Electoral System and Party Dimension Assessment in Democratic Indonesia

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Abstract
Studies on election and its consequences on political parties in new democratic countries have often paid attention to cover the impacts imposed on the party system. This paper aims to examine the extent of the electoral system in influencing political parties in terms of improving their function or performance. This study will apply an analytical framework initiated earlier by Webb and White (2009) on party dimension in the new democracy by looking at the Indonesian case. In this framework, there are several generic factors in the relation between the electoral system and the party’s function such as ideological polarization, party constituency base, fractionalization in parliament and votes distribution. This study found that any changes applied to the electoral system in democratic Indonesia bear little or insignificant impact on political party performance. In addition, this study made use of the national election result dataset and calculated the variables with correlated formula which were subsequently analyzed to obtain an empirical explanation.

Keywords: election; political party; party dimension; Indonesia.

Introduction
In addition to the 1998 Indonesian Reformasi, an open political system has given political elites, who were previously subjected to authoritarian regime pressure, the audacity to start actualizing their political existence by establishing political parties. As a result, since 1999, Indonesia had entered a phase of extreme multiparty system which mirrored the 1950s situation. Thus, studies conducted on...
political parties in post-authoritarian Indonesia still apply the political ‘stream’ (politik aliran) perspective as dominantly occurring within the period in addition to analysis of more recent situation. Ufen (2004), for example, considers how the workings of political stream are reconfigured by the military. Nevertheless, the political stream, albeit in a different form, remains present and has become a part of political dynamics during elections. Even in the 1999 and 2004 elections, some of the supports provided by the political parties were still characterized by Muslim ideological streams, although recent tendencies were relatively weak compared to the pattern of political streams in the 1955 election (Ratnawati and Haris, 2008).

Despite further study, Ufen (2006) mentions that its significance began to diminish by referring to the de-alignment trend indicated by the rise of ‘presidentialized’ parties and growing intra-party authoritarianism. Mietzner’s study (2007) also shows the new direction of party activism by saying that the pattern of party financing has transformed parties into rent seekers which subsequently resulted in low internal coherence to the general democratic agenda.

One factor regarding party leadership and identification is particularly interesting in acquiring more attention during the Indonesian transition period. Analyses of the 1999 and 2004 elections revealed several interesting findings. For example, factors such as voters’ public perception on leadership and party identification remain significant in comparison to other variables such as religious orientation and political economy (Liddle & Mujani, 2007). Liddle and Mujani’s study shows that the leadership aspect remains dominant in the majority of political parties in Indonesia, so the general characteristics of the parties are consequently shaped by the parties’ leading figures. A significant question that could be further inquired is how this relates to the performance of the parties. Several studies on political parties in Indonesia have been conducted since 1998 to address this issue. For instance, studies conducted by Tan (2006) examine the performance of the parties in the period of seven years after 1998. She found that the party and the party system show strengths and weaknesses in relation to legitimacy. Furthermore, the institutionalization of the party is still weak, due to strong personal figures in the election, pointing toward either the president or the head of local governments. Nevertheless, in terms of accountability, the election system progressively allows voters to apply the reward and punishment mechanism to the parties and political leaders. Despite what other studies mention, political parties in Indonesia remain more institutionalized than those in the Philippines and Thailand, where interparty competition is more stable (Ufen, 2008).

Regarding the performance of parties, Mietzner (2013) provides an illustration on the relationship between money and ideology in political parties in Indonesia. Mietzner questioned previous studies mentioning that Indonesian political parties are allegedly dysfunctional and poor in management. Based on this conclusion, he suggests that the contribution of previous studies in the consolidation of a democratic system is questionable. He found little empirical evidence of cartel party, wherein parties in Indonesia are far from adopting cartel characteristics in their organization, and the level of intra-party competition is still shaped by ideology.

Upon reviewing relevant literature on parties condition in democratic Indonesia and being inspired by Hellman’s study (2011), Mietzner notes that democratization can generate political change and new electoral system. Thus, it can trigger the proliferation of new political parties, despite not having strong justifications of their programs and strategies. Moreover, his argument explicitly focuses on the empirical fact that politicians continuously utilize political parties as political vehicles
and mobilize them when necessary during elections. Therefore, the aims of the parties are merely to serve the political ambitions of the party elites.

