Jurnal Pemikiran Sosiologi (JPS)
DOI: 10.22146/jps.v13i1.116490
jurnal.ugm.ac.id/jps
Volume 13, Issue 1, 2026 (53-83)

Reassessing Objectivity and Subjectivity in Indonesian Social Science: Levels of Claims

Muhammad Nurul Huda[1]

Accepted: 8 October 2026 | Published online: 13 October 2026

Abstract

This article reassesses objectivity and subjectivity in Indonesian social science by taking Ignas Kleden and Taufik Abdullah's edited volume, Paradigma Ilmu Pengetahuan dan Penelitian Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial dan Humaniora di Indonesia, as its primary point of entry and extending the analysis to related writings on epistemology, method, and the politics of knowledge. The study addresses a recurring problem in Indonesian debates: similar terms are often used to discuss different targets, including values and partisanship, the adequacy of knowledge claims, and assumptions about social reality. Using qualitative document analysis, the article combines thematic analysis and discourse analysis to examine reflective theoretical and methodological texts. The analysis is organized through Andrew Sayer's three-dimensional account of objectivity and subjectivity and the concept of levels of claims. The findings show that the debate is not a simple opposition between objective and subjective positions. Instead, the authors examined generally recognize subjectivity as an unavoidable condition of scholarly work, while differing in where they locate accountability for objectivity. These differences are concentrated in three arenas: epistemic, methodological, and political. The article argues that these orientations can function as reciprocal corrections rather than mutually exclusive positions. Its contribution is to offer a conceptual map that clarifies the locus of dispute and supports more focused dialogue about justification, reflexivity, and the social conditions of knowledge production.

Keywords: Epistemic accountability; Knowledge justification; Knowledge production; Meta-epistemic reflexivity; Sociology of knowledge

Muhammad Nurul Huda | mhnurulhuda@unusia.ac.id | Corresponding author(s)

1 Universitas Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia

Introduction

In Indonesian sociological research practice, and in social science more generally, debates over objectivity and subjectivity are not confined to abstract theoretical discussion. They shape how researchers design methods, assess findings, interpret field data, and position themselves within the social relations they study. Divergent stances toward objectivity also influence how scholars understand the entanglement of values, interests, positionality, and power relations in the production of sociological knowledge (Resnik and Elliott 2019).

Yet these debates often proceed without sufficient clarity about what is actually being disputed. The terms *objectivity* and *subjectivity* are frequently used to address different levels of claims: the researcher's values and partisanship, the truth or practical adequacy of knowledge claims, and assumptions about the social reality that underwrites analysis. When these levels are not distinguished, arguments may move across different targets without directly engaging one another. As a result, critiques and defenses may resemble *intersecting monologues* rather than arguments directed at the same point of contention.

This problem is visible in Indonesian social-science discussions, where objectivity and subjectivity appear in paradigm debates, methodological reflections, critiques of value-freedom, and analyses of the politics of knowledge. Labels such as positivism, interpretivism, neutrality, partisanship, scientificity, and reflexivity are often invoked to mark positions, but they do not always clarify whether the issue concerns values in inquiry, explanatory adequacy, methodological accountability, or assumptions about social reality.

This article reassesses that problem by taking Kleden and Abdullah's edited volume, *Paradigma Ilmu Pengetahuan dan Penelitian Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial dan Humaniora di Indonesia* (2017), as its primary point of entry. The volume is selected not because it exhausts Indonesian debates on objectivity and subjectivity, but because it offers a concentrated site for mapping their main epistemological tensions. The analysis is also extended to related Indonesian social-science writings that address objectivity, subjectivity, values, methodological rigor, and the politics of knowledge.

DOI: 10.22146/jps.v13i1.116490
jps@ugm.ac.id | jurnal.ugm.ac.id/jps

Contemporary philosophy of science has shown that objectivity cannot be reduced to value-freedom, strict neutrality, or the absence of values in inquiry (Brown 2024; de Melo-Martín and Intemann 2016). Critiques of the "view from nowhere" emphasize that knowledge cannot emerge from a standpointless position and that claims to neutrality may obscure the role of values, positionality, and power in knowledge production (Toole 2022). At the same time, rejecting value-freedom does not mean abandoning objectivity. Several scholars reformulate objectivity as public justification, epistemic accountability, and openness to criticism, testing, and correction within a scientific community (Bird 2020; Koskinen 2020). This view is especially relevant for social research because it allows scholars to acknowledge situated knowledge without reducing all claims to equally valid perspectives (Zahle 2021; Zahle and Ylikoski 2025).

In Indonesian social-science debates, similar concerns emerge through discussions of paradigm, method, historiography, values, and the institutional politics of knowledge. Kleden and Abdullah's edited volume is important in this regard because it gathers cross-disciplinary reflections on the epistemological and methodological foundations of Indonesian social science. It shows that questions of objectivity and subjectivity are not merely imported philosophical problems, but are embedded in the development of Indonesian social science, methodological accountability, and the relation between knowledge, values, and power.

Previous studies have examined the relationship between social science, objectivity, and power in Indonesia. Samuel and Sutopo show that claims of neutrality, objectivity, and universality in New Order knowledge production often concealed power interests behind scientific authority (Samuel and Sutopo 2013). Hadiz and Dhakidae similarly argue that Indonesian social science cannot be separated from power relations, including the tendency to treat objectivity as a technical achievement detached from reflection on the power relations shaping knowledge production (Hadiz and Dhakidae 2005). Extending this critique, Sutopo and Utomo (2020) show how American "modern sociology" in Indonesia marginalized decolonial and Marxist perspectives through claims of universality, exclusion, and erasure. Thufail (2011) and Mahaswa and Syaja (2025) further highlight how objectivity could reject critical approaches and privilege written, codified, and measurable knowledge

over oral, experiential, and relational forms of knowing. Taken together, these studies show that objectivity in Indonesian social science is not only a methodological issue, but also a question of epistemic hierarchy, institutional authority, and the politics of legitimate knowledge.

However, existing discussions have not sufficiently clarified how different formulations of objectivity operate at different levels of claims—whether concerning values and partisanship, the truth or practical adequacy of knowledge claims, or assumptions about social reality. This article addresses that gap by mapping these levels and showing how different Indonesian social-science orientations can be read as distinct modes of epistemic accountability.

To develop this mapping, the article uses Andrew Sayer's three-dimensional account of objectivity and subjectivity as its *theoretical framework*. Grounded in critical realism, Sayer's framework combines ontological realism—the view that social reality is not reducible to what we think or say about it—with epistemological fallibilism, the recognition that knowledge claims remain corrigible and therefore require justification (Sayer 2000:2, 60). This position rejects judgmental relativism and implies a commitment to *judgmental rationality*: although knowledge is situated and value-laden, competing claims are not equally valid and can still be assessed according to their justification, practical adequacy, and explanatory power (Sayer 2000:42–43, 47, 55).

