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Aims and Scope:

PCD Journal of South and Southeast Asia's Power, Conflict, and Democracy Studies is an international refereed journal initiated by the Power, Conflict, and Democracy (PCD) consortium, a collaborative work by the University of Colombo in Sri Lanka, Gadjah Mada University in Indonesia, and the University of Oslo in Norway. It is a journal that comprehensively examines the dynamics of power and democracy, including practices of human rights, popular representation, and public policy, particularly, in Indonesia but still giving a space for comparative studies. Invitation is extended to authors with interest in making comparison experiences in Indonesia with those of the rest of the globe. PCD Journal publishes articles, literature review, field notes, and book reviews in major sub fields of political science, human geography, and political anthropology.

PCD Journal aims to address some of the most current issues of power, conflict, and democracy in Indonesia with comparative perspective. While the journal is open to all methodological approaches, all submissions are expected to be theoretically grounded. The journal can be of great value to teachers, students, researchers, experts, journalists, and social movement activist dealing with these issues and regions.

Submission

Submitted papers should be no longer than 8,000 words excluding tables and figures.
Submit the manuscript via e-mail to the editor-in-chief at pcd@ugm.ac.id.

Manuscript preparation

For detailed instruction check our website: https://jurnal.ugm.ac.id/v3/PCD or http://www.jurnal.ugm.ac.id/pcd.

Peer Review

Every submitted article will be subject to peer review. The normal review period is three months. Most research articles in this journal have undergone rigorous peer review based on initial editorial screening and refereeing by anonymous referees. Authors should take care that the manuscript contains no clues as to identity. Nevertheless, articles published under 'Research Notes' section, aimed at setting up future research agenda, are non peer-reviewed.

PCD Programme

The state of democracy in the Global South is marked by a striking paradox: while liberal democracy has attained an ideologically hegemonic position through two so-called waves of democracy, the qualities of such democracies is increasingly called into question. The "old" democracies in the global South like Sri Lanka are weakened. Democracy deficits have emerged within constitutional and institutional arrangements as well as in political practices. Further, the "third wave of democracy" is over. "New" democracies like in Indonesia have fostered freedoms, privatisation and decentralisation but continue to suffer from poor governance, representation and participation. Hence there are general signs of decline. Vulnerable people are frustrated with lack of actual influence and sustained elitism. Politicians winning elections often need to foster ethnic and religious loyalties, clientelism and the abuse of public resources. Powerful groups and middle classes with poor ability to win elections tend to opt for privatisation and return partially to authoritarian governance.

Critical questions are therefore asked about the feasibility of democracy in developing country contexts. Some observers say it is only a problem of better crafting of institutions. Others contend that "full" democratisation was premature in the first place and that necessary preconditions need to be created beforehand. Both positions are based on a narrow and static understanding of democracy. While the core elements of democracy are universal, real world democracies develop (or decline) over time and through contextual dynamics; in processes and contexts of actors, institutions and relations of power. Therefore, the crucial task is to analyse the problems and options of expanding the historically "early" freedoms and deficient elements of democracy that fortunately exist in spite of poor socio- economic and political conditions in counties such as Sri Lanka and Indonesia rather than giving up on these freedoms until the other have somehow improved. This is to advance towards the universally accepted aim of democracy in terms of popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality, and to be able to use democracy to handle conflicts and alter unequal and unsustainable development.

With this in mind, researchers at the University of Oslo (Norway), Gadjah Mada (Indonesia) and Colombo (Sri Lanka) have come together in a collective research—and post- graduate programme. The idea is to pool their research projects and results, and to promote doctoral as well as master studies by way of, first, a joint framework for analysing power, conflict and democracy and, second, a basic electronic peer reviewed journal and report series (published by *PCD-Press*) to the benefit of students, scholars and priorities in the region. Basic resources—in addition to the participants own voluntary work and projects— are provided by their respective universities and the Norwegian Centre for International Cooperation in Higher Education (SIU).

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Education and Social Mobility for *Orang Asli Papua*[1]

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Abstract

Human resources issues are complicated in Papua due to the educational barriers that make it difficult for Indigenous Papuans, Orang Asli Papua (OAP), to achieve upward social mobility. Many factors have contributed to these educational barriers, including poverty, conflict and war, a lack of teachers, and poor infrastructure. Ideally, these obstacles should be solved through the Special Autonomy Law (SAL) and the "special autonomy funds" it provides. Although these funds have been provided since 2001 to address inequality and improve human resources in Papua, conditions have not improved significantly. This qualitative study explores the experiences of the Mappi and Puncak OAPs whose educations were financed through these special autonomy funds. This study finds that, although the SAL has reduced educational barriers and increased social mobility for OAPs, there are still some areas that must still be improved. OAPs' experiences show that formal education is a main determining factor in upward social mobility. It also highlights several areas for change: greater support for informal education; equal development on the coast and in the highlands; increased community participation; and strengthening political will.

Keywords: *education; social mobility; Orang Asli Papua; special autonomy law*

Introduction

According to Law Number 2 of 2021 concerning Special Autonomy for Papua, Indigenous Papuans—including the people in Papua Province and West Papua Province, internationally known as "West Papuans"—are "people who come from the Melanesian racial group consisting of Indigenous tribes in Papua" (Titifanue, et al., 2016). In Papua, the easternmost part of Indonesia, most areas are still underdeveloped (Halmin, 2006). History shows that OAPs are the most disadvantaged people in Indonesia's socio-political history due to the social conflicts, state violence, and discrimination that have constantly happened on their land

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(MacLeod, 2015; Heidbüchel, 2007). They have thus demanded to separate themselves from the Republic of Indonesia on various occasions.

Figure 1. Maps of Papua Island

Demands for separation have reduced over the last two decades since the passage of the Special Autonomy Law (SAL), which was created as a political consensus between the Indonesian government and OAPs. The law was designed to focus on the welfare issue of OAPs, mainly through the provision of special autonomy funds (Widjojo & Budiatri, 2012). One of the main points determining the policy's success is realising excellent human resources through quality education. Education is believed to be a tool for upward social mobility. However, education faces crucial challenges in Papua, such as geographical location, poverty, social conflict, state violence, and human rights violations (Blades, 2020; Elisabeth, 2012). It implies that Papua's low education indicators have detrimentally affected Indonesia's human development index (Figure 2).

Figure 2. HDI of Indonesia, 2020



Source: BPS (2021)

Poor human development amongst OAPs is not a new issue in Papua; it has occurred throughout history since the territory was integrated into Indonesia in 1963 (Viartasiwi, 2018; Anderson, 2013; Saltford, 2002). Previously, education had become a major issue in Papua due to the Indonesian government's limited education investment before the reform era, resulting in teacher shortages, poor school infrastructure, and low education performance indicators (Mollet, 2007). This situation is further exacerbated by the fact that OAPs belong to the Melanesian race, whose numbers are lower and who are often regarded as backward, poor, and uneducated (Malik, 2019; Gietzelt, 1989). Some Indonesian people have acted in a racist and discriminatory manner, creating various educational barriers that have alienated them from their social environment and made upward social mobility challenging. For this reason, social policies for Indigenous peoples have been urgently needed to protect, recognize, and affirm the existence of OAPs.

This article understands "Indigenous social policy" as having the precise meaning provided by the United Nations. According to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), every country in the world is encouraged to protect the rights of Indigenous peoples, both individually and collectively, including the right to education. In addition, the declaration is also in line with the fourth point of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which seeks to ensure that all students have the right to receive a high-quality education that is inclusive and fair and lifelong learning opportunities available to all (UN, 2012). The jargon "Education for All", therefore, should reflect education as a human right regardless of background.

Education quality in Papua continues to lag behind that of other provinces in Indonesia, and what education is available is unevenly distributed. According to a study, most highlanders receive a lower quality education than those on the coast (Karim, 2012). In addition, despite receiving government assistance on a significant and consistent basis (in the form of special autonomy funds), local governments have not managed their agendas effectively and

efficiently, resulting in budget inconsistencies, mismanagement, and poor plan execution (Prabowo et al., 2021; KPK, 2021; Agustinus, 2013).

As a result, a welfare approach is required. Such an approach is offered by the Papua Roadmap, a framework created by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) to address the root causes of unresolved problems in Papua, such as history and political status, military operations, marginalization, and development failures (Widjojo et al., 2010). Having laid the groundwork for a "new, peaceful, and fair" Papua, this roadmap provides a comprehensive approach that several ministries and agencies have adopted. However, some issues remain, particularly in the implementation of cross-institutional policies.

At this point, this study examines the relationship between education and social mobility through the learning experiences of two groups of OAPs from the highlands and the coast, both of whom were supported by special autonomy funds. The historical and welfare approaches are used to present the analysis. The findings show, that although formal education has played an essential role in providing OAPs with upward social mobility, other determinants exist.

Literature Review

There is debate regarding the relationship between education and social mobility. In general, education refers to what is worth learning and how people should learn it, whereas social mobility refers to how individuals or groups move from position to position. According to Blau and Duncan (1967), social mobility is closely related to "status attainment," where human expansion in education has supported vertical mobility, the causal effect of which can be seen in post-industrial theory (i.e., the OED triangle). Goldthorpe (2014; 2016) adds the concepts of education and socioeconomic class movement to the "OED triangle" theory. Chan and Zhang (2021) highlight the gap in the relationship between education and social mobility, attributing it to the government's failure to investigate the relationship between these things. To achieve upward social mobility, it is necessary to understand historical dynamics and create structural change (Viartasiwi, 2018). These can only be achieved by breaking down barriers, developing hard and soft skills, and making use of determinants other than formal education.

In the context of Papua, Munro (2013) has investigated the Dani tribe, finding that even those who are educated do not necessarily gain an increase in social status, authority, or employment due to limiting factors such as in-migration, primitive stigma, school quality, poor teacher recruitment, and security sector violence. Fatgehipon et al. (2021) further acknowledge that OAPs who receive affirmation scholarships from local governments experience different educational barriers; only a tiny proportion are successful in academic and social life. This failure is influenced by several factors, such as the lack of living allowances, the difficulty finding a place to live that supports the learning process, limited motivation for learning, and the absence of regular assistance and evaluation. It indicates that various inhibiting factors,

both internal and external, can affect social mobility.

Furthermore, Mollet (2007) has highlighted that education in Papua today does not encourage competition among students, as imbalance exists between Indigenous and non-Indigenous students and there is no comprehensive plan for human resource management. Although the topic of education has been an area of social policy research for many years, attention remains focused on general social policy; little attention has been given to the effect of social policy on Indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples are the most vulnerable subjects (Li, 2000). Therefore, this study focuses on the effect of social policy (i.e., the SAL) on Indigenous peoples, as well as its ability to reduce barriers to education and improve the social mobility of Indigenous peoples.

Methodology

This article uses a case study, which Yin (2014) defines as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the case) within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be evident" (p. 16). Case studies aim to examine research questions and problems by recognizing that phenomena cannot be separated from the context in which it occurs. This study uses a descriptive research model to provide solutions to existing problems based on field data. The purpose of this study is to provide a factual and accurate description of the subject being investigated (Sudjarwo & Basrowi, 2009; Nazir, 2011). This model is much more focused than the exploratory model, as the researcher knows enough about Papua to define the propositions, hypotheses, and research questions before commencing research. Thus, this model tries to explain everything that happened while revealing patterns and connections with several relevant theoretical constructs. This is helpful for theoretical development, and thus it is considered an intensive case study (Mills et al., 2010).

Figure 3. Basic Design for Case Study

Source: Yin (2009)

This study employs a single case design, following Yin (2009), using two analytical units: Puncak Regency and Mappi Regency, Papua. It aims to explain the relationship between SAL and its influence on education and social mobility. It is expected that the different patterns of OAPs in these regencies would provide different nuances and provide a more holistic understanding of the educational conditions in Papua. Following certain criteria, interviewees were chosen to represent three groups: OAPs, implementers, and policymakers. Each group received an interview session that was ordered based on the priority of the subjects studied. Interviews were conducted with indigenous students from both Puncak and Mappi Regency who could access education through special autonomy funds. The researcher interviewed three implementers of the SAL, representing the Puncak government, the Mappi government, and the UGM Papua Task Force; these actors were expected to explain their experiences in implementing SAL and provide evaluations. Finally, the researcher conducted two interviews with policymakers and experts (academics) involved in planning and developing SAL at the national level. They were expected to tell how SAL was designed to protect Indigenous rights, including education.

Overview of OAPs

Papua is a complicated land. One of the most protracted conflict zones in modern history, Papua has been under the fragile control of the Indonesian government authority for decades (Chauvel & Bhakti, 2004). Since becoming incorporated into Indonesia in 1963, as confirmed by PEPERA/The Act of Free Choice in 1969, development has stagnated due to ineffective government intervention at the central and local levels (Saltford, 2002). Likewise, development disparities and perceived injustices have driven a significant desire for separation from Indonesia (Rumansara, 2015). Moreover, there is often distrust among stakeholders (Sugandi, 2008). Thus, if the Indonesian government is determined to maintain Papua as part of Indonesia, it must transform its governance and cultivate public trust.

Such changes should start with state initiatives to become present in the community, where the government is obligated to provide essential services, facilitate accessibility, and respond to social problems experienced by OAPs. Policy complexity can stem from various factors, such as limited control, limited costs, and even political will (Widjojo & Budiatri, 2012; Resosudarmo et al., 2014). The decades of suffering experienced by OAPs, during which they did not feel the presence of the state, must be paid for with adequate social protection programmes designed to promote quality human development (Mollet, 2007; Prabowo et al., 2021). Without a state initiative to protect Indigenous peoples, this very diverse population will only call for the disintegration of the current nation—as seen in previous periods (Singh, 2008).

One benchmark of successful human development is the Human Development Index (HDI), which represents the population's basic capabilities (Hou et al., 2015). HDI is calculated based on three primary dimensions: life expectancy, survival rates, and knowledge levels (BPS, 2021). HDI is strategic for Indonesia, as it measures government performance and

determines the General Allocation Fund (DAU). In the context of Papua, HDI is useful for measuring human capital achievements and determining Papua's level of development compared to other regions (Resosudarmo et al., 2014). According to official statistics, Papua's HDI is the lowest in Indonesia. Furthermore, high disparities are evident between regencies, as seen when comparing Jayapura City (HDI 79.94 highest) with Nduga Regency (HDI 31.55, lowest) (BPS, 2021). Most areas of Papua are considered underdeveloped, and areas with high HDI levels are marked by large levels of migration, such as in Jayapura, Merauke, Nabire, and Timika. Therefore, the development challenges in Papua cannot be taken lightly.

Regardless of the complexity of Papua's problem, all parties agree that social development (especially education) is sorely needed by OAPs (Mollet, 2007; Pentury, 2011; Agustinus, 2013; Prabowo et al., 2021). Social investment, in the form of education, is expected to bring benefits to OAPs. Although the number of OAPs is relatively small, enormous diversity is evident. There are various ethnic groups, cultures, languages, social, organizational structures, leadership systems, religions, and livelihoods. Papua, as a diverse society, has unique characteristics that affect the educational barriers and experiences of the population. Overall, OAPs can be divided into two groups, namely highlanders and coastal people (Rumansara, 2015). To explain their respective findings, the researchers used Puncak Regency to represent conditions in the highlands and Mappi Regency to represent conditions on the coast, as the unit of analysis.

1. The Highlands People and Education

Puncak Regency is an autonomous region created out of Puncak Jaya Regency through Law Number 7 of 2008 concerning the Establishment of Puncak Regency in Papua Province. Puncak Regency has an area of 8,055 km^2, with the capital in Ilaga. Geographically, Puncak Regency is located in the Central Highlands of Papua, with an average height between 500 and 4,000 meters above sea level (Pemda Puncak, 2018).

When first established, Puncak Regency only had eight districts; this increased to 25 districts in 2015. This was done to limit control and bring essential services closer to the community. According to the 2020 Population Census, Puncak Regency had a population of 114,741 people, making it the largest regency in the Central Mountains region (BPS Papua, 2021a, p. 9). In addition, Puncak Regency has a very young population, as seen by its population pyramid. This implies high levels of dependency, with birth rates remaining high despite the limited availability of jobs, low average income, and the lack of quality education for youths (Ginting et al., 2020).

Figure 4. Map of Puncak Regency



Source: Puncak Regency RTRW (Pemkab Puncak, 2012)

According to official statistics, Puncak Regency ranks 28th of the area's 29 regencies/cities in terms of HDI, indicating underdevelopment (BPS Papua, 2020a). This has prompted the Puncak government to improve human resource development through educational policy intervention, with the Puncak government pioneering the usage of special autonomy funds for education. The most advanced scheme, involving the Puncak government and the Papua Task Force of Gadjah Mada University (UGM), was initiated in 2012. As explained to the author:

"The Puncak government's collaboration with UGM is a more magical scheme for us than any other. There are two types of teacher recruitment: teacher recruitment and sending prospective students to the best universities. Puncak's future excites me, and I cannot wait to see it." (Implementer 1, 2021).

In particular, the UGM Papua Task Force conducted a preliminary assessment of the basic education needs in the Puncak Regency, mostly related to education indicators and fiscal capacity. Several leading indicators were assessed through the teacher recruitment programme, starting from the number of schools, classrooms, facilities, teachers, and education performance indicators. Other influencing factors must also be considered, such as the distance between settlements and schools, transportation, teachers' homes, socio-cultural conditions of the community, and potential security disturbances. Meanwhile, when sending prospective students, the indicators assessed included the knowledge and expertise required by the Puncak government, the abilities of candidates, and the student coaching models used. Both programmes have considered the Puncak government's financial capacity to run a

high-cost programme. This was explained to the author as follows:

"UGM has assessed them for its programmes. The result is that Puncak Regency is underdeveloped. We may know that the truth is heartbreaking, but we need to accept it and move forward to address the most challenging issues, even if costs are prohibitive" (Implementer 3, 2021).

It should be remembered that Puncak Regency is an area where people have had limited access to state actors. Special autonomy funds would be depleted quickly if not managed appropriately. It also shows that, despite limited funds, the Puncak government has considered its policy priorities, and these have included education. A serious commitment, therefore, is necessary.

The abovementioned findings highlight the complexities of education governance where the issues revolved around a lack of teachers, inadequate educational facilities, poverty, and conflict. Special autonomy funds, despite their significant size, have been unable to solve the problem immediately. Careful planning was necessary, and thus the collaboration between the Puncak government and the UGM Papua Taskforce was the breakthrough in the education sector (Implementer 1, 2021).

2. The Coastal People and Education

Mappi Regency is an autonomous region that was created from Merauke Regency, Papua Province, through Law Number 26 of 2002 concerning the Establishment of Mappi Regency in Papua Province. Mappi Regency, which covers an area of 28,518 km^2, has its capital in Kepi. The people of Mappi Regency are classified as coastal people, as the regency averages 0 to 1,000 meters above sea level and includes 215 kilometres of beaches, as well as large rivers and swamps. Many rely on traditional means of transportation (*ketinting*), fast boats, and motorcycles (Bappeda Mappi, 2018).

When first created, Mappi Regency consisted of only six districts; this increased to 15 districts in 2015. This was motivated by the increasing accessibility and connectivity among districts. According to the 2020 Population Census, Mappi Regency had a population of 108,295, making it the third-largest regency in the southern part of Papua after the Merauke and Asmat Regencies (BPS Papua, 2021a, p. 9). In addition, Mappi Regency also has an expansive population pyramid, one marked by a large youth population. As such, the dependency ratio of the population is high.

Figure 5. Map of Mappi Regency



Source: RPJMD of Puncak Regency (Bappeda Puncak, 2018); RPJMD of Mappi Regency (Bappeda Mappi, 2018)

Official statistical data shows that Mappi Regency has an HDI of 58.15, being ranked 13th out of 29 regencies/cities; however, it is still below the average for Papua Province (BPS Papua, 2020a). Although Mappi's HDI is close to the median, educational standards are insufficient to provide quality and competitive human resources. The Mappi government, therefore, is committed to improving education governance.

After Puncak and Intan Jaya, Mappi Regency was one of the pioneers in the programme to utilize special autonomy funds for education. This can be seen through the cooperation between the Mappi Government and UGM, fostered by the UGM Papuan Task Force since 2015. As in Puncak Regency, two forms of cooperation were practised: recruiting teachers at the elementary and high school levels and sending prospective students to study at UGM through the affirmative selection route. The UGM Papuan Task Force used the same assessment pattern in Mappi Regency as it did in Puncak Regency. As explained to the author:

"A few regencies in Papua have inspired us, and we tend to focus on education and improving human capital. This is possible to achieve through collaborative programmes with UGM. They provide assessment,

recruitment, and measurement. They also help us implement good governance." (Implementer 2, 2021).

Finally, although Mappi Regency existed before Puncak Regency, human development still faced significant obstacles. The distribution of students and schools in certain districts was a challenge; to cross great distances, students relied heavily on traditional modes of transportation called *ketinting*. It shows that the Mappi government needed to consider its policy priorities and ability to improve human resource quality, despite the limited availability of funding.

The findings of the UGM Papua Task Force were included in the Mappi Regency Short- and Long-Term Development Plan. Its discussion revolved around the same four issues as in Puncak, but with different levels of complexity. Special autonomy funds likewise required careful management to ensure good educational performance. Cooperation between the Mappi government and UGM could provide a positive step forward for education reform in Papua.

Table 1. Comparison of Barriers to Education Between the Regencies

No	Indicator	Barriers	
		Puncak	**Mappi**
1.	Poverty	High poverty rate (36.96% as of 2020); exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which pushed millions of people into poverty. Very low Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP).	High poverty rate (25.04% as of 2020); exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which pushed millions of people into poverty. Low Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP).
2.	Conflict and war	Intense conflict between the Papua separatist movement (OPM) and Indonesian security forces. Inter-clan fighting caused by diverse factors such as politics, infidelity, and revenge.	The regent did not get support from some officials as the education development programme was related to potential conflicts of interest. Inter-clan fighting caused by diverse factors such as politics, infidelity, and revenge.
3.	Lack of teachers	Teacher recruitment for both civil servants and honorary employees does not consider teachers' competence and suitability. Lack of discipline and commitment from teachers when carrying out educational tasks.	Teacher recruitment for both civil servants and honorary employees does not consider teachers' competence and suitability. Lack of discipline and commitment from teachers when carrying out educational tasks.

		The education office was not active, and thus education affairs were handled by the Social Service.	Although the Education Office was active, it could not cover everything included in the development plan.
4.	Lack of infrastructure	Minimal educational facilities. Paved roads were found only in Ilaga and a small number of other districts. Locations were far from each other and separated by hilly areas.	Lack of educational facilities. Paved roads were found in only some districts. Locations were far from each other and separated by large rivers.

Source: RPJMD of Puncak Regency (Bappeda Puncak, 2018); RPJMD of Mappi Regency (Bappeda Mappi, 2018)

Educational Experiences of OAPs

On October 25, 1925, Pastor Izhak Samuel Kijne provided an important message of Wasior in the history of education in Papua. He described himself as the "Father of Civilization" for OAPs and said: "I carved the Papuan Civilization into this rock. Even if people have exceptional intelligence, reasoning, and wisdom, they are unable to lead this nation currently. This nation will rise and lead itself in the future" (Feneteruma, 2017; Kudiai, 2015). This message contains two meaningful words: "rise" and "leading". The word "rise" refers to the call for OAPs to not sleep, whereas the word "lead" refers to the desire for OAPs to be empowered and manage themselves. Such things could be accomplished through education, which creates social mobility.

Nevertheless, education is a challenging issue in Papua, something that is clear from various community stories about deteriorating school buildings and the lack of teachers and textbooks in remote areas. It is a story that both previous generations and the current generation have felt. The school buildings in Papua's interior in the 1970s are very similar to those there today. With the rise of government-run public schools in rural areas and the abandonment of boarding-style education, few schools have teaching materials and libraries. Furthermore, the number of teachers has not increased significantly, resulting in the closure of many schools in Papua's interior. Geographic constraints have exacerbated the problem, making access to the internet and telecommunications networks difficult now. It can be traced by interviews with policymakers:

"The Papua issues are more complex than they seem. The government cannot solve it all alone, and by involving stakeholders, including local governments, academicians, and society, we can create a new paradigm of governing education." (Policymaker 1, 2021).

"Special autonomy funds are not enough if they are not supported by collaborative efforts to solve educational barriers, as it results from the interactions of complicated history and structure." (Policymaker 2, 2021).

Political discrimination is the source of these various educational barriers, which have resulted in economic marginalization and inequity. Many OAPs from low-income

families have been forced to drop out of school and support their families, despite having limited education and job opportunities (Cahill & Beadle, 2013). Several government efforts to raise OAPs' socioeconomic status have been limited to distributing cash to OAPs through village funds, which does not educate OAPs. At the same time, racism (fuelled by negative stigma) has put great pressure on OAPs (Munro, 2020).

Upward social mobility cannot be realized unless OAPs know who they are. They must identify themselves when they face social mobility determinants influenced by history and structural change, as well as general, local, and specialized knowledge. Furthermore, they must be equipped with soft and hard skills to face the challenges of an uncertain era. It is consistent with the Papua Roadmap, which takes a welfare-oriented approach (Widjojo et al., 2008). The educational experiences of highland and coastal students, as well as special autonomy funds. In summary, the following findings are presented.

1. Students in Puncak Regency

Before the educational cooperation between the Puncak government and UGM was established, education was never truly available. Historically, the OAPs of Puncak have been the ones who suffered the most due to endless conflicts and the area has seen the slowest development. When government-run state schools replaced the church-run dormitory-style schools, this created a schism between local society (which relied heavily on the church, including in matters of education) and the state's obligation to provide national education. Various evidence reveals that curricular mismatches have made it difficult for the OAPs of Puncak to advance themselves (Implementer 1, 2021).

By 2015, the workforce of Puncak had limited education, with most having only completed their elementary school educations; few have completed high school, let alone tertiary education, and this has limited their employment options (Bappeda Puncak, 2018). The workforce lacks the necessary competencies for advancement. As a result, the Puncak government chose to work with the UGM Papua Task Force to recruit teachers from all over Indonesia to teach students in Puncak and provide prospective students with scholarship opportunities to continue their studies. This strategy was thought to be an effective one and brought about a long-term programme in which students who had completed twelve years of compulsory education (from elementary school to senior high school) could continue their studies. As a result of improved teaching methods, children who had previously faced educational challenges began to progress. The following table shows the various achievements of Puncak's OAPs before and after the cooperation programme was implemented, as measured by several indicators.