The political parties in Indonesia were established by the supremacy of political elites as the fulfillment of their personal ambitions or the ambitions of their respective oligarchs. From the onset of the 1998 reform, a party was generally established based on ideological basis. The programs and strategies of a party are regarded as mere requisites at the formal level and tend to be solely left as written documents. It is only considered at the formal level as it is the initial requirement for the election registration. This is then followed by organizational development, which includes elite composition, governance structure and shaping the organization’s political culture. The process of developing bases for social and political constituency mainly takes place during electoral campaign. This pattern explains the phenomenon of the proliferation of political parties and political elites in Indonesia: it is easy to set up a party simply because it is a vehicle in an election.

Meanwhile, the electoral system has been changed time after time in order to provide quality election result, especially to improve party performance. Studies have shown that the electoral system has political consequences in which it shapes the dynamics of political parties and party system, it also has an effect on the number of parties in election and parliament (Bogdanor and Butler, eds, 1983, Grofman and Lijphart, eds, 1986). Several variables measured as the impact of electoral laws mainly focus on votes convert, electoral formula, degree of proportionality (Gallagher, 1991), or representativeness, fragmentation of party and district magnitudes (Rae, 1967, Sartori, 1968, Taagepera, 1999, Cox, 1997).

This article starts by questioning to what extent has the electoral system influenced the party system and its performance in democratic Indonesia? The aim of this article is to explain the relationship between the electoral system and political parties and party system dynamics from their performance in the election up to the parliament. This study employs analytical framework on party dimension in emerging democracies and applies quantitative data analysis to prove the empirical findings. This exploration will consist of three issues, namely: capturing electoral system change including electoral law and its different procedures, explaining results on party dimension variables, and analysis on the relationship between election and political party dynamics in democratic Indonesia within the span of the 1998 to 2014 election.

Analytical Methods: Assessing Party Dimension in the New Democracy

The changes in democratization, both in the terminology of the third wave of democratization or New Democracy, as encountered in the study by Webb and White (2007), show that political party varies in its level of adaptation. As an example, the historical stages of party development in the first wave of democratization in Western Europe, namely the formation of a cadre of an elite parliamentary party, socialist-mass party, are then transformed into a catch-all electoralist party. The establishment of a new party in a democratic country shows an explicit form of the unique result in democratization. This uniqueness derives from the variation of authoritarian regime model in power prior to democratization. Webb and White (2007) use the three party dimensions to evaluate the effectiveness of a party system. Firstly, they assess the dimensions of party links with electorates. In connection with the variable of party electorates which focuses on the vibrancy and health of linkages between parties and the society at large, I will examine the extent of the popular legitimacy of political parties, party identification, party institutionalization and the level of party fragmentation in parliament.
The present subsection will examine aspects of electoral volatility and explain the maps of public support for political parties. For this reason, the variables applied in this study will be based on data that can be derived from electoral volatility, fragmentation of the party system, and the effective number of party members in parliament (ENPP). Secondly, examination of the development of party organization is employed to assess the strength of party organization. The point lies in parties’ capacity to maximize existing resources to optimize the achievement of their objectives. The variables included in the analysis are party finances, party staffing and party memberships. I observe variations in the context of party organization, which contribute to party effectiveness in carrying out functions optimally in the realm of central and public office and in work on the ground. When assessing the level of party organization, Ishiyama (1999) adopts basic indicator of the importance of membership in the party and the degree of coherence of party ideology.

In analyzing the development of party organizations in Indonesia, examining the degree of ideological coherence became difficult due to three factors. The first factor is the bias issue of ideology internalization within the party. In addition, there is no party capable of maintaining consistency between the conceptualization of ideology and the formulation of the party platform to the level of policy implementation. Secondly, the form and format of inter-party coalition in parliament are based on public pressure to balance the interests of the placement of party cadres in executive government posts. The format of the coalition in a stable executive government needs the support of at least three quarters of votes in parliament. Thirdly, weak party identification is positively correlated with party backing. Socio-political cleavage of constituent parties does not have the benefit of good aggregation process. As a result, there is notable vulnerability in the articulation of the elite’s interests and grassroots supporters, which causes separation within the party elite. In using the second variable, the goal is to reveal how strong the existing party organizations are. The third variable is party performance, which is the contributing factor in the party’s influence in parliament and government cohesion.