Sayer distinguishes three paired meanings of objectivity and subjectivity. The *value dimension* concerns objectivity as value-freedom or impartiality (OBJECTIVE1) and subjectivity as value-ladenness or partisanship (SUBJECTIVE1). The *epistemological dimension* concerns objectivity as truth or practical adequacy—that is, the capacity of a claim to explain the social reality it addresses and guide action accordingly (OBJECTIVE2)—and subjectivity as weakly justified claims (SUBJECTIVE2). The *ontological dimension* concerns objectivity as social reality not reducible to subjects' awareness (OBJECTIVE3) and subjectivity as experiences, meanings, or beliefs that pertain to subjects (SUBJECTIVE3) (Sayer 2000:58–61). These dimensions are *logically distinct*: a value-laden inquiry is not automatically epistemologically weak, just as value-free inquiry does not automatically

DOI: 10.22146/jps.v13i1.116490
jps@ugm.ac.id | jurnal.ugm.ac.id/jps

become true or practically adequate. Likewise, claims about subjective experience can still be assessed through evidence, interpretation, methodological rigor, and public criticism.

On this theoretical basis, the article develops *a conceptual framework* organized around levels of claims and epistemic accountability. Levels of claims refers to the dimension at which an argument about objectivity or subjectivity operates, while epistemic accountability refers to where and how a knowledge claim is justified, criticized, or rendered open to scrutiny. In this article, Sayer's framework functions as the foundational theoretical lens, whereas levels of claims and epistemic accountability function as the study-specific analytic model for reading the corpus.

Against this background, this article asks: how are objectivity and subjectivity articulated in Kleden and Abdullah's *Paradigma Ilmu Pengetahuan* and related Indonesian social-science writings, at which levels of claims do these articulations operate, and how do shifts across levels of claims generate tensions within the discourse? The article's central argument is that objectivity-subjectivity discourse in Indonesian social science is better read as a layered problem of epistemic accountability than as a simple opposition between objective and subjective positions. What appears to be principled disagreement often stems from differences in the level of claims being contested, rather than from a wholesale rejection of objectivity itself (Kemp 2024; Sayer 2000:60–61).

Methods

This study employs qualitative document analysis combining thematic analysis and discourse analysis (Alejandro and Zhao 2024; Morgan 2022). This combination is appropriate because the study examines conceptual arguments, epistemological reflections, and the discursive use of key terms rather than statistical distribution. Thematic analysis identifies recurrent issues, argumentative patterns, and conceptual emphases in debates on objectivity and subjectivity (Braun and Clarke 2019), while discourse analysis examines how these terms are mobilized to construct, defend, or challenge particular knowledge claims.

The data consist of reflective theoretical and methodological documents. The primary corpus comprises selected texts from Kleden and Abdullah's edited volume, *Paradigma Ilmu*

Pengetahuan, which brings together cross-disciplinary epistemological reflections on the social sciences and humanities in Indonesia (Kleden and Abdullah 2017). This corpus was supplemented with Sartono Kartodirdjo's *Pendekatan Ilmu Sosial dalam Metodologi Sejarah* (Kartodirdjo 1992) and Ariel Heryanto's chapter "Kiblat dan Beban Ideologis Ilmu Sosial" in *Ilmu Sosial dan Kekuasaan di Indonesia* (Heryanto 2006). These texts extend two dimensions central to the article's mapping: Kartodirdjo elaborates historical objectivity, source criticism, and the relation between events and narrative construction, while Heryanto foregrounds ideology, neutrality, power, and the institutional legitimation of social-science knowledge.

The corpus was selected purposively. From Kleden and Abdullah's edited volume, which consists of nineteen chapters plus a prologue and an epilogue, this study selected texts based on four criteria: thematic relevance to objectivity-subjectivity debates, contextual relevance to Indonesian social science or philosophy of social science, traceability of conceptual argumentation, and contribution to broadening the range of epistemic positions represented in the analysis (Andrade 2021). Based on these criteria, eight texts from the volume were selected: the prologue by Ignas Kleden; two chapters by Heddy Shri Ahimsa-Putra; chapters by Mestika Zed, Nursyirwan Effendi, Ninuk Kleden-Probonegoro, and Kristi Poerwandari; and the epilogue by Taufik Abdullah. The two additional Indonesian texts by Kartodirdjo and Heryanto were included because they directly address historical reconstruction, objectivity, ideology, power, and the epistemic conditions of Indonesian social science. The selection was not intended to produce a statistically representative sample, but to construct an analytically relevant corpus capable of showing how different authors formulate, justify, and contest claims about objectivity and subjectivity. The corpus and units of analysis are summarized in **Table 1**.

DOI: 10.22146/jps.v13i1.116490
jps@ugm.ac.id | jurnal.ugm.ac.id/jps

Table 1. Corpus and Units of Analysis

Corpus category	Texts analyzed	Analytical relevance
Primary corpus: Kleden and Abdullah's edited volume	Ignas Kleden, Prologue, pp. 1–132	Reflective discipline
	Heddy Shri Ahimsa-Putra, Chapter 2, "Paradigma Ilmu Sosial–Budaya," pp. 139–169	Methodological rigor
	Mestika Zed, Chapter 4, "Konstruksi Historis Ilmu Sosial Indonesia," pp. 193–220	Historical accountability
	Nursyirwan Effendi, Chapter 7, "Tantangan Epistemologi, Metodologi, dan Holism," pp. 301–336	Knowledge verification
	Heddy Shri Ahimsa-Putra, Chapter 9, "Paradigma Etnosains," pp. 383–444	Ethnoscience validity
	Ninuk Kleden-Probonegoro, Chapter 11, "Bahasa sebagai Model Metode Penelitian Humaniora," pp. 471–501	Hermeneutic objectivity
	Kristi Poerwandari, Chapter 12, "Penelitian Kajian Perempuan dan Gender," pp. 505–539	Gender reflexivity
	Taufik Abdullah, Epilogue, pp. 779–803	Functional objectivity
Supporting Indonesian text	Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Pendekatan Ilmu Sosial dalam Metodologi Sejarah*	Historical objectivity
	Ariel Heryanto, "Kiblat dan Beban Ideologis Ilmu Sosial," pp. 63–97	Ideology and power

Source: *Author's compilation.*

Table 1 clarifies that the analyzed corpus consists of selected book chapters and monograph-based texts, while journal articles and other secondary sources are used only for literature review and theoretical contextualization.

The unit of analysis is the argumentative segment, defined as a paragraph or sequence of sentences that articulates a conceptual claim about social reality, warranted knowledge, values in inquiry, methodological accountability, or the politics of knowledge production. All documents were read iteratively; relevant segments were marked, excerpted, coded, and compared across texts until thematic patterns stabilized (Morgan 2022; Neale 2016).

The analysis operationalizes both the theoretical and conceptual frameworks. Sayer's three-dimensional account of objectivity and subjectivity was operationalized by coding each argumentative segment according to whether it addressed the value dimension (OBJECTIVE1/SUBJECTIVE1), the epistemological dimension (OBJECTIVE2/SUBJECTIVE2), or the ontological dimension (OBJECTIVE3/SUBJECTIVE3). The conceptual framework was operationalized through three analytic categories: levels of claims, used to identify the dimension at which an argument operates; epistemic accountability, used to identify how a claim is made answerable through methodological procedure, explanatory adequacy, reflexive disclosure, public criticism, interpretive rigor, or critique of power relations; and epistemic orientation, used to synthesize the dominant argumentative emphasis of each text. The final category was inferred not from single quotations, but from recurrent argumentative patterns across each text.

