

Three Faces of the PKS Political Party in the Formulation of the New Energy and Renewable Energy Bill

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Abstract

Political parties play an important role in aggregating people's interests, including in the formulation of the New Energy and Renewable Energy Bill (RUU EBET) or the EBET Bill, both at the central and regional levels. This study aims to look at the dynamics between the three faces of a political party, namely the party in the public office, central office, and at the grassroots level (Katz & Mair 1993), during the formulation of RUU EBET or the EBET Bill. Using the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) as a case study, this research finds that parties in the public and central office actually depoliticize the roles of parties at the grassroots level. This depoliticization manifests itself in three ways: (1) assumptions about the inability of party structures at the regional level to discuss the EBET issues, (2) not including the interests of developing EBET at the regional level as part of the EBET Bill, and (3) narrow definitions and restrictions of the EBET Bill as a central and elite issue.

Keywords: *New energy; renewable energy; political parties; public policy; EBET Bill*

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Introduction

This paper seeks to analyze the role of parties at the grassroots level using a case study of the New Energy and Renewable Energy Bill (RUU EBET) discussion within the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). The selection of PKS as a case study is because the party was one of the three factions in the People's Representative Council of Indonesia (DPR) that expressed their opinion on local stakeholder's involvement in the formulation of RUU EBET (the EBET Bill henceforth). Ironically, we found an exclusion mechanism perpetuated by the party's structures in the public and central offices toward the grassroots level. Instead of explicitly excluding and negating the role of parties at the grassroots level, the public and central offices excluded covertly by stating that the EBET Bill discussion was "not

a concern" of parties at the grassroots level. To understand this phenomenon, we use the three faces of political parties and depoliticization theory as our theoretical framework. The questions are how stakeholders at the grassroots level participate in the case of policy advocacy for the EBET Bill and whether they have any policy advocacy power or their role is merely proforma in official party forums.

The over-dependence on fossil energy and demands from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change in 2016 has forced Indonesia to make an energy transition. One of the steps taken towards this transition is to encourage the ratification of the EBET Bill. This bill promotes the use of new and renewable energy through four steps: (1) setting national targets for new energy and renewable energy, (2) increasing the accessibility and availability of new energy and



renewable energy, (3) providing financial support and incentives, (4) establishing stringent regulations and arrangements regarding new and renewable energy, and (4) increasing investment in new energy and renewable energy. The bill was first proposed by the Government of Indonesia in 2013 but has only been passed recently. The discussion was heated with debates, both inside and outside of the parliament.

In the parliament, the debates over the EBET Bill cover technical matters, i.e., the use and development of new and renewable energy, such as the debate over the implementation of the feed-in tariff scheme in the development of new and renewable energy through Article 51. This scheme regulates the provision of financial incentives to private producers of new and renewable energy as the main suppliers of national energy

(Couture et al., 2010). The aim is to boost the development of new and renewable energy, especially from the private sector. However, the concern is that this scheme will increase the electricity prices for the public (sindonews.com, 2021). Another technical issue concerns the development of nuclear energy, regulated in Article 7. Some observers think that Indonesia is not yet ready to develop nuclear energy due to issues in security, technical expertise, transmission and distribution, and geographical conditions (cnnindonesia.com, 2022). The next technical issue regarding the EBET Bill is about the division of authority between the regional and central governments. In this bill, the regional government bears the responsibility to provide facilities and infrastructure for

the development of renewable energy but without proper budgeting powers and schemes (PUSHEP, 2021).

Meanwhile, outside the parliament, the pressure is more substantial than technical, such as the demand to involve the regional community in the development of new and renewable energy. The motivation is not solely democratic but also rational, considering the negative impacts of such energy development on the regional community. This condition can be observed in the development of geothermal energy in Banjarnegara, Central Java, by one of the State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN), PT Geo Dipa Energi. The exploration and exploitation of geothermal energy have caused environmental problems, which have prompted protests from the community. The Central Java Indonesian Forum for the Environment (WALHI) found

that the company's operations have caused water and air pollution in Banjarnegara. The water pollution can be observed from changes in the color and taste of water in one of the villages, Karangtengah Village (Laila et al., 2022). This pollution will likely expand because the Sethulu Spring, the main source of water, will continue to be contaminated by the company's operations. Furthermore, the air pollution is apparent from the death of a worker due to a toxic gas leak on March 12, 2022, caused by the poor management of toxic gas disposal (Muharman et al., 2022).

Another demand is to develop new and renewable energy at the regional level. The Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY) is one of the provinces that has the potential to develop new energy and renewable energy. According to Sugiyono (2010), there are two reasons to earmark DIY.



