Exploring the Relationships Between Democracy and Central Bank Independence:
Corresponding Author(s) : Bara Setiadi
PCD Journal,
Vol 12 No 1 (2024): PCD Journal Vol. 12 No. 1 2024
Abstract
This paper applies fixed-effect panel regression on observational data from both developed and developing countries to test the established models of the impact of democracy, political rights, civil liberties, and political institutions on central bank independence (CBI). Evidence shows that lower civil liberties and political risk statistically influence CBI in both developed and developing countries. The findings also show that well-exercised democracy and political rights significantly influence CBI in developing countries only. By contrast, most political variables do not significantly influence CBI in highly developed countries. Instead, CBI depends on macroeconomic variables such as higher taxes and international debt. These findings provide new insights that differ from previously established results, which predict that CBI is not sensitive to political variables. Overall, this paper reaffirms the interplay between politics (proxied by democratic practices) and economy (proxied by CBI) in the early stages of development which varies across different levels of development.
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- Broz, J. L. (2002). Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes. International Organization, 56(4), 861–887. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760403801
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- Cukierman, A., & Webb, S. B. (1995). Political Influence on the Central Bank : International Evidence Author. The World Bank Economic Review, 9(3), 397-423. https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/9.3.397
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- Issing, O. (2006). Central Bank Independence - Economic and Political Dimensions. National Institute Economic Review, 196(1), 66–76. https://doi.org/10.1177/0027950106067048
- Jácome, L. I., & Vázquez, F. (2008). Is there any link between legal central bank independence and inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean. European Journal of Political Economy, 24(4), 788–801. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.07.003
- Jones, E., & Matthijs, M. (2019). Rethinking Central-Bank Independence. Journal of Democracy, 30(2), 127–141. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0030
- Klomp, J., & de Haan, J. (2009). Central bank independence and financial instability. Journal of Financial Stability, 5(4), 321–338. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2008.10.001
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- Palley, T. (2019). CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: A RIGGED DEBATE BASED ON FALSE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS. Investigación Económica, 78(310), 67. https://doi.org/10.22201/fe.01851667p.2019.310.71547
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- Romelli, D. (2022). The political economy of reforms in Central Bank design: evidence from a new dataset. Economic Policy, 37(112), 641–688. https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiac011
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- Agoba, A. M., Abor, J. Y., Osei, K. A., & Sa-Aadu, J. (2020). Do Independent Central Banks Exhibit Varied Behaviour in Election and Non-Election Years?: The Case of Fiscal Policy in Africa. Journal of African Business, 21(1), 105–125. https://doi.org/10.1080/15228916.2019.1584263
- Alesina, A., & Summers, L. H. (1993). Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 25(2), 151. https://doi.org/10.2307/2077833
- Arena, R., & Salvadori, N. (2003). Money, Credit and the Role of the State: Essays in honour of Augusto Graziani (Issue January 2004). Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
- Avramov, R. (1999). The Role of a Currency Board in Financial Crises: The Case of Bulgaria. BNB Discussion Papers DP/6/1999
- Bagheri, F., & Habibi, N. (1998). Political Institutions and Central Bank Independence: A Cross-Country Analysis. Public Choice, 96(1), 187–204. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005055317499
- Barro, R. J. (1991). Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(2), 407. https://doi.org/10.2307/2937943
- Bell, A., & Jones, K. (2015). Explaining Fixed Effects: Random Effects Modeling of Time-Series Cross-Sectional and Panel Data. Political Science Research and Methods, 3(1), 133–153. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2014.7
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- Bernhard, W. (1998). A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence. American Political Science Review, 92(2), 311–327. https://doi.org/10.2307/2585666
- Binder, C. C. (2021). Political Pressure on Central Banks. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 53(4), 715–744. https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12772
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- Giannone, D. (2010). Political and ideological aspects in the measurement of democracy: the Freedom House case. Democratisation, 17(1), 68–97. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340903453716
- Goodhart, C., & Lastra, R. (2018). Populism and Central Bank Independence. Open Economies Review, 29(1), 49–68. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11079-017-9447-y
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- Hagedorn, M., Manovskii, I., & Mitman, K. (2019). The Fiscal Multiplier. NBER Working Papers 25571, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. https://doi.org/10.3386/w25571
- Hausman, J. A. (1978). Specification Tests in Econometrics. Econometrica, 46(6), 1251-1271. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913827
- Hayo, B., & Hefeker, C. (2002). Reconsidering central bank independence. European Journal of Political Economy, 18(4), 653–674. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680(02)00113-1
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- Issing, O. (2006). Central Bank Independence - Economic and Political Dimensions. National Institute Economic Review, 196(1), 66–76. https://doi.org/10.1177/0027950106067048
- Jácome, L. I., & Vázquez, F. (2008). Is there any link between legal central bank independence and inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean. European Journal of Political Economy, 24(4), 788–801. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.07.003
- Jones, E., & Matthijs, M. (2019). Rethinking Central-Bank Independence. Journal of Democracy, 30(2), 127–141. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0030
- Klomp, J., & de Haan, J. (2009). Central bank independence and financial instability. Journal of Financial Stability, 5(4), 321–338. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2008.10.001
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- Palley, T. (2019). CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: A RIGGED DEBATE BASED ON FALSE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS. Investigación Económica, 78(310), 67. https://doi.org/10.22201/fe.01851667p.2019.310.71547
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- Romelli, D. (2022). The political economy of reforms in Central Bank design: evidence from a new dataset. Economic Policy, 37(112), 641–688. https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiac011
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