Table 2. Indicators of Upward Social Mobility in Puncak Regency

Indicator	Before	After
	Knowledge	
General	Having less general knowledge than most citizens, as well as difficulty reading, writing, and counting.	Having general knowledge that is relatively equal to that of other citizens. Furthermore, despite having difficulty with calculations, they can read and write following the rules of Indonesian grammar.
Local	Mastering local knowledge and applying it in daily life.	Mastering local knowledge and consistently applying it, with certain adjustments.
Field of study	Having no special knowledge.	Having knowledge related to their field of study.
	Soft skills	
Critical thinking	Lacking the ability to respond to issues; unstructured thought and needing dictation.	Able to respond to issues more systematically, provide rebuttals, and be independent.
Social	Having difficulty adapting and working with new people.	Being able to adapt to new environments and cooperate with people from other regions.
Communication	Expressing the contents of their hearts and minds with difficulty due to a lack of confidence.	Being bolder in voicing their hearts and thoughts.
	Hard skills	
Computer technology and the internet	Unable to operate a computer, internet, and social media.	Able to operate computers and basic Microsoft Office programmes and social media (Instagram, Facebook, WhatsApp, and YouTube).
English	Studying the basics of English and using the language in limited conditions.	Studying English, with some applied in everyday conversations.

Source: Interview Results (2021)

The findings above indicate that OAPs in Puncak were able to achieve upward social mobility. Most researchers believe that upward social mobility for Indigenous peoples is possible if supported by determinants, such as education, socioeconomic status, and opportunity (Walter, 2016; Garcia-Altes & Ortun, 2014).

It helps avoid horizontal or even downward mobility. Interviews revealed the determinants of social mobility for OAPs in Puncak, which can be seen below:

Table 3. Determinants of Social Mobility for OAPs in Puncak

Factor	Description
Formal education	Considered the most dominant factor in increasing social mobility, especially when going to school is a privilege.
Informal education	The quality of the social relationship between parents and children affects the abilities of children. Education was provided in the family, where it is considered to affect their inner strength. However, they acknowledged that, due to poverty, their families did not play a significant role in their upward social mobility.
Birth location	Born in the highlands, they had few opportunities to develop due to geographical challenges and high social costs.
Social	They had fewer chances to achieve upward social mobility due to their limited interactions with diverse people.
Political will	Local governments committed to investing 30% of special autonomy funds for education, which could encourage the creation of superior human resources.

Source: Interview Results (2021)

For OAPs, their success or failure in upward social mobility was primarily determined by a formal education system wherein migrant teachers sincerely devoted themselves to advancing education in Puncak. This occurred because the family failed to act as an informal educational institution and instead treated education as if it was only the school's responsibility. Meanwhile, their inaccessible birthplace made them isolated. Socially, they interacted with a homogeneous community, and thus there were few opportunities to exchange information and knowledge. The only good news was the political will of the Puncak government, which allocated 30% of its special autonomy funds to reducing barriers to education.

2. Students in Mappi Regency

In Mappi, education was viewed as a crucial sector, one that required the assistance of the UGM Papua Task Force for improvement. Even though Mappi's OAPs benefited more from these programmes because they lived on the coast and because the government existed before that of Puncak, various obstacles could still be encountered, particularly the lack of teachers and political support from bureaucrats. The national education system, therefore, was more accepted than in Puncak, but Mappi had yet to achieve an optimal level of education. Most of the regional government's failures in realising regional development were influenced by the low-quality human resources involved in vital government activities. According to official statistics, only sixty people had attained a baccalaureate degree and five had earned a post-graduate degree; none had received a doctoral degree (Bappeda

Mappi, 2018). Most of these university graduates had studied at universities in Papua, which were perceived as worse than universities elsewhere—especially in Java. The lack of educated graduates and the unavailability of better education prompted the Mappi government to create a planned education programme, one that spanned from the elementary through the tertiary levels. The achievements of Mappi's OAPs because of the programme can be seen below.

Table 4. Indicators of Upward Social Mobility in Mappi Regency

Indicator	Before	After
	Knowledge	
General	Having general knowledge that differed from that of most people.	Having general knowledge that was relatively equal to that of the public.
Local	Mastering local knowledge and applying it in everyday life.	Mastering local knowledge and seeing its relevance in everyday life.
Field of study	Not having particular knowledge in specific academic fields.	Having exceptional knowledge in specific academic fields.
	Soft skills	
Critical thinking	Unable to respond to issues.	Able to respond to issues by considering all related aspects.
Social	Having difficulty adapting and working with new people.	Able to adapt to new environments and cooperate with people from other regions.
Communication	Expressing their hearts and thoughts with difficulty.	Able to voice their hearts and thoughts.
	Hard skills	
Computer technology and the internet	Unable to operate a computer, internet, or social media.	Able to operate a computer, basic Microsoft Office programmes, and social media (Instagram, Facebook, WhatsApp, Tik-Tok, and YouTube).
English	Studying the basics of English and using the language in limited conditions.	Learning more English and applying it in everyday conversations.

Source: Interview Results (2021)

The findings showed an increase in general and specific knowledge, as well as modifications to their local knowledge. Three indicators related to soft skills

experienced significant growth. Meanwhile, regarding hard skills, improvements in English fluency and computer/internet technology were noted. This was influenced by several factors, as follows.

Table 5. Determinants of Social Mobility for OAPs in Mappi

Factor	Description
Formal education	Formal education was considered the most critical factor in increasing social mobility.
Informal education	Families have not yet played a significant role in the educations of their children.
Birth location	Born in a coastal area, they had a greater chance to enjoy development.
Social	OAPs in Mappi were more likely to achieve upward social mobility if they interacted with diverse people.
Political will	The local government committed to investing 30% of its special autonomy funds in education, thereby encouraging superior human resources; however, this was tempered by bureaucrats' political support.

Source: Interview Results (2021)

OAPs in Mappi recognised formal education as the dominant factor in their upward social mobility. This was due to the influence of the information and knowledge brought to Mappi by migrant teachers. At the same time, the effective learning methods offered by UGM made it easier for OAPs to receive knowledge. The family has not played a role in education, acting instead as an agent of violence against children. Furthermore, their coastal location allowed them to enjoy more infrastructure and interact with others from diverse backgrounds, providing them with access to heterogeneous people, giving them access to more information and knowledge. However, the Mappi government's political will to improve the education system has been hampered by state bureaucrats' limited political support.

The Role of the Special Autonomy Law in Reducing Barriers to Education

Over the years, thorough research has been conducted to examine the effect of the SAL on the development of Indigenous peoples. Some studies argue that special autonomy has reduced problems, such as poverty and political conflict. Others, however, believe that there remain many failures in national development, and thus the results tend to be associated with poor performance. The SAL is not a product of negotiation, but a solution imposed by the state (Bertrand, 2014), and thus it has been seen as not accommodating the interests of indigenous peoples (Lele, 2021). The state continues to dominate OAPs' right to self-determination (Scott, 2001); they continue to face social and geographical challenges (Resosudarmo et al., 2014), and other problems remain unaddressed (Widjojo et al., 2008). Although special autonomy has been an area of social policy research for many years, the main concern is that this law will be used as a tool for political

machinations rather than human resource development. It offers an important instrument for protecting and empowering the people (Poku et al., 2007). It is for this reason that this study has analysed the effect of the SAL on education in the context of OAPs' social mobility.

The case of OAPs was used for several reasons. First, Papua has long been an isolated area and OAPs have tended to be alienated within the social structure. Although special autonomy's contribution to development funding has increased sharply in the last two decades, this has not translated to social welfare. Given that Papua is the province in Indonesia with the highest rates of poverty and inequality (World Bank, 2019), an analysis of the impact of special autonomy was essential. Second, the complexity of the SAL could not be separated from the numerous national policies that are not compatible with the local Papuan context (Sullivan, 2003). This was exacerbated by OAPs' difficulty obtaining essential social services, employment, and access to economic resources, as a result of which it has become increasingly difficult for OAPs to occupy political positions at the regional level. In addition, OAPs have had difficulty competing with the migrants who have arrived in Papua, including in competitions for prospective civil servants (Nugroho, 2021). In the end, OAPs are spectators in their homeland, and thus it was, therefore, essential to analyse whether human resource development could be better realized through SAL.

This article holds that, although Papua has seen progress over the past two decades, it has not been enough. There remain four barriers to education: poverty, conflict and war, lack of teachers, and infrastructure. These barriers are found in both the highlands and coastlands and may be understood from various perspectives (i.e., historical, socio-cultural, and political). The findings of this article reinforce those of Agustinus (2013), which saw that the SAL failed due to irregularities in the management of its funds.

In addition, the article supports the findings of Sugandi (2008), who found distrust among Papuan stakeholders; Karim (2012), who highlighted the local government's limited capacity; and Widjojo et al., (2010), who identified unresolved problems. However, this article contradicted previous studies of the SAL's benefits for OAPs, such as economic concessions and human resource development (Widjojo and Budiatri, 2012). Although OAPs have made economic gains, these have been limited to local elites. Human resource development has occurred predominantly in urban areas, such as Jayapura, Merauke, Nabire, and Timika.

Furthermore, one of the main objectives of the SAL was to increase equity in development. This article's analysis showed that Papua's HDI lagged far behind that of other provinces, and that, although a few regencies had a high HDI, most regencies did not. Equitable development, thus, had not occurred in most of Papua. Furthermore, the advancements that have been made occurred mainly in cities/regencies with large migrant populations. As such, special autonomy funds were enjoyed more by immigrants than by OAPs.

Meanwhile, as special autonomy funds have been managed unprofessionally by local governments, spending has not been well-targeted. In

education, for example, spending has increased but focused predominantly on staffing. Finally, the increase in special autonomy funds did not correlate directly with the improved quality of education. Local governments failed to design and implement development plans that were suited to local contexts.

Carefully targeted measures would undoubtedly help organisations, including the government, improve. At the same time, however, not all things can be easily measured in the real world, and not everything that can be easily measured is essential. Mismeasurements often occur not because the government does not know how to measure correctly, but because it has chosen to deliberately measure the most specific indicators. For example, the success of the SAL was assessed based on budget absorption, without considering more complex issues such as bias, focus on insignificant things, and false claims of success. It is thereby necessary to measure success using important indicators, rather than easy ones, to ascertain the benefits of special autonomy.

Lastly, the special autonomy funds should have provided the government with an instrument for solving educational problems in Papua. Ideally, the government should collaborate with universities and OAPs to improve education governance in Papua. In this sense, universities require the resources to assess and map problems, using particular indicators developed by the Puncak and Mappi governments. Likewise, the participation of OAPs was expected to provide them with a decent means of asserting public control over the government and ensuring accountability. In this way, if its progress could be measured appropriately, the SAL would help reduce educational barriers.

Education and Social Mobility

As mentioned above, the relationship between education and social mobility theory is often analysed, particularly when identifying the factors determining upward social mobility. The author believes that the link between education and social mobility has driven several of the most monumental achievements in human history, providing the basis for new perspectives, knowledge, and skills. First, referring to the literature review, social mobility is always associated with education, but other indicators must also be considered (for example, the impact of socio-political transformation and background contexts). This argument is strengthened by this study, in which OAPs acknowledged that the new paradigms provided by education had wrought significant academic and social changes in their lives. They developed skills and knowledge while learning in a supportive system (i.e., dormitory and mentorship programmes). They followed an alternative education pattern, from the elementary to the university level, that brought about significant changes for themselves and their communities. At the same time, however, this contradicted earlier findings that OAPs had difficulty improving their social status even when they were educated (Munro, 2013).

This contradiction represents the complexity of the definition of "education." Education is often understood as solely involving schools or universities, i.e., formal education; in such cases, the family and its role in informal education are neglected. Indeed, the findings of this article showed a

strong correlation between formal education and social mobility. OAPs also acknowledged that formal education was the strongest driver of their upward social mobility—but not the only one. As Anderson (1961) notes, conditions other than formal education also play a significant role in social mobility. This article, too, refuted claims that formal education was still the only factor for OAPs; other factors, such as informal education, place of birth, social interactions, and political will, were also determinant factors.

Furthermore, the government's reason for supporting education was to encourage people to achieve upward social mobility, with the underlying assumption that special autonomy funds could facilitate education. However, these special autonomy funds ultimately became a source of conflict and proved vulnerable to corruption, and thus they were not properly targeted. To avoid such issues, LIPI recommended that the government employ a holistic and integrative framework by considering OAPs' most fundamental needs (Elisabeth et al., 2017, p. 2). The Papua Roadmap also provided a basis for the UGM Papua Task Force's efforts to assess, map, and find alternative solutions to the problem of education governance in Puncak and Mappi.

In conclusion, with special autonomy funds not being used to improve the quality of education in remote areas, OAPs found it challenging to achieve social mobility. They continued to be marginalised, and this exacerbated their sense of alienation and animosity. Furthermore, the government should have employed a participatory approach to development planning, involving local governments and OAPs in the development of a comprehensive policy for Papua. Such a policy must consider the various things that influence OAPs negatively, such as mass migration, curriculum, and special autonomy funds (McGibbon & Alagappa, 2004, p. x).

Differences in Educational Experiences

The author believes that, although special autonomy funds have a dark side (Sugandi, 2008; Widjojo & Budiatri, 2012), they could provide an essential resource for improving the quality of life for OAPs (Samputra, 2020; Prabowo et al., 2021). It was shown in the previous section that special autonomy funds have played an important role in Papuan society, especially in supporting educational programmes (such as school construction, teacher recruitment, teaching material procurement, and scholarships) for OAPs in remote areas.

It was explained that OAPs in Puncak and Mappi continued to face obstacles to their education. However, the factors that hindered them may not be clearly understood by the public. As such, this study sought to gain an adequate understanding of OAPs' educational activities, the obstacles that hindered them, and opportunities to improve their position.

First, an analysis of differences in formal education revealed that the process was no better in the highlands than it was in coastal areas. In both Puncak and Mappi, the number of schools, classrooms, teachers, and teaching materials in Puncak was similar (MoEdu, 2021). However, both areas were able to benefit from the learning methods used by teachers recruited through the GPDT programme. With their help, a small number of OAPs managed to continue their studies at university.

Meanwhile, informal education showed that families in Puncak and Mappi played a limited role in social mobility, due to their poor socio-economic background, and that children often experienced domestic violence that made them less confident (OAP 1, 2021; OAP 2, 2021; OAP 3, 2021; OAP 4, 2021).

Analysis of location, meanwhile, revealed that persons born in the highlands had fewer opportunities to enjoy development than those born on the coast, as they were required to surmount geographical challenges and high social costs (Munro, 2013). Furthermore, analysis showed that, socially, those living on the coast were more open to change than in the highlands due to the intensity of their interactions with diverse people (Rumansara, 2015). Finally, both governments agreed to cooperate with the UGM's Papua Task Force to facilitate the government's usage of special autonomy funds for education.

There were differences in educational performance in Puncak and Mappi. Learning techniques varied; in Puncak, OAPs tended to use learning strategies that were close to nature or outside the classroom (OAP 3, 2021; OAP 4, 2021), while in Mappi, OAPs tended to rely on face-to-face learning in the classroom (OAP 1, 2021; OAP 2, 2021). In addition, OAPs in Puncak faced more significant constraints, including poorer road access and higher transportation costs than in Mappi. A broader picture of the various educational barriers faced by different OAPs would provide the Papuan government with valuable policy insight.

Conclusion

This study looked at the impact of the SAL on education and social mobility. It was initially necessary to unpack the relationship between education and social mobility. In a nutshell, education (as part of social policy) was thought to increase human resources and determine upward social mobility. This paper investigated whether education is the sole determinant of social mobility or whether other factors were involved. Furthermore, the implementation of the SAL through special autonomy funds was highlighted by this paper as the main means of overcoming educational barriers in Papua. Because of the disparate social conditions between the highlands and coastal areas, the researcher decided to focus on two regencies that were deemed representative of their respective regions, i.e., Puncak (highlands) and Mappi (coastal). This was done to identify lessons that could be drawn from their experience using special autonomy funds for education. According to this research, poverty, conflict, war, staffing, and infrastructure have all significantly impeded education in Papua. Due to various educational barriers, human resources in Papua have advanced slowly, even two decades since the passage of the SAL. Although some changes have occurred, problems remain, due in part to actors' failure to comply with existing regulations and the general failure to ensure public participation. Effective implementation of the SAL, thus, was expected to improve the quality of human resources in Papua.

This article's case studies of Puncak and Mappi, Papua, allowed for an Indigenous theory of social policy. The SAL has paved the way for dramatic changes in how OAPs access education as well as

their opportunities to achieve upward social mobility. Its goal was to foster collaboration between local governments and universities by reimagining the existing education system through the eyes of OAPs. The success of this measure depends on the local government's political will to adapt to educational realities. In this sense, the SAL has encouraged fundamental changes that expand OAPs' access to education while also striving to ameliorate the conditions that hinder their development. Aside from formal education, this study also emphasised several factors that determined whether OAPs could achieve upward social mobility, including informal education, place of birth, social environment, and political will.

Finally, the SAL has the potential to tear down educational barriers and promote upward social mobility amongst OAPs. However, this is only possible in a supportive strategic environment wherein mutual trust exists between governments and OAPs, universities are involved as partners, and all parties are committed. The SAL could have done a better job accelerating human resource development in Papua. To summarise, the use of the SAL came with inherent challenges, but when implemented effectively, it could improve the quality of education provided to OAPs and increase their social mobility

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Personal Networks and Elections in a Divided Society: Women Candidates' Strategies during the 2019 Legislative Election in Ambon, Indonesia

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Abstract

Research on electoral politics in post-conflict societies tends to understand religious primordiality as a key factor driving voters' electoral preferences and voting behaviour. Such studies, despite their ability to explain fragmentation, ignore the role of personal networks in electoral consolidation. Those studies that do consider personal networks, at least in a Southeast Asian context, tend to highlight patronage and kinship politics. This paper aims to underscore the importance of personal networks within the context of a post-conflict society while also enriching studies of women and elections. Using the 2019 legislative elections in Ambon, Indonesia, as its case study, this article discusses the reasons, forms, and effectiveness of candidates' use of their personal networks. Although it rarely results in electoral victory, this strategy goes beyond the mere consolidation of constituents and votes. Women candidates' personal networks, which stem from their social, economic, and political activities, provide them with important avenues to approach unfamiliar communities and penetrate psychological barriers. In a divided society, where candidates prioritise offline campaign activities targeting particular communities, the presence of personal networks is crucial. In this sense, the strategies of electoral democracy—including personal networks—can contribute to peacekeeping.

Keywords: *divided society, election, peacekeeping, personal networks, winning strategies, women candidates.*

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Introduction

The literature on electoral politics in divided societies has been dominated by a perspective that places primordialism as an important driver of voting behaviour. Previous studies show that, by exploiting primordial allegiances such as religion, candidates have a great opportunity to win votes (Pariela, 2007; Tomsa, 2009a; Brown & Diprose, 2009; Ernas, 2015; Arjon, 2018; Lamerkabel & Lattu, 2018; Mietzner, 2019)—especially in areas that have recently experienced or are currently experiencing social conflict and segregation (Van Klinken, 2006; Tomsa, 2009b). While politicians use this strategy to consolidate their power (Hamayotsu, 2011; Haryanto, Sukmajati, & Lay, 2019), voters consider religious identity to be more important than parties' or candidates' programmes (Liddle & Mujani, 2007; Higashikata & Kawamura, 2015). Religious identity often strengthens in areas where voters come from diverse religious, ethnic, and/or racial backgrounds (Fernandes, 2018).

Bucking this trend, the current article aims to analyse women candidates' efforts to gain votes from constituents from different sociological backgrounds. Using Ambon, Indonesia, as a case study, this paper aims to answer several questions: Why do women candidates use personal networks to cross religious boundaries? What forms of personal networks are used, and how effective are these personal networks in helping women candidates win elections?

Discussions of personal networks in Indonesia often frame them as part of patronage and clientelistic practices (see for example Erb & Sulistiyanto, 2009; Choi, 2011), including the distribution of club goods/pork barrels (Aspinall & Sukmajati 2014; Aspinall & As'ad 2018). Similarly, in the Philippines, personal networks are also associated with the clientelistic networks of parties (Croissant, 2003: 81) and politicians' independent ability to enjoy and generate their own resources and support bases (Croissant, Bruns, & John, 2002: 349).

In this article, however, personal networks refer to the social networks of candidates themselves, rather than those of political parties. They can potentially overlap with kinship, friendship, family-based, and other clientelistic networks, so long as they emerge as by-products of candidates' social interactions (La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998). Individuals within candidates' personal networks do not necessarily have long-term clientelistic relationships with candidates. They can be anyone that help candidates approach groups that may potentially reject candidates' campaign visits.

Questions of religion in politics are highly relevant in Ambon, the capital of Indonesia's Maluku Province. After the city experienced severe inter-religious conflict between 1999 and 2002, its population was firmly segregated along religious lines. Although this segregation has contributed to lasting peace, during elections it significantly informs the electoral strategies and political configurations used by candidates. For example, during the local executive elections, pairs of candidates generally consist of one Muslim and one non-Muslim (i.e. Christian/Catholic) politician (Tomsa, 2014). In legislative elections, meanwhile, candidates tend to approach communities that practice the same religion as them. Even during presidential elections,

candidates who are politically associated with particular religious groups tend to receive the support of the related religious communities (Mietzner, 2019).

Candidates' political machines likewise tend to approach constituents or communities who adhere to the same religion. They may employ various strategies and platforms to mobilise voters from these communities, including religious institutions (Tomsa, 2009; Ndukwe, 2015), issues (Aspinall, Dettman, & Warburton, 2011; Hosen, 2016), and pulpits. In gubernatorial elections, candidates often combine religious issues with the Second Malino Peace Agreement, which was signed in 2002. Those who have the opportunity tend to use balance and interfaith harmony within Ambon to highlight the importance of Muslims and Christians "taking turns" in the leadership. This last issue is a proposed article that is not included in the signed peace agreement. However, candidates can manipulate this issue in a means of maintaining peace. Such issues seem commonplace in Ambon as, for the past two decades, religious groups have generally devoted most of their energies towards promoting social reconciliation, and this, in turn, has encouraged political parties and candidates to approach religious groups to advance their electoral goals (Karim, 2018).

This study deals specifically with women candidates in Ambon, as there are indications that they have applied innovative strategies to obtain votes and contest elections. Indonesia's 2019 elections were designed as simultaneous multi-level elections, during which voters across the country elected not only the president but also members of parliament at the national, provincial, and municipal/*kabupaten*[4] levels. Due to this situation, the competition of candidates at the lowest legislative level received the least attention. Political parties, already regarded as inefficient political engines, were involved in four different arenas, and most chose to focus on their biggest agenda: winning the presidential election. This situation encouraged lower-level legislative candidates to reach voters using creative means, such as by entering unfamiliar areas. In Ambon, the presence of interfaith personal networks was key to entering these areas, as these networks functioned as bridges that connected women candidates with potential voters from different religious enclaves.

By analysing the Ambon case, we aim to contribute to the literature on the use of personal networks to attract voters. Recognising the limited discussion of personal networks and electoral candidacies, this article has been encouraged to explore various forms of personal network politics. This will enrich the understanding of candidates' use of personal networks during elections in Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia.

Previously, personal networks have been discussed primarily outside the realms of women and peacekeeping. Identified as patronage and clientelism,

[4] Similar to a municipality, a *kabupaten* (translated into English variously as *regency* and *district*) is an administrative division at the sub-provincial level. While the term municipality refers primarily to urban areas, *kabupaten* tends to refer to less urban areas.

personal networks in Indonesia are often identified with political dynasties, kinship politics (Prihatini, 2019), local leaders or bosses (Buehler, 2007; Tomsa, 2009c & 2014; Aspinall, 2013; Allen, 2014), ineffective political party machines (Aspinall, 2005), and open list electoral systems (Aspinall, 2005). 2014a). As a consequence, few scholars have considered the role of personal networks in bridging candidates (especially women) with voters in divided societies. Within the context of Myanmar, they are even placed in a complicated relationship between elections and informal social movements, thereby highlighting tensions between identity groups (van Klinken & Aung, 2017).

In exploring candidates' strategies for crossing religious barriers, this article identifies factors that facilitate this process. It analyses electoral strategies that ensure the sustainability of peace without necessarily contributing to the perpetuation of social division—which remains worrisome to those who recognise that the lack of intense interaction between religious communities can undermine social cohesion.

This article's exploration of how women candidates use their networks to break through religious barriers uses data collected in Ambon between April and June 2019, during the legislative election. Data collection involved observation and in-depth interviews with thirteen women candidates and three officials with the dominant parties (Golkar, PDI-P, and Gerindra). The process also involved discussions with academics, religious/community leaders, and CSO activists, as well as informal chats with randomly selected voters. Women candidates who were interviewed included those who competed for seats in the municipal/*kabupaten,* provincial, and national parliaments. Candidates were selected based on their specific backgrounds (as newcomers/incumbents, having/not having a role in the peace and reconciliation process, and knowledge of Ambon as a post-conflict society).

To present its findings systematically, this article is structured as follows. First, it will discuss personal networks along with women's strategies for penetrating social barriers. The social context of Ambon, including its divided settlements, electoral system, and the implications of these factors for candidates' activities, will also be discussed. Afterwards, the discussion will focus on personal networks and their role in crossing religious boundaries. Finally, this paper will conclude by discussing the intertwined issues of elections, peacekeeping, and democracy.

Results

1. Personal networks and the penetration of social barriers

Research linking personal networks, women candidates, and peacekeeping is quite rare, even though Asia is home to numerous post-conflict areas. What little research exists relates more to women's increased interest in electoral politics, as seen in Cambodia (Kraynanski, 2007), or their use of gender attributes to target women voters (Larson, 2001; Herrnson, Lay & Stokes, 2003).

Women tend to be associated with gender stereotypes, even when (as seen in Myanmar) they offer new hope for improved governance and service delivery

while reducing conflict and discord (Minoletti, 2014). In India, discussion of women candidates and personal networks reflect kinship politics, wherein successful women candidates are associated with powerful family members (Basu, 2016). In Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea, women candidates and their personal networks are seen through the lenses of party system institutionalisation, electoral competitiveness, legal enforcement, and social-cultural attitudes toward women (Tan, 2016).

Personal and social networks are, in fact, important for women in the "middle pathways", especially in Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines. Choi (2009) details that women benefit from family ties and personal connections. These include not only the wives, sisters, or daughters of elected/retired politicians, but also women with roles in the public sphere such as academics, lawyers, advocates, small-business owners, university students, and civil-society activists.