First, there is no source and potential for developing fossil energy, such as fuel, gas, and coal, in DIY. The fossil energy demand in the province is supplied by other provinces. Second, there is a potential for the development of renewable energy sources, such as biofuels (BBN), biogas, micro-hydropower plants (PLTMH), wind power plants (PLTB), and solar power plants (PLTS). In fact, DIY has attempted to develop these renewable energy sources in various regions, such as Gunungkidul and Kulon Progo.

Gunungkidul has independently established a solar-power plant named PLTS Atap, which successfully produces 7,500 Watts of electrical power, sufficient to supply the electricity for the lighting of one hamlet in Piyaman Village (merdeka.com, 2021). Meanwhile, in the Kalibawang Irrigation Area in Kulon Progo,

three hamlets, namely Jurang, Kedungrong, and Semawung, are currently developing alternative micro-hydropower (PLTMH) (harianjogja.com, 2019). It is believed that, when utilized optimally, the PLTMH can produce up to 700 kilowatts of electricity. Unfortunately, these endeavors to develop energy independently are constrained by the lack of support and funding from the DIY government.

Such problems and opportunities in the efforts to develop new and renewable energy at the regional level were not highlighted in the debate on the formulation of the EBET Bill at the People's Representative Council of Indonesia (DPR). This can be seen from the opinion notes of the DPR RI factions on the EBET Bill. Of all the factions expressing opinions, only the Democrat, National Democrat (Nasdem), and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)

factions mentioned the regional stakeholder's involvement in the development of the EBET Bill. This undermines the function of political parties as actors aggregating public interests (Randall & Svasand, 2002) in policy-making.

Literature Review

Party studies have contributed to the development of modern political science. One prominent approach to reviewing problems in political parties is that developed by Katz and Mair (1993), namely the theory of the three faces of political parties. The three faces consist of parties in the public office, parties in the central office, and parties in the grassroots, often used to dissect and analyze the workings of a party. This theory is also used to analyze the behavior of political parties that specifically seek to respond to or formulate a policy.

Ramadhan (2018) researched the role of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) for DKI Jakarta Province in the formulation of labor policy in DKI Jakarta. The study seeks to explain the responses and actions of PDI-P on labor issues in Jakarta province. Ramadhan dissects PDI-P into the three faces and analyzes their roles and relations. The findings show that the PDI-P in DKI Jakarta only carried out labor policy advocacy at the public office level, one of which was pushing for the revision of Jakarta Regional Regulation Number 6 of 2004 concerning Manpower. Meanwhile, parties at the grassroots level are positioned as helpless entities subjected to coordination and direction from the central and public offices.

Similarly, Widiyanto's (2022) research on PDI-P autonomy in Surakarta examines the PDI-P party organs into three typologies



of party faces and then explores the extent to which the party at the grassroots level is autonomous from the other two party super-structures. This study found that PDI-P has a centralized structure that has implications for the political resources at the central and public offices. The party has a strong mass base in Central Java. However, when the political choices of PDI-P cadres at the grassroots level are not in line with the central and public offices, they are left with two choices: submit to the center or leave the party. This research briefly tapped into the informal coordination of PDI-P cadres at the grassroots level with some of their informal sympathizers. It did not explore other dimensions because the cadre's choices were reduced to two: submit or leave.

Outside Indonesia, similar studies have been conducted, including research by Crulli

(2021) and Roewer (2020) in Italy. Crulli's study seeks to explain the evolution of a populist Italian Five-Star Movement party from 2009 to the present. This populist party deviates from the norm and has evolved into a state-centric party. The findings of this study conclude that it is caused by the helplessness of internal party organs, especially at the grassroots level, against pressure from party actors in the public and central offices. Meanwhile, Roewer's research in Italy shows that the National League for Democracy (NLD) party has developed into a centralized party because it was pressurized by military-authoritarian political actors, who intervened in the party's internal organs, especially those in the central and public offices.

Various studies using the three-faced approach of political parties have emphasized the dominance and power of the party

in the public and central offices in internal party organization and policy formulation. Less attention is paid to the role of parties at the grassroots level despite their important role. Dalton and Wattenberg (2002) stated that there are at least four functions that can only be carried out by parties at the grassroots level: (1) political education, (2) simplification of political choices, (3) identity formation and public loyalty, and (4) mass mobilization at the grassroots level. Despite their importance, these roles are under-researched. Therefore, this research aims to identify a party's political agency at the grassroots level. By using the formulation of the EBET Bill as a case study, this study identifies the political agency of the Regional Leadership Council (DPW) of PKS as an organ of a political party at the grassroots level in negotiating with the public office and central offices.

Three Faces of a Political Party

For Katz and Mair, analyzing a political party as an organization with multiple elements or faces is more productive than using simple dichotomies, such as parliamentary versus extra-parliamentary or leaders versus followers. Therefore, political parties are divided into three faces, namely, parties in the public office, parties on the ground, and parties in the central office. This division sees the role of political parties at different levels and places. The three faces are followed by their respective resources, constraints, opportunities, and motivations.