Analytic rigor was strengthened through triangulation between thematic and discourse analysis, traceability of interpretations to source segments, procedural documentation of coding decisions, and reflexive rereading to check consistency and reduce the risk of imposing the analytical framework too rigidly on the documents (Alejandro and Zhao 2024; Morgan 2022; Nowell et al. 2017). Data visualization was used as an interpretive device to clarify patterns of convergence and divergence among authors, rather than as a quantitative summary.

Results

a. Variations in Arguments on Objectivity and Subjectivity

Across the texts analyzed, a consistent general pattern emerges. Although the authors differ in disciplinary background and argumentative emphasis, subjectivity is rarely treated as an epistemic position in its own right or advocated as a normative foundation. More often, it appears as a limit, a source of bias, or a condition to be managed. It takes the form of prejudice, value commitments, researcher positionality, involvement, interests, cultural and temporal embeddedness, and relations of power in knowledge production. From this

DOI: 10.22146/jps.v13i1.116490
jps@ugm.ac.id | jurnal.ugm.ac.id/jps

perspective, the authors converge on a shared question: how should objectivity be formulated and accounted for when subjective elements are regarded as unavoidable?

Ignas Kleden offers a critical realist formulation of this question. He rejects extreme claims that equate objectivity with illusion because they sever knowledge from objective reality (Kleden 2017:91). Yet this rejection does not amount to naïve objectivism. Drawing on Popper, Kleden understands objectivity not as an initial condition but as reflective discipline. Since prejudices are "always present" (Kleden 2017:92), objectivity depends on the capacity to acknowledge, monitor, and "control one's own subjectivity" (Kleden 2017:93). It is therefore an intersubjective achievement pursued through criticism, falsification, and self-reflection within the scientific community (Kleden 1987:52–54).

With a different emphasis, Taufik Abdullah formulates objectivity in functional terms. He distinguishes three roles of social science: as a system of scientific knowledge, as applied science or social engineering, and as critical discourse (Abdullah 2017:790–91). Each role has its own criterion of objectivity, whether theoretical-methodological soundness, practical usefulness, or normative-critical judgment. Since these dimensions are hierarchical and mutually dependent rather than separate, objectivity in Abdullah's framework has no single measure; it is defined by the function of social science being performed.

In historiography, Sartono Kartodirdjo distinguishes between reality and knowledge of reality. He differentiates "history in the subjective sense," understood as the historian's construction, from "history in the objective sense," referring to historical events in their actuality (Kartodirdjo 1992:15–17). Historical objectivity is not value-freedom, but a methodological achievement attained through intersubjectivity, source criticism, verification, and critical dialogue within the community of historians (Kartodirdjo 1992:64–66). A related concern appears in Mestika Zed's work. For Zed, objectivity cannot be achieved by replacing one ideological narrative with another, but requires defensible criteria that make academic history traceable and open to testing (Zed 2017:213). His account situates historical objectivity within the development of Indonesian social science, marked by the tensions among zeitgeist, power, colonial Indology, developmentalism, and later efforts at indigenization (Zed 2017:201–6).

A strong emphasis on conceptual and methodological rigor appears in Heddy Shri Ahimsa-Putra's work. He acknowledges that, at the level of basic assumptions, paradigms may resemble the scientist's ideology and are therefore subjective (Ahimsa-Putra 2017b:146). However, this does not lead to relativism. Instead, he rejects reducing paradigms to technical procedures or administrative research formats (Ahimsa-Putra 2017b:165). Objectivity or validity cannot be guaranteed by formal conformity with research design alone, but requires methodological discipline that makes knowledge claims open to public scrutiny. In his discussion of ethnoscience, this means internally consistent and publicly accessible procedures capable of producing valid and replicable statements with reference to the language users of the society under study (Ahimsa-Putra 2017a:397).

Ninuk Kleden-Probonegoro develops a hermeneutic account of objectivity through a dialogue between Dilthey and Gadamer. From Dilthey, she draws the idea that expressions are objectifications of thought and can therefore become objects of interpretation (Kleden-Probonegoro 2017:474, 483). Following Gadamer, however, she emphasizes that understanding is always shaped by the interpreter's historical condition. In this model, objectivity is not secured by eliminating subjectivity, but through disciplined interpretive work in the dialectical movement between event and meaning (Kleden-Probonegoro 2017:497).

Nursyirwan Effendi shifts the discussion to changing conditions of knowledge production and circulation. He shows how online media present "objective facts virtually without limits," displacing classical texts with accelerated digital reading environments (Effendi 2017:302). Under these conditions, fieldwork-based anthropology confronts digitally mediated visual facts that challenge the authenticity of naturalistic approaches. The acceleration of knowledge production therefore makes quality control, verification, and epistemic accountability increasingly urgent.

More explicit attention to values and power appears in Kristi Poerwandari and Ariel Heryanto. Poerwandari, drawing on feminist epistemology, redefines objectivity as "situated knowledges"—partial, contextual, and relational knowledge (Poerwandari 2017:513). From this perspective, value-free claims are not solutions but illusions that obscure bias, interests, and the politics of knowledge; objectivity is instead reframed as reflexive work on the

DOI: 10.22146/jps.v13i1.116490
jps@ugm.ac.id | jurnal.ugm.ac.id/jps

researcher's values, attitudes, and agendas (Poerwandari 2017:514). Heryanto extends this critique to the institutional level by showing how universality, neutrality, and objectivity may function rhetorically while being subordinated to the interests of political sponsors of science and research (Heryanto 2006:65–73). In both accounts, the legitimacy of ostensibly neutral knowledge is inseparable from values, interests, and power relations.

Taken together, these accounts show that the objectivity-subjectivity debate in the Indonesian social-science writings examined here *does not* unfold as a simple binary opposition. Subjectivity appears as prejudice, positionality, values, perspectival bias, power relations, and institutional conditions. Conversely, objectivity is formulated as reflective discipline, methodological adequacy, public testability, functional differentiation, historical reconstruction, interpretive rigor, verification, and critique of power. What is ultimately at stake is not a normative choice between objectivity and subjectivity, but how knowledge is to be accounted for when subjectivity is acknowledged as a condition that cannot be fully eliminated.

b. Patterns of Convergence and Divergence in the Arguments

From the range of arguments outlined above, two key findings emerge. First, differences among the authors do not take the form of mutually exclusive binary oppositions. Second, beneath this diversity lies a shared baseline: nearly all authors acknowledge subjectivity as an unavoidable condition of scholarly work. The decisive differences therefore lie not in whether subjectivity is admitted, but in where the emphasis is placed when formulating—and, more importantly, when accounting for—objectivity.

A recurring commonality across the texts is a critical stance toward equating objectivity with value-freedom or absolute neutrality. No author explicitly defends objectivity as the absence of values, prejudices, or positionality. What is at issue, instead, is how subjective elements are to be handled. Kleden, for example, frames objectivity as reflective discipline aimed at monitoring prejudices that he recognizes as impossible to eliminate entirely (Kleden 2017:91, 93). Within this framework, subjectivity is acknowledged and regulated, not eradicated.

A second emphasis appears in works foregrounding methodological rigor. Ahimsa-Putra acknowledges that paradigms and basic assumptions held by scholars are subjective, yet he does not use this admission to deny the possibility of objectivity (Ahimsa-Putra 2017b:146–65). Rather, rigorous methodological accountability enables knowledge claims to be examined and tested publicly (Ahimsa-Putra 2017b:165). Zed similarly stresses defensible methodological criteria and the traceability of historical inquiry, especially in confronting perspectival bias and the legacy of colonial historiography (Zed 2017:212–14).

