

Warfare to Welfare: How Social Identity Supports the Political Business of the Former Free Aceh Movement

Vellayati Hajad¹, Cut Maya Aprita Sari²

¹ Department of Public Administration at Universitas Teuku Umar, Indonesia.

² Department of Political Science, Universitas Syiah Kuala, Banda Aceh, Indonesia.

(Corresponding author: cutmayaapritasari@usk.ac.id)

Abstract

This study critically examines how former members of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) transformed their collective social identity into political and economic capital in post-conflict Aceh. Drawing on social identity theory (SIT) and sociocognitive processes, it challenges prevailing reintegration narratives that emphasise disassociation from militant pasts. Instead, it finds that former GAM members deliberately retained and mobilised their rebel identity to gain legitimacy, patronage, and access to state resources. The study identifies three internal identity trajectories: the “ruling group”, which converted its identity into formal political power; the “contractor group”, which leveraged political ties to access state-funded economic projects; and the “common society group”, which remained socially and economically marginalised. This stratification reveals that identity transformation does not uniformly lead to welfare gains. While existing studies often frame ex-combatant reintegration as a linear transition toward civilian life, this study argues that identity retention—rather than abandonment—can be a strategic pathway to upward mobility. However, this process is uneven. Enabling factors, such as provisions within the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), the institutional structure of the Aceh Transition Committee (KPA), and the symbolic value of the GAM identity, supported elite access. In contrast, constraining factors, including limited economic diversification, dependency on political patronage, and exclusionary practices, prevented broader benefit-sharing among lower-tier members. By exposing the unequal outcomes of identity-based transformation, this study critiques assumptions of uniform reintegration success and offers a differentiated lens for understanding post-conflict access and inequality.

Keywords:

social identity; Free Aceh Movement; political business; welfare; sociocognitive processes

Introduction

The Free Aceh Movement (GAM; *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*) is a liberation group that aims to separate Aceh from Indonesia. This movement was founded in December 1976, born from historical grievances against the centralised Indonesian government. A prolonged war between GAM and the Indonesian government lasted until 2005, when a series of negotiations culminated in the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) peace agreement signed by both parties (Sari et al., 2023). The Peace Agreement has since significantly impacted

Aceh's socio-political and economic conditions. One of its most significant provisions granted Aceh the authority to form local political parties, allowing them to compete with national parties in general elections. Former GAM members leveraged this opportunity to integrate into regional governance by establishing local parties. In the first post-conflict election, these local parties dominated the vote compared to national parties. This victory paved the way for former combatants to assume strategic political positions in Aceh's post-conflict government, including roles such as governor, deputy

governor, and members of the regional people's representative council (Andriyani, 2017; Hajad & Susetiawan, 2022).

However, the transformation of ex-combatants did not stop at formal political appointments. In practice, many also moved into careers as contractors, entrepreneurs, and influential local brokers. This shift reflects a pragmatic strategy for economic survival and continued relevance following the cessation of armed conflict and the broader political transformation in Aceh (Aspinall, 2009; Kingsbury, 2010). Such economic ventures often emerged from networks established during the insurgency that were repurposed in peacetime to secure access to state resources and development projects. While these transformations are critical in understanding the post-conflict landscape, the multidimensional trajectories of ex-combatants—spanning politics, business, and informal influence—remain underexplored in academic literature.

These patterns of transformation form the core argument of this paper: that the reintegration of former combatants into civilian life in Aceh was not merely a process of political inclusion but also a strategic reconfiguration of power through economic means. The shift from armed struggle to entrepreneurship and political brokerage shows how ex-combatants adapted their wartime networks and symbolic capital into tools for post-conflict accumulation and influence. Their roles in business and governance are deeply intertwined, often mutually reinforcing. This interdependence becomes particularly evident when closely examining how the presence of former GAM figures in government has enabled others from the same network to access and dominate economic opportunities in the region.

This network-based access to economic power is not merely incidental. Rather, it forms the basis for what can be understood as a post-conflict political economy shaped by shared identity and mutual support among former

combatants. The embeddedness of ex-GAM actors in state institutions and local markets illustrates how the boundaries between public authority and private interest become blurred. It is within this context that the following section elaborates on the concrete ways former GAM members have mobilised their symbolic and political capital to establish business ventures. These are especially prominent in strategic sectors such as construction, import-export, and post-disaster reconstruction, highlighting the continuity of power through informal networks and economic control.

The presence of former GAM members within Aceh's government has facilitated access for other ex-combatants to engage in political business ventures. They leverage their shared social identity as "former liberation movement members" to influence each other in securing business opportunities. Notable enterprises owned by former GAM figures include export-import projects, steel production for post-tsunami reconstruction, and the construction industry (Manan et al., 2022; Nirzalin et al., 2023; Sari et al., 2023). Among these, construction is the most prevalent sector for former GAM figures. The history of the Aceh War is inextricably linked to the development of GAM's military and civilian structures. After the peace agreement, ex-combatants were compelled to resume ordinary lives, requiring assurances of stable and reliable resources. However, many lacked the necessary skills for survival outside a conflict environment. As a result, many of them turned to politics or contracting as a means of livelihood (Ikramatoun et al., 2019; Murziqin, 2016; Sari et al., 2020; Stange & Patock, 2010).

This research focuses on the social identity of former GAM and its connection to the business opportunities they obtained after the 2005 peace agreement. The background to this phenomenon shows two anomalies. First, while much previous research on social identity and conflict indicates that former combatants often

attempt to shed their wartime identities to gain societal acceptance (Cuénoud González & Clémence, 2019a; Gluecker et al., 2022; Guerrero et al., 2021; Lancaster et al., 2018), the Aceh case shows the opposite. After the war, former GAM members continued using their social identities to attain certain positions in the political world and to ease access to political business, thereby improving their welfare. Second, this study focuses specifically on the political businesses of former GAM members in the state-funded construction sector. The aim is to demonstrate that after the peace agreement, some former GAM members who originally rebelled against the state instead sought and obtained business facilities from the state while continuing to use the group's social identity as rebels.

These counterintuitive developments from GAM, where a rebel identity is maintained to secure societal influence while pursuing state-derived economic opportunities, represent intriguing phenomena explored through the following research questions: "How do former GAM members frame their social identity when accessing political business?" and "To what extent does the political business operated by former GAM members impact their welfare?" These questions are analysed using social identity theory, particularly the foundational work of Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1986), along with contributions from other scholars (Brown, 2000; Hogg, 2016; Huddy, 2001; Stets & Burke, 2000; Wessells, 2016). The analysis also incorporates three social cognitive processes relevant to social identity. This study defines "former GAM" members as individuals who participated in the Free Aceh Movement, including both military and civilian members. It encompasses those who fought during the conflict, those who surrendered during it, or those who surrendered after the established peace agreement (Chaidar & Sahrasad, 2013).

This research begins by discussing social identity from a theoretical perspective, reviewing recent literature, and identifying

gaps that will be filled by this study. A methodological note provides an overview of how the research was designed, structured, and analysed. Descriptions of primary and secondary data are presented in three themes, namely expansion of social identity into political identity, from bullets to business, and debating the welfare of former GAM members in Aceh. The final subchapter analyses the socio-cognitive processes of former GAM political business through the lens of social identity theory.

