

a maritime strategy for Indonesia is needed (Buddy, Zarina, & Farizal, 2018).

Like the concept of national security, maritime strategy varies from one country to another; there is no “one size fits all”. The study of maritime strategy by scholars as evidenced by the seminal works of Mahan (1889), Hattendorf (2004), Bruns (2014), and Rubel (2015) from the US, goes as far back as 1898. Maritime strategy is crucial for many, including for Continental States. Mahan (1889), a naval historian, was known as the first theorist to systematically point out the strategic importance of naval operations to warfare. Notably, Mahan laid the foundations for a theory of naval strategy through his comprehensive descriptions of the histories of modern naval warfare. In addition, some important points about Mahan’s concept are presented by Gough (1988), Hattendorf (1989), Klein (2004), Till (2005), William (2008), Vego (2009). Klein (2004) for example, suggested that Mahan’s prime contribution lies in the important links he established between maritime and naval activities to national and international issues, besides laying the foundations for developing naval strategy. Mahan examined national policy, sea power, sea control, offensive versus defensive operations, speed and mobility, communications, trade, concentration of force, and strategic position (Klein, 2004). While there is a national policy yet there is no national security policy on maritime strategy.

There are three main conditions that determine the strategic value of any states (Mahan as cited in Vego, 2009). This includes the offensive or defensive military strength of the place, the resources of the place itself and the resources of the surrounding state. Although Mahan suggested that the main requirement of naval supreme power was the strength of heavy warships, there is a need to consider “... training, morale, the effectiveness of command, tactical disposition (in particular, the skill of pitting all of your force against a portion of the

opponent’s)” besides an aggressive winning tactic to destroy the opponent (Till, 2005, p. 35).

In fact, sophisticated warfare technology (submarine communications, cruiser warfare, mines, sub-marines, torpedoes) was a secondary factor, which means decisive naval battles are a key factor in maritime strategy (Mahan as cited in Gough, 1988). Besides the military aspects in naval battle, Mahan advocated the expansion of other areas to broaden the nation’s maritime strategy, especially during peaceful times. Moreover, commercial sea routes are better controlled via a mobile naval fleet which has strategic local ports used as the naval operations base (Hattendorf, 1989). The key guidelines developed by Mahan are as follows; the true objectives of the navy in times of war and peace; building supportive logistics bases; effective communications between these depots and the home base; the military value of commerce-destroying as a decisive or secondary operation of the war; the system upon which commerce-destroying can be most efficiently conducted, whether by scattered cruisers or by holding in force some vital center through which commercial shipping must pass (Mahan as cited in Benner, 2004). In addition, it was vital to acquire international colonies, naval bases and coaling stations to support both military and commercial maritime operations (Mahan as cited in Williams, 2008).

However, there were weaknesses in the Mahan concept, specifically about his failure to appreciate the importance of convoys in a prolonged war and the deep impact of submarines, torpedoes and mines in a future naval war (Gough, 1988). He also highlighted the fallacies of Mahan’s concept, such as his belief that the nation needed a concentrated battle fleet, and that the Naval forces could protect the people and sea commerce in difficult times.

Another important contribution, came from Turner (2001) who introduces the new term “Sea Control” which was intended to compare more realistic controls in restricted

areas and for limited periods of time. It is very difficult to maintain the security of the area in the airspace, under the sea and at surface sea today especially in terms of maintaining strength overseas. Besides, Turner also explained the methods of weapon systems in Sea control.

The complicated nature of maritime strategy was discussed by Hattendorf (2013). Notably, the navy constitutes only one component of the strategy, which should incorporate diplomacy, merchant trade and sea defence, fishing, safeguarding, conserving and defending the exclusive economic zone at sea, coastal defence, national borders' defence, and offshore islands security (Hattendorf, 2013). In essence, maritime strategy involves participation in regional and worldwide issues relating to the use of oceans, the skies over the oceans and the land under the seas besides influencing and controlling developments on land (Morrison, 2011; Scott, 2004).