A third emphasis concerns explanatory adequacy. In Abdullah's functional account, objectivity is differentiated according to the role of social science—as scientific knowledge, applied science, or critical discourse—and is tied to the capacity of claims to fulfil their explanatory, practical, or critical functions (Abdullah 2017:792–93). Kartodirdjo's historiographical writings point in a comparable direction: subjectivity is acknowledged at the level of narrative construction, while objectivity is pursued through historical reconstruction grounded in evidence, source criticism, explanatory coherence, and intersubjective testing (Kartodirdjo 1992:16, 30, 147). These arguments locate objectivity primarily in the capacity of claims to provide adequate explanations of social or historical reality.

A fourth emphasis appears in Kleden-Probonegoro's hermeneutic account, which foregrounds interpretive rigor. Subjectivity is treated not as a disturbance but as a historical–cultural condition that makes understanding possible. Objectivity is then conceived as the outcome of disciplined interpretive work applied to expressions as objectifications of human thought (Kleden-Probonegoro 2017:483). Validity, accordingly, is not equated with the verification models of the natural sciences, but arises from the rigor of interpretation itself.

A fifth emphasis appears in the works of Poerwandari and Heryanto, who situate objectivity in relation to values and power. Poerwandari understands objectivity as the outcome of researchers' reflexive engagement with their own values, positions, and agendas (Poerwandari 2017:513–15). Heryanto extends this concern to the institutional level, showing how objectivity and neutrality may function as rhetoric within research systems shaped by sponsor relations and power structures (Heryanto 2006:65, 73). Within this

DOI: 10.22146/jps.v13i1.116490
jps@ugm.ac.id | jurnal.ugm.ac.id/jps


framework, objectivity is interrogated as a mechanism of legitimacy that regulates the boundaries of what counts as "scientific."

A sixth emphasis concerns knowledge circulation and verification. Effendi links the problem of objectivity to transformations in online media, especially with respect to quality control, verification, and epistemic accountability (Effendi 2017:302). Under these conditions, objectivity depends less on the researcher's individual stance than on collective capacities to sustain verification, quality control, and public testing amid accelerated information flows.

Taken together, these patterns indicate that convergence and divergence in this discourse cannot be reduced to a binary opposition between objectivity and subjectivity. The convergence lies in a shared recognition that subjectivity is inherent in the production of knowledge. Divergence emerges in the points of emphasis—specifically, where objectivity is to be accounted for and through which mechanisms: reflexive control of subjective elements, methodological rigor, explanatory adequacy, interpretive rigor, reflexivity toward values and power relations, or verification in knowledge circulation. Differences among the authors are therefore better understood as shifts in the focus of epistemic accountability, rather than as mutually negating positions.

To make these patterns clearer, **Figure 1** maps the shared baseline and the main points of divergence among the authors discussed above. The figure does not classify the authors into mutually exclusive objectivist or subjectivist camps. Rather, it shows that their differences concern the locus through which objectivity is made accountable.

Figure 1. Visual Map of Convergence and Divergence in Indonesian Objectivity-Subjectivity Debates



Source: *Author's analysis.*

Note: *The figure maps convergence and divergence in the analyzed texts. The shared baseline refers to the authors' common recognition that subjectivity is an unavoidable condition of scholarly knowledge production. The six lower categories indicate different loci through which objectivity is made accountable. These categories are heuristic and not mutually exclusive, and should be read as analytic extensions of Sayer's distinction between the value, epistemological, and ontological dimensions of objectivity and their paired meanings of subjectivity.*

Figure 1 visualizes this shared baseline and shows that divergence lies not in whether subjectivity is accepted, but in how objectivity is formulated and accounted for. This mapping supports the article's central argument that the debates examined here are better understood as shifts in epistemic accountability than as binary oppositions.

DOI: 10.22146/jps.v13i1.116490
jps@ugm.ac.id | jurnal.ugm.ac.id/jps

c. Fields of Tension: Three Arenas of Accountability for Objectivity Subjectivity Claims

The patterns of convergence and divergence outlined above indicate that debates on objectivity and subjectivity in Indonesian social science do not unfold along a single linear trajectory. Nearly all authors acknowledge subjectivity as an inherent condition of knowledge production. Yet this shared recognition raises a more decisive question: where is objectivity held accountable, and by what mechanisms?

Across the texts analyzed, tensions are most clearly concentrated in three arenas of accountability. Although these arenas are not always distinguished explicitly, they recur as sites where epistemic claims are at stake and subject to scrutiny.

First, the epistemic arena. Here the focus lies on the status of knowledge claims—judgments concerning the truth or practical adequacy of an explanation. What is primarily at issue is not the author's value position, but whether an explanation can be defended as true, or at least practically adequate, in accounting for the social phenomena under study. Within this framework, subjectivity is not treated as grounds for suspending evaluation; rather, it is understood as a condition that demands more careful epistemic accountability. Taufik Abdullah's functional formulation, which differentiates criteria of objectivity according to the roles of social science—as scientific knowledge, applied science, or critical discourse—illustrates how objectivity is assessed in terms of a claim's capacity to fulfil its explanatory or critical function (Abdullah 2017:792–93). In historiography, Sartono Kartodirdjo's distinction between events as actuality and history as narrative construction likewise places the primary stakes within this arena (Kartodirdjo 1992:14–19).

Second, the methodological arena. Whereas the epistemic arena emphasizes what is claimed, the methodological arena emphasizes how claims are produced and made open to scrutiny. Here objectivity is typically formulated as procedural discipline, encompassing the traceability of research steps, internal consistency, openness to public examination, and, in some cases, replicability. Ahimsa-Putra's emphasis on methodological rigor, together with his critique of reducing paradigms to administrative research formats, exemplifies this orientation (Ahimsa-Putra 2017a:397, 2017b:165). A similar emphasis appears in Mestika Zed's work, which links objectivity to the traceability of historical inquiry and defensible

methodological criteria in confronting perspectival bias (Zed 2017:212–14). In Ignas Kleden's writings, this arena takes a reflexive form: subjectivity is not eliminated, but rendered explicit so that it can be monitored and controlled (Kleden 2017:93).

Third, the political arena. Here objectivity is questioned not merely as a matter of procedure or claim quality, but as part of broader relations of values, interests, and power that frame the production and legitimation of knowledge. Poerwandari situates objectivity in reflexive work on the researcher's positionality and agenda, rejecting value-freedom as both unrealistic and irresponsible (Poerwandari 2017:513). Heryanto extends this critique to the institutional level, demonstrating how the rhetoric of neutrality and objectivity often functions as a language of compliance within sponsor-power relations that determine which claims are recognized as "scientific" (Heryanto 2006:65–73). In this arena, accountability does not stop at standards of truth or procedure; it also concerns how epistemic legitimacy is produced and distributed.

These three arenas do not operate in isolation. Methodological disputes often presuppose particular epistemic standards, while critiques of values and power foreground the institutional conditions that shape how claims are tested, circulated, and recognized. This mapping helps explain why debates on objectivity and subjectivity often fail to intersect: claims about epistemic adequacy, methodological procedure, and political legitimacy may operate within different arenas and therefore do not automatically converge on shared evaluative standards.