Social Identity: Theory, Recent Studies, and Gaps

Social identity theory (SIT) originated from a series of studies conducted by the social psychologist Henri Tajfel and his colleagues in the early 1970s. One of their most influential investigations is known as the minimal-group studies (Tajfel et al., 1971). In this research, participants were assigned to groups on an arbitrary and meaningless basis. Group members are then asked to allocate points to the other members. It was found that group members systematically awarded more points to those within their own group than to outsiders. This was interpreted as evidence that merely categorising individuals into groups, however arbitrarily, was able to foster a sense of belonging and partisanship.

Building on this, Tajfel (1982) explored how individuals interpret their position in various social contexts and how this shapes their perceptions and behaviour towards others. He and his colleagues eventually developed a model showing how identity-related motivations can predict a tendency for intergroup discrimination. Thus, SIT stems from the premise that group membership is integral to how individuals define themselves and structure their relations with others (Tajfel & Turner, 2004).

SIT is an integrative theory that links cognitive processes and behavioural motivation.

Social identity can therefore be defined as a dynamic aspect of self-concept, derived from perceived membership in a social group and shaped by situational and societal influences (Wessells, 2016). The theory posits that group members derive self-esteem from their affiliations. They tend to conform to the norms, values, beliefs, and behaviours of their group (Hogg, 2016) and may allocate more resources to the in-group to accentuate its distinctiveness from out-groups. SIT fundamentally explains how individuals navigate their social world by creating and internalising an “in-group” versus “out-group” categorisation.

SIT delineates three socio-cognitive processes. First, “self-categorisation” involves people classifying themselves and others into social groups based on specific criteria. Individuals perceived as similar are categorised as the in-group, while those perceived as different become the out-group. Second, “social identification” occurs when individuals adopt the identity of their group, investing emotionally and adapting their behaviour to align with this membership. Third, “social comparison” entails seeking positive values by comparing one’s group favourably against other groups to result in greater appreciation for their membership. These processes lead to behaviours and attitudes consistent with in-group identity, including stereotyping perceptions and an emphasised differentiation between in-group and out-group members (Stets & Burke, 2000). The status of a group reflects its value to the individual; sometimes, the evaluation of groups is based not on an absolute standard but rather on social comparisons with other groups along valued dimensions (Tajfel & Turner, 2004). Brown (2000) further notes that self-categorisation and social comparison have adverse effects, such as biases towards out-groups, and that perceptions of intragroup homogeneity can be diminished through increased contact and exposure to out-group members.

Studies on social identity and war have been extensive, including those concerning liberation movements affiliated with certain ethnicities in several countries. Examples include the Moro Muslim movement in the Philippines (Özerdem et al., 2010); Kashmiri independence groups (Tremblay et al., 1996); the Scottish Nationalist Party separatist movement in Scotland (Abrams et al., 2020; Abrams & Grant, 2012); and the Basque separatist movement in Spain (Dekker et al., 2003; Martinovic et al., 2011). Studies of social identities associated with liberation movements show that social identities are used to mobilise, function, and develop (Latif et al., 2021; Schulz, 2016).

Social identity frameworks are also employed to analyse recruitment processes in facilitating war. For instance, Kfir's (2016) study found that social identity has been instrumental in recruiting Somali people to the Al-Shabaab radical Islamic jihadi movement. On the other hand, Tezcur (2020) identified patriarchy and social identity as factors driving the recruitment of Kurdish women fighters. Wessells (2016) linked social identity to the recruitment of child soldiers, arguing that children whose parents hold a combatant identity are more likely to adopt the same social identity. Social identity processes, combined with a history of violence and oppression, can propel children into becoming soldiers.

Social identity theory is also frequently employed to analyse the attitudes and behaviours of former combatants during reintegration. In post-conflict settings, social identity significantly shapes a society's acceptance of ex-combatants. This dynamic operates like two sides of a coin. If members of an armed group successfully disengage from their former affiliation, a new social identity can form, thereby aiding reintegration. Conversely, if individuals maintain their old identity, they risk recidivism (Kaplan & Nussio, 2018a, 2018b). Several studies focusing on veterans'

social identity (Demers, 2011; Guerrero et al., 2021; Lancaster et al., 2018; Smith & True, 2014) find that a veteran's social identity heavily influences their reintegration experience. Many veterans report difficulties in reintegrating, often feeling their veteran identity clashes with civilian culture.

A similar pattern is observed in the civilian acceptance of former Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) guerrilla group members, which has been examined by multiple researchers. Even though the armed conflict occurred 60 years ago, the persistent social identity of FARC combatants led to stigma, social rejection, and increased disintegration. This made the reintegration process exceptionally challenging, leading many ex-combatants to adopt defensive strategies, such as concealing their past identities (Cuénoud González & Clémence, 2019b; Gluecker et al., 2022; Stein, 2015).

Social identity is also crucial in understanding post-war societies. Previous studies demonstrate a link between group dynamics and individual behaviour after conflict. War often fractures societies; in its aftermath, social identity shapes how individuals perceive themselves. This self-conception can facilitate ex-combatants' social interactions, potentially easing reconciliation or, alternatively, perpetuating tensions (Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006). Post-war group identities frequently become rigid, reinforcing boundaries between "us" and "them" through strong in-group or out-group identification. An early study by Brewer (1999) explained the psychological mechanisms behind this intergroup bias. Through such identities, groups perceiving themselves as war victims may continually compare their fate with that of other groups (Noor et al., 2008). This process of comparison is characterised by Bar-Tal (2013) and Psaltis et al. (2017) as an obstacle to reconciliation. When collective narratives,

memories, and social identities are wrapped in persistent negative comparisons, they can sustain intergroup mistrust and a sense of threat between groups.

Furthermore, research linking SIT to post-war studies offers a solution to reconciliation through "reshaping" social identities into "superordinate identities". This is considered a key strategy for minimising intergroup bias. Members of conflicting groups are encouraged to perceive themselves as part of a larger, inclusive collective. This sense of shared, overarching group membership can reduce hostile biases (Ferguson & McKeown, 2016; Gaertner et al., 2000; Noor et al., 2008; Reimer et al., 2022).

Previous studies have shown that SIT has been applied across diverse contexts. In some research, it is analysed as a mobilisation tool for liberation movements, such as the Moro Muslim struggle, the Kashmir independence group, the Scottish Nationalist Party, and the Basque separatist movement (Barter, 2024). SIT also explains recruitment drivers for armed groups like Al-Shabaab, Kurdish women fighters, and child soldiers. In post-conflict studies, SIT reveals the challenges former combatants face during societal reintegration. These studies on post-war reconciliation and persistent tensions offer the concept of superordinate identities as a solution to intergroup bias.

Despite addressing these varied aspects, studies on the integration of SIT in various phenomena show several research gaps: first, the current literature generally focuses on the challenges of transitioning from combatant identity to civilian life or on reconciliation rather than the strategic utilisation of their former combatant identity for political gain in a post-conflict, welfare-oriented context. Second, while previous literature broadly discusses "social identity" and its role in conflict and post-conflict scenarios, the term "political business", as offered by this study, has never been studied, thus requiring specific grounding within the

social identity framework. Third, although post-conflict studies suggest that social identity can be reshaped into superordinate identities for reconciliation, they do not deeply explore social identity's dynamic and adaptive nature when former combatants transition to a political business landscape. This study aims to fill these gaps, with implications for theoretical development. In particular, it seeks to advance theory on how the social identity of former GAM members directly facilitates political business, which in turn contributes to their welfare.

