Polarization of Indonesian Society during 2014-2020: Causes and Its Impacts toward Democracy

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Abstract

Polarization was widely used in a large number of publications on Indonesian political studies from 2014 to 2020. This term particularly refers to the divisive society condition because of different political preferences. Previously, polarization is rare to use to frame Indonesian electoral competition since both parties and candidates counted on ideological spectrum. Since the personalization of politics have been flourishing recently, it drives identity to be marker when it comes to evaluating the candidates. This condition, consequently, makes the election is not merely political competition for power but emotional competition for lives. For the last six years, there were three major elections, including the 2014 Presidential Election, 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election, and 2019 Presidential Election. These three elections had a significant factor in polarizing society at that given time. They specifically referred to the two leading figures that represented the two stark political identity symbols. However, after 2018, the polarization of society itself seemed under control since the ruling regime coalitions and their social groups and allies worked together. It was meant to manage the effect of polarization and also to corner the opposition groups. While the clashes of views still exist, the situation would be worse if the 3 elections had not happened.

Introduction

One primary entry point to understanding polarization of society is the social division between nationalist/pluralist coalitions vs. hardliner Islamist coalitions. It is important to note here that the term "coalition" will not refer to political parties. Instead, the term coalition refers to the cross-alliance supporters of elites. These coalitions support elites with different socio-economic status and socio-religious orientation backgrounds. These two factors cause deepening polarization of society. Although, backgrounds would be relevant, it does not explicitly answer the differences between causes and impact on society. The underlying factors like different politics of accommodation might be relevant to understand polarization. These affect members of society to who may maintain hostile views of those with different political preferences. The Indonesian case showed elections are still an important factor that triggers polarization due to different political choices.

The research question I would like to ask is: why does different political accommodation affect polarization of society in Indonesia? What underlying factors cause polarization and its impacts on society and democracy? Here I argue that different political accommodation between two opposing groups after election has produced an envious feeling of favoritism toward certain groups. This feeling then leads to a hostile view of those people associated with supporters of the current regime and resentment of unfair economic treatment. This paper is ordered as follows: first, it discusses the

theoretical concept of polarization of political accommodation and second, it elaborates on the quantitative analysis research method. Third, the main findings will be presented followed up by the discussion section. Fourth, I will provide a summary of the paper, an overview of the gaps in the research and suggestions for further investigations.

Polarization

The consensus of the literature on polarization studies is the clear distinction between two political groups. It also basically reflects well-established political preferences and clear partisanship in society. This usually results in coalition and opposition when it comes to power affairs. However, in reality, the level of democracy also determines polarization at a country-level. For example, those advanced democratic countries are likely to have long-term polarization due to strong ideological roots, meanwhile those flawed democratic countries are likely to have short-term polarization due to certain issues and momentum (Reiljan, 2019). This different polarization situation has attracted many scholars to elaborate on various aspects of polarization.

The first school of thought on polarization is affective polarization. It states that polarisation is the political tendency of people to align themselves as adherents of a certain party and to view opposing partisans negatively and fellow partisans positively (Druckman & Levendusky, 2019; Iyengar et al, 2019). To put it simply, affective polarisation can be described as the relationship of liking other people in the same party and disliking those in the opposite party which leads to segregation of individuals and groups. Both views assume that such hostility might extend from unresolved electoral competition into non-political matters in society. It consequently results in social sorting. Furthermore, it also covers competition between complex social identities which are sorted along political lines already (Harteveld,

2019). Somehow, polarised society is able to mirror the potential election outcomes.

The summary of affective polarization is that this kind of polarisation might be suitable in flawed democratic countries. As social sorting becomes bigger than ideological lines, this encourages people to get more attached to identity politics. Affective polarisation is mostly connected with religious-secular divides, urban-rural divides, and generational divides (Lauka et al, 2018). Those three kinds of recent segregations represent the our current society and the ways in which people currently live. The impetus for affective polarisation might come from a polarised society, even if elites are not polarised.

The second school of thought is partisanship polarisation. The second approach, partisanship, believes that once people have been attached to certain ideologies, this would lead them to become a partisan by nature. This definition gives us an understanding that partisanship is a salient part of polarisation, especially in those countries who adopt a two-party system. Individuals still unconsciously use his/her political ideology in regard to how they view problems and interact with people. Partisanship is more likely to begin with an ideological commitment and then become an institution. Rogowski and Sutherland believe the polarised elites would affect the public evaluation of those officials (Rogowski & Sutherland, 2016, p. 487). Ideologies tie the knot between elites and voters when it comes political preference.