In sum, the central tensions traced here can be understood as tensions among distinct loci of accountability—epistemic, methodological, and political. This distinction is not intended to rigidly separate these arenas, but to clarify the terrain on which claims about objectivity are advanced, challenged, and defended.

d. Sayer's Framework, Levels of Claims, and Epistemic Orientations

Taken together, the preceding analysis shows that recurring disagreements over objectivity and subjectivity in the Indonesian social-science texts analyzed here are less about opposing positions than about divergent emphases on where epistemic accountability is located. Nearly all positions examined acknowledge subjectivity, in its various forms, as an

DOI: 10.22146/jps.v13i1.116490
jps@ugm.ac.id | jurnal.ugm.ac.id/jps

unavoidable condition of knowledge production. The decisive issue is therefore not whether subjectivity is present, but where and how objectivity is held accountable.

Sayer's three paired dimensions of objectivity and subjectivity provide a useful lens for clarifying these differences. The value (OBJECTIVE1/SUBJECTIVE1), epistemological (OBJECTIVE2/SUBJECTIVE2), and ontological (OBJECTIVE3/SUBJECTIVE3) dimensions make it possible to reorganize debates that otherwise appear overlapping or internally inconsistent. Through this framework, tensions across epistemic, methodological, and political arenas can be read as differences in the level at which objectivity and subjectivity claims are made, rather than as direct confrontations between objectivist and subjectivist camps.

On this basis, the findings can be synthesized into three dominant epistemic orientations. This synthesis is heuristic rather than classificatory: it does not fix authors or texts into closed positions, but highlights recurrent patterns in how objectivity is foregrounded when knowledge claims are at stake. These orientations are not Sayer's own categories, but the article's analytic synthesis of the Indonesian texts when read through his three-dimensional framework. A summary is presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Three Epistemic Orientations in the Objectivity-Subjectivity Debate

Epistemic orientation	Core conception of objectivity	Dominant Sayerian dimension	Illustrative arguments	Representative authors (indicative)
Conceptual and methodological rigor	Objectivity as the outcome of rigorous conceptual work and procedural discipline, open to public scrutiny	Epistemological dimension (OBJECTIVE2/SUBJECTIVE2), alongside a rejection of value-freedom as the defining criterion of objectivity (OBJECTIVE1/SUBJECTIVE1)	Objectivity as reflective discipline; validity through consistent and replicable procedures; methodological traceability in historiography	Ignas Kleden; Heddy Shri Ahimsa-Putra; Mestika Zed
Explanatory adequacy of social reality	Objectivity as the requirement that claims adequately explain social reality in context	Ontological dimension (OBJECTIVE3/SUBJECTIVE3) as a foundational assumption, with epistemological demands for practical adequacy (OBJECTIVE2/SUBJECTIVE2)	Differentiated criteria of objectivity by social science functions; historical reconstruction oriented toward empirical actuality	Taufik Abdullah; Sartono Kartodirdjo
Reflexivity of values and power relations	Objectivity as reflexive engagement with values, positionality, and power shaping knowledge production	Value dimension (OBJECTIVE1/SUBJECTIVE1) as a critical entry point, with an expanded epistemological scope (OBJECTIVE2/SUBJECTIVE2)	Objectivity as situated knowledges; objectivity as institutional rhetoric within sponsor-power relations	Kristi Poerwandari; Ariel Heryanto

Source: *Author's analysis.*

Note: *This grouping is heuristic. A single work may exhibit more than one epistemic orientation; categorization is based on the dominant argumentative emphasis across the text.*

DOI: 10.22146/jps.v13i1.116490
jps@ugm.ac.id | jurnal.ugm.ac.id/jps

Table 2 should not be read as a closed typology. Individual works may combine more than one orientation. Nevertheless, the distinction clarifies which dimension of objectivity and subjectivity is primarily mobilized by a given argument, and where epistemic accountability is most sharply located.

The first orientation places *conceptual and methodological rigor* at the centre of objectivity's accountability. Objectivity is understood as the outcome of disciplined conceptualization, consistent procedures, and openness to public testing. Although this orientation rejects the identification of objectivity with value-freedom, it does not abandon epistemic evaluation; subjective elements are managed through traceable and contestable mechanisms of scrutiny. The second orientation foregrounds *explanatory adequacy*: objectivity depends on whether knowledge claims can adequately explain social reality, not merely on procedural orderliness. It therefore treats practical adequacy, explanatory power, and reference to social reality as central criteria of objectivity. The third orientation emphasizes *reflexivity toward values and power*, treating objectivity not as detachment from interests, but as accountability to the positional, normative, and institutional conditions under which knowledge claims are produced and legitimized.

Read through Sayer's framework, these orientations do not stand in relations of mutual negation. Each highlights a different dimension of objectivity and its paired meaning of subjectivity, and can function as *a corrective to the others*. Tensions among them are better understood as consequences of shifts across levels of claims that are not always made explicit. Debates miss their target when a critique of value-freedom at the value dimension is taken as a rejection of truth or practical adequacy at the epistemological dimension, or when methodological rigor is treated as sufficient for explaining a social reality that is not reducible to researchers' perspectives. In such cases, criticism and defense operate across different dimensions.

Accordingly, Sayer's framework is useful not for determining which orientation is "most correct," but for clarifying the epistemic terrain of contestation. Many tensions in Indonesian debates on objectivity and subjectivity stem from misaligned levels of claims. Recognizing these distinctions creates space for more focused dialogue, in which critique

and defense address commensurate dimensions rather than circulating around terminological oppositions.

e. Progress and Pitfalls in Indonesian Debates on Objectivity and Subjectivity

Analysis of the Indonesian social-science texts examined here reveals two parallel tendencies. On the one hand, there is a consistent shift away from equating objectivity with value-freedom, impartiality, or absolute neutrality (OBJECTIVE1), a concern also discussed in contemporary debates on values in scientific inquiry (Dressel 2022; de Melo-Martín and Intemann 2016). On the other hand, this shift is not always accompanied by comparable clarity regarding standards for assessing the truth or practical adequacy of knowledge claims (OBJECTIVE2). The core difficulty is that critiques of neutrality may proceed without articulating evaluative criteria explicit enough to be tested and debated (Sayer 2000:58–61).

The first tendency resonates with contemporary philosophy of social science, which criticizes the myth of objectivity as a "view from nowhere" and the reduction of objectivity to an ahistorical ideal of value-freedom (Koskinen 2026; Toole 2022). Similar moves appear across the Indonesian texts analyzed here. Kleden treats prejudice as unavoidable but subject to reflective control (Kleden 2017:91, 93), Poerwandari reframes objectivity as situated knowledge grounded in reflexivity toward positionality and power (Poerwandari 2017:513), and Heryanto shows how neutrality and objectivity may operate as rhetorical resources within sponsor-power relations (Heryanto 2006:65–73). These arguments mark a significant move away from naïve OBJECTIVE1.

However, rejecting OBJECTIVE1 does not remove the need to evaluate knowledge claims. Critiques of neutrality may slide into disregarding standards of truth or practical adequacy, so that differences in values or standpoint are treated as sufficient to explain differences in epistemic quality. In Sayer's terms, this is where judgmental relativism begins to loom: competing claims about the same matter risk being treated as equally valid simply because knowledge is situated and value-laden (Sayer 2000:47, 59). The point, therefore, is not to restore value-freedom as a condition of objectivity, but to prevent the critique of value-freedom from suspending the assessment of whether claims are better or worse justified.