This study uses SIT to analyse the cognitive processes undergone by former GAM members, which ultimately facilitate their access to political business. As SIT connects cognitive processes with behavioural motivation, the embedded social identity of former GAM members can be considered as providing strong motivation, which can drive them to transform this identity into tangible access to political roles and political business. This motivation may not only stem from personal gain but also from the desire to maintain legitimacy and ensure continued influence in the post-conflict landscape. The cognitive processes of self-categorisation (as a legitimate stakeholder), social identification (with a cohesive inner-group network), and social comparison (affirming moral and

historical superiority) trigger this motivation, creating a drive to secure resources and power. Thus, this process can reinforce their new civil-political roles.

Methods

This research uses qualitative methods with primary and secondary data collection. Primary data was gathered through in-depth interviews with 12 informants. Informants were selected using purposive sampling, which involves identifying individuals with specific knowledge relevant to the research problem. Three criteria guided the selection: first, the informant must possess direct knowledge of the subject; second, they must be willing to participate in an interview; and third, they should be able to provide perspectives from varied angles (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). Based on these criteria, informants were chosen from among former GAM members who hold political positions or are engaged in political business ventures in Aceh. To protect their privacy, the informants are listed anonymously in Table 1.

Interviews were conducted face-to-face and through WhatsApp. The main questions asked were: (1) What is the role of former GAM members in Aceh's post-peace economy and politics? (2) Why did you choose that particular role? and (3) How do you seek out

Table 1.
List of Informants

No	Informant	Date of Interview	Role
1.	Inf-01	5 March 2023	Member of Parliament (2014-2019)/Contractor
2.	Inf-02	2 March 2022	Mayor of Sabang City (2007-2012)/Non-contractor
3.	Inf-03	19 June 2023	Commander of GAM Simeulue (1998-2005)/Contractor
4.	Inf-04	4 March 2023	Member of Parliament (2019-2024)/Contractor
5.	Inf-05	9 June 2022	Member of Parliament (2019-2024)/Contractor
6.	Inf-06	10 July 2022	Head of Regency (2017-2022)/Contractors
7.	Inf-07	19 June 2023	GAM Spokesperson (2018-2019)/Non-contractor
8.	Inf-08	28 May 2023	Chairman of KPA (2020-2023)/Contractor
9.	Inf-09	8 December 2022	Chairman of Parliament (2009-2014)/Contractor
10.	Inf-10	12 June 2022	Peace Actor/Non-contractor
11.	Inf-11	6 March 2023	Member of KPA/Non-contractor
12.	Inf-12	7 July 2023	Member of KPA/Non-contractor

Source: Processed by author (2024)

business opportunities? Interviews also applied probing techniques to elicit more detailed and analytically valuable responses, allowing for deeper exploration of the narratives.

Secondary data was collected from textual sources, including books, magazines, newspapers, official documents, and academic journals. In this study, primary and secondary data hold equally essential and complementary positions. The collected data were analysed by adapting the procedural steps outlined by Taylor et al. (2016) and Wichmann (2017), as follows: (1) Documentation of all primary and secondary data; (2) Organisation of the data; (3) Categorisation of data through a thematic process. Transcriptions were used to trace interpretations and ideas, forming several distinct themes. Based on this process, we found three emergent themes: the extension of social identity into political identity, the shift from bullets to business, and debating welfare. (4) Theoretical analysis was then conducted to address the research questions.

Results

The Extension of Social Identity into Political Identity

The peace agreement signed in 2005 between the Government of Indonesia and GAM marked a crucial turning point, formally ending nearly three decades of armed conflict in Aceh. This agreement not only brought an end to violence but also opened up pathways for the transformation of former combatants' social identities. The transition from armed rebellion to peace created a space where former GAM members could renegotiate their place in society, including by not shedding their identity as rebels but by strategically maintaining it.

In contrast to reintegration patterns observed in other post-conflict contexts, where former combatants typically distance themselves from their wartime identities to be accepted back into society (Cuénoud

González & Clémence, 2019a; Lancaster et al., 2018), former GAM members in Aceh actively maintained and extended their wartime identity. Although physically indistinguishable from civilians, many deliberately retain the label of "former GAM" because it grants them symbolic capital, legitimacy, and access to political networks. This identity allows them to secure strategic advantages within local patronage systems, gain influence, and access political and economic opportunities (Azwar et al., 2023; Young, 2020).

Such strategic adaptation aligns with key aspects of social identity theory, particularly the ideas of Tajfel and Turner (1979), who argue that individuals derive a positive self-concept from group membership and may emphasise this identity when it offers instrumental or status-related benefits. In Aceh, the social identity of being "former GAM" evolved into a political identity associated with power, legitimacy, and access to state resources. This shift demonstrates how identity can be maintained and reshaped to serve political and economic interests, illustrating identity salience and social mobility strategies in a post-conflict society.

Economically, many former GAM members faced significant challenges after the war, including a lack of stable employment and limited marketable skills. In response, they leveraged the political opportunities offered by the 2005 Helsinki MoU, specifically Clause 1.2.1, which permitted the establishment of local political parties in Aceh (Amirulkamar & Ismail, 2019; Budiatri, 2022; Sari et al., 2024a; Sari & Khalid., 2025). This clause aimed to integrate former combatants into the democratic process under the framework of the Unitary State of Indonesia while fostering prosperity for the people of Aceh (Prasojo & Pabbajah, 2020). As a result, former GAM members established local political parties, most notably the Aceh Party (PA; Partai Aceh) and the Nanggroe Aceh Party (PNA; Partai Nanggroe Aceh),

as vehicles to pursue formal political power. Since Aceh's first post-conflict elections in 2006, many former GAM figures have occupied influential positions, including governor, deputy governor, and other strategic political roles (Andriyani, 2017; Hajad & Ikhsan, 2019; Sari et al., 2023).

The integration of former GAM members into Aceh's post-war society also occurred through various institutional roles. Apart from their involvement in PA and PNA, many joined the Aceh Transition Committee (KPA; Komite Peralihan Aceh), legislative and executive bodies, and the business sector (Hamid, 2012; Ridhwan et al., 2022; Stange & Patock, 2010). The KPA, established to oversee demobilisation and reintegration, mirrors the wartime structure of GAM by maintaining territorial organisation across 17 regions led by former commanders and elites. This organisational continuity helped ensure that GAM's influence remained structured and did not become fragmented or disruptive following the peace accord (Törnquist, 2011). Furthermore, the KPA played a key role in facilitating the formation of local political parties, acting as a transitional platform for former rebels to shift their resistance efforts and channel them into formal politics (Ansori,

2012).

In the post-peace agreement period, this research identified three distinct groups among former GAM members: (1) The ruling group, referring to people affiliated with certain political parties or occupying certain political positions; (2) Contractors, those who run or are involved in political business ventures; (3) Common society, for former GAM members without access to political business. A summary of this classification and the groups' characteristic identity features is presented in Table 2.

