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PCD Journal of South and Southeast Asia's Power, Conflict, and Democracy Studies is an international refereed journal initiated by the Power, Conflict, and Democracy (PCD) consortium, a collaborative work by the University of Colombo Sri Lanka, Universitas Gadjah Mada in Indonesia, and the University of Oslo in Norway. It is a journal that comprehensively examines the dynamics of power and democracy, including practices of human rights, popular representation, and public policy, particularly in South Asia and Southeast Asia. Invitation is extended to authors with interest in making comparison experiences in the mentioned regions with those of the rest of the globe. PCD Journal publishes articles, research notes, and book reviews in major subfields of political science, human geography, and political anthropology.

PCD Journal aims to address some of the most current issues of power, conflict, and democracy facing Asian countries, especially in South and Southeast Asia. While the journal is open to all methodological approaches, all submissions are expected to be theoretically grounded. The journal can be of great value to the teachers, students, researchers, experts, journalists, and social movement activists dealing with these issues and regions.

Submission

Submitted papers should be no longer than 8,000 words excluding tables and figures. Submit the manuscript via e-mail to the editor-in-chief at pcd@ugm.ac.id.

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Peer Review

Every submitted article will be subject to peer review. The normal review period is three months. Most research articles in this journal have undergone rigorous peer review based on initial editorial screening and refereeing by anonymous referees. Authors should take care that the manuscript contains no clues as to identity. Nevertheless, articles published under 'Research Notes' section, aimed at setting up future research agenda, are non peer-reviewed.

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The state of democracy in the Global South is marked by a striking paradox: while liberal democracy has attained an ideologically hegemonic position through two so-called waves of democracy, the qualities of such democracies is increasingly called into question. The “old” democracies in the global South like Sri Lanka are weakened. Democracy deficits have emerged within constitutional and institutional arrangements as well as in political practices. Further, the “third wave of democracy” is over. “New” democracies like in Indonesia have fostered freedoms, privatisation and decentralisation but continue to suffer from poor governance, representation and participation. Hence there are general signs of decline. Vulnerable people are frustrated with lack of actual influence and sustained elitism. Politicians winning elections often need to foster ethnic and religious loyalties, clientelism and the abuse of public resources. Powerful groups and middle classes with poor ability to win elections tend to opt for privatisation and return partially to authoritarian governance.

Critical questions are therefore asked about the feasibility of democracy in developing country contexts. Some observers say it is only a problem of better crafting of institutions. Others contend that “full” democratisation was premature in the first place and that necessary preconditions need to be created beforehand. Both positions are based on a narrow and static understanding of democracy. While the core elements of democracy are universal, real world democracies develop (or decline) over time and through contextual dynamics; in processes and contexts of actors, institutions and relations of power. Therefore, the crucial task is to analyse the problems and options of expanding the historically “early” freedoms and deficient elements of democracy that fortunately exist in spite of poor socio- economic and political conditions in countries such as Sri Lanka and Indonesia rather than giving up on these freedoms until the other have somehow improved. This is to advance towards the universally accepted aim of democracy in terms of popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality, and to be able to use democracy to handle conflicts and alter unequal and unsustainable development.

With this in mind, researchers at the University of Oslo (Norway), Gadjah Mada (Indonesia) and Colombo (Sri Lanka) have come together in a collective research—and post- graduate programme. The idea is to pool their research projects and results, and to promote doctoral as well as master studies by way of, first, a joint framework for analysing power, conflict and democracy and, second, a basic electronic peer reviewed journal and report series (published by *PCD-Press*) to the benefit of students, scholars and priorities in the region. Basic resources—in addition to the participants own voluntary work and projects— are provided by their respective universities and the Norwegian Centre for International Cooperation in Higher Education (SIU).

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The Emerging of New Democratic Space: CSOs and Parliament in Post-Soeharto Indonesia¹

Cornelis Lay

Abstract

This article deals with the inclusion of civil society organizations (CSOs) in the decision-making processes in Post-Soeharto era in Indonesia. It argues that reformasi has created and multiplied the democratic space in both the national and local arena. It has not just enlarged the number of CSOs significantly, but also changed the nature of CSOs and has opened the boundary in relations to parliament. This development has confirmed the emerging of the new political space which is more democratic in nature, as witnessed by the present of Gaventa's political space model - "claimed space" as opposed to undemocratic "closed spaces" or "limited space" during the New Order. This paper identifies the presence of a set spaces which is determining the whole course of decision-making processes. This research found the nature of a space, of being either "claimed", "invited" or "closed", is not only determined by who creates the space and able to make use of it within the given boundaries, but also by its relations to other set of spaces, issues in concern, time and infrastructure set up around the spaces.

Keywords: CSO; parliament; political space; democracy.

Introduction

Democratization—or *reformasi* as most Indonesians prefer to call it, to include decentralization—has its "Pandora Box" effect. The quadruple constitutional reform between 1999 and 2004 which followed *reformasi*, has not only created "new democratic spaces" (for further discussion on this issue see Cornwall & Coelho, 2004) at the national level, but also multiplied political spaces in the sub-national politics, opening up ways for *demos* to realize and claim

¹ I would like to express my gratitude to my colleagues at Department of Politics and Government, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada and to Power, Welfare, & Democracy Project. Also to Erwin Endaryanta, Longgina Novadona Bayo, Eko Agus Wibisono, and Umi Lestari for their assistance.

their citizenship rights; and as in many cases (see for example, Heller, 2001) leading to the creation of new political actors. CSOs are among the actors which not only benefited by the presence of these newly created democratic spaces, but also have come to exist due to this democratic opening. As in the case of other Asian countries (Gomez, 1999), Indonesian CSOs have had to contest with other forces to claim space for their political role.

This article is based on my preliminary research on the interlinking between power and space by exploring the relation between civil society organizations and parliament in policy making process in the Post-Soeharto era in Indonesia. Research was conducted over a year, from July 2009 to August 2010; this included five months of field research in Bogor, Jakarta, and Yogyakarta. This paper is part of my paper titled *Broken Linkages* which was already presented before the Panel on “Indonesian Democracy in Comparative Perspective at Euroseas, Guttenberg, 26-28 August 2010. This article aims to answer the question of to what extent the creation of a new democratic space since 1998 reformation in Indonesia has impact on consolidating democracy in the country.

CSOs in Indonesia: An Overview

The need to reconstruct a new pattern of state–society relations has triggered the discussion on the role of CSOs in democratization. Most literatures seem to agree that CSOs have been and would remain playing important roles. As “*a public ethical-political community of free and equal citizens under a certain legally defined system of rule*” as defined in its broader meaning by Cohen & Arato (1992, p.84) or simply as “*subset of social organizations created by the relevant law of particular state*” as Weller (2005, p.3) puts it, or even in its more instrumentalist definition of “*organizations and groups whose activities are directed towards improving, and in more radical sense changing the social and material condition of economically and socially disadvantages*” as Eldridge (1989, p.2) defines it, or “*as self-organized and autonomous groups and movements*” as defined by Lay (1999), CSOs

have been argued to have a significant role in society and it seems to be continued in the future. However, to what extent and by what means CSOs actually or potentially contribute to democratization remains debatable among experts.

Weller *et al.* suggested that as institutions or an intermediate world between the family and the state, CSOs somehow contribute to democratization. As he points out, "... , *they do democratize in looser sense by broadening the range of voices that can potentially influence political decision*" (p.11). Harriss *et al.* (2004) admitted the presence of CSOs as one of intermediary power between demos and public affairs as implied in Tornquist's (2009) general framework for analysing democracy. However, in assessing the specific over-emphasis of mainstream discourse on the centrality of CSOs as being a condition for the achievement of good governance and successful economic development, they have argued that this line of argument represents "*unconstitutional, de-institutionalized and de-politicized democracy*" (Harriss *et al.*, 2004, p. 8). While Mietzner (2012), despite his pessimistic view in seeing the future of democracy since 2005-6—he describes it as a phenomenon of "stagnation of democracy"—still sees the potential of CSOs in preventing the stagnation of democracy from deteriorating into a form of democracy recession.

In the Indonesian context, the current CSOs are both a product of *reformasi*—most were established during the years of turbulence of 1988 and 2001, and survivors of the past. As noted by Eldridge (1988, 1995, 1999), since the 1950s there have been a fairly strong emerging of CSOs in the country. Some, survived the authoritarian regime where corporatism exists (for further discussion see King 1977; MacIntyre, 1991), as a specific model of interests intermediation and means of control where "*the state plays leading role in structuring and regulating interests, organizing them along the functional rather than class line...., and typically granting official recognition to only one representative body to any given sector*" was almost the only game in town (MacIntyre, 1994, p.1). But also, as Sakai (2002) and especially Eldridge argued, they had been able to

preserve their autonomy without jeopardizing their corporative ties to the state. The ability to keep the balance between autonomy and state co-optation lies in the simple fact that, as in the case of post-Totalitarian regime of China (Chan, 2005), CSOs in Indonesia had been able to make use of state fragmentation and of its inconsistent control (Sakai, 2002); and most importantly, to create distinct niches that link a high-quality grassroots' program, activation of regional forum, policy dialog, and joint public advocacy (Eldridge, 1995, 2005).

During the last 10 years or so, more and more CSOs have come to fill the newly democratic political spaces in the post-Soeharto era. Data provided by a long-standing research-based CSO, Institute of Research, Education, and Social Economy Enlightenment (Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial, LP3ES), in 2001 shows that the number of CSOs was only around 426, or a little higher than Jakarta's figure of 412 in 2009.²

SMERU publication showed that within a short three-year period, the number of CSOs have grown tremendously to reach 2,406. The recent figure released by SMERU³ in 2004 is 2,646, leading to a higher concentration of CSOs (PLOD, 2006). More importantly, the long spatial concentration of CSOs in the Capital or big cities (Eldridge, 1988, 1989) are now diminishing. As decentralization effectively took place in 2001, some remote provinces such as Papua and Aceh, and even East and West Nusa Tenggara (NTB and NTT) have emerged as the new homes of CSOs. In these provinces, CSO numbers in 2004 were 130, 223, 124 and 136 respectively as compared to 292, 224 and 209 for Jakarta,

² It is important to note that during the New Order, the number of CSOs were hard to be determined. Hikam (1999) for example provided the number of approximately 7,000 during 1990s. However, as noted by Eldridge (2005), this has to be put into perspective since "the term of 'non-governmental organization' embraces several legal and structural from", and around 70 to 80% of them are village-based or sub-provincial-based.

³ SMERU is a research institute working on public policy area that was founded as initiatives of Social Monitoring and Early Response Units personnel, a project managed by World Bank as response to financial and political crisis in Indonesia 1998.

West and East Java. These figures had changed in 2009. In both Aceh and Papua, the numbers declined to 98 and 120, but in NTB and NTT the numbers were higher than before (156 and 162). In 2009, Jakarta-based CSOs had grown dramatically with a slight increase in West Java (255) and slight decrease in Central Java (205) (Smeru). The figures suggested that CSOs are now a nation-wide phenomenon. It is no longer a Java-based phenomenon, let alone Jakarta-based phenomenon.

More than that, there have been very significant changes within the world of CSOs as well as their relationship with the state, especially with parliament. Contrary to the New Order era where there was almost no connection between CSOs and political parties, (Eldridge, 1988, 1989) including those in parliament. Now there is a new tendency of CSO activists to step in and be part of the party, either formally or informally, as demonstrated through the latest case⁴ where some CSO key figures officially joined the government party. At the very least my research found, are serving as strategic partners of the party in policy-making processes.

Apart from that, the nature of CSO activities has also changed. The domination of “charity” type activism of the first

⁴ Dita Indah Sari, activist of Centre of Indonesia’s Labour Movement (Pusat Perjuangan Buruh Indonesia, PPBI) joining National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB). She is currently expert staff to the Minister of Labour and Transmigration. Rahlan Nasidik, Executive Director of Imparsial (Indonesian Human Right Monitor that was founded in 2002 to monitor and investigate human right violations), joint Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat) and became spokesperson of the party. Teten Masduki, founder of Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) is now became Head of Presidential Office. Based on data from Kompas 2010, Mietzner (2013) suggested there were 7 percent (37 out of 560) members of parliament in 2009, 6 percent candidates for local leaders (governor, mayor or head of district) in 2005 local election were activists of CSOs. Mietzner divided them into three categories based on their background and motivation: First, politicians who previously participated in civil society activism as part of their preparations for further political involvement, such as Muhaimin Iskandar. Second group, those who chose civil society as an escape from Soeharto’s tight regulation of the political realm. After his fall, however, they, such as Benny Kabur Harman, fully embraced the new democratic system and the opportunities of political participation it offered. Third, reformist activist who crossed over into formal politics because of the deficiencies inherent in Indonesia’s post-Soeharto 1998 democracy, such as Binny Buchori, Demos (a think tank of democracy and human rights) activist who was joining Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups) in 2008 and Eva Kusuma Sundari who was joining PDIP (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan).

generation of 1960s and early 1970s, and of “developmental” type of the second generation of the end of 70s and 80s (Setiawan, 1996; Sinaga, 1993) are playing a lesser role compared to the advocacy type of the new generation CSOs. This development has followed the widening of issues covered. Apart from the traditional issues related to development and participation, new issues have come to the stage. Issues such as governance reform is now a dominant theme of the current CSO activists (Suharko, 2005), along with specific issues related to security sector reform (military, police and intelligence), protection of the weak (women, poor—especially urban poor, consumer, labour, child, etc.); empowering of class-based organized movement or specific groups (labour, peasant and indigenous people for example); and managing resources.

With regards to policy, the role of CSOs has expanded tremendously. Now, they are not only involved in influencing the design and implementation of specific development programs (Eldridge, 1988, 1989), but in designing broader policy measures, and being part of almost the entire policy circle at centre of national space of decision making—parliament, and in many local spaces alike. They have also been able to penetrate into the deeper level of policy making, such as agenda setting. The range of coverage issues are much wider, encompassing local and national places, leading to even larger political spaces for CSOs to engage within.

All of the aforementioned development confirmed the emergence of the new political space which is more democratic in nature as witnessed by the present of Gaventa’s “claimed spaces” (Gaventa 1980, 2003, 2006) as opposed to undemocratic “closed spaces” or “limited invited” spaces available during the New Order. Closed or provided space takes place where decision making is undertaken by limited power holders in closed-door meetings without any intention to enlarge the boundaries for inclusion. “Invited space” is a space where varieties of decision-making bodies invite outsiders to take part, either on regular bases or simply on an ad-hoc basis through “one-off consultation” (see also, Cornwall & Coelho,

2007, p.1). “Claimed” or “created spaces”—or in Cornwall term, “organic space” emerges out of common concern or identification and may come into being as a result of popular mobilization. It may consist of spaces in which like-minded people join together in common pursuit” (Cornwall, 2002, p.24), or “spaces conquered by civil society demands for inclusion” (Cornwall & Coelho, 2007, p.:1).

The above development also confirmed the changing nature of CSOs of being more polycentric, implying the end of corporatism and the emerging of a new type of state-CSOs power relations within the new boundaries of more democratic spaces. This dramatic change is not only taking place within the world of CSOs but also in parliament. Its previously inferior constitutional position as rubber stamp of the executive branch has ended. The quadruple constitutional reform has put parliament at the very centre of the policy-making processes. It is now a new space of national politics, locus for policy, budgeting, and oversight processes. The process of forming parliament has also changed. Since the 2004 elections, there has no longer been representation from the military at any level of parliament as MPs chosen through regular free and fair election. The way parliament works has also changed. The bureaucratic type of working is now replaced by a very political one. They no longer solely rely upon government information and expertise in making decision but have gradually moved to decision making based on a combination of party ideological stand points, public opinion, and research finding. They no longer work in an isolated environment, ignoring the voice of the people, but incorporate other social forces, broadening the boundaries for inclusion. In this respect, CSOs are an important source of information and expertise as well as one of the sources of legitimacy for both policy processes and substance.

Despite all the above changes, a comprehensive study on parliament-CSOs relations is rare. Apart from focusing on CSOs-state relations (Sakai, 2002; Eldridge, 2005) as the traditional theme, most recent studies have focused on individual CSOs, mostly to

assess the impact of certain types of CSO activists to very specific issues such as a better public service, better policy making processes, better access of certain groups to resources and services. In the midst of the tremendous rise in “crafting thesis” of both democratic transition and good governance, most energy has been devoted to capacity-building projects of specific institutions and individuals. While in relation to parliament, most researches focused on the issue of representation, parliament performance, institutional and individual capacity building, and more often, on the level of popular confidence in parliament as most of the survey in the country confirmed. An effort to get a more comprehensive understanding on these complex issues and the interrelation between parliament and CSOs, apart from partial data provided by Demos (2009), is very limited. Such an effort was undertaken by Graduate Program on Decentralization and Local Autonomy (*Politik Lokal dan Otonomi Daerah*, PLOD), Universitas Gadjah Mada (PLOD, 2006).

PLOD study concludes that despite CSOs experiencing many problems such as weakness in both institutional and individual capacity, and being highly dependent on international donor institutions, the massive presence of CSOs in local areas and their interconnection with parliament have contributed in uplifting the quality of both policy processes and substance, and in paving the way for the wider spread of participation from below. Unfortunately, this collaborative effort involving the Indonesian National Planning Board, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Universitas Gadjah Mada, is a desk study and focused on local place, longing for a field research. It has not yet provided us with enough evidence desperately needed for a more comprehensive conclusion.

Spaces for CSOs Involvement

As mentioned, *reformasi* has created the overall environment for the creation of newly democratic spaces, implying the presence of a democratic space of “claimed space” within which people can exercise their right and claim their citizenship. As will be discussed in

great detail in the following sections, despite the presence of a wider democratic space in parliament, all three continuum dimensions of spaces—“closed-space”, “invited-space”, and “claimed-space” are simultaneously working in determining the whole course of political decision making processes. All of them delimit the field of what is possible for CSOs that have been on the side-lines of policy processes for years, and for the MPs as well.

“Claimed-Space”

Our resource persons from both parliament and CSOs testified that in principle, all CSO activists as well as individuals are eligible and have the right to engage in policy processes. The reasons as well as the mechanisms to enter parliamentary forum are varied. However, consultation is the most common argument that legitimate CSO activists and public-at-large seek to have access to parliament meeting without any restriction. Through consultation, individuals and CSOs can present themselves in parliamentary forum either voluntarily or by invitation. In both cases, their presence has been used as sources of information by MPs in making decisions.

There are two reasons for the presence of this “claimed-space”: legal and political. As for legal reasons, the regulation stipulates that all meetings are opened to the public and requires the involvement of civil society as an integral part of policy processes. The normative argument behind this is related to the basic idea of democracy—people have the right to be involved in public matters and have the right to know, and of good governance, especially in relations to the need for transparency and accountability. The legislature on creating bills clearly states that every single draft of the bill has to have an academic draft as a basis for discussion. This mandatory requirement gives no room for MPs and government to avoid CSO activist engagement. At the very least both parties have to formally accommodate the presence of CSOs, including people from university and research centres.

Permadi (Interview, October 14, 2009) confirmed that in

every single meeting, the Commission always allotted time and space to meet CSO activists and individuals for public consultancy.⁵ Normally the administration section of the Commission is asked either to invite relevant CSOs, including experts from universities and research centres to attend public hearing or to ask relevant individuals or institutions to organize meetings with MPs during their working tour to local areas (Ali, Marjuki., interview, October 29, 2009).⁶

The involvement of CSO activists are not merely based on invitation. In many cases the CSO activists are also eager to find ways to enter into the parliament forum. CSOs are also actively taking initiative (Karmila, D., interview, October 24, 2009; Hamid, U., Interview, October 4, 2009).⁷ In some cases, the CSOs make the proposals through formal letters, followed by communication with individual MPs who, according to their assessment, can help them to be present and be in the centre of parliamentary meetings. However, in some other cases, the CSOs attempt to find their way into parliamentary meeting through dramatic means. Permadi said that in his long experience communicating with CSO activists, he was often confronted with short messages aggravating the danger of specific articles formulated in a draft of a bill, prompting the involvement of the CSOs or activists. Permadi shared that in some of the instances, he too shared the worry of the CSOs. But in other instances, he disagrees with the CSOs since he has his own views on such the issues.⁸

⁵ Permadi, MP of Commission I, 2004–2009; Commission dealing with defence and international affairs Interview in Jakarta.

⁶ Ibid; Marjuki Ali, Speaker of the House for 2009 - 2014, interview in Jakarta.

⁷ Dian Karmila, Network Coordinator of Syarikat Indonesia, Yogyakarta; Usman Hamid, Executive Director of KontraS (Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Kekerasan, Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence), interview in Bogor.

⁸ He, for example has a different opinion in relation to Indonesian military position. For him it is important to strengthen the Indonesian National Armed Force (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) to be the strongest military force in Asia just like in Soekarno's era. This position contrasts to CSO activists' who tend to see the development of TNI as a treat to democratic process.

As for political reasons, all resource persons from parliament are confident that civil society involvement in policy processes is good in itself for two important reasons: to strengthen the legitimacy of both policy products and their position as MPs (Ali.,M, interview, *Ibid*; Sutrisno, T., interview, November 21, 2009; Nursuhud, interview, November 20, 2009; Safawi, Z., interview, November 21, 2009).⁹

As one MP said, “*it is an effective political tool to make pressure to other fraction and government*” (Sundari, E.K., interview, October 13, 2009).¹⁰

In the case of drawing the Bill on Pornography, Eva Kusuma Sundari (interview, *ibid*) for example said that without pressure both in parliament and in the street from CSO, the content of the law would be even worse.¹¹

She related that “*the pressure from the CSO has proven to be very effective to make significant changes in Law on Pornography*”. The law itself is far from perfect in her eyes. However, the experience of working together with CSOs was highly useful since it not only provided her with political support, but also academic argument which was desperately needed. Her position was confirmed by Rieke Dyah Pitaloka (interview, October 12, 2009), an artiste and women activist-turned politician. As she confessed that collaboration with individual MPs allowed her to understand the latest developments in Parliament. She achieved through what she termed as “man marking” approach, or using physical meetings, emails, phone calls and letters. She then used this understanding to determine issues and slogans for her street demonstrations, and to draw up documents to be surrendered to Parliament. In this way, she was able to persuade not only MPs and government officers, but also key

⁹ Tuti Sutrisno, MP from National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), interview in Jakarta; Nursuhud, interview in Jakarta; Zuber Safawi, from the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) interview in Jakarta.

¹⁰ Eva K Sundari, a member of parliament, interview in Jakarta.

¹¹ Interview, *Ibid*.

figures in society.¹² Pitaloka's experience is very common among CSO activists.

Some MPs believe that the massive involvement of the public in the process of passing bills demonstrates parliament's attempts to maximize its institutional capacity in the policy processes (Mihati, interview, October 27, 2009, December 18, 2009).¹³

However, not all MPs agree that the change in CSO-MP relations has come about as a result of change in the way Parliament works. Some MPs testified that there is neither any clear institutional mechanism which sets out how parliament should involve people in its work; nor any guidelines from party headquarters. This alternative view suggests that CSO involvement mostly results from the willingness of individual MPs to engage with them (Susilo, D., interview, December 1, 2009).¹⁴

“Closed-Space” Within “Claimed-Space”

The overall creation of new democratic spaces is not automatically paving way for “claimed spaces” to fully materialize. There is a set of spaces within the broader democratic space in parliament that remains closed. As both MPs and CSOs activists confirmed, not all stages of policy processes are free for public attendance. Except for plenary session, a closed-door meeting is a norm and regular part of the game at some stages of policy processes. However, it requires a strong argument, and procedurally requires an anonymous agreement amongst MPs at their meetings.

But some other phases, such as “Drafting team meeting”—the final stage before a draft of law is brought to plenary session, for example—there is no need to have an anonymous agreement since it has been a closed-door meeting since the beginning, giving no room

¹² Rieke Dyah Pitaloka, former anti-porn bill activist, who was elected as MP from PDIP, 2009-2014, interview in Jakarta.

¹³ Mihati, interview in Jakarta and Yogyakarta.

¹⁴ Djoko Susilo of PAN, Yogyakarta. He is currently Indonesian Ambassador to Austria.

for the public, including CSOs to be involved. Despite the impact of the CSOs, the reason for the exclusion is because the meetings are very technocratic in nature. At that stage, the focus is to only deal with very technical and legal matters, and not political ones. So, the argument goes, there is no necessity to have public scrutiny since all the substance have been agreed upon by all parties involved. However, as some expert teams of parliament suggested, the process of “wording” of an article at this stage sometimes changes the entire logic of the law.

In another case, as demonstrated through the process of making law on Special Status of Aceh, the closed-door meeting was due to political reasons (Hamid, F., interview, October 23, 2009; Budiman, H., interview, October 24, 2009; Syahrizal, T.B., interview, October 15, 2009).¹⁵ As confirmed, “*the debates on crucial articles such as on human right court, truth and reconciliation commission, local political party, independent candidate for local governor/ mayor/ head of regency, Islamic law, authority of national and local government, and sharing of revenue which are have very serious political implication were mostly discussed behind closed-door*”.¹⁶

This case seems to suggest that the nature of “space” of being “closed, invited, or claimed”, is not only shaped by who created it and the capability of actors to make use of it, but also by the nature of the issues concerned.

Lobby is the most important “closed space” identified within the broader democratic space. My observation during the long and tiring debate on the issue of “Century Gate”¹⁷

¹⁵ Farhan Hamid, the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) vice chairman, 2009-2014, former MP representing Aceh, interview in Jakarta; Hendra Budiman, AJMI (Aceh Judicial Monitoring Institute) Director and member of JDA (Jaringan Demokrasi Aceh, Aceh Democracy Network), interview in Jakarta; Teuku B. Syahrizal form Aceh Civil Society Task Force (ACSTF), interview in Jakarta.

¹⁶ Focus Group Discussion with activists on Aceh, Jakarta, October 15, 2009.

¹⁷ Century gate case emerges from Bank Indonesia policy on short term funding facility for Century Bank, about 6,7 trillion rupiahs. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, BI (Bank Indonesia, the Central bank of Republik Indonesia), and Finance Minister Sri

early this year demonstrated that lobbying can take both informal and formal forms. As an informal space, it has been part of Indonesian parliament tradition since the very beginning, practicing as forum to establish a common middle ground on certain issues among competing parties before a formal meeting takes place. But as a formal space, it is new, taking place after *reformasi* that has formally been integrated into the parliament mechanism to settle disputes on specific issues or agenda, and even between individuals, among parties, and between parties and government. As most of my resource persons testified, since lobby has proven to be an effective means to resolve disputes, it has now become prominent, changing its nature from an *ad-hoc* to an “omnipresent” type of space. It is now replicated itself within all spaces of policy making available in parliament, leaving aside the very question of transparency and accountability. More importantly since lobbying involves only very limited-strategic and highly profile issues, it plays an important political role in determining the whole course of policy processes and substance.

Some activists and MPs suggested that despite lobby providing no room for non-party’s people to be physically present and formally being part of the processes, it does not necessarily mean that CSOs people cannot intervene. They still can channel their views through their informal link with individual MPs that happened to be part of a lobby. Sending short messages is the most common way exercised by CSOs to present themselves in this closed space. However, since lobby is normally taking place in a very short and tense time, as most MPs said, instead of looking into such short messages, they make use of it to consult their top party leaders. The “Century Gate” case confirmed that lobbying is a critical time and space where “the real decision makers” step in to make their final decision. In such a way, it provides an effective channel for the working of both the second

Mulyani argued that the bail out policy is desperately needed to prevent the country from systemic economic crisis just like in 1997/1998.

and the third dimensions of power (for further discussion on the faces of power see Gaventa, 1980; Lukes, 2005).

Lobby is closed space not only for CSOs activists but “ordinary MPs” as well. Only very limited MPs are eligible to enter to this space, especially those who hold formal positions, leading to an even higher competition among MPs to have official position in both parliament and parties. I found that lobbying is a necessary evil. As a purely political instrument to prevent dead-lock in decision making processes, lobby has proven to be an effective tool. However, it is also a powerful mechanism of exclusion. This finding suggests that even within a “broader claimed space” that is assumed to be democratic in nature there is a possibility of a set of non-democratic “closed places” to materialize.

“Semi-closed-semi-invited-spaces”

This study also found the presence of what might be called “semi-closed-semi-invited spaces” where “identities” play critical roles as password for inclusion. Some sub-committee meetings are technically open to public. However, not every single CSO and individual can attend them. Only very limited invited individuals and CSOs are eligible, leading to a kind of “elite settlement” type of engagement. This kind of “arbitrary representation” guaranteed small numbers of CSOs activists to have access to an even deeper public policy arena. However, to be eligible to this kind of privilege, individual or activists it is required to demonstrate certain kinds of “identities”. As Dian Sari suggested, a well-established-network-CSO has more voice to be heard than those with no clear-cut constituency and networking. They are most likely to be the one that Parliament would give priority (Sari, D.K, interview, 12 October 2009).¹⁸

Apart from that, as demonstrates through the case of Propatria

¹⁸ Dian K. Sari, INFID (International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development) Deputy Director, interview in Jakarta.

which has privilege in relation to SSR related issues, CSOs with outstanding record on the issues of concern would also get priority. While this has potential to divide CSOs as some activists argued, this somehow has a positive impact. It serves as an incentive structure for CSOs to manage themselves in such a way so as to be eligible as a reliable partner of parliament. In most cases, closeness to MPs and party is the most important “identity” that an individual or CSOs members have to have. On the one hand this has forced CSOs activists to build capacity to negotiate and communicate with MPs and party official, while on the other it provides “middle ground” for consensus building, softening political as well ideological stands of both sides. However, this “middle way”, often created tension within CSOs as it has been interpreted as compromising CSOs principles by some activists.

Apart from developing a trusted full relationship, some CSOs equipped itself with an image of being close to key figures in government office, be it a minister, military commanders, police chief, or even the President to uplift their bargaining position in the eyes of MPs. Others use their international network to level their position with MPs (Marut, D.K., interview, August 28, 2009).¹⁹

The case of making Law on Environment demonstrated the effectiveness of this path in creating a kind of “semi-closed-semi-invited space” for CSOs to penetrate into even deeper level of policy processes (Barry, interview, October 14, 2009).²⁰

It is also true for the case of Propatria in making law on State Defence and on TNI. As members of its working group said, most of

¹⁹ Phone interview with Don K. Marut, Executive Director of INFID.