DOI: 10.22146/jps.v13i1.116490
jps@ugm.ac.id | jurnal.ugm.ac.id/jps

Sayer's distinctions help resist this slippage. Criticism of the value-free ideal does not negate the possibility of knowledge that is true, or at least practically adequate (OBJECTIVE2) (Sayer 2000:59–60). The question shifts from whether a study is "partisan" to whether and how its standpoint is accompanied by traceable justification, explanatory adequacy, and standards that can be publicly tested and debated (Sayer 2000:43). Partisanship or situatedness must therefore be made accountable; it cannot substitute for evaluating the epistemic performance of knowledge claims.

Within this framework, tensions among epistemic orientations can be read as mechanisms of internal correction. Arguments emphasizing procedural testability—such as those developed by Ahimsa-Putra and Kleden—help prevent value-reflexivity from sliding into the abandonment of epistemic standards (e.g., Ahimsa-Putra 2017b:165, 2017a:397; Kleden 2017:93). Conversely, the insistence on explanatory adequacy, articulated in different ways by Abdullah and Kartodirdjo, resists the reduction of epistemic quality to methodological tidiness alone (Abdullah 2017:792–93; Kartodirdjo 1992:14–19). Critiques foregrounding values and power—most explicitly in Poerwandari and Heryanto—test whether claims to objectivity neglect the institutional and political conditions under which epistemic legitimacy is produced (Heryanto 2006:65, 73; Poerwandari 2017:511–15).

This corrective relation can be seen more clearly across the corpus. Abdullah's functional account and Kartodirdjo's distinction between the actuality of events and narrative construction show that explanatory quality cannot be reduced to procedural order alone; knowledge claims still require assessment in terms of their capacity to explain the social reality to which they refer (Abdullah 2017:792–93; Kartodirdjo 1992:14–19). Effendi's focus on shifts in arenas of knowledge production and circulation extends this problem further. Amid accelerated information flows, claims that appear "objective" in visual or rhetorical terms can lose their footing in public testing when quality control, verification, and epistemic accountability weaken (Effendi 2017:302).

Conversely, critiques that place objectivity within the nexus of values and power remind us that evaluative standards and verification procedures themselves are never fully detached from the institutional conditions that frame epistemic legitimacy (Heryanto 2006:64–65; Poerwandari 2017:511–12). Accordingly, the problem of objectivity cannot be

resolved simply by tightening methods or, separately, by asserting value-reflexivity. What is needed is an evaluative framework that allows claims to be assessed rationally without returning to the myth of neutrality (Sayer 2000:58–61).

One possible point of convergence is Sayer's conception of truth as practical adequacy (Sayer 2000:43). This provides an evaluative language that supports rational assessment without presupposing the elimination of values. In this stronger sense, practical adequacy should not be understood as mere usefulness or pragmatic success, but as the extent to which knowledge claims generate reliable expectations, withstand criticism, and remain answerable to the social reality they seek to explain. In line with contemporary scholarship, objectivity can therefore be understood as a practice of epistemic accountability—open to testing, contestation, and correction through public justification (Bird 2020; Zahle and Ylikoski 2025), rather than as simple "faithfulness to facts" or a value-free ideal (Hoyningen-Huene 2023). Practical adequacy is thus not a compromise "middle way," but a requirement that situated claims continue to function rationally in explaining the social reality under study (Sayer 2000:43, 59).

With such a framework, debates on objectivity and subjectivity can move away from terminological oppositions toward a more operational question: to what extent are situated knowledge claims practically adequate for explaining reality and guiding practice in the social world? From this vantage point, the Indonesian debates examined here display not only impasses but also attempts to reformulate objectivity in more reflective terms—abandoning naïve OBJECTIVE1 without relinquishing the evaluative demands of OBJECTIVE2 (Koskinen 2026; Sayer 2000:59–60; Toole 2022). This also clarifies why "objectivity" remains a moving target across competing defenses and critiques of the value-free ideal (Brown 2024).

f. Implications: Meta-Epistemic Reflexivity as a Foundation for Practice

The fields of tension and the three epistemic orientations outlined above point to a fundamental implication for the epistemological condition of Indonesian social science. The central problem in debates on objectivity and subjectivity does not lie in disagreement over values as such, but in the absence of awareness regarding the levels of claims at which a

DOI: 10.22146/jps.v13i1.116490
jps@ugm.ac.id | jurnal.ugm.ac.id/jps

dispute is being conducted. When this distinction is not made explicit, critiques and responses easily address different targets. Debates may become intense, but they fail to meet analytically because critiques and counterarguments shift across dimensions without explicit marking of the level of claims at stake, leaving no clear point of convergence.

This insight builds upon but also refines earlier critiques of power in Indonesian social science, which have shown how claims to objectivity served developmentalist agendas, sustained bureaucratic authority, marginalized critical intellectual histories, and privileged positivist over oral or experiential forms of knowing (Hadiz and Dhakidae 2005; Mahaswa and Syaja 2025; Samuel and Sutopo 2013; Sutopo and Utomo 2020; Thufail 2011). While these studies convincingly exposed the political effects of objectivity claims, they often treated "objectivity" as a monolithic rhetorical device. By distinguishing between value-freedom (OBJECTIVE1), truth or practical adequacy (OBJECTIVE2), and assumptions about social reality (OBJECTIVE3), the present article adds a conceptual refinement that strengthens rather than dismisses power critiques. Clarifying the level of claims prevents critics from abandoning the standards of justification needed to show why some knowledge claims are better warranted than others.

In such situations, critiques of the value-free ideal (OBJECTIVE1) are often read as if they *abandon* evaluation of truth or practical adequacy (OBJECTIVE2), or even deny assumptions about a social reality that exists independently of knowledge of it (OBJECTIVE3). Conversely, demands for procedural testability or explanatory adequacy are easily dismissed as attempts to ignore values and power relations. When these *shifts across levels of claims* go unrecognized, epistemological consequences are drawn across dimensions without sufficient reasoning (Sayer 2000:58–61).

It is at this point that Sayer's three paired dimensions of objectivity and subjectivity demonstrate their practical usefulness. The framework points to the need for *meta-epistemic reflexivity*, understood as the capacity to map the terrain of knowledge accountability before justifying, accepting, or rejecting a claim. This reflexivity is not merely an additional reflective obligation, but an analytical habit of clearly identifying what is at stake: whether the issue concerns values and partisanship (OBJECTIVE1/SUBJECTIVE1), standards of truth or practical adequacy (OBJECTIVE2/SUBJECTIVE2), or assumptions about the social reality

to which explanations refer (OBJECTIVE3/SUBJECTIVE3) (Sayer 2000:58–61). With such marking in place, critiques and defenses can be located within commensurate dimensions.

With this awareness, positions in the corpus can be read with greater precision. Heryanto's critique of objectivity as institutional rhetoric can be understood as an intervention at the level of values and power relations, *without* being read as a rejection of justificatory standards for knowledge claims (Heryanto 2006:65–73). In Sayerian terms, power relations shape the social conditions under which claims are produced, circulated, and legitimized, but they do not by themselves settle the question of practical adequacy.