Of these three classifications, Groups 1 and 2 have expanded their social identity into a political identity as a tool for acquiring power. This expansion creates a political brand that supersedes conventional party labels, packaging, personalities, and policy issues. It also appeals to the emotional loyalty of their supporters. The aim is to control the information circulating in society by taking political actions that support the constructed brand, for instance, through the emergence of specific political leaders and monitoring policies that are in line with the group's social identity. An example is advocating for populist policies that can resonate with the public while emphasising the social identity of their

Table 2.
Classification and Characteristics of Former GAM Members
in the Post-Peace Agreement Period

Groups of Former GAM Members	Description	Identity Transformation	Access to Power/ Resources	Remarks
1) Ruling Group	Individuals affiliated with political parties or holding political positions.	Social identity expanded into a political identity.	High: Political access and influence over policy.	Leverages a new identity as "representatives of the Aceh people" to exert political control over public policy.
2) Contractors	Individuals involved in political business ventures.	Social identity is commodified into a "contractor" identity.	High: Business opportunities accessed via political networks.	Access depends on loyalty to the former GAM military leadership; identity ties facilitate entry.
3) Common Society	Former members not engaged in political or business roles.	Identity remains primarily social.	Low: Limited access to power or economic resources.	Marginalised in post-conflict opportunities due to a lack of political or business affiliations.

Source: Processed by author (2024)

supporters (Mendelsohn, 2002).

Former GAM members in the ruling and contractor groups utilised their networks to secure business opportunities. The “network” here refers to former GAM members who hold political positions while simultaneously engaging in business activities. They leverage personal ties of their social identity for specific purposes (Peng et al., 2003). One informant (Inf-04, interviewed 4 March 2023) explained that identity ties provided former GAM members with easy business access, an expected outcome given the ideological and kinship-based relationships that were forged during the struggle, ultimately creating channels for access. The ups and downs in business often depended on their obedience to the former GAM military leadership.

However, former GAM leadership and its network refuted claims of being “closed” to non-military GAM groups or individuals in the construction sector. For example, Inf-05, an elected member of the Regional People's Representative Council member for West Aceh (2019-2024) from the Aceh Party, stated that GAM is open to all the people of Aceh. However, he acknowledged that former military GAM members, having fought during the conflict, were more respected and received certain conveniences. Therefore, in peacetime, they received greater attention and facilitation from the government.

“We support all the people of Aceh because the MoU applies not only to GAM but to all citizens. However, if the family of a former GAM member needs assistance, we will prioritise them since we are all members of the same family going through hardships.” (Inf-05, interviewed 9 June 2021).

Several construction companies founded by former GAM members participated in bids for government-owned projects, influencing

the local economy. Notably, many government contracts awarded to former GAM entities were subsequently sold to other business owners. Furthermore, these companies leveraged their government connections to collaborate with coal and gold mining firms on projects such as road construction, drainage works, and transporting mining products, employing many former GAM members in these roles.

These rebel-turned-business networks operate across two dimensions, namely business and political, targeting different groups. The political network targets stakeholders to provide companies with complementary resources like legitimacy, granting varying levels of influence according to political standing (Dong et al., 2013; Huang et al., 2022). Thus, former GAM leaders entered political networks to obtain regulatory resources and political legitimacy (Dong et al., 2013). Within government, former GAM members as part of the “ruling group” use social identity as a basis for political actions, including policy formulation, rule enforcement, negotiation, and information access (Sun et al., 2010).

The political dimension of this network is sometimes also used to expedite the business dimension. One method is to ease access for one's own business, family, and network, framed as rightful compensation for the sacrifices and losses endured during the conflict. In other words, political action is used to facilitate access to former GAM business networks.

From Bullets to Business

This section examines how the construction sector became the most popular form of political business among former GAM members. The term “bullets” signifies former GAM members who have a history of armed conflict and familiarity with weaponry (Conrad et al., 2019; Loyle et al., 2023; Sugiono & Djalong, 2017). In the post-conflict era, this martial identity was strategically commodified into a political

business. After the peace agreement, many former GAM members faced unemployment and lacked formal qualifications for stable work. Consequently, they maintained their social identity as a resource, transitioning into roles as contractors or brokers (rent-seekers) within the construction sector, driven by economic necessity. In the understanding of 'bullets to business', the social identity of the former GAM member is commodified. The "contractor" role can be seen critically as a strategy for modifying the social identity of former GAM members, which is very profitable for maintaining and strengthening their bargaining position in the political economy of Aceh.

Specifically, the contractor role functions as a vital mechanism sustained by in-group networks and resource control. Contracts in construction are typically allocated within the internal circle of former GAM combatants, involving agreements between the “ruling group” and “contractor group”. Both groups tend to prioritise “brothers in arms” when allocating business projects. The profits are then channelled back to maintain solidarity and welfare for both networks.

After the 2004 tsunami, Aceh's reconstruction focused heavily on infrastructure. The Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR; Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam-Nias) allocated approximately USD 5.2 billion, sourced from international institutions and the Indonesian government, for this purpose (Kingsbury, 2010). Former GAM members identified this as an opportunity to develop new businesses. Some, particularly former regional commanders, established new construction companies and secured contracts through political influence and, at times, intimidation. Several became successful contractors despite having no prior experience in the construction sector (Budiatri, 2022).

The Deputy Governor of Aceh from 2012 to 2017, Muzakir Manaf (a former GAM military

leader), was described as a conglomerate active in import and export contracts, port construction, and steel production for the post-tsunami reconstruction programme. Similarly, Sofyan Dawood, a former GAM commander in North Aceh, is known to have collaborated with several public and private companies from China and Malaysia. During the Aceh War, Darwis Jeunieb, a well-known guerrilla war figure, transitioned into a successful businessman, being awarded a contract by the local government to supply materials for construction projects in the region (Aspinall & Chauvel, 2018; Fujikawa, 2021; Sustikarini, 2019).

Aceh Province's economic growth is primarily due to the construction sector. State-funded construction, in particular, serves as a key indicator of successful infrastructure development, stimulating broader economic activity in other sectors (BPS, 2023). The sector's contribution to Aceh's economy became evident in 2006, accounting for 7.7 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth. It has remained a significant component of Aceh's Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP), contributing 10.67 per cent in 2020 and 9.90 per cent in 2021, despite the challenges of the pandemic.

This prominence is due in part to the scale of the industry within Aceh Province, with 8,492 construction businesses comprising 7,462 small enterprises, 844 medium-sized businesses, 20 large companies, and 166 businesses that do not meet standard requirements. The sector is able to absorb a large number of workers, employing 19,000 qualified construction service workers in projects sponsored by the Aceh Provincial Government worth a total of IDR 1.9 trillion, as reported by the Banda Aceh Region I Construction Services Centre, Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing (Antara News, 2023).

The dynamic is notable in West Aceh Regency, where construction is the most

developed business sector and the largest contributor to GDP, as it absorbs a significant workforce, has an extensive supply chain, and acts as an engine for local product growth. According to an interview with Inf-09, a former GAM member, construction projects were distributed within the GAM network by exploiting his official role as Regent. Furthermore, former GAM members benefited from land acquisition procedures in development areas. One cited example was the construction of a major ring road in West Aceh connecting twelve subdistricts (Inf-09, interviewed 8 December 2022).

