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Aims and Scope:

PCD Journal of South and Southeast Asia's Power, Conflict, and Democracy Studies is an international refereed journal initiated by the Power, Conflict, and Democracy (PCD) consortium, a collaborative work by the University of Colombo in Sri Lanka, Gadjah Mada University in Indonesia, and the University of Oslo in Norway. It is a journal that comprehensively examines the dynamics of power and democracy, including practices of human rights, popular representation, and public policy, particularly, in Indonesia but still giving a space for comparative studies. Invitation is extended to authors with interest in making comparison experiences in Indonesia with those of the rest of the globe. PCD Journal publishes articles, literature review, field notes, and book reviews in major sub fields of political science, human geography, and political anthropology.

PCD Journal aims to address some of the most current issues of power, conflict, and democracy in Indonesia with comparative perspective. While the journal is open to all methodological approaches, all submissions are expected to be theoretically grounded. The journal can be of great value to teachers, students, researchers, experts, journalists, and social movement activist dealing with these issues and regions.

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Submitted papers should be no longer than 8,000 words excluding tables and figures. Submit the manuscript via e-mail to the editor-in-chief at pcd@ugm.ac.id.

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For detailed instruction check our website: https://jurnal.ugm.ac.id/v3/PCD or http://www.jurnal.ugm.ac.id/pcd.

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Every submitted article will be subject to peer review. The normal review period is three months. Most research articles in this journal have undergone rigorous peer review based on initial editorial screening and refereeing by anonymous referees. Authors should take care that the manuscript contains no clues as to identity. Nevertheless, articles published under 'Research Notes' section, aimed at setting up future research agenda, are non-peer-reviewed.

PCD Programme

The state of democracy in the Global South is marked by a striking paradox: while liberal democracy has attained an ideologically hegemonic position through two so-called waves of democracy, the qualities of such democracies is increasingly called into question. The "old" democracies in the global South like Sri Lanka are weakened. Democracy deficits have emerged within constitutional and institutional arrangements as well as in political practices. Further, the "third wave of democracy" is over. "New" democracies like in Indonesia have fostered freedoms, privatisation and decentralisation but continue to suffer from poor governance, representation and participation. Hence there are general signs of decline. Vulnerable people are frustrated with lack of actual influence and sustained elitism. Politicians winning elections often need to foster ethnic and religious loyalties, clientelism and the abuse of public resources. Powerful groups and middle classes with poor ability to win elections tend to opt for privatisation and return partially to authoritarian governance.

Critical questions are therefore asked about the feasibility of democracy in developing country contexts. Some observers say it is only a problem of better crafting of institutions. Others contend that "full" democratisation was premature in the first place and that necessary preconditions need to be created beforehand. Both positions are based on a narrow and static understanding of democracy. While the core elements of democracy are universal, real world democracies develop (or decline) over time and through contextual dynamics; in processes and contexts of actors, institutions and relations of power. Therefore, the crucial task is to analyse the problems and options of expanding the historically "early" freedoms and deficient elements of democracy that fortunately exist in spite of poor socio- economic and political conditions in counties such as Sri Lanka and Indonesia rather than giving up on these freedoms until the other have somehow improved. This is to advance towards the universally accepted aim of democracy in terms of popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality, and to be able to use democracy to handle conflicts and alter unequal and unsustainable development.

With this in mind, researchers at the University of Oslo (Norway), Gadjah Mada (Indonesia) and Colombo (Sri Lanka) have come together in a collective research—and post- graduate programme. The idea is to pool their research projects and results, and to promote doctoral as well as master studies by way of, first, a joint framework for analysing power, conflict and democracy and, second, a basic electronic peer reviewed journal and report series (published by *PCD-Press*) to the benefit of students, scholars and priorities in the region. Basic resources—in addition to the participants own voluntary work and projects— are provided by their respective universities and the Norwegian Centre for International Cooperation in Higher Education (SIU).

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Politics of Legitimation: Transnational Policy in Banana Contract Farming in Davao, Mindanao, The Philippines

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Abstract

This research discusses contract farming—an agreement between farmers and processing and/or marketing firms, usually agribusiness transnational companies (TNCs), under a specific arrangement that commonly includes predetermined prices for the production and supply of agricultural products—in a transnational policy context. The study is dominated by institutionalism and materialism approaches which hold that structural changes coincide with economic development. However, this approaches raises a question about the role of actors in instituting, transferring, and challenging the norms of contract farming. This research seeks to challenge the literature by focusing on how contract farming, as a dual process, constitutes a territory for its actors to claim and reclaim their authority. Drawing on the implementation of agreements between TNCs and small farmers in Davao, Mindanao, we discuss the legitimation process within a context of strong state political control and complicated global market flows. Specifically, this research aims to understand how contract farming institutes a particular type of legitimation through the influence of transnational policy. Using the organisational and institutional legitimation approaches, we understand contract farming as a fluid and openly contested distributing authority. This research uses four data collection methods: desk studies, interviews, focus group discussions, and observation.

Keywords*: contract farming; politics of legitimation; transnational policy; transnational companies (TNCs); the Philippines.*

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Introduction

Recently, there has been an emerging interest to discuss contract farming—an agreement between farmers and processing and/or marketing firms, which are usually TNCs, under a specific arrangement that commonly covers predetermined prices for the production and supply of agricultural products (Eaton & Shepherd, 2001)—in the transnational policy interface. This is shown by studies in contract farming including integrating farmers' participation (Barrett et al., 2012; Arumugam, Mohamed, and Mohamed, 2011; Dubbert, 2019); understanding the relationship between global market and agrarian conflict (Vellema et al., 2011; Akram-Lodhi, 2015; Vicol, 2017); also, channelling welfare and economic development performance under the cooperation scheme (Eaton & Shepherd, 2001; Bellemare & Bloem, 2018; Bijman, 2008). Though the literature mostly uses a rights-based point of view, Diprose, Kurniawan, and McDonald (2019) suggest that legitimation in transnational policy is fluid. This perspective is important because they show how contract farming institutes a particular nature of legitimation through the influence of transnational policy.

The Philippines is known as the second-largest exporter of bananas in the world, responsible for 11.1% of global banana production—valued at US$1.9 billion in 2019 (Workman, 2019; Workman, 2021). Consequently, the country is often targeted by transnational agribusiness companies (TNCs) for investment (Vellema, 2002). Mindanao plays an essential role in the Philippines' agricultural economy, as it produces various products for export—including bananas (UMA, 2019). Davao, which is located in Mindanao,

is known as the banana capital of the Philippines; in 2018, it produced 901.14 thousand metric tonnes of bananas—37.3% of the Philippines' overall production (PSA, 2018). Contract farming has been promoted as a prominent mechanism for integrating farmers into the global market, with farmers positioned as TNCs' partners (UNCTAD, 2011). However, this mechanism has been criticised due to the nature of these partnerships, wherein TNCs are dominant (Singh, 2005).

Contract farming demonstrates how international institutions, corporations, and states have established a system wherein resources are controlled by making agriculture private or state-owned. Several kinds of contracts govern various interests in the field, including centralised, nucleus estate, multipartite, informal developer, and intermediary (tripartite) contracts (Eaton & Shepard 2001). However, studies of contract farming have predominantly discussed the superstructure actors who arrange, institute, and implement the system and provide grassroots leadership (Brown, 2020). Studies predominantly understand authority as formal and fixed, bound by that which is stated in contract and policy. This view is problematic, as it does not consider the spillover effects of authority that work in contract farming and among its actors.

This research seeks to challenge this literature by showing contract farming as involving overlapping arrangements and loosely bounded, relatively coupled sets of relations between multilevel actors (Isegar, Fold, & Nsindagi, 2018). Drawing on the implementation of agreements between TNCs and small

farmers—i.e., small landlord farmers and workers—in Santo Tomas and Compostela Valley, Davao, Mindanao, in 2019, we discuss legitimation within the context of strong political control and complicated global market flows. Specifically, this research aims to understand how contract farming realises a particular form of legitimation through a multilevel governance process.

Building on the approach offered by Diprose, Kurniawan, and Macdonald (2019) for understanding political legitimation and transnational policy, this study tries to fill the gap in the literature by addressing how power is distributed within transnational policy. Diprose, Kurniawan, and Macdonald argue that distribution authority in transnational policy tends to be more fluid and openly contested (Diprose, Kurniawan, & Macdonald, 2019), as transnational policy offers more space—understood, per Davoudi and Strange (2009), as economically, socially, and culturally produced—for actors to create and exercise authority (Faludi, 2012). This approach can be further strengthened by the rights-based approach, which focuses on social justice. This allows us to understand how the actors encourage contract farming as part of a legal rights claim under certain conditions. These kinds of frameworks see contract farming as political and multi-processual, being designed to distribute risk among multilevel actors but simultaneously (as a spillover effect) distributing power.

Furthermore, using the concept of organisational and institutional legitimation—strategic forms of action through which transnational actors seek the endorsement of their efforts to exercise authority or

other forms of influence within multilevel governance settings—we provide a perspective that sees contract farming as an arena wherein the distribution of authority is fluidly and openly contested. This theory highlights that actors' strategic rationalities are intertwined with other instrumentals and driven by multiple mixes of moral, cognitive, and instrumental rationalities (Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy claims, thus, are causality processes which are "opposed to other instrumental or cognitive drivers" (Diprose, Kurniawan, & McDonald 2018).

As its research question, this study takes the following: how do TNCs and farmers establish their legitimacy in the banana contract farming system? This study employs qualitative research using a case study approach, which enables it to capture specific power relations in certain periods. Data were collected through four approaches: in-depth interviews; focus group discussions (FGD); reviews of news reports and government documents/policies; and direct observation of critical events from 8 to 15 April 2019. This article is organised as follows: an introduction, which includes a review of the literature, theoretical framework and research method; the establishment of Mindanao as a transnational operational field; the politics of legitimation in contract farming in Davao; the distribution of power in contract making; and conclusion.

Establishment of Mindanao as a Transnational Operational Field

The government of the Philippines has developed its approach to contract farming since 1935, when it initiated a settlement programme in rural

areas that included Southern Mindanao (Vellema, 2002). President Quezon established the National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA) to survey the land in Southern Mindanao and supervise its settlement by developing the social infrastructure needed for agriculture—for instance, by providing irrigation systems (Vellema, 2002). As time went by, the government developed different plans, often involving land reform, as part of its contract farming system. Land reform laws in the Philippines have evolved several times, in line with the nation's economic policy, and have been incorporated into the country's national economic development strategy since 1987 (Martin, 1999; Vera, 2015; Putzel, 1992).