Regarding parties in public office, Katz and Mair highlight members of political parties currently occupying the public office. Actors in this face can be driven by several objectives,



including material gain, power, and status (Katz & Mair, 1993, p. 594). The important characteristic of this face is its transience. Public positions cannot be occupied forever, so the actor concerned must be re-elected to maintain their position. This is also the first obstacle of this face. The need to win the general election (Pemilu) forces the actor to balance between the electoral process and other elements that contribute to the success of the campaign. The second obstacle is the public office's responsibility as a government, as parties that enter the government must be sensitive to the public welfare. Nonetheless, this face has its advantages, namely the governmental decision-making authority (e.g., voting policies, directing bureaucrats, etc.), patronage, time, experts, and information (Katz & Mair, 1993, p. 596).

Parties on the ground refer to ordinary party members, party activists, donors, supporters, and sympathizers, as well as loyal voters. Katz and Mair (1993, p. 597) do not limit the actors in this face with formal membership, so the key characteristics are voluntary, permanent, and regular membership. The motivations are not far from public goals (e.g., access to policies), symbolic, and solidarity. Even though it sounds simpler than the previous face, the party on the ground has important resources, namely labor, voice, money, and local knowledge to the party. However, this face also has its own obstacles, namely the inability to have direct access to government decision-making and the voluntary nature of parties on the ground (Katz & Mair, 1993, p. 598). Therefore, the leader of the party on the ground must win the hearts of the party members.

Parties in the central office are those who occupy positions in political parties at the national level. In Indonesia, this face can be understood as the Central Leadership Council (DPP) of a party. According to Katz and Mair (1993, p. 600), this face is relatively ambiguous because many actors in the central office overlap with the other two faces. The resources of this face are centralization, expertise, formal position at the top of the party, and ability to do assigned work. These resources provide the central office with several functions, namely as the nucleus of the other two faces of the party, controlling the parties on the ground on behalf of the parties in the public office and, vice versa, providing various services for them. Even so, the central office still has obstacles. First, the central office functions only if the members are unified. Second, the central office cannot

implement public policies. Third, when alternative ways are found to complete the work assigned to the central office, the value of central office resources also decreases.

Using the framework of the three faces of the party, the analysis of the dynamics of political parties does not stop within parliament but extends to the internal organs. Understanding the internal dynamics is important for mapping actors at various levels and understanding the connectivity between these actors. In this case, the actors to be analyzed are those in PKS. The question to be answered is what role the three faces of parties in PKS play in drafting the EBET Bill.

Data was obtained from primary and secondary sources. The primary source for the face of the party on the ground is interviews with the Yogyakarta Regional Leadership Council



(DPW) in the Economic, Finance, Technology, and Environment (Ekuintek-LH) section. The three interviewees were the Head of the Ekuintek-LH Division of the DPW PKS Yogyakarta, Ms. Ekantini; the Head of the Department of Economics and Finance, Mr. Basith; and the Head of the Technology and Environment Department, Mr. Ipung. The primary source for the faces of the party in central and public offices is interviews with members of the DPR from the PKS faction, Diah Nurwitasari, and her expert staff. The secondary source is from the archives of the DPR regarding the faction's views and opinions on the EBET Bill.

Results and Discussion

A Brief History of PKS

The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) is an Islamic political party in Indonesia that, to date,

maintains its representatives in the People's Representative Council (DPR RI). PKS has an Islamic ideological orientation that is different from other Islamic parties in Indonesia, such as the United Development Party (PPP), the National Awakening Party (PKB), and the National Mandate Party (PAN), all of which have an Islamic-nationalist ideology. The ideology of PKS is relatively more conservative than these three parties, which means a more robust application of Islamic principles that reflects pure Islamic teachings (Rahmat, 2008).

The establishment of this political party was a dynamic process. The journey of the founders of PKS dates back to the New Order era when these groups were on a mission to oppose the New Order regime, which was considered deviant and unjust towards the general public (*ummah*) (Basyir, 2014).

The forerunners of PKS started with *da'wah* groups under the Campus Da'wah Institute (LDK) in the 1970s. The LDK movement delivered its missions through recitations and student activities on campus due to restrictions on religious-related activities in the New Order era.

The situation changed slightly when President Soeharto, in the 1990s, took a different approach to the Islamic group's movement. Instead of responding with repressive measures, Soeharto acted more subtly toward Islamic groups by making them allies. The movements on campus gradually changed their name to the Tarbiyah Movement. Tarbiyah activists come from various backgrounds, from academics to former activists from the Masyumi Party, which Suharto disbanded in the early days of his leadership (Arrasyid et al., 2020). This allowed

the Tarbiyah Movement to expand its network and influence in various ways, both on campus and outside campus.