**Electoral System and Political Parties in Democratic Indonesia**

It is important to describe several factors regarding party performances such as organization, regulation and impact of party system. The model of party organization in Indonesia could be categorized into the following types. This analysis significantly notes that the corporatism model is less common in Indonesian parties. For example, PDI-P and Golkar were categorized as catch-all parties (Ufen, 2008a). PDI-P became the largest party, representing non-Muslims and those who were not very religious (LSI, 2008). Apart from social and religious cleavages, the discussion on political parties is inseparable from the regional spectrum between centre and periphery in the distribution of votes in the local party (Ananta et al., 2005). Golkar became the controlling party by having strong infrastructure outside of Java, as opposed to either PKB in East Java or PDI-P in Central Java (Mujani & Liddle, 2007). Although the basis of the parties could be mapped, the post-New Order elections have shown the dynamics and shifting support of parties. For example, in the 2004 and 2009 Elections, Golkar lost a significant number of votes in Sulawesi and Sumatra due to the presence of new parties established during the Reformasi period. A high level of competition to reach the constituents also occurred between PKB and PDI-P in East Java. The 1999 elections resulted in as many as sixty-five percent of Parliamentary Members originating from the Golkar Party and approximately 55.3 percent of PPP inheriting...
their positions from the party’s constituency based under the New Order (King, 2003).

There are four laws that have been regulating political parties since 1998, namely Law No. 2 of 1999, Law No. 31 of 2002, Act No. 2 of 2008 and Act No. 2 of 2011 on the amendment of Law No. 2 of 2008. All of these regulations are intended to create an organized political party which is capable of managing a clear constituency base, enabling the aggregation structure and being organizationally accountable in range of human resources to self-financing. The implementation of the laws is limited to administrative and technical matters which are intended to be less influential on the formation of the party system and significantly improve the quality of the party. In fact, quite the opposite had occurred and de-institutionalization of the party system increased. A party less rooted in the community and its constituents resulted in the widening gap between the party vote in the elections and the presidential election of 2004 (Tomsa & Ufen, 2013). The structure of parties was weak and dominated by high levels of personal leadership. The party machine did not work effectively and it had low internal discipline. Institutionally, the party was not well established at the bottom level of the management board. The cases of direct local elections since 2005 show that the acceleration of the relationship between candidates and political parties is increasingly slow and the social barrier is blurred (Pratikno in Erb & Sulistiyanto, eds, 2009).

The party system after the reform was influenced by the level of competition between the parties and the impact of the electoral law. Mietzner (2008) argues that the post-Suharto political party system has developed centripetal dynamics that have stabilized and perpetuated its structures. In his review of the position of the political ideology of the parties that competed after 1998, he found that most parties are central or catch all parties, which use their constituency base merely for winning elections. All political spectrums of the constituency base have been accommodated within the party. He concluded that the Indonesian party system was dominated by the three main political parties, namely Golkar, PDI-P and the Democratic Party. The Megawati era of 2001-2004, in which the PDI-P emerged, saw a move into the middle, away from populist and nationalist views, flowing from policy, economic, and international relations considerations. Pragmatism was needed to keep the wheels of the government properly turning.

The identification and mapping of the post-1999 parties based on ideology are more complex. Many of the currently existing parties had emerged by this time and had a variety of party principles. Formally, ideological categorization, which refers to the ideology contained in the party constitution (Anggaran Dasar/Anggaran Rumah Tangga, AD/ART, Articles of Association/By-laws), is limited because it does not show the characteristics of the parties’ ideological formulation. Some parties clearly stated that they adopt Pancasila as their ideology, but in reality they represented more Muslim voters and advocated programs based on their Islamic platforms. The elites of these parties also had religious background and garnered the favor of Islamic groups. As an example, the National Awakening Party (PKB) was founded by Abdurrahman Wahid who had a background as the former Chairman of the Central Board of NU (Liddle, 2000). Similarly, the National Mandate Party (PAN) was founded by Amien Rais who is the former chairman of Muhammadiyah (Mietzner, 2001).