The second key of partisanship polarization after ideology is the policy preference. This causes people to maintain their loyalty or to disfavour certain parties based on their typical policy delivery (Webster & Abramowitz, 2017, p. 623–624). Policies are arguably the outcome of party ideology. This perception pragmatically causes voters to evaluate the implementation of policies rather than ideological factors.

In summary, partisanship polarisation might be suitable for advanced democratic countries. It seems that strong ideological commitment overpowers the social identity itself. More importantly, the character of polarisation would be salient only in electoral matters but might not extend to social life. These are the factors that differentiate partisanship polarisation and affective polarisation.

Polarization in Indonesia

The most important lesson learned from the elections between 2014 and 2019 is that the level of polarisation has been looming large in society. As the ideological spectrum left and right has been absent since 1965, it encourages identity to be political preferences for public. The last 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election was a witness to heated identity polarisation in public sphere. For example, neighbours refused to attend funeral services for deceased people from the other political supporter's camp. Hostile views on different believers, exclusive neighbourhood communities, and public service discrimination are currently the most common political cleavages in Indonesia (Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2018a; Muhtadi & Warburton, 2020). These three examples have resulted from the residual or remaining impact from polarisation from the last elections.

There are several recent research articles that focus on the contemporary polarisation phenomenon in Indonesia. These studies particularly refer to debates about whether it is the ideology or identity that causes polarisation. Both factors often are used interchangeably among scholars in their works. We will briefly cover these two theories and their contribution toward global polarisation studies.

Identity political-fuelled polarisation has been rampant in recent both local and national elections in Indonesia (Aspinall, 2005, p. 149–151; Aspinall, 2011, p. 297–299; Mietzner, 2019, p. 6). The Indonesian political elites often count on identity politics and set up their campaigns to bring in polarisations among citizens. In contrast to advanced democracies countries whose parties run programmatic campaign based on their identity platform, Indonesia has not relied on that kind of campaign techniques since the election in 2004. It is also important to note that conservatives and plural seculars coalition has not been the focus of campaigns or strategies since 1965. As a result, the political climate focused on identity politics and the elite's strategy to form alliances with polarising opponents further heightens the tension based on religious and ethnic divisions (Mietzner, 2019, p.7). Religious and ethnicity often serve as a vote engine for the candidates because "the cross-cutting cleavages based on religion and place of origin can be very significant politically" (Aspinall, 2011, p.293). Identities linked-religious cleavages turn larger communities into pragmatic pacts with leading politicians (Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2018b). These cleavages patterns affect the way people cast their votes. Polarisation may be created and strengthened based on political clientelism but it is also impacted by the country's identity. This overall structure, which is accepted by both citizens and the leadership results in an asymmetrical democracy. The elite, which serve a patron of identity, believe ideally in democracy procedure, whereas citizens view democracy as a means of delivering social and economic benefits (Aspinall et al., 2020, p. 514). As a result, these cleavages and distortion then create communal voting for those voters, aligning themselves with a certain socio-religious elite background. In short, identity-linked polarisation is being salient before the official date of election campaign period commences.

Ideology driven-polarisation can also become important when electorates become a bastion of certain political powers (Baswedan, 2007; Mujani & Liddle, 2010; Fossati, 2019a: 123; Fossati, 2019b; Fossati et al., 2020). This second approach rejects ethnicity arguments. Instead,

the engine of affective polarisation is religion, regionalism, and class (income) (Mujani & Liddle, 2010, p.39–40). These three sources arguably affect the public vote share and policy preference. Compared with the first approach, the ideology factors nurture people to become evaluative voters, whereby they could refer to the policy impact and party performance. They are still more likely to favour the party itself before disfavouring the other parties. From this standpoint, voters are mainly persuaded by history, geography, and also economic factors. In addition, pluralists and Islamists have made important key findings to understand Ideology driven-affective polarisation in Indonesia. The religion factor, especially Islam itself lies in the heart of these debates. Mujani and Liddle say that Islam does not merely serve as political guidelines but also norms and attitudes in society (Mujani & Liddle, 2004, p. 115). This means people have various opinions regarding how they view Islam, not only as a religion per se but also civil norms. This overlapping view can be disputed by the pluralist itself. This condition, therefore, causes some regions to identify themselves as green or red zones. For the class (income) matter, Muhtadi and Warburton argue "people's own sense of where they sit within the economic hierarchy might also shape their perception of inequality" (Muhtadi and Warburton, 2020, p. 44). Moreover, the perception of inequality is deeply polarised within partisan bias (Muhtadi & Warburton, 2020, p. 50).