²⁰ Walhi and its network, Natural Resources Management proposed the change of the law by discussing it with Department of Health before surrendered to parliament. After several meetings, they came to agree that the Department would take an active role in drafting a bill supported by environment activists. Walhi then used it to establish communication with strategic MP figures such as Sony Keraf, former Minister of Environment and Catur from PAN. Their communication encouraged MPs to use their initiative right to propose a draft of bill, which was realized through the creation of a small team called “drafting team” within parliament (Barry, Director of WALHI [Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia, The Indonesian Environmental Forum] interview in Jakarta).

their time and energies were spent to convince many competing and fragmenting groups within the executive branch and military camp as an important step to convince parliament that such regulations were needed. As they said, only after the Minister and key military figures within the department as well as within the military headquarters showed their support, parliament started to open the forum to Propatria (Widjayanto, A., and Keliat, M., interview, August 12 and 13, 2009; Anggoro, K., and Bhakti, I.N., interview, August 14, 2009; Prasetyo, E., interview, August 15, 2009).²¹ The same pattern was also true for the case of making law on Police. CSO such as Ridep and Concern could only make their way to parliament after high-rank police officers gave signal of “approval” (Keliat, M., interview, August 12 and 13 2009; Sulistyoy, H., interview, October 4 and November 3, 2009; Moena, R., interview, November 2, 2009).²² While these cases seem to suggest different ways through which CSOs can penetrate even deeper into the policy arena, from a broader perspective these underline the persistence of unequal power relation between parliament and government, implying the persistence of hidden power, within the boundaries of new democratic space. Regardless of constitutional reform legally transferring decision-making power to the parliament, as in the past, the executive branch, military, and the police retain its important positions as sources of political legitimacy in the eyes of MPs. The executive branch, military and the police seem to have power to repress issues from not being transformed into agenda setting. These cases also question “the democratic transition” arguments on the centrality of constitutional and institutional reforms as well as proper regulations as key ingredients for the accomplishment of

²¹ Andi Widjayanto and Makmur Keliat, interview in Jakarta; Kusananto Anggoro and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, interview in Jakarta; Eddy Prasetyo, interview in Jakarta.

²² Makmur Keliat former Executive Director of Ridep (Research Institute for Democracy and Peace), interview in Jakarta, August 12 and 13 2009; Hermawan Sulistyoy, former Executive Director of Ridep, now Director of Concern Strategic Think Tank (a think tank dealing with securities issues), interview in Bogor and Jakarta; and Riefki Moena, Former Director of Ridep, interview in Jakarta.

democratic transition. It seems that all of these “crafting” institutions do not automatically lead to the transformation of power relations in favour of democratic principles.

There is another way through which CSOs create this “semi-closed-semi-invited space” so as permit them into even deeper policy area—that is by taking initiative to have an informal-limited meeting with MPs and his/her expert team to discuss specific issues. For example, Centre for Indonesia Risk Studies (CIRiS) during the of making the law on Gas and Mining invited one of the key MP, Arifin and his fellow expert to share information. This August 2008 meeting allowed CIRiS to get a clearer picture on some critical issues, then make use of them to draft a policy brief passed to MPs (Anggoro, K., and Endrayana, E., interview, August 10, 2009).²³

This research found that in most cases MPs and CSOs activists preferred to follow this path instead of having a more formal-institutionalized type of meeting. Apart from being more effective in exchanging information and views, as most resources persons argued, at the very least this kind of linkage is needed in earlier stages, functioning as transitory steps into a more formalized and institutionalized type of engagement (Prihantono, H., interview, October 15, 2009).²⁴ For the interest of individual CSOs, there is no doubt this kind of “space” is useful since it allows CSOs not only to have closer individual-based linkage with individuals, but also helps both sides to get clear picture of issues in concern. We would not know to what extent this was going to contribute to the democratization processes, but it seems that this case reconfirms both Eldridge and Nordholt findings on the great overlap of formal and informal structures as well of individual and institution in Indonesian politics.

²³ CIRiS: 2008; Kusnanto Anggoro, CIRiS Director Executive and Erwin Endrayana, CIRiS expert, interview in Jakarta.

²⁴ Hari Prihantono, Director Executive of ProPatria (a nonprofit organization that working on three issues: security sector, community based development, and cultural and education reform), interview in Jakarta.

Concluding Remarks: A Reflection

Our discussion so far has demonstrated that *reformasi* in Indonesia has created and multiplied new democratic spaces at both national and local places. Judging from their overt faces, the presence of these new democratic places has both broadened the political boundaries for inclusion where excluded people of the past have more room to exercise and claim their citizenship rights, and it has changed the nature of power relations between the state and the society as a whole, implying the emerging of more democratic linkages between *demos* and public affairs.

As I have argued, contrary to the authoritarian period of the New Order, today's CSOs have enjoyed political privileges of being part in the entire circle of policy processes. They have even been able to penetrate into deeper policy arena—agenda setting, pushing this “closed space” of the past to migrate to other edges of space continuum—“claimed space” of decision making. Viewed from a technocratic perspective, the involvement of CSOs are also important in legitimizing the processes and—as they have been able to introduce research—or evidence-based policy into the processes, in strengthening the quality of the policy.

It is also true that the presence of new democratic spaces has changed the entire worlds of both civil and political societies as demonstrated through the dramatic change within the worlds of CSOs and parliament, and the world that interlinks the two. CSOs have been able to claim their political role as intermediary power between *demos* and public affairs, changing the very nature of their previous limited role as advocates of *demos*. They are now living in the world of civil and political society alike. As for CSOs, parliament has also enjoyed a formal political role of being the prime locus of policy-making. Parliament is no longer functioning as a rubber stamp. Legally speaking, it is the real decision-making institution. The interlinking between the two has also changed. The “mutually disinterested” nature of CSOs-parliament relation in the past is now over as the political linkages between the two become more

intensive, leading to even more complex power relations between them.

However, it would be a misleading to conclude that Indonesia is now on the march toward democratization as proponents of “wave of democracy” of Huntington (1991) would argue, or has reached the stage of “democratic transition” as argued by Linz and Stepan (1996, 1998). As our discussion suggested, democratic potential is there. But the 12 years of *reformasi* marked by a massive instalment of liberal democratic institutions together with massive dispersion of power and political liberalization—as observed by Dhakidae (1998) and Lay (1998) in the early stage of Indonesian democratization, is still “*a long and winding road*” and “*an uphill battle*”, far from being closed to both the ideas of “deepening democracy” of Fung and Wright (2003) and of substantive democracy of Harriss *et al.* (2005). It is even far from the idea of “participatory democracy” as has been argued elsewhere by Gaventa, Cornwall, and many others, unless for a limited number of CSO activists.

This is so because, despite all of the above-mentioned changes, my research seems to suggest that even within the boundaries of “claimed space” that are assumed to be democratic in nature, the presence of a set of either “semi-closed-semi-invited spaces” or even “closed spaces” is very obvious. The reasons vary—starting from the very technical one as demonstrated through the case of “drafting team meeting” up to the very political one as in the case of making bill on Special Status of Aceh and of lobbying, the bottom line is the same: the effectiveness of the working of hidden and invisible power in determining the whole course of policies processes. It is a result as well as a reflection of unequal balance of power among actors where the old power remains the sources for political legitimacy.

This research also found that the nature of a space of being “claimed”, “invited” or “closed” is not only determined by who creates and the ability to make use of it within the given boundaries, but also by its relation to other set of spaces, issues in concern, and—while I did not display the data, time and infrastructure set up

around the spaces. As the case has shown, despite parliament having constitutionally been guaranteed to possess decision-making power, it still very much depends on other sets of spaces—ministerial office, military headquarter and lobby, in making decisions. In the future, it seems that the presence of this set of undemocratic spaces would be even more dangerous for democracy since there is a strong tendency of these “closed-spaces” to find their own niches to replicate themselves, leading to a possibility of being omnipresent, and are gradually being institutionalized within the wider democratic space.

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From “Normative Power” to “Global Governmentality”: An Assessment of European Union’s Engagement of Civil Society in Indonesia¹

Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar

Abstract

This article develops a theory of European power as ‘governmentality’, with a particular reference to European Union (EU)’s engagement of civil society in Indonesia through a package of “civil society strengthening programs”. In contrast to some arguments of ‘normative power’ or ‘civilian power’ in the European Union, that put emphasis on EU’s normative framework in explaining EU’s diplomatic engagements in world politics, this article argues that European Union’s global outreach is best seen as the politics of governmentality, which comprises the spread of norms to the “global south” through various developmental strategies in order to form particular subjectivities based on European Union’s “normative framework”. This argument will be applied to empirically explain the role of EU’s engagement of civil society in Indonesia. To substantiate the argument, this article will analyse (1) the debate on recent theorisation of “European power” in EU and International Relations studies, with a reference to Ian Manners’ conception of “Normative Power Europe”; (2) the snapshot of European Union’s key policies on International Development Assistance in Indonesia; and (3) the case of some projects related to “civil society strengthening programs” in Indonesia.

Keywords: *European Union; civil society; international development; democracy promotion; normative power; global governmentality.*

Introduction

The European Union (EU) has been widely acknowledged as one of the largest political entities in the world since its early formation in the late 1990s. In his famous article titled, *Journal of*

¹ Parts of this article were presented at the 3rd Convention of European Studies (Yogyakarta, May 2014) and appeared at Short Film “EU Democracy Promotion: What It is and Why It Matters” (Sheffield, June 2016). The author wishes to thank Muhadi Sugiono, Arie Ruhyanto, Yunizar Adiputera, Suci Lestari Yuana, Farieda Ilhami Zulaikha, Annisa Maulia Fahmi, and the reviewers for insightful comments and Paul James Cardwell for allowing the author to contribute some thoughts to his film.

Common Market Studies, Ian Manners coined the term ‘Normative Power’ to explain how the European Union established itself as one of the major forces in world politics. Since its foundation, according to Manners (2002), ‘norms’ have been central to EU’s foreign policy and EU’s relations with other political forces, which distinguishes the base of EU power from other major powers in international politics such as the United States, China, or Russia. The strength of EU power, according to Manners, is the ability to define ‘what is normal’ in world politics in a way that determines the structure of ‘normative order’ for the world (see also Manners, 2006). For example, one of EU’s values—which was defined by Manners as ‘norms’—is democracy and good governance, which EU has attempted to spread to large parts of the ‘global south’ through international development assistance and democracy promotion (see Gillespie & Young, 2002; Carbone, 2010). Through such international engagements, EU has been widely involved in providing development assistances to many countries that are on their way to the so-called ‘democratic transition’.

This article attempts to critically engage Manners’ argument of ‘normative power Europe’ by exploring EU’s role in international development assistances through an alternative framework, namely “governmentality”. Kicked-off by French philosopher Michael Foucault in one of his articles (1991), this concept has gained prominence in recent International Relations theoretical debates (see Neumann & Sending, 2010; Joseph, 2012; Vrsti, 2013; Chandler & Richmond, 2015; Hamilton, 2014; Kiersey & Stokes, 2013; Umar, 2016). This framework will be applied to further understand the politics and practice of EU’s international development assistance and democracy promotion in Post-New Order Indonesia, in which EU has been engaged during the democratic transition since 1998. More specifically, this article will analyse some of EU’s projects related to “Civil Society Strengthening Programs”, which is the core of EU’s main approach in promoting democracy, good governance, and Human Rights in Indonesia.

Applying the theory of “governmentality” as an alternative approach in understanding EU power does require some discussion on how such projects are able to structurally define not only “what is normal” in world politics, but also on specific techniques used by EU to craft a particular subjectivity that is inherent with the framework that EU holds in its foreign policy. It therefore needs a further analysis of both ideational and material forms of EU power (see Joseph & Bulmer 2016). Against this backdrop, this article will elaborate how EU supported Indonesian civil society to conduct some empowerment or advocacy activities by providing external helps, particularly financial assistance. In this context, this article will raise two questions: (1) How is the relationship between the European Union and civil society organisations in EU’s programs able to strengthen civil society in Indonesia?; and (2) How does EU’s engagement of civil society in Indonesia incorporate the EU’s norms and values into Indonesian governments and civil society organisations through EU-funded projects?

The argument of this article will be developed in five sections. The first section will provide some introductory remarks of this article. The second section will reconceptualise ‘European Power’ through the prism of “governmentality” by engaging the idea of ‘normative power’ developed by Ian Manners. The third section will provide a snapshot of EU’s civil society strengthening programs, which are arguably embedded with EU’s international development and democracy promotion strategies in the global south. The fourth section will assess how the EU’s civil society strengthening programs in Indonesia portray EU’s global governmental project in world politics, which locates Indonesian civil society in the global power nexus between ‘international development’ and ‘global liberal governmentality’ projected by the EU. The fifth section will provide conclusions and interesting insights into EU’s use of normative power.

Reconceptualising European Power: “Governmentality”

Approach

This section will theoretically engage with Ian Manners’ conception of ‘normative power’, provide some critical readings concerning this concept, and offer “governmentality” as an alternative approach to understand EU power. The argument of this section will proceed in two parts. While the first part will explain the idea of “Normative Power” in the understanding of EU power, the second part will develop a framework of global governmentality to sketch EU’s international development projects in the global south.

1. “Normative Power Europe” and the Contending Perspective on EU’s Global Engagements

In the dominating Realist perspectives of International Relations, “power” is defined in terms of ‘material power’ such as military or the political and economic size of a country (Morgenthau, 1956; Mearsheimer 2001). Practically, this concept of power is manifested into the form of ‘militarism’, which relates to the practice of influencing other states through military forces, defence systems, and many other ‘harsh’ sources of power (see Morgenthau, 1956). This concept of ‘power’ is challenged by the concept of ‘soft power’, that is according to Nye (2002), not only characterized by military power, but also the ability to influence by cultural-economic sources of power. Thus, “power” can be redefined, not only in the context of ‘political power’ but also cultural power that one state owns. This dimension of power, according to Manners (2002), gives some moral intentions to stop the fragility of statehood relations that results from the realist perspectives on power.

One could argue, however, that norms cannot be transformed to power until it is materialized in foreign policy practice (Pollack, 2010). This is where Manners’ ideas of Normative Power, which is based on constructivist arguments in International Relations theory, intervenes in the debate (see also Manners & Whitman, 2016). Aimed at bridging the contention between the liberal approach

based on ideational sources of power with the realist approach based on material sources, Manners identifies ‘normative power’ in terms of opinion, ideological, and norm-shaping forces that one state—more specifically, the European Union—possesses in world politics. Manners’ idea resonates with the idea of “normative multipolarity”, which argues that state power depends largely on states’ ideational resources, such as a forceful adherence to international law and institutions and a strong sense of collective identity, and contested throughout states’ involvement in diplomatic practices in world politics (Acharya, 2004).

This debate over conception of “power” has led this research to map the similar debate over “European Power”. Recent studies on European Union’s position in world politics posits EU power as a ‘civilian’ and later ‘normative’ power (Duchene, 1972; Bull, 1982; Manners, 2002). Maull (1990) conceptualises three elements of ‘civilian power’, namely: (1) the acceptance of cooperation with other political forces, rather than conflict, in the pursuit of international objectives; (2) the concentration on non-military means to secure national goals, and (3) a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues in international politics (also quoted in Smith, 2005). This notion of ‘civilian power’ came into the theoretical debate when Hedley Bull, a prominent IR English School theorist, argued that the increasing role of EU in military and defence policy has led to the adoption of the notion of ‘military power Europe’. He argued that the concept of ‘civilian power’ does not represent the realist concept of power, which has been defined as military power. Norms do not significantly construct EU’s Foreign Policy as a major political force in world politics. Thus, with this realist approach, Bull argued that EU’s power should be understood by how it can secure EU from external threat (Bull, 1982).

Ian Manners later challenged such arguments. According to Manners (2002), EU’s power should be read as one ideational resource, which can be transformed as the normative basis of EU Foreign Policy in its relation to another region. EU as a ‘giant’ state

that unites its ten member states constitutes a new discourse of power, which is based not only from a traditional form of “military power” but also the ideational foundations. There are four founding principles, which become the normative basis of EU: liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and rule of law. Those four principles, derived from the Treaty of European Union, then become important norms that constitute EU’s power in its relation to other political forces in the world. Other than that, these principles also become the major campaign in EU’s cooperation with states from different regions such as Southeast Asia.

Given these founding principles, Manners than argued that such foundations, which served as ideational basis of foreign policy is relevant to place EU in world politics. Addressing the multipolar world order, EU came with the opportunity to fulfil many spaces with its unique normative basis. EU has many ideational resources that build the identity of its foreign policy. According to Manners, EU’s specific norms can be conceptualised as a changer of norms in the international system based on the ‘so-called’ normative power. In Manners’ point of view, the principles constitute the normative basis of ‘European power’ that distinguishes EU’s concept of power from another state’s concept of power—particularly US—in their foreign policy. Manners finally concludes that the concept of normative power is the most suitable approach to understand EU’s foreign policy and engagement with other actors in global politics.

From this viewpoint, Manners coined a new term, ‘normative power’. This concept attempts to bridge Maull’s—and also Duchene’s—conception of ‘power’ to the normative foundations of European Union in its latest development, which is embedded in several EU’s foundational treaties. In his essay, challenging Hedley Bull’s scepticism over EU’s civilian power, Manners (2002) stated that the power of EU is located in a debate between the ‘*idea forces*’ and ‘ideological power’ which is focused on the ideational character in EU’s common principles (p. 239). This is, indeed, a constructivist

argument. According to Manners, this ideational character shapes the direction of EU's foreign policy and subsequently spreads EU norms to all over the world through what he called as 'norms diffusion'.

Elements of Manners' idea of 'normative power' will be described as follows. *First*, European Power derives their concept on what they believe as ideology. According to Manners (2002), the European Union has some treaty foundations, which derive some norms, like the Treaty of EU (TEU), the Treaty of the Establishment of European Commission (TEC), and etc. These treaties form a new 'way' of EU Foreign Policy. Those norms become a 'spirit' to formulate EU Foreign Policy in many aspects of cooperation, especially in 'global south countries'—programs that become a so-called *national interest*—in the context of supranationalism. This 'normative power' strengthens EU's position in world politics.

Second, European Power is determined by its norm-shaping forces (Manners, 2002; Pollack, 2010). It is the ability to shape conceptions of "normal" in world affairs that makes EU's normative power operate in world politics. Consisting of many states that have played major roles in world politics, such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and many other countries, EU has been able to drive world politics and define its 'normality' based on its interests. On the other hand, with its 'gigantic' size and high influence, EU can also drive public opinion in the global context, thus 'normalize' the world under EU's leadership.

According to Manners, what makes EU different with other political forces in world politics is its ability to manage its material resources under certain norms. EU has formulated its foundational principles that guide its foreign policy—liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedom, and rule of law. We can see, according to Manners, the manifestation of these norms in some actions that EU has conducted in several countries. One of the examples provided by Manners was the case of the death penalty in the Philippines and Nepal. After voting in favour of the

EU resolution Nepal abolished the penalty two months later, while the Philippines abstained from voting even though it still retained the penalty, but a year later it introduced a moratorium (Manners, 2002).

This case, according to Manners (2002), reflects how EU's normative power operates in world politics. EU's normative power is manifested through the combination of ideational bases, which are embedded in EU's foundational treaties, and its foreign relations with other countries. Since EU consists of many 'giant' states which have been considered as major political forces, and it has been politically involved in many issues in world politics, Manners suggested that norms have been central to the construction of EU's power. It is norms that drive EU's foreign policy and make their big size successfully operate in world politics.

Nevertheless, Ian Manners' conception on 'normative power' has also been widely criticized. Realists have been particularly critical of Manner's idealistic approach to EU's foreign policy by highlighting the importance of military and economic strength to tie down US hegemony in world politics, particularly after 9/11 (Pollack, 2010; Hyde-Price, 2006). A harsher critique even placed Manner's normative power as a justification of military-security dependence on the US—as several scholars implied, “the US makes the dinner and EU does the dishes” (Diez, 2005). Another critique accused 'normative power' of being immaterial and neglecting the political and economic aspects of 'power' (Pollack, 2010). Other critiques such as from Tilley (2012) suspect EU as having a 'double standard' in its human rights campaigns.

It is also important to consider that these criticisms have relied strongly upon the assumption that places EU as the subject in world politics. The normative power concept, as well as its Realist critics, according to Thomas Diez, have been very subjective in assessing EU's power due to its identification basis—EU as 'the I' and other parts of the world as 'the Other' (Diez, 2005). It thus creates a 'Eurocentric' tendency that places EU as the 'centre' of the world

order. Understanding EU's external engagements through this Eurocentric lens will put the study of EU in danger of dismissing the subjectivity of the global south at the expense of "European subjects" (Bhambra, 2009). It is important, therefore, to discuss EU's power in different subjectivity relations—by decentring EU and discussing EU's power in other perspectives—and thus unpacking the ideological tendencies that become a backdrop of EU's concept of power. Michael Foucault's work on "governmentality" will be helpful in unpacking those power relations in EU's international development and civil society strengthening programs in Indonesia.

2. Alternative Framework: Understanding EU Power as "Global Governmentality"

This article will make use of the concept of "governmentality" as an alternative to Manners' conception of normative power. Foucault defined government as the "conduct of conduct," a form of activity designed to shape personal, interpersonal and institutional conduct, as well as the conduct of political sovereignty (Foucault, 1991; Nadesan, 2008, pp. 15-16). Foucault argued that shifting regimes of government can be identified in part through shifting technologies and strategies of power. Rojas (2004) added the role of 'internationalised aid' as a new form of governmentality.

According to Rojas (2004, p. 99), power in the context of 'governmentality' is rationalized differently in terms of diverse modalities of government and specific knowledge associated with specific forms of rule. It constructs a new form of "developmentalism", in which the strategy incorporates the participatory planning, poverty alleviation, the strengthening power of civil society, but in the context of 'development' proposed by EU who diffuse their norms to their 'partners' and thus control the state indirectly through this strategy. Thus, 'development' in EU's programs has become a biopolitical tool that controls the 'global south subjects', and even constructs a new political subjectivity.

By using the concept of 'governmentality', this article

argues that EU's engagement through civil society strengthening programs is a form of 'government' that EU aims to build, construct, and develop in Indonesia. Development and its Civil Society Strengthening Programs—that have been embedded in EU's international development strategy—is an important tool to biopolitically cultivate a particular subjectivity inherent in EU's normative framework. It thus can be perceived as a form of 'global governance' that leads EU to play a major role in governing the global south. From this point of view, EU's involvement in global development projects cannot be merely identified as 'normative power'. Otherwise their development projects, although driven by certain norms that have been developed earlier, have been central to the subjectivity of the global south. From this 'global southist' perspective, EU's power should be read as 'global governmentality' rather than 'normative power'.

How could EU govern the global south and thus create a new form of subjectivity? To analyse EU's strategy, it is important to follow Pollack (2012) to analyse EU's material form of power. Since EU is comprised of many prominent European states, EU can combine sources of funds from many 'rich countries' in Europe. The amount of financial assistance managed by the European Commission—EU's governing body—is allocated to international development projects and is dedicated to help the global south countries who need financial aid or assistance. Consequently, EU can distribute their funds to states that need development and financial assistance. It is nonetheless creating a generosity power in EU's foreign policy.

However, it should also be noted that EU does not give development aid or assistance without conditionalities. There are some aspects and procedures to be committed to before 'partners' access financial assistance from EU, and one of them is 'good governance' conditionalities. These conditionalities thus become a 'bargaining position' for EU to campaign their norms, especially 'good governance', which promotes the principle of responsibility

to govern in accountable manners. It contains several procedures and prerequisites that should be met by those who wish to submit proposals for funding. These prerequisites and procedures are given in order to guarantee responsibility, transparency, and other forms of good governance—typical preconditions proposed by International Development Regimes (Li, 2002). By giving incentives, EU has indirectly forced stakeholders in the country (including government) to learn about democratic responsibility. It also promotes an anticorruption spirit that has become a spectre in developing or less-developed countries.

By using the concept of “governmentality”, it can be understood that the concept of *normative power* constitutes a new method of ‘governing’ in the global south. The process of governmentality can be understood as follows: EU provides development assistance to any countries that are in favour with EU’s norms. However, this financial assistance is not a ‘free-of-charge’ assistance. EU provides the assistance via its specific programs, prerequisites, and procedures—and thus placing its norms within development projects. In Indonesia, EU develops ‘Civil Society Strengthening Programs’ as a mean of development assistance. This unique program has been made to construct certain norms that are embedded within EU’s foreign policy. By placing particular norms, the EU are able to advocate a kind of ‘passive revolution’ in order to maintain their hegemony in third-world countries. EU’s development projects have also been used as a biopolitical tool to construct a model ‘government through society’ (Li, 2002; Harriss, 2003).

Based on this conceptual framework, this article argues that Manners’ idea of normative power needs to be redefined as a possible act to transform another state and give some spaces to EU to manifest their interests in the form of ‘government’ and its ‘governmental project’. EU power is manifested not only through foreign policy as a main tool, but also involves broader international engagements that emerged amid the structural transformation of world politics

after the Cold War. The rise of ‘post-Authoritarian’ states after the Cold War gives the opportunity for EU to engage not only with their ‘traditional’ North American counterparts, but also with broader actors in the ‘global south’ (Merlingen 2006; Bretherton & Vogler, 2009). In other words, EU’s complex external engagement through development assistances and democracy promotion, along with EU’s foreign policy in general, constitute a form of governmental project that aims to cultivate its norms in other part of the worlds through various cooperations and aids. It is therefore important to understand development cooperation and assistance as a political project (see Joseph, 2010).

The term ‘governmental project’ does not entirely have negative connotations. It to some extent could help beneficiary countries to undergo the democratic transition, thereby cultivating democratic culture of those states and preventing the ‘authoritarian nostalgia’ that seems to face post-authoritarian states in their transition towards democratisation (see also Huntington, 1997). However, the implementation of such development and democratic assistance also relates to social formation of EU’s power in the global south, which is interconnected with EU’s economic and security interests in the global south. From this critical perspective, this article will assess EU’s ‘governmental project’ as manifested in its international development, democracy promotion, and, more specifically, the civil society strengthening programs in Indonesia.

European Union and Civil Society Strengthening Programs in Indonesia

Having established the framework of ‘global governmentality’ to understand EU’s power, this article will proceed to explain how the EU’s governmentality works through their civil society strengthening programs in Indonesia. In doing so, this article will start by understanding the role of ‘civil society’ in world politics. This section will be divided into two parts. The first part will discuss the origins of civil society engagement in world politics, particularly

after the Cold War that lead to the ‘third wave of democratisation’ (Huntington, 1993). The second part will discuss EU’s engagement of civil society in Indonesia through their international development and democracy promotion projects.

1. The Origins of Civil Society Engagement in World Politics

It is widely assumed that the end of the Cold War has been marked by the emergence of ‘transnationalism’, ‘globalisation’, and the plurality of actors in world politics. International Relations is not only monopolised by the ‘state’ as single actors, but also recognizes the role of ‘non-state actors in world politics’ (Kegley, 2006; Widjojanto *et al.*, 2007; Riss-Kappen, 1995). One of the important actors, that have emerged after the Cold War, is civil society—those who are identified as ‘voluntary associations deliberately seeking to shape the rules that govern aspects of social life’ (Scholte, 2004). Civil Society has emerged in many post-authoritarian states as influential actors, following the so-called ‘democratic transition’ processes (Huntington, 1993). Since EU and other donor institutions have had ‘democracy’ as their foundational principles, Civil Society’s engagement has been central in their frameworks for development. Thus, discourses of civil society within an institutionalised democratic process has been transnationalised alongside the democratisation process itself, leading to many donor-led development projects that operate side-by-side with civil society’s engagement.

Standard ‘transition towards democratisation’ literatures argue that strong and vibrant civil society is an important ingredient of cultivating democratic cultures in post-authoritarian states (Huntington, 1993; Diamond, 1999; Uhlin, 1997). Democracy should be followed by strong popular participation, which is institutionalised through the democratic political system (see Dahl, 1956). Participation needs engagement from citizens to actively participate in the political process. It is in this context democracy needs civil society organisations as a key variable in maintaining

democratic political processes. Indonesia is often regarded as the best example of how vibrant civil societies will lead the country towards democratization (see Uhlin, 1993). After 1998, a democratic political change swept Indonesia and brought along several agendas to create a democratic state. This agenda, however, required many facilities and supports. Collaborations between Indonesian governments with several donor institutions whose aims to help Indonesia's development through loans and development assistances were crucial at this stage (see Carroll, 2012; Li, 2012). This cooperation was welcomed by many civil society organizations that had to deal with problems such as corruption, lack of capacity of government apparatuses, and poverty.

The transnationalization of civil society that appears in Indonesia gives some chances to EU and civil society both to meet and articulate their interest in mutualistic relations (Widjojanto *et al.*, 2007). EU could distribute development funds and impose certain norms to Indonesia's development practices, while Civil Society could obtain financial support for their programs. This mutual interest has been made possible after 1998 due to several shifts in donor frameworks in distributing aids. Before 1998, donor's involvement in Indonesia had targeted Government and its technocratic infrastructures. However, since the *reformasi*, Civil Society and other non-state actors have been the main target of donor's development projects due to the so-called 'good governance' projects (Hadiwinata, 2003). Through several EU-funded projects, civil society comes to join in the EU scheme of 'international development policy' (Bossuyt, 2006). The cooperation between EU and civil society then becomes a *modus operandi* of EU to spread their norms in its development cooperation with another country. The importance of civil society can be seen in the community involvement endorsed by EU. Endorsement over public participation enables civil society organisations to be more involved in decision-making processes.

It was started in EU's development policy. EU had formalised its relations with states from Africa, the Caribbean, and the Asia-Pacific (later abbreviated as ACP) under the Cotonou Agreement, which was signed in June 2000. This agreement legally recognised the essential role that non-state actors can play in the development process. The purpose is not to oppose governments, but to foster dialogue and collaboration between the different development players (Bossuyt, 2006). This agreement has been the embryo of the so-called 'Civil Society Strengthening Programs' that are central in EU's international development frameworks. In November 2002, the European Commission published a new strategy that put more emphasis on the role of non-state actors within EU's development policy (see Hurt, 2006).

Thus, under the Cotonou Agreement and the following cooperations that EU had signed after 2000, civil society's involvement has played a major role in EU's international development frameworks. EU's democracy promotion in Africa, for instance, has also endorsed civil society's involvement to safeguard the democratic mechanism and development processes (Crawford, 2006, p. 143). Ghana can be a good example of this democracy promotion program. Following the signing of the Cotonou Agreement, the European Commission adopted a new Country Strategy Paper (CSP) that placed emphasis on civil society strengthening and assistance to NGOs. Projects are generally administered with local governments (District Assemblies), with some involvement from beneficiary communities, and thus encouraging grass-root stakeholders to be more involved in development processes (Crawford, 2006, p. 144).

2. Civil Society Strengthening Programs and EU's International Development Projects in Indonesia

Historically, before the Partnership & Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed in the late 2000s, the cooperation between EU and Indonesia was conducted under The Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to European Communities (PRIME) which was

established in 1990. The mission's objective is to accommodate the growing needs for nurturing relations between Indonesia and the EU. EU-Indonesia Partnership & Cooperation Agreement was firstly formalised and signed in 2003. In that PCA, EU agreed to support Non-State Actors to conduct capacity development and institutional strengthening for education stakeholders. The aim of this cooperation, according to this PCA, is to improve access to quality education and increase transparency and monitoring of education budgets. There are 6 on-going projects with Non-State Actors with a total EU support of more than €1 million, PCA reports.

Totally, there were at least 70 projects funded by EU, covering 8 sectors which have formed a cooperation basis in Indonesia-EU's PCA. Civil Society's involvement is included in democracy, government, and human rights sectors. There are several projects funded by EU in the context of civil society activities in Indonesia. There are, for example, advocacy programs for Special Autonomy Fund for the Implementation of Education Quality in Papua, partnerships among Government, Parliament and Civil Society in Support for Pro-Poor and Gender-Responsive Budget Initiatives in South Sulawesi, Capacity Building for Local CSOs to Enhance Democratic Participation and Representation in Aceh and Papua, and the Civil Society Engagement in Improving Quality and Access to Education.