Mindanao's significant role in contract farming is supported by the area's natural environment and its government. Naturally, Mindanao is home to fertile lands that are protected from the ravages of typhoons. Structurally, the government has produced various policies to encourage commercial plantations in the area. For example, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme (CARP) supported the development of pineapple plantations for Del Monte and Dole in Mindanao "by leasing land from private owners or by offering a contract to farmers" (Vellema, Borras, & Lara, 2010). In 2006, the government began offering Agribusiness Venture Arrangements (AVA) as a legal basis for the implementation of contract farming. Aside from defining the type of contracts, AVA regulates the mechanisms from the local to the national levels. With legal mechanisms provided by the state, farmers are formally integrated into the transnational governance of food. From this review, it is

evident that the government has implemented multiple-scale regulations to promote contract farming in Mindanao.

According to Franco and Borras, lease agreements are used by domestic elites and TNCs as new means of exploiting, expropriating, and controlling land that has been redistributed (2005 p. 338). This strategy appears to have been effective, as many TNCs have invested in the Philippines since the 1990s—particularly in Mindanao, which is known as the fruit basket of ASEAN. These include the Big Four of the banana industry, i.e., Dole, Unifrutti, Del Monte, and Sumifru (Monforte, 2017). Many banana farmers have become indebted to TNCs under unfair agreements, leading them to lose ownership of their land, which (according to applicable contracts) is transferred to TNCs (see Oxfam, 2018; Putzel, 1992). The case of AVA shows that the landowners and business actors, including TNCs, use contract farming to accumulate their own capital and violate the land rights of farmers.

Figure 1 Top productions from Mindanao



Source: UMA, 2019.

Figure 2 Production of bananas in the Davao Region 2018-2020 (in metric tonnes)



Source: The Philippines Statistic Authority, 2021

At the same time, these policies have proven effective in integrating the land, farmers, and TNCs in Mindanao. The Davao Region has vast banana plantations, covering some 10,180.05 hectares (PSA-XI, 2016), where various cultivars are grown. Some plantations are managed by independent growers, while others were developed by multinational or corporate banana producers (PSA-XI,2016). As seen in Figures 1 and 2 above, even though overall banana production has fluctuated slightly, production in Mindanao has increased since 2013 and become the region's predominant product. By 2016 Davao was known as a top exporter of bananas, with crops valued at approximately $84.85 million (Arado, 2016). In other words, the contract farming mechanism has been effective in attracting agribusiness TNCs to invest and operate in Mindanao.

As the banana capital of the Philippines, Davao hosts various TNCs. On a field trip in early April 2019, one of the authors encountered several TNCs in Santo Tomas, Davao del Norte, i.e. Nader & Ebrahim S/O Hassan Phils, Inc (NEH), Dole, Sumifru, and the Marsman-Drysdale Group of Companies. These are but some of the dozens of agribusinesses that operate in Mindanao, most of which are TNCs. These companies are united in the Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association Inc. (PBGEA), which was established in 1974 in Davao City to act as "the central coordinating agency for the development and the advancement of the banana export industry in the Philippines" (PBGEA, 2019). As of 2019, PBGEA consists of 22 companies and their subsidiaries as well as their two affiliates operating in fifteen provinces in Southern Philippines (PBGEA, 2019); nevertheless, they only mention twelve of these companies on their website. Currently, the organisation's total production area covers 43,647 hectares, or about 50% of the Philippines' total land dedicated to Cavendish cultivation (PBGEA, 2019).

Five of PBGEA's members are classified as significant exporters of bananas, i.e., Del Monte (Philippines) Produce, Stanfilco (a division of Dole Philippines), Sumitomo, Fresh Asia Produce Co International, and Chiquita/ Unifrutti (Digal, 2005). As Digal (2005) notes, these companies have changed their operations systems from direct farming to contract farming due to the implementation of the CARL. Most growers are affiliated with leading companies or other conglomerates in Mindanao (or at least the Philippines), such as the Anflo, Dizon, and Tristar groups of Banana Companies.

The five companies mentioned above have several subsidiaries within their structures, such as Del Monte Fresh Produce (Philippines) and Agrinanas Development Co. Inc., Delinanas Development Corporation, Mindanao Agri-Traders Inc.; Chiquita/Unifrutti and Marsman-Drysdale Group of Companies, and Tortuga Valley Plantation Inc. Other TNCs, such as Nader & Ebrahim S/O Hassan Phils, Inc., are not affiliated with other companies' growers but have growers who are directly linked to small farmers. These observations indicate that, although several companies are leading banana exporters, only a few have a direct relationship with small farmers.

Such relationships between companies and their subsidiaries are seen as a means of governance and adapting to the local situation. Departing from Wallerstein's (2011) world economy argument, the prominence of subsidiaries and affiliations demonstrates how a few TNCs control the market and the global production chain. By cooperating with local businessmen and elites, the global norms of contract farming can be translated into something appropriate and sensitive to local social and economic contexts. Also, the alliance process brings more benefits for local businessmen, as they can expand their markets and improve their product quality at the same time. This can be seen, for instance, when TNCs set product standards with which local companies are obligated to comply. Meanwhile, localised network building gives greater control to small farmers, as subsidiary companies normally serve simply to advance the leading companies' policies. Control is understood as a requirement for continued

production. These facts demonstrate the importance of utilising existing legitimate entities to support network-building (Suchman, 1995).

Aside from having bottom-up connections, PBGEA has played an important role in the Philippine government and its policymaking process. Members of PBGEA include powerful people, both domestic landlords and international corporations, who enjoy strong connections with the highest-level elites in the political system. For example, when lobbying the government to produce a land reform policy that suited their interests, they worked with local land elites to push successfully for the expropriation and redistribution of plantations in strategic areas, including Mindanao (Borras & Franco, 2005). After the land reform policy was passed, MNCs still had chances to hijack the system. For example, they submitted a computation system—important in defining companies' obligations when paying farmworkers and sharing profits—to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). This system used different parameters, which enabled companies to pay the farmworkers less than the actual production levels (Borras & Franco, 2005). PBGEA has the power to define policy and its implementation at the same time, thus operating "like a cartel, controlling the price levels of labour, land lease rates, and farm input and output markets" (Borras & Franco, 2005).

In banana production, the flow of contract farming involves various actors, each of which has different capacities, roles, authorities, and networks. The way these actors influence each other is important to understand to better comprehend the fluidity of power in the contract farming scheme.

Politics of Legitimation in Banana Contract Farming in Davao, Mindanao

The integration of TNCs in the local area has created a dual process of legitimation. Contract farming has been challenged by local actors—landowners and farmers who mainly demand the right to work as companies' equal partners as well as some bargaining rights. However, certain challenges plague the adaptation and integration process. This process can be demonstrated through the two stages below.

1. Contract making as the first step in legitimation

Transnational agribusiness companies in Santo Tomas apply a top-down approach when signing contracts to institutionally reconstruct their field-building. This step aims to assert the agribusiness TNCs' authority so that they can exercise their influence. Interviews revealed that agreements only detail the rights of companies; for small growers, the agreement makes but a brief statement of rent payment (Interview, 10 April 2019). Because of farmers' limited command of English, they do not know the substance of the contract nor do they fathom its implications. In the FGD (10 April 2019), an informant explained that:

> *"The company approached us by going door to door, asked us to contact them and offered a contract to sign. At the time, the company came with a well-drafted deal which was written in English—ready to be signed" (FGD, 10 April 2019).*

Other informants in other villages experienced the same thing:

"We just signed, without reading, and I don't have the contract now" (interview, 9 April 2019).

The top-down mechanism for contract signing demonstrates that, by influencing policy mechanisms, companies can simultaneously influence the implementation of their contracts. These contracts, which are written in English by agribusiness companies, are seen as ways of starting new lines of activity in domestic arenas. Farmers' limited command of English makes it easier for companies to control their knowledge and influence their compliance. As such, TNCs can develop boundaries that favour their capital accumulation.

Companies know that farmers have limited knowledge of English and that this lack of fluency hinders their ability to obtain proper information about the agreement. The cases of Santo Tomas and Compostela Valley thus demonstrate how inequality in the contract process influences growers' access to information about their rights (Digal, 2007). This strengthens Ribot and Peluso's (2003) argument that knowledge and information are essential elements when gaining access to resources and thereby becoming part of a transnational field-building process.

The sociological aspects of banana farming offer an advantage to agribusiness companies when constructing their roles. Agribusiness companies shape the role of the farmers by requiring the head of the family to sign the agreement. They do so because, usually, these individuals are the ones in possession of land rights. Some informants explained that:

"Yes, we had joined the company for many years since my father…" (interview, 11 April 2019).

"My husband was the one who signed the contract for 30 years in 1989. But, when he died, I did not know the contract, and then the company asked me to sign another contract for another year" (interview, 11 April 2019).

"No, it is directly between farmers and the company. The government knows about it, but they don't intervene" (interview, 9 April 2019).

By understanding the important roles of landowners, transnational companies shape their role in the contract farming system. The involvement of the head of the family effectively limits their descendants' ability to challenge previously signed contracts. Displeasure with contract terms was commonly voiced by descendants, as seen in one interview:

"The contract was for 25 years, but they didn't know. They didn't read the contract, and some of them didn't sign the contract. Then, in the last part of the arrangement, it states that renewal would be for 25 years. So the land would be occupied by Marshman (a transnational company) for 50 years. They didn't participate in the drafting of the contract—it was only the company. After the contract was done, the landowners simply signed" (interview 09 April 2019).

Ultimately, however, the contract process is not fixed. In distributing authority, a wide range of norms are evident in transnational policy and implementation. This character has a spill-over effect for farmers, who can contest the system.

> *"Yes, we know the contract because the growers are the ones who attended the meeting. Also, somebody, an attorney, helped us and guided us when deciding which articles we should agree to" (Interview, 10 April 2019).*

The quote above is excerpted from interviews with villagers in Davao who retained an attorney to help them with the contract with Sumifru, a Japanese company. The people there were lucky enough to have comprehended the contract and have an attorney guide them so that they were able to negotiate, terminate, and adjust the articles in the contract. With better knowledge of the contract, these people had more legitimation and control of the contract farming system. For example, the informant explained that she was able to terminate the contract and become an independent grower. With guidance from an attorney, a fair contract can empower farmers by granting them the authority to contest the system.