In general, strategic maritime studies can be divided into two sections. On one hand, the discussion has focused on maritime strategy, and on the other hand, it has emphasized the appropriate concepts and factors affecting the strategy. Among pioneer scholars in the field of maritime strategy were Mahan (1889), Corbett (1911), Booth (1977), Grove (1990), Turner (2001), and Till (2005) who have all made major contributions to the field.

It is the purpose of this article to discuss the evolution and development of maritime strategies focusing on the Asia Pacific region. In particular, the discussion seeks to investigate why states adopt maritime strategy and how to implement the strategies. Although countries perceive national security to be important, yet they have not all focused on maritime strategy. Because developing naval power is too expensive, due to the vast area to protect, and government policy seems to be more land-based. The article will first discuss the development of maritime strategies for

continental states including the US, and India. Next, the article will analyse the strategies from maritime states including United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, and Singapore as well as Indonesia, one of the largest maritime nations and an important founding member of ASEAN, a regional institution in Southeast Asia (Sugiarto et al., 2017). By doing so, it is hoped that the discussion will help maritime countries such as Indonesia in formulating its comprehensive maritime strategy.

Methods

Most of the data for this article is obtained from secondary sources that are publicly accessible which includes official documents from Indonesia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia. Academic books and journals on maritime issues, maritime strategies, national security, and reputable sources from open access journals, have also been consulted. For the purpose of this research, this data collected was analyzed using Atlas.ti software through coding manuals for qualitative research.

Results and Discussion

Maritime Strategy in Continental States: US and India

As a superpower, US maritime strategy development has undergone several changes in accordance with global trends caused by changing political events and technological developments. The changes can be seen beginning from Ford's 1971 presidency that developed the concept of the mission of the navy, Reagan's 1981 Maritime strategy, Bush's 1989 administration and From the Sea concept, Clinton's 1994 forward thinking concept of the sea and to Bush's 2002 Sea power 21 concept (Swartz, 2005). The view that maritime strength does not concern conquering territories but also looks at controlling coastlines and smaller waterways is also supported by Menon who pays attention to amphibious operations in history, speed in battle, and the synergy between

technology and strategy (Menon, 1998). Next, Wiley (2016) who observed that the debate over maritime strategy in the 1980s stemmed from the United States and its allies' response to Soviet aggression in Central Europe during the cold war era on a bipolar world where the competition between communist and capitalist was at its height. This involved carrier raids and amphibious assaults against Soviet in the Black, Mediterranean, Norwegian Seas, and the Pacific, and the strategy was criticized as it appeared to be a rationalization for the 600 ships involved rather than a serious wartime plan. This strategy was seen as unreasonable, as once the Soviet military threat subsided, the rationale for building the fleet was lost and the new administration decided to reduce its size, without a corresponding reduction of the nation's overseas obligations.

Wiley (2016) suggested that the navy and marine corps of the Cold War era in the 1970s were gradually transformed and embraced a more cooperative, sea power strategy for the 21st century. This transformation was also shaped by the historical experiences of the 1990s and 2000s. Then, Hoyt (2007) observed the need for maritime strategy to extend control to the nation's economic interests and guarding it against threats from other states. Additionally, Ho (2008) looked at the broader focus to prevent conflict, counter terrorism and provide humanitarian assistance. This shift from a narrow focus on winning wars emphasizes cooperation between nations. An important contribution was from Taylor (2008) who assessed the need for routine and effective cooperation between regional and international maritime nations to secure a free and safe maritime domain. Quite understandably, it calls for an integrative and robust global maritime alliance that is based on trust, and thus, enables greater prevention and security. This approach emphasizes the important role of governmental and nongovernmental, public and private maritime partners.