In this article, I will take a deeper look at program samples in three sectors: education, anticorruption, and social empowerment. In the education sector, there was a project for Promoting Transparency, Accountability and Effectiveness in the Management of Education Deconcentration Fund. It was conducted by *Pusat Studi Pengembangan Kawasan (PSPK) Tunggal* in 6 cities: Lampung, Semarang, Samarinda, Kupang, Makassar, and Jakarta. The purpose of this program is to promote transparency, accountability, and effectiveness in the management of the education deconcentration

fund. PSPK Tunggal worked from 01/2009 to 01/2011.² It is interesting to see the result—educational budgeting is in fact very corrupted because of the lack of transparency of the educational institution itself. Thus, the civil society strengthening program was concentrated on the budget monitoring and transparency so that the public can access information from the educational institutions.

We can see another program in education: Encouraging School Accountability System to Ensure School Service Affordability for the Poor. This program was conducted by PATTIRO (*Pusat Telaah Dan Informasi Regional*) in 3 regencies: Serang, Gresik, and Malang, funded for about € 171,899.95 by EU. PATTIRO tried to promote an education expenditure system at schools that facilitate students of poor families to receive affordable education services by maintaining accountability of education fund usage at schools.³

In the anticorruption sector, there was also an advocacy support for Public Procurement Reform in Local Government by Promoting Stakeholders Participation as a Means of Corruption Eradication in Public Service Delivery. It was conducted in Purwakarta and Indramayu by Yayasan Bandung Trust Advisory Group from 2009 until 2010. EU contributed funding of € 121,112 total.⁴ The purpose of this program was to reform public procurement in the endeavours of accomplishing good governance and preventing corruption through espousing local stakeholders' participation. In this sense, EU tried to prevent corruption by enhancing public participation. This approach—which is very similar with the neoliberal approach—sees corruption as a result of the lack of transparency from public institution and thus the institutional reform as well as greater public control should be encouraged. Thus, the effort to prevent corruption, according to EC, should be conducted through participation strengthening of civil society.

² http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/indonesia/projects/list_of_projects/172234_en.htm.

³ http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/indonesia/projects/list_of_projects/172462_en.htm.

⁴ http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/indonesia/projects/list_of_projects/172334_en.htm.

Lastly, we should also see EU-funded programs in social empowerment. From 2010-2014, Bandung Institute of Governance Studies (BIGS) held a project to encourage local governments in implementing the National Action Plan on Human Rights (RANHAM) for 4 consecutive years in the framework of ECOSOC rights. Fulfilment in education, health and economic sectors were the main concerns of this program. Generally speaking, this program was a response to a government program RANHAM (*Rencana Aksi Nasional tentang HAM*) that was proposed by the local government. Focusing on economic and social rights, the program was conducted in Bandung and Cimahi, two regencies in West Java and fully supported by EU.⁵ Those programs, before being accepted to be funded, should follow some complicated procedures.

According to Amin Sudarsono (Interview, January 3, 2011), a former PATTIRO activist who conducted EU-funded projects several times in Malang, Gresik, and Serang, applicants were invited for a presentation in the EU office in Jakarta before applying for EU projects. The presentation was followed by a tender selection to see which proposals are suitable for financial supports. It is a complicated procedure. It required a high sense of responsibility to manage and report the project, since the program should be reported in detail, especially for the financial report (Interview, January 3, 2011). If an applicant won the tender, there should be a letter of interest and proposal summary sent to the EU office. It is then selected and revised by EU Commission (there was another tender for the revision). After the second tender, applicants sent a complete proposal with the budget. Then the program was conducted with some periodic evaluations. If the program was fulfilled, the project manager should send a responsibility report to EU with the budget usage explanation. EU requires professionalism and accountability to select the right persons to handle the project.

⁵ http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/indonesia/projects/list_of_projects/212707_en.htm

However, these EU-funded programs should also be analysed in a different perspective. What is the primary purpose of EU in spreading some fresh financial assistance to civil society organizations in funding their projects? What is the objective of the civil society organization in participating in those projects? What is the relationship between Civil Society Strengthening Programs with the construction of EU's global governmental project in the global south? The following part will analyse the formation EU's politics of global governmentality through their Civil Society's Strengthening Programs in Indonesia.

Not Necessarily Normative? A Critical Assessment of European Union's Engagement of Civil Society in Indonesia

EU-Indonesia Cooperation in Civil Society Strengthening Programs that had been presented before cannot be separated from EU's political interests in supporting Indonesia's development programs and assisting its democratic transitions. This section will apply the 'governmentality' approach in analysing EU's Civil Society Strengthening Programs in Indonesia. As presented in the previous part, civil society strengthening programs constitute a part of EU's democracy promotion to newly democratic states. Even though it contributes to develop democratization processes in Indonesia, there are also several aspects that should be criticized in the program.

This article will be departing from the discussion of EU's power. From the 'normative power' lens, as previously argued by Ian Manners, power should be understood on the basis of EU's ability to define 'what is normal' in world politics. In other words, we can say that EU's power relied upon the 'normalization process'—or in constructivist perspective, on how to diffuse norms to the real world. As argued by Ian Manners, EU works as a 'norms promoter' who has been able to use force in favour of redefining international norms in its own image (cited in Fiott, 2011). The particular norms that EU promotes, in the case of Indonesia, are democratic norms,

which are based upon the premise of popular participation and the importance of a vibrant and strong civil society in the country (see Kurki, 2011).

In the Indonesian case, the governmentality process operates in the international development projects. EU shared many funds to develop and introduce Indonesian society to good governance, education, social empowerment, and anticorruption projects (EC, 2009). In this context, EU used the “third actor” to conduct the project—the Civil Society. However, Civil Society does not implement the project on their self-defined interests; they have to meet EU’s prerequisites and procedures. This process has been described by Foucault as *technologies of the self* or *biopolitics*. Civil Society played a major role in employing the *technologies of the self* by doing advocacy under certain norms that had been imposed in funding and its procedures. The degree of successfulness is measured through some measurements provided by the donors—it involves local consultants in the process.⁶ Thus, within this mechanism, the Civil Society Strengthening Programs along with its complicated procedures and prerequisites have been an effective biopolitical tool that controls Indonesia’s development practice in appropriation of EU’s norms.

Therefore, Civil Society Strengthening Programs have been embedded with EU’s international development strategies, which are supported by financial assistances that, as previously discussed, were given to Indonesian civil society. By providing some grants and projects, EU has been able to diffuse its norms and also drive the socio-political changes in Indonesia, which did not only appear in terms of corruption eradications, poverty alleviations, and many other programs, but also in a formation of a new ‘discourse’ of development. Such norms that EU proposed were thus diffused

⁶ For instances, there are many publications from civil society organizations who have successfully conducted advocacy with financial supports from donor institutions. EU and the World Bank also published some success stories that has been made ‘best practice’ for Civil Society to do advocacy under donor’s assistances.

in specific projects that had been conducted by CSOs under EU's prerequisites. Thus, the CSOs independently managed the projects under strict circumstances given by EU.

Consider, for example, the case of Public Procurement Reform in Local Government by Promoting Stakeholders Participation as a Means of Corruption Eradication in Public Service Delivery. The European Commission had mentioned that the aim of this program was to develop a reliable procurement system in the Indramayu and Purwakarta districts that underscores the principles of FATCEO (Fairness, Accountability, Transparency, Competition, Efficiency/Effectiveness, Openness) and easy access. To that end, the European Commission provides technical assistance to incorporate community participation at all stages, therefore ensuring community participations in public service delivery in accordance with the principles of transparency, accountability, and broader good governance.

This project highlights how the European Commission promotes their perspective of transparency and accountability in public delivery through two particular strategies: the use of 'procurement'—or more broadly 'technological tools'—and stakeholders engagement (see Greenwood, 2003). The process highlights the governmental processes that enable EU not only to deliver its norms to beneficiary countries, but also to create a system of democratic accountability in the grass-roots level. The combination of the use of 'technological tools' and democratic systems of participation is promoted as a 'model' for public management in the 'global south', which is embedded in EU-funded programs in Indramayu and Purwakarta. The principles of FATCEO (Fairness, Accountability, Transparency, Competition, Efficiency/Effectiveness, Openness) represent the normative framework that is put to work through EU's technical assistance toward greater community participation in managing the public procurement.

The case of Public Procurement Reform in Local Government by Promoting Stakeholders Participation as a Means of Corruption

Eradication in Public Service Delivery illustrates two ways in which Civil Society engages with EU, which exposes the particular form of “governmentality” that EU aims to promote in Indonesia. *First*, Civil Society is central in diffusing EU’s norms to the real world, and thus creating some degrees of normality. In the process, EU will be able to strengthen civil society capacity in conducting advocacy, particularly in several issues related to local democratization, respect for human rights, and good governance. Thus, projects that are funded by EU can lead to social change. From such perspectives, EU is able to cultivate particular subjectivities (such as “good governance”) through financial assistances to NGOs that lead to their active participation in influencing the practice of local governance.

From this point of view, “normative power” is not necessarily “normative”, in the sense that it always goes hand-in-hand with a material form of power. Therefore, normative power could work only if there are reciprocal relationships between ‘norms’—as a main source of power with a strong economy or even diplomacy that supports the norms diffusion in the global south. It is in this context some analyses of EU’s international development practices stress how important it is to understand how EU develops their bases of ‘normative power’.

Second, in the procedural level, EU funding for several projects also creates some practices of “norm internalization” for Indonesia Civil Society. The procedure to access those fundings is not as simple as fresh financial assistance for example that given by China to Angola. EU gives some prerequisites that are to be fulfilled by candidates who wish to apply for the project. A strict procedure creates responsibility for Civil Society Organizations. In a wider context, EU seems to provide a kind of ‘education’ for Indonesians to be accountable in using the funds, so that the corruption can be prevented and minimalised. EU sees ‘accountability’ as a belief in the neo-liberal perspective that sees the best way to combat corruption and prevent the dysfunction of state apparatuses is by increasing

public control. It is why EU introduced ‘good governance’ as a specific norm that entails many aspects of accountability and thus involving Civil Society in the process.

The main benefit that they can gain is financial benefits. Civil Society Organisations will be able to find some financial supports to operationalise their programs. Through financial supports provided by EU, their objectives can be obtained. The second benefit is related to the making of a democratic environment that enables civil society to be more involved in decision-making processes, and thus minimizing risks of confrontation with the governments.

The normative power approach seems to overlook this question by providing only a little concern regarding the global south’s perspective. Such relations between EU and Indonesia’s CSOs will lead to the constitution of identity, which involves the construction of ‘the I’ and ‘the Other’ (Diez, 2005). The normative power approach has overlooked the subjectivity of Indonesia’s CSOs that has just reappeared in Indonesia’s democratic transition processes. Thus, the question of ‘identity’ should be addressed in a critical perspective. It is within this context the concept of ‘governmentality’ is useful. Foucault, for example, argues that certain norms that are imposed in a society are in fact an inseparable part of liberal governmentality, which recognizes that social fields—the state, the market, and population—are heterogeneous spaces constituted in relation to multiple systems of power, networks of control, and strategies of resistance (Nadesan, 2008: 10). The externality of the law was supplemented and replaced by the internality of “norm”—in which Foucault linked it with the relations of power to persuade society (2008: 22).

EU’s governmentality was also made possible by the decentralization and regional autonomy context that has been established in Indonesia since 1999.⁷ Hadiz (2010: 69) argued that

⁷ For clearer explanations on Regional Autonomy and social development practices in Indonesia, see Hadiz (2010), Erb and Sulistyanto (2009), or Carroll (2012).

the decentralization projects in Indonesia also were followed by some institutional changes, which were driven by external forces such as the World Bank and EU. There were at least twelve institutional changes that occurred in Indonesia after the *reformasi*, including the establishment of the *kabupaten* and the *kota*, as the focal points of regional governance, and decentralization of power—such as budgeting—to enable the *kabupaten* and *kota* government to manage their own resources. Those changes also include the ability of local government (*kabupaten*) to secure loans from the Special Allocation Grant (DAK) provided by the central government through which special regional initiatives could be funded (2010: 78-79). In his previous article, Hadiz also argued that the decentralization scheme, which is advocated by external forces such as The World Bank and European Union created many contradictions, especially in political economic relations in local politics, which formed a new political hybrid of the old New Order oligarchy (Hadiz, 2004).

Thus, it can be concluded that the actual basis of EU's power is located within the implementation processes of development assistance programs instead of certain norms imposed on those programs. From the perspective of 'governmentality', the way in which EU bases their power does not necessarily rely solely upon the promotion of 'norms' but also in the way they engage with the community through aid giving practices, technical assistances, and more importantly international development programs funded by EU. The manifestation of EU's actual power, within this multifaceted approach, is the construction of 'post-authoritarian' Indonesian subjectivity that was built upon Civil Society's involvement and government's obedience to EU's tight procedures. Civil Society constitutes the *technologies of the self* and its role is central to EU's governmentality processes. The main goal of EU's motivation, in this context, can be tracked down to its neoliberal approach that is embedded in 'good governance' and decentralization politics that have been implemented in Indonesia since 1999. Further studies are required to breakdown and delineate this neoliberal vision.

Nevertheless, it is obvious that EU's governmentality cannot be separated from the so-called 'neoliberal development policy' that has been a global consensus in post-Cold War world politics, even though it is operated in a softer manner.

Conclusion

This article has analysed EU's Civil Society Strengthening Programs in Indonesia and how it relates to the projection of EU governmentality in global politics. Two conclusions could be generated. *First*, EU's power in the developing countries, more specifically in Indonesia, operates through advocacy projects conducted by Civil Society Organizations. In the Indonesian context, civil society organization's activities significantly improved after the *reformasi* served to guide the democratization process. While the European Union believes in democracy as its fundamental norm, it assists the advocacy from Indonesian Civil Society Organizations through various financial grants. It therefore constructs power relations between the 'funded' donor programs with the EU's democracy promotion agenda that is embedded in its foreign policy.

Second, the purpose of EU in giving incentives to those projects is not purely 'normative'. Rather, it also contains particular political programs in the broader global context. From the "governmentality" perspective, it can be concluded that EU's Civil Society's Strengthening Programs are also considered a tool to construct particular modes of subjectivity of Indonesia's Civil Society. By analysing the strict procedures and prerequisites that EU apply in order to impose certain norms in its projects, EU's normative power is basically political. This mode of governmentality, which has been practiced by EU in its emerging international development projects, has led to a shifting paradigm of power in International Relations that does not necessarily rely upon state 'power', but also incorporates more complex techniques, tools, and strategies. The case of EU's engagement of civil society in Indonesia exemplifies this argument by reflecting the construction of EU power not only in

traditional diplomatic or military strengths, but also in the practices of international development and democracy promotion.

Viewed from this perspective, this article has acquired two theoretical implications of the conceptualization of ‘power’ in global politics, particularly those related to the European Union and the ‘Global South’: *First*, ‘power’ cannot be understood merely on its ‘material’ or juridico-institutional basis, but also on its influence on the making of a particular society. It is thus important to identify ‘power’ in diverse and multiple aspects. *Second*, we need to consider aid giving practices, which are accessed by civil society organizations, as a strategy of ‘governmentality’ that is constitutive to the construction of EU’s normative framework and political subjectivity in the global south. With the essential help of civil society as the executor of such programs, EU has been able thus to confront ‘state-led’ development policy and narrate ‘good governance’—which is inherent in the neoliberal logic of development—as a framework of development through technical and financial assistances. Therefore, we could conclude that EU’s Civil Society Strengthening Programs is also constitutive to the neoliberal development model as promoted by the European Union.

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The Islamic Fundamentalist's Politics of Dissents and the Emergence of Urban Citizenship in Yogyakarta¹

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Abstract

This study seeks to add to the ongoing debate regarding the state of multiculturalism within Indonesia political landscape. Using Yogyakarta as an exemplary case, this study suggests that the so called radical groups' political practices should be situated within the spatial formation of urban politics. This will shed new horizon on the political myth which has been redressing violence as values or belief-driven reproduced by certain groups and gradually expanding it as mode of political engagement. Representing space as a political register which is discursively constituted by three dominant discourses; local identities, multiculturalism, and lastly global terrorism. This study argues that Yogyakarta citizens are subjected to the interplay between these three forces which composed the urban space of Yogyakarta as a local, national and global entity. Within this context, the expression of radical groups should be viewed as politics of dissent which target to alter and appropriate the three spatial conjunctures which characterized Yogyakarta. This shows that the articulation of dissent and discontent are effective political forms to engage with the notion of urban citizenship.

Keywords: *urban citizenship; multi-scalar politics; dissent; Islam politics.*

Introduction

The tension brought forward by the political practices, ideas, and sentiments of muslim fundamentalist groups continue to characterize the urban political landscape in Indonesia. Recent

¹ The data used by this essay is previously collected for the following research: "Does Intolerance Always Matter: Dynamics Coexistence of Pluralism and Islamist Radicalism in Java", by Hakimul Ikhwan, Muhammad Najib Azca, Rohdi Mohan Nazala, Syahrul Hidayat, Zaki Arrobi, Fachry Adulsyah, and Rizky Alif Alvian (FISIPOL UGM-The Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter, 2015); and "Fenomena Sektarianisme di Indonesia", funded by Maarif Institute for Culture and Humanity (2015). The authors thank the above mentioned names and institutions for their permission to use the collected data for this essay.

trends have been illustrative to demonstrate such political events ranging from massive campaigns against Ahmadiyya, Shia, and sexual minorities; demonstrations against academic discussions pertaining to communism and pluralism; conflicts concerning churches' development and other houses of worship; as well as opposition against non-muslim leaders in electoral politics.

Within the academic and policy debates, dominant approaches tend to portray such political events as the failure to integrate and conform with multiculturalism, tolerance, and liberal democratic values. Citizens that are associated with fundamentalist ideas in Indonesian politics are conceived as defected citizens as they are unable to think and act according to hegemonic societal standards which regulate the borders of being good and bad citizens. Their inability to perform in adherence to hegemonic Indonesian principles—to avoid political confrontation, respecting religious and ethnic differences among citizens, and to maintain harmonious inter-faith relationships—are easily categorized within the political spectrum as deviations and illiberal subjects. Furthermore, this 'deviation and illiberal representation' is frequently utilized both by NGOs and bodies of government to legitimate moral education and inter-faith trainings which aim to correct deviation behaviours—occasionally coupled with religious preaching to fix citizens' interpretations of religious doctrines.

This essay sets out to offer a different perspective as well as narrative on religio-political issues. Through redressing the violence rendered by fundamentalist groups, this essay argues that the so-called politics of dissent should be situated within the broader set of urban political settings constituted by multiple political engagements, power contestation, and appropriation of hegemonic discourse. In other words, this essay proposes that the dissent/radical practices of fundamentalist groups should be considered at the onset as forms of urban citizenship. Through a re-reading of political narratives based on interviews with Islamic groups in Yogyakarta, this essay attempts to demonstrate that radical

practices constitutively expose the limit of current urban societal formation underpinned by neoliberal principles and struggle to reshape urban power configurations. Central to this possibility of transforming urban structure is the interplay of exclusion-inclusion in rendering subject positions. Therefore, taking account of the power relationships and unequal effect is pivotal to understand the narrative of fundamentalist groups.

Attention to the importance of space plays a determinant role to comprehend the articulation of citizenship performed through political intervention and disruption. Besides space and place being heavily implicated by the reconfiguration of the global economy structuring the flow of capital and labour, they also regulate citizens' bodies and social conducts. Precisely at this point where space becomes a technology of power we argue that political subjectivity may emerge as citizens' bodies are conditioned by multiple and multi-layered spaces which regulate normative behaviour (Sassen, 1991; Foucault, 1991). Pertaining to the spatial politics of Yogyakarta are three important discourses: space of 'multiculturalism'; space of 'national unity'; and the space of 'locality'. This essay argues that fundamentalist groups' spatial practices can be read as contestation and resistance to these different spatial frameworks which impose discursive and material exclusion and marginalization. In return, all of their endeavours are directed to challenge the exclusion boundaries characterized by the dominance of liberal democratic values and mechanisms.

This essay will be divided into several sections. *First*, this essay will discuss the concept of "space" and "citizenship" and how these two concepts relate to each other. *Second*, the dominant approach to identity politics, in this context, the liberal approach will be discussed as well as the outlining of their limitations. *Third*, this essay will identify various practices of fundamentalist groups in Yogyakarta and show that these practices can be considered as practices of citizenship. *Fourth*, this essay will attempt to identify multiple spaces that underlie those practices and how fundamentalist

groups' practices of citizenship relate to these multiple spaces.

Space and Citizenship

There has been a 'spatial turn' in conceptualizing the notion of citizenship. This spatial turn nevertheless does not propose a new conception of citizenship. The spatial turn rather invigorates the spatial and temporal dimensions of citizenship that are often set aside in citizenship studies. The spatial turn rises into prominence particularly when the factory or industrial base is no longer perceived as the only means of production that can divide society into two competing groups (Lefebvre, 1991).

As capitalism as an economic system is transformed into a more sophisticated machine commodifying and reifying every aspect of daily lives, the notion of space becomes one of the central commodities for contemporary capitalism. Lefebvre's (1991) conceptualization of the triad moments of social space is fruitful to elaborate the concept of this spatial turn. He argues that there is a dialectic between the notions of 'spatial practice', 'representation of space', and 'representational space' which characterize our society today. The notion of 'representation of space' is the space conceptualized by city planners, urbanists, and technocrats, which entails places where our daily lives are performed (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 38). In other words, this is the space constructed by social actors who have the formal authority to govern which simultaneously is the space where our day to day social practices are occurring. Arguably, this law of 'representations of space' is conceived by the municipal and provincial governments seeking to produce order in the city settings (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 33).

Aside from the formal conceptualization of space there is the notion of 'representational space' attentive to everyday spatial practices and the production of 'space of representation'. This notion of 'representational space' or 'space of representation' encompasses the day to day practices of urban citizens and the living space, where the latter is associated with images and symbols,

revealing how a particular place is felt to be important for a certain group, “Space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols ... It overlays physical space, making symbolic use of its objects” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 39). In other words, ‘representational space’ is the space which is constituted not only through tangible materials but also meanings, memories, utopias, dreams, and so on (Sack, 1997). Arguably, the triadic relationship between spatial practices, representational space, and space of representation will lead to a comprehensive investigation on what people actually do in that space, and how they conceptualise their own relationships to that space (Anjaria, 2006, p. 2140).

The triadic moments of space constitution described above while on the one side arguably bring back spatial and temporal dimensions into citizenship debates thereby opening up theoretical gaps regarding the political influence of space within power contestation, on the other side, it needs to be complemented with the nature of space. The nature or formation of space enables us to identify the deployment of power, both strategies and methods, in regulating subject positions. Harvey (2006) proposed triple layers of spatial configuration which enrich the notion of this spatial turn. Similar to how Lefebvre distinguishes between the notion of ‘representational space’, ‘spatial practices’, and the ‘space of representation’, Harvey argues that there are the notions of ‘absolute space’, ‘relative space’, and ‘relational space’ (2006). The first two notions, absolute space and relative space, Harvey describes as the dominant perspectives which imagine every social process can be quantified and thereby banishing all uncertainties and ambiguities (2006). This is problematic because as he explains: “Processes do not occur *in* space but define their own spatial frame” (Harvey, 2006). Through our daily practices, our actions do not only occur in a space, but also construct its own perceptions of space and place. In turn, this spatial framing influences or alters our daily practices. Harvey calls this notion as ‘relational space’.

Combining Lefebvre’s (1991) conception of triadic moments

of space with Harvey's (2006) notions on space, particularly spatial relationality, excites the horizon of discussion of urban politics for two following reasons. *First*, space can no longer be conceived of as given and fixed. Instead, space is an object of transformation: its limits can be redrawn, its rules reformulated, its power structure altered, and its members rearranged. This transformation, moreover, is inherently political. The dominant discourse in a space attempts to regulate and normalize people's daily conduct while people organize daily resistance, invest new meanings and imaginations to their space, or even appropriate dominating rules and discourses for their own purposes (de Carteau, 1984). *Second*, space functions not only as a container of spatial practices. Space determines the form of spatial practices that emerge within it. Its scale—its limit and scope—shape people's practices, memberships, institutions, and politics. Space's regime of representations also determines what is considered to be proper conduct inside a certain space (Elden, 2001; Foucault, 1991). However, since space itself is always an object of politics—thus, reinventions, redrawings, and reformulations—different spaces are possible to exist at the same moment (Marston, 2000). This condition brings interesting implications: urban citizens are living in different spaces with their different regimes of representations simultaneously. A body is thus being regulated by different logics of appropriateness and required to respond—or resist—all these normalizing powers at the same time (Harvey, 2000).

To begin with an illustration, the politics of informal traders in Jakarta embodies this tension of multiple spatial forms and relationships producing vulnerabilities as well as allowing the possibility for negotiation and even mass protests to erupt (Hasibuan, 2013). Situated within urban settings that facilitate and restrict urban poor spatial practices and movements, Hasibuan finds that political subjectivity is articulated both through 'small-p politics' and 'big-P politics' (Amin & Thrift, 2007). Whereas big-P politics are arenas such as legislatures and city halls, small-p politics

“is the space where power struggles are not specifically territorial or locally fixed”. This distinction between two political expressions are important because politics of space sometimes occur in day to day agreements—“ordinary space of negotiation”—which entails extra-legal negotiations with various actors that retain power over a space (Anjaria, 2003). Primarily in urban areas like Jakarta this form of political engagement is directly linked with the long absence of representation within the big-P politics. In other words, these extra-legal activities can be discerned as “unwritten rules of engagement that operate outside of conventionally defined spaces of ‘civil society’ and the formal legal institutions of the state” (Robins *et al.*, 2008, p. 1076).

This essay therefore makes several claims on the relation between space and citizenship. *First*, the practice of citizenship is inherently spatial. This means that citizenship always assumes a certain spatial framework that, in turn, shapes the practice of citizenship itself. Different spatial frameworks arrange people in different ways and thus indirectly shape citizens’ strategies in organizing resistance, making demands, and determining who are their fellows and enemies. Or to put it in another phrase, the practice of citizenship is determined by multiple spaces within which the body of citizens is living. As previously discussed, this condition makes the practice of citizenship complicated since it internalizes various conflicting rules and requires it to give different responses to those rules—ranging from compliance to resistance. *Second*, the spatial framework which is assumed by citizenship practice is characterized by its relationality. This relationality results from the political process which produces, contests, and reproduces space itself. This implies that the politics of space will necessarily alter the practice of citizenship: members of a political community can be expelled or the rules of community can be reformulated.

The power of this perspective in illuminating fundamentalist groups’ practices of citizenship will be salient if we try to scrutinize dominant approaches to religious fundamentalism and the politics

of citizenship in Indonesia. The subsequent section will attempt to do this task and reveal the gap which this approach aims to fill in.

Space and Liberal Citizenship

Numerous studies have been made to understand the practice of citizenship—especially in its relation to the issue of multiculturalism—in contemporary Indonesia. Syaiful (2013), Qodir (2015), Latief (2015), and Robert and Tobi (2011) are among the Indonesian scholars that have investigated the ongoing exclusions and discrimination practices targeted towards minority groups. Furthermore, adding to this group of Indonesian scholars are international academics and NGOs that refer to identity politics and the rights-based approach as the underpinning conceptual framework to extrapolate multiculturalism issues in Indonesia (Wahid Institute, Komnas HAM, Setara Institute, Telle, 2013; Sidel, 2006; Fealy, 2004; Assyaukanie, 2009; Hasan, 2002; Abuza, 2007). Within this cluster of multicultural studies significant contributions have been made expanding our understanding of Indonesia's current socio-political situation where, for instance, minority groups are left vulnerable and with little protections of citizens' rights by the state. On the other hand, this study identifies that within this area of knowledge production the notions of space are still under-represented and undertheorized.

Those aforementioned studies are largely conducted under the light of the liberal approach to the problem of citizenship. In this regard, liberal citizenship posits that citizens are members of a homogeneous polity possessing some form of rights which have to be guaranteed by the state (Isin, 2002; Held, 2005). In developing this stream of argument, the liberal approach implicitly assumes that all citizens have similar conceptions of what it means to be a citizen, that is to have similar rights—with similar understandings on the content of those rights; to have their rights protected by the state; and not to intervene with the rights of the others (Wolfe & Hittinger, 2003; cf. Mouffe, 1991 and 1992). This notion of liberal citizenship

while providing rights discourse as the political marker at the same time renders it impossible to be deployed as a form of political engagement as it presupposes rights as inherently given by the sovereign body. In this context, rights become a marker that reified space as being a fixed material with salient boundaries and citizens are only subjects who identify and constitute themselves according to this set of rights discourses. It is from this presupposition that various citizenship literatures in Indonesia denigrate fundamentalist groups' practices as illiberal subjects (cf. Brown, 2006 & Toscano, 2011).

The idea of citizen itself is a constant object of political struggle (Isin, 2002). As space is reimagined as a neutral zone with clear borders, nevertheless, fundamentalist groups' practices are consequently represented as outsiders' practices unable to comply with the normal standards regarding what it means to be an Indonesian citizen. From the liberal point of view, religious fundamentalism appears as a reflection of an inability to understand and implement the essence of the so-called Indonesian citizenship instead of rethinking existing confrontations as a manifestation of political struggle, with its specific aspirations, rationality, and ideas to transform the society. This negative portrayal directly shows that far from being innocent the production of space is vested with power interests.

It is this shortcoming of identifying the nature of space which precisely exhibits that space is a form of technology of power. Otherwise, how could fundamentalists use religious rhetoric—which, according to that perspective, is not compatible with Indonesian citizenship—to justify their manoeuvres in elections? How could fundamentalists conduct a campaign which says that Shia is threatening Indonesia and Pancasila? In short, how can we explain the rise of various movements which, on the one hand, carry ideas which cannot sit easily with the ideas of how Indonesian citizens should behave and think, while on the other hand, bring very strong political aspirations on how Indonesia should be managed

and directed in the future? How can these groups go against the basic principle of political community while, at the same time, devote their efforts to advance and protect the political community?

This difficulty is possible to resolve if the problem of citizenship is approached through a perspective which is sensitive to the plurality of forms of citizenship. Instead of measuring citizens' practices through an idealized form of citizenship and deriving the notions of normal and deviant citizens, this study suggests a more nuanced approach which treats citizenship as an outcome of political struggles of various subjects' positions; in other words, there are various ways to interpret what it means to be a citizen of a political community (Mouffe, 1991, 1992). Although all citizens share the same belonging to a political community, they have different dreams, imaginations, and ideals regarding how that political community should be arranged and managed. Accordingly, people also have different expressions of citizenship: while some citizens are campaigning for human rights, others perhaps are campaigning for the exclusion of minority groups. Interestingly, all of these expressions are justified by the spirit to advance the well-being of society. The difficulty faced by the dominant approach to citizenship in Indonesia can be resolved through this solution: fundamentalist groups hold a legitimate subject position amidst the plurality of forms of citizenship in Indonesia.