The turning point was in 1998 when the reformation era started. The fall of the New Order regime was the gateway for Tarbiyah to play a more active role in Indonesian society. This group of intellectuals fought for the establishment of a party grounded in Islamic teaching and called it the Justice Party (PK). PK was declared at the Al Azhar Mosque, South Jakarta, on August 19, 1998, with the first Party President, Nur Mahmudi Ismail. With its intellectual background, PK seeks to correct the stigma in society by presenting educated intellectuals from the United States, presenting an image that PK is not an extreme Islamic political party.



After taking part in the first election in 1999, PK obtained only seven seats in the DPR RI. At that time, the election constitution of the Republic of Indonesia did not allow PK to continue to exist as a political party. PK was presented with two choices: it must change the name and symbol of the party, or else it would be disbanded. PK agreed to transform and join the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) by changing the name and symbol of the party that we know today. Then, the new PKS was declared on April 20, 2002, at the Silang National Monument Square, Central Jakarta, with the Party President Hidayat Nur Wahid.

The new PKS took part in its first election in 2004 and passed the parliamentary threshold of the DPR RI by securing 45 seats, or an equivalent of 7.34%. Since then, PKS has consistently won around 7-8% of the votes in every election in Indonesia,

with the most recent held in 2019. With a background in political ideology and the strength of its activists, PKS is currently active in the political arena in Indonesia by continuously recruiting and regenerating through various networks and party wings. This political party's cadre system adopted various methods, one of which has survived to this day is the Tarbiyah (education) method which is similar to the violent Islamic movement in Egypt.

However, PKS is now transforming into an Islamic party with a more moderate ideology. Since 2020, PKS has had the vision to become an Islamic party that is *rahmatan lil alamin*, strong, and at the forefront, serving the nation and state of Indonesia. The party's mission is to increase the number of party members in accordance with the values and principles of PKS as a political party. In a more general sense, the mission is to become

a pioneer in serving the Indonesian people and supporting the wider community (*ummah*). In line with the founders' missions, PKS seeks to revive the spirit of youth activeness in society.

Just like other parties, structurally, PKS has management from the central to regional levels. At the central level, PKS has a Central Executive Board (DPP). The PKS DPP has a national (Indonesian) management scale led by a Party President. Like other Islamic parties, at the central level of the PKS DPP, there is also a Shura Council led by the Chairman of the Shura Council. At the provincial level, PKS has a Regional Management Council (DPW) led by a chairman. At the district/city level, PKS has a Regional Management Council (DPD). At all levels of regional management, both

the DPW and the PKS DPD have a Regional-level Party Advisory Council led by a Chairman of the Advisory Council.

PKS in Public and Central Offices

The issue of the EBET Bill in the public office is on the agenda for discussion for Commission VII, which is engaged in the scope of energy, research and innovation, and industry, at the DPR RI. There are 49 members of the DPR RI who are members of this commission. Commission VII is chaired by Sugeng Suparwoto from the National Democrat (NasDem) party faction and four vice chairman, namely Dony Maryadi Oekon from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) faction, Maman Abdurrahman from the Golongan Karya (Golkar) party faction, Bambang Haryadi from the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) faction, and



H. Eddy Soeparno from the National Mandate Party (PAN) faction. There are five members of DPR RI from the PKS faction who are members of this commission, namely H. Tifatul Sembiring, H. Rofik Hananto, H. Mulyanto, Nurhasan Zaidi, and Hj. Diah Nurwitasari.

The views of the PKS faction regarding the EBET Bill were also published in the DPR archives. In general, the PKS faction agreed to ratify the EBET Bill with several notes. The faction believes that the energy transition from non-renewable energy to EBET is urgent in Indonesia (DPR RI, 2023). Environmental preservation needs to be a priority, but such energy transition cannot be carried out without clear planning.

Member of the Republic of Indonesia DPR, Diah Nurwitasari, conveyed twelve important notes regarding the EBET Bill. First, the EBET Bill and its derivative

regulations must be clear and not conflict with other laws and regulations. Second, the transition from fossil energy to EBET must be gradual and with a clear deadline. At this point, PKS expressed the urgency to replace diesel power plants that were no longer economical with EBET power plants. Third, PKS does not want a “bigger peg than the pole” incident in EBET research and exploration.⁵ This means that the economic benefits of EBET must be greater than the research and exploration costs.