Additionally, Kraska (2012) cited the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral, Michael G. Mullen, who claimed that sea control belonged to old schools of thought whereas the newer maritime strategy recognizes that the economic strength of nations increase when the seas are made safe and free for all. Another study, by Bruns (2014), analyses U.S. Navy Strategy & American Sea Power from "The Maritime Strategy" (1982-1986) to "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower" (2007). He pointed out the intricate links between strategy, planning, and force structure, considering theories, sea power, the political and military uses of the sea, the links between different levels of strategy, naval missions, and some particulars of the maritime domain that guide formulation of naval and maritime strategy (Wiley, 2016).

Subsequently, in 2015, the US revised the 2007 maritime strategy with the title "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower" (U.S. Navy, 2015). This was made with respect to the vastness of the maritime region that required naval forces to protect and maintain not only the economic and security interests of the U.S, but also the stability of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Cropsey & McGrath (2018) observed that in order to formulate global strategy, it requires an extensive government plan involving military, diplomatic, geo-strategic, industrial workforce, and budgetary implications, amongst others. Thus, the elements of America's maritime strategy includes diplomacy, economics, global, sea control, maritime security, navy strength, marine power, maritime cooperation, joint concepts, maritime domains, military values, politics, and choke point (a narrow strait that is strategic for sea shipping lines).

Scholars from India such as Menon (1998) emphasized that such tactics are necessary as there was a shift from just controlling territories towards comprehensive security measures involving coastlines and smaller

battles that include decisive battles, fleet in being (standby fleet), blockade, and second, the preventive sea measures such as coastal protection, protection of trade, projection of power ashore, naval diplomacy and strategic deterrence. He synthesized the works of various authors (Bateman & Sherwood, 1992). Till observed the relativeness of sea power which most countries possess. The degree of sea power in each country depends on the following factors and its combination; their naval strength, shipbuilding expertise, skills in marine sea power insurance, or their capacity to supply seafarers. Furthermore, Till (2005) summed up Baer's (1994) views that to achieve sea power, a nation has to internally agree on the value of an aggressive big fleet triphibious Navy, as outlined by Mahan's principles, besides having public and professional support.

In reviewing Corbett's work (1911) that advocated an army that works with the navy to conquer overseas territories and to outflank land-bound adversaries with amphibious operations, (as cited in Till, 2006) noted that this strategy focuses on confusing rival plans and making one's own and the allies' positions stronger. In addition, Till (2009) suggested that the typical problems for navies and coastguards include defence inflation, budget limitations, resources – commitments gap, sea blindness, and land-centric culture. These are the limitations for the navy expansion.

The modern concept of 'sea control', is defined by the Royal Navy as the exclusive freedom and power to exploit the use of part of the sea and also, if need be, make it inaccessible to rivals. However, besides sea denial, other weak naval strategies involve attacking merchant ships and coastal hit and run raids. Speller (2005) observed the acknowledgement given by the authors of British Maritime Doctrine (BR1806) to the established concepts of maritime strategy that include access, mobility, versatility, sustained reach, resilience, lift capacity, poise, and leverage.

According to Grove (2006) who examined various Royal Navy documents such as the 2001, 'The Future Navy' and 'and 'Future Navy Operational Concept', stressed four core capabilities for future fleets, i.e. power projection, flexible global reach, optimized access for the joint forces via sea control and theatre entry. Wide-ranging aspects of maritime security are also highlighted such as Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). In Heuser's (2010) assessment of Till's work, he highlighted Till's prediction of paradigm shifts in the Western navies post-Cold War (Till, 1994). He envisaged that instead of securing sea control and protection against raids, there would be a focus on coastal strategies and protection, or "littoral warfare". This however constitutes one of the many shifts in maritime warfare.