The summary of polarisation studies in the Indonesian experience is the identity that may become more salient than the ideology factor. As most Indonesians are attached to one or two identities, these would make it easier for them to be a political tool rather than ideology. Identities are presumably the ideology itself. It can also be a representative of the leader itself since elites often stand for certain identities. More importantly, elites or certain interest groups, which use identities as their political symbol, serve as a patron for their fellow political followers. It means that the use of identities in shaping polarisation would be greater if the leading actor could provide benefits for those followers.

In accordance with affective polarisation, social sorting is likely the result of identity politics factors. It would cause an ingrained dispute if the sorting itself also is the result of unequal economic distributions. These could happen due to the "winner-takes-all" pattern in Indonesian politics. As a result, those elites and certain social groups will take advantage should their coalition win the election. This situation subsequently makes up voters with identity issues rather than fair electoral competition result. This biased perception, consequently, is a reason why polarisation still continues in Indonesian society.

Politics of Accommodation

The definition of accommodation itself has many various explanations. It could be principles of bargaining, cooperation, or offering consensus. These three attitudes basically describe how to determine those who are politically different from us. The terms "them" and "us" show how the impact of polarization remains in society (Kenny, 2017; Mietzner, 2020). For this condition, therefore, accommodation mitigates the polarization by giving some consensus. Consequently, it enables the power-sharing mechanism or the winner-takes-all. The former refers to an equal position between incumbent and challengers in power, while the latter refers to the incumbent successfully remaining in power by offering some incentives to the challengers. Now we will further investigate these above definitions regarding debates on this issue.

There are numerous recent research articles on politics of accommodation. This topic covers many issues that relate to how to find a middle ground among actors. It can be either short-term or long-term resolutions.

In regards to resolutions, one classic study revealed that politics of accommodation is "the lack of a comprehensive political consensus, but not the complete absence of consensus" (Barry, 1975,p.479). This definition means the agreement between incumbent and challengers should work for both parties' solution and be mutually isolated. The challengers agree to accept terms and conditions, which are offered by the incumbent, but they retain their views which are opposite from the incumbent. Most importantly, politics of accommodation is a step by step way an incumbent can embrace their rival.

One main lesson-learned value of classical study is maintaining status quo conditions without suppressing oppositions harshly. While monitoring the rivals in a mutually isolated condition, this enables the incumbent to approach rivals' followers with several concessions, particularly social and economic benefits. Regarding the status quo condition, another major task of accommodation is to foster religious conformity (Storslee, 2019, p.877). This has aimed to curb any remaining strained tones due polarization tension. Religious factors often become the primary engine of polarization. This particularly affects lower-middle class people that perceive religion as their main driving factors. To deal with this kind of polarization, it usually offers some incentives like access to state-funding. This access is meant to tackle the problem of unfairness in the economic distribution (Freeman, 2020, p. 40). In line with the above status quo condition, the social group that has access to state-funding is really important to serve as a mediator between two opposing parties. The resolution which is offered by the social group may outweigh the disputes.

The way the current regime manages these two opposing parties is likely to be part of the social arrangement. This means the regime provides a certain area where the two opposing groups can express their viewpoints (Jayasuriya, 2020,p.46). This also has the aim of providing legitimacy for current political institutions. While the current regime can corner their position in the mutual political condition, it can be a stick and carrot mechanism for the regime to carefully pick up the allies from the opposition. The regime could decide whether to pick up or banish these two opposing parties. By backing up one group through providing accommodations, it enables the regime to suppress the opposing group.

In sum, the politics of accommodation enable the regime to mediate two opposing parties in the public sphere. By offering them several political concessions, it is meant to curb any conflict that involves a large number of voters. This condition, consequently, allows the regime to recruit more allies in order to reduce the polarization effect. The emergence of certain social groups, which can cooperate with the government is important. It ensures that the regime can reduce the power of opposition. The deployment of third parties like certain social groups also shows that the government wants to be in a neutral position. As a result, the effect of polarization can be controlled by the government.