Candidates establish personal networks outside the structure of their political parties, thereby obtaining influence in formal and informal grassroots institutions (Buehler, 2009). Personal networks may appear in layers, involving local leaders who are connected to voters through paternalistic and non-paternalistic interactions. Nonetheless, risks can also be involved. In some cases, voters position themselves as brokers, also working for potential competitors and betraying their benefactors to gain material advantages (Aspinall, 2014b). In Thailand, many "vote screeners" act as election brokers and rely on candidates for resources. "They are more likely to provide their canvassing services for transactional arrangements and personal gain" (Chattharakul, 2010: 9).

In Indonesia, issues reach beyond the economic. The country is currently seeing a surge in identity politics and religion-based populism (Hadiz, 2014, 2016, 2018; Hadiz & Robison, 2017), and various practices have become evident. These include the comprehensive networking activities of key organisational stakeholders in Ambon's divided society (Tomsa, 2009). In this context, discourses not only deal with the particular issues being debated but also the importance of cross-communal communication in peacekeeping.

Lastly, while many studies have discussed the role of women in the peace process and social reconciliation (Sudjatmiko, 2019, 2008; PolGov, 2018; UNDP, 2016; Soegijono, 2015; Al Qurtuby, 2014; Asyathri, Sukesi, & Yuliati, 2014), very few have linked this role to women's electoral activities—even though Maluku had the highest percentage of women candidates in the 2004 election (Margret, et.al, 2018). In fact, this achievement is very likely related to the prominence of women in the peace process. Between 1999 and 2002, peace was initiated not only by women religious leaders and activists but also by traditional traders—known as *papalele*—who crossed religious barriers for economic and kinship reasons. In this manner, they contributed to reconciliation and social cohesion at the grassroots level.

2. The Social Context of Ambon: Challenges of Election in a Divided Settlements

After it experienced several years of religious conflict (1999–2002), Ambon—the main island in Indonesia's Maluku

Province—saw an extensive rearrangement of demographic and spatial patterns (Ansori et al. 2014). Ultimately, the island became highly segregated, with Muslim and Christian/Catholic inhabitants occupying different locations. Such adjustments, common as communities seek security in post-identity conflict areas (Cox & Sisk, 2017), reaffirmed the role of religious identity in Ambonese social and political life (PolGov 2018, Gaspersz 2016).

Figure 1. Distribution of Muslim and Christian/Catholic Voters in Ambon



Source: Interpreted from demographic data (Statistics Indonesia, 2019a). See also Table 1.

Demographically, Ambonese settlements can be easily identified as having particular socio-religious characteristics. Overall, the island's population is 49.7 per cent Muslim, 44.2 per cent Christian, and 6 per cent Catholic (Department of Population and Civil Registration, Ambon City, 2019). These religious communities are concentrated in their own particular enclaves, as seen in Figure 1 above as well as Table 1 below. These facilitate our understanding of how the Ambonese, especially candidates and their supporters, interpreted the socio-religious characteristics of particular electoral districts.

In the above figure and below table, the label "All Christian" refers to electoral districts which, according to statistics and general interpretations, are inhabited entirely by Christians/Catholics. "Predominantly Christian" refers to electoral districts which, while inhabited mostly by Christians/Catholics, are also home to small Muslim enclaves. "Leans Christian" refers to electoral districts where the population is almost evenly divided, but Christian/Catholic residents have a slight majority. "Predominantly Muslim" refers to electoral districts that are primarily inhabited by Muslims, though some areas are considered to be Christian/Catholic. Finally, "Leans Muslim" refers to electoral

districts that are inhabited by both Muslims and Christians/Catholics, wherein the Muslim residents have a slight majority.

This settlement pattern is supported by the hilly landscape that provides natural barriers between communities. Concerns about the lasting effects of social division on social cohesion have encouraged both the provincial and municipal governments to support the continued practice of traditional forms of brotherhood between communities (*pela gandong*). Similarly, civil society activists have continued to pursue means of intensifying interactions between religious communities. Finally, political elites have continued to pair politicians from different religious backgrounds in elections.[5]

Despite these efforts, however, electoral arrangements have reinforced barriers. The Indonesian electoral system uses a standardised principle for establishing electoral districts, one that does not necessarily consider the special needs of post-conflict areas. Law No. 16 of 2017 regarding the General Organization of Elections identifies several principles, including cohesiveness, but prioritises the consideration of population, administrative boundaries, and electoral level. Ultimately, the creation of electoral districts is a purely technical and administrative process rather than a democratic effort to support social cohesion.

Electoral districts vary between elections. In Ambon, however, there are always overlapping electoral districts, and this creates challenges and complexities for candidates' efforts to reach voters. In their political strategies, candidates tend to be practical and target voters who share the same religion as them (Tomsa 2009). In so doing, they draw on the painful memories of those who experienced the conflict; in the 2019 election, it was estimated that 82 per cent of voters were more than 25 years of age[6]—and thus old enough to remember the conflict.

Therefore, when developing campaign strategies, it is relevant to consider the social-demographic character of each electoral district. To obtain this information, candidates generally combine an analysis of demographic data with their own general knowledge. The following table offers an illustration.

[5] Pairs should ideally consist of one Muslim and one Christian/Catholic politician (Tomsa, 2009a). Political forces determine whether a Muslim or a Christian runs for the main executive office (i.e., governor, mayor) or the deputy position.

[6] Calculated from national statistics: Statistics Indonesia (2019).

Table 1. Characteristics of Electoral Districts, by Religion

Electoral District	Administrative Lines	Total Population	General Identification	
			Features	Sub-Areas
I	South Leitimur	10,302	All Christian	All areas
II	Sirimau A	166,397	Predominantly Christian	Christian Areas: Soya, Waihoka, Karang Panjang, Batu Meja, Batu Gajah, Ahusen, Uritetu, Amantelu Mixed Areas: Rijali, Honipopu
	Sirimau B		Predominantly Muslim	Muslim Areas: Batu Merah Mixed Areas: Pandan Kasturi, Hative Kecil,
III	Nusaniwe	98,417	Predominantly Christian	Christian Areas: Latulahat, Seilale, Nusaniwe, Urimesing, Kudamati, Wainitu, Manggadua Mixed Areas: Waihaong
IV	Teluk Ambon	47,358	Leans Christian	Christian Areas: Besar Mixed Areas: Rumah Tiga, Tihu, Tawiri, Laha**, Wayame***, Poka**, Hunuth*
	Teluk Ambon Baguala	61,658	Leans Muslim	Muslim Areas: Waiheru Mixed Areas: Latta, Passo, Nania**, Nageri Lama*, Lateri*, Halong*

*Source: Statistics Indonesia (2019b) and NN (woman supporter of DPD candidate, interview, December 2019). *: tend to be Christian dominant. **: tend to be Muslim dominant. ***: Christians and Muslims approximately equivalent in number*

As seen in this table, it is possible to identify the dominant character of each area within each electoral district. Candidates' support teams can even reach further, such that it is possible to target voters based on their socio-religious characteristics—even in mixed areas.

Such mapping is also important for political parties, as it helps them strategically compose their candidate lists. "If an electoral district is 90 per cent Muslim and 10 per cent Christian, the political parties will make a candidate list with the same composition; or vice versa" (D.P. Latuconsina, interview, 9 April 2019).

To deal with Indonesia's open proportional electoral system, which uses

the Sainte-Laguë method,[7] political parties focus on maximizing the number of votes received. They rarely back candidates in electoral districts with different socio-religious characteristics, doing so only for candidates who are perceived as capable of handling interfaith communities. For example, the Golkar Party continued to back Elly Toisutta (a Muslim) in the predominantly Christian Nusaniwe Electoral District due to her ability to mobilise loyalists of different religious backgrounds.

Nevertheless, political parties sometimes back women candidates in areas characterised by different socio-religious backgrounds. For example, the Berkarya Party supported Debi Puspita Latuconsina (a Muslim) at Sirimau A Electoral District, which was identified as predominantly Christian. In this experiment, the party targeted voters from the small but densely populated Muslim area around the Al Fatah Grand Mosque in Honipopu. Likewise, the Golkar Party ran Margaretha Siahay (a Christian) in Sirimau B Electoral District, a predominantly Muslim area, to target voters in Galala—a small but densely populated Christian area. PDI-P experimented by placing Oliva Lasol (a Catholic) in the predominantly Muslim Sirimau B Electoral District. Lasol, known as a peace activist and party official, was used to reach voters in her area of residence: Batu Merah. After the conflict, this area had been one of the strongest support bases for Muslim parties in Ambon. PDI-P, long identified by Muslim voters as a "Christian" party, had never made inroads with this community.

Owing to their limited ability to provide support, political parties encouraged candidates to independently develop their campaign strategies. Ambon, the capital city of Maluku, was hotly contested as it was home to 18 per cent of the province's voters (KPU Act, 2019). Cost was also a consideration; it would be prohibitively expensive to travel to the thousands of islands in the area (dpmptsp-Maluku.com, 2018), but much cheaper to reach the provincial capital (A. Latuconsina, interview, 7 April 2019).

This situation is exacerbated by the ineffectiveness of clans, which had previously been known as important voting machines in the region (van Klinken, 2006). Simultaneous elections make them split their support for member-candidates, including those who usually provided solid support to clan members (O.C. Latuconsina, interview, 2 April 2019).

The situation forced women candidates, both those with and without strong political resources, to consider the right strategy to approach grassroots communities. In post-conflict Ambon, all candidates used direct–offline ("door-to-door") interactions within small communities. By forsaking rallies and online campaigns in favour of more personal interactions, they were able to avoid clashes between religious groups. Here, personal networks played a crucial role, as presented in the following section.

[7] This method was proposed by the strongest political parties in Indonesia’s parliament. In this system, the number of votes for political parties is calculated based on the number of seats available in each electoral district.

3. Personal Networks: Cornerstones of Crossing Religious Boundaries

The analysis in this section is based on interviews with thirteen women candidates, each of whom had a background (in activism, business, and/or other social activities) that facilitated their efforts to cross religious boundaries. Generally, these women candidates admitted that they crossed religious boundaries to gain voter support. However, as elaborated below, this did not guarantee their electoral success. Winning an election requires a rich combination of various political resources and strategies; personal networks, thus, are not sufficient in and of themselves, serving more as a strategy to approach other religious communities. As the main theme of the paper, this section elaborates more on how women candidates in Ambon's 2019 election used personal networks to break religious barriers in the city's divided society.

Respondents' experiences show that variations in their use of personal networks affect the number of votes received. The table shows that those who used various networks received significantly more votes than those who relied on a single type of network (mainly existing activism networks).

Table 2. Women Candidates Identified as Using Personal Networks (Informants)

No.	Candidate (Political Party)	Religion	District	Personal Networks	Votes
			Municipal Election		
1	Debi Puspita Latuconsina (Berkarya)	Muslim	Ambon I	Various networks	880
2	Hilda Rolobessy (PKB)	Muslim	Ambon II	Activism and other networks	428
3	Oliva Lasol (PDIP)	Catholic	Ambon II	Activism and party networks	112
4	Elly Toisutta* (Golkar)	Muslim	Ambon III	Various networks	1,548
			Provincial Election		
5	Olivia Chadijah Latuconsina (Golkar)	Muslim	Maluku I. Ambon	Activism and other networks	2,053
6	Sr Brigitina "Brigitta" Renyaan (Gerindra)	Catholic	Maluku I. Ambon	Mainly activism networks	316
7	Jaqueline Margareth Sahetapy (Demokrat)	Christian	Maluku I. Ambon	Mainly business networks	6,105
8	Rostina* (PKS)	Muslim	Maluku I. Ambon	Various networks	4,035
9	Cherly C. Patty Laisina (PDIP)	Christian	Maluku I. Ambon	Mainly activism networks	461
10	R Ayu Hindun Suhita Hasanusi* (Berkarya)	Muslim	Maluku I. Ambon	Various networks	5,269
			National Election (DPR/ Parliament)		
11	Habiba Pelu (PKB)	Muslim	Maluku	Various networks	35,423
			National Election (DPD)		
12	Novita Anakotta* (no party)	Christian	Maluku	Various networks, inc. activism	85,869
13	Anna Latuconsina* (no party)	Muslim	Maluku	Various networks, inc. activism	119,091

Source: Certificate of Recapitulation/Vote Count Results, 2019.

*: elected

Candidates' personal networks stemmed from their experience and involvement in peace activism, business, politics, friendships, and clans. Overall, women candidates relied on, combined, or neglected certain types of networks when approaching diverse religious communities.

As indicated earlier, women candidates generally ignored primordial strategies (such as clans). Due to the high level of competition, clans with members of different religions (such as the Kei, Toisutta, Anakotta, Salampessy, and Patty clans) were divided in their support. Only candidates with strong political networks and resources, such as the incumbent Novita Anakotta, used these networks. Others, such as Sister Brigitina "Brigitta" Renyaan and Oliva Lasol (both Kei) and Cheryl C. Laisina (also known as Othe Patty, having become a member of the Patty clan through marriage) relied more on activism networks to reach other religious communities.

Clan networks were not always viable for women candidates, especially those with a known political vision and image. Olivia C. Latuconsina, who was born into the Salampessy clan, relied more on her reputation as Ambon's deputy mayor during the reconciliation era (2006–2011) and her party's nationalist profile. She targeted young voters, who constituted 18 per cent of total registered voters and were expected to be more open to religious differences (O.C. Latuconsina, interview, 2 April 2019). With the help of her children, she established Tamang Bae Olivia, a small group of young people that worked for preparing and consolidating venues, coordinating gatherings, and handling other technical matters.

Similarly, women candidates who were involved in non-clan organisations relied more on personal networks derived from their organisational interactions. Hilda Rolobessy (a Muslim) had established personal networks through Tifa Damai (Tifa Institute for Peaceful Maluku /ITDM), an NGO involved in peace activism, as well as the Integrated Service Centre for Women's Empowerment and Child Protection (P2TP2A), a service unit for women and children. Her involvement in these two organisations offered her opportunities to establish interfaith networks. However, competition also occurred. In P2TP2A, for example, she competed for attention with the organisation's leader—who was running in the national election, as discussed elsewhere in this article.

Furthermore, the usage of personal networks did not necessarily correlate with electoral victory. As shown in Table 2, only five of the interviewed candidates were elected: Elly Toisutta (Ambon City parliament), Rostina and R. Ayu Hindun Suhita Hasanusi (provincial parliament), and Novita Anakotta and Anna Latuconsina as senators/members of the Regional Representative Council (DPD RI).

Of these five candidates, four were incumbents. Rostina was the only newcomer to win the position she was seeking. In 2019, her party (PKS) received was about 11 per cent of the seats in the provincial parliament, with an estimated 400 votes having come from the Christian areas of Galala and Lateri. This was quite a significant amount for a politician from an Islamic party (interview, Rostina's husband/member of her campaign team, 5 April 2019).

The most successful woman candidate amongst voters of diverse religious backgrounds was Elly Toisutta (Golkar). As in the 2014 election, she became the only Muslim candidate to receive the majority of votes in a Christian-majority district (in this case, Nusaniwe). According to her political party, in 2019 she received more than 1,000 votes from those communities (Golkar Party official, interview, 5 April 2019).

To reach these communities areas, Toisutta relied heavily on community and religious leaders who managed small gatherings. In one meeting in Amahusu in 2019, a community leader highlighted Toisutta's eligibility. In this community, where she had received 600 votes in 2014, Toisutta was invited to speak at a pulpit bearing a large Christian religious symbol. The community's leader emphasised Toisutta's role in securing the community's interests, including those related to its religious and basic needs. Similarly, a Christian religious leader played a crucial role by inserting Toisutta's name in the prayer with which she closed the meeting. These personal networks not only connected Toisutta with the community at an emotional level but also effectively mobilised voters. Toisutta's victory, however, was also supported by the distribution of resources. As an incumbent and as an entrepreneur, she was known to have provided the community with government-funded programmes. Nevertheless, her ability to approach key figures and speak before different communities successfully convinced voters that she was a politician who cared about the interests of the majority.

The efficacy of diverse personal networks, including business and political networks, was also demonstrated by R Ayu Hindun Suhita Hasanusi (a Muslim). In 2019, this businesswoman and senior politician ran with the backing of the Berkarya Party, which she had joined after leaving Hanura in the wake of disruptions within that party's national leadership. Her successful bid, even with a new political party, suggests that she did not rely on the party machine but rather on her personal networks (as supported by her political and economic resources) to reach diverse religious communities (Hasanusi, interview, 7 April 2019).

Although the use of personal networks was not always effective in ensuring women candidates' victory, successful efforts to cross religious boundaries were necessary to bolster candidates' political profile as individuals capable of representing a divided society. For this purpose, expanding the reach of their campaigns enabled them to reach more voters. For those running for national positions, such efforts required significant financial capital, given the high cost of transportation and accommodation within the Moluccas. Therefore, this approach was only available to those with significant financial support. Novita Anakotta (a Christian), an incumbent senator (DPD member), had previous experience as an activist, businesswoman, and politician. She received 1,899 votes from Buru Regency, located on a large island outside Ambon, which had a population that was approximately 94 per cent Muslim. Although these votes represented less than 5 per cent of the total votes cast for Anakotta, they were nevertheless significant in ensuring her electoral victory.

Similarly, Anna Latuconsina (a Muslim), received 833 votes from

Southwest Maluku. This archipelagic regency, which is predominantly Christian (94 per cent) and Catholic (nearly 4 per cent) was identified as contributing the most interfaith votes for her. Although these votes represented less than 1 per cent of the total votes cast for Latuconsina, they supported her profile as a senator (DPD member) representing all of the people of Maluku.

In reaching the people of Southwest Maluku, Anna Latuconsina combined her personal networks with her business and political networks as well as her economic capital. The local resort entrepreneur had access to strong and diverse networks, including those of her husband—who had held strategic positions in the province's bureaucracy and politics for decades. Latuconsina herself was known as a woman activist who worked to promote economic development. In 2019, during her candidacy, she was serving as the local chair of the P2TP2A, an organisation that consists of women activists from diverse religious backgrounds. In this capacity, she was able to maintain individual channels that helped her enter different religious communities. For example, she was able to approach activists who were directly connected to the Women's Service Branch of the Maluku Protestant Church, the largest Christian church in Ambon. She also maintained networks at the grassroots level, especially amongst those she had employed to maintain her assets during the conflict as well as beneficiaries of the women's economic empowerment programmes in which she had been involved.

In interviews, women candidates generally expressed that votes obtained from different religious communities represented a long-term political investment. Rostina, for example, highlighted how her achievements in the 2014 election had greatly influenced her candidacy in the 2019 election. Rostina, who had received a total of 3,861 votes in the 2014 election, said that her victory in two polling stations had given her the confidence to enter communities that embraced a different religion than hers.

"In one area that was inhabited entirely by non-Muslims, I got 117 votes. That was in Ahuru, over the mountain. … For me that was extraordinary… It proved [that] PKS [party] was accepted by non-Muslim society…" (Rostina, interview, 5 April 2019).

Her victory in 2014 gave her the confidence to deal with other groups of people. Her achievement in the Christian enclave of Ahuru, located in Karang Panjang District, encouraged her to expand her 2019 campaign to Galala and Lateri—also Christian-majority communities. Her campaign team estimated that 10 per cent of her 4,035 votes came from those three areas. This number contributed significantly to her electoral victory (Rostina, interview, 5 April 2019).

Rostina also benefited from the establishment of a local party branch. During her 2019 campaign, she took advantage of this situation to make a combination of strategic approaches to communities. In her efforts to consolidate votes, her husband played a key role. Over the years, her husband had gained prestige as a community leader as well as a local merchant who operated a business in a traditional market. As such, he provided Rostina with grassroots networks.

Furthermore, as a community leader of Southeast Sulawesi descent, he gave her access to a religiously diverse immigrant community interfaith membership. He also helped reach voters in Batu Merah, their area of business and residence, where a small number of non-Muslim voters lived. Rostina's victory in the 2019 election demonstrates the crucial role of individual networks.

Ultimately, however, the use of personal networks does not necessarily have to result in a fantastic number of votes. Any little achievement is ultimately a major one, as receiving votes from diverse supports proves candidates' competitiveness and supports their position within their party. As D.P. Latuconsina illustrated:

"It is important [for a candidate to get votes from communities with different religious identities] because the competition in Ambon City is very tight... A difference of ten to twenty votes can determine whether or not a seat is won … If every candidate gains 10 votes from other pockets [communities], it will accumulate and be a significant addition [for the party] (D.P. Latuconsina, interview, 9 April 2019).

If varied personal networks, used in conjunction with extensive political resources, are key to success, then victory is difficult for those with less varied personal networks and limited political capital. Habiba Pelu, an activist and former member of Maluku's provincial parliament, relied on the personal networks she had established through Nahdlatul Ulama, one of Indonesia's largest Islamic organisations. She admitted that it was difficult for her to obtain votes, as she was placed in an archipelagic electoral district that demanded significant economic capital to reach voters (Pelu, interview, 9 April 2019). Although she received numerous votes, her failure to win the intended seat could be attributed to the specific profile of the party and organisation that backed her rather than her interfaith networks.

A different case is offered by Cherly C. Patty Laisina (a Christian). During the conflict, this woman activist had spearheaded the establishment of a new settlement at the top of the mountain. Together with several people in her community, she advocated for the fulfilment of clean water and basic needs. However, her lack of political resources limited her ability to establish personal networks with Muslim-majority areas (Patty, interview, 6 April 2019). As with Lasol (discussed previously), her party's image also hindered her efforts to reach Muslim communities. PDI-P has historically had little success with Ambon's Muslim communities, and in 2019 this was exacerbated by the party's focus on the presidential election during which it sought the re-election of Joko "Jokowi" Widodo.

Jaqueline Margareth Sahetapy (a Christian) built an interfaith network through an organisation for youth entrepreneurs. As Chair of the Young Entrepreneurs Association of Maluku (HIPMI), she used individual channels within this organisation to identify opportunities to reach Muslim communities. Meanwhile, D.P. Latuconsina (a Muslim) used a network of school friends to enter South Leitimur, which was inhabited entirely by Christians. These two young women politicians seemed to use

less varied personal networks since they were less exposed to interfaith activism.

Even with more varied personal networks, a lack of political support—involving not only campaign financing but also institutional influence and efforts to combat societal stereotypes against women candidates—can lead to electoral defeat. Sister Brigitta Renyaan was acknowledged for her role as a peace pioneer who bridged religious communities and established interfaith networks during the conflict. Despite maintaining interfaith networks through her education and economic empowerment programmes at the grassroots level, she lost the church's support due to her "unprocedural" candidacy process. This senior nun believed that candidacy was necessary to advance her activism, but was perceived by the Church as violating the norms of the institution. She faced severe limitations in campaign financing, and thus had to rely on the interfaith personal networks that she established during and after the conflict (Renyaan, interview, 2 April 2019). However, as the dual issues of conflict and peace had given way to welfare issues, the public's memory of her role as a peacemaker had faded. She was further restricted by stereotypes; as a nun, she was expected to involve herself in social and religious activities rather than entering practical politics (informal interview, taxi driver, 2 April 2019).

The use of personal networks to cross religious divides was not intended to be the key to electoral success. While networks played important roles, they were intended predominantly to supplement votes from candidates' religious communities. In general, personal networks may be limited in their ability to reach potential voters and ascertain the needs of the targeted communities. Whatever role they play, the power of personal networking allowed women candidates to approach others of diverse backgrounds, involving themselves in ways that are uncommon for male candidates.

Conclusion

Studies of personal networks in Asian elections tend to associate said networks with patronage, kinship, party machines, and brokerage. Research about women candidates, meanwhile, tends to identify campaign strategies by relating them to traditional matters such as gender stereotyping and kinship politics. Although it does not eliminate all of those possibilities, the Ambon case offers an opportunity to explore the role of personal networks in a divided society and discuss the link between elections and peacekeeping. This case study explores the strategies used by women candidates to reach voters in diverse religious communities. Although their usage of personal networks does not always result in victory, it nonetheless emphasises women candidates' ability to identify and exploit non-primordial factors.

At the same time, this paper does not intend to present personal networks as complete strategies in and of themselves. Other factors, such as candidates' political resources (including incumbency, the image of political parties, and political financing) doubtlessly play a role, and it is clear that the use of personal networks can only produce victory when combined with strong political resources/modalities. However, as the main theme of this paper, it is interesting to observe the variations in

women candidates' personal networks. As shown in the above analysis, women candidates' personal networks come from their various activities and institutions, including activism, political parties, organisations (both social and professional), businesses, friendships, and family (clans and marriage). This offers opportunities for non-traditional explanations of candidates' electoral strategies.

Whatever the result, the use of personal networks in a divided society offers a pragmatic strategy for obtaining votes while simultaneously supporting social cohesion. Women candidates' efforts to cross religious barriers will gradually contribute to more intensive interactions between demographically isolated groups. It is in this manner that democracy in a divided society can benefit from elections.

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Equality Agenda, Sustainable Development Goals, and Muslim Countries' Acceptance of LGBTQ

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Abstract

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are an agenda designed by world leaders to reduce and protect the global world. The fifth of these goals is gender empowerment. Many narratives related to the rights of the LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer) community have often emerged, and the community has even experienced threats in several Islamic countries that still adhere to sharia law. This article aims to examine how the SDGs can influence Muslim countries' policies toward the acceptance of their domestic LGBTQ community. Using Samuel P. Huntington's Clash of Civilizations theory, this research employs Atlas.ti to qualitatively analyse data collected from many sources. This research finds that the fifth SDG cannot yet be fully incorporated into the policies of Muslim countries, i.e., those that have implemented sharia law. The SDGs are part of a Western globalist agenda that failed to take into account the different cultures and beliefs held around the world. Furthermore, the issues of cultural identity contained within the SDGs are far more sensitive than these goals' economic components. It is this sensitivity that has driven debate and conflict over the fifth SDG. The SDGs are ultimately unable to change deep-rooted policies, especially those rooted in the ideologies of nations that forbid LGBTQ.

Keywords: *Equality agenda; LGBTQ; Muslim countries; Sustainable Development Goals*

Introduction

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), consisting of 15 goals and 169 targets that are planned to be met by 2030, provide a global action plan that has been agreed upon by world leaders. The fifth of these goals is gender equality, which is aimed to provide marginalized communities with equal opportunities in various aspects of life. One highlight of this goal is its applicability to the LGBTQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer) community, an umbrella term that encompasses people with diverse sexual orientations and gender identities. Since birth, many members of this community feel abandoned by their peers and experience discrimination because of their

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sexual and gender identity (Connecticut Clearinghouse, 2020)

Lesbian, bisexual, and transgender women often experience various forms of violence and discrimination due to their sexuality and their sexual identity, which is considered "different" in the eyes of society (Correa, 2019). Likewise, as gender-based violence is often driven by a desire to punish people who do not conform to gender norms, men and non-binary people who deviate from these norms are also targeted (Stonewall, 2016). Although the term gender-based violence was first offered as a synonym for violence against women, O'Toole and Schiffman (1997) provide a broader definition. Gender-based violence is an offence committed by an individual, organisation, or person with a political orientation that is committed because of gender differences between them or sexual orientation in a social hierarchy that is still dominated by men. This definition is useful because it may not be limited to violence directed against women, but also include hostility towards other genders as well as the context of social inequality in which this hostility occurs (Collins, 2014).