In running a construction business, not all members of the "contractor group" operate their own companies. Some act as brokers between genuine contractors and the government, using their GAM social identity as "bargaining capital" to secure preferential access to projects. The GAM leadership functions as a gatekeeper, granting privileges to contractor groups for small-scale projects. However, most of these brokers subsequently resell the projects to others. As one former GAM member explained, their members engage in various livelihoods, including farming or trading, according to their abilities. Some also act as project brokers, reselling contracts to actual contractors (Inf-01, interviewed 5 March 2023).

Becoming a broker was often a necessity, as most former GAM members lack the substantial capital required to finance construction projects before receiving government payments. Inf-03 admitted that many former GAM members did not have the initial capital to work on construction projects and therefore chose to sell the contracts to other (often non-GAM) entrepreneurs with the funds.

"To obtain contracts, former GAM members maintained tight ties with the government; however, once they obtained projects, they sold them to other parties. Can you envision

the calibre of the subsequent building projects? Former GAM members take on the role of fictitious contractors or brokers." (Inf-03, interviewed 19 June 2023).

The PA's victory in the elections and the large number of former GAM members who hold political positions have strengthened this patronage system. They support political businesses run by fellow former GAM members because, in turn, the "contractor group" will fund PA activities and campaigns. Therefore, this reciprocal relationship is mutually beneficial (Budiatri, 2022). Project awards often depend on close political or personal connections to certain former GAM elites, sometimes even when proposals do not fully meet requirements. For example, a contractor bidding on a project in a specific area must have the support of the former GAM elite based there or risk being outbid. After winning a project, the "contractor group" is expected to share the income with the "ruling group" who provided the necessary support (Ansori, 2012).

In contrast, former GAM members classified as "common society" reported being excluded from these political and economic networks. Inf-12 (interviewed 7 July 2023) stated they had no access to such opportunities in West Aceh, specifically citing two individuals, Abu Yus and Gambit, who held excellent access to political business. Abu Yus is a former GAM military leader in West Aceh and once served as the former Chairman of the KPA and PA, while Gambit is the current KPA chairman. Both have a solid social identity as GAM elites, allowing them to influence political and economic affairs. They also ensure that no one else can gain benefits without their permission (Inf-11, interviewed 6 July 2023). The selective sharing of economic opportunities to create welfare within the former GAM network is a symbiotic relationship between former rebel parties (such as the PA and PNA) and the

group's unified interests inside and outside of the government (Allern & Bale, 2012). The underlying motivation of most former GAM members to become contractors is that it does not require high costs when compared to becoming a contractor in other sectors.

Discussion

Debating Welfare

This section examines the relationship between political identity, business, and welfare, focusing on the impact of political business on the welfare of the "common society" group, who are not involved in such ventures. For many former GAM members, becoming a construction contractor is an effort to control access within the sector. They often frame this not as a pursuit of personal gain, but as serving the broader political interests of their organisation and community. However, prosperity has not been universal, particularly for the "common society" group. As Inf-07 noted, many GAM members and leaders accrued wealth by being willing to intimidate bureaucrats and institutions to secure government projects.

Former GAM members can prosper for two main reasons. First, intimidation has been a recurring tactic; individuals have approached government agencies while armed, creating a climate of fear that pressured officials into granting projects. Second, former GAM members have collaborated, leveraging their shared background to secure contracting roles for mutual benefit. Despite these strategies, post-war job opportunities remained scarce due to a widespread lack of formal skills, work experience, and educational qualifications. Many had lost jobs, education, and career prospects during the conflict. Transitioning from fighters to entrepreneurs was a common survival strategy, yet it was often met with societal indifference or hostility. Consequently, many former GAM members continue to live in poverty, without secure housing or stable

employment. Inf-07 highlighted that even those who have secured political positions often neglect the welfare of their fellow members, focusing solely on their own financial gain.

The interviews further reveal that economic prosperity was not achieved by all former GAM members; solidarity is not absolute among the "contractor group". Ansori (2012) noted that such internal conflicts are commonplace, in this case primarily due to economic competition involving tenders and high-value contracts related to the post-conflict rebuilding process. Competition for these projects generated antagonism and even hostility among former GAM elites. Of the three groups of former GAM identified in this research, it is the "ruling" and "contractor" groups that have been most likely to attain prosperity.

Meanwhile, the “common society” group largely remains in poverty. This disparity has bred disappointment and resentment towards their former comrades. This sense of betrayal and economic hardship has led some to reactivate their social identity as former combatants, forming new rebellious Armed Criminal Groups (ACG). Two AGCs that have received public attention are the Gambit and Dinminimi movements, which organised rebellions with new targets. During the warfare, their sentiments were directed at the Indonesian government; now, they are fighting against former comrades serving in the Aceh government (Sari et al., 2023).

Reviewing the transition from “warfare” to “welfare”, this study finds that all three groups have utilised their social identities. However, this has not translated into uniform prosperity. Only the ruling and contractor groups could frame their social identity as “former rebels” and transform it into a political vehicle. The use of this social identity benefits both groups, where the ruling group provides construction project business access to the contractor group, who provide political

support and financial benefits. For the common society group, however, maintaining their social identity has proven insufficient for accessing political or economic channels. Therefore, it can be argued that social identity alone is not the primary determinant of gaining access to political business. Such access appears contingent on personal closeness and mutually beneficial conditions between the parties involved.

Socio-cognitive Processes Towards Political Business

SIT helps explain why someone identifies with a group, how that affects their affiliation and communication, and how in-group and out-group distinctions affect relations. This theory is part of an individual's self-concept, which originates from perceptions corresponding to membership in a social group. This theory also considers the consequences of personal and social identities on individual perceptions and group behaviour (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 2004). According to Tajfel and Turner (1986), the formation of social identity involves three socio-cognitive processes: self-categorisation, social identification, and social comparison. These processes can explain the formation of an Acehnese combatant identity during the war and how this identity in peacetime was commodified as a bargaining position to access public office and government-linked business sectors as contractors.

During the war, people of Aceh who felt marginalised by Indonesia's centralised government joined GAM. They categorised themselves as members of a liberation movement grounded in Acehnese ethnonationalism. This wartime self-categorisation established a sharp boundary between "us" (GAM) and "them" (the Indonesian Government and other parties considered as opponents). GAM reinforced this identity through symbols, attributes, and anthems as strong visual and ideological markers (Sari & Khalid, 2024; Sari

et al., 2024b.,2024c). In addition, collective narratives of history, conflict, and the struggle for independence further solidified this self-categorisation that emphasised the individuals' roles as members of GAM.

After categorising themselves, the process of social identification took hold. Members of GAM deeply identified themselves by making significant emotional investments and practising group ideology. GAM's struggle often involves traumatic experiences involving loss of life, property, and freedom, forming a sense of pride, solidarity, and brotherhood between GAM members. As combatants, GAM members practised the ideology of Acehnese ethnonationalism, strengthening their group identification. Furthermore, GAM combatants engaged in social comparison, evaluating their group against the out-group (the Indonesian government). They framed their own actions as a defence of justice for the Acehnese people, while characterising the government as a colonising force. The comparison ultimately creates a sense of moral superiority for GAM members and maintains group cohesion in facing a common enemy.