Methods

I used the quantitative research method in this paper. More specifically I would like to observe and measure two variables. This enables me to analyze the two variables and determine whether there is an empirical relationship between them. I will further explain several variables in the next sections. I will use two kinds of analysis to investigate whether there exists balanced accommodation or political favoritism. Another method is critical discourse analysis. I use this to elaborate on previous critical findings into several causal mechanisms.

The main purpose of these two analyses above is testing the theory. I intend to examine the gap of knowledge from existing literature.

It can determine whether it is possible to generate a new understanding or debate the current views on polarization studies. It is also important to note that testing the theory enables us to figure out why polarization in country A does not work out in country B. This leads us to know what leading factor might be different between case A and case B, especially in advanced vs. developing democratic countries.

Results
Data Source, Causal Mechanism and Hypotheses

The data I use in this research is derived from a country graph created by V-Dem institute from 1900 to 2020. This dataset consists of two key components, like countries and indicators. For the sake of this research, I will focus only on Indonesia during 2014-2020 and several indicators I choose are "access to state business opportunities by a social group", "freedom of discussion", "ideology", "person characteristics of the leader / personality", and "polarization of society". The reason I picked these variables was because this group of keywords represents key points of theoretical framework. I divided this group of indicators into dependent and independent variables.

According to the dataset, the range of polarization of society is between 0 and 4. More specifically, 0 means serious polarization, which results in huge contestation among political actors, 1 means moderate polarization, which means that the different views in society exist but only result in moderate clashes, 3 means limited polarization, which means there are a few different opinions in society that affects limited polarization, and 4 means no polarization at all (Ziblatt et al., 2021).

The fundamental question of access to state business opportunities by a social group is "are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of social group?" (Ziblatt et al., 2021). The answer range of access to state business

opportunities by a social group is between 0 and 4. 0 means "extreme" which means almost 75 percent of the population does not have access.... because of certain social group domination. 1 means "unequal" which shows 25 percent of the population roughly would not be able to access state business due to certain social group domination. 2 means "somewhat equal", which describes a situation in which approximately 10-25 percent of the population is not able to access state business because of a certain social group. 3 means "relatively equal", which shows only 5-10 percent of the population experiences restricted access to state business. 4 means all citizens have equal access (Ziblatt et al., 2021).

This question starts the examination of the variable of freedom of discussion "Are citizens able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?" The answer range of freedom of discussion is between 0 and 1. 0 means low expression, meanwhile 1 means high expression.

The fundamental question of ideology is "to what extent does the current government promote a specific ideology or societal model (an officially codified set of beliefs used to justify a particular set of social, political, and economic relations; for example, socialism, nationalism, religious traditionalism, etc.) in order to justify the regime in place?" (Ziblatt et al., 2021). This question provides several responses like 0: Not at all. 1: To a small extent. 2: To some extent but it is not the most important component. 3: To a large extent but not exclusively. 4: Almost exclusively (Ziblatt et al., 2021).

The main question surrounding the variable of personal characteristics of the leader is "to what extent is the Chief Executive portrayed as being endowed with extraordinary personal characteristics and/or leadership skills (e.g.as founding fathers, exceptionally heroic, moral, pious, or wise, or any other extraordinary attribute valued by the society)?" (Ziblatt et al.,

2021). Similar to ideology, this question also provides a number of responses like 0: Not at all. 1: To a small extent. 2: To some extent but it is not the most important component. 3: To a large extent but not exclusively. 4: Almost exclusively.

This range of answers basically will show us the various engagement of those dependent variables into polarisation of society in Indonesia. Here I also would like to show whether one or two might be more causal factors that affect polarisation. This aim, therefore, requires some preliminary statements that give us some basic insights on polarisation.

For the sake of causal mechanism statements, I choose "polarization of society to be the main independent variable and freedom of discussion", "ideology", "personal characteristics of the leader", "access to state business opportunities by a social group" to be dependent variables. Since polarization of society is not a single phenomenon, it could be better if we employ those several dependent variables to look at polarization in different ways. This will enable us to understand in what ways those variables cause polarization in society. There can be direct and indirect variables. To give us the basic knowledge, some causal mechanism statement would be great to help us delve into an Indonesian version of polarization.