It is against this background that this essay proposes spatial analysis as the theoretical framework. This essay argues that this form of citizenship can be better understood by analysing spatial frameworks that underlie it. Three primary spatial frameworks are influential in shaping fundamentalist groups' citizenship practices. *First*, the space of "multiculturalism" governs fundamentalist groups in such a way that requires them to be tolerant, peaceful, and able to acknowledge differences among people. *Second*, the space of "unity" requires them to preserve Indonesian unity and adhere to the Indonesian constitution and principles of Pancasila. In the context of Yogyakarta, the *third* space which is "locality" is

also influential as it requires them to act according to traditional practices of toleration.

Fundamentalist groups' practice of citizenship attempts to resist these imperatives without entirely dismissing the representations of these spaces since such dismissal will result in their total exclusion from the political life of the community. Their attempt to resolve this contradiction is interesting. As will be discussed further below, there is a change of political engagement where they try to reappropriate the language of dominant representations of space and bend it over to serve their purposes. By affirming the dominant grammar of conduct this mode of engagement allows them to redraw and reformulate the boundaries of spaces from within. For instance, by affirming the primacy of tolerance, fundamentalist groups are able to legitimately participate in public discussions on the future of the political community. By framing their political aspirations in multiculturalist language, fundamentalist groups attempt to demonstrate their belonging to a community which adopts multiculturalism as one of its main organizing principles. Yet, it does not necessarily mean that fundamentalist groups will entirely dismiss their previous political aspirations. Instead, previous aspirations—bigger power-share for muslims in politics, for instance—are reframed using multiculturalist language. Hence, we are witnessing an interesting condition where political aspirations—usually portrayed as unacceptable—intrude into the community's political space as legitimate aspirations that need to be heard. However, by making this manoeuvre, fundamentalist groups will inevitably subsume themselves under the rules, norms, and principles of multiculturalism. In order to retain their status as legitimate players in the community's politics, they need to constantly conform their moves according to the principles of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism simultaneously also limits fundamentalist groups' possible moves.

This pattern of explanation therefore rejects the dominant liberal approach which denigrates fundamentalists' citizenship practices to the realm of abnormality, deviance, madness, and

irrationality. Instead, their practices reflect an affirmation of dominant principles of society as they try to participate and shape the future of the community according to a certain ideal they believe. Their struggle targets the production of space which has constitutively excluded various social groups from the political landscape by rearranging the code of spatial conduct through localism, multiculturalism, and national unity discourses. Citizenship is the fundamentalists' struggle to resist being the subject of localism, multiculturalism and unity as spatial power while at the same time it forges the possibility of re-appropriating/reclaiming these overlapping spatial configurations and turning them into one more compatible with the fundamentalists' own ideal of a free and prosperous society.

Politics of Dissents in Yogyakarta

This section attempts to identify various forms of struggle in response to various spatial configurations which regulate and manage politics of differences in Yogyakarta. This section will show that these various forms of struggle can be denoted as signs of citizenship practices characterized by political engagement, contestation, and confrontation which do not easily sit well with liberal citizenship. Numerous reports have stated that Yogyakarta nowadays is facing one of the most serious challenges to its claimed tolerance values and practices. The Wahid Institute reports that intolerance in Yogyakarta is growing rapidly from 2014—the number of intolerant practices in Yogyakarta was almost zero from 2009 to 2013—while Setara Institute stated that the conditions of religious freedom in 2014 Yogyakarta is “slightly grim”. From 2013 to 2015 two issues were dominant: anti-Shia and anti-Christian sentiments. However, further development in late 2015 and 2016 shows that anti-Communism, anti-LGBTQ, and anti-Ahok issues also gained their momentum and supporters in Yogyakarta (The Wahid Institute, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014; Setara Institute, 2013, 2014).

Anti-Shia campaigns in Yogyakarta became increasingly dominant in 2013. Mass demonstrations and recitations were organized to increase people's awareness regarding the threat posed by Shia to Islam and Indonesia. Several attacks on the Shia community in Yogyakarta also followed these activities in 2013 and 2015. Further, public declaration to oppose Shia was held in the UGM University Mosque in 2013. Sri Purnomo—currently the regent of Sleman, a regency in DI Yogyakarta—was in attendance at the declaration. All of these activities were also coupled with the spread of banners, posters, and leaflets that constantly framed Shia as a serious threat both to Islam and Indonesia (The Wahid Institute, 2014; Setara Institute, 2014).

Anti-Christian campaigns have always been the most prominent issue addressed by these practices. In 1997, a church in Bantul was closed while several churches in Kotagede were burnt. Other records on church-related conflicts were also found in 1998, 2000, 2004, and 2006 (Subkhan, 2007). In 2014, the Pangukan church in Sleman was attacked and sealed by several fundamentalist groups due to, according to these groups, its illegality. This event attracted local and national attention since the church was eventually closed by the Sleman government. The Indonesian Police Chief further informed that houses should not be used to conduct worship without the formal permission from authorities (The Wahid Institute, 2014). This statement and the Sultan's unclear position on this issue triggered various protests from human rights based groups in Yogyakarta. In the same year, anti-Christian sentiment encouraged the government to forbid Paskah Adiyuswa—Easter celebration—in Gunungkidul despite protests and lobbies from human rights based groups (BS, interview, 15 June 2015). The fear of conversion encourages fundamentalist groups to strengthen their advocacy capacity, organize recitations in areas considered vulnerable, and provide social and financial assistance to muslims in those areas (FA, interview, 9 December 2015).

Anti-LGBTQ demonstrations gained its momentum in

Yogyakarta in early 2016. Following the national debate on LGBTQ, several fundamentalist groups attempted to close an Islamic boarding school for transgender in Kotagede. To contest this attack, several pro-democracy movements organized themselves and planned to arrange a demonstration. However, this plan was responded to by fundamentalist groups with mass mobilization to Tugu—the place where the demonstrations would be held—which aimed to bring down the demonstration with, if necessary, violence. Death threats were issued by the mass to the demonstrators who dared to come to the place. Facing this condition, the police finally prevented the demonstrators to move from their assembly location to Tugu by force since the demonstrators insisted to march to Tugu.

The fear of the re-emergence of the Indonesia Communist Party (PKI) was also salient among fundamentalist groups in Yogyakarta. Attacks and threats to 1965-related discussion and film screening frequently happened in Yogyakarta. The screenings of *Senyap* in various institutions were cancelled due to organizers' inability to guarantee the safety of the screenings. Anti-communism discourse also appeared in several recitations and demonstrations. An Anti-Ahok rally was conducted in Yogyakarta in the end of October 2016 in order to support the approaching demonstrations on November 4th in Jakarta. Besides the usual rhetoric of Ahok's blasphemy against Al-Maidah 51, the anti-Ahok rally in Yogyakarta was interesting because the demonstrators also emphasized the importance of helping the Jakarta or Betawi muslim-*pribumi*.

The brief and sketchy discussions above provide us with a rough picture on the practice of fundamentalist groups in Yogyakarta. However, at this moment, further questions arise: How did those groups understand and give meaning to their practices? How did they narrate and justify their actions? These discursive aspects of their practices are important to be understood in order to reveal the underlying complexities of these practices which tend to be neglected in previous studies and prevent us from dismissing these practices simply as a reflection of irrationality, misguided

interpretation of religion, or intolerant thinking.

For those purposes, the anti-Shia and anti-communism campaigns in Yogyakarta can illustrate the complexities. The importance of opposing Shia is motivated not only by understandings that Shia is a deviation from Islam, but also by the perception that Shia is threatening Indonesia. This argument presupposes that Indonesia and Islam is inherently compatible. A muslim who obeys the law of Islam will automatically act in accordance with Pancasila and the Indonesian constitution. On the contrary, those who defy Islam—either they are non-muslim or perverted—will necessarily contradict Pancasila and UUD 1945. Shia is an example of how the act of misguiding Islam necessarily results in incompatibility with the fundamental value of Indonesian society. The practice of *mut'ah* marriage is understood as a humiliation to a woman's dignity while the celebration of Assyura does not reflect the imperative to protect and develop oneself and humanity. Further, fundamentalist groups are also suspicious of Shia activities in Indonesia. Although it is true that Shia activities do not seem to pose a serious threat to Indonesia today, they believe—by reflecting on the history of Iran or Syria—that, in the long term, Shia will trigger fragmentations among Indonesian citizens and threaten Indonesian unity. The importance of fighting against Shia is emphasized because it was Indonesian muslims who contributed significantly to the independence of the Republic of Indonesia—including by sacrificing seven words from the Jakarta Charter (SA, AK, BN, and AB, speeches, 11 October 2015; H, interview, 4 December 2015).

The similar pattern of argument can be found in fundamentalist groups' rejection of communism. Communism is renounced by these groups due to its stance toward Islam. Communism is considered as atheistic—thus it contradicts the Indonesian belief in God—and hostile toward Islam, indicated by how communists in the past assaulted muslims and their leaders before 1965. These groups therefore consider that Tauhid and Pancasila are inseparable. Embracing Tauhid will result in the reinforcement of Pancasila

and vice versa. An imperative to protect Pancasila presupposes an imperative to protect Tauhid. Moreover, these two different issues are intertwined in Yogyakarta. In Parade Tauhid—a mass rally in October 2015 in order to show the strength of Islam in Yogyakarta—numerous ustadz stated that Shia and communist are muslims' common enemy. Both of them are threatening Islam and Indonesia and should be defeated in order to preserve muslims and the country (BN and SF, speeches, 11 October 2015; H, interview, 9 December 2015).

What is interesting in these discourses is how fundamentalist groups relate 'Islam' and 'Indonesia'. In these discourses, the idea of Islam and Indonesia are intertwined and overlapping to the point that it is very difficult to separate them. The notion of Islam-Indonesia compatibility is taken to the point where a threat to Islam becomes a threat to Indonesia and vice versa. Further, this implies that Islamist groups' efforts to protect Islam is not only motivated by a willingness to defend the religion per se, but also the political community to which they belong. Their efforts to mainstream several political agendas—forbidding religious minority beliefs, discriminating against sexual minorities, or implementing the sharia—can also be read in a similar way: as a willingness to participate in the debate over the political community's future; transform the political community according to certain ideals; and to protect the political community from approaching threats. *These practices therefore need to be conceived as a practice of citizenship.*

The same patterns can be found in other issues. In early 2016, these groups organized various public protests and recitations to oppose LGBTQ. In opposing LGBTQ, these groups argue that LGBTQ is forbidden by Islam. However, this religious argument is complemented by arguments stating that LGBTQ threatens the future of society by demoralizing family and youth. In the end of October 2016, these groups arranged public protests in order to encourage the government to sanction Ahok for his blasphemy. These protests, nevertheless, are not based solely on the argument

that Ahok is disrespecting Islam. The protesters also argue that Ahok's blasphemy puts Indonesian unity in jeopardy. Further, opposition to Ahok is considered necessary not only because Ahok is disrespectful to Islam and Indonesia unity, but also because Ahok is repressing Betawi-muslims in Jakarta. In this case, the protesters therefore perceive themselves as muslim, Indonesian, and pribumi which have the obligation to protect their religion and country while providing solidarity for their fellow muslims and *pribumi* in Jakarta.

This section has discussed how various practices of fundamentalist groups—which usually are misrecognized simply as a deviation—could be understood as practices of citizenship. However, further questions arise: How did these specific forms of citizenship emerge? How, different to the hegemonic liberal discourses on citizenship, could these forms of citizenship assume a compatibility between the idea of Indonesian unity and overt opposition to religious minorities; Why speak of tolerance and try to ban different sexual orientations; Why proclaim a religion of peace and attack other churches and the Shia community? The subsequent section will attempt to provide answers to these questions.

The Emergence of Urban Citizenship in Yogyakarta

Yogyakarta is widely recognized as a city of tolerance. While this imagined representation currently appears to hold a certain 'truth', in practice it is actually highly contingent. Based on the historical course, the image of Yogyakarta continues to be contested and redefined throughout different periods in relation to the broader national and global political landscapes. For example, for almost 4 decades since the independence in 1945, Yogyakarta was more known as a city of education rather than a city of tolerance. In the last two decades, however the discourse of Yogyakarta as a city of tolerance has supplanted the past image of the city. This transformation of urban identity is fundamental because it signifies a radical rupture of urban development and the constitution of space. Rural activities are slowly displaced by mass-based consumption economy

incorporating flows of information and capital and inscribing urban lifestyles. The saturation of images and signs into the everyday life of the city, as they call it, brings to the fore the primacy of (cultural) identity; hardly as something with essential and substantive contents and nothing less than “signifier” in a sea of symbolisms whose meanings are produced and adopted through a play of differences, through negation of, and identification with, other signs and/or identities. This intervention of late-capitalism arguably flourishes the expansion of tolerance and liberal values as they go hand in hand with the spectacle of consumerism. This sudden emerging and accentuating of (cultural) identity of those who reside in the city leads to the interrogation of the meaning of the (existing) political community. Coupled with a number of communal conflicts across the Archipelago, at the centre of this whole discursive process is the classic notion of “unity and diversity,” as the ideal Indonesia long being dreamed about, which now seems to be under serious threat by spatially saturating diverse (cultural) identities.

As such, from the nodal point of liberal tolerance discourse there are three intertwining discourses that discursively regulate the spatial formation of Yogyakarta and simultaneously are challenged by fundamentalist groups’ articulations. The first which is implicated with the emergence of Islamic radical practices is the space of “multiculturalism”. This mode of spatial formation intervenes directly on how to acknowledge cultural differences and preserve tolerance among heterogenous members of society. This space is thus characterized by, on the one hand, an imperative to think about oneself and society in terms of cultural identity—ranging from religion to ethnic identity—and to tolerate those differences on the other hand. In other words, this space targets on dividing people based on cultural identities, accentuates differences and subsequently disciplines the citizen body to recognize diversity without inscribing a sense of commonality.

The toleration itself is made possible since this logic depoliticizes or privatizes the identity (Zizek, 2008). Different

cultural identities can live harmoniously with each other since the political aspect of those identities that puts each identity in antagonistic stance against its others has been removed. Moreover, this space splits the society into two opposing camps: those who are able to tolerate and those who are not able to tolerate. While the first camp is considered as civilized and ideal, the second camp is believed to be uncivilized, mad, and irrational. Through such hierarchy, this space distinguishes those who are recognized as legitimate political subjects and those who are excluded (Brown, 2006; cf. Forst, 2003). Recent political events demonstrate this trace and spatial effect of depoliticization. The promotion of multiculturalism has reinforced ethno-based representations as well as majority-minority social group categories as a hegemonic approach to everyday social interactions. Instead of enriching social peace, multiculturalism has led to the rise of adversaries based on native and non-native settlers' identification. In this context, local inhabitants feel they are being dispossessed by the urban development while new settlers are anxious about discrimination and exclusion. Multiculturalism would clinically remove injustice related issues associated with developments and treat cultural tensions simply as a matter of tolerance/intolerance. Those who cling on hatred against opposing identity, without taking the political dimension behind this stance, would be treated as a threat to the very liberal notion of a good citizen.

Brown demonstrates that the dismantling of the social fabric through the rearrangement of spatial boundaries and practices is a worldwide phenomenon and not particularly unique to post-colonial nations (2006). Furthermore, although the representation of multicultural space inherits the Lockean and Millian liberal tradition of toleration (Sahin, 2010), the deployment of multiculturalism rose into prominence particularly after US declared the war on terrorism in 2001. It was part of a global strategy to contain cultural identities primarily religion as they are perceived as innately hostile and therefore prone to escalate into conflicts. This shows that instead of

being a universal value, multiculturalism casts the securitization of space and reproduces disciplined bodies of political subjects.

Second, the space of “national unity” plays a significant role as power control mechanisms. It requires people to maintain national unity, adhere to national ideology and constitutions, and protect the country from all approaching threats. This space grants people the status of citizen—in its traditional sense—and separates them from those who are considered as defective citizens, indicated by their inability to preserve unity, believe in national ideology, and defend the country. In other words, this discourse functions to delegitimize all attempts that potentially threaten the country while compelling people to follow the ideal form of citizens. In relation to the space of multiculturalism however the space of national unity acquires a nuanced political flavour. The prism of national unity operates as a set of methods and mechanisms to bind the division of societal relationships constituted by multiculturalism values. In other words, national unity serves to legitimate the fragmentation of society and regulates the forms of engagement of sub-ethno categories. This notion of formal unity confirmed as solidarity and unity is usually associated with liberal terms such as social capital, trusts, and respect in relation to managing differences.

Adding to the constitutive relationships between multicultural and national unity spaces is the space of “locality” which locates the notion of good ethics such as tolerance or social trusts within the Javanese cultural traditions. In this context, it is argued that the long historical embodiment of cosmopolitan values dates back to the precolonial era as Yogyakarta has been the epicentrum of early modern civilization in Java. Differences based on horizontal and vertical relationships have been capable to maintain social cohesion and adapt with broader political changes provisioned by local norms. As a result, the notion of good ethics is not only derived from universal principles but it is also located within the Javanese cultural traditions. It is noteworthy that such historical roots are significant inventions to deal in specific ways with the saturating

cultural identities in the city recently. Historical roots in divine cultural values and norms seems to encapsulate tolerance with a sacred image, something obliged to be preserved, otherwise being sanctioned for committing cultural sin.

These three different spaces are distinctive analytically but deeply intertwined in regulating citizens' bodies and everyday interactions. The space of multiculturalism in relation to the space of unity at the national level produces narratives which claim that citizens have to perform with tolerance in order to preserve nation unity. Conversely, to be intolerant is to be defective and illegitimate citizens who pose serious threats to the country. Those who are unable to meet this requirement therefore are risking themselves for double exclusions. They are not only considered as mentally incapable to be recognized as a political subject but also facing stigmas that accuse their positions as threatening Indonesian unity. The overlapping between the space of multiculturalism and Indonesian unity is further combined with local narrations on sacred tradition. In this layer, people's inability to conform with representations of local space result in further exclusion. They will be considered not only as people who are detaching themselves from local tradition but also choosing foreign cultures instead of local traditions—thus, renouncing the very spirit of nationalism.

Fundamentalist groups' political dissents are primarily resistance against these multiple neoliberal spaces. Their so called intolerant attitudes sketched above should be understood as, and is produced within, this spatial resistance. However, this study suggests that their resistances are not conducted by simply dismissing the intervention of these disciplining spaces. Instead, they attempt to appropriate those regimes of representation for purposes not intended by the hegemonic regimes. This is shown by the local experience where the fundamentalist groups contest the cultural claims of tolerance as the expression of Javanese local traditions. This is conducted by questioning the religious legitimacy of the Sultanate which has predated as far back as Javanese local cosmology beliefs.

Reassessing the cultural claim, fundamentalist groups extrapolate the legitimacy of the Sultanate of Yogyakarta which is characterized by its adherence to Islam. In their articulations, Islam is being sidelined instead of being placed as the centre value of the political establishment. The inability of the Sultanate to perform with fidelity to Islamic practices indicates that the Sultanate falls short in fully recognizing the historical configuration of Yogyakarta's values.

Against this background, the groups claim that their fidelity to Islamic practices is expressing the true spirit of Yogyakarta. Interestingly, the notion of tolerance is not entirely dismissed. In various interviews, the so called radical groups actually believe that tolerance is already inherent in everyday spatial practices in Yogyakarta. People with different beliefs live side by side without interfering with each other's faiths. The problem of tolerance in Yogyakarta, they argue, is the development of churches which are not compatible with the laws that regulate the development of houses of worship or is not involving society—especially people living around the development site—in the process of development. When these formal-legal and cultural mechanisms are neglected, the groups suggest that the problem of intolerance will arise immediately. Through these narrations, the groups are actually reappropriating the meaning of Yogyakarta and its image as a model of a tolerant city. The groups enter the political sphere as a citizen since they are able to show that they are committed to restoring Yogyakarta and protecting its long tradition of tolerance from intolerant practices.

At the level of spatial practice, this act of appropriation manifests in various raids toward the so-called "illegal" development of houses of worship and protests—mainly through posters and banners—which condemn the Sultanate for their inability to preserve Yogyakarta's Islamic tradition. As previously discussed, fundamentalist groups justify this action by appropriating existing norms and rules which were intended to exclude them from the political arena. By framing their actions as endeavours to protect the existing practice of toleration in Yogyakarta and to preserve

Yogyakarta's traditions, the groups legitimate their actions as an appropriate form of political participation in the public realm. Fundamentalist groups' actions hence are able to intrude into the political space which usually works to exclude and limit their participation.

Similar phenomena can be seen at the national level. In order to be recognized as good citizens, these groups try to show their adherence to national ideology and the idea of Indonesian unity. This condition results in a very interesting phenomenon where the opposition to certain religious or sexual minorities and ideologies are always related to the importance of preserving national unity. In the case of the anti-Shia campaign, the opposition against Shia is conducted to prevent it from triggering fragmentations amidst the community members and occupying the local government. The Anti-Ahok campaign is also seen as an effort to preserve national unity since Ahok's religious blasphemy poses an enormous threat to Indonesia's religious diversity. All of these phenomena are presupposed by the notion of Islam-Indonesia compatibility. All reinforcement of Islamic values in politics will be necessary in order to preserve the unity of the nation. This manoeuvre is interesting since Islam-Indonesia compatibility is a notion usually promoted by the establishments that try to exclude fundamentalist groups from the political arena. In response to these establishments' claims, fundamentalist groups instead argue that the former groups are actually threatening the unity of Indonesia. Islam Nusantara, for example, is misguided since it is unable to see the potential threat posed by Shia to Indonesia.

Another form of political contestation and appropriating disciplining space works through the discourse of tolerance and multiculturalism. The hegemonic deployment of this discourse has encouraged its supporters to denigrate fundamentalists groups due to their inability to refrain from using violence and believe in tolerance. Nevertheless, fundamentalist groups have responded to this mode of exclusion by destabilizing the border of the multicultural space.

Despite the demands of fundamentalist groups hardly changing, the means adopted to promote those demands are designed to conform and adjust with the rule of law. At the present, violent practices are considered unnecessary in order to promote a more peaceful image of Islam. The spirit of tolerance is also affirmed while these groups try to convey the message that Muslims are actually the victims of intolerance practiced by other religious believers. We could easily find a resonance with the resistance of these groups against the discourse of global terrorism at the international level. They endeavour to avoid the stigma as an intolerant group while using the language of tolerance to challenge the powerful. The fundamentalist groups are again appropriating the representations of space and bending them over and turning them to their own use.

As previously mentioned, fundamentalist groups' decisions to organize anti-Shia and anti-LGBTQ rallies in Yogyakarta could be read against this context. Their endeavour to ban Shia and LGBTQ groups were justified using nationalist arguments. They argue that Shia and LGBTQ are threatening the unity of Indonesian society, both through the potential of the Shia community's insurgency and LGBTQ groups' ability to damage Indonesian values and morality. These discursive moves actually reflect this groups' intention to join the community's political space by affirming, yet twisting, the meaning of unity. Similar moves could also be found in these groups' endeavours to conduct peaceful rallies—culminating in Aksi Bela Islam rallies in Jakarta—instead of relying on violent raids as usual. Based on interviews, this decision was consciously made in order to avoid the attribution of a violent image toward the groups. Despite their fundamentalist political aspirations, they attempt to develop a more peaceful image which could conform to public imagery on how Muslims and Indonesian citizens should behave. Further, the groups' rhetoric that they attempt to resist intolerance acts conducted by other religious groups also signal their intention to intrude into the community's political space by affirming the importance of tolerance in public life. These spatial practices capture

the ambiguous nature of fundamentalist groups' political moves. On the one hand, they retain their conservative political aspirations. Yet, on the other hand, they frame their moves and aspirations using hegemonic languages, norms, and rules. This ambiguity captures not only the groups' intention to advance their political aspirations, but also their desire to be recognized as a legitimate member of the political community.

However, the space of multiculturalism also brings important implications toward the practice of fundamentalist groups. First and foremost, the space of multiculturalism essentializes people's identity. It encourages people to think that they possess a fixed and given identity and compels them to interact with each other peacefully while acknowledging different identities among them. The emergence of fundamentalist groups can be read as a response to this logic. The idea of a true, original, and unchanging Islam—which gives fundamentalism a foundation for its existence—is made possible by this logic. The space of multiculturalism therefore generates subjects who attempt to promote fundamentalist sentiments based on an invented, true, original unity and substantive identities and perspectives while, at the same moment, excluding them from the political landscape. The consequences of this condition are remarkable: fundamentalist groups endeavour to avoid exclusion, enter the community's political landscape, and uphold fundamentalist perspectives in the community's life at the same time. Fundamentalist groups' inability to think beyond the framework indicates that the groups' citizenship practices can not fully detach themselves from the logics imposed by the space of multiculturalism (cf. Žižek, 2008).

Secondly, fundamentalist groups' opposition to several cultural identities arise because those opposed identities are actually political proxy to support the hegemonic logic of neoliberal space. Those identities are used in order to show how the relations among people with different identities should be conducted. In other words, the opposition toward these identities does not simply signify the groups'

hatred toward them. Instead, the opposition signifies the opposition of the groups toward the very logic of spatial fragmentation and potential exclusions. This explanation—arguably—can help us to illuminate the phenomenon where the groups change their imagined enemy rapidly, from Ahmadiyya and Shia to LGBTQ and Chinese ethnic. What matters in these oppositions are not simply the shifting identity per se, but the very logics that animate the use of these identities. Those minority groups are different names of multicultural space that excludes the fundamentalists. These two implications demonstrate a dialectical relation between subject and space. While the subjects are able to transform the space, the subject's spatial practice is also heavily determined by the nature of the space.

These discussions also show that the notions of unity and multiculturalism are considered as highly problematic by fundamentalist groups. Unity and multiculturalism are believed more as exclusionary instead of inclusive and encompassing all of the members of society. For unity and multiculturalism are defined in specific ways while excluding and neutralising—as well as demonising—other ways of perceiving the same discursive practices. It is this sense of exclusion which motivates them to intrude into the political space through the act of appropriation. The practice of fundamentalist groups is actually a response to various dimensions of space that attempt to forbid them from entering such space. They attempt to avoid such exclusions by appropriating dominant rules and imperatives. While dominant rules are affirmed, these groups interpret the rules in a certain way which makes them acknowledged as a political subject and helps them to retain their political aspirations. On the one hand, this condition leads to less violence. In order to be recognized as a political subject, the groups have to dismiss violence from their repertoire of actions and channel their aspirations through a commonly recognized mechanism. The language of democracy, multiculturalism, unity, and locality are affirmed. On the other hand, this condition also leads to increasing

influence of fundamentalist groups in the so-called democratic public space.

The dismissal of violence and conformity to dominant rules and languages are the costs that have to be paid by the groups in order to participate in the community's political life. However, the groups still retain their fundamentalist aspirations since, as discussed previously, the space of multiculturalism with its emphasis on cultural identity has reinforced fundamentalist groups' sense of uniqueness, distinctiveness, and originality. These two paradoxical processes, eventually, engender a 'democratic' political landscape in which fundamentalist aspirations have enormous influences. All these politics of dissents result in a production of space which is characterized by both strong democratic and radical tones.

Furthermore, the discussion in this section also shows that local, national and global spaces are considered to be the most important spaces in this groups' perspectives. Various manoeuvres and adjustments are made to allow them to mould these three spaces together. The impacts of such political strategies for fundamentalist groups' power in national political landscapes, however, remain unclear. The groups' initiatives to permeate hegemonic political spaces are inevitably marked by strong tensions between their willingness to affirm existing political grammars or to subvert them. Hence, the groups are taking various and, sometimes, contradictory stances against different issues. While they affirm the importance of democratic norms in one occasion, they take a contrary stance in other circumstances: they emphasize the importance of non-violent action in advancing their political aspirations, yet they also forbid LGBTQ groups to voice out their interests in public space.

The last question that this essay has to answer is: What sort of dreams, imaginations, or utopias are invested by the groups in their resistances? Following Lefebvre's triadic schema, representational space is always invested in people's lived experience. Although the representations of space order people in certain ways, the people always find a way to escape and invest new meanings and images

different from the hegemonic interpretations. Despite its strong fundamentalist tone, a closer reading of the groups' narration also shows that the need to be acknowledged as equal, to be included, and to be recognized as subject are also dominant in the groups' narration. As previously discussed, this opposition to exclusion encourages the groups to find a way to enter the political life of the community. Rejecting the minorities aside, inherent in this political stance is an aspiration to a specific ideal of political community called Indonesia. The rejection is very often not as much as the quest for being treated fairly in terms of having, and contributing to, the ideal Indonesia. However, the groups do not simply want to enter the politics. Instead, they also attempt to redefine, redraw, and reformulate the space of the community. Through their political articulation, the groups attempt to develop new norms, impose new forms of inclusion-exclusion, and make the space more accessible for them.

Conclusion

This essay suggests that the practice of fundamentalist groups can be considered as a practice of citizenship. This practice emerges as the groups attempt to resist various spaces that try to exclude them. By appropriating the representations of these spaces, the groups endeavour to enter the political landscape of society while retaining their political aspirations. This movement itself emerges as the groups expect to avoid exclusions and be recognized as legitimate political subjects. This results in a form of citizenship which is characterized by, on the one hand, a strong fundamentalist tone and, on the other hand, an affirmation of several rules of society as well as a political space that is compatible with such practices of citizenship.

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Disengaged Citizens: Involuntarily Returned and Relocated Transmigrants in Southern Kebumen

Laila Kholid Alfirdaus

Abstract

The government's policy to return transmigration program participants, due to the explosion of conflicts in transmigration areas outside Java in the early 2000s to the district where these people originated has raised many questions of citizen engagement. This study aims to identify the impacts of the policy on the returned transmigrants using the idea of citizenship as a framework of analysis. The field research was conducted from December 2012 to February 2013 in Southern Kebumen using in-depth interviews with about 20 informants and direct observations. From the fieldwork, it is found that instead of resolving the problem by returning thousands of transmigration participants, which then was followed with collective relocation, has made the issue more complex. This later aspect caused multiple exclusions to the returned transmigrants socially and politically. The case highlights the government's ignorance of the aspects of geography, ethnicity, cultures, religions, languages, and gender that define citizenship in the Indonesian context, and are impacted by the transmigration policy. Such ignorance has led to the acute political disengagement. Weak inclusion and over-simplification in the handling of the transmigration program (sending, returning, and relocating people from one place to another), due to the single definition of citizen and citizenship, which the government uses in treating people merely as 'materials' for boosting economic growth, instead of as citizens that have rights for recognition, seems to be the core explanation of this case. By elaborating this issue, this paper is expected to enrich the existing study on citizenship, especially the core problems that relate to (forced) transmigration policy, which is rarely discussed among scholars.