In the next point, PKS wants the government to be realistic too. Although it is important to encourage EBET, the use of fossil energy cannot be completely eradicated. This takes into account the uncertain global political climate, such as the Ukrainian-Russian war. Fifth, PKS prioritizes domestic EBET

⁵ Interview with Diah Nurwitasari, member of the DPR RI PKS faction

producers. Sixth, the purchase of electricity from EBET must pay attention to the capabilities of the State Electricity Company (PLN). Seventh, PKS demands clear rules regarding the Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard (SPET) and the development of EBET, which are not environmentally friendly.

Eighth, PKS expects proper funding to accelerate the development of EBET in Indonesia. Ninth, PKS supports EBET innovation research and development activities. Tenth, PKS expects the active role of local governments in developing EBET so that electricity supply to remote areas can be accommodated and EBET-producing areas can be prioritized. Eleventh, PKS supports the government in conducting EBET coaching. However, if this coaching does not run optimally, PKS suggests

working with a credible party. Finally, PKS demands stringent law enforcement for those who violate the EBET regulations.

Furthermore, the PKS faction, through Diah, also revealed additional notes regarding the government's commitment to the energy transition and the development of EBET.⁶ According to the PKS faction, the government does not take this issue seriously, as reflected in the delay in sending the Problem Inventory List (DIM) from the government to the DPR RI. Apart from that, the PKS faction also highlighted the absence of an energy roadmap in Indonesia. Without a clear roadmap, the implementation of the energy transition in Indonesia may not succeed.

The PKS faction also tends to reject the idea of the power wheeling scheme, a direct

⁶ Interview with Diah Nurwitasari, member of the DPR RI PKS faction



electricity distribution scheme from the private sector through borrowing (leasing) PLN's electricity lines, at RUU EBET.⁷ They added that, although the practice of power wheeling was commonplace abroad, electricity distribution monopolized by PLN would not work well in Indonesia. The PKS faction also understands the huge burden borne by PLN if power wheeling is allowed for EBET. They consider the rent costs, maintenance of the PLN electricity network, and overloaded electricity supply in Java. The suggested middle ground is a selective power wheeling scheme, whereby it is only permitted in areas with low electricity supply.

Various notes from the PKS faction regarding the EBET Bill are the result of discussions by members of the DPR RI who are engaged in the DPP PKS

Ekuintek-LH field. This shows that discussions on the EBET Bill are still being carried out at the central level, not yet reaching the regional level, let alone the grassroots. In the view of Diah and her expert staff, the absence of party faces at the regional level in the EBET discussion is caused by the nature of energy issues, which is arguably elitist. The issue of energy, especially EBET, may not be well understood by the general public.

“When we talk about fuel prices, all of them, from parties on the ground, to the public office, to the central office, must be unified in their voices. But, for EBET, I don’t think they understand much either. When we talk to them, they also don’t know or don’t understand the issue. So actually, this issue has little relevance to actors at the regional level.”⁸

7 Interview with Pranoto, PKS DPP expert staff

8 Interview with Pranoto, PKS DPP expert staff

For PKS, the sensitivity of the Indonesian people towards green energy and environmental preservation is still minimal. In terms of energy, for example, people generally do not care what power plant their electricity comes from as long as the electricity is available in their homes. Therefore, extra efforts are needed to educate the public regarding the urgency of the energy transition, which will involve the faces of parties at the regional and grassroots levels. This is why PKS parties are reluctant to coordinate with party officials at the regional level.

PKS actually has a mechanism to coordinate with party officials at the regional level. The party claims that the communication channel between the DPP and party organs at the regional level is excellent and structured.⁹ They have an open house scheme

that opens opportunities for cadres at the regional level to express their concerns. PKS also accommodates concerns online through various short message applications. These two mechanisms tend to be informal. For the formal mechanisms, PKS will usually hold discussions through the National Working Conference (Mukernas), scientific forums, and various socializations, which tend to be top-down rather than bottom-up. In a sense, the PKS DPP acts more as a patron directing the understanding and actions of cadres at the regional level. This also applies to the issue of the EBET Bill. PKS has a short- and long-term orientation to educate and equalize understanding of EBET issues at the regional level first, assuming that party organs at the regional level have a lower understanding of the issue dynamics.

⁹ Interview with Diah Nurwitasari, member of DPR RI PKS faction



However, an interview with DPW PKS Yogyakarta showed otherwise. The DPW PKS, as a party institution at the grassroots level, is by no means an entity that does not understand and does not study EBET issues. The author finds that the face of PKS on the ground in Yogyakarta shows sensitivity, knowledge, and even concern about the EBET Bill, which has not been heard at the central level of PKS. DPW PKS has even taken several actions to encourage sustainable EBET management, at least at the regional level.

PKS at the Grassroots Level

Referring to Katz and Mair (1993), political parties need to be seen as organizations consisting of various faces that interact with each other. That way, a party has the potential for fragmentation regarding strategic issues. This condition can be observed from

the relationship between the PKS organizational structure at the central level, both those in the DPP and those holding public positions, and the PKS organizational structure at the regional level, i.e., the DPW.