> *"I just wanted to continue by myself because the company would control the product. Also, the price [provided by the company] is much lower. The company will intervene, and [in such cases] we have the agreement" (Interview, 10 April 2019).*

This statement came from an independent grower from Santo Tomas, who preferred maintaining his one-hectare banana plantation and selling his products through a mini-plant (Interview, 10 April 2019). This decision was driven mainly by the possibility of selling his crops for higher prices. The independent grower phenomenon was also noted in another village in Santo Tomas,

"There are many mini-plants here, hundreds, and the owners are the villagers as well as growers. The price per box [of bananas] is now 340 pesos, but if yields are low, it would be 400 pesos per box" (Interview, 10 April 2019).

Mini-plants play an essential role for independent growers. Even though they do not have formal agreements like agribusiness companies, they trust each other to keep prices high. Furthermore, as mini-plantations are only small companies, they have several qualifications and particular mechanisms that need to be followed by small growers. One informant explained that:

"Yes, there are many requirements. One requirement is that I need to harvest four leaves, and not dry them. There are QI (Quality Inspectors) who check the area and give the requirements. So, I only choose to sell to one mini-plant. Because if I keep changing the mini plants, the price will go down" (Interview 10 April 2019).

The fact that the independent growers are willing to follow the mini-plants' mechanisms shows that the contract system could work if entities respect each other's rights and are transparent about implementation processes. Independent growers understand that certain requirements are essential for ensuring quality; however, they have more freedom and can provide input and maintain their current techniques. In other words, the traditional system could also be used, as one informant explained to me (Interview 10 April 2019). Consequently, some more small growers are keen to end their contracts and become independent growers, "Yes, there are more than one hundred independent growers. They had

an agreement with the company a few years ago. However, the company paid much less, and thus they did not renew the contract" (Interview 10 April 2019).

The contract process as a tool for transferring global norms—the rules of the game in contract farming—shows the potential fluidity of legitimation. At first, major companies dominated and limited the process by defining the rules of the game. Transnational companies translate the global norms of the corporate food regime at the local level by limiting access to knowledge, information, and participation, thereby hindering the ability of farmers and their families to conduct contract negotiations. This shows that field-building comes with specific circumstances through which transnational companies seek to legitimise their accumulation processes. However, the strict contracts used by companies still allowed small growers to contest the system by using attorneys (who have legal power) to understand the process of contract farming and advance their interests. At the same time, status as an independent grower—despite a lack of formality—offers fairer remuneration and greater freedom. Additionally, the open system used by mini-plants gives every grower an equal opportunity, so long as they follow certain rules.

2. Establishment of contracts in defining roles and space boundaries in the implementation of contract farming

Transnational agribusiness companies govern farmers' benefits and production through legal-based access. These companies understand that contracts are essential parts

of their accumulation process, as they define the roles and boundaries of both parties. Consequently, the substance of these agreements is crucial. An FGD (9 April 2019) in Santo Tomas village acknowledged that the English-language agreement was well-drafted by the company. Some informants explain how this was used to exercise control, saying:

> *"…I think that the company kept the contract. It is one of the ways that the company handles them; they can get charged or fined if they do not follow what is set in the contract" (interview, 9 April 2019).*

Contracts govern farmers' actions within the contract farming system. At the same time, as farmers' families are usually involved as workers, contracts govern family members who have not signed them. One informant told us that:

> *"No, I am never complaining to the company. It was my mother who signed the contract, so we don't know what the deal is. We don't know what to complain about. Mother didn't read it; [she] just signed it" (interview, 9 April 2019).*

This shows that companies use legal-based access not only to ensure access to resources but also to ensure their authority over the land.

Farmers' lack of access to these contracts creates an opportunity for companies to continue their capital accumulation. Many contracts include clauses allowing companies to automatically renew contracts; as many small growers do not have and cannot read the contract, they cannot negotiate access to their land (interview, 9 April 2019). Limited participation thus carries over to other spaces. By having limited participation, farmers

must adapt to their new role as contract farmers on their land. They also have to face the consequence that their land now is controlled by major companies. This shows that contracts not only shape space as a physical arena but create space—i.e., the accumulation mechanism.

In the daily production process, transnational agribusiness companies regulate every process. One informant explained that:

> *"…they, the companies, provided everything, even the people. But there was interest as well. Whatever the price, there was interest" (interview, 11 April 2019).*

While companies rent their land, farmers must plant bananas with specific requirements, and they are obligated to buy supplies—seeds, chemicals, pesticides, and even aerial spray plans—directly from companies (Interviews, 9 & 11 April 2019). Another informant elucidated:

> *"By the time the grower puts the product in the packing house, the grower doesn't get much income because of the cost of fertilizer, which is very overpriced, and farmers also need to consider the minimum wage. Right now, companies buy at 180 pesos per box, but if bananas go to another country, it's 1,200 pesos per box. It is very different!" (Interview, 09 April 2020).*

This reliance on TNCs for supplies not only expands the companies' roles but also creates new mechanisms for banana production. Farmers must adapt to new circumstances, including a prohibition against producing

their own bananas. Companies also set fixed prices for products, as ensconced in their contracts. One informant said:

> *"…Whatever your contract is with the company, you will get the same price. For example, if your contract is three dollars, then you will get the same price for two years, even though the market price is getting higher" (interview, 11 April 2019).*

The fixed price strategy helps companies deal with price fluctuations, thereby simplifying production costs so that companies can focus on global dynamics. At the same time, however, by using fixed prices, companies eliminate one of the spaces where farmers can assert their rights.

In these cases, two forms of space are recognized: land and production areas. The essential aim of controlling space is to limit people's behaviour so that companies can optimise their accumulation of capital. This shows that defining space through legal mechanisms is an effective strategy for companies. By limiting space during the signing and understanding of contracts, companies establish their roles and set rules for farmers. However, these spaces are not static. They have different meanings and are openly contested by each party.

In the Philippines, the AVA Law regulates the amendment, renegotiation, and revocation of contracts through Article II (4.14) of the DAR AO No 09. The law aims to protect parties, including small growers, and ensure the availability of fair remedies through a comprehensive mechanism that involves the local government. Basically, the state has provided a remedy scheme for small growers. To use the facilities provided by

the state, some small growers have attempted to negotiate with companies through formal channels. One respondent from Santo Tomas brought her case to court to reduce her latest contract from thirty years to five years. Disputes over contract renewal among descendants make the lawsuit process an attractive option (Interview 9 April 2019).

Small growers who use formal remedy mechanisms can be considered the lucky ones, as this implies that they held and could comprehend the contract and thus could bring their case to court. Many growers do not see the contracts, which are held by companies, and thus must wait for termination or unite to bargain collectively with the company. Some small growers from Santo Tomas indicated that they wanted to end their contract with Marsman, not only due to the low rent but also because it dominated the land and did not allow them—the owners—to enter the area so long as the contract was still valid (Interview, 9 April 2019). Additionally, these growers did not want to lose their land due to Panama disease; one feared that, if she permitted the contract, the company would continue operations for sixty years. Action to bring this case to court was supported by many growers and even the union; however, they could not do many things due to the required formalities. As the court case is ongoing, the company is still paying rent—15,000 pesos for 1.5 hectares.

Distribution of Power in Contract-Making

Contract-making in Davao demonstrates that the distribution of information influences the institutionalisation of legitimacy itself. Transnational policy is institutionalised through

common understanding, norms, and practices that are agreed upon among participants (Purdy & Gray, 2009 in Dirpose, Kurniawan, & McDonald 2019). Since small growers cannot understand English, they cannot envision the reality of contract farming. As also seen among tomato farmers in Honduras (Glover & Kusterer, 1990), access to information in contracts is essential for understanding the system; otherwise, growers will think that it is the best and only system, with no alternative, without really considering the risks posed by companies.

Unequal distribution of information leads to unbalanced power between companies and small growers. Companies' efforts to limit access to information enable them to regulate the social process to control small growers through social and economic mechanisms. Furthermore, this phenomenon also connects with Glover and Kusterer's (1990) argument by showing that the distribution of risk is strongly related to other factors, such as bargaining power, alternative availability, and access to information. Language is an entry for understanding this connection. For small growers, contracts offer opportunities to increase their wealth; for companies, meanwhile, contracts mark the beginning of their legitimation. In the end, the process has strengthened the theory that holds that transnational actors need to reconstruct their audiences and sites of authority in certain ways so that they can establish a conducive environment to exercise their transnational influence (Diprose, Kurniawan, & McDonald 2019).

As Clapp (1994) argues, unequal partnerships result in open conflicts, as seen in the

lawsuits filed by hundreds of small growers. Unfair contracts that limit the availability of information on substantial matters bring small growers to another level. Furthermore, lawsuits such as those mentioned above influence the social relationships between companies and growers. Where growers are forced to remain in their contract, other growers recognise that they are neglected by the system. Meanwhile, when partnership is equal, small growers have the right to get fair treatment in the remedy process—as guaranteed both in international and national laws.

In contract farming, role adaptation occurs through contract development. Companies earn their legitimacy by directing and dominating consensus through contract agreements, thereby enabling them to define the area and boundaries of contract farming. Clapp (1994, p. 80) argues that companies' domination gives them legal power over seeds, crops, inputs, and even land access. Such institutional legitimations construct the rules of the game, including the right to participate in the banana cultivation process. However, other parties' acceptance of companies' legitimacy comes with certain expectations. When these expectations are not met, these parties—the small growers—challenge companies' legitimacy by adopting new roles. They use the formal mechanisms provided by the state to influence companies, hoping to reframe contracts and their implementation. Such strategic action shapes the processes through which roles are defined, with contract farming best legitimated when both parties are in agreeance.

Conclusion

This article has argued that contract farming, common in transnational policies regarding agricultural production, allows for a fluid distribution of power that strongly influences the relations between companies and common people. As implied in the case of Mindanao, contract farming creates a situation wherein power is unequal yet openly contested by each party. Supported by the state through various policies, contract farming has created new spaces and territories for its actors, especially transnational companies. Broad and intensive alliances are used to localise network building, as TNCs work together with the local businesses and oligarchs while ensuring that global norms of contract farming are adapted to national regulations. These strategies play an important role in efforts to delegitimise transnational actors at the local or even grassroots levels by framing them as outsiders.

The article shows that political legitimation in Davao, Mindanao, occurs through reciprocal processes that reach beyond establishing rules, adapting roles, and defining boundaries for small farmers, and governing social relationships among involved parties. The degree of information about contracts is a crucial indicator of the distribution of legitimacy; where information is not available, relationships tend to be unequal and open conflicts are common. The implementation of contract farming demonstrates that the claiming of resources is highly related to the exercise of power and authority. At the same time, banana contract farming in Mindanao also shows the contestation between TNCs and farmers in legitimising access

to resources (i.e., plantations). Instituting legitimacy is not a linear process, but may involve the reclaiming, contesting, or repeating of legitimacy processes by TNCs and/or small growers. The legitimation processes involved in contract farming, in other words, are informed by the constellation of power and authority in the social relations between the involved parties.