In the 1999 election there were forty-eight political parties. Ten political parties formally used Islam as a platform, namely: the Justice Party (PK), the Indonesian Muslim Awakening Party (KAMI), the Party of Muslims (PUI), the New Masjumi Party, the United Development Party (PPP), The Indonesian Islamic Union Party (PSII), the Indonesian Islamic Union
Party 1905 (PSII 1905), the Islamic Political Party of Indonesia (Masjumi), the Crescent Star Party (PBB), and what is now the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPP, formerly the Justice and Unity Party). Two parties were based on Pancasila and Islam, the Nahdlatul Ummah Party (PNU) and the People’s National Awakening Party (PKU). The rest were parties with Pancasila as their ideology. A striking party which had a different ideology in 1999 was the People’s Democratic Party (PRD), which had a popular social-democratic ideology (Profil Partai, 1999). Most parties were not explicitly ideological in their public trajectories, which was part of their strategy to obtain constituents. Parties positioned themselves as nationalists, as pro-Pancasila, or simultaneously combined the two ideologies in an attempt to secure widespread support. This was a strategic response from the parties upon observation that typical voters were no longer enthusiastic about ideology. PKS, for example, at the beginning of its establishment, was one of the parties that called for the enforcement of Islamic law (Shihab & Nugroho, 2008). However, in the 2004 and 2009 elections PKS labelled itself as an anti-corruption party (Homayotsu, 2011; Machmudi, 2008). In fact, their electoral campaign featured offerings and expressions that are less Islamic, and more popular instead, such as featuring the punk community. The Democratic Party, at the beginning of its appearance in 2004, positioned itself as a nationalist-religious party. This trend was also followed by PDI-P and Golkar, which no longer positioned themselves purely as nationalist-secular parties, but rather as religious nationalist parties. This strategy continued until the 2009 Election. Eight of the nine parties, except PPP which had a seat in the DPR, could be classified as catch-all parties.

In Table 1, it can be observed that Indonesia post-Reformasi has been implementing an electoral law which constantly changed during election periods. In general, the Act made attempts to establish a simple multi-party system wherein only parties having a stable constituent can gain seats in parliament. From 1998 to 2014, eight of the electoral laws can be classified into four parts. First, the Act had the goal of opening up democratization with the participation of political parties as stipulated by Law No. 3 of 1999 on General Elections and Law No. 4 of 2000 on Amendment Act No. 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>Chamber Structure</th>
<th>Chamber names</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Vote Methods</th>
<th>Electoral Treshold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Unicameral</td>
<td>DPR</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Total seats</td>
<td>PR-Closed</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MPR</td>
<td></td>
<td>Total seats</td>
<td>Not elected</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>(soft) Bicameral</td>
<td>DPR</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>3 to 12</td>
<td>PR-open</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DPD</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>(soft) Bicameral</td>
<td>DPR</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>3 to 10</td>
<td>PR-open (most votes sequence)</td>
<td>2,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DPD</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>(soft) Bicameral</td>
<td>DPR</td>
<td>77</td>
<td></td>
<td>PR-Open (most votes sequence)</td>
<td>3,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DPD</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total seats 692

Source: Compiled by author

1 In the 2009 election, open list PR system which stipulated in Law No. 10 of 2008 had amended. The Constitutional Court issued a verdict No. 22-24 / PUU-VI / 2008 which establishes an open list PR system with majority voting sequence (Urutan Suara Terbanyak). In that verdict, the Court abolished the threshold of 30 percent of the number of voter divider (Bilangan Pembagi Pemilih).
of 1999. In the two laws above, an election is still understood as a unicameral legislative election in which a president shall be elected through Parliament. Second, there are laws that strengthen the Indonesian presidential system through the separate issuance of laws between the legislative and presidential elections. Law No. 12 of 2003 has been mentioned explicitly as pertaining to the election of parliamentary members, and of Provincial and Regent/Municipality assemblies, while Law No. 23 of 2003 regulates presidential elections.²

The third part is the expansion of a decentralized system by opening up local elections directly, and the direct election of members of the Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD, Regional Representative Council, which is similar to the Senate but has no legislative authority).³ There are also laws that govern, among others, Law No. 32 of 2004 in which the direct election of local government is included. Law No. 20 of 2004 provides for the establishment of Government Regulation No. 2 of 2004 on the amendment of Law No. 12 of 2003 on the Election of MPs. Another provision is added through Law No. 10 of 2006 on the establishment of Government Regulation No. 1 of 2006, on the second amendment of Act No. 12 of 2003, concerning parliamentary elections. Fourth, the Act strengthened the presidential system and the simple multi-party system. This is stipulated in Law No. 42 of 2008 concerning presidential elections, Law No. 10 of 2008 concerning the parliamentary elections, Law No. 10 of 2008 on the legislative elections, and Law No. 8 of 2012 on parliamentary elections.