Although structurally, the DPW PKS Yogyakarta is a delegate from the face of the party that occupies the center. They cannot be called an extension of the central office. Our findings show that the DPW PKS Yogyakarta has its own specific political agency regarding the condition of EBET issues in the region, which is related to the debate on the EBET Bill. The opinion of the DPP PKS, which stated that the issue of the EBET Bill was a “difficult” and “irrelevant” issue at the regional level, was refuted by Ekantini’s statement, Head of the Department of Economics and Finance of the DPW PKS Yogyakarta, as follows.

"PKS's view of the EBET Bill is actually in several official party publications. PKS actually often publishes about the faction's response to bills and laws, especially bills, because inputs from the public are needed before the law is passed. In fact, we discussed this PKS view at the end of March 2023, but in fact, we could read the final response to the bill around July 2022. Almost a year. Then the final response was that the government did not immediately include this Problem Inventory List (DIM). A bill without DIM is actually unable to answer the problems faced by this nation. DIM is a series of requirements needed to become law. If you read this, there are actually five PKS responses, but actually, there are twelve."¹⁰

10 Interview with Ekantini, Head of the Department of Economics and Finance DPW PKS Yogyakarta

Ekantini's statement shows that the PKS DPW, as a party structure at the grassroots level, has a fairly comprehensive general understanding of the EBET Bill. Even though the DPP PKS stated that the DPW may not understand the problems related to the EBET Bill, it turned out that the DPW PKS had a detailed understanding of the dynamics of the EBET Bill. This can be seen from how the PKS DPW understands that the PKS DPP is concerned about the Indonesian Government's delay in sending DIM to discuss the EBET Bill. The PKS DPW can even explain in detail the twelve arguments for the PKS DPP's response to the EBET Bill.

Furthermore, the DPW PKS also has different and specific views on new and renewable energy issues. Ekantini stated that, within the scope of Yogyakarta, EBET is not a new issue. This issue has been



discussed for a long time at the provincial level since 2000. In fact, the draft of local regulations related to EBET has been initiated since 2018. Ekantini said that EBET is not just a national or regional need. The two domains must work together so that the resulting legal products can be synergistic and able to provide input for the EBET Bill at the central level.

In addition, the Yogyakarta DPW PKS considers that the EBET Bill does not yet have a clear priority, so the concern is that the legal product will further boost the consumption of new energy instead of renewable energy. In this case, the PKS DPW's opinion aligns with the PKS DPP's opinion regarding the lack of priority and delays in DIM. However, unlike the PKS DPP, the Yogyakarta PKS DPW did not explicitly show its support for the outline of the EBET Bill which is currently rolling out at the central

level.¹¹ If the DPP PKS views the regions as entities that “have difficulty to understand” and are “irrelevant” in the discussion of the EBET Bill, the DPW PKS actually sees great potential in developing EBET at the regional level, especially in Yogyakarta.

In fact, several areas in Yogyakarta have developed renewable energy, such as Kulon Progo and Gunung Kidul. The development of alternative energy in Kulon Progo can be seen from the existence of a micro-hydropower plant in the Kalibawang Irrigation Area, which was built in 2012. The power plant utilizes wastewater from the Progo River in the primary ditch of irrigation canals in Kedungrong Hamlet, Jurang Hamlet, and Semawung Hamlet. Apart from these villages, several areas in Kulon Progo have the potential to develop micro-hydropower.

11 Interview with Ekantini, Head of the Department of Economics and Finance DPW PKS Yogyakarta

Experts say that the power plant is capable of producing up to 700 kilowatts of electricity if it can be processed optimally. However, the development of alternative energy is constrained by the district government's budget, so support from the central government is needed.

In Gunungkidul, the solar-powered energy source has been operating since 2018. Developed independently, the alternative energy is capable of producing 7,500 watts of electrical power. In addition to being able to reduce dependence on the use of electricity from fossil energy sources, the power plant helps reduce the expenses of micro, small, and medium enterprises.

"If we look at Indonesia, there is quite a lot of potential for new and renewable energy. Yogyakarta is one of the pioneers in the development of new

and renewable energy. [Renewable energy] in Yogyakarta has been around for a long time, but the most famous one was around 2000-2018 when Gunungkidul developed wind and water energy for fishermen. Then, there was also a development in Kulon Progo. Our regencies/cities already have concerns about working on draft local regulations regarding this."¹²

On the other hand, the DPW PKS also critically debated the discourse on "new energy" and "renewable energy" in the EBET Bill, which is rarely even mentioned at the central level. In the EBET Bill, these two discourses lead to different debates. In Article 1 of the general provisions of the EBET Bill, new energy is defined as a type of energy originating or produced from new technologies

¹² Interview with Ekantini, Head of the Economics and Finance Department of Yogyakarta DPW PKS



for processing non-renewable energy sources and renewable energy. Meanwhile, renewable energy is defined as energy that originates or is produced from renewable energy sources.