The British Maritime Doctrine BR 1806 outlined the important role of navies in the post-Cold War era. Apart from providing required protection and surveillance, their diplomatic influence and cooperation in strategic alliances is a very fundamental aspect in the fast-changing regional and international maritime domains (Till, 2005). Mière (2013) observed the evolving nature of the strategy, while Cable (1983) believed that the strength of British navies depended on their ability to predict as well as the adaptability and plausibility of their strategy in relation to present and future policies. Generally, though, the aim of British maritime strategy was a combination of the financial support of Continental allies and the exertion of maritime pressure through blockade, the threat of amphibious landings, attacks and raids on threatened coastlines and through the seizure of their adversaries' far-flung colonies and bases (Gardner, 2006).

Additionally, Till also forecasted the modern navy tasks in the future that correspond with a reduction in resources. Politically, naval planners will also receive less strategic guidance as compared to during the Cold War

era (Till, 2008). This, however, is a reflection of the past when British Chiefs complained of getting little guidance from their political masters, a time that is often seen as a forecast and preparation of things to come in the future (Grove, 2006). Another major contribution comes from Hill (2000) who described the tools used by the Medium Powers as 'levels of conflict' that required understanding the levels of command, tasks and management of military forces instead of the nature of conflict. This concept is also described in the "The Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10 British Maritime Doctrine" which specifies that the hierarchy levels span all warfare areas [tactical, operational and strategic] (Britain MoD, 2011).

Being a maritime state, the UK government issued official maritime security strategy documents in 2014 certified by four departments, i.e. the Secretary of foreign affairs and commonwealth, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense Affairs, and Secretary of State for Transport. The main purpose of the UK maritime security strategy is as follows:

"To promote a secure international maritime domain and uphold international maritime norms; to develop the maritime governance capacity and capabilities of states in areas of strategic maritime importance; to protect the UK and the overseas territories, their citizens and economies by supporting the safety and security of ports and offshore installations and Red Ensign Group (REG)-flagged passenger and cargo ships; to assure the security of vital maritime trade and energy transportation routes within the UK marine zone, regionally and internationally; to protect the resources and population of the UK and the overseas territories from illegal and dangerous activity, including serious organised crime and terrorism" (British Government, 2014, pp. 10–11).

The strategy is two-fold; one concerns developing national capabilities utilizing available resources and the other focusing on international cooperation between governments to identify, assess and address maritime security issues locally and internationally. In order to remain relevant, the strategy should also be continuously examined and improved.

On the other part of the continent is Australia, an importance US ally. Specifically, in strategy, theories of sea power and maritime strategy are to be used in warfare and also in peaceful times. Secondly, complex principles are used during war times and thirdly, that joint approaches are used, acknowledging the importance of both land and air tactics. Lastly, the maritime strategy also includes civil components of maritime power (the marine industries and maritime infrastructure). Essentially, they described the Australian maritime strategy as one that optimizes the country's scarce resources to defend and protect Australia's maritime assets against any maritime attacks and to uphold a safe and secure environment (Bateman & Sherwood, 1992).

Meanwhile, Donohue (2000) has listed the importance of geography. Considering Australia's geographical location in a region with the busiest shipping lanes in the world, he highlighted how Australia's active role is instrumental in influencing regional maritime cooperation on all levels of defence and industry whilst creating and maintaining communications with its neighbors. The Indonesian maritime project will impact Australia and the rest of the Indo-Pacific region especially by providing powerful insights about the challenges faced in building maritime power (Till, 2015, p. 9). Scott (2004) also stated that with the advances made in technology, it was crucial that air, sea and land forces work together, besides integrating the traditional blue water maritime concepts of sea denial and sea control.

The *Australian Maritime Doctrine* (2000) was an Australian spin-off of British formulated concepts and reflected the nation's national interests. In writing about the need for nations, Till (2005) suggested that Australia should retain a greater focus on sea control, and that this strategy, together with air control, will enable greater influence on land. He stressed that the preconditions for sea control should not be taken for granted.