Dealing with this issue requires a cautious approach: working with the entire community to address gender stereotypes while prioritizing support for LBT (Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender) women, who are the most affected by gender-based discrimination and violence (Stonewall, 2016). This point is often underscored by equality activists. Likewise, the United Nations and its subsidiary organs (including the United Nations Development Programme) have strived to end violence and discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation. The UNDP often encourages the inclusion of the LGBTQ community, including through partnerships with governments, community organisations, youth organisations, and various human rights activists (Soliman, 2015).

LGBTQ rights activists have made great progress in the international community, especially in non-Muslim countries. At the same time, however, the community continues to struggle for recognition and the most basic of human rights—such as the right to life—in the Muslim world. Laws protecting LGBTQ rights are mostly meaningless in Muslim countries, where Islamic law wields greater power than state law. Iran, for example, has executed 4,000 people since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Such application of the death penalty has been criticized strongly by Amnesty International, which condemns the death penalty except for criminals—as provided in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dubagari, 2016).

Although some countries that follow a liberal system, such as the United States, have provided protection in the form of legal protection for the LGBTQ community. However, in fact, in the United States itself, discriminatory attitudes are still often encountered, which are based on sexual orientation and gender identity. For example, in the United States that often called a liberal country, not all states explicitly enforce legal protections for the LGBTQ community (Freedom For All Americans, 2021). In fact, discrimination still often happens. To be very specific in the health care and employment sectors. The Center for American Progress and several independent pollsters surveyed to see how the LGBTQ community lives, attitudes, and experiences in the United

States. The survey was conducted on 9 – 30 June 2020, in which this survey reached 1,528 adults from the LGBTQ community with a vulnerable age of 18 years and over. And from the survey results, it was found that 1 in 3 Americans from the LGBTQ community received discrimination during 2019. And 3 out of 5 transgender Americans received the same treatment.

The discriminatory treatment they experience has an impact on the economy and mentality of LGBTQ individuals. From the bad economic situation due to this discriminatory treatment, 3 out of 10 LGBTQ Americans have difficulty getting access to the health services they should get. Fifteen per cent of the American LGBTQ community reported that they would be better off delaying or even refusing to seek medical help because of the discrimination they experienced. And transgender people face a "unique" challenge to access their health services. In addition, the LGBTQ community has experienced mental health problems during the COVID-19 pandemic (Grunberg et al., 2020).

Several studies have carried out that the population of the LGBTQ community in almost all parts of the United States has difficulty in obtaining their health rights (Human Rights Watch, 2018). In addition, these LGBTQ communities also experience difficulties in meeting their daily needs. Because many of them experience discriminatory treatment from companies or insurance provider services. Due to this discrimination, many people from the LGBTQ community choose not to seek treatment for fear of being discriminated against. In fact, in the absence of applicable regulations, in this case, a federal law that stipulates the prohibition of discrimination in health care regardless of identity orientation and gender identity leaves people from the LGBTQ community with no other way when the discrimination ends against them.

The American Cancer Society suggest that women from the LGBTQ community develop breast cancer at higher rates than heterosexual women. In addition, they also receive less attention in terms of health care, such as screening for colorectal, breast, and cervical cancer. Furthermore, many health insurers did not cover same-sex spouses until the Supreme Court legalized marriages (Simmon, 2018). In addition, according to Casey and Levesque (2018), many students in the United States experience discrimination during their studies; it is common, for example, for them to face discrimination and stigma when applying for college (Logan & Mann, 2018).

From these data, we can say that discrimination against the LGBTQ community does not occur only in Muslim countries; even countries with a liberal ideology, such as the United States, which has granted legal recognition to the LGBTQ community, still show high levels of discrimination. In Indonesia, such discriminatory practices are also common. Members of the LGBTQ community face stigma from their peers and even the government. This can be seen, for example, in the passage of regulations that discriminate against the LGBTQ community, as well as statements that promote conversion therapy—such as when the Public Relations Coordinator of the Bekasi City Ministry of Religion explicitly asked religious leaders and community leaders to bring members of

the LGBTQ community "back to normal human nature" (Warso & Aisyah, 2018).

Although many in the LGBTQ community experience persecution and violence, transgender individuals tend to experience higher levels of violence and discrimination than their lesbian, gay, or bisexual counterparts. This happens because transgender individuals tend to be more easily identified based on their outward appearance (Genia, 2019). This is a problem in both liberal nations and Muslim-majority ones.

Homosexuality is not a new phenomenon, even in the Muslim world. Historically in Morocco, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq, acts of homosexuality have been opposed, banned, and even condemned because it was considered a sin and moral disorder that brought disease and health problems (Qibtiyah, 2015). On the other hand, the United Nations has established the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to replace the MDGs and ensure just governance that could maintain and even improve the quality of life of the next generation. This programme supports LGBTQ peoples' fight for their rights. However, in the Muslim world, Islamic law is stronger than conventional law, which has resulted in significant debate (Kementerian PPN, 2021).

This research investigates the debate between human rights activists who vocally support equality and recognition for LGBTQ people and the policies of Muslim countries that implement religious law in their countries. Unlike earlier studies, the authors investigate the SDGs' capacity to influence the acceptance of the LGBTQ community in Muslim countries. We hope that this research can provide information on and map the complex issues that link various identities. This provides a very significant reference for the latest socio-political literature.

Research Method

Empirical data were collected by the researchers through qualitative methods, referring to the framework provided by Sharon Ravitch (2020) in her "Research Design in Qualitative Research". First, the researchers chose the topic being studied, i.e., LGBTQ acceptance. Second, the researchers formulated the research goals, through which this research was expected to benefit academics and practitioners in the future. Next, the researcher purposed the research question. The major question that will be answered in this article is “Do the SDGs influence LGBTQ policies in Muslim countries?”. Last, data relevant to the goals were obtained through side selection. This research will quote expert opinions and reports from selected countries in the discussion section.

In addition, to support the researchers in their study, Alan Bryman's grounded theory will be used. Grounded theory is a qualitative research method that uses systematic procedures to develop theories from the scientific arena. Grounded theory is a very important methodology for researchers in the contemporary era (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In this research, grounded theory was used by the researchers after collecting data from journal sources, trusted news articles, and academic reports. Ideas or concept mapping are commonly used when triangulated data has been obtained.

Grounded theory plays a significant role in ensuring the neutrality of research, as it allows the researchers to use inductive

reasoning without an initial hypothesis. As such, instead of using an existing theoretical framework and then seeking data that supports the validity of the premise, the researchers collected data before applying the Clash of Civilizations theory during analysis. The grounded theory approach is a form of the scientific method because its work procedures are designed very carefully and meet the criteria for the scientific method (Khan, 2014).

Clash of Civilizations Theory

Samuel P. Huntington, in his book *The Clash of Civilizations and The Remarking of Word Order,* argues that, following the end of the Cold War, the main source of conflict is no longer ideological and economic issues but cultural differences. During the Cold War, international conflicts occurred between ideologies such as Communism, fascism/Nazism, and liberal democracy. The defeat of fascism/Nazism exacerbated the conflict between the surviving ideologies (Huntington, 1993: 12). Likewise, with the end of the Cold War—which marked the collapse of the Communist ideology—the area of conflict expanded beyond the Western sphere. The conflict was informed by the conflict between Western and non-Western civilizations as well as between non-Western civilizations themselves. The people and governments of non-Western civilizations were no longer objects of history, as the targets of Western colonialism, but actors who shaped history together with those in the West (Huntington, 2004: 17).

Huntington suggests six main reasons why the clash of civilizations has become the main source of conflict in the post-Cold War era. Civilizations are differentiated by history, language, culture, tradition, and more importantly, religion. Religious differences refer to the differences in humans' view of their relationship with God, individuals and groups, citizens and the state, rights and obligations, freedom, etc. Differences do not necessarily lead to conflict, and conflict does not always mean the emergence of violence. However, over the centuries of recorded history, these differences have frequently given rise to the most violent and protracted conflicts. Huntington thus argued that the main source of conflict in the new world was not ideology, politics, or economics, but religion (Huntington, 1993: 25-40).

In the era of globalization, the world is seemingly getting smaller, and thus frictions between cultures and civilizations are getting stronger. In this case, the SDGs have been promoted as a universal agenda that must be legitimized by all countries, regardless of their religious or cultural background. Ironically, this globalist paradigm facilitates conflict between different cultures. In this research, SDG 5 is examined as promoting a culture of tolerance without taking into account beliefs (in this case, those held in Muslim countries) that do not accept the LGBTQ community or its practices.

The processes of economic modernisation and social change have uprooted people from their local identity and weakened the nation-state as the source of their identity. Religion is a common source of identity, with fundamentalist religious approaches

commonly identified with political activity, extremism, fanaticism, terrorism, and even anti-Americanism. It is this sense to which Huntington seems to be referring. Although it may be true that some religious communities are involved in radical religious politics, as noted by Esposito, fundamentalism works within an established order. The term itself is overburdened by Christian preconceptions and Western stereotypes, which also imply a monolithic threat that never existed (Binder, 1997).

The conflict of civilizations occurs due to the growing awareness of civilizations that are colliding with the Western world. The West is on the cusp of dealing with other cultures that wish to reshape the world through a process of de-Westernization. According to Huntington, this de-Westernization occurs among the elite, while the opposite process can be found among ordinary people. The emergence of various anti-Western ideologies can be attributed to the West's domination and its tendency to impose its will through the international political arena, especially in matters of democracy, human rights, and the environment.

Cultural characteristics are more markedly different than political and economic ones. As such, all countries can work hand-in-hand to achieve certain goals, though more sensitive ones—such as SDG 5, on gender equality—involve many beliefs, customs, and cultures, which cannot be equated. This research investigates how SDG 5 has provided a basis for many (non-violent) conflicts between Muslim and Western countries.

Gender Equality

The creation of a sustainable world must be complemented with the recognition of previously marginalised parties. Of the 17 SDGs and 169 targets, the concept of equality is among the most massive undertakings being carried out around the globe. Equality is a multidimensional concept, one that spans the political, cultural, social, and even economic realms. At the global level, the concept of equality is derived from several liberal objectives that require freedom and human rights. As the West has increased its dominance in the international order, this principle has become a universal one socialized in countries with diverse cultural characteristics—including Muslim ones.

Often, the concept of equality is associated with gender. In international relations, the concept of gender was originally identified with bias, using a point of view derived from the biological sciences. International understandings of gender have increasingly drifted away from the binary between men and women, putting greater emphasis instead on the ideas of masculinity and/or femininity (Arbain, Azizah, & Sari, 2015). Within this framework, non-binary people have a greater opportunity to assert themselves and make their voices heard. This is also in line with the concept of democracy, which prioritizes human rights and individual freedoms. Although methodological debates continue between researchers, the normative equivalence approach has found ground within the international community. With it, not only do multilateral institutions urge state entities to ratify the goal of equality—which includes gender plurality—but so do non-governmental actors whose voices massively influence the digital masses (FRA, 2020).

1. **Dynamics of the LGBTQ Equality Movement in the Muslim World**

As of writing, it can be said that LGBTQ activists have been unable to do much in Muslim countries, as they have not gained much recognition from their governments or peers. Many laws and regulations in Muslim countries prohibit LGBTQ marriage and activism. Rather, the LGBTQ community has frequently been depicted in such countries as violating the normative rules that guide humanity (Kreps, 2012). Likewise, members of the LGBTQ communities in Muslim countries continue to face high levels of discrimination, and thus they have great difficulty asserting their rights as citizens.

After the Arab Spring, it cannot be denied that LGBTQ movements have accelerated in the Middle East and other Muslim countries. These movements have wrought changes in the political, social, and even cultural sectors. Narratives about the rights of the LGBTQ community in Muslim countries have been increasingly heard (Needham, 2013). At the same time, resistance has grown. At least four Muslim countries have fairly large LGBTQ movements, namely; Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia (Girijashanker, 2018).

A. Jordan

Jordan legalized homosexuality in 1951 (van Doom, 2020). However, in the country, there are no community organizations or institutions engaged in promoting the rights of the LGBTQ community. Under Jordanian law, homosexuality itself is recognized on the condition that same-sex relations are consensual, and members of the LGBTQ community do not face fines or penalties under Jordanian criminal law. Several LGBTQ communities in Jordan have continued to strive for the formation of institutions that protect them.

The LGBTQ community in Jordan has been active through various initiatives, which come from individuals, communities, online media, and activists who are aggressively promoting their agenda through art and cultural performances. However, efforts to promote and establish legitimate organisations have faced opposition from the people there. Many LGBTQ activists in Jordan have faced threats of violence from individuals and parties who do not agree with their agenda. In addition, media coverage following the IDAHO (International Day Against Homophobia) incident posed significant hurdles for the LGBTQ community, as acts of hate speech became more commonplace.

Various efforts to establish organisations that accommodate the LGBTQ community continue to be pursued. However, various obstacles—including existing regulations—have resulted in these activists not finding common ground. For example, in 2009, a proposal to establish a community institution that works to support the rights of the LGBTQ community was immediately rejected by the Jordanian Ministry of Social

Development on the pretext that the establishment of this institution violated public morals and decency. Various efforts continue to be made, but none have been realized. In 2017, the Jordanian Minister of Home Affairs explicitly stated that LGBTQ organizations and activism were illegal and therefore not permitted (Girijashanker, 2018).

At the same time, Jordan has agreed to the SDG agenda. In 2015, Jordan released a document related to its views on the goals, titled "Jordan 2025: A National Vision and Strategy" (Phenix Center for Economic and Informatics Studies, 2017). This document does include a discussion of SDG 5 on Gender. However, despite Jordan having decriminalized homosexual behaviour since 1951, the document does not deal with the activities of the LGBTQ community. Likewise, although women are involved in economic activities—at least to a point—there is little discussion of the economic activities undertaken by the LGBTQ community in Jordan.

B. Lebanon

LGBTQ activism emerged in Lebanon in the mid-1990s following the establishment of an online community. Since 2002, organisations have emerged that advocate for the LGBTQ community on the grounds that existing human rights organisations do not guarantee the community's rights. An LGBTQ organisation, named Helem or "Dream", was established in Lebanon; however, the Lebanese government disapproved and rejected the organisation. A community organisation for LBTQ women was also sought, as they felt burdened by a lack of recognition and special space. This organisation, named Meem, was founded in 2007 by underground feminists who wanted to provide the community with legal, medical and psychological support. Since its founding, Helem since its founding in 2007 has advocated for the LGBTQ community in Lebanon. It has employed membership principles to become a community centre and major service provider for the LGBTQ community.

So how has the Lebanese community responded to the activities of the LGBTQ community in Lebanon? Members of the community still face repressive measures from the police and the Lebanese community. This has included, for example, a raid on Cinema Plaza in 2012, where as many as 36 men were arrested and subjected to forcible rectal examinations (Girijashanker, 2018). Today, the LGBTQ community in Lebanon continues to face a worrisome situation. They must conceal themselves from the Lebanese government, at least until it repeals Article 534 of the Criminal Code which expressly punishes same-sex relations (Younes, 2020). According to some members of the Lebanese LGBTQ community, the government should introduce more

laws that guarantee the community its rights, protect them from acts of violence, and ensure that their lives are free from fear and threats (Human Rights Watch, 2020)

Lebanon's view of the SDGs is quite clear, and in 2019 the country ranked 6th of the 21 countries in the Arab region in its application of the SDGs agenda. There is one interesting point: in its 2030 agenda for sustainable development, Lebanon prioritised six goals, one of them being "Improving social protection systems for all groups and overcoming inequality." Looking at the experiences of the Lebanese government and its interactions with the LGBTQ community, this is quite a shift. Does Lebanon truly desire to protect all groups, including the LGBTQ community, or is this priority just an agenda item?

C. Morocco

The LGBTQ community in Morocco faces clear legal and social problems. Article 489 of the Criminal Code, which threatens persons involved in same-sex relations with three years' imprisonment, is a major obstacle to the LGBTQ community in Morocco. Although this law does not explicitly mention transgender, law enforcement officials still equate gender identity with sexual orientation. Accordingly, the law has also been used to criminalise gender expressions and identities that do not conform to established norms (OuthRight Action International, 2020).

LGBTQ community activism in Morocco began through movements outside of the country itself. The first community came from Spain, having been established in 2004 by a Moroccan citizen who was living in Spain. This organisation, named “Kif-Kif” (All the Same), was officially recognized by the Spanish government in 2008. Among its activities is the publication of a print media, called *Mithly*, which promotes LGBTQ rights to Moroccan readers. However, this magazine has received various criticisms from other media in Morocco; these include, for example, the magazine *Attajdid*, which is closely tied to the Islamic Justice and Development Party (Girijashanker, 2018)

The first organisation based in Morocco itself, Mouvent alternative pour les Libertes Individualelles (popularly known as the MALI Movement), was only formed in 2009. This organisation has engaged more in advocacy and providing education to the people of Morocco about the rights of the LGBTQ community. MALI is thought to have considerably affected the major media in Morocco through its aggressive campaign against articles that prohibit the existence of the LGBTQ community in Morocco.

One organization that has been quite successful in addressing bureaucratic problems within the Moroccan government is the UFL.

Officially founded in 2016, this feminist organisation has advocated for the rights of the LGBTQ community. In 2018, it became the first LGBTQ organisation to be recognised by the Moroccan government, following two years of negotiations.

Morocco is similar to the countries discussed above in that it has agreed to all of the SDGs, including the fifth goal regarding gender equality (Green Policy Platform, 2017). Indeed, although its national goals do not recognise the LGBTQ community as one involved in economic development, the recognition of one LGBTQ advocacy organisation can be said as a step toward realising the goal of empowering the LGBTQ community.

D. Tunisia

LGBTQ activism began secretly in Tunisia in the 1990s, before the revolution, when various feminist activists advocated for the gay community—which at that time still faced criminalization from the Tunisian government and people. It was not until 2002 that Tunisia's first LGBTQ organisation, Damj, was founded. At the same time, Damj has not limited its activities to LGBTQ activism; it also seeks to accommodate local people who have no place to live, providing what has become known as “dix neuf apartments".

Since the Tunisian revolution, various organisations have sought to advocate for the LGBTQ community in the country. These include, for example, Mawjoudin and Chouf—organisations with a feminist ideology that fight for the rights of women, especially LBT women. Many organisations have sought government recognition, identifying themselves as serving “sexual and gender minorities”, but they have always failed. LGBTQ activism of the community in Tunisia reached its peak with the establishment of the Civil Collective for Individual Liberties in 2016, an umbrella organisation that included several advocacy organisations for the LGBTQ community (Girijashanker, 2018)

As with other countries, Tunisia has agreed with the SDGs and the points discussed therein. A UN human rights expert acknowledged the steps Tunisia has taken since the Revolution to advance equality and non-discrimination and urged the government to amend its laws to fully protect the human rights of LGBTQ people. Even so, it is believed that a social agreement exists between the government and the LGBTQ, wherein the latter remains hidden.

From these four countries, we can conclude that most Muslim countries have agreed with the fifth SDG regarding gender equality, but in implementing these goals governments have still practised discrimination and repressive attitudes. It is thus a major question as to whether these countries'

activities are indeed national goals or merely part of an agenda to keep pace with world developments.

2. The Formulation of Sustainable Development Goals by Western Countries

One of the principles proclaimed in the SDGs is universality. Referring to the complexity and transnationality of global phenomena, such as economic globalization, the term universal is no longer taboo. However, in the modern era, the word 'same' in the context of hegemony seems to be the dominant agenda that needs to be achieved by all entities. Another principle in global sustainable development is “leaving no one behind”, which means moving forward in unison toward the same significant goal. Universality, or a structurally united world, will cause an imbalance of influence in the order. The United Nations, which was originally founded on the principle of equality between sovereign states as a platform to eliminate war, has now provided room for vertical flows for the sake of consistency in achieving this 'one' world.

In global history, the United States is the only nation-state to have ever become a hegemony in a unipolar structure, named after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. In its influence-spreading scheme, the United States often couches its activities using Western terms. Countries in Europe, which in the post-war period received a lot of relief funds, have also been sources of liberal reform and democratic nationalism. In this case, the United States and its Western allies have become the dominant component of the UN Security Council in permanent status.

In the official description of the SDGs, it is officially explained that the universality principle of this agenda was born from the Declaration of Human Rights—which has become part of the West's written norms. Due to the universality principle, human rights must apply to all individuals and countries without the barrier of cultural differences (especially beliefs). Sustainable development will succeed when all entities are committed to supporting and complying with them. In a softer framework, in the realm of sponsorship and funding facilities, the superpowers of the United States and the West are entities that have expressed the importance of a universal agenda that is full of benefits. Likewise, they have been the major actors in its implementation, serving as the most passionate parties in the promotion of universality (SDGF, 2016).

3. Policy Changes in Muslim Countries and LGBTQ Equality

Despite major changes in norms and laws on the issue of same-sex marriage as well as the rights of LGBTQ people around the world, public opinion on the acceptance of the community remains highly divided. This is because the Western concept of equality and universality has seeped through uncontrollable globalisation, thereby changing the minds of some people

and sparking debate. According to research data from the Pew Research Center, in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Ukraine, and Russia, only a few societies have supported the acceptance of homosexuality (Poushter & Kent, 2020).

In 2013, the Russian Federation adopted a new federal law that prohibits the depiction of non-traditional sexual relations in media accessible to minors. International media were quick to label the law an anti-gay propaganda law, identifying LGBTQ people as targets. Such prohibitions have been around for a long time and have been implemented in several Russian districts (Kerf, 2017). The recently passed law was presented as part of the government's efforts to protect traditional Russian values from the influence of western liberalism, which is seen as damaging the young generation of Russia (The Guardian, 2013). It is also cited as a means of undermining the universality of human rights, which is argued to undermine traditional values (Kerf, 2017).

In a survey conducted in several countries with sizable Muslim populations, acceptance of the LGBTQ community is very low (Poushter & Kent, 2020). Under Islamic law, those who commit sexual acts with persons of the same sex can be sentenced to death. Such law is applied in almost all Muslim countries (as well as countries with large Muslim populations), including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan, Yemen, Qatar, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Northern Nigeria, Mauritania, and Southern Somalia, and as well as the ISIS-controlled parts of Northern Iraq and Syria (Ali, 2016).

The question of legalising LGBTQ rights has been hotly debated within the international community. On 17 June 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Council issued Resolution 17/19 on Human Rights in Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. It issued this resolution due to the UN's deep concern over reports of violence and discrimination against LGBTQ people. This resolution, perhaps, reaffirmed the imperative nature of implementing human rights for everyone, without discrimination of any kind (Rehman & Polymenopoulou, 2013).

Activists and experts advancing the protection and promotion of LGBTQ rights around the world state that the suppression of the community has become a global phenomenon. Indeed, as highlighted in HRC Resolution 17/19, as well as in the Report of the High Commissioner and several other UN Committee reports, human rights violations are commonly experienced by the LGBTQ community. In 2011, it was noted that 76 nations had laws and criminal sanctions that provide consequences for individuals' sexual behaviour, sexual orientation, or gender identity; many of these laws have existed for a long time (Rehman & Polymenopoulou, 2013).

Although human rights violations have been found in many countries, the Pew Research Center found that people in Western Europe and America are more supportive and accepting of the LGBTQ community, and even found that this support has increased from year to

year. Left-wing countries also tend to be more accepting and supportive of LGBTQ people (Poushter & Kent, 2020). Criticism and demonstrations against governments that reject LGBTQ rights have occurred in various parts of the world, especially in Muslim countries where people who practice same-sex relations face the death penalty. Such issues are quite sensitive for human rights enforcement.

As mentioned above, the LGBTQ community may face the death penalty in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sudan, Iran, and Mauritania, as well as in southern Somalia and northern Nigeria, which have a majority Muslim population. Caning and stoning are also enforced in several other Muslim countries, such as Malaysia, Qatar, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Still other Islamic countries sentence perpetrators to life imprisonment. Even some of the most otherwise tolerant countries still punish and oppose LGBTQ people (Rehman & Polymenopoulou, 2013). The World Economic Forum (2015) reports that more than 70 countries place legal obstacles to LGBTQ people, including Islamic countries. The existing data always represents the gaps and differences between enforcement in the West and the East with identity considerations.

Throughout history, culture, tradition, and religion have provided important guidance for everyday social life. Many religious scholars from the Abrahamic traditions (Christianity, Judaism, and Islam) have argued that homosexuality is unacceptable. Such religious prohibitions have become controversial among “humanitarian” activists who support the LGBTQ community regardless of religious prohibitions. However, Islam is often described as extreme in its response to the LGBTQ community, as it provides the most serious punishments both in this world and in the hereafter. In Islamic thought, not only are LGBTQ rights not recognised but their very existence must be rejected (Rehman & Polymenopoulou, 2013).

In the Muslim world, many states' laws are made and enforced using Sharia law. These laws contain both Islamic law and the law created for state decision-makers. Therefore, those found guilty of homosexuality in Saudi Arabia (for example) can be subject to sanctions such as caning, imprisonment, and the death penalty. In fact, Saudi Arabia has a legal entity that strictly oversees and enforces all Sharia laws in the country. Although the United Nations has determined that sexual orientation is a human right that must be protected, and thus included in the SDGs, the Government of Saudi Arabia has ordered all public schools—including universities—to ban homosexuality and intensely prohibit the spread of homosexual behaviours online (Rehman & Polymenopoulou, 2013).

In its formulation, the SDGs have been approved by 193 UN member states, including Islamic countries. The purpose of establishing the SDGs is in-line with the goals of Islamic law, which emphasises sustainable economic growth and also includes prosperity in religion and life. The 5th SDG, which discusses gender equality and women's empowerment, is also in-line

with Islamic law, which requires equality and prohibits discrimination between human beings. Muslim countries also agreed with this agenda (Mukhtar, Zainol, & Jusoh, 2018).