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Working through Boundaries: Behind-the-Scenes Interdisciplinary Collaboration from a Dutch-Indonesian Consortium[1]

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Abstract

It is commonly assumed that multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research collaborations involve various values, knowledge, and practices, thereby existing between science and policy. This study argues, oppositely, that multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research collaborations are socially constructed and not to be taken for granted. To support its argument, this article uses the concept of boundary work to see how the interaction between science and policy is constructed. Taking as its case study the Ground Up consortium, a collaborative water management research programme involving the Netherlands and Indonesia, this study finds that boundary work generated and formed boundaries between science and policy through a joint call for proposal documents, research proposals, and three people operating at boundaries. Furthermore, this article shows that the collaborative research in the Ground Up consortium was a social process evidenced through three mediums: text, object, and person. This qualitative research thus uses a single-case study to explore boundary work in a consortium setting. Data were collected through a review of documents (meeting notes, research proposals, and calls for proposals) as well as in-depth interviews with three members of the Ground Up consortium.

Keywords: *boundary work, consortium, water management, Indonesia*

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Introduction

Numerous multi-dimensional problems have emerged (such as climate change) in the current era, and the resolution of these issues requires collaborative international research that incorporates multi-disciplinary and intra-disciplinary knowledge (Gonsalves, 2014; Fitzgerald, et al., 2018). This can be seen in many cases. For instance, several international research collaborations have been established in Indonesia, particularly in Semarang City, in the past five years to investigate the issue of water management.[3] Data collected by the Ground Up consortium (PowerPoint, 29–30 April 2019) showed that ten collaborative research programmes have been established between Dutch and Indonesian universities to investigate the subject of water management and propose solutions to contemporary issues. The current study contributes new explanations on boundary work[4], consortia, and knowledge of water management in Southeast Asia.

Establishing international research collaborations such as those mentioned above involves various documents, including those specifying honoraria and participants' obligations. Collaboration is established

3 For example, the WaterWorX programme—established in 2019—is a joint project between the Semarang City-owned Tirta Moedal Water Company and the Dutch Water Operators (VEI). The partnership is oriented toward improving groundwater access, ameliorating inefficient operations, low utility coverage, and land subsidence problems (including urban floods) in Semarang. This project thus mitigate the negative effects of water usage. See also: Jong, T.D., (2019). *WaterWorX project: WOP Semarang Indonesia*. https://www.vei.nl/projects/waterworx-project-wop-semarang

4 Boundary work is a concept developed by Thomas F. Gieryn to examine the relationship between science and policy. For Gieryn (1983), the ideology of the scientist limits the action of science in policy activities. Meanwhile, for Halffman (2003), the action of science is implied through the texts, objects, and persons of policy activities. Further explanation is provided below.

through negotiations between members, which continue until an agreement is reached (Perkmann & Schildt, 2015; Kirchhoff & Esselman, 2015). Unfortunately, the topic of how the different disciplines, values, and practices of consortium members influence the collaboration process has received limited attention in academic literature.

To fill this gap, the current article focuses on the establishment of the Ground Up consortium. This consortium was selected based on three considerations. First, it involves a multitude of partners from diverse backgrounds, writ, two universities in the Netherlands (the University of Amsterdam [UvA] and IHE Delft Institute for Water Education), two universities in Indonesia (Gadjah Mada University [UGM] and Diponegoro University [Undip]) and two NGOs in Indonesia (the Amrta Institute for Water Literacy and the People's Coalition for The Rights to Water [KRuHA]) (Ground Up Document, 2018). As such, Ground Up consists of members with various backgrounds and involves collaborative research from more than one institution.[5]

Second, this article explains the boundary work between science (universities) and policy (NGOs). This explanation is important, as universities and NGOs are commonly viewed as having different values, knowledge, and practices, which leads to contestation. This study, conversely, seeks to understand how these entities can coordinate and finally "work together". Although the

5 This is distinguishes the Ground Up consortium from other projects, which involve collaboration between only two institutions active in the same field. The aforementioned WaterworkX project, for instance, involved the Utrecht-based Dutch Water Operators and the Semarang City-based Tirta Moedal Water Company, in a co-funded scheme from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Jong, 2019).

investigation of collaboration between universities and NGOs is not unique, the research collaborations between them have always been taken for granted. This study, thus, investigates research collaboration as a social process that may include (but does require) contestation.

Lastly, this study deals with the contestation of knowledge, values, and practices amongst members of the consortium. The Netherlands are well known for their knowledge of water management, through which the country has developed its canal system (Colven, 2020). Such knowledge is particularly prominent in Dutch universities, given their positions as institutions with the competence to combine scientific disciplines—for instance, history and urban studies (Colven, 2020). On the other hand, knowledge of water governance in Indonesia is different due to the country's emphasis on a regulatory-based approach (SI, interview, 7 June 2021). Such a difference is interesting, especially given their decision to collaborate.

As the topic of international research collaboration and consortia is already established (e.g.: Perkmann & Schildt, 2015), this article focuses on using Southeast Asian experiences to provide a new explanation for how demarcation and collaboration are formed in such projects. Most consortium studies, such as Perkmann and Schildt (2015) and Kirchhoff and Esselman (2015), have relied on experiences from the Global North in their investigation of the main factors underpinning consortium work. Such a situation has contributed to the strong demarcation between universities and NGOs and, following McNiel et al. (2008), between science and

policy. Little has been done to understand how science and policy can collaborate to achieve shared goals.

This article, thus, seeks to explain how the universities and NGOs within the Ground Up Consortium negotiated science and policy boundaries. In so doing, it seeks to answer three questions, namely: 1) How did members of the Ground Up consortium divide and coordinate work between science and policy?; 2) What were the consortium members' views on the relationship between science and policy?; 3) How did consortium members manage to find common ground to work together when dealing with the issue of land subsidence?

To answer those questions, this study uses the boundary work concept offered by Willem Halffman (2003), which emphasises demarcation and coordination between science and policy. For this research, document analysis was conducted by using the consortium's meeting notes from January 2019 to April 2021. Interviews were also conducted with three members of the Ground Up consortium to provide additional information for analysis. What was discussed at the coordination meetings? On what aspects did they agree on definitions, knowledge, and the need for research? What is relevant knowledge? How did they view the roles of science and policy? What were the problems and what could be solutions? Such questions guided this study's effort to reconstruct our understanding of what is seen as science or policy (Halffman, 2003, p. 416).

Literature Review

The study of collaborative research, including consortia between universities (science)

and non-government organisations (policy), has drawn special attention. Perkmann and Schildt (2015) argue that any consortium consists of stakeholders with different goals, interests, and benefits. This argument is supported by Gonsalves (2014), who writes that a relationship between science and policy exists within any research consortium. Such collaborative projects create public spaces wherein science may interact with policy and vice versa. Therefore, reconstructing our understanding of how research collaboration occurs in the context of consortia invites attention to further study.

Most scholars have observed the role of consortia as bridges between science and policy. A study from Perkmann and Schildt (2015), for instance, investigated the role of consortia in the topic of open data using the example of the Structural Genomics Consortium. They show that the Structural Genomics Consortium played a role as a boundary organisation[6] in encouraging collaboration between universities and industry to increase the quantity of Research and Development (R&D) in open data projects (Perkmann & Schildt, 2015). The consortium was therefore successful in stimulating collaboration and regulating the demarcation between science and policy. They found that substance in the research agenda contributes positively to institutional coordination. If the object (writ, research agenda) disappears, interactions between science and policy will never materialise and thus the collaborative open data project will fail (Perkmann & Schildt, 2015).

6 Guston (2001, 2003) identifies the institutions that operate in communicating science and policy as boundary organisations. The main task of these institutions is to serve as science and policy communicators.

In a different case, Kirchhoff and Esselman (2015) examined the Great Lakes Integrated Sciences and Assessment (GLISA), a consortium of climate science producers and brokers. They investigated how GLISA collaborated with the Hudson River Watershed Council (HRWC), an NGO, and argued that GLISA—as a boundary organisation—had a role in transmitting scientific climate information, whereas HRWC acted as a facilitator (Kirchhoff & Esselman, 2015). As a boundary organisation, GLISA was identified as an important 'tool' for bridging science and policy.

As discussed above, two main points should be highlighted. First, most studies of the interactions between science and policy take the context of the Global North.[7] The aforementioned study by Perkmann and Schildt (2015), for instance, took a consortium involving the University of Oxford (United Kingdom), University of Toronto (Canada), and the Karolinska Institute (Sweden) to see research collaboration contributed to encouraging universities and industry actors to improve research and development. In contrast, this study focuses on a different context, taking its example from Southeast Asia—specifically, Indonesia, cases in Indonesia have been understudied.

Secondly, most studies use an institutionalist analysis to see the interactions between science and policy. They argue that consortia act as boundary organisations that mediate between the two. In the context of water governance, the boundaries between science and policy have also focused

7 Research on boundary work construction within consortia that focus on water management has been conducted by several scholars, with emphasis on water scarcity and knowledge contestation between experts and laypersons (White, et al., 2008), as well as the negotiation of knowledge between experts and laypersons (Leimona, et al., 2015).

their analysis on the institutional setting, with organisations acting as mediators (White et al., 2008; White, 2010; Parker & Crona, 2012; Boezeman et al., 2013). Meanwhile, this study uses the SSK perspective to explore how collaborative research was initiated by different institutions in a consortium.

Theoretical Framework

1. Boundary Work

The concept of boundary work was introduced by the sociologist Thomas F. Gieryn in 1983 to describe how the different knowledge between science and non-science is negotiated (Gieryn, 1983; Zeiss & Groenewegen, 2009). Early studies by Gieryn (1983) reviewed the demarcation of "what is science" and "what is non-science", arguing that ideology is the main factor limiting scientists' ability to be objective in seeing phenomena. Gieryn's studies contributed significantly to the shift from an essentialist[8] to a constructivist[9] paradigm of scientific authority (Ramírez-i-Ollé, 2015). The constructivist paradigm is used by scholars to explain, understand, and discuss the boundaries between science and policy, which have long been considered to be different worlds (Ramírez-i-Ollé, 2015).