After the war, the social identity of former GAM combatants began to change into another form. The three socio-cognitive processes can be explained as follows. First, former GAM initially used self-categorisation to emphasise their shared identity. However, they soon realised this social identity held little economic value in peacetime. Facing a lack of decent employment, they leveraged a clause in the Helsinki MoU permitting the formation of local parties and involvement in government. This opportunity enabled a re-categorisation, transitioning their social identity into a formal political identity.

Second, the social identification process explains why not all former combatants successfully re-categorised into political identities. This led to the formation of varied social identifications; former GAM members

who successfully re-categorised began to identify themselves as stakeholders in peace or representatives of the Aceh people's voice through local political parties. The majority of former GAM members chose to join parties that are closely linked to their struggle, such as PA and PNA, which retained a strong Acehnese ideological character. Party members then sought to improve their circumstances by running for legislative office. Their former GAM social identity, used to attract or intimidate voters, significantly influenced electoral success. When the first post-war elections were held in Aceh, the victory of legislative candidates from former GAM ranks (which this study terms the "ruling group") was largely determined by this social identity rather than candidate quality. This victory caused the former to succeed in controlling the Aceh government. At the same time, other former GAM members, whether party-affiliated or not, sought opportunity by entering the construction business. They utilised their social identities to build political business networks and gain access to the ruling group. This "contractor group" collaborates with the ruling group to form a patronage-based economic system. Meanwhile, former GAM members who failed to recategorise had no access to political channels. They are identified in this study as the "common society group", lacking access to political business and emotional ties to the ruling elite.

Third, the process of social comparison reveals that the ruling, contractor, and common society groups began to evaluate themselves relative to each other. The ruling and contractor groups recognised their mutually beneficial patronage system. They tended to marginalise the “common society” former GAM members, categorising them as an unfavourable out-group. SIT thus illustrates how the post-war social identity of former GAM members was successfully commodified as bargaining capital for accessing public office and political

business, but only for the ruling and contractor groups. After the conflict, these groups ceased to identify primarily as “armed fighters” and instead as “peace stakeholders” through their political identity. The social identity formed during war did not disappear but evolved into a form of solidarity utilised for political and business purposes, with mutually beneficial relationships to strengthen their position and welfare.

As a consequence, the common society group are marginalised due to this social categorisation. They were perceived as a group distant from political access and thus unprofitable, ignored by their former comrades and remaining in poverty. Social comparison has the negative impact of bias against out-groups, although perceptions of intragroup homogeneity can be reduced through increased contact and exposure to out-group members.

The expansion of ex-GAM social identity into political identity shows that SIT is fluid and adaptable (Haslam et al., 1992; Hogg et al., 1995). This fluidity impacted the organisation's capacity to respond to socio-political dynamics concerning ex-GAM and their opponents (Huddy, 2001). Within the socio-cognitive process, individuals will tend to prioritise those within their own group. This predisposition forms the basis for organisational political actions, including favouritism. The business world intervenes in relationships with other groups to build consensus, even amidst underlying conflict (Gaertner et al., 2000). Former GAM members used their social identity in approaching primary political access in two ways: by approaching the ex-GAM network in the KPA, political parties, and the legislature and executive bodies; and by approaching, influencing, or even intimidating stakeholders related to their political-economic interests.

Conclusion

This study identifies three distinct groups among former GAM members in the post-2005 peace landscape: the “ruling group”, the “contractor group”, and the “common society group”. While all groups strategically mobilised their shared social identity, the outcomes of this transformation varied significantly. Applying the socio-cognitive processes of self-categorisation, social identification, and social comparison according to SIT, this research explains how former GAM members renegotiated their identities for political and economic advantage.

The ruling group successfully converted its social identity into political capital by forming local parties and securing official positions, thereby dominating regional governance. The contractor group leveraged its close ties to this ruling elite to access lucrative state-funded business opportunities, creating a symbiotic patronage system that reinforced its economic status. In contrast, the common society group, which lacked equivalent political connections and patronage access, remained marginalised and economically disadvantaged.

This disparity stems not only from differences in identity use but also from structural enabling and constraining factors. Enabling factors include the legal-political openings provided by the Helsinki MoU, institutional platforms like the KPA, and the symbolic legitimacy of the former GAM identity. Conversely, constraints such as economic diversification, an overreliance on political patronage, and unequal distribution of access perpetuate exclusion of some groups. This study concludes that social identity alone does not guarantee upward mobility or welfare improvement. The successful transformation of identity into political and economic access requires strategic alliances with elites and reciprocal benefits within patronage networks. This nuanced understanding challenges existing assumptions of uniform reintegration success

among former combatants in post-conflict contexts.

References

Abrams, D., & Grant, P. R. (2012). Testing the social identity relative deprivation (SIRD) model of social change: The political rise of Scottish nationalism. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 51(4), 674–689. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8309.2011.02032.x>

Abrams, D., Travaglino, G. A., Grant, P. R., Templeton, A., Bennett, M., & Lalot, F. (2020). Mobilizing IDEAS in the Scottish Referendum: Predicting voting intention and well-being with the Identity-Deprivation-Efficacy-Action-Subjective well-being model. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 59(2), 425–446. <https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12355>

Amirulkamar, S., & Ismail, I. (2019). The Domination of the Local Party of Aceh Parliament in Responding the Aspiration of Community. *Budapest International Research and Critics Institute (BIRCI-Journal Humanities and Social Sciences*, 2(2), 150–159. <https://doi.org/10.33258/birci.v2i2.251>

Andriyani, S. (2017). Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), Transformasi Politik Dari Gerakan Bersenjata Menjadi Partai Politik Lokal Aceh [The Free Aceh Movement: Political Transformation from an Armed Movement to a Local Political Party]. *Jurnal ISIP: Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik*, 14(1), 13. <https://doi.org/10.36451/j.isip.v14i1.32>

Ansori, M. H. (2012). From Insurgency to Bureaucracy: Free Aceh Movement, Aceh Party and the New Face of Conflict. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, 1(1), 31. <https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.ah>

Antara News. (2023, July 28). PUPR: Aceh Butuh 19 Ribu Tenaga Kerja Jasa Konstruksi Bersertifikat [Public Works and Public Housing Ministry: Aceh Needs

19 Thousand Certified Construction Service Workers]. 28 Juli 2023. <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/3656769/pupr-aceh-butuh-19-ribu-tenaga-kerja-jasa-konstruksi-bersertifikat>

Aspinall, E. (2009). Combatants to Contractors: The Political Economy of Peace in Aceh. *Indonesia*, 87(1), 1–34. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40376474>

Aspinall, E., & Chauvel, R. (2018). Constructing separatist threats. In *Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific*. Manchester University Press. <https://doi.org/10.7765/9781526130877.00013>

Azwar, W., Permatasari, Y., & Ulil Amri, M. (2023). Examining a Tuanku's Political Power in West Sumatra. *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik*, 27(1), 90. <https://doi.org/10.22146/jsp.68310>