From two literature reviews above polarization and politics of accommodation, we can draw some key issue points. Polarization itself stands to be the main independent variable. From the politics of accommodation, we can narrow it down into several variables. These include the ideologies, the leading figures, and the role of the social group. These three are worth further investigation in an Indonesian context as Indonesia does not have a strong sense of polarization. Also, I put freedom of expression as the fourth variable along with these three previously mentioned

variables. The variable freedom of expression basically shows to what extent polarization affects public perception.

In line with several variables above, I will add several causal mechanism points that enable us to understand polarization in alternative ways. The purpose of this casual mechanism is to show to what extent those dependent variables can affect the likelihood that polarization will be imminent. This also has another aim which is to show the intersection of polarization and politics accommodation in Indonesia. The goal is to learn whether one or mixed factors bring about polarization in Indonesia.

I have included several causal mechanisms that would be relevant to this research. Those causal mechanisms are: 1) the higher political accommodation people receive like access to state business will result in the strong commitment polarization, 2) the less public support for certain leaders will cause an average sense of polarization, 3) the more people get affected ideologies will end up in strong polarization feelings, and 4) the more people refuse different views, the more likely they get affected by polarization.

From these four causal mechanisms, I would like to narrow it down into four hypotheses. Each statement below corresponds to each previously mentioned causal mechanism as follows:

1) People who have loyal commitment to certain ideologies would end up with a strong sense of polarization.

2) People who identify with moderate support for certain leaders would be less likely to get affected by polarization.

3) People who greatly benefited from access to state business due to participation in a social group would be much more likely to get affected by polarization.

4) People who have a hostile view of different opinions and perspectives would be likely to end up with a strong sense of polarization.

Statistical Analysis

Before going further, I would like to separate political accommodation factors into two major groups: material and non-material. The purpose of this division would enable us to further find out whether money or thoughts would be effective accommodation in mediating polarisation. For the sake of this analysis, I put several accommodation factors such as "access to state business opportunities by a social group" and "personal characteristics of the leader" within material accommodation, meanwhile "ideology" and "freedom of expression" fall within non-material accommodation. By separating those dependent variables into two groups, it enables us to run a bivariate analysis between each accommodation group and polarization. After that, I ran a multivariate analysis between all accommodation factors and polarization.

This allows us to know the different levels of affection between one independent variable and several dependent variables.

The first thing to do is run two bivariate analyses. As I previously mentioned, running bivariate analysis enables us to see different effects of two accommodation factors towards polarization. To begin with, my analysis will get started with non-material accommodation factors.

The first graph above shows the interaction between two dependent variables "freedom of discussion" and "ideology" and the main independent variable, "polarisation of society". In general, Indonesia underwent a moderate polarisation between 2014 and 2020 because of the increasing role of ideology and average level of freedom of discussion. As shown in the first graph above, the green line, which corresponds to "polarisation of society"

Graph 1.
Interaction between non-material accommodation factors and polarization of society

Source: V-Dem [Indonesia/2014-2020] Dataset v11.1

steadily increased from 2014 to 2019. At the same time, the variable "freedom of discussion" interacted with "polarisation of society" in 2019. The former variable showed a flat position between 0 and 1 between 2014 and 2019. This interaction basically showed that people could not engage in any kind of political discussion at home, workplace, and even neighbourhood environment as the current government seemed to promote a certain ideology into the policymaking process.

According to the statistical results, while there is no direct interaction between "ideology" and "polarisation of society" between 2014 and 2020, it looks like both underwent a significant increase rate after 2018. As shown in the first graph above, there was a steady increase from 2018 to 2019 onward for the variable "polarisation of society "from around 0.5 to 1 between 2018 to 2019 and then it increased significantly after 2019. This showed polarisation of society in Indonesia had shifted from moderate to medium polarisation, which was marked by clashes of public view, particularly political issues. In line with polarisation, the latter variable "ideology" had increased from approximately 1.5 (2018-2019) to 2 (2019-onward). This showed that, both "polarisation of society" and "ideology" were not significantly correlated after 2018 in Indonesia. However, both underwent a significant jump after 2018.

The lesson learned from the first bivariate interaction here is the current government appeared to embrace one ideology in mediating polarisation of society. As the freedom of discussion got limited expressions, particularly for those oppositions, from 2018 to 2019, the government wanted to ensure that there was no hostile view of policies in society. This intention, therefore, prompted the government to promote a certain ideology to tackle other ideologies that might create opposition to the government. As a result, the way the government accommodated the

oppositions was by imposing a certain ideology on them. This subsequently affects the level of polarisation of society. Previously Indonesia had a serious ideological polarisation, which corresponded to 0 then changed, becoming moderate polarisation, at a value of 1. In a nutshell, imposing certain ideology is meant to reduce polarisation of society in Indonesia.