Early studies using the boundary work concept emphasised the discursive and defensive nature of the demarcations between science and non-science (Gieryn, 1983). Scientists build boundaries to protect their territories, and the contestation and defence of these

8 The knowledge produced by the scientific community has some fundamental and unique qualities, including certain values, norms and methods. This uniqueness provides a strong foundation for the creation of science (Ramírez-i-Ollé, 2015).

9 The SSK paradigm was used by Gieryn (1983), who provides an alternative argument about the formation of science by emphasising that science is formed based on social constructions (i.e., social interactions or activities).

boundaries (Langley, 2019) are encouraged by the social interest to claim, expand, and protect the authority of cognitive science (Jasanoff, 1987). In addition, earlier studies on boundary work tended to explain the way science does not contribute to policy, and vice versa (Ramírez-i-Ollé, 2015; Langley et al., 2019).

Several scholars, such as Langley et al. (2019); Orsini et al. (2017); Sheldow (2017), and Halffman (2003), have a different perspective on that statement. Langley et al. (2019: 705) define boundary work as involving individual and collective efforts to influence social, symbolic, material, and temporal boundaries; demarcation; and differences affecting groups, occupations, and organisations. In other words, Langley et al. (2019) emphasise the coercive power of individuals and collectives to re-construct the demarcation between science and policy.[10]

Orsini et al. (2017) have a different emphasis, defining boundary work as involving the achievement of mutual understanding between agencies while maintaining the necessary boundaries and clarifying each agency's respective role. In line with that, Shedlow (2017: 831) said that boundary work is an attempt to build or break down the barriers between different practices or activities. To

10 According to Langley et al. (2019), categories of boundary work include: 1) competitive boundary work; 2) collaborative boundary work; and 3) configurational boundary work. Competitive boundary work can be seen as the initial conception of boundary work, one which emphasizes the efforts of scientists to build boundaries and protect their privileged status. Gieryn explained this as a 'credibility contest', wherein knowledge is contested between scientists and policymakers. Collaborative boundary work, meanwhile, is characterised by an effort to negotiate boundaries and 'work' at them. Finally, configurational boundary work is explained as a shift in meaning, wherein working on building boundaries turns into working on boundaries. Orsini et al., (2017) argue that boundary work has to explain more than demarcation, and include also the effects on collaboration.

summarise, Orsini et al. (2017) highlight the need to appreciate the respective roles of science and policy, while Shedlow (2017) emphasizes developmental aspects and breaks down boundaries between science and policy.

Most definitions of boundary work emphasize either the demarcation of science and non-science or the 'negotiation' between science and policy. In this, Halffman (2003) revealed the key variables in the interaction of science and policy. He emphasised that boundary work is institutionalized in boundary devices, which include coordination, and that practice through boundaries is a key part of boundary work. The interaction between science and non-science is not only a matter of demarcation but also coordination (Halffman, 2003: 4)., both of which are embedded within practices. As Halffman writes, boundary work is

> *"...a practice, in contrast with other practices, protects it from unwanted participants and interference, while attempting to prescribe proper ways of behaviour for participants and non-participants (demarcation); simultaneously, boundary work defines proper ways for interaction between these practices and makes such interaction possible and conceivable (coordination)" (Halffman, 2003: 116).*

Furthermore, Halffman (2003: 63–71) argued that boundary work uses and produces boundary devices where textual, material, or social sources serve to demarcate and coordinate practices between the

boundaries of science and policy. These boundaries can be realized by text, objects, and people (abbreviated TOP), which form the boundary configurational.[11] This means that the boundaries between science and policy use and produce and configure new boundaries through texts, objects, and people. This TOP framework will be used in this article, which will identify the texts, objects, and people in the Ground Up consortium.

2. Text, Object, and Person (TOP Model)

To identify the construction of boundary work involving the Ground Up consortium, I use the TOP framework developed by Halffman (2003). This framework emphasises that texts, objects, and people can be identified through several documents, such as programmatic journal articles and polemics between members of research institutions (Halffman, 2003: 120). This approach provides useful guidance on what data is required to look at science and policy boundary work.

Firstly, text refers to boundary work marked by rhetoric, language, and literary tools (Halffman, 2003: 60). It refers to people or actors that separate science and policy through speech or writing to emphasise their respective roles. Take, for example, the terms "risk assessment" and "risk management"; the former was produced through boundary work by the National Research Council of the United States with a specific purpose, while the latter places risk within the context of

11 Halffman (2003) argues that boundary configuration is a combination of text, object, and person (TOP) that is mobilised together and produces an effect on the demarcation of science and non-science. In this article, I use the TOP framework to examine how the configurational boundary is formed.

the policy world (Halffman, 2003: 60). The differences between these terms affect various activities (Halffman, 2003: 66).

Secondly, objects are the material boundary devices used to mark boundaries (Halffman, 2003: 60). The term "boundary object" was introduced by Star and Griesemer in 1989. This concept explains various actors' different understandings of objects to which all refer. Take, for example, heart and lung specialists. Both will refer to this object. However, the cardiologist will examine the pulsations of the heart to ascertain its condition. In contrast, the pulmonologist will focus more on the patient's breathing to determine the quality of the lungs. From this example, we can conclude that boundary objects function to coordinate different social worlds and ensure communication between them. At the same time, however, they provide space for their social worlds to remain separate and stable (Goksu, 2014: 12-13).

A study by Cutts et al. (2011) offers an excellent example of the logic of boundary objects. Studying a socioecological model that projects water consumption and availability in central Arizona in scenarios of growth, urbanisation, climate uncertainty, and policy choices, they found that the object (i.e., simulation) facilitated the negotiation of specific issues related to water consumption between scientists and stakeholders. This is not surprising, as the model was produced by scientists to communicate knowledge products for use by policymakers.

From this case, we can that objects do not only coordinate boundaries but provide space for scientists to produce knowledge as well as for stakeholders to use for policymaking. In other

words, an object can be used by two different actors, who remain separate and stable in the two different social worlds. Continuing from the previous example, the water model could be moulded into a standardised package[12] (Franks, 2010, p. 286-287; Halffman, 2003, p. 64) and create a new, stable definition for both scientists and policymakers.

Lastly, the term 'people' or boundary person describes an agent that stands in two social worlds, a figure that represents a link between science and policy or one who operates on the boundaries between different worlds (Halffman, 2003: 61). These people are defined variously as gatekeepers[13] and knowledge brokers[14] (Halffman, 2003: 61). For instance, a study from White et al. (2008) looked at the role of water managers as knowledge brokers representing the Decision Center for Desert City (DCDC), Arizona State University (ASU), in the distribution of knowledge about climate change uncertainty to stakeholders. These water managers received the title "people" because they had the authority to represent the DCDC and its decisions.

To conclude, Halffman (2003) emphasized that text, objects, and people operate together and form the boundary configuration. Through these three instruments, boundaries are bound to each other to distribute meanings, values, and participants to construct interactions

12 This term coined by Fujimura (1992: 168), who explains that negotiation between boundary objects can lead to a standardised package that functions to stabilize the facts and boundaries of the boundary object.

13 As Halffman (2003: 61) illustrates, gatekeepers could be exemplified by journal editors as persons representing a journal. Editors have the right to decide the topic, who can contribute to the journal, etc. (p. 61).

14 Kimble et al. (2010), in Halffman (2003), define a knowledge broker as a person who has a role in mediating expertise.

(and provide boundaries) between science and policy (Halffman, 2003). This article aims to develop this concept within an Asian context through the example of the Ground Up consortium.

Figure 1 Conceptual Framework



Source: Author's Analysis (2021)

Methodology

This qualitative research offers a case study of the Ground Up consortium. It relies on primary documents, in the form of meeting notes, calls for proposals, initial proposals, and meeting/workshop PowerPoint presentations (Laswell: 2007: p. 73) prepared by Gadjah Mada University (UGM) for the Ground Up consortium. The documents produced by UGM have been chosen due to the university's status as the coordinator of the research team in Indonesia and the recorder of consortium

meeting notes (Ground Up document, 2019). Data were collected between January 2019 and April 2021, during which time the objects, ideas, negotiations, and discussions shaping the collaborative work of the Ground Up consortium were investigated. For research and publication purposes, this article disguises the names of informants and consortium members.

This article uses the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK)[15] approach, a tradition that emphasises that knowledge and technology are not "natural"[16] but socially constructed to form "new" knowledge of agency (Sismondo, 2010; Bijker, 1997). This approach traces its roots to academics at the University of Bath and Edinburgh School, particularly Steven Shapin, Trevor Pinch, and Harry Collins. Since then, the SSK approach has been extended to several theoretical and methodological frameworks, one of the famous being Bruno Latour's Actor-Network Theory.[17]

In this study, and following the tradition of the SSK approach, the concept of boundary work in knowledge collaboration is not taken for granted. Rather, it emphasises that non-human actors (such as documents) contribute to the formation of collaborations (Zeiss & Groenewegen, 2009; Halffman, 2003). Therefore, this study tries to uncover why the Ground Up consortium was

15 The SSK approach is embedded with a constructivist logic.

16 The SSK approach was develop to criticise technological determinism, an understanding which emphasises technological growth based on actor knowledge and leads to one goal, either good or bad (Bimber, 1994).

17 Using a laboratory study, Latour (1987) emphasised the role of non-human actors (such as electricity networks, documents, and scientific experimentation tools) in the formation of social networks in society. Both are termed "actants".

ultimately established despite the differences in consortium members' cultural/social practices and knowledge.

Analysis: Boundary Work in a Consortium

The analysis section is divided into three subsections, each of which deals with one aspect of the TOP (text, objects, people) model used for analysis. Based on document analysis and interviews with consortium members, this article argues that the research collaboration represented by the Ground Up Consortium was constructed by calls for proposal documents, research proposals, and the presence of people who acted within the boundaries of science and policy.

1. Boundary Text: Calls for Proposals and Division of Labour in Research Proposals

The Ground Up consortium was initiated through a call for proposals issued in conjunction with two donor agencies, the Dutch Research Council (NOW) and the Ministry of Research and Higher Education of Indonesia (RISTEKDIKTI). According to the widely distributed call for proposals, several prerequisites had to be met. One was that the Dutch research organisation had to act as the main applicant; the Indonesian research organisation as a member; and one or more private/public partners had to be involved to enhance the social impact of the research. It was also stated that including one or more awardees of a current-year RISTEKDIKTI grant on the research team would increase

the chances of the proposal being accepted. However, this was not a mandatory requirement (NWO Document, 2018: 9).