However, it should be emphasised that Islam does not justify, recognise, or protect sexual behaviours deemed deviant (such as those of the LGBT community), as such acts are deemed to be against the will of God and nature. In Islam, humans are required to have the knowledge and ability needed to obtain their rights and carry out obligations. At this point, the SDGs and Islamic law both seek to encourage the elimination of discrimination against and exploitation of women by eliminating sexual violence (Mukhtar, Zainol, & Jusoh, 2018). With this consideration. Muslim countries that strictly enforce Sharia law seem to run contrary to the West's universal agenda to specifically recognize LGBTQ rights and make room for same-sex orientation.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is another country that has implemented a ban on same-sex sexual relations. Iranian law criminalises all homosexual acts and actively punishes homosexuals. Caning, stoning, and public executions are still actively carried out. In 2011, it was reported that numerous youths were executed on charges of unlawful acts, i.e., having same-sex relations, right after the implementation of the UN Resolution on the eradication of discrimination and violence against sexual minorities (Rehman & Polymenopoulou, 2013). On the other hand, according to a report from OutRight Action International, the situation of lesbian rights in Iran is more complex (OutRight Action International, 2016).

In Afghanistan, homosexuality is considered a very serious crime that must be punished as proscribed by Sharia, i.e., through caning or stoning. Moreover, although the death penalty was officially abolished in 2010, local religious authorities have the right to impose the death penalty according to Islamic Sharia law. Pakistan also applies Sharia law through its Hudood regulation, which prescribes the consequences for all forms of extramarital relations, adultery, and same-sex relations. This regulation applies in local and Sharia courts. However, the death penalty in the regulation was only valid until 2009 (Rehman & Polymenopoulou, 2013).

In Malaysia, LGBTQ people have been prosecuted by various religious authorities, with punishments ranging from fines and whipping to detention. Malaysia also has very strict regulations against cross-dressing. In 1983, a conference of religious leaders established a *fatwa* that prohibited Muslim surgeons from conducting all forms of sex-change surgery. The Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf enforce similar laws. In the United Arab Emirates, same-sex relations could be punished through 2010. After that, a new sentence was imposed: ten years imprisonment. In Dubai, there is an article that stipulates that sodomites face up to fourteen years in prison (Rehman & Polymenopoulou, 2013).

In some Muslim majority countries, some anti-LGBTQ laws have been abolished, even as Sharia law is

still practised among the people. For example, in Iraq, the death penalty was still prescribed for homosexuality as of 2003. In Indonesia, the LGBTQ community faces social sanctions and punishments (Rehman & Polymenopoulou, 2013). A survey by the Pew Research Center (2013) found that most residents in Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt believe that homosexuality should be rejected (A.L., 2018).

Sharia law holds that homosexuality is prohibited in Islam. Under the laws of some Islamic countries, homosexual acts are considered a crime and can be punished with death. In late 2010, it was reported that a Saudi diplomat had openly admitted that he was gay and sought asylum in the United States. Following Sharia law, if he were to return to Saudi Arabia, he could be sentenced to death for openly stating that he is gay (Ahmadi, 2012). However, LGBTQ individuals who do not openly declare their sexual orientation are still tolerated by Sharia law in many Muslim countries.

Finally, some Muslim countries have loosened their rules and adopted Western ideas. These countries have often been identified as moderate Islamic countries. Moderate Islam is a very contextual term, as each region has a different context. This term was advanced during the Iranian Revolution in 1979 to describe Muslim countries that have adopted some Western ideals (Islam & Khatun, 2015).

Conclusion

In the end, it can be concluded that elements of SDG 5 will continue to face rejection because Islam provides strict and explicit guidelines related to same-sex relations that cannot be challenged. The international agenda, followed by a growing number of activists supporting LGBTQ rights, can ultimately be seen as a form of "disrespect" to Sharia law and its clear prohibitions. The SDGs are a universal agenda formulated by hegemonic countries from the West. Referring to Samuel Huntington's thesis, this is part of a process of Westernization, wherein different cultural identities and beliefs have been transmitted. From the Western perspective, countries that do not follow all points of development, especially in sensitive matters such as SDG 5, are intolerant or even fundamentalist. According to Huntington, such perceptions occur because countries are coming closer together even as differences between them result in conflict.

With this research, the writer hopes that the readers can see that different perspectives will always exist so long as civilization does. Traditional views will continue to be preserved even as some values fade in the face of Westernisation, particularly the rules of God as revealed in the Holy Book. Not all entities can abandon "traditional" beliefs to advance development, as in the West. The authors hope that this research can explain the complex differences between the East and West, which must be responded to and considered carefully. The ratification of the SDGs should aim to realise equal global welfare rather than homogenise the beliefs of diverse meta-geographic communities.

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Does Education Foster Electoral Turnout? Evidence from Indonesia

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Abstract

This study shows that nine years of compulsory education in Indonesia does not foster electoral turnout, especially during the simultaneous elections (district, presidential, and gubernatorial) in the first decade of direct elections (2004-2014). Gender, marital status, and Islam (the largest religion in Indonesia) also do not have a significant effect on electoral turnout. However, a factor that determinant to induces electoral turnout is ethnicity; the ethnic Javanese/Balinese, as the largest ethnic group in Indonesia, are more likely to participate in direct district, presidential, and gubernatorial elections than other ethnic groups. Although education does not foster electoral turnout, nine years of compulsory education does significantly affect the younger cohort, who go on to seek higher education.

Keywords: *Indonesia, electoral turnout, education, compulsory*

Introduction

What is the link between education and electoral turnout in Indonesia? The link between these elements is important to consider given Indonesia's status as a constitutional democracy that guarantees all Indonesians the right to an education. Elections, moreover, are foundational to the Indonesian people's ability to exercise their sovereignty.

All Indonesian citizens have the right to an education. Consequently, on 2 May 1984, the Indonesian government mandated that all Indonesian citizens attend six years of compulsory education. This law remained on the books through 1994, when nine years of compulsory education were required.

Education and elections are inexorable parts of citizenship. Stokke (2017) mentions that modern citizenship could be understood as consisting of four interconnected dimensions: membership, legal status, rights, and participation. Stokke (2017) understands membership and legal status as the cultural and judicial inclusion of citizens in communities. Right and participation, meanwhile, refer to the entitlements and responsibilities that follow from such inclusion. Stokke's explanation shows that education is included in the dimension of rights and that

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elections embody membership and legal status.

Different systems govern the education and election systems in Indonesia. The education system stipulates the length of education, the age at which education begins, etc., while the electoral system determines how people vote. Indonesia has held numerous elections since 1955, under different election systems and regimes. The election of 1955, held under the Old Order, shortly preceded the Guided Democracy era. The elections of 1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997 were held under the authoritarian New Order, which identified itself as following the ideology of Pancasila Democracy. Uhlin (1997) identified several structures that support authoritarianism, namely the state apparatus (particularly the military) that controls and dominates Indonesian society and class structures; the gender structure, which leads to the subordination of women and supports patriarchal and authoritarian forms of rule; and ethnic and religious cleavages in this large multi-ethnic state. Finally, the elections of 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019 were held under the *Reformasi* Order.

This research focuses on the direct elections that were held between 2004 and 2014, under the *Reformasi* Order. Why have these elections been chosen for this research? The answer is that elections are a form of democracy. Moreover, there is a relationship between education and democracy. According to Dahl (2015), democratic countries develop knowledge for their citizens, and educated workers are beneficial for innovation and economic growth. Dahl (1989) wrote that democracy means rule by the people. To rule, according to Dahl, the people must have some way of ruling, i.e., a command process. Dahl mentioned democratic government processes as embodying distinctive assumptions: political order, a democratic political order, and criteria for democratic processes. Dahl (2015) also mentioned the logic of equality in democratic participation. Electoral turnout is one measure of political participation in democratic countries such as Indonesia.

Other factors that we must consider in the context of education and elections in Indonesian demography, especially ethnicity and religion. Bauman (2004) writes that it is not easy to define ethnicity, as ethnicity and the creation of ethnic groups have not been defined. Ethnicity is not culture but related to a specific identity (imposed or otherwise). It is the result of self- and group identity, created within extrinsic contexts and through social interactions. Indonesia is a multi-ethnic country, with many ethnic groups being associated with specific territories and provinces. According to Bulmer (1996), an ethnic group is a collective within a larger population with common ancestry, shared past, and culture that defines the group's identity, such as kinship, religion, language, territory, nationality, or physical appearance. Members of ethnic groups are conscious of belonging to the group (Ananta et al., 2015).

According to Ananta et al. (2015), the fifteen largest ethnic groups in Indonesia are the Javanese, Sundanese, Malay, Batak, Madurese, Betawi, Minangkabau, Buginese, Bantenese, Banjarese, Balinese, Acehnese, Dayak, Sasak, and Chinese; there are also hundreds of other smaller ones. This research will divide ethnic groups into five categories, based on their territory of origin. Another variable that we will include in this

research is religion. In 1965, the Indonesian government gave Indonesian citizens the freedom to choose from one of five officially recognised religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. A sixth, Confucianism, was recognised in 2004.

According to data from the 2010 census,[2] Indonesia's religious composition is as follows: Islam (87.18%), Protestantism (6.96%), Catholicism (2.91%), Hinduism (1.69%), Buddhism (0.72%), Confucianism (0.05%), and Other (0.13%). Based on this information, Indonesia is a Muslim majority country.

Given those theories and findings, we seek to determine whether education fosters electoral turnout within the context of Indonesia? Answering this question will be the focus of our research.

Literature Review

Several theories or concepts are related to this research, as follows:

Theory and Concept of Democracy in Indonesia

The definition of democracy encompasses both normative and empirical theories. Normative theories treat democracy as a goal, whereas empirical theories are concerned with existing political systems. Scholars have diverse definitions of democracy. According to Uhlin (1997), democracy is not only a Western idea, nor is the Western model of liberal democracy the only possible form of democracy. He notes that many Indonesian pro-democracy activists are inspired not only by Western liberal thought, but also by Marx, the Qur'an, and traditional Indonesian values. Cultural objectivism, therefore, should be rejected.

Beetham (1993) offers a definition of democracy that covers both normative and empirical theory. He defines democracy as a decision-making model for collectively binding rules and policies over which people exercise control. Based on this definition, Uhlin (1997) mentions democratisation as the extension of people's rule to an increasing number of institutions, issues, and people not previously governed by these democratic principles. According to Uhlin (1997), democracy is not limited to a narrowly defined political sphere but includes the possible democratisation of social and economic ones.

In recent research, discussion of democratisation tends to focus on regime transition. Uhlin (1997) mentioned that the authoritarian New Order regime was not as stable as it seemed and that the prospects for at least limited democratisation were not as bad as often conceived. Rather, "Indonesia is in what I call a pre-transition phase" (Uhlin, 1997). Indonesia is no longer in the same position. Rather, it has successfully passed through the pre-transition phase from the authoritarian New Order regime to the *Reformasi* Order.

Citizen Effectiveness and Politics of Citizenship in Indonesia

Dahl and Tufte (1973) mention that citizen effectiveness depends on different

[2] Religious data is taken from Sensus Penduduk 2010 - Penduduk Menurut Wilayah dan Agama yang Dianut | Indonesia (bps.go.id)

techniques in the politics of homogeneity (in small systems) and the politics of diversity (in extensive systems). In small democratic systems, citizens' chances to be influential are enhanced by the lower costs of direct communication with representatives/other officials and by greater homogeneity, which means that, even without communication, representatives are more likely to hold views like those of their constituents. The extensive democratic system loses these advantages, depending more on indirect communication chains and overt competition among organised political forces—particularly among parties. No single method for maximising citizen effectiveness within each of these units is best. In some, direct participation is best; in others, more indirect methods are used, including the delegation of authority to officials appointed by the national government (Dahl & Tufte, 1973).

Hiariej and Törnquist (2017) identified six regimes in Indonesia: (i) the colonial regime, which lasted until the mid-1940s; (ii) the rise and fall of citizenship, popular organisations, and democracy, until 1957; (iii) the 'Guided Democracy' regime, until 1965; (iv) the New Order regime, until mid-1998; (v) elitist democracy and decentralisation, until the late 2000s, and (vi) populist transactionalism, in the current period.

Ethnicity in Indonesia

In this research, we include ethnicity as the control variable. As such, it is essential to know about ethnicity in Indonesia. Ethnicity is not culture but a particular kind of identity, imposed or otherwise, that results from the creation of self- and group identity within extrinsic contexts and social interactions (Ananta et al., 2015).

We use the classification system compiled by Ananta et al. (2015) based on statistics from the 2010 census. This new classification of ethnic groups, according to Ananta et al. (2015), was expected to capture the rich ethnic diversity of Indonesia and its provinces, particularly the many small ethnic groups in the country's eastern provinces.

This new classification is designed to be statistically robust, coded based on 1,331 ethnic categories. It also incorporates anthropological, sociological, and demographic literature and local expertise (Ananta et al., 2015). For this research, we chose a user-friendly classification based on six main islands/regions: Sumatra, Java and Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua. Ananta et al. (2015) also included a category for Indonesians of "foreign origin" (referring to Indonesian citizens of foreign descent).

We consider ethnicity an important control variable in this research. Ananta et al. (2015) mentioned that ethnicity may also be related to occupation. According to Ananta et al. (2015), people of different ethnic groups traditionally tend to specialise in certain occupations. However, these occupational differences may have disappeared as Indonesia has experienced economic integration and urbanisation. Indonesia's economy has shifted away from the primary sector and towards the industrial and service sectors. Therefore, ethnic-based occupations may have disappeared and been replaced by new ones (Ananta et al., 2015).

Institutional and Policy Background

Compulsory Education in Indonesia

The preamble of the 1945 Constitution includes multiple mandates to enrich the life of a nation. Specifically, Article 31 of the 1945 constitution stipulates that all Indonesian citizens have the right to an education. Therefore, on 2 May 1984, the Indonesian government passed a law requiring all Indonesian citizens to attend six years of compulsory schooling. This policy remained in effect until 1994.

Following the success of this program, the Indonesian government passed Law No. 2/1989 on National Education System. Article 14 of this law stipulates that all citizens who have reached the age of seven must receive primary education (six years in elementary school and three years in junior high school). Therefore, based on this law, compulsory education was extended from six years to nine years, beginning with the implementation of this law in 1994 through Presidential Instruction No. 1/1994 on the Implementation of Compulsory Education. Based on this law, all Indonesian citizens must attend elementary school (or an equivalent) between the ages of 7 and 13 and junior high school (or an equivalent) between the ages of 13 to 15. The provision of this education was the responsibility of the Minister of Education and Culture.

Higher Education, education in Indonesia is divided as follows (Table 1):

Table 1. Levels of Education in Indonesia

Primary Education	**Years of Education**
Elementary School, *Madrasah Ibtidaiah* (MI), or another equivalent form[3]	6
Junior High School, *Madrasah Tsanawiyah* (MTs), or another equivalent form[4]	3
Secondary Education	**Years of Education**
Senior High School, Madrasah Aliyah, Vocational High School, Vocational Madrasah Aliyah, or other equivalent form[5]	3
Tertiary Education	**Years of Education[6]**
D1	2
D2	3
D3	5

[3] Paket A.
[4] Paket B.
[5] Paket C.
[6] Full-year education for higher education, per Regulation of the Minister of Research and Technology No. 44/2015 on National Standards for Higher Education.

DIV, Undergraduate (S1)	7
Professional education *(Profesi)*[7]	3 (after finishing D4/Undergraduate)
Magister (postgraduate), Applied Magister, Specialist-1	4 (after finishing D4/Undergraduate)
S3, Applied-S3, Specialist-2	4–7

Parinduri (2019) notes that Indonesia's school year starts in July and ends in June of the following year. Previously, Indonesia's school year began in January and ended in December of the same year; this change was made to synchronise the school year with the government's fiscal year.

Through Presidential Instruction No.1/1994, the Indonesian government stipulates that the funding of primary education is the government's responsibility; as such, students must not be obliged to bear the associated costs.

Nevertheless, the government has faced several challenges. According to Darmadi (2019), these challenges include: (1) when the government announced its nine years of mandatory schooling programme, only half of Indonesians between the ages of 13 and 15 were in school; (2) the government lacked the capacity (funds, facilities, and staff) to implement the nine-year compulsory education programme, which was more burdensome than the implementation of the six-year compulsory education programme; (3) many facilities, costs, and staff were necessary to accommodate Indonesia's 6.2 million children of junior high school age.

On 29 May 1996, the President of the Republic of Indonesia launched the National Movement for Foster Parents (GNOTA)[8] to support the nine years of compulsory education. In 2005, the Indonesian government also launched the school operational aid (BOS)[9] programme, through which special funds were taken from the state budget to assist schools and *madrasah* throughout Indonesia.

The Election System in Indonesia

Indonesia has held general elections in different periods with different election systems. These may be divided as follows: (i) the 1955 election; (ii) the 1975–1982 elections; (iii) the 1987–1997 elections; (iv) the 1994–2014 elections; and (v) the 2019 election. Each of these periods was marked by different regimes and different electoral systems. These election periods and their election systems can be seen in Table 2.

[7] *Profesi*, according to the Elucidation of Law No. 20/2003, refers to professional education/higher education after an undergraduate programme that prepares students to take jobs with special skill requirements.
[8] For further information, see http://www.gn-ota.or.id/en/.
[9] For further information, see https://jendela.kemdikbud.go.id/v2/opini/detail/sejarah-dan-peran-bos-bagi-pendidikan-indonesia.

Table 2. The Election System in Indonesia

No	Election period	Election System
1	1955	Using the Proportional System to choose members of the People's Representative Council (DPR) and Constituency Council.
2	1971–1982	A combined district and proportional system for electing members of DPR, DPRD level I, and DPRD level II.
3	1987–1997	A combined district and proportional system for electing members of DPR and MPR.
4	1999–2014	✓ An open proportional system for electing DPR members. ✓ A District System for electing DPD members. ✓ An Absolut Voting System for electing the President and Vice President (2004–2014).
5	2019	Using an electoral system similar to the 1999–2014 period; for DPR members, however, a limited open proportional system was used.

Direct Elections for Regional Heads in Indonesia

Indonesia has several kinds of elections: presidential elections, regional head elections, House of Representatives (DPR) elections, Local Representative Council (DPD) elections, and Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) elections. Indonesian citizens voted directly for the president and vice president for the first time in 2004. Following the success of this direct presidential election, the Indonesian government implemented direct elections for regional heads throughout Indonesia in 2005—as allowed through Law No.32/2004.

In 2015, the Indonesian government issued Law No. 1/2015 on the Passage of Government Regulation No. 1/2014 on the Election of Governors, Regents, and Mayors. Based on this law, Indonesians were able to exercise their sovereignty at the local level to elect governors, regents, and mayors directly and democratically. Therefore, political parties were required to submit their preferred gubernatorial, regent, and mayoral candidates to local election commissions. These elections are held democratically on the principles of directness, openness, freedom, confidentiality, honesty, and fairness. Direct regional elections are held simultaneously, throughout Indonesia, every five years.

Before Indonesia's first direct elections for regional heads, the Indonesian government issued Government Regulation

No. 6/2005, specifying the means through which regional heads and their deputies are appointed. This regulation also provided stipulations for voters. If voters have more than one residence, they must choose one place of residence based, as noted on their identity card, then vote if their name is on the voters' list. If the voter's name is not on the list, they can provide updated data so they can be included on the additional voter list.

Further simultaneous elections were held in 2015, 2017, and 2018.[10] In 2018, about 171 electoral areas held simultaneous local elections.

Table 3. Direct Elections in Indonesia

Type of Direct Election	Years	Laws[11]	Election Organiser
Presidential	2004 2009 2014 2019	• Law No.23/2003 on Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections • Law No. 42/2008 on Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections • Law No.15/2011 on Election Management Bodies • Law No. 7/2017 on General Elections	General Election Commission (KPU)
Direct elections for regional head (*Pilkada*)	2005 2006	Law No. 32/2004 on Local Government	Part of regional autonomy
General elections for regional heads (*Pemilukada*).	2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013	• Law No. 22/2007 on Election Management Bodies • Law No.15/2011 on Election Management Bodies	Under the coordination of the General Election Commission (KPU)

[10] Information from: https://infopemilu.kpu.go.id/
[11] For complete information about the laws, check this website: https://jdih.kpu.go.id/undang-undang.

On 24 September 2014, the Plenary Session of DPRI RI decided that the DPRD would re-appoint regional heads[12]			
Simultaneous regional elections (*pilkada serentak*)	2015, 2017, 2018	• Law No. 1/2015 on the Passage of Government Regulation No. 1/2014 on the Election of Governors, Regents, and Mayors • Law No. 8/2015 on the Amendment to Law No. 1/2015 concerning the Stipulation of Government Regulations in lieu of Law No. 1/2014 concerning the Election of Governors, Regents, and Mayors into Law	Under the coordination of the general election commission (KPU).

Methodology and data

Empirical Strategy

This study aims to determine how education affects electoral turnout. It offers a linear probability model as follows:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 YearEdu + \beta_2 gender + \beta_3 stat + \beta_4 islm + + \beta_5 javbEthn + \beta_6\, sumEthn + \beta_7 klmEthn + \beta_8 sulEthn + \beta_9 nstEthn + \beta_{10} birth_year + u_i \quad \textbf{(1)}$$

The education variable is correlated with omitted variables bias. To cope with this problem, Wooldridge (2015) offers three options. First, to ignore the problem and suffer the consequences of biased and inconsistent estimators. Second, to find and use a suitable proxy for unobserved variables. Third, to assume that the omitted variable bias does not change over time and use the fixed-effects or first-differencing methods. In this study, we use the proxy of nine years of compulsory education to deal with the endogeneity of education.

Another explanatory variable in this research is gender. Gender=1 is used to indicate female and gender=0 for male. The last of the explanatory variables is

[12] See also http://ham.go.id/2014/10/07/diskursus-pemilu-kepala-daerah/.

$birth_year$. With reference to Indonesia's nine years of compulsory education, we divided voters into cohorts based on year of birth, with the cut-off date being 1987. From this $birth_year$ variable, we created $young_cohort$ as an instrumental variable (IV) to overcome the education variable's endogeneity problem. Two assumptions were used for IV: $Cov(z,u) = 0$ and $Cov(z,x) \neq 0$.

IV's two assumptions are explained below. First, education policy is assumed to be an exogenous instrument, meaning that education policy (nine years of compulsory education) will affect the model examined. Members of the young cohort, i.e., persons born after the passage of laws mandating nine years of compulsory education, were required to continue from elementary school to junior high school. In the exogenous assumption, there exists an exclusion restriction: compulsory education cannot directly affect the outcome. Instead, it affects the outcome through $YearEdu$. When the government-mandated nine years of compulsory education, $YearEdu$ increased from six years to nine years for members of the young cohort. Second, a relevant condition, $young_cohort$, is related to the endogenous value of $YearEdu$. It means that members of the young cohort (i.e., those born after the cut-off) will receive more education due to the new education policy (see also the first-stage regression result from the appendix).

We divided $cohort$ into two groups, based on year of birth. The old cohort consisted of those born before the cut-off date (1987). The young cohort, meanwhile, consisted of those born after the cut-off date (1987).

In the first stage, we estimated the $young_cohort's\ effect$ as an instrumental variable in education attainment (years of education) using the following equation:

$$\boldsymbol{YearEdu = \pi_0 + \pi_1 young_cohort + \pi_2 gender + \pi_3 stat + \pi_4 islm + + \pi_5 javbEthn + \pi_6\, sumEthn + \pi_7 klmEthn + \pi_8 sulEthn + \pi_9 nstEthn + \pi_{10} birth_year + v_i} \quad \textbf{(2)}$$

In the least squares (2SLS) two stages, electoral turnout ($\boldsymbol{y_i}$ =district election, the presidential election, and gubernatorial election) using the estimated $\widehat{YearEdu}$, where $\widehat{YearEdu}$ is the estimator from the first-stage equation. The reduced form is as follows:

$$\boldsymbol{y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \widehat{YearEdu} + \beta_2 gender + \beta_3 stat + \beta_4 islm + + \beta_5 javbEthn + \beta_6\, sumEthn + \beta_7 klmEthn + \beta_8 sulEthn + \beta_9 nstEthn + \beta_{10} birth_year + u_i} \quad \textbf{(3)}$$

Data

Data for this study were collected through the Indonesia Family Live Survey (IFLS), an ongoing longitudinal survey in Indonesia by RAND and Survey Meter.[13] This study uses data collected at the household level.

Table 3 provides definitions of the variables. The first outcome variable, district election ($districtE$), refers to the direct elections for regents and mayors between 2005–2015. It is a dummy variable indicating voting/not voting in district elections. The

[13]. Data can be downloaded from https://www.rand.org/well-being/social-and-behavioral-policy/data/FLS/IFLS/ifls5.html.

second outcome variable, presidential election ($pres_election$), refers to the direct presidential elections held between 2004 and 2014. This is also a dummy variable, which indicates the decision to vote or not vote in the presidential election. The third outcome variable, direct gubernatorial election ($gov_election$), refers to the direct gubernatorial elections conducted between 2005 and 2015. This is also a dummy variable.

The main variable of interest, years of education ($YearEdu$), refers to the years of completed education achieved by an individual. From the summary statistic in Table 4, we can see that individuals averaged twelve years of education. $YearEdu$ also describes how long (how many years) individuals took to complete their studies. After cleaning the data, the years of education received by individuals ranged from one to twenty-one. Values included 1, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21 years of education.

$Gender$ is a dummy variable showing male or female, with most heads of households being male. $Stat$ is a dummy variable showing marital status, i.e., whether the head of household is married or single. $Islm$ is a dummy variable showing the religion of the head of household, whether Islam or another religion. $JavbEthn$ is a dummy variable showing Javanese/Balinese ethnicity or lack thereof. $SumEthn$ is a dummy variable showing Sumatra ethnicity or lack thereof. $KlmEthn$ is a dummy variable showing Kalimantan ethnicity or lack thereof. $SulEthn$ is a dummy variable showing Sulawesi ethnicity or lack thereof. Finally, $nstEth$ is a dummy variable showing Nusa Tenggara ethnicity or lack thereof.

Table 4 also summarises the IFLS Wave 5 statistics on education and electoral turnout, which consisted of a complete data set covering 36,391 respondents. After cleaning and sorting the data, we obtained a sample size of 14,428 observations for district and gubernatorial elections and 14,426 observations for presidential election.