Bar-Tal, D. (2013). *Intractable Conflicts*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139025195>

Barter, S. J. (2024). Territorial Autonomy across Asia: Assessing Challenges, Addressing Concerns. *Asia Policy*, 19(4), 177–205. <https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2024.a942842>

BPS. (2023). *Indikator Konstruksi, Triwulan I-2023 [Construction Indicators, First Quarter 2023]*. <https://www.bps.go.id/id/publication/2023/10/20/0eb7a5ed3be492da75e12896/indikator-konstruksi-triwulanan-i-2023.html>

Brewer, M. B. (1999). The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love and Outgroup Hate? *Journal of Social Issues*, 55(3), 429–444. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00126>

Brown, R. (2000). Social Identity Theory: past Achievements, Current Problems and Future Challenges. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 30(6), 745–778. [https://doi.org/10.1002/1099-0992\(200011/12\)30:6<745::AID-EJSP24>3.0.CO;2-O](https://doi.org/10.1002/1099-0992(200011/12)30:6<745::AID-EJSP24>3.0.CO;2-O)

Budiatri, A. P. (2022). The Impact of Local Parties on Party System Institutionalisation in Post-Conflict Aceh. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 41(1), 34–58. <https://doi.org/10.1177/18681034211029035>

Chaidar, A., & Sahrasad, H. (2013). Negara, Islam, dan Nasionalisme sebuah Perspektif [A Perspective on State, Islam, and Nationalism]. *Jurnal Kawistara*, 3(1). <https://doi.org/10.22146/kawistara.3960>

Cuénoud González, O., & Clémence, A. (2019a). Concealing former identity to be accepted after the demobilization process in Colombia: A real reintegration in a post conflict scenario? *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, 7(2), 941–958. <https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v7i2.864>

Cuénoud González, O., & Clémence, A. (2019b). Concealing Former Identity to be Accepted after the Demobilization Process in Colombia: a Real Reintegration in a Post Conflict Scenario? *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, 7(2), 941–958. <https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v7i2.864>

Dekker, H., Malová, D., & Hoogendoorn, S. (2003). Nationalism and Its Explanations. *Political Psychology*, 24(2), 345–376. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00331>

Demers, A. (2011). When Veterans Return: The Role of Community in Reintegration. *Journal of Loss and Trauma*, 16(2), 160–179. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15325024.2010.519281>

Ferguson, N., & McKeown, S. (2016). *Social Identity Theory and Intergroup Conflict in Northern Ireland* (pp. 215–227). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29869-6_14

Fujikawa, K. (2021). Settling with Autonomy after Civil Wars: Lessons from Aceh, Indonesia. *Global Policy*, 12(2), 204–213. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12949>

Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., Banker, B. S., Houlette, M., Johnson, K. M., & McGlynn, E. A. (2000). Reducing Intergroup Conflict: from Superordinate Goals to Decategorization, Recategorization, and Mutual Differentiation. *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice*, 4(2), 109–129. <https://doi.org/10.1037/1524-3269.4.2.109>

Theory, Research, and Practice, 4(1), 98–114. <https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2699.4.1.98>

Gluecker, A., Correa-Chica, A., & López-López, W. (2022). The FARC in Colombia: Collective Reintegration and Social Identity Transformation. *Political Psychology*, 43(2), 359–374. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12765>

Guerrero, M., Wiedbusch, E. K., Abo, M. G., Nguyen, R. L., Soto-Nevarez, A., Principato, K., & Jason, L. A. (2021). “It’s like a Brotherhood”: Thematic analysis of veterans’ identity processes in substance abuse recovery homes. *Journal of Community Psychology*, 49(6), 1531–1553. <https://doi.org/10.1002/jcop.22623>

Hajad, V., & Ikhsan. (2019). Peran Mantan Kombatan GAM dalam Sektor Ekonomi Pasca Konflik [The Role of Former GAM Combatants in the Post-Conflict Economic Sector]. *Jurnal Politik Profetik*, 7(1), 59–79.

Hajad, V., & Susetiawan, S. (2022). Diffusion of Ideology and Role of Local Party Control to Understand Aceh Post-War. *Journal of Government and Civil Society*, 6(1), 71. <https://doi.org/10.31000/jgcs.v6i1.5518>

Hamid, S. (2012). Indonesian Politics in 2012: Coalitions, Accountability and the Future of Democracy. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 48(3), 325–345. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2012.728631>

Hogg, M. A. (2016). Social Identity Theory. In S. McKeown, R. Haji, & N. Ferguson (Eds.), *Understanding Peace and Conflict Through Social Identity Theory* (pp. 3–17). Springer Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29869-6_1

Huddy, L. (2001). From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory. *Political Psychology*, 22(1), 127–156. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00230>

Ikramatoun, S., Nusuary, F. M., & Amin, K. (2019). GAM and Social Transformation, from A Rebellion into A Political Movement. *Proceedings of the 1st Aceh Global Conference (AGC 2018)*. <https://doi.org/10.2991/agc-18.2019.35>

Kaplan, O., & Nussio, E. (2018a). Community counts: The social reintegration of ex-combatants in Colombia. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 35(2), 132–153. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894215614506>

Kaplan, O., & Nussio, E. (2018b). Explaining Recidivism of Ex-combatants in Colombia. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 62(1), 64–93. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716644326>

Kfir, I. (2016). Al-Shabaab, Social Identity Group, Human (In)Security & U.S. Counterterrorism. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2810080>

Kingsbury, D. (2010). Political Reconstruction in Aceh. In M. Clarke, I. Fanany, & S. Kenny (Eds.), *Post-Disaster Reconstruction* (pp. 75–92). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781849775137-11>

Lancaster, S. L., Kintzle, S., & Castro, C. A. (2018). Validation of the Warrior Identity Scale in the Chicagoland Veterans Study. *Identity*, 18(1), 34–43. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15283488.2017.1410157>

Latif, I. R., Mutiarin, D., & Nurmandi, A. (2021). The Quality of Peace in Post-Conflict Situation: A Comparative Study Between Armed Conflicts in Aceh and Bangsamoro. *Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional*, 22(2), 221. <https://doi.org/10.7454/global.v22i2.430>

Manan, A., Hadi, A., & Rahmat Saputra, I. (2022). Post-conflict Reconciliation in Aceh, Indonesia: Perspectives from the Victims. *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik*, 25(2), 162. <https://doi.org/10.22146/jsp.66177>

Martinovic, B., Verkuyten, M., & Weesie, J. (2011). Group identity, ethnic separatism and multiple out-groups: The Basque case. *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology*, 21(1), 28–40. <https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.1053>

Mendelsohn, M. (2002). Measuring National

Identity and Patterns of Attachment: Quebec and Nationalist Mobilization. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 8(3), 72–94. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537110208428670>

Murziqin, R. (2016). Aceh Paska MoU Helsinki. *Al-Ijtima'i: International Journal of Government and Social Science*, 1(2), 1–11. <https://doi.org/10.22373/jai.v1i2.475>