> *"In the call for proposals, there was an obligation to cooperate with existing Indonesian academics recommended by RISTEKDIKTI. There was a list in the call for proposals document. Approximately 50 scientists based at universities in Indonesia were recommended by RISTEKDIKTI. This call for proposals was a collaboration between NWO-RISTEKDIKTI, so it included two different funding schemes" (BA, interview, 7 June 2021).*

Another prerequisite was implicit: advancing the goals of the NWO-RISTEKDIKTI research grant. In the call for proposals, three main objectives were identified. First, strengthening cooperation in the fields of science and innovation. Second, addressing the current problems of society by creating collaboration between scientists and scholars at institutions in Indonesia and the Netherlands. Third, promoting interdisciplinary research (NWO Document, 2018: 3). This had implications for the involvement of experts in the Ground Up consortium.

Also stipulated was the focus of the research. Three research focuses were listed in the NWO-RISTEKDIKTI call for proposals. First, food security and agriculture. Second, regional planning (including water management and hydrology). Third, governance and rule of law (NWO Document, 2018: 5–6). To accommodate the requirement to promote interdisciplinary research, the Ground Up consortium chose to focus on two elements: Regional Planning (Water Management and Hydrology) and Governance and

Rule of Law (Ground Up proposal, 2018). These were translated as land subsidence, which was chosen because it incorporated both technical dimensions (regional planning) and matters of governance (SI, interview, 7 June 2021).

To address these prerequisites, the Ground Up consortium was assembled as a combination of universities, institutions that produce science, and NGOs, as institutions that focus on advocacy (policy). In the Netherlands, UvA and IHE-Delft acted as the main university applicants for this proposal. These universities brought with them a tradition of socio-technical knowledge that sees social conditions and technical aspects as mutually influential. UGM and UNDIP acted as the university applicants from Indonesia. UGM dealt with the governance aspects of water management, particularly the power dimensions involved in water management. Meanwhile, UNDIP brought with it knowledge of urban spatial planning. Finally, two NGOs—the Amrta Institute and KRuHA—were concerned with citizens' right to water without exception. Both were tasked with distributing the findings of the Ground Up consortium and conducting public advocacy activities. Once the Ground Up proposal was accepted, UvA and Undip were rarely involved in consortium activities; their inclusion in the consortium was primarily to meet administrative requirements for their applications to be considered by NWO-RISTEKDIKTI. In short, every member of the consortium agreed to be involved because it was relevant to its particular expertise (SI, interview, 7 June 2021).

Figure 2 Actors in the Ground Up Consortium



Source: Author's Analysis

Challenges arose because the call for proposals required the involvement of universities (science) in the Netherlands, universities (science) in Indonesia, and NGOs (policy) in Indonesia. The main challenge was bridging the different values, knowledge, and practices of the Ground Up consortium's members. Such differences arose naturally due to the differences in culture, interaction, and environment that affected the way institutions work (McNie, 2008). The contestation of expertise, therefore, was unavoidable.

From these facts, it is evident that the formation of the Ground Up consortium was influenced by the requirements set within

the NWO-RISTEKDIKTI call for proposals, such as collaboration of knowledge, values, and practices. This requirement entered the basic logic of each consortium member, and thus the urgency to collaborate was undeniable. Collaboration was carried out by dividing tasks among members, with certain research questions entrusted to certain members. At the same time, the boundary work between science and policy was formed through this process.

The Ground Up consortium thereby created a division of labour in answering the research questions. IHE-Delft, as the main applicant, had an important role in drafting the research questions and honing the ideas to be brought by the Ground Up consortium. UGM also played a role as a discussion peer in brainstorming ideas. However, IHE-Delft was the sole institution with the authority to decide the final research questions (SI, 7 June 2021).

> *"Initially it was IE, EL, and BA, who from the beginning identified research problems. Finally, the research questions themselves were made by EL, after we discussed them. It takes skill to make solid research questions, and EL was more expert in doing so, but together we identified the big direction of this research" (IE, interview, 12 June 2021).*

The results of the brainstorming were then communicated with the Amrta Institute so that it could provide input on the research questions. The Amrta Institute agreed, as the research questions had been arranged to coincide with its agenda—

which is heavily intertwined with water management issues (SI, interview, 7 June 2021; IE, interview, 12 June 2021). The results of the brainstorming were also communicated to KRuHA, which did not have any specific point to address. UNDIP, as a consortium member, did not contribute to the shaping of the research questions considering their focus on a "strategy". Therefore, the research questions included in the proposal were the responsibility of IHE-Delft.

> *"That was like EL's prerogative. BA did not seem to have much involvement. There were three research questions for this project, so we just accepted them; nothing happened" – (IE, interview, 12 June 2021).*

Discussions ultimately led to a decision on the three research questions included in the proposal, namely: 1) How do ecological and socio-technical relations between below-ground and surface water distributions shape uneven outcomes for water access and risk?; 2) How are groundwater governance practices shaped by formal and informal institutions?; 3) How can civic innovation influence groundwater governance practices to realise more equitable distributions of flood risk and water access?

> *"EL was heavily involved in research question number one and two because she is a practitioner. Question number three, I think it was SI and IE who dealt with civic innovation" (BA, interview, 5 June 2021).*

These three research questions were formed and each member of the consortium took into account each institution's expertise in the study of water management. Boundaries

were therefore constructed (see Table 1). The creation of the research questions involved three members of the consortium, namely EL, BA and SI (SI, interview, 7 June 2021), who brainstormed to develop the questions and coordinated to identify problems. However, in the end, BA and SI had limited ability to make final decisions. Such authority fell to EL, because of her experience formulating research questions. In other words, the scientific approach was emphasised over the policy approach when designing the research questions.

Boundaries had to be created through the research questions due to expertise considerations. For example, SI had extensive knowledge of urban spatial issues and saw the dimensions of governance that impacted urban development. Therefore, she was responsible for the research questions related to governance issues (BA, interview, 5 June 2021). On that basis, we can see that the demarcation factor is due to the belief within the consortium that everyone had certain skills.

Table 1 Division of Labour in Ground Up Consortium

No	Research Question	Institution
1	How do ecological and socio-technical relations between below-ground and surface water distributions shape uneven outcomes for water access and risk?	IHE-Delft, UvA
2	How are groundwater governance practices shaped by formal and informal institutions?	IHE-Delft, UGM, Amrta Institute

3	How can civic innovation influence groundwater governance practices to realise more equitable distributions of flood risk and water access?	IHE-Delft, UGM, Amrta Institute, KruHA

Source: Author's Analysis (2021)

This division of labour was based on the knowledge and expertise of each institution. IHE-Delft had a deep understanding of the interdisciplinary approach and understood water management through a combination of its technical and governance aspects (SI, interview, 7 June 2021). They were able to speak well with other actors because of their expertise and existing track record with previous collaboration projects (IE, interview, 12 June 2021).

In contrast, UGM viewed the inability to solve water problems in Semarang as stemming from water management policies that emphasised an institutionalist approach, even as there existed disharmony between the executive, legislative and judicial branches (SI, interview, 7 June 2021). Amrta Institute and KRuHA had developed similar beliefs through their emphasis on communities' right to water.

As discussed above, the boundary text was identified through the substance of the NWO-RISTEKDIKTI call for proposals. This document provided an "area" for science and policy collaboration between Dutch and Indonesian institutions. At the same time, however, it created limitations on the research topic and the involved parties. Another boundary text was the research questions compiled by the Ground Up consortium. The division of labour in developing

research questions placed "boundaries" between UGM and IHE-Delft as well as between IHE-Delft and the two NGOs (Amrta Institute/KRuHA). At the same time, the research questions also created "coordination" between consortium members when answering the research questions (see Table 1).

Boundary work in the Ground Up consortium was constructed through a call for proposals from NWO-RISTEKDIKTI, research questions, and methodologies. This condition shifted after the project started. For the call for proposals, applicants planned transdisciplinary research with a focus on food and water management and rule of law (NWO Document, 2018). This impacted the form of the Ground Up consortium, which shared the common goal of producing transdisciplinary knowledge on the rule of law and water management (Ground Up proposal, 2018). Therefore, the Ground Up consortium was formed by various agencies, but they had a shared interest in investigating water management.

At the same time, the division of labour in the consortium was constructed through the research questions in the proposal. Every member of the consortium had an obligation to answer the research questions. Likewise, through the methodological aspects—the decision to use a survey—the demarcation between science and policy was shaped. These boundaries shifted over the course of the year.

2. Boundary Object: Research Proposal

Discussing the boundary objects of the Ground Up consortium brings our discussion to the research proposal, which functioned to set boundaries between science and policy, expertise and non-expertise, and

(more generally) the Netherlands and Indonesia. The research proposal contained, among other things, a timeline of the activities to be carried out by the Ground Up consortium. Specific budgeting and research questions were arranged, distinguishing specifically between science-based and policy-based activities. Boundary work thus became more prominent.

Reconstruction of this process can begin with explaining the research proposal as a boundary object. Three components of the research proposal can be said to be boundary objects. Firstly, the timeline of Ground Up consortium activities contained in the research proposal. The Ground Up project ran for three years. In the first year, the Ground Up consortium focused on collecting data to answer the research questions detailed in the proposal. It also produced knowledge through the book *Maleh Dadi Segoro* (MDS), which emphasised land subsidence in northern Semarang.

Entering the second year, the distribution of knowledge to water stakeholders in Semarang was carried out through a workshop in late December 2019 and early January 2020. Targeted stakeholders included the Regional Revenue Agency (Bappenda) of Semarang City, the Regional Planning Agency (Bappeda) of Semarang City, the Department of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) of Central Java Province, the Public Works Department (PU) of Semarang City, and local politicians. In this workshop, the Ground Up consortium explained the results of data collection and initial analysis through PowerPoint presentations. Focus was given to land subsidence in several parts of Semarang City (such as Tambak Lorok), local

innovations from residents who made and distributed water tanks, and potential solutions for each stakeholder (Ground Up meeting notes, 19 January 2020).

In the third year, the consortium focused on the production of knowledge in the form of journal articles, according to the main interests of each member of the consortium. For example, UGM wrote about how local (material) policy relates to water issues. The local election in Semarang showed that the materiality of policy is shaped by patronage. Furthermore, this article related to the momentum of local elections and looked at how the issue of water was being interpreted in public discourse. On the other hand, Amrta Institute and KRuHA developed an open course about "socio-ecological crises and direct democracy". BA was involved in this open course as an individual, as he assumed that it would be a way to share knowledge. He discussed "degrowth", knowledge of which he gained through his involvement in Ground Up (BA, interview, 5 June 2021).