Conversely, Ahimsa-Putra's emphasis on conceptual and methodological discipline need not be labeled naïve positivism, since what is at stake is the testability of claims rather than a value-free stance (Ahimsa-Putra 2017a:397, 2017b:165). Kartodirdjo's distinction between historical actuality and narrative construction clarifies the relation between assumptions about reality (OBJECTIVE3) and the epistemological assessment of historical claims (OBJECTIVE2), while Zed's demand for methodological criteria can be read as an effort to control perspectival bias rather than as a claim to full neutrality (Kartodirdjo 1992:14–19; Zed 2017:212–14).

A further implication concerns how we understand the productivity of debate itself. Debates do not become productive because one epistemic orientation "wins," but because tensions among orientations are managed as mechanisms of reciprocal correction. Conceptual and procedural rigor prevents value-reflexivity from slipping into the abandonment of epistemic standards, namely truth and practical adequacy. Demands for explanatory adequacy prevent methodological orderliness from displacing questions about the relevance of claims to social reality. Meanwhile, reflexivity toward values and power relations tests whether claims to objectivity—whether procedural or substantive—ignore the social and institutional conditions under which knowledge is legitimized (Sayer 2000:59–61).

The challenge ahead, therefore, is not to simplify epistemic diversity into convenient dichotomies, but to cultivate meta-epistemic capacity as a prerequisite for more focused dialogue. Debate advances when participants can state explicitly which dimension of a claim is at stake before drawing epistemological, methodological, or political consequences from

DOI: 10.22146/jps.v13i1.116490
jps@ugm.ac.id | jurnal.ugm.ac.id/jps

it. This capacity enables debates on objectivity and subjectivity to move beyond recurring confusion and toward sharper, mutually testing exchanges of argument.

The relevance of meta-epistemic reflexivity becomes even clearer when connected to the aspiration of social science not only to explain social reality, but also to transform it. This implication is consistent with Sayer's later argument that normativity is not an external addition to social inquiry, but is tied to evaluation as a practical relation to flourishing, vulnerability, and need (Sayer 2019). In this regard, the idea of transformative social science emphasizes the need for an integrated engagement with ontology, epistemology, and axiology (Santoso 2011). Within this framework, meta-epistemic reflexivity is not an end in itself, but a foundational form of awareness that enables knowledge interventions to be designed and justified more responsibly—epistemically, methodologically, and politically.

In the context of Indonesian sociology, this mapping of epistemic orientations is relevant not only for interpreting theoretical debates, but also for understanding differences in empirical research approaches, such as studies of social class, gender, education, or power relations, where assumptions about objectivity and subjectivity often remain implicit rather than explicitly articulated.

Conclusion

This article has reassessed objectivity-subjectivity debates in Indonesian social science by reading Kleden and Abdullah's *Paradigma Ilmu Pengetahuan* as a primary point of entry and extending the analysis to related writings on epistemology, method, and the politics of knowledge. The central finding is that these debates rarely unfold as mutually exclusive oppositions between objective and subjective positions. Rather, they involve shifts across different levels of claims. The same terms—objectivity and subjectivity—are used to address analytically different issues: values and partisanship, the truth or practical adequacy of knowledge claims, and assumptions about the social reality that grounds explanation. When these levels remain implicit, critiques and defenses tend to miss their targets, producing recurrent misunderstandings within the discourse.

The article's contribution lies in offering a conceptual map for clarifying these shifts. By distinguishing the levels at which claims are made, the analysis shows that the debates examined in this article can be read through three dominant epistemic orientations: conceptual-methodological rigor, explanatory adequacy with respect to social reality, and reflexivity toward values and power relations. These orientations should not be treated as mutually negating positions. Instead, they foreground different loci of knowledge accountability and can operate as reciprocal correctives. Methodological rigor prevents reflexivity from sliding into the abandonment of epistemic standards; explanatory adequacy prevents method from becoming merely procedural; and reflexivity toward values and power prevents claims to objectivity from ignoring the social and institutional conditions of knowledge production.

The novelty of this article is therefore not that it introduces another position in the objectivity-subjectivity debate, but that it clarifies why the debate often appears stalled. The problem is not simply disagreement over whether objectivity is possible. More fundamentally, the debate becomes unproductive when different levels of claims are treated as if they referred to the same epistemic issue. By extending Sayer's distinctions into a levels-of-claims reading of Indonesian social-science texts, the article offers a vocabulary for identifying where a critique is located, what kind of accountability it demands, and which evaluative standards are appropriate for assessing it.

The implication for Indonesian social science is the need to cultivate meta-epistemic reflexivity. Scholars need not only to be reflexive about their values, positions, and methods, but also to specify the level at which their claims about objectivity and subjectivity operate. This requires clearer distinctions between critiques of value-freedom, assessments of knowledge justification, and assumptions about social reality. Such distinctions can make epistemological debates more focused and can help researchers formulate more accountable methodological and theoretical choices.

Future research and discussion on objectivity and subjectivity in Indonesian social science would benefit from applying this levels-of-claims approach to more specific fields of empirical research, such as class analysis, gender studies, education, development studies, or political sociology. This would show how assumptions about objectivity are not only

DOI: 10.22146/jps.v13i1.116490
jps@ugm.ac.id | jurnal.ugm.ac.id/jps

debated at the level of epistemological reflection, but also embedded in concrete research practices. In this sense, the article provides not a final settlement of the objectivity-subjectivity debate, but a conceptual basis for more precise, reflexive, and productive epistemic dialogue.

DOI: 10.22146/jps.v13i1.116490
jps@ugm.ac.id | jurnal.ugm.ac.id/jps

References

Abdullah, Taufik. 2017. "Tiga Dimensi Ilmu Sosial Dalam Dinamika Sejarah Bangsa." Pp. 779–804 in *Paradigma Ilmu Pengetahuan dan Penelitian Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial dan Humaniora di Indonesia*, edited by I. Kleden and T. Abdullah. Jakarta: LIPI Press.

Ahimsa-Putra, Heddy Shri. 2017a. "Paradigma Etnosains: Kehadiran Dan Perkembangannya Di Indonesia." Pp. 383–444 in *Paradigma Ilmu Pengetahuan dan Penelitian Ilmu-ilmu Sosial dan Humaniora di Indonesia*, edited by I. Kleden and T. Abdullah. Jakarta: LIPI Press.

Ahimsa-Putra, Heddy Shri. 2017b. "Paradigma Ilmu Sosial-Budaya: Sebuah Pandangan." Pp. 139–69 in *Paradigma Ilmu Pengetahuan dan Penelitian Ilmu-ilmu Sosial dan Humaniora di Indonesia*, edited by I. Kleden and T. Abdullah. Jakarta: LIPI Press.

Alejandro, Audrey, and Longxuan Zhao. 2024. "Multi-Method Qualitative Text and Discourse Analysis: A Methodological Framework." *Qualitative Inquiry* 30(6):461–73. doi:10.1177/10778004231184421.

Andrade, Chittaranjan. 2021. "The Inconvenient Truth About Convenience and Purposive Samples." *Indian Journal of Psychological Medicine* 43(1):86–88. doi:10.1177/0253717620977000.