Table 4. Variable Definitions

Variables	Notation	Definition of variables
Outcome Variables:	y_i	
District election	$districtE$	District election refers to the direct election for regent and mayor (2005–2015)
Presidential Election	$pres_election$	Direct presidential election (2004–2014)
Gubernatorial election	$gov_election$	Direct gubernatorial election (2005–2015)
Explanatory Variables:		
Year of Education	$YearEdu$	Year of completed education of the individual

Gender	$gender$	Dummy variable; female=1, male=0
Status	$stat$	Marital status (being married or single): Married=1, single=0
Islam	$islm$	Islam as religion; Islam =1, non-Islam=0
Javanese/Balinese Ethnicity	$javbEthn$	Javanese/Balinese ethnicity; yes=1, no=0
Sumatran Ethnicity	$sumEthn$	Sumatran Ethnicity; yes=1, no=0
Kalimantan Ethnicity	$klmEthn$	Kalimantan Ethnicity; yes=1, no=0
Sulawesi Ethnicity	$sulEthn$	Sulawesi Ethnicity; yes=1, no=0
Nusa Tenggara Ethnicity	$nstEthn$	Nusa Tenggara Ethnicity; yes=1, no=0
Cohort birth year	$young_cohort$	Dummy variable; young=1, old=0
Dummy birth year	$birth_year$	Dummy variables; birth year

Table 5. Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev	Min	Max	Observations
Outcome Variables:					
District election	.693	.461	0	1	14.428
Presidential election	.84	.366	0	1	14.426
Gubernatorial election	.708	.455	0	1	14.428
Explanatory Variables:					
Year of Education	11.92	4.797	1	21	14.428
Gender	.477	.499	0	1	14.428
Marital Status	.309	.462	0	1	14.428
Islam	.899	.301	0	1	14.428
Javanese/Balinese Ethnicity	.626	.484	0	1	14.428
Sumatran Ethnicity	.137	.344	0	1	14.428
Kalimantan Ethnicity	.039	.194	0	1	14.428
Sulawesi Ethnicity	.052	.222	0	1	14.428
Nusa Tenggara Ethnicity	.067	.25	0	1	14.428
Instrumental Variable:					
Young Cohort	.394	.489	0	1	14.428

Result and Discussion

District Elections

Our first analysis focused on elections at the district level. The results are presented in Table 6. Each additional year of education decreases the probability of voting by 0.3%, at a significance of 1%.

Table 6. Outcome of District Elections

	Dependent Variable: District Election	
	(OLS)	**(IV)**
$YearEdu$	-0.003***	0.073
	(0.001)	(0.052)
$gender$	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.008)	(0.010)

stat	0.006	0.007
	(0.010)	(0.013)
islm	0.008	-0.010
	(0.016)	(0.024)
javbEthn	0.055***	0.081***
	(0.015)	(0.026)
sumEthn	0.110***	0.022
	(0.016)	(0.064)
klmEthn	0.052	-0.043
	(0.036)	(0.079)
sulEthn	-0.320***	-0.315***
	(0.062)	(0.077)
nstEthn	0.264	0.176
	(0.196)	(0.252)
IV Estimate		
young_cohort	-	0.334**
		(0.137)
constant	0.598***	-0.287
	(0.024)	(0.607)
dum_by	Yes	Yes
Observations	14.428	14.428

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Using the cohort birth year as an instrumental variable (IV) for the endogeneity of education, we can see that the IV results correct the OLS results. However, the P-value shows no indication that years of education will induce turnout during district elections. Discussion of the gender variable in OLS and IV shows that gender decreases electoral turnout insignificantly, by 0.4%. Marital status is likewise found to not affect electoral turnout. In IV, the Islam variable decreases electoral turnout insignificantly, by 1%. In both OLS and IV, the Javanese/Balinese ethnicity variable affects election turnout at the district level. In OLS, Javanese/Balinese ethnicity increases district election turnout by 5.5%, and thus significantly. In IV, Javanese/Balinese ethnicity increases district election turnout significantly by 8.1%. In OLS, the Sumatran ethnicity variable increases district election turnout significantly, by 11%, but in IV the coefficient estimates are corrected,

indicating that Sumatran ethnicity does not affect election turnout at the district level. The Kalimantan ethnicity variable does not affect district election turnout in OLS, but in IV, it decreases district election turnout insignificantly, by 4.3%. In both OLS and IV, the Sulawesi ethnicity variable decreases election turnout significantly, by 32% and 31%, at the district level. The Nusa Tenggara ethnicity variable does not affect district election turnout in OLS and IV.

Regression Results from Presidential Elections

For the second analysis, years of education were examined vis-à-vis turnout during presidential elections. The results are presented in Table 7. Again, from the OLS and IV regression results, years of education do not affect turnout during presidential elections

Table 7. Presidential Election Outcome

Dependent variable: Presidential Election		
	(OLS)	**(IV)**
$YearEdu$	0.000	0.053
	(0.001)	(0.040)
$gender$	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.008)
$stat$	0.003	0.004
	(0.008)	(0.010)
$islm$	0.020	0.008
	(0.013)	(0.018)
$javbEthn$	0.015	0.033*
	(0.011)	(0.019)
$sumEthn$	-0.020	-0.083*
	(0.012)	(0.049)
$klmEthn$	-0.027	-0.095
	(0.028)	(0.060)
$sulEthn$	-0.033	-0.029
	(0.048)	(0.059)
$nstEthn$	0.177	0.114
	(0.153)	(0.191)
IV Estimate		

young_cohort	-	0.331**
		(0.1374)
constant	0.812***	0.183
	(0.019)	(0.464)
dum_by	Yes	Yes
Observations	14.426	14.426

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are in parentheses.

In OLS and IV, the gender variable decreases presidential election turnout by 0.5% and thus is statistically insignificant. The marital status and Islam variables likewise do not affect turnout during presidential elections. In IV, the Javanese/Balinese ethnicity variable increases turnout significantly during presidential elections, by 3.3%. The Sumatran ethnicity variable, in IV, decreases presidential election turnout significantly, by 8.3%. In both OLS and IV, the Kalimantan ethnicity variable decreases presidential election turnout by 2.7% and 9.5%, respectively, and thus is statistically insignificant. Neither the Sulawesi ethnicity nor the Nusa Tenggara ethnicity was found to affect turnout during presidential elections.

Gubernatorial Election Results

Table 8 presents the effect of education on voter turnout during gubernatorial elections. Each year of education was found to decrease voter turnout by 3.7%, which is statistically insignificant. IV corrected the underestimation results of OLS, indicating that years of education do not affect voter turnout during gubernatorial elections.

Table 8. Gubernatorial Election Outcome

	Dependent variable: Gubernatorial election	
	(OLS)	**(IV)**
YearEdu	-0.037	0.091
	(0.089)	(0.070)
gender	0.005	-0.013
	(0.081)	(0.011)
stat	-0.031	0.013
	(0.095)	(0.012)
islm	0.236	-0.019
	(0.163)	(0.027)

javbEthn	-0.343**	0.053*
	(0.145)	(0.031)
sumEthn	1.162***	-0.160*
	(0.157)	(0.084)
klmEthn	1.262***	-0.177*
	(0.354)	(0.100)
sulEthn	-0.055	0.088
	(0.614)	(0.081)
nstEthn	1.185	0.171
	(1.944)	(0.268)
IV Estimate		
young_cohort	-	0.229*
		(0.123)
constant	11.715***	-0.342
	(0.222)	(0.822)
dum_by	Yes	Yes
Observations	14.428	14.428

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are in parentheses.

In IV, the Gender variable was found to decrease the probability of voting by 1.3%, and therefore statistically insignificant. In IV regression, neither the marital status variable nor the Islam variable was found to affect turnout during gubernatorial elections. Javanese/Balinese ethnicity was found to decrease the probability of voting significantly, by 34%; however, IV regression corrected the coefficient estimate, increasing the probability of voting significantly by 5.3%. In OLS, the Sumatran ethnicity variable increased the probability of voting by 116%. However, the IV regression result corrected the coefficient, showing that the variable decreased the probability of voting in gubernatorial elections by 16%. Based on IV regression, the Kalimantan ethnicity variable was found to decrease the probability of voting in gubernatorial elections by 17.7%. In IV, neither the Sulawesi ethnicity nor Nusa Tenggara ethnicity variables were found to affect turnout during gubernatorial elections.

Discussion

OLS results show that education significantly decreases the probability of voting in district elections, at least between 2005 and 2015. These results are related to the regulations regarding the systems for updating election and voter lists (*system*

pemutakhiran data pemilih). Law No.6/2005 provides guidelines for voters, stipulating that each voter must vote based on his/her place of residence as recorded on his/her identity card. Furthermore, Law No. 1/2015 stipulates that, if a voter has more than one place of residence, that voter must choose a place of residence based on their electronic national identity card or a letter of domicile from the village head (*lurah*). Voting is held directly, in each administrative area.

Moreover, as mentioned in Regulation No. 6/2005 concerning Elections, data for the 2005 direct local elections were collected from Voter Registration and Sustainable Population Data (*Pendaftaran Pemilih dan Pendataan Penduduk Berkelanjutan/P4B*), which was collected by the Central Bureau of Statistics (*Badan Pusat Statistik/BPS*) in 2003 through door-to-door visits to houses.[14] Regulation No.6/2005 also provided mechanisms for updating and validating the voter list, as well as preparing additional voter lists and provisional voter lists (*Daftar Pemilih Sementara/DPS*).

The Election Committee (*Panitia Pemungutan Suara/PPS*) must announce the provisional list and have it posted for three days, during which it accepts improvements and revisions. The voting committee then announces the additional voter list (*daftar pemilih tambahan*), which remains posted for three days. Afterwards, the listed voters receive proof of registration. The data contained therein can be revised further after the committee validates the additional voter list to form the final voter list (*daftar pemilih tetap*/DPT).

In the 2009 direct local elections, data was not derived from P4B, but from the local governments and the database of potential voters (*Data Penduduk Potensial Pemilih Pemilu-DP4*). The remainder of the system was the same as in 2005; data compiled from *DP4* became the DPS, which was then updated to produce an additional voter list (*daftar pemilih sementara hasil perbaikan/DPSHP*), then finalised as the DPT. The databases, mechanisms, and updating systems are presented in the following table:

[14] The information about P4B: https://sirusa.bps.go.id/sirusa/index.php/dasar/view?kd=40&th=2003.

Table 9. Mechanisms for direct local elections

	Direct local elections, starting in 2005[15]	Direct local elections, starting in 2009[16]
Voter data	Taken from Voter Registration and Sustainable Population Data (*P4B*) by the Central Bureau of Statistics.	Provided by the government. Contains data on potential electors (*DP4*).
Voter list updating process	P4B ↓ List of voters ↓ Provisional voter list (DPS) ↓ Additional voter list (DPSHP) ↓ Final voter list (DPT)	DP4 ↓ List of voters ↓ Provisional voter list (DPS) ↓ Additional voter list (DPSHP) ↓ Final voter list (DPT)
Deadline for registration	• PPS announces DPS for three days • PPS announces DPSHP for three days • PPS announces DPT for three days	• PPS announces DPS for 21 days • PPS announces DPSHP for three days • PPS announces DPT for three days

[15] Derived from Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia No. 6/2005.
[16] Derived from PKPU No. 67/2009.

Voters	▪ Voters can only register once ▪ If voters have more than one residence, address is chosen based on identity card. ▪ Registered voters receive proof of registration and they can exchange it for a voter card.	▪ Voters can only register once ▪ If voters have more than one residence, address is chosen based on identity card. ▪ Registered voters receive proof of registration and they can exchange it for a voter card.
Voting locations	In their administrative area, voters come directly to the polling station (*tempat pemungutan suara/TPS*).	In their administrative area, voters come directly to the polling station (*tempat pemungutan suara/TPS*).

Voters must actively report to the election committee to update or improve their data. Additional data may result in voters losing their rights; for example, members of the armed forces and police may not vote. Furthermore, if voters fail to register before the deadline, they are unable to vote. Such voters are less likely to vote.

Polling sites can also serve as barriers. For example, when voters live far away from their electoral region (for example, overseas or in a different administrative region), they are less likely to vote. Voters compare the costs and benefits of voting; the higher the cost, the lower the participation rate. As such, in the Indonesian context, years of education can decrease turnout during district elections significantly (as shown by the OLS results). Elections in Indonesia are also likely affected by voting regulations and the year of data collection (i.e., in 2003); this may have resulted in many citizens' data not being collected or registered.

At the same time, OLS regression results are prone to underestimation, especially as the IV results show zero effect. Underestimation may also be attributed to bias; it is more likely that people who choose to vote are more likely to choose to receive higher education. The OLS results also show that the years of education variable does not affect turnout during presidential elections. As presidential elections are national, rather than local (as in district/gubernatorial elections), they are held throughout Indonesia and abroad. To facilitate Indonesian citizens living abroad, the Indonesian government established a foreign election committee (*Panitia Pemilihan Luar Negeri/PPLN*). Per Law No. 23/2003 on General, Presidential, and Vice-Presidential Elections, PPLN is mandated with handling elections overseas.

Voter data, registration, and updating systems have affected local (district /gubernatorial elections) and direct presidential elections since 2004. In the 2009 presidential election, voter data was

collected from local governments to produce a database of potential voters (*DP4*). The General Election Commission, the sub-district election committees, and the election committees were able to update voter data.

Unlike during earlier presidential elections, in the direct presidential election of 2014, the Indonesian government used information systems and technology to support election organisers' efforts to compile, coordinate, announce, and maintain voter data. The Indonesian government was particularly concerned about special voters with resident identities. We can see these mechanisms in the following table.

Table 10. Mechanisms for direct presidential elections

	2004 direct presidential election[17]	**2009 direct presidential election[18]**	**2014 direct presidential election[19]**
Data of voters	Taken from Voter Registration and Sustainable Population Data (*P4B*) by the Central Bureau of Statistics.	Provided by local government; contains a database of potential voters (*DP4*).	Government (in coordination with ministry of internal affairs) provides data; contains a database of potential voters (*DP4*).

[17] Derived from Law No. 23/ 2003 on the General Election of the President and Vice President.
[18] Derived from Law No. 42/ 2008 on the General Election of the President and Vice President as well as PKPU No. 14/2009.
[19] Derived from Law No. 15/ 2011 on General Election Organisation & PKPU No.9/2014.

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<td>
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<td>
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<td>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deadline for registration</td>
<td>• PPS announces DPS
• DPS + additional voter list = DPT
PPS announces DPT</td>
<td>• DPS updates for 30 days
• PPS announces DPSHP for seven days
• Improvement of DPSHP and DPSHP, becoming DPT, over seven days.
• DPT set no later than 30 days before voting</td>
<td>• PPS announces DPSHP for seven days
• DPSHP improvement for seven days.
• DPT determination, 30 days before voting</td>
</tr>
</table>

The voters	▪ Voters can only register once ▪ If voters have more than one residence, address is chosen based on identity card. Registered voters receive proof of registration and they can exchange it for a voter card.	▪ Registered as a voter ▪ Voters can only register once ▪ If voters have more than one residence, address is chosen based on identity card.	▪ Registered as a voter ▪ Voters can only register once ▪ If voters have more than one residence, address is chosen based on identity card.
Information systems and technology	-	-	Voter data information system (*sidalih*)
Voting Site	• Within Indonesia: voters come to the polling station (*tempat pemungutan Suara/TPS*) Overseas: voters come to TPSLN (overseas polling stations)	• Within Indonesia: voters come to the polling station (*tempat pemungutan Suara/TPS*) Overseas: voters come to TPSLN (overseas polling stations)	• Within Indonesia: voters come to the polling station (*tempat pemungutan Suara/TPS*) Overseas: voters come to TPSLN (overseas polling stations)
Presidential candidates	• 5 (five) presidential candidates ▪ Election held in two rounds.	▪ 3 (three) presidential candidates	▪ 2 (two) presidential candidates

Even though the Indonesian government allows all Indonesian citizens to vote where they live and helps voters update their information, the OLS and IV results show that education does not affect turnout during presidential elections. The limited influence of education on turnout during presidential elections is more likely affected by voting regulations as well as voters' psychological condition.

In Indonesia's first direct presidential election, held in 2004, five presidential candidates contested the presidency. Indonesian citizens voted directly for their preferred candidates over the course of two rounds. When so many candidates are available, it may burden voters unduly, as they must seek information regarding regulations and candidates (including their personalities, programmes, and platforms). Such active participation is uncommon, as voters are more likely to focus on their personal lives (work/study). This factor was less influential during the 2009 and 2014 elections, when the number of candidates decreased to three candidates

and then two candidates.

Nevertheless, the IV results of this study show that education does not significantly affect electoral turnout during district, presidential election, and gubernatorial elections. These results are similar to those of Parinduri (2019), who found that education does not affect turnout during Indonesia's presidential and parliamentary elections.

The gender variable shows consistent results in IV, being associated with an insignificant decrease in turnout during district, presidential, and gubernatorial elections. This variable should not be understood as influencing turnout in and of itself. Rather, it is more likely that the gender variable correlates with other demographic characteristics. We also believe that gender correlates with swing voting, as many voters did not express their preference for a particular political candidate.

In dealing with swing voters, we must look Dahl's (2015) understanding of modern representative democratic government: (1) Elected officials: control over government policy decisions that is constitutionally vested in elected officials; (2) Free, fair, and frequent elections: citizens elect officials infrequently using fairly conducted elections where coercion is comparatively uncommon; (3) Freedom of expression: citizens' right to reveal themselves without danger of harsh punishment on political concerns broadly explained, including a critique of officials, the government, the regime, the socioeconomic order, and the current ideology; (4) Access to alternative sources of information: citizens' right to explore options and accessible sources of information from others (citizens, experts, newspapers, magazines, books, telecommunications); (5) Associational autonomy: to achieve their different rights, citizens also have a right to form moderately independent associations or organisations, including independent political parties and interest groups; and (6) Inclusive citizenship. From the aspects Dahl mentioned, we believe that access to information and inclusive citizenship are essential, especially during election time. Access to information is paramount, as potential voters have the right to know everything about the election, especially regulations and voters.

The marital status variable shows no effect on turnout during district, presidential, and gubernatorial elections. This may potentially be associated with psychological conditions. Marital status is one potential requirement for voting, as only individuals who have reached the age of seventeen or who have married can participate in elections. Marital status, thus, should not be considered a factor hindering electoral turnout.

The religion (Islam) variable has the same effect on turnout during district and gubernatorial elections, decreasing turnout insignificantly during these elections. During presidential elections, meanwhile, it does not affect turnout. This may be attributed to the fact that Islam does not make participation in elections compulsory for Muslims. All Muslims have the freedom to decide whether they vote or not. Even though Indonesia is a Muslim majority country, Islam has no significant effect on election turnout.

Of the ethnicity variables, Javanese/Balinese ethnicity significantly affects turnout during district, presidential, and gubernatorial elections. This is likely

due to the size of this category; Java and Bali are the most populous islands in Indonesia and include two of the country's largest ethnic groups: the Javanese (40.05%) and Sundanese (15.50%)[20] (Ananta et.al:2015).

The Sumatran ethnicity variable shows no effect on district elections. However, in presidential and gubernatorial elections, this variable decreases turnout significantly. According to Ananta et al. (2015), two ethnic groups in Sumatra are among Indonesia's largest—the Malays (3.70%) and the Bataks (3.58%), which are respectively the third- and fourth-largest ethnic groups in Indonesia. However, this composition has no positive effect on turnout. It is more likely that population size also affects electoral turnout. This is also the same for the Kalimantan and Sulawesi ethnicity variables. Finally, the Nusa Tenggara ethnicity shows no effect in the OLS and regression results.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

These findings provide little evidence that members of the young cohort with more years of education are more or less likely to vote. These results are the same as those of Parinduri (2019). However, members of the young cohort were found to have more years of education than their older peers, as shown in the first stage regression result. Many factors must be considered when measuring electoral turnout, including governmental, geographic, demographic (ethnicity, religion, etc.), regulatory (especially as related to voting), data, access, psychological, and economic (such as the cost of voting).

In the context of Indonesia, another variable affects electoral turnout: ethnicity. Javanese/Balinese ethnicity has a significant effect on voter turnout in Indonesia, especially compared to smaller ethnic groups such as those in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Nusa Tenggara. The gender, Islam, and marital status variables are found to have no significant effect on turnout during district, presidential, and gubernatorial elections.

As an implication of this study, education—especially the nine years of compulsory education provided by law—is essential and has a significant effect on the young cohort. The first stage regression results showed that the average level of education increased among the young cohort. Therefore, the Indonesian government should maintain this programme, increase the education budget, and/or give citizens more opportunities to pursue higher education.

This research has several limitations. As such, further research using different methods, theories, and data is needed to determine the hidden determinants of electoral turnout.

[20] This information is based on the composition of ethnic groups in Indonesia: See Ananta et al. (2017).

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Appendix

Table 11. First-Stage Regression Result

$\boldsymbol{YearEdu}$ is the endogenous variable.

	Dis. Election	Pres. Election	Gub. Election
$gender$	0.0201	0.0185	0.0213
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.0811)
$stat$	-0.1062	0.1078	-0.1178
	(0.1075)	(0.1075)	(0.1062)
$islm$	0.2334	0.2331	0.2347
	(0.1634)	(0.1634)	(0.1634)
$javbEthn$	-0.3468**	0.3475**	-0.3464**
	(0.1451)	(0.1451)	(0.1451)
$sumEthn$	1.1636***	1.1636***	1.1646***
	(0.1570)	(0.1570)	(0.1570)
$klmEthn$	1.2605***	1.2603***	1.2586***
	(0.3536)	(0.3536)	(0.3536)
$sulEthn$	-0.0609	0.0607	-0.0598
	(0.6138)	(0.6138)	(0.6137)
$nstEthn$	1.1878	1.1884	1.1830
	(1.9439)	(1.9437)	(1.9438)
$youngcohort$	0.3338**	0.33078**	0.2287*
	(0.1374)	(0.1374)	(0.1226))
$constant$	11.5728***	11.574***	11.6212***
	(0.2209)	(0.2209)	(0.2157)
dum_by	Yes	Yes	Yes
$Observations$	14.428	14.426	14.428
$R - squared$	0.0198	0.0198	0.0196

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are in the parentheses.

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Code availability

We used Stata Application17

Islamic Populism and Village Chief Elections in Java[1]

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Abstract

The strengthening of political identities, including the use of Islamic populism, has widely been used to explain the electoral victories and defeats of candidates at the municipal, provincial, and national levels. However, no study has been found to investigate this phenomenon in the village elections (pilkades) of Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Our research, conducted in ten villages, did not find a tendency to use Islamic populism. Rather, in two villages—Baleharjo, Gunungkidul, and Temon Kulon, Kulon Progo—we identified an interesting phenomenon: the principle of inclusivity was used to ensure that competition was open to candidates of all backgrounds, including religious minorities. This article seeks to investigate this trend, which

[1] We would like to express our gratitude to the Research Centre for Politics and Government (PolGov), Department of Politics and Government, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada, The Australian National University, and Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV). We are grateful for the insightful comments offered by Edward Aspinall and Ward Barenschot during the research workshop. We are also grateful to all individuals who provided valuable information; to Anastasia Imelda, Darnik Fatimah Wulandari, and Fikri Disyacitta for conducting fieldwork in Baleharjo, Gunungkidul and Irwan Harjanto; and Dr. Abdul Gaffar Karim in Temon Kulon, Kulon Progo. We especially thank Umi Lestari for providing assistance during the writing of this article.

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enabled religious minorities to be elected to the highest position within the village government: chief. It finds that minority candidates' electoral victory was made possible by several factors. Importantly, Islam's limited penetration into suburban Java restricted its ability to be used for identity politics in village elections.

Keywords: *Islamic populism, village elections (pilkades), minority candidates, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.*

Introduction

This article investigates the factors that contributed to religious minority candidates' victory in village elections (*pilkades*) in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. This study departs from the question of why, even as identity politics and Islamic populism are increasingly exploited in Indonesia's municipal, provincial, and national elections, religious minority candidates were elected in two of the ten villages studied.

This is an important question as, in the past decade, populism has become increasingly common in elections around the world (Bernhard & Kriesi, 2019; Ivanov, 2020). This has included Islamic populism (Hadiz, 2016; Kirdiş & Drhimeur, 2016), which this article defines generally as a multi-class political expression that positions the shared interests of the Muslim *ummah* vis-à-vis the interests of elites and non-Muslims. In Indonesia, identity politics—particularly Islamic populism—has been rampant, especially during Jakarta's 2017 gubernatorial election (Hadiz, 2018; Hara, 2018; Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2017). In a survey conducted by Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI) in January 2017, shortly before the aforementioned election, 71.4 per cent of respondents stated that it was important for a candidate to share their religious beliefs. This represented a significant increase over previous surveys, conducted in March and October 2016, in which this sentiment was expressed by only 40 and 55 per cent of respondents, respectively (Situmorang, 2017). Prasetyawan (2020), drawing on data from the General Elections Commission and Statistics Indonesia, found that the Muslim candidate Anies Baswedan carried 80 per cent of subdistricts, including all subdistricts with more than the median Muslim population (87 per cent). Islamic populism was also exploited during Indonesia's 2014 presidential election (Hadiz, 2016), and again in the country's 2019 presidential election (Fossati, 2019). It can therefore be concluded that, while Islamic populism has been perceived as having the transformative power to challenge the oligarchy (Aspinall, 2015; Hadiz & Robison, 2017), it has also affected candidates' electability.

Problematically, however, studies of Islamic populism in Indonesia have primarily used municipal, provincial, and national elections as their cases (Sulistyo, 2002; Bhakti, 2004; Aspinall, 2005; Buehler & Tan, 2007; Tomsa, 2009; Erb & Sulistiyanto, 2009; Aspinall & Mietzner, 2010; Choi, 2011; Mietzner, 2014; Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019). Village elections (*pilkades*) are absent from public discourse and receive little scholarly attention, not being used to understand contemporary Indonesian politics but perceived as

unimportant local events that are unrelated to broader electoral phenomena.

Such a perception is hard to defend, however, given that village elections have deeper historical roots in Indonesia than other elections (Aji, Hermawan, & Trilaksana, 2020; Lombard, 2005; Muis & Immerzeel, 2016), and that these elections are extremely numerous. Villages are the smallest government units in Indonesia, and 74,954 are recorded throughout the country (Pusat Data Desa Indonesia, 2019). Because village chiefs interact routinely and intensively with voters, and because village chiefs are at the vanguard of public service, their election directly affects the interests and routines of the Indonesian public.

This article departs from a study of elections in ten villages in three regencies: Banjarharjo, Brosot, and Temon Kulon in Kulon Progo Regency; Dlingo, Ngestiharjo, Panggungharjo, and Srihardono in Bantul Regency; and Baleharjo, Monggol, and Mulusan, in Gunungkidul Regency. Research was conducted by the Research Centre for Politics and Government (PolGov), Department of Political and Government Studies, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada, in collaboration with the Australian National University, Australia, and the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV), Netherlands. Data were collected through live-in, shadowing, and direct observation. In each village, two members of the research team (three in Baleharjo) lived at the homes of candidates—selected based on their potential for electoral victory—for one week before and after the election (7–21 October 2018) and participated in their routine activities. This method enabled the researchers to gain the trust of the candidates and the voting public and thereby access a broader wealth of data and information. It also ensured that the researchers had a good understanding of local issues. Further information was collected through unstructured, in-depth interviews with key actors, including candidates and their families, campaign teams, village administrators, and social/youth/religious leaders. Informants were selected through snowball sampling, with the number of informants increasing until information and data were deemed sufficient.