Moving on to material accommodation factors towards polarization, I would like to run the second bivariate analysis between one main independent variable, "polarisation of society" and two independent variables: "access to state business opportunities by a social group" and "personal characteristics of the leader". The variables' interaction will show in this second graph below.

According to graph 2, the second bivariate analysis generally shows the polarisation of society tends to be lower as the personalisation of the leader gets stronger and leads to unequal access to state business due to domination of a certain social group. These general finding is similar to previous bivariate analysis that shows the "serious" polarisation of society seems to no longer exist, particularly after 2019.

Similar to the first bivariate analysis, the second one shows only one dependent variable, "access to state business opportunities by a social group" interacted with the main independent variable "polarisation of society" after 2019. Interestingly, there was an interaction between two dependent variables: "access to state business opportunities by a social group" and "personal characteristics of the leader" in the middle of 2018 and 2019. This other interaction gives us a puzzle to solve to determine why Indonesian polarisation did not get attached to the personal characteristics of the leader.

As shown in graph 2 above, the second bivariate analysis shows that the level of polarisation of society had shifted from "serious" and then became "moderate" levels from 2018 and onwards. The reason behind this trend might be due to more consolidated pro government

Graph 2.
Interaction between material accommodation factors and polarization of society

Indonesia

Access to state business opportunities by social group
Person of the leader
Polarization of society

Highcharts.com | V–Dem data version 11.0

Source: V-Dem [Indonesia/2014-2020] Dataset v11.1

allies after gaining more power accommodations. It points out the steady increase from around 0.5 in 2018 to 1 after 2019. This finding is basically similar to the previous bivariate analysis. This positive trend of lowering polarisation, however, seemed to get significant help from "access to state business opportunities by a social group" after 2019. The graph 2 above shows the variable "access to state business opportunities by a social group" was in a flat position between 2014 and 2019, which reached a value at 1.5. This position means the people that were outside of the appointed social group got "somewhat equal" access to state business. As of 2019, the variable line gradually dropped down to 1 or lower. This decreasing line basically signalled "unequal" access to outsiders in order to get access to state business.

While the business variable interacted with polarisation in 2019, the latter interaction between "personal characteristics of the leader" and polarisation were not correlated between 2014 and 2020. However, it seems that both variables had significant interactions after 2020. As shown in graph 2 above, the green line, which corresponds to "polarisation of society" and the red line, which corresponds to "personal characteristics of the leader" appeared to be closely connected sometime in 2020.

Regardless of having no direct interaction, the interaction between two dependent variables, "personal characteristics of the leader" and "access to state business opportunities by a social group" gives us an alternative view of polarisation. As I mentioned earlier, this puzzling relationship resulted in the more consolidated power in the personal characteristics of the leader. Most importantly, when polarisation is controlled, it culminated

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in the rising rate of leader because he / she was able to put his/her followers within some state business enterprises. These statistical findings surely need further clarification in the discussion section.

The lesson learned from the second bivariate interaction here is the way the current regime is managing polarisation by giving broad opportunities for their social group allies to get into state business. By this means, the regime can be able to economically suppress the dissidents and their followers. This intention, consequently, enforces the oppositions to lower their tone against the current regime.

From the result of bivariate analyses, we can agree / disagree with several previously mentioned hypotheses. For example, we likely agree with H3, which says "people who greatly benefit from access to state business from the social group would be much more likely get affected polarization". In reality, those people who identity as the government's supporters have great access to state business. At the same time, we disagree with H1, which says, "people who have a loyal commitment to certain ideologies would end up with a strong sense of polarization". In reality, the current regime itself instead consists of people who promote a certain ideology within the policymaking process. This intention also shows winner-takes-all positions for the winner of the election to highlight their own ideologies rather than embrace other ideologies. It can subsequently attract his/her followers to get into several strategic positions, particularly state business. At this stage, we can argue that money and thoughts work together to reduce effects of polarisation. These statements about the results of the bivariate analysis are worth investigating into multivariate analysis.

Turning to multivariate analysis, it includes all the dependent variables in the same vein with the main independent variable "polarisation of society". Overall, there are similarities and differences between the results of bivariate and multivariate analyses. One main striking finding here is the variable, "access to state business opportunities by a social group" and its active interaction with several dependent variables, exceptionally "freedom of discussion" which is engaged to polarisation itself. For the comprehensive information, please see the graph 2 below.