In 1999 the electoral system used a PR-closed list, a system of proportional representation in which only active members, party officials, or consultants determine the order of candidates. This arrangement allowed political parties to place strong candidates in the first order of the ballot sheet. Of all the issues that emerged as a result of the workings of the system, the most important is the authority of the dominant political party to put forward its candidates and ensure their electability. In a “closed list” system, the candidates elected are ranked in an order determined by the parties (Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis, 2005). Changes in electoral law are related to the operational aspects of power distribution and parties in parliament (Reilly, 2001). In the 2009 elections, the system applied an open-list PR in the legislative elections. Through this arrangement, parties created open space for free competition against their candidates (NDI Report, 1999).⁴ The relationship between the leadership in each party and its candidates was less structured, because each candidate was promoted based on popularity and strong capital backing is used to obtain votes for the party. The party machine is no longer dominant in securing candidates’ success or otherwise. Open-list PR tended to attract candidates seeking to buy influence, business connections, and lucrative contracts while neglecting the duties of parliamentary representation (Hadiz, 2003; Robison & Hadiz, 2004; Tan, 2002).

² Compiled from www.kpu.go.id with cross-check from another official release on national regulation, at: www.ditjenpp.kemenkumham.go.id
³ Laws that govern, among others, Law No. 32 of 2004 on which the direct election of local government is included. Law No. 20 of 2004 on the establishment of Government Regulation No. 2 of 2004, on the amendment of Law No. 12 of 2003 on the Election of MPs. Another is added through Law No. 10 of 2006 on the establishment of Government Regulation No. 1 of 2006, on the second amendment of Act No. 12 of 2003, concerning parliamentary elections.
⁴ Some parties had specific reasons for taking advantage of the permitted flexibility in the process of determining elected candidates. For example, PDI-P was criticized during the campaign for nominating a disproportionate number of non-Muslim (especially Christian) candidates. In response, after the elections PDI-P took advantage of the discretion allowed by the KPU and the PPI to ensure that a larger share of its elected candidates were Muslim.
The 2004 election featured an imposed 2.5 per cent threshold while concurrently allowing an increased number of districts within a range of three to ten seats. This is a narrower application than the previous one, and parties found they had little chance running against big parties with an established organizational structure at the lower level. There was an entry threshold for parties to obtain seats in Parliament for nominating a presidential candidate. Law 10 of 2008 regulated the amount of 20 percent of the seats in the DPR or 25 per cent of the national vote, for a party to nominate its presidential candidate (Sherlock, 2009). That requirement led parties to form coalitions to nominate a candidate. In the post-1999 elections no party won votes more than 20 percent in the national elections. Another significant change was the creation of a new legislative body called the Dewan Perwakilan Daerah Republik Indonesia (DPD, Regional Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia), following the amendment of the constitution in 2004. The DPD did not have the authority to make laws and merely participated in the hearing of the DPR. Similarly, the most powerful body prior to 2004 was the MPR but it no longer had any power, serving only to ceremonially authorize and dismiss the President. MPR members are comprised of DPR and DPD members. The members of DPR amounted to 560 people from seventy-seven electoral districts, with each province accumulating three to ten seats (IDEA Policy Research Paper, 2005), while the DPD have 132 elected members, four people representing every province with independent nomination, and a single system using a non-transferable vote (SNTV) (IFES, 2014).

Assessing Party Dimension in Indonesia

In this article, index measurements are utilized, such as on party system fragmentation by using the polarization index Herfindahl = ∑ (party seat share in legislature which can be interpreted as the probability that two deputies picked at random from among the legislative parties will be of different parties, with higher values indicating a less fractionalized party system) (Dalton, 2008). Also by using the effective number of parties (ENPP) which is calculated as ∑ (party seat share in legislature) (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979) and Rae’s fragmentation measuring party number and size or as the proportion of pairs of members in a system which contains persons who have voted for (or belonged to) different parties in the last previous election (Rae, 1968). Another mean to measure party strength is by using the Pedersen Volatility Index which shows change in the share of votes (or seats) per party per election (Pedersen, 1979).