Further explained, Article 9 of the EBET Bill states that new energy consists of several sources, such as nuclear, hydrogen, methane gas from, liquefied coal, gasified coal, and other new energy sources. Ipung, the Head of the Yogyakarta PKS DPW Technology and Environment Department, said that there is confusion in the discussion of new energy in the EBET Bill, which is contrary to the target of a sustainable energy transition. The central government encourages investment and development of sustainable new energy, such as nuclear energy. In fact, this energy has emissions that are not friendly to the environment and are not conducive if applied

in disaster-prone areas, such as Indonesia. Academic papers in the EBET Bill do not provide further explanation about the side effects of nuclear and its handling, which can take up to thousands of years.

"In fact, if we look at the academic papers, this bill is not too far from the 2007 Energy Law. Many chapters and articles repeat the essence of the law. What is somewhat ambiguous is the new energy. If we look at the articles, they immediately raise an issue of nuclear management. Well, we read the current government, and in the future, it seems that new energy development will focus on nuclear energy. Technically, the issue of nuclear power has been debated in the world, especially regarding the Fukushima earthquake, which posed a problem to the reactor and eventually shut it down. But this law



actually includes nuclear energy in a separate chapter. We read whether the government prioritizes nuclear development or is in a position as if this law does not talk too much about renewable energy, but more about new energy.”¹³

Apart from the negative externalities in the development of nuclear energy, the Yogyakarta DPW PKS also highlighted the budget allocations presented in the EBET Bill. When the discussion of new and renewable energy is combined into one legal product, which results in an unclear roadmap for a sustainable energy transition, the concern is that a lot of the budget will be allocated to one energy only. The EBET Bill shows a tendency to prioritize new energy, which encourages much of the APBN investment to be

absorbed in fossil and nuclear development. In fact, this energy source can only be managed by large business entities because it requires large financing.

The emphasis presented by Yogyakarta DPW PKS here is the involvement of the local government in terms of management. Management of new energy with large capital will make it difficult for local governments. This process will be significantly different in the case of renewable energy. In other words, the existence of the EBET Bill must encourage the management of renewable energy so that all levels of society can receive the incentives and benefits of the large budget disbursed by the government for the energy transition. This is because renewable energy will open greater opportunities for local governments to the

13 Interview with Ipung, Head of the Department of Technology and Environment DPW PKS



smallest level, such as Village Owned Enterprises (BUMDES) to be actively involved in its management.¹⁴

The DPW PKS expresses its views and concerns regarding the EBET Bill at the National Working Meeting (Mukernas) forum every year. They always encourage the government to ensure there is a clear roadmap for a sustainable energy transition. It is clear that the road map in the energy transition process clarifies the division of roles between the central and regional governments significantly. If the road map is clear, local governments can also carry out programs that align with the law. However, the proposals from the DPW at Mukernas were often not conveyed to the center because there were conflicts with the PKS DPP as the central office, which assumed that the regions were unable to deal with EBET

14 Interview with Ipung, Head of the Department of Technology and Environment DPW PKS

issues and cadres in the public office, who had to negotiate with other parties and the interests of the old energy oligarchy.¹⁵

Parties at the Grassroots Level

Katz and Mair's argument about the three faces of political parties is relevant in the case of the drafting of the EBET Bill. There was a moment when the three faces of PKS aligned in terms of political opinions and choices. However, there are also moments when these three faces show different interests. This difference is obvious when the party structure in the public and central office seeks to depoliticize party political agencies at the grassroots level. This depoliticization is evident in three ways: (1) assumptions about the inability of party structures at the regional level

15 Interview with Basith, Head of the PKS DPW Economics and Finance Department

to discuss the EBET issues, (2) not including the interests of developing EBET at the regional level as part of the EBET Bill, and (3) narrow definitions and restrictions of the EBET Bill as a central and elite issue.

Discussion about the inability of the grassroots party structure to administer the EBET Bill can be seen from the statements of Diah and Pranoto. Diah stated that “it is still a long way to go” to discuss the EBET Bill issue with party officials at the grassroots level. Pranoto also stated that it was “very difficult to imagine” party officials at the grassroots level discussing the EBET Bill issue. These two statements imply that party structures at the grassroots level need to be educated before being invited to discuss and push the formulation of the EBET Bill.

