are very different from those of most citizens. The most striking finding is that members of the DPRD not only come from wealthy backgrounds, but many of them have political-bureaucratic connections. This paper shows that in most policy areas, conformity with political preferences is almost always higher for citizens with high income levels, followed by high backgrounds, or professional backgrounds. Especially in terms of distribution and immigration. a review of the growing literature on class and conformity in developing democracies. These results emphasize that there are class-based differences in statistical economic models. Richer, more educated, professional voters, legislators tend to oppose state intervention that would redistribute wealth in favor of the poor.

There are three groups that can be used to illustrate the constraints faced by local firms. First, there are small indigenous businesses (firms) – traders and craftsmen, some of the small communities. These small businesses show that small firms are constrained by

collective action problems and large, dispersed group structures inhibit efforts to organise. Another problem is that individual businesses tend to ignore the efforts of other members, making joint initiatives ineffective. There is also skepticism among the Chinese, who are more reluctant to engage in public debate. Despite their economic power in the rural economy, the 20 Chinese communities in this study are reluctant to participate in community efforts to improve government outcomes. Second, there is a small group of ethnic Chinese firms, most of whom are engaged in wholesale and retail trade. Third, a small group of large indigenous companies that derive their income from construction, procurement, resource extraction and infrastructure. Case examples are not surprising, big businessmen prefer to maintain close relations with government officials rather than criticize administrative weaknesses. Many companies avoid anything that could cause friction with government officials. Some regents are very concerned about the interests of the general public and small business owners in particular. For example, the regents in Solok and Kebumen skillfully and consistently use their official powers to form strategic reform pacts. This is seen from the practice of implementing effective monitoring (via telephone conversations, complaint boxes via SMS), punishment (demotion and dismissal of corrupt staff) and reward systems (merit-based promotions, performance awards). At the national level, the performance of the political economy system is still low. In some regions, there are still high taxes, bureaucracy and public corruption. Although some of the local governments have shown efficient and responsive services. However, there are still local governments (regents) that burden the local economy by providing administrative uncertainty, inefficiency, and extortion. Variations at the district level show ongoing dynamics in the local political economy.

The next literature from (Hadiz 2013), Robison's work is important for Indonesia in placing political economy as the core of the study of the contemporary economy. Moreover, his study is not only limited to scientific studies in one country, but also includes literature on the development of Asian politics and economics and political economy more generally. Discussions on this have also been initiated by figures such as Garri Hawes, John Girling, Paul Hutchoft. Vedi R. Hadiz in this writing wants to focus on two things, first, providing a context

that makes Robison's work written. Second, examining the relevance of this book in three areas of academic debate.

In the formation of states and classes in studies in Southeast Asia began to be explained in the 1970s. A period in which nationalist and often authoritarian states, siding with the Western allies against the communist bloc, led to the rapid development of capitalism. Along with economic growth, new social contradictions emerged, in which urban and industrial workers were gradually displaced by large-scale peasants and a growing urban middle class. Eventually, a domestic capitalist class emerged in various forms of symbiotic relationships with the authoritarian state.

The political economic conditions proposed by Robison and others are essentially attempts to address these implications. This work then looks at the transformation of domestic structures and the driving forces of the internet, including those within the state, albeit in the broader context of global capitalism. The stated aim is to interpret class formation by focusing on the consequences of the integration of the national economy into a world market dominated by capital, the expansion of social inequality, mediated by the state. Capitalist transformation, democracy, and institutional change are closely related to Indonesian capitalism during the New Order. According to this view, it was primarily Suharto's personal abilities and leadership skills that enabled him to extract certain economic benefits from his patrimonial regime, and even go beyond that autonomy, to drive the process of modernization in Indonesia. In capitalist transformation, democracy and institutional change are closely related to democratization and institutional change. This is because Indonesia has long been led by the authoritarian regimes of Suharto and Sukarno. Deviations from the ideals of liberal democracy have replaced the regime in many cases. Although this book predicts that Western-style bourgeois democracy will soon be present in Indonesia. The constellation of power and interests and the consequences of social conflict defeat the behavior caused by the redesign of Development. Indonesia's convergence with the European capitalist organizational model is politically and economically rejected because it is considered a real possibility in the future.

Conclusion

Political interests and personal relationships often take precedence over competence and performance in the decision-making process. The root of the problem of patronage can be found in Indonesia's political and social structure, which is still vulnerable to nepotism and personal connections. A political system that is too centralized on central figures, as well as low transparency and accountability in decision-making, creates an environment that makes it easy for patronage practices to flourish. This article highlights the urgency of education as the hope of democracy in the future. Policy and regulatory reforms aimed at preventing patronage practices, such as strict law enforcement against corruption and nepotism, are very important to improve the political and governance order. In addition, education and public awareness also play an important role in changing a political culture that is vulnerable to patronage.

Educational programs that educate citizens about the importance of meritocracy, integrity, and active participation in the political process can help reduce dependence on patronage practices. How then does education contribute to the success or failure or how the future of politics grows and is formed. Education is the responsibility and obligation of the state and is supported by all its people. However, until now the implementation of this mandate has not been fully implemented in the field of education, in fact it is still very far from what is aspired to. Although in terms of funding in 2009 the government has targeted a budget of 20% of the APBN. The challenges of today's world developments demand the ability of strong human resources and have high creativity, but how the state is able to prepare quality human resources is still looking for patterns until now. It is important to create class awareness in politics to the voting public who are often the center of the target of political entrepreneurship. This can be done by strengthening the essence of democracy for the purpose of the general public, not a handful of parties who have the capital to achieve victory. We think it is important to explain this, because social class which is generally measured using a person's income, education, or professional background, or a combination of the three indicators has long been associated with various types of different socio-

economic political preferences. When political actors use social class in political games, democracy will always be eroded.

In conclusion, patronage is a serious challenge to the development of sustainable democracy in Indonesia. However, with joint efforts from the government, civil society, and the private sector, and a commitment to improving political and social systems that are vulnerable to patronage practices, we can create a more just and inclusive environment for all Indonesian citizens. This is the result of cooperation and support from various parties. The relationship between education and politics is very close and always related so that with this situation we can see that state politics plays a very important role in determining the direction of educational development in a country.

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