In general, the result of multivariate analysis shows the effect of "polarisation of society" had shifted from "serious polarisation" to "moderate polarisation". As shown in the graph 2, the score was around 0.5 between 2014 and 2018 and then increased to around 1.5 in 2020. This movement basically showed that people toned down the different opinions regarding political issues in society. While the clashes of views still remain, it is unlikely to create worse conditions since the current regime consolidated its power after 2019 and beyond. The clashes of views are more concerned about unbalanced power sharing a relationship between the current regime and its oppositions. As a result, there were many politicised issues in the public sphere from 2014 to 2018.

Unlike two previous bivariate analyses that showed ideology / thoughts and access to state business / money were the key to manage polarisation of society in Indonesia, the multivariate analysis showed the variable "access to state business opportunities by a social group" played a decisive role in managing polarisation of society between 2014 and 2020. At the beginning, the score of the variable "access to state" had been in a flat position, at a value of 1.5 from 2014 to 2019. However, in 2016, the variable "access to state" coincidentally correlated with "ideology" and was connection to "person of leader" in between 2018 and 2019. These two interactions basically showed that the ideological / elite factor did not directly affect the polarisation of society. Instead, two factors seemed to strengthen "access to state business opportunities by a social group" so

Graph 3.
Interaction between all dependent variable factors and polarization of society

Indonesia

Legend:
- Access to state business opportunities by social group
- Freedom of discussion
- Ideology
- Person of the leader
- Polarization of society

Highcharts.com | V–Dem data version 11.0

Source: V-Dem [Indonesia/2014-2020] Dataset v11.1

that it could control "polarisation of society in Indonesia.

From the multivariate analysis, we can agree or disagree with previously mentioned variables. For example, we reject H2, which says "people who identify with moderate support for certain leaders would be less likely to get affected by polarization". In reality, there was no proof that the direct influence of the leader's personal characteristics would be likely to shape polarisation since the variable, "personal characteristics of the leader" did not significantly correlate to polarisation from 2014 at least until 2019. Similar to H1, we reject H4, which says, "people who have a hostile view of different opinions and/or perspectives would end up with a strong sense of polarization". In reality, the freedom of discussion itself was terminated in 2019 when the winner of the election assumed power. Lastly, we also

refuse H1, which says, people who have a loyal commitment to certain ideologies would end up with a strong sense of polarization. According to graph 3 above, the ideological factor did not have a direct influence on polarisation of society. Instead, it only interacted with another dependent variable, "access to business opportunities by social group". This finding is like the second bivariate analysis but disagrees with the first bivariate analysis that said the current regime promotes a certain ideology as the way to tackle polarisation.

Regardless of having no interaction with three previously mentioned variables, the remaining variable, "access to state business opportunities by a social group" at least had an interactive relationship with the polarisation of society. Following up on the above-mentioned statistical results, as polarisation gets under control, especially after 2019, the access to

state business gets restricted because it has been occupied by a certain social group. This finding certainly gives us two preliminary answers here. First, the social group who was affiliated with the current regime has broad opportunities to get access to state business. This signals a political reciprocity for the regime to certain social groups because they helped out the ruling coalition in managing the polarisation of society. Second, the social group and the ruling government are on friendly ideological terms. This enables them to work together to promote certain ideologies within the policymaking process. I will elaborate on these two preliminary answers for statistical analysis in the discussion section.

Discussion

Let us return to the research question: why does different political accommodation affect the polarization of society in Indonesia? More specifically, what underlying factors cause polarization and its impact on society and democracy? According to the results of the multivariate analysis, I have two preliminary findings to provide answers.

1) the social group who was affiliated with the current regime has broad opportunities to get access to state business.
2) the social group and the ruling government are on friendly ideological terms which enables them to participate in the policymaking process in Indonesia.

Following up on the above-mentioned data analysis results, there are two explanations to further elaborate. The first data analysis preliminary finding shows that when government picks up a certain influential social group, especially a traditionalist Islam group, it has an aim to corner the opposition group because the latter actor does not want to cooperate with the ruling elite coalition. This intention is closely related to the ongoing inter-Islamic rivalry in Indonesia. Moreover,

the opposition and their followers still have a hostile view of the government. This condition prompts the government to use a stick and carrot tactic through their social group allies to suppress the opposition. As a result, clashes of views are still omnipresent, especially those supporters of opposition who did not receive political accommodation from the ruling government.