Similarly, McCaffrie (2006) outlined the requisites of a maritime strategy as the combination of all aspects of national power, not excluding the military, economic and diplomatic aspects that are deployed for national security. The specific requisites for an Australian maritime strategy includes "mobility in mass, readiness, access, flexibility and adaptability, reach, poise and persistence, maneuver" (McCaffrie, 2006). Notably, in a speech to the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Maritime Conference, Morrison (2011) stressed that to ensure the future relevance of maritime strategy, it must involve the army or air force and that this strategic alliance defines maritime strategy. Maritime strategy is therefore, a triphibious exercise, and is not exclusive to the naval forces. However, Till (2013) added that budget constraints may limit the use of maritime concepts and for maritime strategy to be fully implemented, Australia needed to defend navigation freedom, to actively pursue measures that reduce the risks of accidental encounters at sea and to develop wider naval relationship networks of mutual benefit around the region.

In examining the security threats at sea, Percy (2013) identified four security risks, i.e. piracy; people smuggling (both illegal migration and human trafficking); illegal, unreported and unauthorized (IUU) fishing; and narcotics smuggling. By focusing on narcotics smuggling, which is considered one of the longest criminal maritime security threats, he also discussed different types of control and whether these maritime threats can

be resolved by traditional maritime strategy. Furthermore, Kainikara (2013) not only agreed with the view that air strategy is essential to Sea control, but also that success of sea control is relative to the ability of the air force to control the air. For maritime strategy to be successful, therefore, it requires strong support from air strategy.

The next topic for discussion is the development of maritime strategies in Japan, and Singapore. According to Kaneda (2002) the development of maritime strategy in Japan, faced threats from North Korean missiles and spy ships in the form of "Taepodong", during the post-Cold War era. This led to Japan's "maritime coalition" strategy that involved building an integrated, anti-ballistic missile system, using information systems. Research on Singapore's Maritime Strategy focused on the Straits of Malacca and the need to maintain international co-operation and develop a balanced military strength with respect to other nations (Rotte, 2002).

Indonesia is an important state in the region. Its free trade island city, Batam, has contributed wealth to Indonesia (Adiwan, 2017). Specific studies on Indonesian maritime strategy are limited. Indonesian scholars include Mangindaan (2002) whose article *Maritime Strategy Indonesia in 2000-2010*, argued that due to the financial difficulties facing Indonesia in safeguarding national interests in maritime territory, it is strongly recommended and necessary to cooperate with other forces such as official political-diplomatic power and cooperation among departments. Keliat (2009) examined two areas of Indonesian maritime strategy; i.e. the concept of maritime safety and its implications for Indonesia. Other similar research studies include one by Melda (2009) who described the Indonesian view of maritime security in South East Asia, as well as Forward (2009) who worked on "the Indonesian submission to determine the validity of the IMO's declaration at international law".

The researcher Djalal (2013) examined the responsibilities and capabilities of the country with regard to its diverse land, air, sea and seabed boundaries. This study was undertaken in light of the widening territories of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia as a result of the worldwide acceptance of UNCLOS 1982. To this end, Sebastian, Supriyanto, & Arsana (2014) observed the need for Indonesia to take measures in re-strategizing its diplomatic, legal, and security initiatives to face potential external maritime challenges. On the other hand, Indonesian maritime policies against illegal foreign fishing in Indonesian waters, has jeopardized the ambitions of China's Maritime Silk Road Initiative and Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum. It has also economically hurt China's fishing industry (Hongzhou, 2015). In addition, with the appearance of non-traditional maritime security problems, Indonesia should reformulate its maritime strategy (Buddy, Zarina, & Farizal, 2018).