Keywords: *citizenship recognition; civic nationalism; and fragmented citizenship.*

Introduction

This paper discusses the idea of citizenship of the returning transmigrants from outer Java to their original land in Kebumen. The policy was exerted to respond to the escalating violent conflict in transmigration areas, such as Aceh, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua in order to avoid further impacts of the conflict from the so

called 'new comer' transmigrants. Although the policy was initially intended to minimize the violent conflict impacts, it later created other problems for the returned transmigrants. They got difficulties in earning money and are constrained in accessing their social and political rights in the new relocation area. From its findings, the study identifies that the use of a single standard for citizenship in moving, and then returning and relocating citizens, without carefully and sufficiently assessing its impacts on the people, will create drawbacks. Using case study methods, the research investigates the policy by interviewing returning transmigrants and the neighbouring community members, as well as observing the relocation area. The field work was conducted from December 2012 to February 2013. The number of informants was about 20 consisting of the returning transmigrants, the neighbouring community and local legislature members, the government officer, NGOs, and academicians. The paper is expected to provide lessons on the importance of accounting for the complex social and political structures that construct citizenship, which in the future could minimize the misleading issues in the transmigration policy.

Citizenship Concept and the Policy Context

By definition, citizenship refers to the recognition of the citizen's rights and responsibilities more than administrative matters (Gaventa, 2002, p. 10) including, but not limited to, legal status, equal suffrage, welfare access, political participation and freedom, cultural expression, knowledge and information access, organization freedom, and economic redistribution (Isin & Turner, 2002, p. 1-14). All of these concerns play a crucial part in the implementation of the idea of democracy. Recognition on the principles of equality and justice that is beyond the borders of identity, highlighted with the attributes of ethnics, regions, religions, languages, and gender, addresses the practical application of democracy beyond the procedural process. Equal rights and responsibilities are the basic foundation for the basic idea of citizenship recognition.

Although the idea of citizenship is crucial, the practice is not as easy as it seems, especially in countries like Indonesia. While the idea of citizenship in general imagines the direct relations between the state and citizen, in Indonesia there are many layers that play equally significant roles in defining citizenship other than state, namely ethnics, region, religion, and so forth. In this case, efforts to manifest the idea of citizenship clearly face a great challenge. The complexity still does not mention the layers within the state body that consist of the national and local government, which is sometimes also contradictory between one another in defining citizenship and who is called as citizen. This multilayer definition creates another complex issue in terms of citizenship recognition.

In this regard, the case of the returned transmigrants, which then followed with the collective relocation in the Kebumen district, Central Java Province, Indonesia has given us a clear picture of how complex it is to handle what we call as citizenship in Indonesia. Each layer of identity, as mentioned earlier, defines its respective idea of citizenship, while overlapping one another, as well as contradicting, so that the identification of “who should do what” is getting blurred. Any policy related to population management (demography) as transmigration and relocation ideally should not ignore any existing definitions of citizenship, posed by ethnic, religious, cultural, regional, and language groups. Unfortunately, when thousands of New Order-promoted transmigration program participants returned from their transmigration areas to Kebumen due to the conflicts in Sampit, Aceh and Poso, in the early stages of *reformasi* era (1999-2002), the national government did not quickly respond.

Responding to this, Rustriningsih, as Kebumen district-head at the time, took initiatives to handle the problems; something which is actually not her responsibility, but the national government's. She took actions by providing semi-permanent shelters on the state's ground in the southern coastal area of Kebumen in Tanggulangin village, Klirong sub-district. The new relocation area was equipped

with public toilets and a praying house. She also distributed particular amounts of money and monthly staple foods for several months, several goats per family to raise up their status, 5 fishing ships, coastal agriculture training, and home industry training for female returned transmigrants.

Without disregarding the contribution the local government had made, in fact this policy has been a blunder for the local government. Instead of solving the problem, the policy leaves some other critical problems unsolved, as in terms of land-ownership status and employment. The positive impact shortly ended, and thus failed to give maximum benefits to the returned transmigrants as the policy beneficiaries. It only advantages the national government for the taking over of their responsibility by another party, e.g. Kebumen local government, as well as Rustriningsih and her party, namely Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP), for the rise of the political popularity after the distribution of the government-funded social assistance to the returned transmigrants.

In fact, after more than a decade since the relocation, the returned transmigrants, who are getting older, continue finding difficulty to earn money, face the uncertainty of the land status, and remain excluded from community decision making. The change in local political structure after two direct elections (2005 and 2010) does not change the pressure on the local government to remedy these issues as soon as possible.

From the case of the returned transmigrants' relocation in Kebumen as mentioned above, this article tries to highlight the complexity of citizenship recognition that has occurred in Indonesia. This article criticizes the use of a single standard of citizenship by the national government to implement transmigration policy while disregarding the other sources of citizenship definitions as mentioned above including regions, ethnics, religions, and so forth.

First, when exerting transmigration policy, the national government only considered economic growth and population distribution. The government did not consider that both the

transmigration participants and the local residents of transmigration destination areas have their respective binding ties that define and scope their citizenship, called as “communitarian citizenship” (Etzioni, 2011). This includes regions, ethnics, religions, and languages. The failure to engage citizens from these different scopes creates what is called “fragmented citizenship” (Wiener, 1997).

As the transmigration policy did not take into account the scoping for taking the citizens for granted as the object of the policy, problems of overlapping and contradicting identities become unavoidable. The idea of “multicultural citizenship” (Kymlicka, 1995) that regards citizen’s rights by respecting their identities, as ethnicity, religion, geographical origins, age, and so forth is forgotten. In the case of returning transmigrants, it is clear that they have the same ethnic and religious identity with the neighbouring community. However, their status as outsiders keeps them excluded from social relations in the village. It has been a public secret that local residents use to have hard relationship with the new comer transmigrants. Such a situation seems to fail to anticipate adjustment issues and to get a proper response in the government’s policy.

The case of returned transmigrants and its complexities in relocation policy has shown us a clear irony in the Indonesian population policy. How could policy related directly to citizens, as in transmigration and relocation policy, disregard citizenship? There should be an account on the local cultures in order to avoid the creation of multiple “otherness”. In this regard, citizen recognition is the key, and citizen engagement is one of the crucial strategies to manifest it. Indeed, promoting citizenship recognition is not an easy task, but it is not an impossible mission.

Given the complex natures of society, the government will always deal with the complexities of decision making, as in transmigration and relocation policy, i. e. to choose between rational or incremental policy makings (Seal, 2003, p. 94), and between top-down or bottom-up models (Sabatier, 1996, p. 22-36). However, promoting social welfare while strengthening citizen’s engagement

in population policy, as the basis of the citizenship recognition as Mettler and Soss (2004) identify (p. 55-73), through for instance policy feedback (p. 64) can be an alternative. From the case of the returning and relocation of transmigration program participants in Southern Kebumen, this article tries to reflect the problem of citizen recognition and citizen engagement in population policy.

The Policy Complexities in the Relocation of Returned Transmigrants in Kebumen

Kebumen government relocated thousands of transmigrants returning to the district to save their lives in the late 1990s and early 2000s responding to the massive riots in their transmigration areas. There were about 400 families or 2140 people in that case (“400 Keluarga,” 2002, October 16; “2.140 Jiwa,” 2003, Juni 20).¹

Some of them transmigrated since the early 1980s, late 1980s and in the mid 1990s. They were distributed in Aceh, West Sumatra, North Sulawesi, Papua, and Moluccas. It is widely known that most of these areas experienced mass riots during the political transition era. Consequently, the provincial and district governments in the transmigration destination forced transmigrants to quit the areas and return to their original districts.

In the original district, as Kebumen, the sudden coming of returned transmigrants had forced the Kebumen government to respond, although it is clear that this is the responsibility of the national government. Instead of resolving the problems, further problems arose because the response of the Kebumen government was not well-planned, not well-prepared and not comprehensively assessed. The local government, even, was not aware of the scope of the coverage of their authority and responsibility.²

¹ Suara Merdeka, “400 Keluarga Eksodan Bisa Picu Kerawanan” (400 Families of “Eksodan” Can Trigger Social Vulnerability), 16 October 2002 and, “2.140 Jiwa Eksodan akan Menjadi Beban” (2140 “Eksodan” People will be the Burden), 20 June 2003.

² Suara Merdeka, “400 Keluarga Eksodan Bisa Picu Kerawanan” (400 Families of “Eksodan” Can Trigger Social Vulnerability), 16 October 2002 and, “2.140 Jiwa Eksodan

In addition to providing new residential facilities in the relocation area on the state-owned ground, the Kebumen government also distributed some material assistance, which was supposed to help the returned transmigrants to survive and create new sources of livelihood.

At a glance, the policy sounds very good. However, to what extent it impacted on the whole problem, the resolutions for the returned transmigrants are never clear. Of course, the material assistance is useful. However, the impact only lasted in the short-run. Instead of securing the returning transmigrants, it later resulted in an even harder situation. Very low income, bad infrastructure, limited public facilities, uncertain land ownership status, exclusion from village decision making process, and the distancing relations with the local residents in Tanggulangin, are amongst the difficulties the returned transmigrants have to face after about a decade since being relocated.

In terms of social and political exclusions, the local government that was taking over the handling responsibility of the returned transmigrants, seems not to be aware that what the returned transmigrants needed were not merely economic materials, but also assistance to integrate and socialize with the local Tanggulangin village residents. They also need the space to involve the community in decision-making, as well as the adjustment with the new coastal environment, which has extremely different circumstances compared with the hilly and mountainous environment they usually lived in. In fact, none of the government's aid is about to touch these non-material necessities. It is not a surprise should problems like social tension and political exclusion becomes a crucial question in those matters later.

The situation worsened with the absence of the national government, as the main responsible party in this case, in dealing with the issue of returned transmigrants' relocation. Meanwhile, it

is clear that transmigration policy is of the national government's policies. It is ironic that merely because the local government wears the same uniform with the national government then they have to be responsible for what they are not doing, only because the object of the policy is originally from those of local regions, which then are returning back to those regions.

Transmigration policy is clearly outside the Kebumen government's authority at that time (early stage of *reformasi* era). It is the central government's responsibility. Moreover, because most of the returned transmigrants are already registered as the residents of the transmigration destination areas, as shown in their national ID (KTP), the role of the national government is urgently required. Burdening this financially and politically to the Kebumen government is unfair. The involvement of the Kebumen government should be only in the capacity of supporting the implementation of the national government's policy.

From this experience, we learn about a clear neglect of the state towards the unanticipated excesses of what they have been doing. Ignoring the problem of local acceptance, even by the local village residents, which were basically having the same roots in Kebumen, let us know that there is chronic illness in the building of citizenship conception on the side of the state. This is not to mention problems of acceptance in the transmigration destination that was segregating people into Javanese transmigrants and non-Javanese natives, which has already become a public secret. The same fault was repeated when the government of the transmigration destination returned transmigrants to their original districts due to social and political conflict, such as occurred in the relocation policy in Kebumen.

The way the government exerts its transmigration policy that is not supported with sufficient consideration of social complexities caused by different identities and geographical origins, faced by the participants of the programs as such has led to further critique on the government. As Santoso and Tapiheru (2016) argue, this reflects government's lack of sensitiveness on social and cultural issues. This

leads to the question of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (unity in diversity) the government always asserts to promote national integration. The fact that the government does not strive to facilitate social engagement among people from different ethnic identities and geographical origins such as in transmigration policy discussed above leads to the notion that *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is viewed only as a political slogan or jargon.

The existing residents of the local village in Kebumen feel hard to accept returned transmigrants, simply because they are newcomers, attributed as “returned transmigrants”, “*eks-transmigran*”, “evacuees”, “*eksodan*”, and so forth, although it is clear that they are by ethnic, language, origin, and religion are the same. Consequently, the conception of citizenship of the returned transmigrants experiences multiplied weakening, due to multiple changing of identity affiliations, resulting in fragmented citizenship (Wiener, 1997), which was competing with what the state has been setting up. Simplification and generalization are what seem to happen in the implementation of transmigration and returned transmigrants’ relocation policies.

Referring to Gutmann (in Taylor, 1994, p. ix-x), Taylor (1994, p. 39) and Gaventa (2002, p. 10), intended discrimination due to identity differences and social classes are similar with unnecessary impartiality and indifference, as both are degrading to citizenship recognition (or democratic citizenship in Gaventa’s term). This is the same with treating citizen having different attributes of identity differently (meaning in discriminatory manners) in issues that need equality. Strong identity binding among the existing village residents followed with the differentiation from returned transmigrants that social engagement was difficult to promote between them is what the state failed to identify. As a result, multiple exclusions and displacements are occurring there.³ This is among what Gaventa

³ Involuntary movement within a state’s territory as such is what Mooney (2005, p. 10) sees as displacement, and the subject of this is called IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons).

(2002, p. 10) and Clapham (in Abrams, Christian, & Gordon, 2007) mention as the barriers for democratic governance building.

In the case of returned transmigrants in Kebumen, the recognition of citizenship is neglected by the local government, because they only respond to the case with the idea of benevolent policy. This reflects that local government does not understand nor have any idea about the meaning of citizenship and citizen's rights. Meanwhile, the idea of the state benevolence itself is questionable, because every state's action is political. In the case of returned transmigrants in Kebumen, we can clearly see it, for instance, from the PDIP's photograph; the Kebumen district-head's affiliation party, which is attached in each semi-permanent house built for them. Thus, it is clear that the local decision makers saw this as political commodity, because the policy is financed through APBD (local government budget), and not through PDIP's. The people are seen as the target for a political campaign, and the policy is a means for collecting political support, which is funded by the public.

The Policy Implication: Being IDPs in the Land where Returned Transmigrants Originally were Born

The origin of returned transmigrants to be IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) started when they had to accept the relocation policy by the local government. By definition, IDPs is related to forced migration within a state. Involuntary movement within a state's territory as such is what Mooney (2005) sees as displacement, and IDPs is used to mention the subjects of the policy. In Kebumen, relocation occurred in 2002-2003 after around 2140 transmigrants (around 410 families) were returned to their original districts from the areas where horizontal conflicts exploded as in Aceh (with the issue of Aceh Liberation Movement), Kalimantan (with the issue of Dayak-Madura conflict in Sampit) and Sulawesi (with the issue of Moslem-Christian conflict in Poso) in the early 2000s. Amongst these, returned transmigrants from Aceh and Sampit (Kalimantan) were dominating. Most of them, who transmigrated since the New

Order around 1980s and the early 1990s, were already settled in and had a decent life from having sufficient farming areas to cultivate (around 3-5 acre) and producing cattle in their transmigration region.

In fact, horizontal conflicts not only created problems for the conflicts perpetrators and victims, but also those who lived near the conflict location, including those returned transmigrants. Horrible situations posed a worrisome outcome for the returned transmigrants and the district government in transmigration destination areas. Staying means they would bear a risk of conflict excesses, while returning would mean losing the source of life. Given the situations that were not getting better, those transmigrants finally were returned to their original districts. Kebumen and Madura are amongst the districts that received a significant number of the returning transmigrants and migrants (more than a thousand). As most of those returned transmigrants already lost their property in their original district, finding a residence was a clear issue in Kebumen at the time. At first, returned transmigrants were collected in the Office of Working Training (*Balai Pelatihan Kerja*). After a year, the Kebumen government decided to provide house buildings on the state's ground in the southern coastal area of Kebumen.

Kamini is one of the returned transmigrants, who still stayed at Kampung "Eksodan" when the researcher visited her for an interview in 2012. She is from Gombang sub-district and was a transmigrant in 1982 to Aceh following her husband. Two decades in Aceh was the golden period for Kamini, who used to live in poverty. She and her family cultivated 3 areas of rice field and vegetable plants. In her first two years, the national government fully supported Kamini and her family's life. They were paid for cultivating their own land while gaining monthly food assistance, as rice, salted fishes, and the other daily needs. She planned to retire in the early 2000s because she would be able to divide her land and distribute it for her 5 children.

However, the explosion of Aceh Liberation Movement

(GAM) conflict in the late 1990s and early 2000s had forced Kamini to return to Java. A letter from an unidentified sender posted to her house saying that GAM will kill her and all her family members, as well as rumours from her neighbours that GAM would kill Javanese men and use their dead body as fertilizer for palm farming (in Indonesian: “*laki-laki Jawa akan dijadikan pupuk sawit oleh GAM*”), were a clear threat for her. She left all her belongings, including her profession as a cooking helper in the military barracks near her residential area. After a hard evacuation, she and her family finally arrived at Kebumen in 2002. She joined with the other returned transmigrants from Kalimantan, who had been a year living in Kebumen.

Indeed, Kamini and the other returned transmigrants had to bear a consequence of losing their source of livelihood. Living as an evacuee in Kebumen without a clear job and income is hard, moreover, compared to the life they had in transmigration area, where it was relatively easy to earn money. Unfortunately, Kamini, Santi, and the other returned transmigrants in Kebumen did not have many choices. Responding to this, the Kebumen government prepared for them a semi-permanent house for each family in southern coastal area of Kebumen, near Tanggulangin village, which is 30-40 km from the city centre. Although becoming a solution for the short-run, relocation in Tanggulangin is also a start for the other bigger problems of returned transmigrants in Kebumen.

First, residing separately from the local Tanggulangin village residents led to a difficult social integration. Social jealousy due to the provision of semi-permanent housing, cattle production facilities and fishing ships for the returned transmigrants for free is one of the explanations of the rise of social tensions between the returned transmigrants and Tanggulangin residents.

The government only prepared a place to reside, which is 200 meter away from the sea, but not a mechanism to socialize. The fact that the closest distance of Tanggulangin residents to “Kampung Eksodan” is about 0.5-1 km did not become the consideration of the

local government to initiate local interaction and integration. This is outside the government's relocation design.

Although a rather intensified integration finally occurred after about a decade, the broken relationship between the two has not been totally healed. The recognition of returned transmigrants as the returning family is hard to happen, and they remained identical with the outsiders or newcomers. The aggressiveness of returned transmigrants is understood as an inherent nature of newcomers instead of as an impact of social pressure (Mumfingah, 2005). Returned transmigrants, as a result, suffer from the stigma of being left behind, negative, criminal, allowing prostitution, and poor, so that they were placed as "the others" in Tanggulangin and Kebumen environment in general. They become IDPs in the land where they were actually born.

The local village residents saw that the local government was spoiling the returned transmigrants by providing staple foods and fresh money for the first 3 months, as well as home industry and agriculture training, in addition to housing, cattle (3-4 goats per family) and fishing ships. They argued that the government was having blinded eyes seeing the life condition of the Tanggulangin residents, which are not less poor than the returned transmigrants. Apart from the debate about the social policy design, the Tanggulangin village residents' complaints indicate the weak inclusion of the government in handling the relocation issue, not only to returned transmigrants but also to the existing village residents, highlighting us the very weak social sensitivity of the local government, top-down methods of policy, and reactionary nature of the policy.

While social tension and protest from the existing village residents arose, problems on the side of returned transmigrants are also yet to be resolved. Their profession changing from mountain to coastal farmers, and moreover, fishermen, is not an easy deal for them. As a result, agriculture training the followed the coastal farming experiment totally failed. A respondent said, in their transmigration area, farming did not need much water and fertilizer.

They also did not need to wait for harvesting. The greater amount of water and fertilizer needed to cultivate coastal farming in Kebumen compared with the mountainous one in the transmigration area posed another challenge for them.

Consequently, some of returned transmigrants tried to earn money in the city or just by being a labour for the Tanggulangin farmers. Some of them even leave their houses in “Kampung Eksodan” empty,⁴ leading to the perception that returned transmigrants are lazy, instant thinkers, and dependent. Such a thought, indeed, worsens the existing stigma addressed to returned transmigrants, as the residents of “kampung eksodan”, a naming that is actually problematic,⁵ and negative.⁶ This is not to mention the remaining problem of land-ownership status, which is unclear until more than a decade after the relocation. The prolonged inability of the local government to make a firm decision on land ownership status has made the burden of being IDPs addressed to returned transmigrants could not be easily cleared up.

Multiple Exclusions and Displacements in the Relocation Policy

The Kebumen government’s policy to provide shelter and assistance for survival in the first three months clearly deserves appreciation. At least, the government already showed its good intention to support the citizens’ welfare, apart from the criticism that the policy did not successfully solve the problem. However, the fact that later the relocation policy of returned transmigrants becomes problematic and continuously complex needs further

⁴ Referring to Millar (in Abrams, Christian, & Gordon, 2007, p. 1-3) exclusion is the deliberately assigned disjuncture of citizen participation in decision making (Brannan, John, & Stoker, 2006, p. 993).

⁵ Until 2009, the number of returned transmigrants decreased until about one fourth out of the initial numbers returning in 2002. Currently, there are 100 families, mixed with new comers from the other Kebumen regions.

⁶ See, for instance, *Suara Merdeka* published on 16 October 2002 (“Relokasi Eksodan Terancam Mundur”), and 19 January 2005 (“Warga Eksodan Kesulitan Mencari Makan”).

attention. There is a need to identify the root of the problems to trace the point where the complexity of the policy started from to identify “who should do what” in that matter.

In the case of returned transmigrants relocation, there is a need to look carefully at the politics exerted by both the central government and the local politicians. There is a need to clarify the responsibility, tasks and functions of the central and local government so that the overlapping and unnecessary responsibility shifting could be avoided. Thus, it would be clear who and how to handle the policy, including its unexpected excesses, like the tension and exclusion between returning transmigrants and the neighbouring community.

However, the local government, which was directly facing the crowd, seemed to be unable to avoid the pressure to fulfil the social demand on them. Instead of resolving the problems, the local government’s approach did not lessen the complex problems of returned transmigrants. When the locally initiated policy failed, things get worse than before because the identification of who should be responsible for the failed policy becomes terribly difficult.

The absence of the national government not only caused the burdening on the Kebumen government’s budget, but also the multiplying blame was addressed to them. Returned transmigrants, for instance, see the government is half-hearted in resolving the problems. As Sarikun (interview, December 10, 2012), an ex-transmigrant from Ketapang, West Kalimantan, identifies, the government’s assistance only works partially, but never touches the real issue of employment. Saino (Interview, December 10, 2012) adds, what the returned transmigrants needed is an area of farming, as they used to do in their transmigration area. Living without land for farming, for Kamini, Santi (Interview, December 5, 2012) Sanusi (Interview December 5, 2012), and Sari (Interview, December 5, 2012), is like being between life and death.

The existing Tanggulangin residents (Interview, December 5, 2012), conversely see that the returned transmigrants as getting

better treatment. They thought the government gave the returned transmigrants a piece land for farming. They also thought returned transmigrants were getting more dependent on the local government, in the midst of the poverty problems that still exist in Tanggulangin.

This makes it clear that even the neighbouring residents in Tanggulangin and Pandan Lor do not always understand the complexities returned transmigrants have to face after relocation. For Mustiko Aji (Interview, December 4, 2012), the misunderstanding of the existing Tanggulangin village residents clearly means problem in the local government's policy, referring to reactionary, highly politicized, and simplified methods of policy-making. Mustiko Aji adds, as handling returned transmigrants is not politically attractive, the ruling politicians in Kebumen government that has changed three times, including Rustriningsih, Nashirudin and Buyar Winarso failed to place this as their priority of attention.

Cahyo (Interview, December 19, 2012) confirms returned transmigrants are reliant on the local residents to earn money through becoming the labourers in coconut sugar production. Meanwhile, Sholahuddin (Interview, December 4, 2012) asserts, the government's assistance ended up merely as a project that did not resolve returned transmigrants' problems. Salim Wasdi (Interview, December 5, 2012) underlines, the policy exerted merely functions as a political machine to gain votes. Mahrur (Interview, December 5, 2012), academics and ex-legislature member in 2004-2009, addresses similar criticism of relocation and social assistance policies as being poor and in need of assessment. Finally, Irma Susanti (Interview, December 4, 2012), sees the political contents of the policy is more striking than the problem-solving orientation.

Trying to defend from the strong criticisms addressed to the local government, Dian, a member of the legislature body in 2009-2014 asserts that what the government has done is more than enough.⁷ Dian (Interview, December 16, 2012) sees the remaining

⁷ The term "eksodan" is used not to disregard its problematic meaning and the entailed

demands of the returned transmigrants, especially towards the house reconstruction and land-ownership status indicate the never-ended dependence of the returned transmigrants on the government's policy. Sri Hardjayanti (Interview, December 24, 2012), an employee in the Office of Labourers, Transmigration and Social Protection Office (*Disnakertransos*), asserts the assistance from the local government was for tackling emergency situations. Returned transmigrants now are expected to have an ability to be self-helping, as it is impossible for the Kebumen government to always assist them.

The contradicting arguments between those advocating and criticizing the relocation policy clearly seem to give us a clear portrait that the problem is between returned transmigrants and the Kebumen government. In fact, it is not. The problem, conversely, should mainly include the national government. In that regards, there is clearly a severe simplification through merely contradicting the returned transmigrants and Kebumen government in relocation policy without involving the national government within. Consequently, exclusion and displacement are not only occurring between returned transmigrants and Kebumen government, or returned transmigrants and the existing Tanggulangin residents, but also between returned transmigrants and the national government, and, more importantly, between the Kebumen government and the national government. In this case, the Kebumen government is only part of the parties that should be responsible for the problems, but also a victim of the non-action choice by the national government and the free rider, vote-seeking local politicians.

Lessons Learned on Citizenship Recognition

Reflecting from the case of the returned transmigrants' relocation such as occurred in Kebumen, it becomes clear that citizenship recognition should be context-sensitive, and when applied in a country like Indonesia, it should not just consider a single

negative stigma. This is merely to ease the discussion.

standard of citizenship understanding, as the Western countries usually apply. Unlike the governments in Western countries, of which the deal in policy making especially that relates to population only involves the state and citizen, while in the Indonesian context, the deal should include layers outside the state that equally play crucial roles in defining citizenship, including ethnicity, geography of origins, languages, religions, and races. Recognizing citizen's rights is not merely about providing social assistance, but more importantly assuring the rights in the political and social life. In that regard, citizen engagement in policy making is the key.

Indeed, as the case has shown us, citizenship recognition is never as simple as we generally think. Citizenship recognition is not the same as the idea of state benevolence, as Lund (2000) asserts. Referring to Lund (2000), "The idea of *benevolence* is rather closer to *charity*, which is usually moralistic in its nature, instead of about political action" (p. 32). Meanwhile, with regarding public policy, does anyone believe in the state's morally promoted action? What looks like moral action in state-citizen relation is always political. In citizenship recognition, what needs more underline is citizen engagement, which does not have anything to do with the state's benevolence. In the case of returned transmigrants' relocation, citizen engagement needs to assert to make sure that social assistance distribution is need and context-based.

In the case of Kebumen returned transmigrants, it is clear that the effort to recognize citizen's rights considers merely single dimensions, namely economy, but fails to identify the other issues related to social and political life. Non-discriminatory manners and political inclusion in community decision making are among the returned transmigrants needs to adjust with the social and political environment. The rise of social tension and the exclusion of returned transmigrants in village decision making are a clear implication of the partial consideration of returned transmigrants' citizenship recognition.

In the case, there is also a tendency of the Kebumen government

to feel enough was done by distributing a set of social assistance to the returned transmigrants. Ironically, the local government even perceives it as the government's generosity. Although handling the returned transmigrants is part of the national government's responsibility, perception of local government that distributing social assistance is their generosity is misleading. In that case, instead of being generous to the returned transmigrants, the Kebumen government is actually generous to the national government and the local politicians. The national government's inaction and the free rider politicians gained benefits from the responsibility taken over by the Kebumen government. Indeed, in practice state benevolence and state welfare is sometime overlapping, as Gilbert (2002, p. 182) asserts, for equally impacting on the government's budget (Malthus, as cited in Morris, 1994). Therefore, the deliberation scheme, which is clearly also about citizen engagement in policy making, as Bramson (2000), William (2001), and Gastil (2000) assert, is necessary to enable the policy transparency.

Finally, and most importantly, the case of returned transmigrants in Kebumen reminds us of the risk of using a single citizenship standard in exerting policy in the multicultural society like Indonesia. The policy makers should have learned from the transmigration policy, widely known to have resulted in social friction between transmigrants, coined as newcomers, and the existing village regions. Not only between Javanese transmigrants and the existing residents, as found in Aceh and Papua's conflicts, social friction could also be found between Makian ethnic group, as the newcomers, and Kao ethnic group, the existing sub-district residents, in North Moluccas.

The weak social integration as a result of the weaknesses in engagement and unequal social distribution approach the government applied in its transmigration policy, indicates the over simplification of what is coined as the "state" and as "citizen". The government assumes what is called as citizens are those who have to obey the state's policy, and thus, citizenship is just about

the state-citizen relationships. In fact, there are other elements that bind community into the particular citizenship units and scopes, and equally define citizenship as the state does, as ethnics, geography of origins, religion, language, race, and so forth. Not only complementing each other, sometimes they are overlapping and even contradictory, leading to the fragmented citizenship.

Layers of citizenship definitions in the context of Indonesia, as such, remind us that citizenship recognition is not a simple deal. It needs high sensitivity to the social, cultural and political contexts. In the context of decentralization as currently practiced in Indonesia, the application of citizenship recognition also requires the carefulness in determining who should be responsible for what.

Deliberation and continuous policy feedback are among the mechanisms that might be useful to overcome the social complexities the government has to deal with given the overwhelming identities attributed to the citizens. They enable the government to recognize not only the policy beneficiaries but also the related stakeholders directly and indirectly influenced by the policy. Otherwise, instead of resolving problems, actions taken could lead to the further bigger problems in the future, and turn out to be a blunder for the government in the national and local levels.

Conclusion

The case of returned transmigrants relocation in Kebumen has let us know that transmigration policy is made without sufficient considerations of social complexities in demography issues. It disregards the social nature of Indonesian community that counts on very important cultural and social identities, which play equal role with the state in determining social and political binding, as described in the idea of citizenship. From the returned transmigrants relocation case, we could then know that the weak design of transmigration policy leads to the—unanticipated—policy excesses, as found in the multiple exclusions of returned transmigrants in Kebumen.

The case reminds us that making clarification of who should do what since the initial period of policy making is crucial. Otherwise, the other party will take benefit from the choice of inaction and of being free riders. In Kebumen's returned transmigrants relocation case, the national government is the party that benefited from the action of responsibility taking over by the Kebumen government. The other party being advantaged is local politicians who use the public funded social assistance as a vehicle to fertilize their political popularity. Returned transmigrants are not much benefited as they remained facing difficulty in gaining their rightful recognition due to the partial solution the Kebumen government addressed to their real problems. Social tension is among the remaining impacts of the incomplete solution of returned transmigrants relocation.

Finally, the case reminds us that using a single standard definition of citizen and citizenship in the Indonesian context will not help much. Citizenship is not simply a state versus citizen relationships, as many other Western countries experience. Society in the countries like Indonesia is also usually bound with so many identity attributes, which at the same time define their respective idea of citizenship as the state does. Therefore, the idea of citizenship becomes multi layered and complicated, which includes geography of origins, status in transmigration policy, location of residential area, region written in National ID, and nationality and locality of returned transmigrants.


Consequently, citizenship recognition is never a simple issue to deal with. Being contextually and culturally sensitive is, therefore, a prerequisite for promoting citizenship recognition. Deliberation and policy feedback mechanism could be among the ways to tackle the social complexities related to transmigration and relocation policy, not only towards the policy beneficiaries, but also towards the other stakeholders directly and indirectly influenced by the policy.

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Appendix 1: Map of Tanggulangin, Klirong, Kebumen



Source: <http://maps.google.co.id/maps?hl=id&vpsrc=0&ie=UTF8&ll=-7.73072>. Retrieved 31 October 2012, at 21.36.