This article argues that the victory of religious minority candidates in the village elections of Baleharjo Village, Gunungkidul Regency, and Temon Kulon Village, Kulon Progo Regency, resulted from a combination of several factors: the limited penetration of Islam in suburban Java, the strength of interpersonal solidarity and kinship networks, and candidates' control of and access to capital (particularly cultural capital). These structural factors were complemented by more individual ones, including candidates' social skills, distribution of resources, technocratic abilities, willingness to offer quality programmes, and capacity to deliver said programmes (which, in both cases, was facilitated by candidates' incumbency). Combined, these factors reduced the influence of identity politics and enabled minority candidates to not only compete in village elections but to win them. We show that Islamic populism cannot be taken for granted as a feature of electoral politics in Indonesia. Structural and individual factors are very influential in village elections *(pilkades)* in Java.

This article is organised as follows. First, it discusses the concepts of populism, Islamic populism, and general elections in Indonesia, then highlights the link between these concepts and the anomalous nature of these cases. Second, it discusses the contexts of the villages in which these elections occurred. Third, it delineates the factors that influenced minority candidates' electoral victory, with a particular focus on the shortcomings of Islamic populism. Finally, it draws conclusions and elucidates the implications of this research for future studies.

Populism, Islamic Populism, and Indonesian Elections

In recent years, populism has commonly been studied by political scientists (Panizza, 2005; Müller, 2017; Conniff, Roberts, Basurto, et al., 2012; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Hadiz, 2016; Grant, Moore, & Lynch, 2018; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). As the concept of populism is ambiguous, there has been extensive disagreement as to its definition, essence, and application (Stanley, 2008; Mény & Surel, 2002; Anselmi, 2017). This ambiguity has also resulted in the concept being used to identify a broad range of political ideologies, styles, and strategies.

At the same time, it must be recognised that populism has been applied diversely in different places and at different times, depending on the particular spatial and cultural context (Anselmi, 2017). It has been found in various countries, including in the Americas, Europe, and Asia. For instance, Stockemer (2019) compared the histories, actors, strategies, successes, and failures of populism around the world. He found that, in the United States and Russia, populism traces its roots to the peasant movements of the late 19th century; in Latin America, meanwhile, it emerged in the mid-20th century. Movements in these regions subsequently promoted populism in Europe (Stockemer, 2019) and, later, in the Muslim world.

Populism has frequently been defined and applied broadly as a political ideology (Ibrahim, 1998; Hadiz, 2016; Hadiz, 2018; Gandesha, 2018). According to Mudde (2004), populism is a "thin-centred" ideology that divides society into two homogenous and mutually antagonistic groups, the "pure people" and the "corrupt elite", and claims to express and realise the desires of the majority. Owing to its "thin-centred" nature, populism may be found across the political spectrum. Both leftist and rightist forms of populism exist, being shaped by the particular socio-political contexts in which they develop and are practised (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017).

Populism has also been identified as a political style, as a means of making political and discursive claims. De la Torre (2010), for example, defines populism as a rhetoric that frames politics as a moral and ethical struggle between the people and the oligarchy. In doing so, it creates a discursive dichotomy between "us" and "them" (Kazin, 1998), a Laclauian "empty signifier" that enables the link between the signifier and signified to be filled with a range of discourses (Panizza, 2005). Certain social groups are defined as "the people", and positioned in binary opposition with an ill-defined oppressive "Other". Populism, thus, is a discourse that challenges the status quo and its inherent hegemony and subjugation.

Populism has also been defined as a political strategy, a means of policymaking and organisation. Madrid (2008) argues that populism may be manifested in policies that promote the redistribution of resources and mobilise the masses against the establishment and the system. Such a strategy may involve, for instance, a declaration of support for the disenfranchised majority and/or a claim of being free from elite influences. It often requires candidates to establish personalistic relationships with their constituents and to flexibly adapt to populist demands (Weyland, 2001)

Despite these ambiguities, it can be seen that all populist movements share three fundamental elements (Mény & Surel, 2002). First, they emphasise the fundamental role of "the people", not only in society but also in the political structure and system. As a discourse that challenges the status quo, populism reduces political spaces and structures to the people and the others, the populace and the elites. Second, populism involves a claim that the people have been betrayed, subjugated, and exploited by others. These may be politicians, elites, oligarchs, public officials, or others who abuse their power to stifle the people. Third, populism seeks to bring power to the common people, overthrow the elites, and replace them with leaders who are willing to advance their shared interests. These three components are flexible, providing space for diverse movements, leaders, and programmes.

In Indonesia, the Power, Welfare, and Democracy (PWD) research project—a collaboration between Universitas Gadjah Mada and the University of Oslo—identified populism as a Manichean political style involving the above-mentioned elements (Savirani et al., 2014; De Raadt, Hollander, & Krouwel, 2004). Others have seen Indonesian populism as a political strategy for mobilising voters and garnishing support.

Populism has emerged in Indonesia as a result of public pressure and protests against the increasingly elitist and oligarchic political system. Representative democracy has been perceived as not promoting the interests of the public but rather the interests of oligarchic and bureaucratic elites. Political parties, similarly, have been perceived as being oligarchic in their administration and as failing to fulfil their political promises. Elites are perceived negatively and often labelled as corrupt by populist leaders who, claiming to represent the common people, present themselves as incorruptible (Hara, 2017).

Several forms of populism have been found in Indonesia, including the technocratic populism of Joko Widodo (Hamid, 2014; Mietzner, 2015) and the populism of Prabowo (Aspinall, 2015; Hatherell & Welsh, 2020). By far the most prominent form of populism in Indonesian elections, however, is Islamic populism. Religious sentiments have been increasingly exploited and several studies have shown that such populism is an effective means of securing votes and winning elections (Setijadi, 2017; Ubaid & Subandi, 2017).

Islamic populism is inexorably linked with voters' perceptions of Islam and their Muslim identity. As religious issues are paramount for rightist Muslims, Islamic populism has a strong emotional effect that facilitates candidates' search for support (Nastiti & Ratri, 2018). Islamist groups, claiming authoritative religious

knowledge, exploit voters' piety to (re)define right and wrong. At the same time, these groups convince voters that the Indonesian government has not only failed to accommodate Muslims' interests but bears enmity towards the religion (Hadiz & Robison, 2017); this strategy was particularly common in Jakarta's 2017 gubernatorial election. Through their narratives, such groups shape the everyday religious beliefs and practices of voters, thereby manipulating the emotions of people of diverse social classes and backgrounds. Candidates promise to change the status quo through specific programmes (Burhani, 2017; Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2018; Muhtadi, 2019).

At the same time, other identities—such as ethnic identity—have also been exploited in Indonesian elections (Aspinall, Dettman, & Warburton, 2011; Fox, 2018; Haryanto, Sukmajati, & Lay, 2019). When significant social inequalities exist, such strategies have often been successful. Nonetheless, in municipal, provincial, and national elections, religious identity politics have been most prominent. Religious sentiments are inherently emotional, and as a rule, populism targets voters' emotions (Alamdari, 2005; Geovanie, 2013; Huddy, Mason, & Aarøe, 2015; Salmela & Scheve, 2017).

Populism can only emerge in democracies; in authoritarian nations, discourse is too restricted for the public expression of sentiments that challenge the regime and its status quo. Consequently, populism only emerged in Indonesia after the authoritarian New Order regime collapsed in 1998 and political reform began (Azra in Muhtadi, 2019). Populists came from both ends of the political spectrum, involving groups whom the New Order regime had labelled the extreme left and the extreme right, monitored closely, and controlled with violence.[5] As elsewhere, populism has never been a centrist ideology, and thus, it is not surprising that it has offered a means of challenging the establishment and the political system (Muhtadi, 2019).

In Indonesia, Islamist populists have defined "the people" as those Muslims who experience injustice and the "other" as encompassing both the ruling regime and the non-Muslim community. As such, it has not only positioned everyday Muslims vis-à-vis the ruling regime but also people of different religious beliefs and, by extension, other minorities. Islamist populists have positioned themselves as representing the aspirations of the people. In doing so, they use discourses that not only challenge the elites and the status quo but also frame ethnic minorities (predominantly Indonesia's Chinese diaspora community) and religious minorities (particularly Christians) as being party to the subjugation of Muslims in Indonesia (Hadiz, 2018).

Baleharjo and Temon Kulon

This article examines the experiences of two villages, namely Baleharjo Village, Gunungkidul Regency,

[5] The violence employed by the New Order to control Islamic ideology (Fealy, 2005) can be seen, for instance, in the 1984 Tanjung Priok incident (Tirto, 2019) and the 1989 Talangsari incident (Wasis, 2001), and its response to the 1981 hijacking of a Garuda Indonesia airliner (Wiwoho, 2016) and the 1985 bombing of Borobudur Temple (Tempo, 1999).

and Temon Kulon Village, Kulon Progo Regency, both of which participated in the simultaneous 2018 village elections. Both villages are suburban, with the majority of residents earning their livelihoods through agriculture. In the past decade, Baleharjo has experienced rapid modernisation; consequently, much farmland has been repurposed, the social structure has transformed, and many residents have entered the service and trade sector. Historically, the two villages have never experienced religious conflict. The people of these two villages, as plural regions, live side by side peacefully, and their religious activities are undertaken without conflict.

The demographics of both villages reflect general trends in Java. Both have Muslim-majority populations; approximately 69% (4,605) of Baleharjo residents and 82.7% (1,519) of Temon Kulon residents are Muslim. Villagers tend to practice *kejawen*, a traditional system of culture and habits. They practice rites such as *slametan*, believe that certain objects have spirits, and hold that specific times are sacred. *Kejawen* continues to influence how residents understand right and wrong; consequently, it informs their political behaviour. Village heads and administrators—who, as stated empathetically by one informant, must be distinguished from staff—must embody such values as honesty and goodness, maintain social proximity with constituents, and dedicate themselves to protecting the village.

The 2018 Baleharjo election was contested by two candidates, the incumbent Agus Setiawan (49, Catholic) and Agus Sulistyo (49, Muslim). Setiawan was an entrepreneur and property broker who delivered such necessary services as cooperatives and restaurants. Although public response was divided, the majority of respondents perceived the incumbent as having successfully delivered his programmes. As one informant stated, "his work performance is apparent. He simply had to sign" (interview, Nanok, merchant, supporter of incumbent, 14 October 2018). Setiawan used his spatial proximity, family networks, social skills, and political experiences to reach voters. He also relied on public beliefs about honesty. As one informant stated, and as Setiawan confirmed (interview, Setiawan, incumbent candidate, 7 October 2018), residents of Baleharjo believed that corrupt leaders would lead short lives (interview, Nanok, merchant, supporter of incumbent, 14 October 2018). Villagers believe that leadership is a divine mandate, one that requires the blessings of the Almighty. As one informant stated, "Becoming a village administrator is a *kepulungan*.[6] If one does is not *kepulungan*, one cannot become a village administrator" (interview, Lestari, Director of Public and Administrative Affairs, Baleharjo Village, 9 October 2018).

The challenger, Sulistyo, was also a wealthy property broker. He was known as a kind, polite, and religious man who was heavily involved in community activities (including farmer organisations, Family

[6] *Kepulungan* is derived from the word *pulung*, which means to receive a divine revelation. *Pulung* is often depicted as a blue, green, or white light that radiates from the sky and shines on the home of the next leader. The Indonesianist Benedict Anderson (1972) describes *pulung* as signifying the legitimacy of leadership in the traditional Javanese logics of power.

Welfare Empowerment groups, and communal prayers). However, he was still inexperienced in matters of politics. As with the incumbent, Sulistyo relied on his spatial proximity and kinship networks to gain public support. In an interview, he emphasised the importance of clans (*trah*) in village elections and claimed that 70–80 per cent of the people of Rejosari and Gedangsari were his clansmen (interview, Sulistyo, challenger, 8 October 2018).

During Baleharjo's 2018 election, development was a hot-button issue and candidates quickly became proxies for the struggles between those who supported and opposed development. Sulistyo's campaign promoted transforming village-owned land into productive agricultural land, framing it as part of a moral (Islamic) narrative. Meanwhile, Setiawan's campaign promoted the transformation of Baleharjo into a centre of tourism and trade, arguing that the village had significant potential owing to its proximity to the regency's economic and government centres.

Villagers saw that Setiawan had "survived" for six years, and this evidenced the honesty and quality of his leadership. In the election, Setiawan received 54% of the votes (1,911) and carried three polling stations, with particularly strong showings in areas occupied by his family, local youth movements, and programme beneficiaries. He thus enjoyed incumbent advantages, the exposure, networks (Cox & Katz, 1996; Krebs, 1998; Kushner, Siegel, & Stanwick, 1997), economic capital (Fouirnaies & Hall, 2014), and experience (Cox & Katz, 1996) he accumulated over his term.

Interviews indicate that the absence of identity politics was crucial. As Sulistyo stated, "Gedangsari is 70% non-Muslim, but they mostly supported me. Meanwhile, Wukrisari is predominantly Muslim, and they mostly supported my opponent" (interview, Sulistyo, challenger, 28 October 2018). This was confirmed by Setiawan. "I am a Christian, and Mas Agus [Sulistyo, ed.] is Muslim. In Baleharjo, 17% of residents are Christian, while 83% are Muslim. That's strategic. I would have lost if religious sentiments were used for campaigning. I would not have been able to win." (interview, Setiawan, incumbent, 14 October 2018).

The Temon Kulon election was also contested by two candidates: the incumbent Ari Sasongko (41, Catholic) and the challenger, Heri Kristiyanta (49, Muslim). Sasongko, who ultimately won the election, was the son of the village secretary. Sasongko's mother was Muslim and his father was Catholic; their children, Sasongko and his two siblings, were raised Catholic. Having been born and raised in Temon Kulon, Sasongko had been recognised for his involvement in village activities since his youth, and he had established strong networks through said involvement. Sasongko exploited his kinship and social networks during the election, as stated by one informant:

> *"Pak Ari and his wife are from Temon Village. Their main capital is their family networks. Even if attacked with various rumours, so long as he had his family networks, he could still emerge victorious*" (interview, Pak Gendhut, Chairman of the Incumbent's Campaign Team, 10 October 2018).

This was supported by another informant, who confirmed that Sasongko was better known by residents (*Dina, District Staff and Member of the 2018 Temon Kulon Election Committee)*

During his six years as village chief, Sasongko was perceived as responsive to residents' needs and as an honest and visionary leader. He also maintained close social relations with his constituents by participating in their ceremonies and rituals, including *seripah* (funerals), marriages, and communal prayers. Although he was Catholic, he maintained close relations with Islamic leaders (scholars, imams, etc.). This had a positive effect on public perceptions.

> *"Pak Ari has a good record as village leader. Any time we have communal prayers or Eid celebrations, he comes. So far, he has had no issues with his performance. The only matter is religion.* (interview, Heri, leader of Kedungbanteng Hamlet, 8 October 2018; interview, Awang, resident of Kedungbanteng Hamlet, 9 October 2018).

> This was confirmed by Sasongko.

> *"My principle is that, working as the village chief, I must facilitate the people in their activities, such as through service. For example, if someone requires the signature of the village chief, no matter where I am, I'll handle it. If there's a funeral or communal prayer activity, I will attend. From the beginning, I've never sought to involve religion in village elections. As for those who practice indigenous faiths, I help them too, as there are many of them here*." (interview, Sasongko, incumbent, 8 October 2018).

Evaluations of Kristiyanta were significantly different. The challenger, the chairman of the Village Representative Body (Badan Perwakilan Desa, BPD)—a village-level legislative institution—was perceived as having performed poorly. Furthermore, he was not born in Temon Kulon and rarely interacted with residents. One informant explained, "*A lot of people know him, but he hasn't lived long in Temon Kulon. Pak Hery spends more time handling his showroom"* (interview, Dina, District Staff and Member of the 2018 Temon Kulon Election Committee). Kristiyanta's focus on his entrepreneurial activities was emphasised by another informant (interview, Suparji, police officer stationed in Temon Kulon, 4 October 2018). One informant contrasted the challenger's limited social networking with the vast networks of the incumbent (interview, Awang, resident of Kedungbanteng, 9 October 2018).

In his campaign, Sasongko integrated such *kejawen* values as *primbon* (auspicious dates on the Javanese calendar) and *pulung* (revelatory light, i.e. a sign of electoral victory). He and his campaign team also wore batik shirts with the *kawung* motif, symbolising the culture of Yogyakarta. By doing so, he emphasised his Javanese cultural identity, as noted by the leader of his campaign team (interview, Pak Gendhut, Chairman of the Incumbent's Campaign Team, 10 October 2018).

Kristiyanta, meanwhile, attempted to emphasise his Islamic identity. He presented himself as a religious man, a pious Muslim who frequented the local mosques. During his campaign, he gained the support of several religious leaders. As stated by the administrator of Nurul Huda Mosque:

> *"I have good relations with both candidates, but for the election I had to vote for someone of the same faith. That's what we call akidah (creed). So*

> *during every prayer session, we emphasise the importance of voting for a leader who shares our faith. It's not that Pak Ari has performed badly or what have you, but it is best for Muslims to be led by Muslims"* (Parji, Chief Administrator of Nurul Huda Mosque, Temon Kulon, 12 October 2018)

The use of religious identity was confirmed by the coordinator of the challenger's campaign team:

> *"I sought to optimise the elders in the mosques. We used a strategy"* (interview, Budi Susilo, coordinator of the campaign team, 29 October 2018).

Ultimately, Sasongko won the election with 694 votes (64.14 per cent of all valid votes). Identity politics, therefore, was ineffective.

Successful Minority Candidates and the Limitations of Islamic Populism

Our research shows that, to a certain extent, Islamic populism was exploited during village elections in Yogyakarta. However, these strategies were ultimately unable to sway voters. Unlike in municipal, provincial, and national elections, where Islamic populism is widely and often successfully used in elections, in these villages it was ineffectual. Rather, the keys to electoral success were personal capacity, political experience, social networks, the capacity to formulate and deliver programmes, as well as the ability to control village spaces. Such control was exerted through several instruments, including claims of indigeneity, kinship networks, and social proximity with constituents.

More specifically, we find, first, that Javanese villages have not used Islam as a symbol in their social and power relations, including in their electoral processes. This may be related to the historical transfer, translation, and acceptance of Islam in Javanese villages (Drewes, 1968; Hooker, 1983; Ricklefs, 2007). Abdullah (1987) writes that Islam was disseminated throughout Southeast Asia in three ways. First was the Pasai approach, in which Islam developed and spread along with state power; in this approach, Islam provided the State with the legitimacy necessary to shape the direction of society. Second was the Malaka approach, found in such diverse places as Malaka, Patani, Gowa Talo, and Ternate, where Islam was spread from power centres to rural areas. Third was the Javanese approach, wherein Islam was spread through dialogue between local communities and Islamic leaders.

These three patterns fall into two main categories: the integrative tradition and the dialogue tradition. The integrative tradition, employed in Pasai and Malaka, created a strong Islamic culture as power flowed outwards from centres of power. Meanwhile, the dialogue tradition—as used in Java—resulted in acculturation. According to Ricklefs (2007), when Islam first entered Java, conflict occurred between the predominantly Hindu–Buddhist Javanese and the new converts. Over time, however, acculturation produced a syncretic belief system wherein Javanese and Islamic cultures complemented each other. Ricklefs identifies this syncretism as "the Mystic Synthesis" and argues that it was built upon three pillars: a commitment to a shared Islamic and Javanese identity, a commitment to performing Islamic

rituals, and an acceptance of local spirituality (including belief in spirits, sacred sites, and other Javanese beliefs such as the Queen of the South Sea).

The limited penetration of Islam in rural and suburban Java is also evident in previous village elections. Chailley-Bert, an Indonesianist and contemporary of Raffles, observed a village election in Probolinggo, East Java. This election was contested by five candidates, one of whom dropped out soon after declaring his candidacy. Of the remaining four candidates, one was the sitting village secretary, two were local landlords, and one was a merchant. The landlords subsequently dropped out, leaving two candidates. Although this village had 607 residents, only 130 had the right to vote; suffrage was limited to tax-paying landowners. Chailley-Bert noted with interest that voting was simple and practical: voters simply sat behind the candidate they supported and then were tallied. Ultimately, the village secretary received 86 votes, while the merchant received 42 (Lombard, 2005).

Based on this, the victory of minority candidates in village elections in Java is not surprising when compared to, for example, what happens in village elections in areas with a strong Islamic culture (such as Aceh). In addition, referring to Geertz (1976), the process of acculturation of religion and culture in Java resulted in a category of devout Muslim society (*santri*) and nominal Muslims who profess more indigenous modes of religious beliefs and cultural belonging (*abangan*).

Several conclusions may be drawn from this study. First, these cases not only highlight the lack of universal suffrage and secrecy, both important tenets of modern elections, but also the fact that patron–client relations were more important than religious personal identities in village elections. Here, patron-client relations refer to how elites can mobilise their capital to bind clients. This is not limited to their positions within the village they have but more to capital that is useful to provide social services to their constituents. Candidates also did not use Islamic identities but rather presented themselves with symbols that indicated economically important crops: bananas, rice, cassavas, papayas, melons, durians, etc.

Second, these cases also highlight the importance of kinship networks in creating and maintaining solidarity. In Java, although villages have been important loci for electoral competition even before broader political reform began in 1998, they are not solid political entities. Sub-village units, known as *dusun* or *dukuh*, are used to distinguish between insiders and outsiders;[7] in such a context, clans (*trah*) significantly shape social bonds and political preferences. Although such a situation is not unique to Javanese villages (Koentjaraningrat, 1967; Kartodirdjo, 1992; Haryanto, Sukmajati, & Lay, 2019), the *dusun* of Javanese villages are more consolidated than elsewhere.[8] Tönnies

[7] In the context of Javanese villages, the concepts of inside and outsider are strongly correlated with one's status as a local or migrant. Locals, or indigenous peoples, are those who have lived for generations within a village and established deep roots within the community. Migrants, meanwhile, are those who trace their roots to other villages yet still interact with villagers.

[8] According to Statistics Indonesia, in 2019 there were 83,813 villages/subdistricts in

(2001) describes these *dusun* as *gemeinschaft,* being united by shared blood, location, and perspectives. Such *gemeinschaft* are characterised as intimate, private, and exclusive; by a shared common will and consensus; and by natural law perceived and obeyed by members. *Dusun*, thus, are close and intimate social spaces, wherein the activities of all residents—even the elites—are known by all (Kartodirdjo, 1987).

Third, in Javanese villages, political symbols are predominantly linked to elites' power and ability to mobilise their social capital (including status), cultural capital (including knowledge and experience), and symbolic capital (including *pulung*, the revelatory light deemed to portend electoral victory).

Fourth, candidates must be able to provide social services to their constituents. Interviews indicated that, in elections, candidates' benevolence is deemed more important than more material aspects. This phenomenon was explained aptly by one informant: "[*The candidate] is a good man and often interacts with villagers. If we have a ceremony, he'll attend. He isn't reluctant, and will reply if we greet him in the streets.*" (interview, Awang, resident of Kedungbanteng Hamlet, 9 October 2018). In interviews, informants stated that village heads are not merely government officials, but also "fathers" to their communities.

Conclusion

This article has shown that, even as Islamic populism has become widespread in Indonesia's municipal, provincial, and national elections, it has had little effect on elections in the two studied villages. Such a phenomenon is not without precedent; a cursory review of election results showed that several Javanese elections were won by minority candidates. For instance, in 2012, Rogomulyo Village in Semarang Regency, Central Java, elected a Christian priest named Timotius Trimin with 60% of the votes (1,559 of 2,600 votes); Trimin was re-elected in 2018 (Satuharapan, 2013; UKDW, 2019). In 2013, a Christian named Mulyadi was elected the head of Nglinggi, a Muslim-majority village in Klaten, Central Java; although this village was home to only 20 Christians (0.8% of its 2,400 residents), Mulyadi received 52% of the 1,248 valid votes cast (BBC Indonesia, 2019). Meanwhile, Giling Village in Pati, Central Java, elected a Buddhist leader named Sunarsih (Patikab, 2019),

This article has shown that Islamic populism has had limited influence on village-level political contestations in Indonesia, a situation that may be explained by several factors. Village elections are thus inclusive, with minority candidates being provided space to contest and even win elections. This article has also indirectly shown the limitations of analyses that emphasise the importance of

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Indonesia. Almost a third of these (25,277) were located in Java: 8,562 in Central Java, 8,501 in East Java, 5,957 in West Java, 1,552 in Banten, 438 in Yogyakarta, and 267 in the Jakarta Capital Region.

It was estimated that, in 2018, Java was home to 149.6 million people, divided as follows: West Java, 48.7 million; East Java, 39.5 million; Central Java, 34.5 million; Banten, 12.7 million; Jakarta Capital Region, 10.5 million; and Yogyakarta 3.8 million (Kata Data, 2019).

Islamic populism in elections and offers a window into contemporary electoral processes. Islamic populism, though used commonly in Indonesia's elections over the past fifteen years, has its limitations. Since 2004 (and particularly following Jakarta's 2018 gubernatorial election), scholars have emphasised the role of Islamic populism in contemporary elections and argued that this populism—together with money politics, paternalism, and programmatic politics (Allen, 2015; Aspinall & Rohman, 2017; Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2016; Mas'udi & Kurniawan, 2017; Sukmajati & Aspinal, 2014)—poses a significant threat to Indonesian democracy. Our findings indicate that, to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of Indonesian electoral processes and political developments, we must also obtain an understanding of village elections, as these are integral parts of broader political processes. We thus believe that this article can enrich and expand contemporary discourse on elections in Indonesia.

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Livelihood Diversification as Political Translation: The Political Reaction of the Modang Dayak to Large-Scale Land Acquisition in Upland East Kalimantan

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Abstract

This article questions the ability of the resistance framework to explain local communities' political reactions to oil palm expansion. Guided by a translation and ethnographic framework, this study investigates the Modang Dayak community's political reaction from below to large-scale land acquisitions in upland East Kalimantan. It shows that, based on their knowledge and everyday life practice, the Modang Dayaks have the agency to negotiate the land scarcity that has accompanied oil palm expansion. This study contributes to reaction theory by arguing that livelihood diversification is a form of political translation used to negotiate the difficulties created by palm oil; as land has become increasingly scarce, the Modang Dayaks have redefined their relationship with it. This reality tends to be ignored in political science debates because researchers generally view political reactions through a resistance paradigm. Ultimately, however, the politics of translation go beyond the politics of resistance.