Table 2.
Variables in Party System from 1999-2014 Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Volatility</th>
<th>Polarization (Herfindahl)</th>
<th>Fragmentation</th>
<th>ENPP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>0.788</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>31.22%</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>32.01%</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>28.78%</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.877</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated by author

Volatility results become important in view of the stabilization of the party system and its level of institutionalization. The factors that cause high and low volatility could lie in the consolidation of the elites that spin the wheels of the party organizations, or external factors, such as government being formed or supported by poorly performing party. Generally, factors that degrade the image of the party in public have a direct impact on the emergence of a negative campaign against the party (Mair, 1996). From the 1999 until 2014 election in Indonesia, the highest volatility (32.01 percent) was found within the period of 2004 to 2009 (Table 2). Moreover, it has never declined below 20 percent. This proves that there is a serious problem in all the major parties regarding the institutionalization of parties and party support.
The next variable of party polarization reflected the dynamics of intra-party competition. Polarization of the parties in the 1999 elections was high, at 0.212. In comparison to the following election, which is within the 0.123 to 0.161 range, the results of the 1999 election (in which forty-eight political parties took place) were better able to accommodate the heterogeneity of political forces. This is corroborated with data in 1999 showing that the effective number of parties at the electoral level (ENPP) adopted a simple multiparty system with 5.1 points. Political fragmentation in parliament was also at a low of 0.788.

When the 2004 elections (won by the Democratic Party) and the 2009 elections (won by Golkar) were examined, with the determination of electoral threshold above one percent for the national vote, the party system was clearly more stable. Volatility remained high due to the major parties competing for voters that were likely to shift their position (swinging voters). Swinging voters were predominately individuals with higher education degrees living in urban areas. On the other hand, polarization and fragmentation variables are unlikely to have a high discrepancy. Interestingly, several phenomena exhibit sharp differences with respect to ENPP. In the 2004 elections, ENPP achieved 9.6, compared to 8.6 in the 2009 elections. Following the 2004 elections, many new parties were a combination of parties that had failed to obtain a seat or gained only a few seats in parliament. Thus, the votes of each party were relatively stable, but evenly spread with additional votes for intermediate parties. In general, the party system in Indonesia in the post-reform era (or in the four elections analyzed here), have an average ENPP of eight points, and the system is thus categorized as a moderate-high multiparty system. The variable of polarization also decreased to 0.123, with fragmentation that remained in the vicinity of 0.8.

In the second dimension, party finance and staffing were analyzed. In this context, there is no pretention to explain the details of the parties’ financial and staffing processes in terms of the nominal amount of their financial statements. This was decided due to limited access to reliable data. In addition, the Election Commission (KPU) and Finance Inspection Board (BPK) were currently carrying out reporting and financial audit. As a result, only Gerindra submitted financial audit reports for publication (Kompas, 16/04/2013). Party finance is an important issue in building party accountability. The general perspective that can be derived regarding the matter is that there has been significant change in party financing from the previous New Order government, due to the latter providing huge subsidies to political parties, especially to Golkar. Post-reform, parties were required to seek their own sources of funding, since state subsidies were limited. Thus, parties typically relied on MPs and cadres holding public office at the executive level (Mietzner, 2007). From the assessment of regulations on party financing, party funding could come from members’ income, non-binding donations, and state subsidies, which are determined based on the number of seats in parliament. The Gerindra audit revealed that government subsidy funds are typically spent for political education of cadres and operational costs of the national secretariat (IDEA political finance report, 2012; Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (BPK RI) Audit Report, 2010).

Based on the Transparency International Indonesia (TII Report, 2013) release (Table 3), only five parties completed the questionnaire, with four other parties providing incomplete data. Based on the data pertaining to these five parties, four provided financial information to the state report. In this case, the report was sent to the KPU for administrative requirements and the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (BPK RI), in order to audit the state subsidy.
funds provided to each party. However, all parties did not even provide mandatory information, as most of the information was incomplete and there was not even widespread publicity (Kompas, 12/03/2015). The report thus describes the general condition of the financial transparency of political parties in Indonesia. It is interesting to note that the Gerindra party had the highest score as they submitted the most transparent financial statements. In contrast, the Democrat Party emerged as the party that was uncooperative and did not allow public access to its financial budget.