The residential area of the existing Tanggulangin village

The residential area of returned transmigrants

Appendix 2: Photograph of semi-permanent housing of returned transmigrant



Power in The Tradition of *Kain Timur* Exchange: A Study of Using Tradition to Get Support in the Local Election in South Sorong 2010¹

Haryanto

Abstract

The tradition of kain timur requires the receiver party to reimburse the value of a gift. This exchange tradition has the potential to become an instrument to gain support in local elections. The ability of the candidates in making use of this resource becomes the key to success in applying the exchange of kain timur tradition as an instrument to gain power. This can be seen in South Sorong, in which a candidate could successfully become the winner in local election in 2010 by using the exchange of kain timur tradition.

Keywords: *exchange tradition; gain support; the actor's ability (candidate); power.*

Opening Remarks

This writing was inspired by the awareness that the efforts to gain power will never exist in a vacuum. It happens in the socio-cultural, socio-economic, and socio-political settings. The political practice to fight to gain power cannot be separated from the setting in which the fight for power is happening. As one of the socio-cultural settings, the existence of tradition can influence the efforts to gain power through the election mechanism. This writing aims to study the existence of the tradition of exchange that is used as an instrument to gain power.

Tradition can be used as a study because so far as the writer understands, studies related with socio-cultural setting as an effort

¹ Data for this article was collected during the author's doctoral research at the Social and Political Sciences at Universitas Gadjah Mada between 2009 and 2011. More detail analysis of this article could be found in the author's book 'Politik Kain Timur "Instrumen Meraih Kekuasaan"' (PolGov, Department of Politics and Government, FISIPOL UGM, 2015).

to gain power are more on the study of political identity. The local politics in Indonesia tend to be coloured with the work of political identity in trying to explain the effort to gain power. Those studies among others were done by Andrianto (2001), Sugiono (2001), Syarkawi (2007), and Ramandey (2008). Therefore, this writing will not do the same as these studies, which focus on political identity, but this writing will study about efforts to gain power seen from a different point of view, especially from the socio-cultural aspect, that is the tradition of exchange, which has been in the community.

In this context, tradition is considered as customs referring to habits, which are used as the guidelines to interact among members of the community. In relation to this, referring to the categorisation which is stated by Helmke and Levitsky (2004; 728-729), tradition can be categorized as an informal institution because of the way it is formed by the community themselves. As an informal institution, tradition can be used as an instrument to gain support (mobilization) in order to gain power that is done by the local election mechanism known as *Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Pilkada)*.

The tradition being studied in this writing exists among the community in South Sorong, West Papua. Tradition in South Sorong community can be said to be relatively strong. The strength of values in the tradition cannot be separated from the relatively salient similarities of the ethnic identities existing in the Papua community in general.² Field realities indicate that the traditions that still exist in the daily practices of Papua contribute to the prominence of ethnic identities and at the same time, the ethnic identities also support the continuity of the traditions in the community. In relation to this, it

² The thickness of Papua identities can be seen from 3 (three) aspects: *one*, the issue of separatism based on the identity differences between people from Papua and from outside of Papua. *Two*, the enactment of Laws No. 21 year 2001 about Special Autonomy for People from Papua which regulate about the form of *Majelis Rakyat Papua (MRP, Assembly of People from Papua)* as the cultural representation of native inhabitants of Papua, and which required the Governor position by the native Papua. *Three*, there is an issue the native indigenous Papua and the non-indigenous Papua in the mechanism of gaining power through *Pilkada* in some districts in Papua.

is not too much if it is claimed that the prominence of the identities is correlated with the prominence of the tradition in the community. Between these two, the strength of ethnic identities and the strength of the traditions simultaneously support each other to strengthen their existence.

The tradition studied in this writing is the exchange tradition of *kain timur* which is still in practice in South Sorong until now, and which is prominent with its ethnic identity. The exchange tradition of *kain timur* can still be felt until now and becomes a stable reference for the South Sorong community for a relatively long time span (Mansoben, 1994). This exchange tradition does not only contain economic values which guide the community in terms of exchange (debts and receivables) and investments (savings), but also contains socio-political values that guide the community in the decision-making process.

Based on the previous argument, this writing explains the essence of the exchange tradition of *kain timur* which is still used to gain political power. To describe how the exchange tradition of *kain timur* happens and how it is used to gain power, this article focuses on one of the strategies used by a candidate of the local election in South Sorong in 2010, Otto Ihalauw. The election of Otto Ihalauw as an actor is selected to explain how the essence of the exchange tradition of *kain timur* works and is not without reasons.

First, Ottow Ihalauw was the first-choice incumbent candidate. This means, that the resources he owned were more than the ones owned by other candidates. The ownership and ability to use these resources became the key points for the triumph of Otto Ihalauw. *Second*, Otto Ihalauw knew the exchange tradition of *kain timur* that existed in the South Sorong community. *Third*, Otto Ihalauw was the candidate from a non-Papua ethnic. Therefore, based on these arguments, this article tries to see how the exchange tradition of *kain timur* is used as an instrument to gain and maintain power by using Otto Ihalauw as the *proxy*.

Exchange Tradition of *Kain Timur*

In its form, *kain timur* is not more than a type of *kain ikat* ('ikat-cloth') that can be found in 'kepala burung' Papua (the 'vogelkopt' of New Guinea) inland. One study done by Elmberg, Pouwer, and Kamma is used as reference by Mansoben (1994) in identifying the history of *kain timur*. Mansoben claimed that *kain timur* was from Nusa Tenggara island and Maluku island, and it is estimated to enter the 'kepala burung' area since the first half of the 16th century (pp. 75-76). *Kain timur* entering 'kepala burung' area and west coast Papua could be traced by the trading activities done by the traders from Nusa Tenggara and Maluku. By means of these trading activities, finally *kain timur* which was in the west coast of Papua continued entering the 'kepala burung' inland area.

The existence of *kain timur* can be differentiated into 2 (two) categories; they are what are considered sacred and profane (Mansoben, 1994: 73-74; Massink, 2001: 475-477; Sanggenafa & Koentjaraningrat, 1994: 162-166). *Kain timur* which is categorized as sacred is *kain timur* which is considered holy and is called *wan* or heirloom fabrics. *Wan* functions as magical-religious fashion. This fabric is owned through hereditary, passed from father as the oldest son to the oldest son and this fabric can be used to communicate with the ancestors. The contact with the ancestors is done in the skull home where the skulls of the ancestors are kept, which is called as *sachefra*.

Kain timur is considered to have magical-religious values because it takes the role as a medium, for example in ritual ceremonies, praying skulls ceremonies and wedding ceremonies. By means of *kain timur*, ritual ceremonies are believed to bring the spirits of the ancestors to ask for help and safety. It also happens when the owner is in difficulties, for example one of the family members is sick or fails to get harvest, *kain timur* which is categorized as *wan* or heirloom fabrics can be used by spreading it in the *sachefra* while asking to be freed from the difficulties that they are facing. However, as mentioned previously, *kain timur* which has magical-religious

values cannot be exchanged but only inherited as a cloth which is considered sacred.

Meanwhile, *kain timur* which is considered as profane is *kain timur* which does not have magical-religious values. Profane *kain timur* is called *bo* or *kain jalan*.³ Profane *kain timur* has a socio-economic function, and can be used in exchange relationship as a gift, in wedding ceremonies as a means to pay for dowry, and in trading activities as a medium of exchange. As a medium of exchange in trading, *kain timur* can bring special profit or interest for its owner.

The benefits gained from exchanging *kain timur* is not necessarily economical; however, it can be socio-political. As a medium of exchange, *kain timur* can be used to increase the status or prestige of its owner. The success in exchange can make someone have a lot of *kain timur* and the more *kain timur* someone has, the higher the status and prestige of the owner, which then enlarges their influence. The success in collecting *kain timur* is considered as the achievement of social strata which culminates in the ability to influence the decision-making process in the community. Another aspect that needs to be explained from the exchange of *kain timur* is the one related with someone's pride or prestige. It means that the ownership of *kain timur* is a symbol that represents the success and influence of someone, not only socially and politically, but also economically. Therefore, it is not too much if it is claimed that *kain timur* has magical-religious, economic and socio-political values.

In its function as a medium of exchange, *kain timur* hints the presence of tradition in which the party who receives the gift is supposed to give a bigger amount of refund. In relation to this, Boellaars (1986) explains that the opening gift is followed by giving a reply which is more valuable, and this gift is followed by the gift

³ Profane *Kain timur* which functions as the payment of dowry and as means to pay is called by Maybrat people with *ru-ra*, which means a human bird, because it needs to fly and gives benefits (Mansoben, 1994, pp. 74-75), which is quoted from the study of Elmberg, Schoori, and Miedema).

of inaugural award. If the party who receives it neglects or ignores the responsibility to give refund, the related party will get penalty. Penalty is given so that the effort done by the party who gave it will get the refund. The penalty is not only in the form of anger from the party who gave it, but also in the form of physical threat that might lead to death.

In its development, the exchange of *kain timur* includes a small number of people who have the best quality of *kain timur* in a large amount. These small number of people who are able to collect a large number of *kain timur* make themselves as *bobots*. With this title, a *bobot* sometimes has the authority to be the ethnic leader because this person has a lot more *kain timur* than other people. "The ownership of *kain timur* by a *bobot* presents a *patron-client* relationship between a *bobot* and the other people who are not *bobots*" (Mansoben, 1994, p.78). *Bobots* take the role of *patrons*, and the community members who are not *bobots* take the role of *clients*.

The achievement of social strata cannot be separated from the existence of '*kain timur complex*' as it is explained by Mansoben (1994). '*Kain timur complex*' refers to the exchange system in the establishment of social unity which is larger than the *self-support* economic system (p.71). This is because *kain timur* can work through the social unity which is based on clan groups so that it represents the social unity based on the traditional exchange system of *kain timur*. Therefore, it is not surprising if it is studied based on the traditional leadership typology. As it is explained by Mansoben (1994), South Sorong has dignified leadership typology (*local big-man*).⁴

⁴ In commanding man or the local big-man leadership, a leader gain his position by the efforts, and not based on the line of decent. Someone he can be a leader if he can collect a great amount of *kain timur*. In order to lead a person needs to be rich, kind and smart in diplomacy (good in speech) in the context of exchange and circulate *kain timur* (Mansoben, 1994, pp. 61-115).

The Tradition of *Kain Timur* Exchange and the Effort to Gain Power

The exchange of *kain timur* has been happening for a long time. Therefore, the exchange of *kain timur* has been the tradition and become the norm in the daily life of the community in 'kepala burung' inland Papua, especially in South Sorong. As mentioned previously, the essence of the exchange tradition of *kain timur* is the hint for the existence of the responsibility of the receiver party to give refund and the refund should be followed with the interest as the addition. This means that the exchange of *kain timur* is mutually reciprocal and binding, either for the party who gives it or the party who receives it. This is because both parties get the responsibility to return as long as both still accept the gift. Meanwhile, the process of giving and taking should not stop and continuously happens with greater amount than the previous ones. If the party who receives it neglects or denies those responsibilities, the related party will get social penalty even physical threat (Haryanto, 2015). The essence of this exchange tradition can be explained parallel with the concept of giving a present or donation as it is said by Mauss (1990) and Hyde (1983) as a *gift*. The concept of *gift* presents the giving, receiving and returning concepts that is accepted in a continuous process.



In its practice, the tradition of the exchange of *kain timur*, in addition to the form of binding relationship between the giving and receiving party, there is also a transactional dimension.⁵ This transactional dimension happens through the exchange process, which is sometimes economical. This is because the party who receives it feels burdened by the responsibility to return a gift with a bigger and more valuable refund. At this point, this means that the giver party will get more benefit in the process of refunding because the refund will be bigger and more valuable than the previous ones.

⁵ The transactional principles in 'profane' *kain timur* in its function as a means of exchange; the transactional principles in 'sacred' *kain timur* in its function as ritual needs related with the ancestors.


In other words, the more the giving actions, the more benefits one will get from the refund.

This explanation is strengthened by Mansoben, who mentioned that the transactional process does not only have the economical dimension but also is centered on the political dimension. Mansoben (1994) explained that “politically the gifts in any forms become the modal (investment) for the giving party to bind the receiver party to gain the political purpose of the giving party” (p. 63). This can be interpreted that the more one gives, the more political supports go to the giver. In this context, gathering the electoral political power, transactional relationship in the exchange of *kain timur* can be described by the relationship of reciprocal benefit among the actors who try to get the power by sounding the community that is needed by the actors. In its practice, the exchange of *kain timur* tradition which is indirect and continuous can be illustrated as follows:

**Relationship Mechanism
Based on the Essence of the Exchange of Kain Timur Tradition**



The combination of direct relationship and indirect relationship



In this diagram, indirectly, the mechanism of the exchange also indicates the political phenomena that happens in the process of electoral politics, that is the patronage phenomena as described by Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007). In the mechanism of the exchange relationship, the party who gives takes the position of a *patron* and the party who receives it takes the position of a *client* and between those two reciprocal benefits happen. In relation with this study, in order to avoid bias, the concepts of *patron-client* and patronage are interchangeable to reveal the relationship of the exchange of *kain timur*. In addition, it is important to explain that in *kain timur* exchange tradition between *patron* and *client*, the relationship is not necessarily hierarchical and profitable for the *patron* only as it is explained in previous studies.

Moreover, based on the observation of *patron-client*

relationships in the tradition of the exchange of *kain timur*, at some levels a *client* is placed as less passive and relatively at the same level as the *patron* (Simandjuntak, 2012). For example, in one of the cases the relationship between *patron-client* was disconnected because the *patron* did not have legitimation and strong resources after he did not hold a particular position anymore. In addition, as it is mentioned in the relationship of *kain timur*, the supports can only be given to the *patron*, and not to the person who is chosen or who represent him. Therefore, the exchange of *kain timur* does not only form the patronage relationship which is reflected in the goods exchange in which in the context of electoral politics can be in the form of either material or non-material giving between the *patron* and *client*, but also reciprocal benefits which is relatively at the same level and less passive.

Even so, the mechanism of the relationship of the exchange of *kain timur* which appears in the form of direct and indirect relationship indicates the relationship happening among actors in the exchange of *kain timur* (see the previous figure). The pattern of direct relationship reveals the actor who tries to gain power taking the position of the giver and the community taking the position of the receiver. The actor gives either material or non-material gifts to the community. The community returns the gifts in the form of support for the actor. Then, the actor receives the return, in order to keep the support from the community, will give more than the first giving and the community will do more to support the candidate. Therefore, the mechanism of the relationship continuously and reciprocally happens.

The indirect relationship happens when the figure who takes the role of intermediary appears in the exchange transaction relationship. This figure is sometimes paid by an informal figure (ethnic figure) in the community. Beginning with the relationship between the actor who takes the position as the giver and the mediator figure who takes the position as the receiver. An actor gives something, either in the form of material or non-material giving, to

the mediator figure. Then the mediator figure played by the informal figure creates a relationship with the community. The mediator figure (informal figure) in his position as a patron gives something to the community, and the community in their position as clients return the gifts they have received by showing their obedience in the form of supports to the informal figure. This return in the form of supports from the community, initiated by the mediator figure is directed to the actor as the return for something that he has received. The return is in a bigger amount and more valuable.

Therefore, the exchange of *kain timur* tradition presents the relationship which tends to be transactional and creates patronage between the giver and the receiver parties. As it is illustrated previously it can be interpreted as savings or investments for the future. These savings or investments will bear fruit in the form of return from the informal figure or from the community in the form of supports. Politically, the gifts in any forms can be the savings or investments for the giving party to bind the receiver party to support the political purpose of the giving party. The more the party gives, the more supports from the receiver they will get. On the other hand, the less the party gives, the less supports (voice) given to the giving party. The following excerpts explain the essence of the exchange of *kain timur* tradition as an instrument used by Otto Ihalauw to gain support in Pilkada in Sorong 2010.

The Exchange of Kain Timur Tradition: An Instrument to Gain Power in South Sorong

Before discussing the exchange of *kain timur* tradition as an instrument to gain power through the mechanism of Pilkada, this passage describes the setting of South Sorong briefly. In addition to the description of the existence of the ethnic groups, this passage also presents the profile of the actors who contested in the Pilkada held in 2010. This description is ended with analyses related with the ability of the successful actor who made use of the exchange of *kain timur* tradition as an instrument to gain supports in Pilkada 2010.

1. The Setting of South Sorong

As one of the districts located in 'kepala burung' area, the community in South Sorong consists of some ethnic groups (Miedema & Reesink, 2004)⁶. They can be categorized into various groups based on whether they are from Papua as their origin or new comers who are non-Papuan. Those who are included into the Papuan group in the South Sorong district are Tehit, Imekko, and Maybrat.

The composition of the number of the members of Tehit, Imekko and Maybrat are relatively even. However, as Maybrat has separated becoming a new district, the composition of the number of members of Maybrat ethnic is slightly changing⁷. This is because Maybrat people moved becoming the people in the Maybrat district and some of them remained staying and domicile in South Sorong district.

In addition to the Papuan ethnic group, the presence of new comers from outside can also be found in South Sorong. In general, the new comers were from Java, Sulawesi, Maluku and Nusa Tenggara Timur. Their numbers are relatively smaller compared with the native inhabitants. The following table illustrates the distribution of the ethnic group in South Sorong.

⁶ The existence of Papua ethnic groups is an aspect that cannot be denied. Miedema and Reesink (2004). in their book entitled *One Head, Many Faces* illustrated that *Kepala Burung* area, located in South Sorong, can be found some ethnic groups whose names are based on the area consideration or based on the domicile of the groups, language or dialect of the groups, the leader's names or the group figures, or the new names from outside of the groups (pp. 9-11).

⁷ Maybrat became the new district based on Laws No 13 Year 2009 about the Form of Maybrat district.

Table: Ethnic Group Comparison

Ethnic Groups	Districts (domicilies)	Total (Estimates)
Tehit: - Tehit - Sawiat - Imyan - Salakhma - Saifi - Ogit	- Teminabuan and Seremuk - Sawiat, Fkour - Seremuk - Sawiat - Saifi - Konda	35 %
Imekko: - Bira - Iwaro - Negiro/Mate - Kaiso - Ameyode - Awee	- Inanwatan - Matemani - Matemani - Kais - Kokoda - Kokoda Utara	35 %
Maybrat: - Ayamaru - Aifat - Aitinyo	- Moswaren - Wayer	20 %
Non-Papua *)	- Teminabuan - Moswaren	10 %

Sources: field data, processed

Notes: *) Non-Papua people consisted of people from Java, Bugis, Buton, and Makassar (known as BBM), and some people from Ambon.

Although each ethnic group tends to live in a colony in a particular area, in their daily life, one ethnic group will not be separated from the other ethnic groups. They interact in the market to fulfil their economic needs and they meet in the health centre when they need health service and even their children go to the same school (Sija, A., interview, July 17, 2010).⁸ The life continuity that blends among different Papua ethnic groups and the new comers cause South Sorong community to be considered as an ethnicity-

⁸ Ansar Sija, with a newcomer ethnic group background interview in Teminabuan – South Sorong.

based community.

The relationship pattern among South Sorong community members that is ethnicity-based cannot be separated from the context of the community there which tends to be heterogeneous. This context causes primordialism to become strong especially because of the similarity of the blood, religious, language and especially the tradition which is articulated in the *kain timur* exchange (Haryanto, 2015). Nevertheless, this strong ethnicity which then peaks as Papua indigenous primordialism is used as an instrument by actors to mobilize and gain supports (Haryanto, 2015, p. 28). In such relationship, patronage as the strategy to gain support in Pilkada becomes possible.

Moreover, in the context of natural conditions in South Sorong especially to fulfil daily needs for the community who live similarly with gathering culture becomes prominent. This condition causes South Sorong people to have the character that easily changes depending on the natural condition. Especially when they intend to choose from the possibilities, they tend to choose ones that can give the biggest benefit. At this point, we can say that this character becomes one of the driving factors for the patronage-based relationship to happen.

2. Otto Ihalauw: An Actor who Contested in Pilkada 2010

Otto Ihalauw was one of the candidates who joined the competition to get the position as the district head in South Sorong through the Pilkada mechanism in 2010. Being in a non-Papua ethnic group that is Ambon (Maluku), Otto Ihalauw was born and grew up in Papua. His background took an important role in forming Otto Ihalauw to be a simple and religious individual. From this father's line, his grandfather was a religious figure and at the same time was a missionary in South Sorong, and from his mother's line, his grandfather was known to be an educator. Meanwhile, his father was a career bureaucrat in the ranks of local government. Therefore, it is not surprising that the life of bureaucracy had been

familiar to him since he was a child.

His educational background began with Otto Ihalauw going to primary school and middle school in Manokwari, meanwhile his high school was in Sorong until 1977. His higher education was in Jayapura in which Otto Ihalauw finished his Diploma III in Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri (Government Domestic Academy, APDN). In 1981, and then continued in Institut Ilmu Pemerintahan (Institute of Science of Government, IIP) Jakarta which was finished in 1989. Amid a bustle as a local government official, Otto Ihalauw tried to attend Masters Program in Political Science in Universitas Gadjah Mada focusing on Local Politics and Regional Autonomy which he finished in 2011.

His career in government bureaucracy began after Otto Ihalauw finished his study in APDN, Jayapura. His career as a bureaucrat could be considered without significant challenge. This is seen from the records in which Otto Ihalauw began from becoming a staff until he got a structural position in a relatively short time period. In addition to getting a structural position as a head of a department, Otto Ihalauw had been a head of a region, that was *camat* or district head of Teminabuan. The experience of becoming the head of the district apparently gave him a special experience which was more valuable for Otto Ihalauw in terms of communicating with the community.

One aspect that needs to be noted in the career journey of bureaucrats is his inauguration as the indigenous child of Tehit (one of the indigenous ethnic groups in South Sorong). The inauguration as the indigenous child of Tehit made the person accepted as the original Papua. Although having a status as indigenous child of Tehit, Otto Ihalauw did not treat this ethnic group differently. He continued making efforts in treating this ethnic group in relatively the same way without considering their descent (Momot, M., interview, July 19, 2010).⁹ This treatment and behaviour created a positive image

⁹ The interview with Michael Momot (The head of Indigenous Council of Tehit) in

in the community that Otto Ihalauw was a bureaucrat who was able to lead without favouring one ethnic group.

The political career of Otto Ihalauw began when he was inaugurated as the head of the district of South Sorong in 2003. After approximately 2 years becoming the head of the district, Otto Ihalauw decided to join Pilkada for the election of definitive head of the district election which was held in 2005. Otto Ihalauw successfully won in Pilkada, and became the head of the district of South Sorong 2005-2010 period. In the midst of his bustle as the head of the district, Otto Ihalauw also became the head of *Golkar* Party in South Sorong.

The previous description indicated that Otto Ihalauw had some of resources that could be used to gain and defend political power. At least, Otto Ihalauw had 3 of 5 types of resources as stated by Andrain (1992, pp. 132-135)¹⁰, that is the normative, personal and skill power. The normative resources were in the form of the authority which were attached to himself as the head of the district. Moreover, the authority as the head of *Golkar* Party was also considered as a normative resource for Otto Ihalauw. Additionally, his status as the child of Tehit was considered to be a normative resource owned by Otto Ihalauw.

Personal resources that were owned by Otto Ihalauw were in the form of personal character as a simple, open, kind-hearted, and easy-going figure. This personal resource as a political figure cannot be separated his family background that was simple and religious. In addition, another important personal source of Otto Ihalauw was his decent as a non-Papua when he proposed himself to be the head of the district of South Sorong. At this time people

Teminabuan – South Sorong, In the interview, Michael Momot stated that “Otto Ihalauw diangkat sebagai anak adat Suku Tehit, tetapi ia memberi perlakuan sama ke semua kelompok etnis. Kelompok etnis asli ataupun pendatang diperlakukan sama”. (“Otto Ihalauw was adopted as the son of Tehit clan, but he treats the other ethnic groups the same way. Either the indigenous ethnic groups or new comers are treated the same way.”)

¹⁰ Andrain (1992) stated that 5 types of sources, they are physical, economic, normative, personal and skills (informational) sources (pp. 132-135).

who were non-Papua were more beneficial because one, the trust relationship of indigenous Papua to the non-Papua was more than to the indigenous Papua themselves. This was because when one of the Papua ethnic groups wins the Pilkada, all of the resources would go to and benefit only one of the indigenous ethnic groups. It means that there had been exclusivism among indigenous ethnic groups of Papua especially in gaining resources. Two, when Otto Ihalauw proposed himself as the district leader, two indigenous people from the same ethnic group proposed themselves to be the district leaders so that more people elected Otto Ihalauw to be the district leader.

Meanwhile, the skill resources owned by Otto Ihalauw was in the form of knowledge and technical skills in governmental aspects. These resources were gained through his education that he took in APDN, IIP, and Local Political Program and Regional Autonomy (Pasca Sarjana-UGM). The skill resources were also gained through his career journey in the bureaucracy until he gained the political position as the head of the district of South Sorong in 2005-2010.

Meanwhile, Otto Ihalauw's understanding about the South Sorong community and their tradition was considered sufficient. Otto understood the reality that the essence of exchange *kain timur* tradition became the reference of the community in their daily life, especially the one related with one's ability in collecting a great number of *kain timur* that causes the person to be considered as holding the position and influence in his community (Ihalauw, O., interview, July 21, 2010)¹¹. In relation to this, Otto was also aware that the mechanisms of exchange in the *kain timur* tradition could be used to gain influence that finally could be implemented in gaining the supports in order to gain power. The understanding that the exchange in the *kain timur* tradition that can be used as an

¹¹ Otto Ihalauw's understanding about the exchange of *kain timur* was identified by the interview with him in Teminabuan – South Sorong. In the interview it was stated that “orang yang mempunyai kain timur dalam jumlah banyak akan mempunyai pengaruh di masyarakat; semakin banyak kain timur yang dimiliki akan menjadikan semakin besar pengaruh pemilikinya” (“someone who owns a great number of *kain timur* will get more influence in the society; the more *kain timur* he has, the more the influence he has.”)

instrument to materialize the political needs implicitly appeared in his statement that said, “the gift that was done is the model to bind the other party in order to get political support from a lot of the givers (Ihalauw, O., interview, July 21, 2010).”¹²

Otto Ihalauw’s understanding about the exchange of *kain timur* tradition was completed with the understanding about gathering culture that existed in the community. Like indigenous Papua in general, the ethnic groups in South Sorong also know the gathering tradition. The gathering tradition indicates that the community has the habits to find food by cultivating an unirrigated field from one place to another. If a particular place does not bare food anymore, the field will be left and they move to another place that is more promising. The essence of gathering tradition, if it is matched with the exchange of *kain timur* tradition, is that the community will only receive the most beneficial gift. When both parties or more offer a gift, therefore only the gift that is accepted is only the one that is valuable; and the gift that has been accepted will be returned together with the interest as its addition.

In the context of Pilkada, Otto Ihalauw was aware and understood that the community in South Sorong strongly tended to not accept both or more gifts which were offered by the candidates who competed. Otto Ihalauw believed that the community would only accept one of the gifts. This was because the community did not want to get burden to return the gift in the form of support toward the candidates who lost in the Pilkada contestation. The gifts that was offered by other candidates were rejected because it is impossible for the community, at the same period, to give supports to two or more candidates. The community will only receive the gifts that were thought to be the most beneficial for them. Otto Ihalauw realized and understood that the behaviour of the community referred to the essence of the exchange of *kain timur* tradition and the gathering tradition.

¹² The interview with Otto Ihalauw in Teminabuan – South Sorong.

3. The Actor's Ability, Instrument Tradition, and the Efforts to Gain Support in Pilkada

As an actor who contested in Pilkada, Otto Ihalauw tried to gain support to be the winner in the contestation of Pilkada. The raising of supports was done by Otto Ihalauw in every life activity in the form of government activities in bureaucracy, politics and communities. The raising of supports was done far before the election was held and happened over a relatively long period. Meanwhile, Otto Ihalauw also raised the supports through election activities including the steps of campaigns and election/ voice counting.

The raising of supports in government and communities' activities, also the activities in election could not be separated from each other. The raising of supports in those activities accumulated to be one energy to win the Pilkada to gain power. In raising the supports, Otto Ihalauw used the exchange of *kain timur* tradition as an instrument; and the use of the instrument was done based on the resources that he owned. In order to win the Pilkada, Otto Ihalauw as the actor who tried to gain power was expected to be optimal in using the exchange tradition as an instrument to gain supports.

a) The Raising of Supports in Bureaucracy

In his position as the candidate incumbent, Otto Ihalauw had the normative resources in the form of his right to manage and lead the government bureaucracy. Based on this right, Otto Ihalauw used the bureaucracy to gain supports from the community. The first step that he took was gaining supports from the bureaucracy themselves and then the bureaucracy was used to gain supports from the community. With the right resources as the head of the district, the support raising at the bureaucracy was done by Otto Ihalauw by considering the representativeness of the ethnicity.

The explanation is, by applying the principle of representativeness of the ethnic groups means that each ethnic group would gain voice in the structural position in the bureaucracy. For these ethnic groups, the replacement of the members in the

structural position is interpreted as the gifts from Otto Ihalauw and the ethnic groups were attached to the responsibility to return the gifts. The returning process was done by the members of the groups who were in the structural position. The return was in the form of raising the supports done by the officials towards the ethnic groups in which the related people were from.

The filling of the structural bureaucracy other than considering the representativeness of the ethnicity was considering the community perception related with the bureaucracy position. The community assumed that the bureaucracy position had a high social status and was able to indicate the existence of a particular ethnic group. A bureaucrat who was in the structural position was considered to be able to increase the social ethnic status which the related person was from and at the same time it made that particular ethnic group influenced towards the supports that was given by a particular ethnic group. By its representativeness of each ethnic group in a structural position, there was no reason for any ethnic groups not to support Otto Ihalauw.

The consequence of the representativeness of the ethnic group in order to fill the structural bureaucracy was the emergence of the reciprocal benefits between the bureaucrats who were in a structural position and the members of ethnic groups where the bureaucrats were from. The bureaucrats would make efforts so that they remained at the same position, but at the same time they should consider the aspiration of the ethnic group's needs and fulfil the economic materials that were sometimes required by the members of the group. In this condition, the bureaucrat positions became the source of economy and self-prestige of the ethnic members.

Approaching the election of Pilkada in 2010, the composition of Echelon II at the local government of South Sorong was occupied by the bureaucrats from all ethnic groups. Although it was not equal, all the ethnic groups, either the indigenous or new comers were represented in the government structural. The following table describes the distribution of the Echelon II based on the ethnic groups.

Table: Background of the Echelon II Ethnicity

No	Ethnic Groups	Amount
1	Tehit	10
2	Imekko	3
3	Maybrat	8
4	Non-Papua	6
	Total	27

Source: BKD of South Sorong District, 2010, processed.