Keywords: *translation, large-scale land acquisition, palm oil, livelihood diversification.*

Introduction

This article analyses how the Modang Dayaks of upland East Kalimantan have politically reacted from below (Borras & Franco, 2013) to the large-scale land acquisitions that have accompanied the expansion of palm oil. How has this expansion affected the struggles of the Modang Dayaks? In the political sciences, resistance has been the most commonly used explanation. Chin and Mittelman (2000) suggest Gramsci's counter-hegemony, Polanyi's counter-movements, and Scott's infra-politics as potential frameworks for studying resistance to neoliberalism. In this paradigm, the Dayaks' struggle against palm oil expansion is more representative of the Gramscian model

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(Potter, 2008) and everyday resistance (Toumbourou & Dressler, 2020; Gönner, 2017).

This article questions the concept of resistance as an explanation for local responses to oil palm expansion. It argues that resistance is merely a cover for the many faces of power and domination (Rose, 1999, p. 279). It is a binary concept, one that leaves people with only two choices when confronted with power: passive submission or total rejection (Cooper, 1994). It ignores other possibilities and denies power relations aside from these two options (Latour, 1986: 268).

As a result, the analysis offered by resistance studies fails to consider the various ways in which people use their knowledge and practices to deal with the effects of power. Individuals are not only acted upon by abstract structures, says Weiler (1988: 21), but negotiate, struggle, and create their meanings of power. As Foucault emphasises (Foucault, 1980: 142), power is not something that is exercised along a single chain in which it is received (thereby allowing it to continue in its original form) or is blocked by an active force that prevents or reverses its transmission. Instead, it operates through networks in which individuals continually accommodate, reshape and, at times, resist the discourses and practices of power that they encounter in everyday life.

Following Ortner (1995), Li (2012: 282) suggests avoiding "ethnographic refusal", namely the trap of "black-and-white" narratives that present people as heroes fighting against repressive powers. Instead, it is necessary to direct attention to how creativity can emerge from people who engage in certain relationships of power and meaning, and what these possibilities build on (Rose, cited in Li, 2012: 50).

To explain such creativity, this study uses the case of the Modang Dayaks in East Kutai Regency, East Kalimantan. Inspired by translation theory (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1986; Law, 1992), this article argues that, despite the problems posed by palm oil and the power it exerts to regulate their behaviour, the Modang Dayaks are not docile bodies but have the agency to translate them into circulating discourses. Their diversification of livelihood is one form of political translation undertaken in response to palm oil.

Theoretical Framework

Conceptually, the politics of translation emerged from within the body of Actor-Network Theory—also known as ANT (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1986; Law, 1992). Latour (2005: 204) claims that no place is domineering enough to be global, nor is any place independent enough to be local. Networking is a central issue in ANT. Networks never consist solely of humans; they involve complex relationships between people, objects, and texts (Latour, 1987: 180). One important point of ANT is that humans are not the only ones with agency; nature, too, has agency and its own will.

How is the network between the actants[2] formed? It is formed through the process of translation, i.e., the process by which actants join a network, being brought into a situation of coexistence (Latour 2005: 108) by moving from one state to another (Callon, 1986). In these networks, one actant reinterprets or shifts the interests (goals, problems, solutions) or even the identity of the other actants, thereby ensuring the alignment of their interests (Law, 1992). In short, translation is an attempt to define and control other actants (Horowitz, 2012: 809). It is a process for shaping thoughts and behaviours, one involving discussion or negotiation between human and non-human actants (Williams-Jones & Graham, 2003). In other words, translation is an act of invention that combines previously disparate elements.

This study follows the translation framework developed by Callon (1986). According to Callon (1986: 203–219), the translation process occurs through four potentially non-linear moments: problematisation, interessement, enrolment, and mobilisation. Problematisation is where focal actants (churches and NGOs) seek to make themselves indispensable to other actants (swiddeners and nature) by defining the nature of the problems that actants face in achieving their goals. Interessement is the stage where focal actants lock others in place by repositioning themselves and weakening other actants' relationship with alternative interpretations through the development of Village Forests as an obligatory passage point (OPP) that all actants must pass. Enrolment refers to the success of interests. Finally, mobilisation is the stage where focal actants borrow the alliance power of their agents and transform themselves into representatives or spokespersons for the Modang Dayak people and customary forests.

Method

This article draws on ethnographic field research conducted by the author over the course of nine months in Long Bentuq (pseudonym), a Mahakam Dayak village located in East Kutai Regency, East Kalimantan, Indonesia. To explore the research questions, a mix of participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and in-depth interviews were used. The fieldwork involved a total of 89 formal interviews with the provincial, district, sub-district, and village government officials, as well as informal interviews with NGOs, *adat* leaders, *adat* elders, and swiddeners.

Participant observation and interviews were used mainly to collect data on spatial concepts, landscape changes, and how these changes affect livelihood strategies. The themes that were common in semi-structured interviews (i.e., the scarcity of land and forest resources, as well as the desire for alternative revenue streams) were then explored through in-depth interviews. Pseudonyms were used to protect participants.

[2] Following ANT theorists, this study uses the term actant to replace the anthropocentric actors.

Results and Discussion

1. Problematisation: Finding Customary (*Adat*) Rationality

In 1998, the Governor of East Kalimantan launched the One Million Hectares of Oil Palms programme. Five years later, a new ambition emerged: to double the area covered by oil palm plantations, reaching two million hectares. East Kutai Regency was central in the expansion of oil palm agribusiness, as it accounted for 453,490 hectares of oil palms—37.8% of the provincial total (Kaltim Plantation Office, 2019). As of writing, a total of 21.7 million hectares of concessions have been granted in East Kalimantan for mining, forestry, and oil palm cultivation—more than the province's total area of 19.6 million hectares (Fel, 2019). This "bubble" has occurred because of overlapping permits issued by the national and local governments.

In 2007, the Modang Dayaks in Long Bentuq began to express unease with the limited availability of land for cultivation due to the expansion of oil palm plantations. The village head, with the support of the Catholic Church, established an alliance with an NGO, the Perkumpulan Nurani Perempuan (Women of Conscience, PNP), to take action against the palm oil plantations. The village head, PNP, and the Catholic Church emerged as focal actants because they aimed to translate the interests of other actants and establish networks.

In mid-July 2007, focal actants began to hold discussions with *adat* elders to develop a better understanding, awareness, and sense of belonging amongst the indigenous of the Busang District. Inspired by the neighbouring Wehea Dayaks, who have succeeded in developing Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM), focal actants proposed that 40,808 hectares of forest be designated as a Village Forest, a scheme that was officially recognised by the Minister of Forestry. The village forest programme was established to strengthen CBFM in the Indonesian forestry sector; if customary forest areas are approved as village forests, residents can protect the area from corporate expansion and maintain it under their management for 35 years (Urano, 2014: 18). For focal actants, community-based forest management initiatives offer a medium for community organisation as well as a basis for negotiations with the state without requiring open resistance.

Thus, focal actants aimed to translate themselves as the main force, or at least as inspirations for an ongoing struggle. The moment of problematisation involves definition and solution. As narrated in the Letter of Rejection against Oil Palm Plantations, dated 9 July 2007: "forest land and water are gifts from God that must be protected and preserved for the sake of the integrity of creation and its survival. Land, water, and forests are not only of economic value but also of social and cultural value."

The focal actants identified the problem, namely that the forest—as God's creation—was subjected to cruel and destructive practices due to oil palm expansion. Protecting the forest, as God's creation, was paramount. Furthermore, problematisation is highly dependent on focal actants' definition of customary forests. In this case, focal actants defined the landscape (forest, land, water, and animals) through the gaze of the Catholic Church. In this gaze, the forest is imagined

as natural and thus needing to be kept away from destructive human activities, while the Modang Dayaks are narrated as victims who are bound to and live in harmony with forest resources. The narrative of the natural landscape and its inhabitants as victims justifies the compulsory eviction of companies.

The removal of oil palm was thus considered to be the primary interest of the forest, with the narrative of a "helpless forest" that must be saved from human greed being the main feature of focal actants' arguments. In this narrative, the forest narrative (as an actant) is powerless to rationalise the actions of a focal actant to represent its will.

However, the focal actants did not have the power to stop the expansion of oil palm plantations. They faced a power network that stretched from the national to the local. As such, to challenge this power network, focal actants had to attract other actors. The Village Head of Long Bentuq Village gave the authority to eleven NGOs[3] to join the network against the presence of palm oil.

2. Interessement: Aligning Actants Interests

At this moment, focal actants are trying to establish themselves as an alliance that has the privilege to advance the struggle of the Modang Dayak by severing other potential ties, especially with oil palm companies. According to Callon (1986), during the interessement phase, other actants should become interested in the proposed solution: designation of Village Forests. The moment of interessement is necessary because an alliance of focal actants is not the only option. Actants may reject or accept the Village Forest by defining their needs, preferences, goals, and attributes, thereby stabilising the network. For example, the Village Head could mobilise citizens in demonstrations against the company, but he would be vulnerable to legal action due to his position.

At the moment of enrolment, roles were assigned to actants. Focal actants acted as the main driving force behind the grassroots struggle against the claims of palm oil companies, while traditional protest groups served as the public face of the movement and became the basis of its political and moral legitimacy at the national and international level. By using the discourse on customary rights, focal actants succeeded in persuading the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission and the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia to join a larger network. The formation of new networks required a redefinition of the relationship between nature and humans. Nature was no longer linked with a spiritual discourse, as defined by the focal actants, but with the internationally recognised discourse of customary rights. In the new discourse, customary rights were linked with the argument that oil palm exploitation went against customary morals and culture. Oil palm was contextualised within the discourse on indigenous peoples' rights, suggesting that its exploitation violated the idea of customary forests as havens for

[3] Nomaden Institute, Perkumpulan Nurani Perempuan (PNP), Serikat Hijau, Padi Indonesia, Kelompok Kerja (Pokja) 30, Perma Adat, Wahana Lingkungan Hidup (WALHI) Kalimatan Timur, Lembaga Pemberdayaan Perempuan, Missio Institute, Jaringan Tambang (JATAM), and Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nustara (AMAN)

wildlife and that posed a significant obstacle to the community's usage of its customary space. This is evident in the Village Forest proposal:

> *Forests are part of the daily life of the Modang Dayak indigenous people and cannot be separated from the local culture. From the perspective of moving villages, it is closely related to human dependence. When people are looking for directions to make changes, they must enter the forest, and meet and communicate with various animals ... A new paradigm was introduced after independence, when forests were cut down on a massive scale, and after the government's Large-Scale Palm Oil Plantation programme, the cultural destruction of the Modang community began (author's translation).*

The narrative of customary rights was further linked to biodiversity: "Pressure has forced the Long Bentuq community to fight to protect and save the forest, including the biodiversity it contains, such as hornbills, peacocks and orangutans" (Forest Watch Indonesia, press release, 15 April 2013). Escobar (quoted in D'Andrea, 2013: 206) said that the term "biodiversity" is a new discursive finding, a new form of capitalism that accumulates not capital but nature by creating landscapes that are consumed by thousands of corporate sponsors and members who pour money into organisations. As such, through the discourse of "biodiversity", facilitators transformed the Long Bentuq forest landscape into a global commodity. Here we see a redefinition of the relationship between humans and nature, shifting from the Catholic gaze to the global discourse on conservation. In this new discourse, customary practices were narrated in line with conservation efforts. This discourse shift aimed to align the interests of Church-based actants with those of customary rights activists. Problematically, as shown later, even though they were against the existence of oil palm plantations, the village forest solution was ultimately based on the same logic: abstract space (Lefebvre, 1991).



Figure 1. Conservation Discourse Network
OPP = Obligatory Passage Point

3. Enrolment: How do focal actants represent the will of Modang Dayaks?

In the moment of interessement, focal actants secure their preferred definition and ensure it is received well, but they do not involve entities in active networks. In other words, interessement devices do not always lead to alliances, i.e., actual enrolment (Callon, 1986: 2011). This is only achieved through what Callon (1986: 211) calls a "group of multi-lateral negotiations, trials of strength and tricks."

Negotiating with nature is not an easy matter. If the forest is to be enrolled, coordinates must first be found through Global Positioning Systems (GPS). In December 2011, the team from the East Kutai Forestry Service failed to find the coordinates. After conducting a field survey between 2012 and 2014, activists from Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif (Participatory Mapping Network, JKPP) helped the Modang Dayaks produce a participatory map of Long Bentuq in 2017. Mapping is a very powerful medium for shaping a particular place (D'Andrea, 2013: 189). A counter map, as Peluso (1995) calls it, offered the Modang Dayaks an important tool to negotiate their territorial claims with the state. Through participatory maps, the Modang Dayaks could also see the extent of concessions on their customary lands. In short, through a participatory map, the Modang Dayaks could match the state's claims (Kurniawan, 2016).

While JKPP helped the Modang Dayaks map their territory, another actant, the Nature Conservancy (TNC), provided knowledge on zoning techniques. Long Bentuq Village Forest was divided into five zones: Conservation, Timber Forest Plantation, Annual Plantation, Micro-Hydro, and Ecotourism.

In October 2009, the coalition proposed a village forest covering 40,000 ha to the Ministry of Forests. This became an obligatory passage point (OPP) that had to be passed by every actant who joined the conservation discourse network. Therein

lay the dilemma. For a customary forest to be registered, it must be tied to the district government. However, such links were not easily achieved. Referring to Law No. 41/1999 on Forestry and Law No. 32/2009 on Environmental Protection and Management, customary forests must be recognised through local regulations. As a result, the proposal process failed to meet expectations, and the focal actants were forced to submit three proposals after the first two (in 2009 and 2010) were said to have been "lost on the Regent's desk". Facing pressure from the Human Rights Commission and the Indonesian Ombudsman, on 21 June 2011 the Regent of East Kutai finally signed the proposal for the Long Bentuq Village Forest (albeit with only 11,648.90 ha of the proposed 40,000 ha). In November 2012, the Ministry of Forests issued a Decree on Management of Long Bentuq Village Forest, covering an area of 880 hectares. The Modang Dayaks of Long Bentuq rejected this decision, as not only was the approved area greatly reduced, but the designated area was outside the proposed location and administratively separate from Long Bentuq Village. As such, it could trigger horizontal conflict with neighbouring villages.

The Minister of Forests did not issue a policy following the proposal, as in 2009 it had granted PT Permata Borneo Abadi an industrial concession to 54,000 ha of forests (Ministry of Forestry, 29 May 2009). Thus, both the Minister of Forests and the Government of East Kutai Regency sought to establish obligatory passage points through their permits. Since Indonesia had implemented autonomy and decentralization, regency governments had found room to manoeuvre and renegotiate their powers. Having already felt the benefits of forest exploitation and ready to achieve autonomy, they often ignored the Ministry of Forests (Wollenberg, Moeliono, & Limberg, 2009: 15).

The East Kutai Regency Government sought to involve the Long Bentuq community in its pro-palm alliance, using as its enrolment tool the village head elections (*pemilihan kepala desa*, or *Pilkades)*. These elections provided the pro-oil palm networks with opportunities to involve the Kutai Dayaks and Buginese. The Buginese are the largest ethnic group in Long Bentuq, representing approximately 40% of the total population. Exploiting religious issues, the pro-oil palm network succeeded in eliminating the incumbent, a major opponent of oil palm plantations, in the village head election on 20 December 2016. According to a PNP coordinator, the palm oil company was behind the incumbent's defeat. In translating the situation, representatives of the pro-palm oil network framed themselves as having provided Long Bentuq with employment and promised future financial benefits. Using such narratives, as well as religious sentiments, the company succeeded in involving the Buginese and Kutai Dayaks in a pro-palm oil coalition. As observed elsewhere (see Tjitradjaja, cited in Li, 2002: 33), some of them became land brokers for outsiders. These individuals may betray their class interests and their fellow villagers to form alliances with newcomers, including patrons who promise access to jobs, resources, and/or government power.

Thus, the successful mobilisation of contesting networks depends on proving which representation is more "representative" (Woods, 1997: 33). The question is, how representative are the

focal actants representing the people and nature?

4. Mobilisation: Why the Conservation Discourse Coalition Failed

> "We took one step further in the fight for the Village Forest, but suddenly the *Kepala Adat Dayak Besar Modang* (Great Customary Chief of Modang Dayaks) came to see me, got angry, and said: "Why are you rejecting palm oil? Not everyone here doesn't like palm oil. There is no point in refusing palm oil; it makes a profit." (author's translation).

The above quote describes the focal actants representing the will of the Modang Dayaks. If interessement is successful and enrolment is achieved, the network of entities can be mobilised and actants can be transferred to the network designed by focal actants. In this case, however, the attempt failed due to the knowledge gap between the actants and the persons being presented. Many social movements based on collective identity weaken when members no longer feel adequately represented (Polletta & Jasper, 2001: 292), resulting in what Callon calls the fifth moment: dissidence. In the case studied by Callon (1986), seashells refused to be presented or involved (p. 220). Likewise, fishermen do not obey their spokespersons (scientists) and were tempted to harvest shells in restricted zones.

From the perspective of ANT theory, dissidence arises because of the problem of the "representativeness of representatives". Mobilisation means consolidating entities where this was not previously the case (Callon, 1986: 216). Initially, forest actants, swiddeners, and assistants were scattered; they only became a network after the facilitator said that community-based forest management was the solution to save the "remaining customary forest." This mobilisation (or concentration) has a certain physical reality that is manifested through a series of displacements (Callon, 1986: 217). Forests are transferred to GPS coordinates, coordinates to GIS numbers, and numbers to maps that are easy to reproduce and move (Latour, 1985). However, GPS is often unable to accurately determine the coordinates of particular points. For example, the coordinate points used for the 700-ha forest area of Long Bentuq village were located within the transmigration area of Long Tesaq Village, Muara Ancalong District. Usually, such problems occur because of the curvature of the earth. However, the error can be adjusted through computer calculations; to create precise maps, it is necessary to enter information into the computer so that the points can be shifted slightly and boundary lines can be drawn accurately (D'Andrea, 2013: 222). This cannot be done in the field; it must be done in the office. The Long Bentuq Forest, for example, was easily moved to a "companion" office space for further map production, ultimately becoming represented by maps that could easily be reproduced and carried to conference rooms, seminars, mass media, and others.

At the moment of enrolment, thus each entity is simply represented. In this case, forests were represented by maps, the Modang Dayaks were represented by focal actants who were depicted as victims of development and capitalism. The problem is that the focal actants' efforts to map and divide Village Forest zones to produce community-based forest

management plans used an approach that conceptualised an abstract space that was empty of occupants. Abstraction not only reduced forest landscapes into images but also replaced the Modang Dayaks' indigenous knowledge of space. In their traditional knowledge, the Modang Dayaks classified landscapes into *sebelau* (young forests), *tenoaq pwun* (secondary forests), *la mauq* (swidden plots), and *tenoaq nan* (primary forests) using not maps, but conceptual zones (field notes, 6 May 2019). In this model, zones were strictly defined by the types of activities that could be conducted within. For example, in conservation zones, all human activities were forbidden—including swiddening—because this zone aims to maintain natural authenticity and protect water sources.

The next dilemma lies in focal actants perspectives on the classical/romantic concept of indigenous peoples. Focal actants viewed indigenous communities as built on solidarity and cohesion, failing to recognise that the Modang Dayaks are a divided society where conflict affects many aspects of their networks—including their efforts to oppose large-scale plantations.

Thus, network mobilisation depended highly on the extent to which the Modang Dayaks accepted the image of palm oil companies and their cruelty. Not all residents of Long Bentuq accepted the conservation discourse and rejected the idea that oil palm cultivation was destructive.



Figure 2. Development Discourse Networks
OPP = Obligatory Passage Point; NES = Nucleus Estate and Smallholders

5. Livelihood Diversification Strategies as Political Translation

The failure of focal actants to build a coalition against palm oil prompted the Modang Dayaks to develop a new strategy for the situation they were facing. Rather than aiming to preserve local ecosystems, their main goal was to protect the indigenous peoples' interests from exogenous threats to their landscape and livelihoods. Unlike the focal actants, who blamed cultivation for their woes, *adat* protest groups have not rejected oil palm exploitation. As one *adat* leader put it:

> *We don't reject palm oil. What we reject is their way of not asking us for permission. They don't respect us. In our custom, people who do not ask permission to plant in our fields are considered thieves. That's a serious offence. In the past, people who did that were carried out in a traditional ceremony and then expelled from the village…. If the company came to us nicely, there wouldn't be a problem. Just like the Bugis, the Kutai, and the Kenyah who now have a village. They used to come nicely asking for permission; they were allowed to not even pay a penny. But now we are having a hard time finding land (author's translation).*

The narrative explains that Modang Dayaks do not blame the cultivation efforts or reject palm oil in its entirety; such a narrative was promoted by the conservation discourse. Not infrequently, the Modang Dayaks' way of redefining their relationship with nature was accused of framing themselves as "victims of capitalism". For example, in my interview with an environmental activist, it was explained: "it's hard for us to fight because they always want money… if they want to protect the forest, let's fight together".

Environmentalists and proponents of peasants' rights who assume that "traditional" societies oppose the state or government to maintain their "own" institutions and practices may be forgetting that rural dwellers often try to get the most out of their positions as full citizens (Li, 2002: 36). Understanding the concept of power through a binary lens has been common among NGOs who take a Dayak identity as their conceptual foundation: the Dayaks and their way of life are described as sustainable, biodiverse, and natural, based on the ideals of collectivity and cooperation, spirituality, traditional rituals, subsistence, customary law, and locality, while the opposite of empowerment is monoculture, individuality and competition, scientific rationality, commerciality, globalisation, and the state (Duile, 2017: 124).

Thus, each network of actants gives *adat* groups a certain identity and interests through the process of engagement and enrolment. In this process, NGOs try to position themselves as spokespersons (Horowitz, 2011: 19–20), or as "companions". The result is a narrative featuring "the simultaneous production of knowledge and construction of networks of relationships in which social and natural entities mutually control who they are and what they want" (Callon, 1986: 59). To be adopted by individuals and groups, each identity must appear natural, that is, as an identity independent of other identities. Such identities in post-structural theory are described as transcendental signifiers or centres of symbolic order: They govern the order of symbolic meaning, as the

meanings of all other elements in the symbolic order of language seem to depend on that centre. Of course, this idea is inaccurate; although they appear to be central, independent symbols, as symbols in language structure they are inexorably dependent on other terms and symbols within the structure (Derrida, 1997 cited in Duile, 2017: 123). Instead of relying on one contesting centre, the Modang Dayaks have conducted discourse. They have not rejected development or markets. Rather, they have rejected the tendency for outsiders to take too much while leaving them with too little.

Generally, the Dayaks of Kalimantan—including the Modang Dayaks—have relied heavily on livelihood diversification. The cacao boom of 2012–2014 in Long Bentuq provides a contemporary example. In 2014, the 2,530 hectares of cocoa plantations in Busang District (home to Long Bentuq) produced 1,940.85 tonnes of pods. It was thus one of the most productive sub-districts in Indonesia (Urano, 2014: 6). During this boom, the land in Long Bentuq was first commodified, exchanged, and traded. Land cleared for cultivation was quickly transformed into cocoa fields (field note, 12 March 2019).

An important lesson from the cocoa boom is that the destruction of the subsistence base is not always the result of the development of state-supported market capitalism. Swiddeners in Long Bentuq were fully aware that the cocoa boom would destroy their subsistence base. However, the interviewed swiddeners said that the risks were commensurate with the benefits. It was only during the cocoa boom that the Modang Dayaks could buy things like televisions and washing machines, or new clothes for their children to wear to church.

Another swiddener said that cocoa cultivation did not interfere with their autonomy, as production factors such as land and labour remained completely under their control. The work was relatively easy, paid better, and was easy to learn. As Dagog (pseudonym) said: "The convenience of cocoa [is that] we manage it ourselves; the pods are not difficult and caring for them is also easy. If there is a problem, we call the Bugis." In the palm oil industry, conversely, these communal practices are fully under the control of the company. Oil palm agribusiness transfers control of land, labour, and cultivation knowledge from households to the company. Consequently, the expansion of commercial plantations has led to the widespread and rapid demise of upland agriculture (Cramb, et. al., 2009: 328).

Instead of curbing their enthusiasm for becoming involved in the market, since the burst of the cocoa bubble, the Modang Dayaks have begun actively growing crops that are desired by the market. Driven by the need to earn money, they have reoriented their modes of production; they have planted bananas and durians, developed aquaculture, made wallets, raised pigs, and created other commodities that the market is interested in. However, many still view swiddening as their main source of livelihood. The Modang Dayaks refer to such diversification of livelihoods as *teweus hiang* (field note, 25 April 2019). Scholars, meanwhile, call it a dual or composite economy (Eghenter, 2006; Dove, 2011; Lounela, 2007) involving semi-subsistence (Potter, 2011; Rigg, 2005), extended subsistence (Gönner, 2017), or

flexible livelihood strategies (Höing & Radjawali, 2017).



Figure 3. Livelihood Diversification Networks
OPP = Obligatory Passage Point; LD = Livelihood Diversifications

The history of land use in Long Bentuq shows that, no matter how strong the structural pressures, farmers are not passive victims of circumstance (Schneider & Niederle, 2010: 387). Rather, they are innovative actants who wish to use and modify new practices for accumulation (Ruiter, 2002: 405). The most basic principle of translation is that individuals are never limited to the choice of rejecting or passively accepting power; rather, they are active agents who can transform power into other forms depending on their needs (Latour, 1986). Humans have their reasons for accepting rules and, in their journey, translating them into new forms (Latour, 1986). From this perspective, rules are reshaped and transformed from within the networks of power, rather than being challenged from without, and politics becomes "a much more open process of contestation and engagement" (O'Malley, 1996: 312).

Conclusion

This article shows that political reactions to oil palm expansion are not sufficiently explained by resistance. As in the case examined in this study, the scarcity of land and the need for income prompted the Modang Dayaks to redefine their relationship with nature. In contrast to the classical romantic view that is prevalent in resistance discourse, *adat* is a dynamic practice that is always in the process of becoming. In this context, the decision to become actively involved in the market cannot be seen as falling victim to capitalism, but as a creative strategy to actively benefit from the opportunities offered by palm oil without sacrificing swiddening practices. In this context, too, it can be explained why local struggles often fail. In contrast to the actor-based explanation, this study found that local struggles failed due to the differences in knowledge between the focal actants who

represented and those who were presented.

The Modang Dayaks' use of livelihood diversification strategies in response to palm oil expansion has theoretical implications for the exercise of power, which goes beyond the binary narratives described in resistance theory. Existing studies have yet to explain livelihood diversification as a political reaction from below, specifically as a form of political translation.

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