Bird, Frederick. 2020. "A Defense of Objectivity in the Social Sciences, Rightly Understood." *Sustainability: Science, Practice and Policy* 16(1):83–98. doi:10.1080/15487733.2020.1785679.

Braun, Virginia, and Victoria Clarke. 2019. "Reflecting on Reflexive Thematic Analysis." *Qualitative Research in Sport, Exercise and Health* 11(4):589–97. doi:10.1080/2159676X.2019.1628806.

Brown, Matthew J. 2024. "For Values in Science: Assessing Recent Arguments for the Ideal of Value-Free Science." *Synthese* 204(4):112. doi:10.1007/s11229-024-04762-1.

Dressel, Markus. 2022. "Inductive Risk: Does It Really Refute Value-Freedom?" *THEORIA* 37(2):181–207. doi:10.1387/theoria.22795.

Effendi, Nursyirwan. 2017. "Tantangan Epistemologi, Metodologi, Dan Holism Dalam Antropologi Terhadap Body of Knowledge Di Media On-Line." Pp. 301–36 in

Paradigma Ilmu Pengetahuan dan Penelitian Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial dan Humaniora di Indonesia, edited by I. Kleden and T. Abdullah. Jakarta: LIPI Press.

Hadiz, Vedi R., and Daniel Dhakidae. 2005. "Introduction." Pp. 1–29 in *Social Science and Power in Indonesia*, edited by V. R. Hadiz and D. Dhakidae. Jakarta and Singapore: Equinox Publishing; Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Heryanto, Ariel. 2006. "Kiblat Dan Beban Ideologis Ilmu Sosial." Pp. 63–97 in *Ilmu Sosial dan Kekuasaan di Indonesia*, edited by V. R. Hadiz and D. Dhakidae. Jakarta: Equinox Publishing.

Hoyningen-Huene, Paul. 2023. "Objectivity, Value-Free Science, and Inductive Risk." *European Journal for Philosophy of Science* 13(1):1–26. doi:10.1007/s13194-023-00518-9.

Kartodirdjo, Sartono. 1992. *Pendekatan Ilmu Sosial Dalam Metodologi Sejarah*. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama.

Kemp, Stephen. 2024. "Objectivity, Criticism and Dialogue." *Innovation in the Social Sciences* 2(2):171–93. doi:10.1163/27730611-bja10018.

Kleden, Ignas. 1987. *Sikap Ilmiah Dan Kritik Kebudayaan*. Jakarta: LP3ES.

Kleden, Ignas. 2017. "Paradigma Ilmu Pengetahuan: Tantangan Penelitian Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial Dan Humaniora Di Indonesia." Pp. 1–132 in *Paradigma Ilmu Pengetahuan dan Penelitian Ilmu-ilmu Sosial dan Humaniora di Indonesia*, edited by I. Kleden and T. Abdullah. Jakarta: LIPI Press.

Kleden, Ignas, and Taufik Abdullah, eds. 2017. *Paradigma Ilmu Pengetahuan Dan Penelitian Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial Dan Humaniora Di Indonesia*. Jakarta: LIPI Press.

Kleden-Probonegoro, Ninuk. 2017. "Bahasa Sebagai Model Metode Penelitian Humaniora: Sudut Pandang Hermeneutik." Pp. 471–501 in *Paradigma Ilmu Pengetahuan dan Penelitian Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial dan Humaniora di Indonesia*, edited by I. Kleden and T. Abdullah. Jakarta: LIPI Press.

Koskinen, Inkeri. 2020. "Defending a Risk Account of Scientific Objectivity." *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 71(4):1187–1207. doi:10.1093/bjps/axy053.

Koskinen, Inkeri. 2026. "Values and Objectivity." in *The Routledge Handbook of Values and Science*, edited by K. C. Elliott and T. Richards. London and New York: Routledge.

Mahaswa, Rangga Kala, and Ainu Syaja. 2025. "Questioning Local Wisdom in Indonesian Indigenous Research." *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 112(October 2023):170–78. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.07.001.

de Melo-Martín, Inmaculada, and Kristen Intemann. 2016. "The Risk of Using Inductive Risk to Challenge the Value-Free Ideal." *Philosophy of Science* 83(4):500–520. doi:10.1086/687259.

Morgan, Hani. 2022. "Conducting a Qualitative Document Analysis." *Qualitative Report* 27(1):64–77. doi:10.46743/2160-3715/2022.5044.

Neale, Joanne. 2016. "Iterative Categorization (IC): A Systematic Technique for Analysing Qualitative Data." *Addiction* 111(6):1096–1106. doi:10.1111/add.13314.

Nowell, Lorelli S., Jill M. Norris, Deborah E. White, and Nancy J. Moules. 2017. "Thematic Analysis." *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 16(1). doi:10.1177/1609406917733847.

Poerwandari, Kristi. 2017. "Penelitian Kajian Perempuan Dan Gender: Paradigma Dan Karakteristik." Pp. 505–39 in *Paradigma Ilmu Pengetahuan dan Penelitian Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial dan Humaniora di Indonesia*, edited by I. Kleden and T. Abdullah. Jakarta: LIPI Press.

Resnik, David B., and Kevin C. Elliott. 2019. "Value-Entanglement and the Integrity of Scientific Research." *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A* 75:1–11. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.12.011.

Samuel, Hanneman, and Oki Rahadianto Sutopo. 2013. "The Many Faces of Indonesia: Knowledge Production and Power Relations." *Asian Social Science* 9(13):289–98. doi:10.5539/ass.v9n13p289.

Santoso, Purwo. 2011. *Ilmu Sosial Transformatif: Pidato Pengukuhan Jabatan Guru Besar Pada Fakultas Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik Universitas Gadjah Mada*. Yogyakarta: Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Sayer, Andrew. 2000. *Realism and Social Science*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Sayer, Andrew. 2019. "Normativity and Naturalism as If Nature Mattered." *Journal of Critical Realism* 18(3):258–73. doi:10.1080/14767430.2019.1613852.

Sutopo, Oki Rahadianto, and Hartmantyo Pradigto Utomo. 2020. "Kritik Southern Theory Terhadap Hegemoni 'Sosiologi Modern' Amerika Di Indonesia." *Jurnal Filsafat* 30(2):287. doi:10.22146/jf.55864.

Thufail, Fadjar I. 2011. "Riding the Postmodern Chaos: A Reflection on Academic Subjectivity in Indonesia." Pp. 277–92 in *Decentring and Diversifying Southeast Asian Studies: Perspectives from the Region*, edited by B. L. Goh. Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute.

Toole, Briana. 2022. "Objectivity in Feminist Epistemology." *Philosophy Compass* 17(11). doi:10.1111/phc3.12885.

Zahle, Julie. 2021. "Objective Data Sets in Qualitative Research." *Synthese* 199(1–2):101–17. doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02630-2.

Zahle, Julie, and Petri Ylikoski. 2025. "Objectivity in Social Research." *Synthese* 205(5):206. doi:10.1007/s11229-025-05006-6.

Zed, Mestika. 2017. "Konstruksi Historis Ilmu Sosial Indonesia Dalam Perspektif Komparatif." Pp. 193–220 in *Paradigma Ilmu Pengetahuan dan Penelitian Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial dan Humaniora di Indonesia*, edited by I. Kleden and T. Abdullah. Jakarta: LIPI Press.