Nirzalin, N., Bachri, N., Fakhrurrazi, F., Yunanda, R., Ilham, I., & Muchlis, M. (2023). Strengthening Reintegration through Social Capital: Learning from Aceh, Indonesia. *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik*, 27(2), 141. <https://doi.org/10.22146/jsp.82251>

Noor, M., Brown, R., Gonzalez, R., Manzi, J., & Lewis, C. A. (2008). On Positive Psychological Outcomes: What Helps Groups With a History of Conflict to Forgive and Reconcile With Each Other? *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 34(6), 819–832. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167208315555>

Özerdem, A., Podder, S., & Quitoriano, E. L. (2010). Identity, Ideology and Child Soldiering: Community and Youth Participation in Civil Conflict – A Study on the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in Mindanao, Philippines. *Civil Wars*, 12(3), 304–325. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2010.509566>

Peng, M. W., Buck, T., & Filatotchev, I. (2003). Do Outside Directors and New Managers Help Improve Firm Performance? an Exploratory Study in Russian Privatization. *Journal of World Business*, 38(4), 348–360. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jwb.2003.08.020>

Psaltis, C., Franc, R., Smeekes, A., Ioannou, M., & Žeželj, I. (2017). Social Representations of the Past in Post-conflict Societies: Adherence to Official Historical Narratives and Distrust Through Heightened Threats. In *History Education and Conflict Transformation* (pp. 97–122). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54681-0_4

Reimer, N. K., Kamble, S. V., Schmid, K., & Hewstone, M. (2022). Intergroup contact fosters more inclusive social identities. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 25(1), 133–157. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430220960795>

Ridhwan, M. M., Nijkamp, P., Ismail, A., & M.Irsyad, L. (2022). The Effect of Health on Economic Growth: a Meta-Regression Analysis. *Empirical Economics*, 63(6), 3211–3251. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-022-02226-4>

Rubin, H., & Rubin, I. (2005). *Qualitative Interviewing (2nd ed.): The Art of Hearing Data*. SAGE Publications, Inc. <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452226651>

Sari, C. M. A., Ghifari, M. S., & Khalid, K. A. T. @. (2020). Transactional Political Practices in The Asymmetric Decentralization System in Aceh (10-Year Analysis of Special Autonomy Fund Management Period 2008-2018). *Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews*, 8(3), 1443–1453. <https://doi.org/10.18510/hssr.2020.83145>

Sari, C. M. A., Khalid, K. A. T. @, & Hamzah, S. A. (2023). Aceh Post-Peace Agreement: New Conflicts and Transactional Politics. *Akademika*, 93(02). <https://doi.org/10.17576/akad-2023-9302-15>

Sari, C. M. A., @ Khalid, KAT., & Hamzah, S. A. (2024a). *Perjuangan Orang Aceh: Naratif, Hubungan Etnik dan Konflik [The Struggle of the Aceh People: Narrative, Ethnic Relations, and Conflict]*. Malaysia: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.

Sari, C. M. A., & @ Khalid, KAT. (2024b). Transmigration, Ethnic Sentiment, and Inter-Ethnic Conflict in Aceh. *Akademika*, 94(03). <https://doi.org/10.17576/akad-2024-9403-17>

Sari, C. M. A., Sari, N. & Fitri, L. (2024c). Transformation of Ethnonationalist Ideology among Former the Free Aceh

Movement Combatants After the MoU Helsinki Peace Agreement in Bireuen Regency. *ARRUS Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, 4(3 SE-Articles), 429–437. <https://doi.org/10.35877/soshum2658>

Sari, C. M. A. & Khalid, K. A. T. @. (2025). What Caused the Ethnic Revival? Multi-case Studies in 11 Southeast Asian Countries. *Journal of ASEAN Studies*, 13(1), 87–115. <https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v13i1.10478>

Schulz, M. S. (2016). Social Movements and Futures Research. *World Futures Review*, 8(2), 98–107. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1946756716634310>

Shamir, M., & Sagiv-Schifter, T. (2006). Conflict, Identity, and Tolerance: Israel in the Al-Aqsa Intifada. *Political Psychology*, 27(4), 569–595. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2006.00523.x>

Smith, R. T., & True, G. (2014). Warring Identities. *Society and Mental Health*, 4(2), 147–161. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2156869313512212>

Strange, G., & Patock, R. (2010). From Rebels to Rulers and Legislators: The Political Transformation of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 29(1), 95–120. <https://doi.org/10.1177/186810341002900105>

Stein, R. M. (2015). War and Revenge: Explaining Conflict Initiation by Democracies. *American Political Science Review*, 109(3), 556–573. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055415000301>

Stets, J. E., & Burke, P. J. (2000). Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 63(3), 224. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2695870>

Sustikarini, A. (2019). Financing Peace: Special Autonomy Fund as a Peace Dividend in Aceh, Indonesia. *JAS (Journal of ASEAN Studies)*, 7(2). <https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v7i2.5787>

Tajfel, H. (1982). Experimental Studies of Intergroup Behaviour. In *Cognitive Analysis of Social Behavior* (pp. 227–246). Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7612-2_8

Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C. (1971). Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 1(2), 149–178. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420010202>

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In Austin W. G. & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 276–293). Brooks/Cole.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (1986). The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior. In S. Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), *Psychology of Intergroup Relation* (pp. 7–24). Hall Publishers.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (2004). The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior. In *Political Psychology* (pp. 276–293). Psychology Press. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203505984-16>

Taylor, C., Harrison, J., Haimovitz, K., Oberle, E., Thomson, K., Schonert-Reichl, K., & Roeser, R. W. (2016). Examining Ways That a Mindfulness-Based Intervention Reduces Stress in Public School Teachers: a Mixed-Methods Study. *Mindfulness*, 7(1), 115–129. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12671-015-0425-4>

Tezcür, G. M. (2020). A Path out of Patriarchy? Political Agency and Social Identity of Women Fighters. *Perspectives on Politics*, 18(3), 722–739. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719000288>

Törnquist, O. (2011). Dynamics of peace and democratization. The Aceh lessons. *Democratization*, 18(3), 823–846. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.563118>

Tremblay, R., Mâsse, L., Pagani, L., & Vitaro, F. (1996). From Childhood Physical Aggression to Adolescent Maladjustment:

The Montreal Prevention Experiment. In *Preventing Childhood Disorders, Substance Abuse, and Delinquency* (pp. 268–298). SAGE Publications, Inc. <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781483327679.n12>

Wessells, M. G. (2016). Reintegration of Child Soldiers: The Role of Social Identity in the Recruitment and Reintegration of Child Soldiers. In S. McKeown, R. Haji, & N. Ferguson (Eds.), *Understanding Peace and Conflict Through Social Identity Theory* (pp. 105–120). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29869-6_7

Wichmann, F. A., Janssen, D. H. J., Geirhos, R., Aguilar, G., Schütt, H. H., Maertens, M., & Bethge, M. (2017). Methods and measurements to compare men against machines. *Electronic Imaging*, 29(14), 36–45. <https://doi.org/10.2352/ISSN.2470-1173.2017.14.HVEI-113>

Young, C. (2020). Interlocking systems of oppression and privilege impact African Australian health and well-being in greater Melbourne: A qualitative intersectional analysis. *Journal of Social Issues*, 76(4), 880–898. <https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12407>