According to Thomas Reuter, the three models of party financing from private funding sources can be adopted in order to understand the financial conditions of a party. However, these models are difficult to detect, as funds are used directly to finance the election campaign. The first category of privately owned party refers to parties founded by the political elite in order to serve its political interests, as is the case with Gerindra, Nasdem and Hanura. The financing of these parties is often supported by private funds. The second category pertains to the party rental vehicle category which is used as a political vehicle of the ruling elite, such as Golkar. Party power holders use these funds to finance the organization of the party, for office functioning until election. The third category pertains to heritage parties, such as PDI-P’s use of political dynasty as a source of funding, namely the family of Taufik Kiemas, Megawati’s husband (Reuter, 2005).

How compact is each faction in parliament? It is important to ensure that the size of the parties’ influence in parliament is controlled through factions. This also reveals the extent of support for the executive government in parliament. Although voting was introduced in the House of Representatives in 2004, there are no official records accessible relating to the number of decisions taken by voting. The House was divided by two types of voting, the voting commission was followed by members of the commission for the election of executive officers in accordance with the commission’s work, and the parliamentary voting was followed by all MPs. The final voting made decisions regarding important issues, such as the Constitution Act and other matters related to the issue of parliament responsibility. In the analysis of the cohesiveness of the party, the Agreement Index (AI) and Rice Index (RI) are used to calculate the degree of party cohesiveness.

In table 4, the AI is calculated, wherein \( Yi \) denotes the number of “Yes” votes expressed by group \( i \) on a given vote, \( Ni \) is the number of

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**Table 3. Transparency Index by Parties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Information (mandatory to provide)</th>
<th>Information (mandatory to publish)</th>
<th>Information (mandatory reporting to the state)</th>
<th>Overall Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gerindra</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanura</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>2.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>2.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1 = no information, 2 = incomplete information <50 percent, 3 = incomplete information >50 percent, 4 = complete information.

Source: Transparency International Indonesia, 2013
“No” votes and AI the number of “Abstained” votes. As a result, the AI equals 1 when all the members of a party vote together and equals 0 when the members of a party are equally divided between all three of these voting options (Hix, Noury & Roland, 2005: 209-34 & 215-216). The AI has compatibility for choice of “Abstained” votes. I also conducted a calculation of Rice Index (RI) to provide a comparison of party cohesiveness conditions without including the “Abstained” variable. RI is calculated based on the proportion of the group’s reduced votes from majority and minority groups (Hazan, 2013:67; Martin, Saalfeld and Strøm, 2014: 223-24). I note that the Indonesian parliament in a coalition does not have a clear structure; hence, the basis for assessing the coalition is a coalition of parties in the Presidential nomination. Even in Parliament, the coalition could disintegrate. I show the RI for each sound faction in parliament in order to assess the level of cohesiveness of the AI and RI in each issue of the various sampled period in parliaments.

The variation of party cohesiveness is evident in every period of parliamentary work. With respect to the variable of the AI, an interesting question arises: why is the AI lower in the 2004-2009 period when compared to the subsequent period? This phenomenon was not caused by the type of issues raised during the voting because, in other periods, a very high AI is noted. The main cause for this outcome was the composition of the political forces in parliament, which was more heterogeneous with weak majority support to presidential powers. The major parties, such as PKB, PPP, and Golkar, became factions in parliament with a low level of group cohesiveness. In the case of Golkar, the ELaw 2009 voting data shows the cohesiveness of the lowest fraction. A crucial factor that can explain this finding is the internal situation at the time, which disintegrated following Wiranto’s failure in the 2004 presidential election. All the while, Jusuf Kalla did not fully garner the support of Golkar MPs in parliament. As the majority party