Secondly, the research budget component also played a role as a boundary object. Each member of the consortium viewed it differently. For example, NGOs saw the budgeting component as focused on advocacy activities through the production of knowledge. For universities, the budget could be diverted to other things, such as strengthening the capacity of civil society by improving water education. The budget was part of the research proposal that regulated science and policy activities, identifying not only activities that would be carried out but also the means of carrying out these activities. Take, for example, survey activities. These limited the scope of the research, i.e., how many areas could be sampled for knowledge

production activities. The survey culminated in the production of knowledge. At another point, this produced advocacy to be carried out by the consortium (Ground Up Meeting Notes, 13 December 2019).

Another example can be seen when the Ground Up consortium sought to engage external partners in producing output. Per the research proposal, one of the outputs of the Ground Up consortium would be a video campaign (Ground Up Proposal, 2018). For NGOs, a video campaign would provide a means of supervising land subsidence. On the other hand, universities saw the video campaign as involving the dissemination of knowledge about land subsidence. These were transformed into an effort to deliver knowledge about water management through digital platforms. Such an output provided a blended science and policy activity because it combined knowledge production (in the form of documentary films) with advocacy (policy) activities. However, the budget was an obstacle to delivering science and policy activities. The two examples above show that the budget of research plays a role in maintaining the stability of practices and activities between science and policy.

> *"We need to decide what targets we want to achieve. Example: social justice and inequality. Alas, our budget is too small for [Watchdoc], as a Watchdoc could cost IDR 100 million" (Ground Up meeting notes, 12 January 2021).*

Furthermore, through the relationship and research management between consortium members, reciprocal relationships were created based on the research proposal. UGM and IHE-Delft played a

role in covering the research budget, while Amrta Institute and KRuHA focused on advocacy and knowledge transfer. This assignment of roles was evident throughout the entire project because KRuHA and the Amrta Institute were at the forefront of the advocacy process. In other words, each consortium member coordinated to ensure the continuation of research.

Thirdly, the research questions contained in the research proposal. Star and Griesemer (1989) argue that boundary objects involve standardised work and protocols. As such, research proposals—including research questions—can serve as important boundary objects that create demarcation and collaboration between consortium members (Ground Up consortium proposal, March 2018).

> *"If you look at the structure of the question, you can guess who will handle what, because, in the formulation of the problems we have designed, it is not actually designed from the beginning. Rather, there was pressure from each member of the consortium that shaped the research questions" (SI, interview, 7 June 2021).*

As noted previously, three key research questions were developed (see Table 1), with each consortium member having a role in providing answers. These questions thus served not only to divide members but also to ensure coordination. For instance, UGM was obliged to answer research questions number two and three. Thus, UGM conducted field research to answer these two questions. However, they did not restrict their interview guides to these two topics; they also

included more general questions so that other members of the consortium would be able to use their data.

Based on the above explanation, I argue that the research proposal played an important role as a boundary object in the Ground Up consortium. This is evidenced by three components, namely the timeline, budget, and research questions included in the research proposal. These functioned to demarcate and coordinate science and policy. For example, we can see that the demarcation of science and policy was constructed through the research timeline, which specified when scientific activities would be carried out and when policy activities would be carried out.

All consortium members' activities referred to the proposal. During meetings and discussions, they used the research proposal to remind them of the programmed direction of activities, both scientific and policy. For example, the production of scientific knowledge was to be carried out in the first year, while policy activities would be prioritised in the second year. In the third year, the consortium would be deeply engaged in advocacy activity through the production of knowledge, such as journal articles. Data collection was carried out in the first year, which then became the basis for the production of knowledge (in the form of journal articles) in the third year. Each member was involved in bridging their different values, knowledge, and practices. As such, the Ground Up consortium was able to realise their activities in practice.

> *"My role was to try to ascertain what was promised in the proposal. For example, the proposal promised to*

produce an article, and in my opinion, I think that conceptually it has been fulfilled." (BA, interview, 5 June 2021).

According to the previous discussion, we can assume that understandings of the research proposal differed. Universities interpreted research proposals as important parts of knowledge production that aimed to answer what previous studies had not. On the other hand, NGOs referred to research proposals to ascertain what kinds of activities could be done to increase public awareness about land subsidence. NGOs needed the knowledge produced by universities to be able to better understand the context of land subsidence. To conclude, universities and NGOs had different understandings of research proposals.

3. Boundary People: Shifting as Research Progressed

Identifying boundary people in the Ground Up consortium is tricky because almost all of the members acted as boundary people. Through document analysis and interviews, I discovered that members operated within different communities. EL operated on behalf of IHE-Delft, UvA, and the Ground Up consortium, as did BA. SI, meanwhile, acted on behalf of UGM and the Ground Up consortium itself, and held the title of coordinator.

Members' respective roles were also different. EL played a major role in bringing together experts to be involved in this study. BA, on the other hand, consolidated the expertise contributed by UGM, Undip and KRuHA within the consortium and explored the possibility of collaborating with the Legal Aid

Institute (LBH) of Semarang to deal with the issue of evictions in the coastal areas of Semarang. I argue that they acted as knowledge brokers because of their role to mediate experts and expertise within the Ground Up consortium.

The formation of the Ground Up consortium was inexorably linked to a meeting between EL and IE at a workshop on land subsidence in Jakarta, which was possible because IHE-Delft and Amrta Institute were asked to present the findings of their collaborative programme to the Governor of Jakarta. In this activity, Makara, a Dutch NGO engaged in water issues, was also involved.

The results of this workshop raised hopes that research activities could continue and provide policy input to the provincial government of Jakarta. Around this time, the call for proposals was announced by NWO-RISTEKDIKTI. EL conveyed this news to Amrta Institute and Makara and urged them to prepare a proposal.

> *"At that time EL said that there was a chance to join the NWO call for proposals. Did we want to take it or not? In the end, we tried" (IE, interview, 12 June 2021).*

Discussions were carried and BA was involved in making the Ground Up proposal. When she wanted to involve BA, EL consulted IE, who also knew BA.

The inclusion of BA in the consortium helped EL gather experts for the Ground Up consortium. BA held a series of meeting with prospective members—UGM, KRuHA, and LBH Semarang—that could help their advocacy activities.

BA held a personal meeting in December 2018 with each member of the consortium and

potential external partners. BA met representatives from KRuHA, Amrta Institute, UGM, and LBH Semarang. The purpose of these meetings was to identify their expectations for this research, what roles they could play, and their main concerns when involved in this project (Ground Up Meeting Notes, 19 January 2019).

First, he met KRuHA representatives to initially discuss the Ground Up consortium's research objectives, especially as related to the issue of groundwater extraction and its effect on floods and land subsidence. KRuHA agreed that this was very important, as in their experience with the issue of land subsidence in Jakarta the public tended not to discuss the matter (Ground Up meeting notes, 19 January 2019). They found that the issue of land subsidence was not something that had a direct impact on the community. Therefore, the research objectives of the Ground Up consortium were in-line with the main goal of KRuHA (Ground Up meeting notes, 19 January 2019).

BA then met with representatives from the Amrta Institute, an organisation with a focus on research management and knowledge transfer. The meeting emphasised that research activities would continue for three years, starting from the consolidation of the Ground Up consortium to the release of research findings as a part of knowledge transfer. Representatives of the Amrta Institute argued that the Ground Up consortium needed a strong individual figure capable of channelling ideas of water governance in Semarang. Over time, the Amrta Institute hoped that there would be integrated data to facilitate advocacy activities in Tambak Lorok

(Ground Up meeting notes, 19 January 2019). The consortium owned the medium because one of its objectives was public advocacy.

The next meeting was with SI, as a representative of UGM. In the meeting, UGM expected that the Ground Up consortium would have a network of stakeholders to assist its advocacy actions and produce knowledge about land subsidence (Ground Up meeting notes, 19 January 2019). BA answered that the Ground Up consortium could invite LBH Semarang as one of its stakeholders. The involvement of LBH would improve knowledge of groundwater within the community.

Following this meeting with UGM, BA met with representatives of LBH Semarang to ascertain its potential as a medium for transferring knowledge to society and stakeholders. During the meeting, BA provided background information on this project, such as its objectives and duration. LBH positively welcomed this meeting and was willing to be involved in the groundwater crisis campaign (Ground Up meeting notes, 19 January 2019).

To summarise, EL and BA acted as knowledge brokers. EL played a major role in shaping ideas as well as connecting experts. She also distributed tasks and determined what data should be used, shaped the conceptual framework, and decided the main arguments.

On the other hand, BA acted to integrate the different knowledge and expectations of members. He was also involved in advocacy and, at the same time, contributed to the substance of the research. At one point, he demarked science and policy by playing a role in determining the members of the Ground Up consortium. At another point, he coordinated

science and policy relations by being involved in advocacy activities and maturating the research substance.

As research was underway, SI was made the main coordinator in Indonesia. This allowed her to stand between science and policy. She handled administrative matters, in the form of knowledge production activities through surveys and advocacy activities for residents affected by land subsidence. For instance, in preparing a book that contains knowledge and advocacy for residents affected by land subsidence, SI handled administrative issues such as the honorarium for the editor, the number of copies printed, etc. SI took care of these matters, and thus acted as a person who crossed the line between science and policy.

She was also involved in substantive processes. For instance, when the second survey was completed, she played a role in overseeing the analysis of the survey results. SI then played a role in distributing these results to stakeholders, especially politicians (SI, interview, 7 June 2021). SI had an agenda to raise awareness of the issue of land subsidence amongst politicians, thereby ensuring that the public was aware of the dangers of land subsidence. By using survey instruments, politicians could easily recognise that land subsidence was currently happening. Therefore, through the survey instrument, she was involved in both the production of knowledge and advocacy.

Further evidence of her role as a boundary crosser is the fact that SI represented the Ground

Up consortium in the press release of the project's findings (Ground Up meeting notes, 30 January 2020). On that basis, she acted not as a representative of UGM, but rather on behalf of the Ground Up consortium. She determined what research findings could be shared and what research findings should be kept. Therefore, if we define boundary people as gatekeepers, SI was the key figure. Through the discussion above, we can see that SI acted as a boundary person and played a role in bridging science and policy, such as by acting as a spokesperson. Therefore, SI was not involved only in the production of knowledge. She slowly became involved in advocacy (policy) activities.

Conclusion

Using the TOP model, this article shows that the negotiation between science and policy was constructed through the call for proposals, research proposals, and people operating at boundaries. As a boundary text, the call for proposals issued by NWO-RISTEKDIKTI shaped the formation of the Ground Up consortium. Its contents, such as the purpose of the call for proposals and the focus of research, pushed the Ground Up consortium to promote collaboration between science and policy and informed the focus of the research. At the same time, the call for proposals established a clear division of labour in answering the research questions.