Furthermore, the national maritime strategy of other countries and the establishment of Indonesia's national maritime strategy will support the role of naval diplomacy in the future (Marsetio, 2014). Salim (2015) also explained that since 2005, the Indonesian Navy has formulated the Nusantara Marine Defense System and continued with the formulation of the Indonesian Maritime Defense System. However, this concept is not fully supported with higher level commitment, so it cannot be used as a reference in carrying out maritime defense. Additionally, Setianegara's (2014) writing about maritime strategy on Nusantara naval and the world maritime axis, considered several factors including maritime history, environmental geopolitical order, maritime trade and energy security, maritime control, strategy on time of peace and conflict time, and strength development strategy. Others like Suropati, Sulaiman & Montratama (2016) suggested the need for Indonesia to study strategic forward defense (SFD) to face external

threats in the navy and air force sectors. This concurs with the concept of a blue water navy as practiced by the US and UK.

Hattendorf (1989) stated that although Britain and the United States held different positions in late 19th and in the 20th century, they saw a common need to take on a leadership role in controlling the basic network of bases and fleets around the world. This change was necessary to maintain a balance of power, especially against other land-based rivals. This view was strongly validated by Gough (1988) who maintained the relevance of principles founded by the two classical theorists, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Stafford Corbett. Essentially, he outlined three considerations resulting from their work; firstly, the vital economic and political aspect of sea security. Second, the need for big and small nations to take sea power seriously, and third, the rich naval lessons to be learnt from historian-strategists that need to be digested and well understood. Till (2005) also strongly advocated the application of the Mahanian and Corbettian theories, acknowledging the fact that they needed to be used in the specific contexts of the national security strategies of each country. He concluded, however, that the basic concepts of maritime strategy are universally and generally applicable (Till, 2005).

Gardner, Roskill and Gretton (2006) concluded that the traditional principles of maritime strategy were not required to make huge changes because of new technology. Britannia's role as a world police force meant that they were successful in halting the slave trade and in diminishing pirates (Gough, 1988). However, as a result of the shifts in Western Europe's balance of power, its role was also increasingly supplemented by the naval strength of Germany, Japan and the United States. As Britannia's rule over the seas since 1815 was coming to an end, the focus became who would replace Britannia's lead as well as how the direction of international affairs would be configured in the future.

From discussions about the development of maritime strategies by the American, British, Australian, Japanese, Indian, Singapore and Indonesian governments, the similarities and differences in elements of maritime strategy between maritime countries and continental countries are displayed in Table 1.

From the Table 1 it can be seen that the different elements of maritime strategy in maritime countries compared to continental countries are access, adaptive, balance, conserving and defending the exclusive economic, defence, deterrence, fishing, influence, maneuver, maritime coalition, maritime development, maritime environment, national borders' defence, naval strength, power projection, sea denial, sea dependency, technological expertise, and the methods of weapon systems in sea control.

Furthermore, from the discussion, the elements of maritime strategy in each country have similarities and differences. This can be seen in Table 2.

From Table 2, the elements of Indonesia's maritime strategy are based on suggestions from earlier research recommendations that Indonesia's maritime strategy should have elements of diplomacy, economy, sea control, maritime security, joint concepts, war and peace time, trade, forward defense, politics, and maritime history. Therefore, Indonesia needs to formulate a maritime strategy, which is in line with national interests and strategic environmental situations and by considering strategy concepts from experts or other countries that already have maritime strategies.

Conclusion

As one of the countries in the Asia Pacific, Indonesia is considered a maritime country, yet it can learn key elements for shaping its maritime strategies from continental countries such as the United States, and India, namely threats, diplomacy, economics, geography, global, sea control, maritime security, navy strength, sea

Table 1.
Elements of Maritime Strategies in Continental States vs. Maritime States