The second preliminary finding from the data analysis shows that polarisation may bind together the ruling government coalition and their social group allies with good ideological terms. While the government coalition and certain social groups might have different ideological stances, they agreed to put aside their different ideological positions for a while because they have opponents that became their "common foe" (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019). This possibility might appear to achieve consolidated power. This political common ground happens when the opposition uses their identity to mobilise people in order to delegitimate ruling elites. This condition requires that the social group and the ruling government issue some policies that restricted the opposition. As a result, this affects people who are affiliated with the opposition group. For example, it may restrict them from speaking up for political issues in the public sphere.

My two data analysis findings above certainly need to be compared with findings from previous literature reviews in regard to previous polarisation studies in Indonesia. My research findings show that the effect of polarisation of society did not deteriorate after 2019 since the ruling regime and a certain social group worked together to curb polarisation tension. This claim, therefore, enables me to disagree with previously mentioned findings concerning both identity-fuelled polarisation and ideological-driven polarisation. Instead, the polarisation itself is driven by mutual interests of the government and the social group which caused the lack of accommodation

to the opponents. As a result, it contributed to further nurturing of polarisation in society. The Joko Widodo administration has been closely working with many social group organisations like the biggest Islamic organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama and his groups of *relawan* (political volunteer) (Fossati et al., 2020; Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2018b). These two main social groups had primary tasks to deal with some of the government's oppositions like former conservative Islamic group, *Front Pembela Islam* (Front of Islamic Defender) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. These two latter organisations had been well-known for their anti-Jokowi campaigns. To tackle these two organisations, the ruling regime dissolved them both in 2016 and 2019. This policy reflects the fact that the freedom of discussion was terminated in 2019 after the ruling regime ascended to throne. While FPI itself was dissolved in 2020, the freedom of discussion was not protected in reality since the government uses illiberal strategies like monitoring social media to curb polarisation of society (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019). This policy has the impact of lowering trends of government dissidents and increasing the role of government allies.

Regarding politics of accommodation, my findings show that the importance of influential social groups is required to help deal with polarisation. The role of social groups in gathering public support and mediating tension with dissidents helped the ruling regime (Storslee, 2019). As their rewards, many of Joko Widodo's leading supporters have occupied many strategic state businesses(Aji & Dartanto, 2018; Setijadi, 2021). This action seems to suggest a stick and carrot mechanism for those loyalists their opposition. While the loyalists get fully accommodated state service, the opposition itself has nothing to do due to lack of economic and political supports. As a result, the polarisation of society is kept under control.

Conclusion

The causes of the polarization of Indonesian society between 2014 and 2020 regarding democracy emphasised the accommodated and unaccommodated political groups. They have impacts on the identity rivalries in society, especially pro-government and opposition factions. As a result, these rivalries resulted in so called polarisation in Indonesia.

The polarisation had been persistent in Indonesian politics between 2014 and 2020. However, the effect of polarisation seemed to decrease particularly after 2018. This showed the polarisation between coalitions and oppositions was not going to get worse as many scholars predicted. Both the government and social groups maintain a firm line especially in ideology or identity-driven factors since the former needs support from the latter in grass-roots level. The oppositions can gain power if the ruling elites offer them political accommodations. Giving political accommodation, especially access to state business, seemed to be the primary key in managing polarisation. Here the ruling regime appointed some influential social groups to deal with oppositions in the public sphere. The economic and political supports enable social groups to curb the effect of polarisation. More importantly, it subsequently was prevented the opposition from being able to criticize the government, prevented the opposition from criticizing the government the government.

While the way of handling polarisation can also be considered an authoritarian tactic and an illiberal movement, this action seems to consolidate power in the ruling regime and its allies. Through access to state business, it attracts the public to be part of the government's supporters. As a result, the clashes of view on key political issues can be kept under control by the ruling regime and its social groups' allies. The current pandemic situation seems to be a blessing in disguise that enormously supports the government to handle the crisis.

This situation, therefore, strengthens the power of the regime to deal with oppositions.

The gap in this study's findings includes other political accommodations that might be suitable to manage polarisation of society. This can contribute to further research for those scholars who might also be interested in studying Indonesian politics following the 2019 election.

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