Something interesting about the previous table was that the distribution of the ethnic background of the Echelon II was not equal among the ethnic group members. Imekko as one of the biggest ethnic group only got 3 chairs in the position of echelon II. This condition did not cause a challenge for Imekko people because they realized they were limited in the bureaucrat resources as to fulfil the requirements for the stratification according to rank. Because the Echelon II structural from Immeko was less than those from other ethnic groups, Otto Ihalauw placed Imekko people in enough numbers in the lower echelon, that was Echelon III (Suroso, interview, 24 July 2010).¹³

The fulfilment of the structure was based on the equality of the representativeness of the ethnicity and it was also implemented in the fulfilment of the position of the head of the district with the reconsideration that the position was relatively strategic to raise the supports. Even the position of the head of the district was more strategic than the structural position because the position of the head of the district was closer and sometimes directly related with the community. The following table indicates the origin of the officials where they were from.

¹³ The interview with Suroso, the Secretary of *Bappeda* South Sorong district, in Teminabuan – South Sorong.

Table: Ethnicity Background of the Head of the District

No	Districts	Name of the Person	Ethnics
1	Teminabuan	Mesakh F. Kokurule, S. Pd	Non Papua
2	Wayer	Yohana K. Saul	Non Papua
3	Moswaren	Drs. Yulianus Bosawer, M.Si	Maybrat
4	Seremuk	Karel Sremere, S.Sos	Tehit
5	Inanwatan	George Japsenam	Non Papua
6	Sawiyat	Albert Snahan, S.Sos	Tehit
7	Kokoda	Hengki Gogoba, S.Sos	Imekko
8	Kais	Yakonias Tigore, SE	Imekko
9	Kokoda Utara	Yunus Kokurule, SH	Non Papua
10	Matemani	Marten Nebore, S.IP	Imekko
11	Konda	Izak Meres, SH	Tehit
12	Fkour	Moses Blessia, A.Md. Kes	Tehit
13	Saifi	Simon Sesa	Tehit

Source: *BKD South Sorong, 2010, processed.*

The previous table indicated that most of the heads of the district positions were filled by the officials who had the same ethnic background with the majority who domiciled in the related district. If the position of the head of the district was not occupied by the officials who were of the same ethnic group, or even was occupied by non-Papua, the official who occupied the position of the head of the district was the bureaucrat who had been known by the community in the related district. Therefore, the officials who were placed at the head of the district were relatively easy to raise the supports. The head of the districts were available to raise the supports because they thought that the position that they had was the gift from Otto Ihalauw. When it came to their turn, they returned the gift from Otto Ihalauw in the form of mobilizing support. The raise of the support was easy to be done because the head of the district had the same ethnic group as the majority of the people or had been known by the community in the related district for so long.

The support raising in the bureaucracy area could be traced back to the process of selection and acceptance of the civil servants. The process also placed ethnicity issues as the main consideration if a candidate would be accepted or not. The ethnicity consideration in the acceptance of civil servants in South Sorong was responded to by the ethnic groups in the form of the willingness to support Otto Ihalauw. These ethnic groups claimed that they were willing to support Otto Ihalauw in the Pilkada contestation if the members of the groups who applied for being civil servants were accepted.¹⁴

Related with the effort for support raising in the bureaucracy area, Otto Ihalauw in appointing someone to take the position of official also considered their being public figures of the related people in the community.¹⁵ The consideration was done because it was in line with the *patronage* relationship that was still applicable in South Sorong. The people being public figures as the officials in the community made the related people have the position as the *patron* among their communities. This condition made the officials easier to raise supports from their groups to support Otto Ihalauw.

In short, based on the previous explanation, it can be said that the raising of the supports done by Otto Ihalauw was in line with the mechanism in the exchange of *kain timur* tradition. In raising the supports from bureaucracy, Otto Ihalauw depended on the normative resources more in the form of his rights as the head of the district. The mechanism of the structural appointments and the head of the district can be interpreted as the gift from Otto Ihalauw to the officials who were appointed in those positions. The same things

¹⁴ The field findings indicated that there were a lot of potential statements from ethnic groups that supported Otto Ihalauw in the contestation of Pilkada if their group members were accepted as civil servants. One of the proofs was supporting statements from the society of 4 kampongs in Fkour District, these groups stated their supports followed by their requests to Otto Ihalauw as the Bupati (District leader) to accept "anak-anak kami" ("our children") from the 4 kampongs as the civil servants.

¹⁵ The officials who supported Otto Ihalauw were the figures (in their ethnic groups) who got sympathy; and the were placed on strategic positions, like the position of the head of *Bappeda*, the head of *Badan Kepegawaian Daerah* (Local Staffing Agency), and the heads of the districts.

happened with the mechanism of the civil workers' acceptance that could be interpreted as the gift from Otto Ihalauw to the ethnic groups where the candidates were from. They who accepted the gift from Otto Ihalauw interpreted it as the debt that should be paid. Meanwhile, for Otto Ihalauw himself, interpreted the gift as the saving or investments in which result would be harvested from the return. The return in the form of support could be interpreted as the payment of the debt from those who once accepted the gift from Otto Ihalauw. Meanwhile, the return in the form of supports was interpreted by Otto Ihalauw as the saving or investment that he made.

b) The Raising of Supports in Political Aspects

Having the status as the candidate incumbent and the head of Golkar Party, Otto Ihalauw did not find significant difficulties in gaining the political supports. The position as the candidate incumbent and the head of the party indicated that Otto Ihalauw had the normative sources in the form of the rights that were attached in his position. With these sources, Otto Ihalauw did not find difficulties to determine the political party that nominated him as the candidate of the district leader in Pilkada 2010. This was because Golkar Party that he led had 5 chairs in Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD, regional representatives), which means it had fulfilled the requirements as the bearer of political party.¹⁶ Nevertheless, in nominating Otto Ihalauw, Golkar Party formed coalition with PKS and Hanura Party.

In forming the coalition, Otto Ihalauw got the benefit in the form of relatively big supports because PKS and Hanura Party each had 2 chairs in the DPRD. Meaning, two political parties had

¹⁶ The political parties or the coalition of political parties can register their candidate if gaining the requirement of at least 15% of the available chairs. Meanwhile the number of chairs in the DPRD (Local Representatives) of South Sorong were 20 chairs. Therefore, Golkar Party which had 5 chairs (25% of the whole chairs) could nominate their candidate in Pilkada without coalition with the other political parties because they had fulfilled the requirements.

significant supports compared with the other political parties.¹⁷ Meanwhile the benefits got by PKS and Hanura party was in the form of sympathy from the supporters of Otto Ihalauw. As it was well known, in his position as a candidate incumbent, Otto Ihalauw had a lot of supports because of his success in running the government and development in the first period (2005-2010). PKS and Hanura Party in coalition expected sympathy and supports from the supporters of Otto Ihalauw in the coming legislative election (2014).

In order to gain supports, Otto Ihalauw also created a harmonic relationship with DPRD. Being known as a friendly person and in his position as the leader of Golkar Party which had 5 chairs in DPRD, Otto Ihalauw did not find significant challenges in maintaining the good relationship with DPRD (Suroso, interview, July 24, 2010).¹⁸ In his position as the current district leader, Otto Ihalauw needed the presence of the government which was stable without the intervention from DPRD as the working partner. With a stable government, Otto Ihalauw was recognized for his ability and success in leading the South Sorong district, and this would increase his eligibility which at its turn would increase his supports in the Pilkada contestation.

Based on the previous illustration, it could be said that Otto Ihalauw used normative sources, personality and skills that he owned to gain political supports. The efforts to form a coalition of political parties and to develop harmonic relationship with DPRD could be said unavoidable from the influence of the exchange of *kain timur* tradition. Those efforts could be interpreted as the savings or investments of Otto Ihaauw. Meanwhile, the political parties were invited to form the coalition and DPRD interpreted this as the form

¹⁷ In addition to Democate Party, the political parties outside the coalition of Golkar, PKS and Hanura Party had 1 chair in the DPRD of South Sorong.

¹⁸ The interview with Suroso, the Secretary of Bappeda of South Sorong, in Teminabuan – South Sorong.

of returning the favour that should be followed up by supporting him in Pilkada 2010.

c) Raising the Support in the Community

With his personal abilities, normative resources and skills that he owned, Otto Ihalauw as the candidate incumbent raised the supports by the policies that he made. The main purpose of the policies that he enacted was to run the government and develop South Sorong that he led but those policies were also used as a means to raise the community supports. The development policies were wrapped proportionally with the equity issues and this could be interpreted that Otto Ihalauw to proportionally took action for the purpose and needs of the groups that existed in the community. Those proportional policies were responded to positively by each community groups because those policies were assessed relatively just and not harming any particular group.

The policy that relatively stood up was the policy related with the development of the local hospital in Teminabuan.¹⁹ This policy was based on the consideration of development equalization. This means that Otto Ihalauw as the district leader in any chance always socialized this policy and was directed to increase the health of the community without considering the background where the related people were from. In socializing the policy, Otto Ihalauw always said that the hospital was developed not only for any particular ethnic group. However, the development of the hospital was meant to increase and juxtapose the health service so that the community did not necessarily get treatment away from South Sorong. This hospital development policy was responded to positively because the community did not become worried about the discrimination in

¹⁹ Otto Ihalauw took an initiative to develop a hospital at district level because the south area of 'kepala burung' of Papua never got an appropriate hospital, neither in terms of its size nor the equipments nor the medical personnels. By this policy it was expected that South Sorong people and its surroundings did not need to go to Sorong or Manokwari for the health reasons.

health services.

The community responded that this policy was enacted justly and equally for all members without considering the groups' backgrounds (Thesia, K., interview, July 20, 2010).²⁰ In this case, the ethnic groups considered that the policy to develop hospital was a gift from Otto Ihalauw. As a result, these ethnics responded in the form of supports to Otto Ihalauw as the return. Meaning, Otto Ihalauw with the policy to develop a hospital was able to raise the supports that could be used for his intention in the Pilkada contestation that he joined.

In addition to the policy to develop a hospital, Otto Ihalauw also made a breakthrough in the economy, especially the policy related with market development (Suroso, interivew, July 15, 2010).²¹ This was done because the old market was thought to be inappropriate to cover the economic activities which continuously developed. The policy to develop a market created a challenge in the process of moving the sellers to the new market. To encourage the movement to the new market, Otto Ihalauw enacted a new policy to give priorities to the sellers who were in the old market and to the community around the new market by allowing them to take a first pick of the location. This policy apparently gave positive impact towards his image as the leader who was considered to be responsive and responsible towards the needs of the community, especially the sellers.

In addition to the previous policies, Otto Ihalauw also enacted the policy to build up the road and electricity infrastructure,

²⁰ The interviwe with Kenan Thesia, Tehit ethnic, in Teminabuan – South Sorong. In the interview it was stated that “Pembangunan rumah sakit Teminabuan untuk semua anggota masyarakat tanpa memandang dari kelompok mana berasal. Tak ada kelompok yang merasa diperlakukan tidak adil; semua orang merasa senang bisa berobat dan memperoleh pelayanan yang sama”. (“The development of the hospital in Teminabuan was for the whole community without considering groups backgrounds. None of the groups felt being treated differently; because all people felt happy being able to get the same treatment.”)

²¹ The interview with Suroso, the Secretary of Bappeda of South Sorong, in Teminabuan – South Sorong.

and the policy in facilitating religious institutions (church) and customs. By these policies, like in the policy about the hospital and market development, Otto Ihalauw gained the needed supports.

Based on the previous illustrations, it can be said that in order to raise the support from the community, Otto Ihalauw used the exchange tradition of *kain timur* as an instrument to gain support. With his normative sources in the form of his rights as the district leader, Otto Ihalauw enacted the government and development policies for the sake of raising the supports. The government and development policies was interpreted as the savings and investments to generate the supports from the community who got the benefits from the policies. Meanwhile, the requirements to return the gift was interpreted as the debt payments to Otto Ihalauw who had fulfilled the needs of the community by his policies.

d) Raising the Supports in Election Activities

The raising of supports in the bureaucracy, politics and community as it has been explained previously was happening together with the raising of the supports in election activities (Pilkada). With his normative sources, personal abilities and skills that he owned, Otto Ihalauw raised the supports both in the campaign levels and in the election/voice counting step.

At the campaign level, Otto Ihalawu did not use ethnicity as the main issue to gain supports but instead to uncover the development issue. If the ethnicity issue was nominated as the theme of the campaign, it would be counterproductive for Otto Ihalauw who had a non-Papua background. The development issue was nominated for the theme of the campaign because during his time becoming the leader in the first period, Otto Ihalauw was committed to run the development for the sake of community welfare in South Sorong. Otto Ihalauw tried to be consistent with his commitment, and therefore, in his campaign, he introduced the slogan “developing together with the community.”

In order to get more supports, Otto Ihalauw prepared

campaign materials with the theme development based on the study done by a competent institution or agency, that was Bappeda (Badan Pemerintah Daerah, Local Government Bodies). In preparing the campaign materials the pair of candidates were given input related with development that had been done. The help in the form of information that was for the needs of the campaign could be interpreted that Otto Ihalauw used the normative sources that were in the nation to win Pilkada. This was possible because the position of Otto Ihalauw as the candidate incumbent and Bappeda was the agency that was led by an official who happened to be his close friend (Ihalauw, O., interview, July 21, 2010).²²

Thus, despite what was mentioned previously, in order to gain the supports and to optimize the campaign, Otto Ihalauw invited the parties' figures who nominated him, either at the national or province level, and also the ethnic figures to campaign. The use of these figures also proved that Otto Ihalauw got supports from political parties who nominated him and from the ethnic groups. The success of Otto Ihalauw in presenting the figures in the campaign could not be separated from the personal sources that he owned, that was his personal ability to maintain personal relationship with those figures.

The discussion of the raising supports in the campaign indicated that Otto Ihalauw used the mechanism of the exchange of *kain timur* tradition. The campaign theme that was stated by Otto Ihalauw was related with the fulfilment of the needs and the importance of the community. Those campaign themes by the community was interpreted as gifts and for the community, those gifts were the debts that should be returned. Meanwhile, Otto Ihalauw interpreted that the gifts were the form of the savings or investments that in turn resulted in the supports towards him through the mechanism of returning the gifts.

²² The interview with Otto Ihalauw, in Teminabuan – South Sorong.

At the level of election/the voice counting, the raising of supports was focused to monitor the date of election and the counting. A number of people were prepared as the witnesses to monitor the election and the counting. The determination of witnesses was done with selection that was conducted by the successful teams and those who were selected were the supporters whose loyalty and commitment were not in doubt. Those who were selected as the witnesses got letters of assignments. The meaning of the letter of assignments was to fulfil the administrative requirements and to guarantee the selected people to get reward from Otto Ihalauw. The raising of witnesses done by Otto Ihalauw was in line with the essence of the exchange of *kain timur* tradition. The loyalty and commitment by the witnesses were considered as the form of gift to Otto Ihalauw and therefore, he was required to return the gifts for the willingness of the witnesses to monitor the election and the counting.

The bottom line explanation was that an actor (candidate) in order to gain supports could use the giving, receiving and returning back mechanisms as manifested in the process of the exchange of *kain timur*. In the political contexts, the gifts in any forms in the exchange mechanism could be interpreted as the modal for the giver and the modal could be used as an instrument to bind the receiver in order to get supports for political intention of the giver. The more he gives, the more the modal that he had and this later could be predicted as the more supports going to the giver as the capital owner. Also, with the success of the exchange mechanism that presented the supports depended upon the ability of the actor (candidate) to use the sources that he owned.

Closing Remarks

Based on the study that has been done, it was revealed that the success to gain supports was determined by the ability of the actors (candidates) in making use of the exchange of *kain timur* tradition. With the resources that was owned, a candidate successfully used

the exchange of *kain timur* to gain supports in government and community activities as well as in the election activities.

This study concluded that the tradition that could be used to gain supports was the exchange tradition. The exchange tradition, as well as the exchange of *kain timur* tradition, presented reciprocal benefit relationship with a *patronage* pattern between the party who gave and the party who received. The *patronage* relationship pattern was the explanation of the ongoing supports. In his position as the *patron*, the party who gave guaranteed the ongoing life of the party who received the gift from the provider. Meanwhile, in his position as a *client*, the party who received it indicated loyalty for the gift that was received and being loyal was manifested in the form of giving supports to the *patron*.

In addition, this study also indicated that the raising of the supports could also be explained through the power that existed in the exchange tradition itself. This is because the exchange tradition successfully “locked” the party who received with the responsibility that requested the party who received it to refund the gift in the form of supports.

In short, the tradition that could be used as an instrument to gain support was the exchange tradition in which it had a number of elements at the same time; they were the transactional relationship, debts, and savings and investments. Therefore, in this context the values of tradition that were important were how the economic and political situation worked. These two are attached to the mechanism of the exchange tradition and at its turn would be used as an instrument to mobilize supports to gain power for political sake. Finally, this research indicated that in political studies in Indonesia, the cultural nuance either in the form of ethnic or traditional values still have an important role as the background of the works of local politics and economy.

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Intermestic Approach: A Methodological Alternative in Studying Policy Change

Dyah Estu Kurniawati

Abstract

In policy change study, there are at least two main methods used, namely the domestic and international approaches. The classification of approaches is not only based on who the actors are involved in the policy change process or where the source of influence comes from, but more fundamentally each approach emphasizes a different political arena. The domestic approach that is dominant in the study of political science and public policy administration explains policy change as an arena of domestic actors in the fight for their own self-interests. Meanwhile the international approach developed in the study of international relations oversees policy change as an arena for the achievement of the international or transnational actors' interests who want a policy change either by pressuring for changes or providing preferences that can be selected voluntarily by the governments in the decision-making process.

This paper aimed at reviewing the methodology of the two approaches that had existed previously and trying to introduce an alternative approach called intermestic (international domestic). The intermestic approach is useful to analyse the policy change in the globalization era that occurs as if the world is "borderless". This approach starts with the explanation that the domestic and international categories are no longer relevant. In other words, the intermestic approach emphasizes the one fatal mistake that we did was precisely in the selection of the domestic and international arena in the policy change process because the world was headed for a "one space or global political arena". However, in the intermestic approach the idea of state sovereignty is an important aspect and the government still has the main role in the policy change process in addition to those influences of other actors. Nevertheless, the role of states becomes ambiguous because the globalization process has redefined the sovereignty rights and political power of the nation state.

Keywords: *policy change; intermestic approach; globalization; borderless world.*

Globalization and Illusion of Isolation

Globalization has created a global structure which is as if there exists a *borderless world* as a result of the international movement caused by industry, investment, individuals, and information which is now known as the 4i (Ohmae, 1992). In addition, globalization

also generates ideas and knowledge that can create an international network that shifts easily between state or non-state actors who have the same awareness related with a particular issue, including issues related with, and in the process resulting in, government policy. However, the emergence of this 'borderless' network does not mean terminating the authority of the nation state (*state authority*). The process of redefining the state authority happens so that the state becomes more open in facing the flow of ideas which is beyond their territorial limits and, as its consequence, involved in conducting the experiment of the new global policy (Rhoeds, 2000; Heritier, 1993; Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997). In the process, the power and the interest of the nation state does not become meaningless but is redefined and relocated so that it is appropriate with the development of globalization.

The fundamental political processes that result from globalization create a situation where the study of contemporary policy cannot ignore the interrelationship between the domestic and international context in the policy making process. Apparently, globalization resulted in both challenges not only towards the national policy of a country because of the 'borderless' idea and the global network policy that can influence the national policy, but also towards the theorization of a particular policy that preferred being isolated either in the domestic or in international spaces. Because of globalization it is difficult to differentiate between the policy which is influenced by international politics and the policy which is influenced by the domestic policy, because both are interrelated. The process of political change is now formed in the context of this interrelationship and as a result a new approach called the intermestic (international-domestic) approach is needed.

This writing is dedicated to explain what is meant by the intermestic approach, how it is different from the other approaches, and why this approach is direly needed in this 'borderless' globalization era. The explanation begins with the mapping of various models of policy change which became the main flow in

either domestic-based or international-based approaches as the unit of analysis. Then the writer clarifies the position and function of the intermestic approach in the framework of “capillarity” to reveal that the separation of domestic and international arenas in policy study in the globalization era is merely an illusion. In this case, “capillarity” is defined as the process of “leaking” of the influences which are either ideas or knowledge which go beyond the territorial limit of a nation state. This process illustrates the increasingly blurred extension of the limits set between the domestic and international arenas. The policy change therefore happens due to *interconnecting among and within governances*. The framework of capillarity is adapted from the principles of capillarity in Physics which explain that fluid can “leak” from one domain to another through small capillary pipes as if it relativizes the limit and goes even against the common gravitational laws. With this capillary analogy, it is expected that the methodological explanation about intermestic approach can more easily be understood.

Variations of Explanation about Policy Change: Domestic vs International

Policy change can be explained by a number of theories which are developed based on different thoughts and methodology. There are many theories that have resulted from exclusive studies in a particular country and have ignored the international or across nations process so they are considered as domestic approaches. There are also studies which have paid little attention to the internal dynamics of a country so that they are categorized as international approaches. The ones that are included in domestic approaches with varied analysis levels in the domestic areas are: the institutionalist model, the pluralist model, the rationalist actors model, and the advocacy coalition models. While the ones that are included in international approaches are: the external pressure (neorealist) model, the global preference (neoliberal institutionalist) model, and the structural/globalist model. Methodological reviews of the

models from both approaches are done to show the weaknesses of both approaches in the more globalized world and at the same time to emphasize the importance of the intermestic approach.

1. Domestic Approach: Policy Change as the Interest of Domestic Actors

The domestic approach covers several explanation models of policy change. The dominant models of this type are: the institutionalism model, the pluralism model, the rationalism model, and the advocacy coalition model. These are called the domestic approaches because the actors' characteristics that are involved and concerned in the process of policy change are the actors in the domestic territory, either state or non-state actors. This approach therefore has never considered the external factors seriously. This writing then will briefly analyse the models one by one.

For the followers of the institutionalism model, policy change is considered as the results from the nation's efforts in obtaining the decided objectives. The governments as the main actors of the policy are considered as the whole power, which has the rationality to actualize the states' interests (Scocpol, 1985). In this model, there is no competition among actors that might influence the policy change. There are no "politics" in the process of policy arrangement because all are directed to the attainment of national interests that are homogenous (Allison, 1971). The approach, which is *state-centred* illustrates the state institution which sometimes acts stable and sustainable for a long period of time and the policy process is illustrated as a system in the form of steps, consisting of agenda setting, policy formulation, policy implementation, policy evaluation, policy change, and policy termination.

The outline of this approach has the strength in the form of the simplification of social and political reality and the complex interaction between actors in the policy process. However, this part is the main challenge, because basically policy making is related with detailed and complex processes. But concerning the most essential

aspect, the institutionalism model never pays attention to the role of ideas in the policy change because the focus of the study is more on the factors of national interests. In explaining international partnerships for example, the focus is not on the partnership itself, but on the factors of interests that the nation wants to attain in the international partnerships being made (Keohane, 1984; Oye, 1986).

On the other hand, the pluralism model considers this complexity. According to the pluralism model, the definition of the problem and the determination of policy agenda is basically the result of the competition among different groups. Policy change needs wide coalition supports from various interests groups which can be based on either function, interests, values, perspectives, or identity. Policy change creates *the winner* and *the loser*. Therefore, policy change will only be possible if the coalition of the winner groups (candidate) is strong enough to influence the policymakers in implementing a particular policy. For the followers of this model, reducing the policy process becomes the process of rationalization of the state interests by the elite and is the simplification of the excessive and *misleading* political reality. The policy process is more complex than that. In policy process, the government should sometimes face other entities such as parliament and interest groups so that there are three main actors in the *policy making process*, namely Bureaucrats, Parliament and Interest Groups. Those three compose what is so called the *iron triangle*, which takes the role of defining problems and determining the policy that will be made or changed as the solution. In this case, the state is considered as a neutral arena for either competition or consensus of the interests groups in forming policy results. In line with this neutrality, each group has the same access to the policy makers (Dahl, 1994).

Congruent with what can be imagined from the explanation so far, the strength of this model is in its ability to explain policy change as a bigger and more complex change in the society. Policy change is closely related with friction of interests among several pressure groups in the *policy making* process in the domestic arena.

However, this model is not much different from the institutionalism model which ignores the importance of ideas. While the first model emphasizes the state interests, the second model diverts the pressure onto group interests.

Next is the rationalism model. This model begins with the wide utility maximalization assumption which is developed in economics. A state is considered as consisting of rational individuals who act to obtain their own needs. For rational choice theory, public policy is the result of political interactions among rational actors to maximize their interests for themselves. The policy is made based on the calculation of profit and loss, and alternative choices that might give the biggest profit, or the least loss, will be selected as the policy. In this case, the rationalism model can be done if the policy makers know what they want and what the society needs, knowing all of the policy alternatives and their consequences, as well as choosing the most efficient policy alternative. In addition, this model has some weaknesses because human rationality is limited (*bounded rationality*). This bounded rationality means that human beings have limited cognition in the ability to process information and to understand what constitutes their needs. This limitation is then materialized in three forms. *First*, human beings tend to pay attention to information or stimuli which is appropriate with what they believe and neglect what is not. *Second*, human beings will only confirm the information or stimuli which is appropriate with what they believe. *Third*, the implication of the first and the second is that human beings can interpret information ambiguously. This theory usually ends up in a circular form of logic, where the actors know their needs because they are acting as rational beings (Mallarangeng, 2002).

According to the rationalism model, an idea is not that important or not extraordinary (*epiphenomenal*) to be considered because actors always anticipate the results of their action rationally so that it can give the fruits that they want (Shepsle, 1989). In the extreme version of this model, an idea is merely inbred and attached

to the rationality of the actors. The competing elites use ideas especially in the form of popularity building as propaganda or to legitimate their interests only. Meanwhile, the idea itself will not play the role to determine the policy change. What is meant by interests in the individual rationality model is the maximalization of wealth, but it also covers larger aspects including values and power. An idea is considered as a 'given' so that the rationalism model focuses on calculation variation based on the maximalization of profit (Nau, 1990; Moravesik, 1992).

The advocacy coalition model is rooted in the thought of Freeman's sub-system theory (1965), the study about *agenda setting* and Hugh Hecló's (1978) policy change, and Paul A. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's (1993) *Advocacy Coalition Framework* (ACF). In this model policy change happens in a *fragmented* sub-system through a dynamic *policy making process*. Hecló introduced two important concepts related with *agenda setting* process in policy change; they were *issue networks* and *technopols*. *Issue networks* involve an informal network which is developed by individuals from various interest groups, public and private organizations, as well as *ordinary citizens* called *technopols* who have skills and concerns on the same issues. They share *mutual interests* and are concerned to influence the policy change process. In line with that in the 1990s Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith described policy change done in policy sub-systems which was not merely consisting of the policymakers but also numbers of actors involved in policy problems and implementation. They were not only the *iron triangle* (bureaucrats, parliament, and interests groups), but also academic analysts, think tanks, researchers, journalists, and actors at the government levels who later formed advocacy coalitions. Advocacy coalitions can be classified based on the belief system and the resources owned while advocacy coalitions in sub-systems are neither static nor monolithic because there is learning process which is policy oriented among related aspects. Therefore, in this model, belief systems, values and ideas' factors take an important role in the policy change process. According to

Sabatier, to understand the policy change it is necessary to consider factors that make the elites' opinion shift over a relatively long period and are continuously reassessed. Because the policy process tends to be dynamic, it is important that there are policy brokers, namely the parties that are considered to be able to look for logic and realistic compromise among perspectives supported by these advocacy coalitions. Policy brokers do not mean actors who are not interested in the mediation process among advocacy coalitions. To avoid conflict among the advocacy coalitions competing in the policy process even in crisis situation a coalition can be appointed to negotiate a win for the policy broker using the institutional rules (Bratt, 2013).

The advantage of the ACF model developed by Sabatier compared with the previous models in the domestic approach is that this model illustrates that the policy change process is not merely influenced by the policy-oriented learning done by the advocacy coalitions in the sub-system, but is also influenced by the external conditions of the sub-system. Therefore, although it does not explicitly mention the role of international aspects involved in the domestic policy, methodologically this model has given a new perspective in the study of public policy that has been dominated by public administration and political science which tended to be domestic oriented for so long. ACF is a model that explains that the change is not only seen as the competition of various interests but also being formed by policy-oriented beliefs and policy learning. Therefore, ACF gives the possibility for "the test towards policy change" which is determined by the structure of beliefs from the policy actors and is influenced by the external changes (such as economy, social, and political trends) and causing policy learning among actors through a *policy community* to happen. It is in this part that ACF has the advantage as having the potential to be developed into an intermestic model by widening the subsystem area of policy, to include not only the domestic concerns, but also the international agenda. The policy process does not only happen in each arena but

can also be interconnected and involve interplay because of the similarity of idea/belief systems owned by the advocacy coalitions in each domain.

However, ACF model also has some disadvantages. In this case, the main disadvantage is in the limitation of the subsystems which are only in the domestic domain. Therefore by the writer, this model is still placed in the context of the domestic approach.

2. International Approach: Policy Change as the International/ Transnational Actors' Interests

Different from the domestic approach, the international approach is instead concerned about the roles and the interests of international and transnational actors in policy change. When being identified, this approach has at least three models of policy change; they are the external pressure model, the global preference model, and the structuralism model. The next part will discuss each model and its critics.

In the external pressure model which is based on Neorealism ideas, policy change in a particular country tends to be considered as a way to create a feeling of peace in the middle of an international policy constellation which is anarchic and uncertain. Therefore, the role of government is not that important because the state behaviour is influenced by international systems. As a result, although states have different characteristics, there is a tendency to have the same behaviour (Nye, Jr., 1988). For example, the intensity of interdependency and the degree of institutionalization or internalization of ideas and international rules in domestic policy is not different among nations although the conditions of each of the actors are different. According to this model, the management of the international world mostly represents the interests of big developed countries (Mearsheimer, 1994/1995). The larger and more dominant countries—even hegemonic—play an important role in preventing violations of the established rules by means of the implementation of fines and penalties in the form of particular

behaviours and actions towards the violators (Gilpin, 2001). As a result, the motivation of policy adaptation in a particular country tends to be a way to seek security in the middle of an international political constellation which is anarchic. Therefore, the role of the actors is not as important because the actors' behaviour is influenced by the structure.

In this context, a policy change in a country which is like the policy in other countries, is the adaptation of the national agenda to the global demands so that the related country is "safe" and does not get a *penalty* or fines from big countries which are behind the international donor agencies, such as IMF, World Bank, UNDP, ADB, GTZ, USAID, etc (Sahdan, 2005). This consideration explains that the international system can homogenize the behaviour of different states. Because of this process, this model can understand the rationality and actions of a country which can always be placed in the framework of efforts to better adapt with its surrounding.

Nevertheless, this systemic approach cannot accommodate the varied domestic demand factors believed by many parties which are influential in the process of policy change because in this approach, the role of the actors is considered unimportant, and not more than a response towards system determination. In addition, this approach cannot be used to analyse the interests behind the international agency programs mentioned previously. In other words, the neo-realism approach can only partially explain the process of policy change in a country.