No	Maritime States (UK, Australia, Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia)	Continental States (US and India)
1.	Access	-
2.	Adaptive	-
3.	Balance	-
4.	Choke Point	Choke Point
5.	Coastal Defence	Coastal Defence
6.	Command at Sea	Command at Sea
7.	Communication	Communication
8.	Cooperation	Cooperation
9.	-	Conserving and Defending The Exclusive Economic Zone at Sea
10.	Defence	-
11.	Deterrence	-
12.	Diplomacy	Diplomacy
13.	Economy	Economy
14.	-	Fishing
15.	Global	Global
16.	Influence	-
17.	Joint	Joint
18.	Maneuver	-
19.	Maritime Coalition	-
20.	Maritime Development	-
21.	Maritime Domain	Maritime Domain
22.	Maritime Environment	-
23.	Military Value	Military Value
24.	Mobility	Mobility
25.	Naval Base	Naval Base
26.	-	National Borders' Defence
27.	-	Naval Strength
28.	Politic	Politic
29.	Power Projection	-
30.	Sea Control	Sea Control
31.	Sea Denial	-
32.	Sea Power	Sea Power
33.	Security	Security
34.	Sea Dependency	-
35.	Technological Expertise	-
36.	Threat	Threat
37.	Trade	Trade
38.	-	The Methods of Weapon Systems in Sea Control
39.	War and Peace Situation	War and Peace Situation

Source: Compiled by Authors

Table 2.
Strategy Elements According to Selected Countries

No	Element	U.S.	India	UK.	Australia	Japan	Singapore	Indonesia
1	Adaptive	-	-	✓	-	-	-	-
2	Access	-	-	✓	✓	-	-	-
3	Threat	✓	-	✓	✓	-	-	✓
4	Diplomacy	✓	-	✓	✓	-	-	✓
5	Economy	✓	-	-	✓	-	-	-
6	Geography	-	-	-	✓	-	-	-
7	Global	✓	-	✓	-	-	-	-
8	Sea Control	✓	-	✓	✓	-	-	✓
9	Maritime Security	✓	✓	✓	-	-	-	✓
10	Navy strength	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
11	Sea Power	✓	-	✓	✓	-	-	-
12	Maritime Cooperation	✓	-	✓	✓	-	✓	-
13	Balance	-	-	-	✓	-	✓	-
14	Maritime Coalition	-	-	-	-	✓	-	-
15	Communication	-	-	-	✓	-	-	-
16	Joint Concepts	✓	-	✓	✓	-	-	✓
17	Maneuver	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
18	Maritime Domain	✓	-	✓	✓	-	-	-
19	War and Peace Time	-	-	-	✓	-	-	✓
20	Method in Sea Control	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
21	Mobility	-	-	✓	✓	-	-	-
22	Value of Military	✓	-	✓	✓	-	-	-
23	Naval Base	-	-	✓	-	-	-	-
24	Deterrence	-	✓	-	-	-	-	-
25	Influence	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
26	Sea denial	-	-	✓	✓	-	-	-
27	Trade	-	-	✓	-	-	-	✓
28	Fishery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
29	Command at sea	-	-	✓	-	-	-	-
30	Sea Boundary Defense	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
31	Forward Defence	-	-	-	-	-	-	✓
32	Coastal Defence	-	✓	✓	-	-	-	-
33	Politic	✓	-	-	-	-	-	✓
34	Power Projection	-	-	✓	-	-	-	-
35	Maritime History	-	-	-	-	-	-	✓
36	Choke point	✓	✓	-	-	-	✓	-

Note:

✓ : available

- : not available

Source: Compiled by Authors

power, maritime cooperation, joint concepts, maritime domain, value of military, deterrence, coastal defence politics, and choke point. Furthermore, Indonesia also can learn from maritime states such as UK, Australia, Japan, and Singapore about several key elements on

maritime strategy particularly, adaptive, access, balance, maritime coalition, communication, war and peacetime, mobility, naval base, sea denial, trade, command at sea, and power projection. In addition, the thoughts of scholars such as Mahan, Corbett, Hattendorf, Turner, Ken Booth,

and Till, other elements of maritime strategy can be implemented by Indonesia including geography, policing, maneuver, methods in sea control, influence, fishery, technological expertise and sea boundary defense.

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