Table 4.
Fraction Cohesiveness in Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>EVList 2009</td>
<td>AI</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>AI</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>AI</td>
<td>RI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hanura</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>88.23</td>
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<td>Gerindra</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>100</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>83.33</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<tr>
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<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDIP</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>83.33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PG</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
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<td>33.33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
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<td>92.15</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Source: calculated by author from official meeting notes of DPR.
that gained 21 percent of the vote in the 2004 election, Golkar’s bargaining position against the Yudhoyono-Kalla administration was very high. The condition was different from the 2009-2014 period, in which Golkar decided to join the Democratic Party and initiate a grand coalition in parliament. The impact of this decision is evident in the very high AI. In the current 2014-2019 period, Golkar is experiencing similar issues as in 2004-2009, with AI = 0 and RI = 73.81 percent. It should be noted that Golkar suffered a split in the 2014 presidential election wherein the faction of Chairman Aburizal Bakrie supported Prabowo-Hatta Rajasa, while the other faction led by Luhut Panjaitan voted for Joko Widodo-Kalla.

In the Indonesian parliament, the size of the AI and RI is not influenced by different perceptions of MPs and factions in view of policy issues that become the object of voting. The most dominant factor is the unresolved issues in the previous political events related to internal party support in the presidential election. Faction authority is dominant and decisions are rarely taken through voting. A faction can easily express party interest in accordance with the instructions of the party authority holder through horizontal intervention. Other parties, such as the Democratic Party, PDI-P, and Gerindra, have a very high degree of cohesiveness. In the three parties, the factions have a full representation to choose and implement strategies from policy debate to decision-making in parliament. This further proves that effective party control lies in the central leadership, which controls the party political agendas through factions in parliament. Several other factors that explain why MPs rarely have dissenting opinions from that of a fraction include the threat of sanctions imposed by the party leadership. In certain categories, having an opposing vote from the fraction could result in dismissal as a parliamentary member. As is widely known, the party leadership has the right to withdraw the party members from parliament for reasons of violating party discipline. In general, a presidential multiparty system, as is the case in Indonesia, could produce levels of party cohesion that are relatively high. In a sample of voting on important issues that was taken in this study, the lowest mean AI was 0.7 and the RI was 92.6 percent. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the AI and RI values can vary if calculated based on groupings of factions within each issue that becomes the object of voting.

Finally, based on the description regarding party dimensions, four important facts are considered noteworthy. Firstly, in the dimensions of the connection to party electorates, electoral volatility remains relatively high. Parties have failed in reforming stable infrastructure with strong political support. Consequently, the parties rely solely on the strength of the dominant leader for strengthening organizational capacity. Party organization managed to produce a more centralized organizational hierarchy that reinforces oligarchy within the party. Secondly, in terms of organizational development, the parties are not managed with proper managerial systems and they lack transparency. Moreover, in terms of party financing and structuring, organizations that demonstrate party accountability are not managed properly. The implications of using the party as a political vehicle of the elites can be observed in these problems. Thirdly, the party dimension of performance, as measured by its performance in parliament, revealed differences in horizontal control of the party faction in parliament. In general, the level of party cohesiveness is high, with the exception of Golkar. Despite producing legislative products, this party is highly dependent on the performance of its members in parliament during each period. Other factors, such as political coalition, do not have much impact on productivity since
horizontal control of the party in government coalition parties has a relatively high degree of compactness.

Conclusion

Based on the explanation above, this study has shown at least three specific items: First, changes of electoral system in each election term only have an impact on the party success to gain votes, especially regulation on the percentage of electoral threshold. Basically, there is no evidence that party grouping is carried out grounded on ideological tendencies; and Secondly, electoral system change has significant impact on party volatility and has close relationship with ENPP. This is basically an indication that party votes are coming from floating voters that switch their vote of choice from one party to another in each election. Party votes instability is also caused by the low level of party identification which affect voters’ loyalty. Interestingly, the different point of ENPP in each election did not have direct impact on the factionalization within parliament. Polarization and fragmentation look more stable and the evidence is obviously pointed out by testing the voting in parliament with compactness measurement which shows higher degrees of RI and AI. Thirdly, electoral system change has no significant effect on party financing improvement as parties are still infected by lack of accountability and financial transparency. In quality, electoral system change in Indonesia during the democratic transition has no significant improvement on party accountability and was unsuccessful in creating simple and concise multiparty system as shown by ENPP point from four to five. Another impact is party volatility that remains high, indicating the failure of party identification at grassroots level. As an exception, faction compactness in parliament is relatively high although this is mainly caused by variable of centralism in the party line coordination and centric based leadership.

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