The global preference model is based on the liberalist idea that the process of policy making involves actors outside the country such as individuals, interest groups, multinational companies, NGOs/INGOs, and international donor agencies, such as the IMF, World Bank and UNDP. The governments do not always act as the main actors because there are many non-state actors that take a role, including non-transnational state actors, so that the policy process of a country is difficult to be seen separately or even cannot be considered independent. The issues being discussed are not merely

limited to the needs of the safety and politics of the country, but cover wider aspects such as economic, humanitarian, environmental issues, etc. International agencies determine the agenda, encourage the coalition formation, and provide the guidelines for countries in solving the problems they are facing. Even in particular issues it is valid to apply the international regime which closely controls the behaviour of its members and applies penalties if violations happen. Therefore, the interdependence phenomena and institutional reference or international actors become the main instrument of policy change (Keohane, 1988).

The advantage of this approach is in its argument that countries in policy decision making can choose a system or a form of policy which is considered to be the most appropriate for themselves, by the implementation of the rational choice which is considered as the most important aspect of this model. The leaders of the countries can determine the appropriate balance from various policy choices, and determine the appropriate strategy in making a good and rational policy. The process of policy making which is as far as possible “immune” from the political process because the involvement of the political agendas can be the disruption from the technocratic consideration which has the ability to make scientific calculation when choosing the policy.

However, the explanation about the process of policy change which is “neutral” has disadvantages. In reality, the policy making in government is not merely choosing “rationally” the “appropriate” decisions in a technocratic and free of value way, but fundamentally is more formed by the contention of ideas and the competition of interests (Hadiz, 2004). Therefore, the explanation of the global preference model denies that rationality can be subjective and cannot be separated from conflict of interest. However, as mentioned previously, the emphasis on the conflict of interest itself is problematic because such emphasis tends to ignore the important meaning of an idea in the process of policy making.

The structuralism model explains that policy or policy change

happening in a country is not determined by the government because a country is only an instrument of the dominant class. This policy cannot be forced by the outside power, for example by the donors as a requirement to get foreign aid. This model is much influenced by the class analysis tradition developed by Karl Marx, which explains the relationship between the capitalist class and the working class in a community or nation (Viotti & Kauppi, 1997). The policy process is interpreted that the competition among classes and states is only the instrument for the dominant class, that is the capitalist class. The structural model adapts this way of thinking and studies the relationship between the developed and developing countries as forms of an exploitative relationship (Budiman, 1996). In defending the interest of its economic domination, the developed countries which represent the interest of the capitalist class sometimes use the development agencies and international monetary funds to oppress the developing countries so that they facilitate the global capital operations in their own countries. Therefore, the policy process especially in developing countries is influenced by the interest of external actors, in this case the developed countries and the interest of capital owners behind them, which impose policy onto the developing countries' government as the requisite support and return for their investment.

The advantage of the structuralism model is in its critical analysis towards global capitalism hegemony which is previously considered a "given". Nevertheless, the practice of national relationship is not always pessimistic as it is imagined by the structuralist in which policy change is considered as enforcement from the greater power and always harmful. In reality, there is always a "room to manoeuvre" for the domestic decision makers to learn in the process of policy change. The states' role, and therefore domestic factors that shape the role of the state, cannot be neglected and can be the important base without seeing the international world pessimistically. Besides, the structuralist approach also puts great pressure toward the material needs, that is about global

capitalism interests in accumulating profit continuously. As a result, this approach fails to grasp the important role of ideas in forming the policy and behaviour of the states.

Intermestic Approach: Policy Change as Idea, Networking, and Learning Construction

When the interconnectedness between the domestic and international arenas became more inevitable because of globalization process, policy study in the late 1980s experienced vocabulary changes which dominated the explanation and controversy. The emergence of terms *governance*, *institutional capacity*, *networks*, *complexity*, *trust*, *deliberation*, *transnational*, and *interdependence*, shifted the previous dominant terms such as *state*, *government*, *power*, *authority*, *loyalty*, *sovereignty*, *participation*, *hierarchy*, and *interest groups* (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). Policy change presently is not merely considered as a conflictual process resulting from the struggle for interests and power because now the role of transnational ideas is considered (Adler, 1986, 1992; Smith, 1988; Hall, 1989, 1993, 1997; Onuf, 1989; Sikkink, 1991; Weber, 1992; Goldstein, 1993; Goldstein & Keohane, 1993; Risse-Kappen, 1994; Katzenstein, 1996; Wendt, 1997; McNamara, 1998; Mandelson, 1998; and Berman, 1999).

Either vocabulary changes or attention focus in policy study illustrates the new change in political practice as well as the change of the theme of the policy study. Nevertheless, the tendency of policy theorization is still dominated by domestic and international approaches. Whereas with the power structure change in the globalization era, the state policy change process is difficult to be done if it is only understood as domestic political activity without considering the factors of transnationalization of ideas from the actors outside of the territory because there are many similarities in timing and policy characteristics in many countries. For example, the wave of the third democratization from the 1970s until the 1990s (Huntington, 1991) cannot be explained without connecting it with the diffusion of democratic ideas which goes beyond state limits.

This development, as is well known, results in important changes related with the policy in terms of making the government closer with the international community, providing wider chances for the participation of the community in the political process, and helping the development of responsive policies and services. During the decade of the 1990s there was also the decentralization wave with the main mission for the development and good governance practices (Conyers, 1983). During that period, many countries from various parts of the world with different backgrounds of history, political systems, and a wide variety of levels of development made changes in decentralization policy using very similar concepts and strategies (Strech1, 1999). The emphasis was on political rights, civil liberty, institutional pluralism, and pluralism in policy choices. These phenomena justify the importance of the intermestic approach that can illustrate the relationship between the international and domestic arenas in the process of policy change because of the traffic of transboundary ideas.

As an illustration, there are some explanations about why the democratization wave and decentralization shift with changes in market ideology in various countries happened from the late 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. If using the international approach, these phenomena are the reflection of the domination of orthodox neoclassical theory which globalized and then were implemented together in either developed or developing countries as the preference which was recommended by international donor agencies. A large number of academic excerpts explaining about the excellence of market economy from the followers of neo-classical economics can be compared with the dirigisme dogma from Keynesian macroeconomics stated in the New Right (*Kanan Baru*) intellectual publications such as Lal (1985), Hicks (1989), and various publication of the World Bank since 1981 (1981, 1993).

However, the domestic approach will never believe that the ideas of *Kanan Baru* are the most important factors behind the deregulation of policy change, liberalization, and privatization in

developing countries following democratization in the late 1970s and 1980s. The source of adoption of market ideology in developing countries is seen as more domestic than external. According to this approach, it is difficult to imagine that market ideology directly influences the policymakers in developing countries and it is less possible for the policy decision makers to read the writings of the intellectuals of *Kanan Baru* which elaborate the strengths of market economy compared with the government intervention. If only they had read them, it is still not clear how far those ideas can be accepted and influence the policy decision makers in making policy decisions.

The intermestic approach fills the gap left by the domestic and international approaches in its explanation about the influence of *Kanan Baru* ideas in developing countries. From the perspective of the intermestic approach to policy change, the simultaneous adoption of market ideology at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s reflected the “infiltration” of Liberal ideas which happened in knowledge networks/KNETs so that it was able to construct the global policy change. The process of “knowledge transnationalization” (Helleiner, 1990) worked through various media, such as giving scholarships to postgraduate students from developing countries to study at universities in which *Kanan Baru* ideas were dominant such in the USA and Europe in the 1970s. The alumni of those universities in the end became the epistemic community who brought market ideology to the policy cycle in their own countries and demanded economic reformation based on neo-classical economic recipes. Similar processes also happened in training programs offered by international monetary agencies, such as the World Bank for either the technocrats of developing countries or for activists who also were involved in the policy change process. This process was supported by the availability of various international publications which were easily obtained by all parties in all countries such as *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Economist* and *The Financial Times*. It is in these writings that the capillarity

analogy which strengthens the way of thinking of intermestic thought can be described. The work of the capillarity principle which permeates from top to bottom, from right to left, and to all directions interconnectedly can be used to describe the blurring of the domestic—international limits so that policy change happens with mutual crochet hooks in, among and between governances. Through the network of advocacy coalitions consisting of scientists, technocrats, and possibly some groups such as economic actors, politicians, and the followers of neo-classical economic recipes, journalists either the ones in or outside of the countries interpret and gather again the market ideology arguments so that it becomes appropriate with the domestic context in a continuous learning process, which at the end becomes the basis for the policy change.

Therefore, the study of policy change in the intermestic approach in addition to considering the role of idea construction important, also supports the existence of relational aspects (*networking*) across nations and policy change itself as the form of learning, and not a forcing by hegemonic actors. Basically, networking is developed because of interdependent actors, who have similar perspectives/beliefs and need resources from other parties to obtain their objectives. Networking can happen across nations either formally or non-formally (Adam & Kriesi, 2007). The distribution of power in networking can be either concentrated or fragmented; it can be concentrated in the government (*state-centred*) or it can be fragmented to the nation or non-nation actors although it continues to include the role of the government (*state-society centred*).

When simplified, the intermestic approach relies on three main arguments. First, the importance of the role of an idea; second, the importance of the networking aspects that are across nations; and third, policy change as the learning process. An idea takes an important role in the policy process because it can help actors (in the public arena) to know their necessary purpose, why this purpose is more important than others, how the purpose will be achieved, and who will be the friend and enemy in the process to achieve it

(Adler, 1986). Generally, the policy actors in the public arena face many choices and have a variety of impacts or *multiple equilibria*, or various balances (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993). The relationship between the actors and policy choices constantly is covered with uncertainty. In such a condition, it is difficult for the policy actors to understand their interests, or if they do, it is not easy to know what policy they need to take to achieve their interests. It is in here that the role of an idea becomes important because an idea can construct an interest and an idea creates a mechanism (an instrument) to obtain that interest. It means, an idea can become a normative foundation and justification for certain decisions and an idea can let the policy actors know about the means-objectives relationship. Therefore, the interest and structure created through policy change is in fact the reflection of an idea. This idea can create a “reality” and bring about the interest that does not exist previously. An idea has the power to change the perception of a group related with their interests, so that it enables policy change to happen. Because of the nature of an idea that can go transnational, the study about an idea becomes important for the intermestic approach which cannot separate between the domestic and international arenas. The “permeation” of ideas which are transboundaries in this approach is analogized as the capillarity process which involves ideas or knowledge networking through the role of the epistemic community as capillary pipes.

The networking aspect itself showed the new architect model in policy study in the 1990s. When referring to the model of policy making in the domestic context which covers agenda setting, policy formulation, policy implementation, and policy evaluation, therefore a significant change in the process of policy making was happening in the contemporary era. In the face of the agenda setting, in this era there is no stipulation who will be responsible, who will have the authority and whose hope will be able to be materialized through the policy. All happens in a political process which is competitive (March & Olsen, 1995). The policy formulation process is coloured with the policy learning process (Sabatier & Jenkins, 1993) which

involves the epistemic community as the “message senders”. Policy implementation requires coordination among nations and various institutions because of the similarity of the concerns or issues, and the policy evaluation process involves various parties including either international monetary agencies or professional organizations. There are two types of learning, namely *lesson-drawing* and *social learning*. *Lesson drawing* is the learning process based on their own group’s experiences (Sabatier, 1987, 1988, 1993) or based on other groups’ experiences (Rosse, 1988, 1991). Meanwhile *social learning* (Hall, 1989, 1993) aims at only the idea and knowledge induction process which changes the distribution of political resources, but—referring to Kuhn (1962)—the policy change at the end can result in a paradigm change.

The intermestic approach includes the policy change model that gives an important role to idea factors and policy networking which is transnational. An *idea* in this context is understood as a cognition which can be in the form of a belief system, knowledge or discourse. While *networking* can be in the form of a policy community, professional network, intergovernmental network, producer network, and issue network (Hudson & Lowe, 2004). It means, the quest does not necessarily begin from zero because in fact there have been several models which are relatively sensitive towards this matter. Some models have been available for this approach, for example, the network model, the deliberative model, and the constructivist model. These models will be discussed shortly.

The first model in the intermestic approach is the *networks* model which treats public policy as a pro forma, if not as a series of networking. This model emphasizes relational and informational aspects in policy change because its study is based on the principle that: networking is developed transnationally because the actors are *interdependent*. This interdependency cannot be avoided because for the realization of an idea of policy, resources from other parties are needed. Networking at least involves two actor groups, namely the country and the transnational actors so it is called *interstate-society*

centred. A state still has an important position because it has the resources in the policy process while non-nation actors also have the role in supporting or not supporting the policy change so they form *differentiated policy* (Rhodes, 1997).

The advantage of the *networks* model is that it can illustrate the complexity of relations that exists in international relationships in the globalization era. The process of policy change is influenced by the contact patterns and good relations either formally or non-formally in policy networking which is transnational. The typology to deal with network complexity can be based on distribution of power and the type of interaction in the network (Adam & Kriesi, 2007). The power distribution can be concentrated or fragmented and the interaction type in networking can be in the form of conflict, bargain, or partnership. Policy can be changed and greatly influenced by the pattern of the relationship of those two aspects, that become the adhesive bases of this model as *shared resources* and *shared interests* among the “members” of the networking. *The epistemic community* as the intellectual networking is one of the examples of the network model, in which the role of ideas/knowledge from the actors in their expertise then creates networking transnationally and the influence of the process of policy formulation is highlighted. There are several terms used to identify this intellectual networking, for example *epistemic community* (Haas, 1999), *transnational advocacy networks - TANs* (Keck-Sikkink, 1998), *policy community* (Walker, 1981; Brooks, 1994), *individual policy entrepreneurs* (Mintrom, 1997), *intellectual organic* (Gramsci, 2013), etc. In the frame of the intellectual network model, policy process is coloured with complexity and uncertainty, and the policymakers do not sometimes know for sure what is in the best interest of the country and how to achieve it. Therefore, the one which represents the state needs advice from intellectuals who have high integrity and expertise and have the technical capacity and mastery of the detailed information about an issue or a policy idea.

The *epistemic community* according to Haas (1992) is a group of actors (individuals or organizations) who have the same ideas

and perspectives related with a particular policy issue. They are not limited by narrow organizations which are defined as political institutions (such as executive, legislative, political parties, etc.) but also include communities that so far “dodge” to be defined as political actors, such as universities, research centres, scientific associations, expert staff, etc (Santoso, 2002). Even international institutions which are concerned about the same policy issues can become *epistemic communities* because the diffusion process of ideas and knowledge knows no national boundaries. Therefore, the members of the epistemic community are plural and transnational. The relationship character of the epistemic community refers to “trust” and “shared appreciation” and if a conflict happens, it will be framed in a consensus decision making process (Jordan & Maloney, 1997).

Different from Haas, Gramsci who is a follower of Marxism interprets the intellectual network as an intellectual organic whose characters have the relationship with the class interests that they represent. According to Gramsci, an idea takes a role but is always associated with the interests of particular groups, especially the capitalists. Hegemony towards particular groups is not enforced, but is achieved through intellectual organics with cultural or intellectual and political efforts. This means that the class which has power should “universalize” their ideas and interests, and also ensure that ideas and interests are not merely possible but also become the perspectives and interests of sub-ordinate groups so that it results in history blocking and creating hegemony. Generally, the epistemic community has the ability to influence ideas and strategy of policymakers (veto players) in a country through an education process, training, socialization, etc., so that it has the influence in the process of policy change. However, they sometimes do not have veto power directly or formally in the policy process so that they still need good, strong affiliations either personally or institutionally with the policy decision makers in order for their missions to be obtained.

The second is the deliberative model which explains that policy change happens because of discourse change which manages the pattern of social relations which is normal so that the key of policy change is the discourse interpretation structure. Understanding the behaviour can be done by learning discourse interpretation which is done by the actors who are involved. The policy recommendations can be different because the points of their discourse are different. In this case discourse is interpreted as a thinking system (see, for example, Foucault, 1990). It means that the policy process involves policy discourse to arrange the argumentations that form the policy frame in which there are problematics and their solutions.

The best standpoint to understand the deliberative model is that the language used to discuss policy and its problematics is not neutral. Therefore, to understand how a problem is considered a “problem” one should understand the discourse process, that is what happens when the problem was made and defined in a particular language or discourse. The policy change process is embodied in the struggle to determine the discourse in which the policy problem is arranged by *epistemic notions* or *discourse coalitions* which are transnational. This process is called with various names, among others, the *discursive process* (Santoso, 2010), *rational communicative* (Dryzek, 1990), *deliberative process* (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003), or *social process* (Majone, 1989). In this process, *epistemic notions* or *discourse coalitions* which work to influence policy will make efforts to arrange persuasive arguments so that they can dominate the policy discourse, which also means determining the direction of the policy. In the deliberative model the most important aspect is *discourse* because the policy ideas depend on the *discourse* and *counter discourse* in the communicative rationality process or discursive process.

The third model that can be a consideration in formulating the intermestic approach is the constructivist model. In this model policy change is a learning process based on the appropriateness of logic and international norms as the important bases of policy change (Checkel, 1997). International norms will be more easily

internalized and legitimized in domestic policy if they touch the values, identity, or beliefs of domestic actors. However, if outside norms are contradictory, it will possibly be difficult to follow although the possibility continues to exist. Not like the rationalist or structuralist/materialist models which see policy change as a result of rational interest factors, the constructivist model views policy change more from norms or idea factors. The internalization process of international norms is through a cognitive process, in which policy change is not merely forced by the interests but is also influenced by the perceptions, capacity to gain information and learning that can change the interests of the actors involved.

From the explanation above, several aspects concerning policy change from the domestic, international, and intermestic approaches can be summarized in the following table.

Table of Typology of Approaches in Policy Change

Variables Model	Actors (Who)	Policy Change Process (How)	Factors that influence/ Important (Why)
Domestic Approach			
State centred: Institutionalists	Government	<i>A-political: decision making</i>	State interest defined by power elites
Society centred: Pluralism	Groups, Iron Triangle	Political process: policy making	Group interests
Individual centred: Rational choice	Individual Actors;	Political process: results maximalization	Individual interests
State-society centred: Advocacy Coalitions	Domestic Sub-system	<i>Learning Process</i>	<i>Idea / Belief System</i>
International Approach			
State Centred: Neorealism	International system	Politic Process: Conflict	The state interests are extensive

Society Centred: Liberalism	Supra-state Actor/ Transnational actor	Politic Process: Partnership/ Consensus	Global interests
Class Centred: Structuralism / Globalism	Global Class	Politic Process: Conflict/Exploitative	External actor interests based on class/hegemony
Intermestic Approach			
<i>Network</i>	<i>Epistemic community</i>	Knowledge Process	Shared knowledge, shared issue, etc.
<i>Deliberative</i>	<i>discourse coalitions and epistemic notions</i>	<i>Discursive/social/ deliberative/rational communicative Process</i>	Global Discourse
<i>Constructivist</i>	Domestic idea and international norms	Learning Process	Norms/Ideas/ Values

Processed by the Writer

The intermestic approach maintains the domestic approach logic that government roles remain in the important position in policy change because they have *veto power*. However, this approach also applies the international approach logic that gives room for the involvement of non-state actors in the domestic and international arenas in influencing the policy change process so that it forms *differentiated policy* (Rhodes, 1997). The strength of the intermestic approach can be better illustrated and more completely with the complexity of domestic-international interrelationship in the globalization era which is considered *borderless*. However, the main problem of the intermestic approach that concerns with the role of ideas, *networks* and learning in the process of policy change is on how to map the ideas and beliefs from the actors (*actors' belief*) who are involved in the policy change process which is complex on the same canvas so that the complexity becomes the strength and at the same time can reveal any of the weaknesses in the process of policy making.

Conclusions

At the beginning, the study of policy change was dominated by the domestic approach which sees the policy change identical with the government administrative process. Non-state actors such as parliaments, interest groups, NGOs, or academicians are also considered in the form of their analyses, but only limited in domestic political aspects. In its development policy change involved international and transnational actors such as donor institutions, INGOs, or intellectual community networks in policy change. This tendency encouraged the emergence of an international approach that was very much influenced by international relationship sciences. But, with the globalization process which now occurs as if there is a blurring of the borders of all nations, analyses of policy change could not separate the domestic and international approaches anymore, in which the role of government remained important but not closing the door to the possibility of the involvement of either international or transnational actors and in the process policy change becomes more learning oriented.

The intermestic approach became important because the globalization of the international system in fact is not only a consequence of domestic politics (*dependent variables*) like the ones generally studied in the analysis of foreign policy (Waltz, 1959). The new international system could also be the cause (*independent variable*) of domestic political dynamics (Gourevitch, 1978). Therefore, international relationships and domestic politics are in fact interconnected so that policy change should be analysed interrelatedly using the intermestic approach.

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Flawed Democracy: Beyond Agency and Structure A Book Review

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Flawed Democracy in the Rent Seekers' Hands

Desi Rahmawati

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The failure of democracy still becomes the main theme of most of the discussions in many countries, either the ones that have implemented a well-established democracy or the ones that are implementing democratic transition. Along with democracy becoming widespread, the democracy practice still deals with many problems, especially related with the quality and sustainability of the democratic process. The democratic transition does not always lead to democracy consolidation, even sometimes it leads back to the previous non-democratic practices instead (Huntington, 1991; Sorensen, 1998; Diamond, 1999). This tendency then resulted in the study about institutionalization of democracy, which aims at identifying the preconditions needed to strengthen the development of democracy and then recommend the strategy to make it happen.

The institutional approach used in the study of democracy consolidation is justified with a democratic achievement measurement based on various democracy indexes. However, the institutionalization of democracy needs more than a measurement. As one of the exchange processes, democratic transition is always related with the past experience and the current dynamics. A study done by Hadiz (2003a, 2003b) emphasizes the importance of studying the historical process to uncover the structural conditions that hinder the institutionalization of democracy. The results of the

study indicate that oligarchy power structures that cause predatory behaviours in political elites never change even when the power regime has. Hadiz believes that the political actors will always be subject to the oligarchic structure because it is their obedience that will make the actors remain in the power circle.

Will the actors ever go against that oligarchic structure? A study done by Demos concerning democracy practice in Indonesia (in Priyono *et al.*, 2007; Samadi *et al.*, 2009) indicates that political freedom has created new political actors, including ones from the pro-democracy activist groups, who enter the power arena to change the power relation pattern to become more pro-public. This finding shows that the actors also respond to the structural conditions around them. The emergence of the new actors also causes positive changes. They are indicated by the strengthening of the function of the formal political institutions (Priyono *et al.*, 2007; Samadhi & Warouw, 2009; Savirani & Törnquist, 2015), but democracy practices in Indonesia in the post reformation era also stimulate critics towards the weakening function of political representation. Although the formal political institutions are available, the public prefers to use alternative channels to fulfil their needs. To obtain public supports, many political elites then choose to develop direct relations with the public, which later encourages the emergence of figure-based political practices.

Democracy practices which are diverse are not only caused by the structural conditions but also by the actors' response in interpreting democracy. The interaction between the actors and the structure become the determinant of the political character that is produced. The structure provides the rules to play that form the actors' mind-set and behaviour but the actors have the capacity to reform the rules. The problem is not because the actors do not want to change their behaviour following the new rules but because the actors also have the capacity to get involved in reconstructing the rules to play. This situation can become as if there is no change in democracy practices although the new actors come and occupy the

power arena because the particular actors, especially the dominant ones only use the rules to play to serve their own interests. In this context, the present state of democracy as an institution is as if it were just formality because the power relationship pattern remains working on an undemocratic framework.

Democratic stagnation because of the framework stagnation which underlies power behaviour becomes the important reason for doing a study to learn the power logic about how actors are empowered and at the same time are constrained by structure. This is important to give deeper understanding about actors' point of view towards power, why such point of view is formed, and how that point of view is transformed in the actors' behaviour. This transformation process becomes a crucial part in the institutionalization of democracy, but there are not many researches done to uncover how the point of view about power proceeds in becoming embodied behaviour. It is not enough to explain this process with the structural approach because it only sees the actors' behaviour as the formed result of social, economic and political contexts that is applied while the actors have the capacity to respond to the context. On the other hand, the actors' approach believes too much that actors are fully able to control their behaviour so that they neglect the existence of various factors out of themselves that give legitimation for a particular behaviour until they are accepted as equity. The transformation process from the mind-set that embodies a behaviour is not a mechanistic process which is only determined by a single cause, but a multidimensional process that is the interaction of the contexts and actors.

This book analyses democratic failure at the local level which is indicated from the political issues that happened in Asahan, North Sumatera. The four political issues are: (1) the limitation of public access toward information; (2) the discrimination in social policy; (3) the ignorance of public aspiration; and (4) the land disputes that followed together with the criminalization towards public activists. In those four issues, public matters management becomes the arena that happens outside public control. Issues about the weakening

of public control have become an analysis project that colours the development of democracy study. In the structural perspective, the relationship between the ruler and the public is believed to be in a lame position, because the capital accumulation always gives benefits to a particular group. As it is in the agent perspectives, the figures that have the greater access towards the resources dominate the power relationship. Both approaches have given significant contribution to the development of democracy study, but the classification towards the structure and agent dimensions gives limited comprehensive understanding about the interaction between the two, especially in understanding the thought logic of the actors that create particular behaviours in power relationships. This book offers the way of analysis to bridge both approaches using Bourdieu's (1977, 1970) conceptual frame in uncovering the roles of the actors in the structural context.

Structure in Bourdieu's concept is explained as habitus¹, capital², and arena.³ Meanwhile the roles of predatory political actors are analysed by identifying the strategies used by actors in gaining and defending capital in the efforts of changing its structure and status in the social and political arena. This Bourdieu's concept is used to complete the previous study done by Hadiz which was dominated by the structural approach. The combination between

¹ Bourdieu formulates the habitus concept as the social values that are lived by human beings, and created through the socialization process of values for long periods of time, so it settles becoming the mind-set and behaviour pattern in the related human beings. One's habitus is strong, so it influences the physical condition of the person. The conditioning that is related with a particular class results in habitus, sustainable system, and structure that form practice and representation (Bourdieu, 1990). The principles of distribution in logic classes that determine the perceptions from social world themselves are the product of the internationalization of the social class distribution (Bourdieu, 1994).

² Capital is the modal that enables us to get chances in life. There are many types of capital, such as intellectual capital (education), economic capital (money), and cultural capital (background and networking). Capital can be gained, if someone has an appropriate habitus in his life.

³ Arena is the special place that exists in the society. There are many arenas: such as the education arena, the business arena, the artists arena, and the political arena. If someone wants to be successful in one of these arenas, then they have to possess suitable habitus and capital.

these theoretical frameworks uncovers a number of important findings concerning power practices in Asahan, i.e., *first*, the actors' behaviour is motivated by their interests to dominate the economic and social capitals. The ownership of the economic resources becomes the preconditions to gain social status needed as the capital to strengthen the bargaining position in political relations. This practice did not only happen during the New Order era, but also has happened since the colonial period and will continuously happen after the reformation, although in a different arena and with different economic resources.

The sustainability of the domination of economic resources and status created the *second* tendency, which is the rent seeking behaviour that is encouraged by the reluctance of the political actors to lose their access to those two capitals. This power is defended by maintaining economic and status capital, so although democracy has caused changes by the emergence of new political institutions and actors, including the pro-democracy activists, but their way of working does not change. The political actors, either the ones that are rent seeking actors from the previous regime or the ones that are not, gain power with the same logic. Political reformation has created new numbers of actors that are not related with the power practice in the previous regime, such as the bureaucracy apparatus which was recruited through the new system and the activists of the social institution activists who criticize the government policies. These new political actors also use their economic and status capital to enter the power arena to influence the policies, so that what happens is the old power logic is still used in modification practices by including the new logic, but for different purposes, that is to gain the acceptance of their status so that they can enter in the power system.

The *third* finding is that the old and new logic combination bears the form of rent seeking behaviour with a different purpose. The activists use the "oppression" technique to gain money (economic capital) and the recognition (status) so that they can go against the

ruling elite. The competition to gain capital encourages the actors to “oppress” other actors who are in a higher position so that they distribute the economic capital which they have if they do not want their corruption reported to the public. On the one hand, this strategy of “oppression” opens the access for more public control of the behaviour of the rules; but on the other hand, the groups that get more benefit than they should are the activists who are successful to place themselves as “dangerous actors” so that they can get more attention from the rulers, including getting more benefits, such as materials or strategic positions in the power circle. The strategies used by the actors to get power reflect the “weak patronage” pattern relation, in which close relationships exist between the patron and the client. The relation between both is based more on the competitive rent-seeking exchange. People will change the patron easily when they find other patrons who have more capital or higher status. This practice opens the competition that gives chances to the emergence of new political actors in the power constellation, but those new actors continue to act with the old logic. To defend their position in the power constellation, the actors should be able to use their symbolic capital skilfully. The needs to maintain the capital, status and followers become the reason behind the corrupt and coarse behaviour done by the actors.

The rent seeking phenomena that has happened in Asahan in fact uncovers the stagnation in power logic as a result of the democratic stagnation. Actors use their political capacity to hijack public control not as an instrument to defend public interest, but to gain economic benefits for themselves. The structural conditions that are inherited by the New Order power regime defend its sustainability as the justification for the new roles that are done by the political actors. This finding becomes the important reminder for the democracy institutionalization to begin to focus on the disclosure of thinking logic behind the power practice, and not merely how it reveals the structural conditions or actors’ behaviour in power relations. Democracy practice in Asahan indicates that

democratic stagnation is caused by the failure of the actors to go against the power regime which has been deep rooted for years, so that the struggle for democracy does not merely subvert particular regimes that are inherited from the previous ruler but goes against power logics of all time that form the mind-set and actors' behaviour, including the pro-democracy actors. The biggest challenge for the democracy institutionalization is on how to strengthen the ability of the pro-democracy actors to criticize various power logics that hinder the process of democratization.

Bordieau's theoretical framework provides sharp analysis about thinking logic behind the actors' behaviour by uncovering the relationship between habitus, capital, and arena, but this relation needs to be directed to improve the actors' capacity in dismantling economic and symbolic structures that dominate. Rent seeking practice in Asahan has been embodied in the behaviour of the political actors for a long time creating habitus that is in contradiction with democracy. Therefore, a new habitus that offers public awareness to come out of the symbolic oppression through economic and status capital domination needs to be created.

To change the habitus, habitus reformulation needs to happen by rejecting various categories and definitions that limit the behaviour, and in the process opens the arena for meaning negotiation. Although Bordieau (1977) claims that habitus allows agents to respond to dynamic situations, habitus that has become part of the behaviour is accepted as applicable public logic restraining the individuals from changing the habitus that they accepted instead. The habitus change is only possible to be done if the agents are not restrained by the structural conditions around them. When the structural conditions that form habitus change, the new habitus will emerge to adapt to the new reality. Progressive agents will be able to respond to the changes and reform habitus that can be accepted by other agents. A whole new capital, habitus and arena will become an alternative logic to manage present-day power practices.

Flawed democracy in Asahan gives important lessons for

the democracy journey in Indonesia because it reveals that so far the democracy process has not yet been successful in creating new habitus in power practices in Indonesia. Rent seeking phenomena are only those surface symptoms that prove the difficulties to change the mind-set that has grown and been accepted as equity. Therefore, democratization should become a radical process so that it is able to offer the new habitus to replace the old habitus that is not appropriate with democracy. Although in Bourdieu's perspective, an agent has the capacity to go against structure, but when the structure has become habitus, it can be resisted with another habitus. This change is the homework that should be done by the fighters for democracy in Indonesia.

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