“We have an Aspiration Day forum that functions to accommodate aspirations,

including from the regional level. Cadres in the public office also have a recess period which serves to socialize our views, including about the EBET Bill. Central and regional are relatively the same. We need to unify views through FGDs, scientific forums, etc. The orientation is to build a common understanding.”¹⁶

The urgency to educate party officials at the regional level is questionable. Because, according to our findings, the DPW PKS, as a party administrator at the grassroots level, has a deep and comprehensive understanding of EBET issues. Likewise, the urgency to unify views needs to be questioned as well. This is because the PKS DPW has its own political orientation and choice to develop EBET at the regional level. Uniform

¹⁶ Interview with Diah Nurwitasari, member of the DPR RI PKS faction



understanding and views will only be an excuse to ignore party political agency at the grassroots level. Forums, such as Aspiration Day, Legislative Corner, and FGDs, are nothing but a one-way outreach from the center to the regions.

In addition to the discourse on “incomprehension” which castrates the political agency of grassroots party structure, the depoliticization of the party at the grassroots level is also carried out through the dichotomy of EBET and non-EBET issues. The PKS structure in the public and central offices positions the development of new and renewable energy at the regional level, not as an integral part of the EBET Bill.

“Many local communities have built biomass cofiring and micro-hydropower plants. It is usually developed through BUMDES alone. So, why

is the development of the EBET Bill so slow? There are various factors. One of the factors is the government’s delay in submitting DIM to the DPR. It’s been delayed for months. The government in the G20 seems very serious, but the bill is not being seriously discussed. There are 574 problem lists, and only about 170 have been discussed. Many points have not been discussed. Another factor is the roadmap for the energy transition that the government has not yet discussed. The third problem is about power wheeling. There are still differences of opinion about this.”¹⁷

In the above statement, the party structure in the public and central offices dichotomizes the EBET and non-EBET issues. The development of EBET at the

¹⁷ Interview with Diah Nurwitasari, member of the DPR RI PKS faction

regional level, such as biomass and micro-hydropower, can be completed by organs at the regional level, such as BUMDES. Meanwhile, the issue of the EBET Bill is defined in an elite-centric manner. There are three main issues that are considered to be problems with the EBET Bill: (1) the government's lack of seriousness as shown by the delay in collecting DIM, (2) the absence of a clear energy transition road map, and (3) the debate over the power wheeling scheme. Problems and potential for developing EBET at the regional level are not included in the problems of the EBET Bill.

The final depoliticization mechanism is the affirmation that the EBET Bill is an elite issue that only certain circles understand exclusively. Diah and Pranoto stressed this repeatedly to deny the involvement of party officials at the grassroots level in deliberating the EBET Bill.

"One of the objectives of the EBET Bill is to reduce carbon emissions. But what happened? For example, when the price of pertamax, a type of gasoline that is lower in carbon than pertalite, went up. Were people willing to make sacrifices to spend more money to use pertamax? No, people preferred to return to pertalite, which was cheaper but emits more carbon. Well, this shows that people still lack an understanding of EBET. They are not ready to preserve the environment. It must be admitted that this is indeed an elite issue."¹⁸

The three forms of party depoliticization at the grassroots level by parties in the public and central office castrate the party's political agency at the grassroots level. In fact, contrary to these assumptions, parties

18 Interview with Diah Nurwitasari, member of the DPR RI, PKS faction



at the grassroots level have a detailed and comprehensive understanding. In fact, they can observe and aggregate their own political interests related to the development of EBET at the grassroots level.

Conclusion

The global demand for an energy transition has forced the Government of Indonesia to formulate supporting laws and regulations, one of which is the EBET Bill. Political parties, as instruments of aggregation and channeling the interests of the people, play an important role in the formulation of this bill. One of its important roles is to coordinate with party structures at the grassroots level to accommodate the interest in issues and develop new and renewable energy potentials at the grassroots level.

Theoretically, the relationship between the three faces of political parties, namely parties in the public office, central office, and grassroots, is not always ideal. Even though they are in the same party organ, the three are often at odds and have conflicting interests. This is evident in the coordination between PKS at the public and central offices with PKS at the grassroots level. The conflict between the two did not take place in a firm and confrontational manner but manifested in depoliticization efforts by the PKS in the public and central offices against PKS at the grassroots level. Nonetheless, PKS, at the grassroots level, was able to show its political agency. They are able to demonstrate in-depth knowledge of new and renewable energy issues and actively aggregate interests in efforts to develop new energy and renewable energy at the regional level.



This finding shows that, in a study of the three faces of political parties, parties in the public and central office are not always the dominant actors. The initial assumption of viewing parties in the public and central office as dominant actors made efforts to review party political agency at the grassroots level more deeply constrained. Therefore, the political agency of each face of the party, especially at the grassroots level, which is often not reviewed in depth, should be the focus of research on the study of the three faces of political parties.



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