As for boundary objects, the initial design of research collaboration demarcated science and policy in a particular manner. This was evidenced through a series of practices that were listed in the research proposal. However, the research proposal did not only function to

demarcate science and policy. It also functioned to coordinate science and policy by specifying the time for science activities and the time for policy-based activities. Finally, for boundary people, this study finds that three members of the consortium played a role to coordinate the boundaries. Furthermore, there was a shift as research progressed.

Through the example of the Ground Up consortium, this study finds that collaborative knowledge between the Global North and Global South is not taken for granted. Rather, collaboration was socially constructed through the call for proposals, boundary objects, and the involvement of people who are at the limits of science and policy.

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Political Clientelism, Family Power and Conflict Permanence in Local Elections: The Case of Maluku

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Abstract

This article examines the relationship between political clientelism and the establishment of family power in local elections. It argues that the use of clientelism networks impacts the creation of family power, the application of which results in the perpetuation of social conflict. Clientelism networks serve as ready-to-use networks which can be mobilised to support relatives during political events. This article uses the case of local elections in Central Maluku (2007–2017) to show the clientelist processes used by the relatives of Tuasikal. The use of alternate clientelism networks enabled the Tuasikal family in Central Maluku to successfully establish power and perpetuate conflicts between supporters and opponents. This study used field observations to collect data in fifteen villages, focusing on the elites and community members involved in the 2007, 2012, and 2017 elections, as well as a review of relevant literature. This study concludes that clientelist practices are used to create political networks to maintain family power and perpetuate conflict between opposing community groups during elections.

Keywords*: family power; political clientelism; conflict; local elections*

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1. Introduction

To date, studies of clientelism have tended to emphasise the provision of support to candidates and political exchange (Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2019; Hopkin, 2008). Clientelism is seen more as a relationship wherein voters provide support to candidates and function as intermediaries in local elections (Robinson & Verdier, 2013: 262; Wale, 2014: 232; Hopkin, 2006: 5; Brienkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002: 3; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007: 2; Aspinall, & Sukmajati, 2019). It is as if clientelism only works through political exchanges and does not consequently impact the formation of family power and conflict in society, even though, as a support organisation, such networks can be used to win over relatives.

Likewise, studies of family power generally view it as a network and political modality that is concentrated on the family sphere (Susanti, 2017; Fokatea & Mas'udi, 2020; Djati, 2013; Habbodin, 2017; Rusnaedy & Purwaningsih, 2015; Haryanto, 2014). At the same time, these studies also do not clearly link the creation of family power with the use of clientelism networks within the family to claim the same support bases. Several studies see family power as the intergenerational inheritance of power within a small family sphere (Habbodin, 2017; Rusnaedy & Purwaningsih, 2018). They do not examine relatives' operation of clientelism networks to work on the same support base in turn. In fact, family power—as a form of network and political capital—is also maintained through political co-optation (Fokatea & Mas'udi, 2020) and the inheritance of mass bases and bureaucratic networks (Rusnaedy & Purwaningsih, 2018).

Previously, a study of clientelism and family power was conducted by Malik, Mirza, and Platteau (2021), who highlighted the practice of clientelism and its involvement in the establishment of family power in Pakistan. They described the relationship between clientelism and family power through the role of incumbents, who have the political discretion to use public goods to win elections. Such clientelist practices are detrimental to the quality of development, as seen in Punjab. Despite looking at the expansion of family power through clientelism networks, this study focuses more on the impact of family power on economic stagnation at the regional level. As such, it does not provide further exploration of how political clientelism and associated networks are used to shape family power and conflict in society.

Ravanilla, Hicken, and Davidson (2017) looked at the relationship between clientelism and the formation of family power in the Philippines. They showed that the clientelist operations that take place through family political networks contribute to changing voting behaviour. In the Philippines, clientelist networks also operate by exploiting the political loyalties of candidates and support providers as well as their reciprocal relationships in favour of family power (Ravanilla, Hicken & Davidson, 2017: 2). Despite developing research by Cruz, Labonne, and Querebin (2016) on the use of the family power networks in Philippine elections, both studies emphasise loyalty and the political exchanges that take place in clientelism networks as the basis for creating family power; loyalty and political exchange are not only means of providing support, but also the

main prerequisites for binding candidates and support providers (Stokes, 2019; Sukmajati, 2019; Aspinall, 2014; Hutchcroft, 2014; Hopkin, 2006;) and creating family power (Ravanilla, Hicken & Davidson, 2017).

Political loyalty, which operates through clientelism networks, can be used as a means of political mobilisation to ensure candidates' electoral victory (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2020; Stokes, 2019:3; Dunning, Thad & Stokes, 2008; Chubb, 1981). Leveraging the loyalty of support providers, clientelism networks mobilise the masses while connecting candidates and voters (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2020: 3). The political loyalty created by clientelism helps candidates detect defections from support providers (Aspinall, 2014: 547; Stokes, 2013; Stokes, 2005) while making it easier for voters to identify candidates based on their familial ties (Rivanilla, Hicken & Davidson, 2017:5). In fact, organising family power networks also makes it easier for candidates to earn and transfer political capital within the family (Purwaningsih, 2015: 99).

The local elections in Central Maluku Regency, which took place from 2007 to 2017, were important examples of the use of clientelism networks as the basis for the formation of the Tuasikal family's power. Clientelism operated through political exchanges that were nurtured as hereditary engines for supporting the family's electoral victory. These practices work through voters' loyalty to their raja (traditional leaders) as well as customary institutions

such as saniri and mataruma.[2] All of these customary institutions were used as political brokers by the Tuasikal family.

Starting from Abdullah Tuasikal's rise to political power in the 2007 local election, clientelism networks were used by Abua Tuasikal—Abdullah's older brother—and his relatives to secure electoral victory in the 2012 and 2017 elections. These political actors used the same clientelism networks to organise the raja and other traditional institutions as support providers. At the same time, clientelism was also organised through formal institutions such as the bureaucracy and civil servants. Formal actors linked the Tuasikal family with voters even as they facilitated political compromise between the family and the raja/adat institutions. This was possible because family power was supported by strong political networks that were shared within the family (George, 2019; Habbodin, 2017; Muraoka, 2018; Fokatea & Mas'udi, 2020).

Clientelism networks were by Abdullah Tuasikal during the 2008 and 2013 gubernatorial elections; although his bids were unsuccessful, he was able to mobilise support in Central Maluku. Abdullah Tuasikal's wife, Miranti Dewaningsih, used clientelism networks to gain a seat in the People's Consultative Assembly (2009–2024) and Regional Representatives Council (DPD; 2014–2019). Amrullah Amri Tuasikal, the son of Abdullah Tuasikal and Miranty Dewaningsih, also gained support from the same clientelism network when contesting the 2019 legislative elections.

2 The *raja* is the head of government at the *negeri* (village) level; the position, thus, is equivalent to village head. In Maluku, the position of *raja* is based on lineage/clan (*mataruma*). *Saniri* is equivalent to the Village Consultative Body (BPD). Finally, *negeri* is the customary name for villages in Maluku.

The use of these alternative clientelism networks divided communities based on their affiliation with the Tuasikal family as well as the raja and customary institutions that were connected to their power centres. At the same time, unaffiliated elites became the political opponents of the Tuasikal family. The division became widespread, sowing the seeds of political conflict in local society. With the Tuasikal family's far-reaching tendrils, political polarisation provided alternative avenues for conflicts between opposing groups (Ficher, 2002).

On the one hand, the networking of these groups strengthened the political polarisation of society. Likewise, the repeated use of clientelist political networks perpetuated the conflict between different groups. This situation was exacerbated by the political intervention of Abdullah Tuasikal and Abua Tuasikal as incumbents, who organised family power as well as mobilised support through clientelist nodes within the bureaucracy and at the village level. Political polarisation was caused not only by socio-ideological divisions but also stemmed from the abuse of power by local executives (Arugay & Slater, 2018: 93). In the context of Central Maluku's local elections, the two incumbents—Abdullah Tuasikal and Abua Tuasikal—created political reach by co-opting the bureaucracy, the raja, and traditional institutions to mobilise support for relatives even as they dragged communities into political conflicts.

The organisation of clientelism networks in Saleman Village, Northwest Seram, for example, also created division within society. The co-optation of the raja and other customary institutions resulted in the

selection of leaders attuned to Abua Tuasikal's political interests. As regional leaders, both Abdullah Tuasikal (2002–2007) and Abua Tuasikal (2012–2017) received political support through their clientelist relationships with the raja, and thus they sought the appointment of local leaders whose interests aligned with their own. This political penetration had a significant effect on political divisions in society. The conflict between top-level elites, both candidates and other elites, resulted in broader political divisions. In other words, the polarisation of elites was extended to create conflict between different elements of society (Gunterman & Blaiss, 2022:141).

In Saleman Village, the community was divided into those opposed to the Tuasikal family (matahari nai) and those who supported the Tuasikal family (matahari turung).[3] Each formed its own village government, appointing its own raja, saniri, and village administration, as well as their own village office. Similar conflicts and political divisions were found throughout Central Maluku. Tactically organising clientelist networks enabled the Tuasikal family to maintain its power base. Clientelism was used to support family members, even as society was divided.

This article discusses the Tuasikal family's use of clientelism networks as the basis for establishing power and perpetuating conflict through Central Maluku's local elections in 2007, 2012, and 2017. Data were collected through field observations in fifteen villages as well as in-depth interviews

3 The *matahari turung* (sunset) referred to community members who lived in the western part of Salamen. Meanwhile, the *matahari nai* (sunrise) were concentrated in the eastern part of the city. These groups came into conflict because of their different political affiliations.

with seventy-five informants, consisting of both elites and community members, as well as campaign teams and non-political elites. Each informant participated in at least one of the three local elections (2007, 2012, and 2017), either in support of or opposition to the Tuasikal family. To expand on this information, interviews were conducted with elites who were clientelistically connected and politically affiliated with the Tuasikal family in the local/legislative elections.

Structurally, this article is divided into five parts. First, it provides an introduction that discusses clientelism, family power, and political conflict within the case of local elections in Maluku. Second, it examines the socio-historical roots of clientelism in Maluku and places it as an entry point for the formation of political clientelism and conflicts in local elections. Third, it discusses the use of clientelism networks as a basis for establishing the power of the Tuasikal family in Central Maluku through executive or legislative elections. Fourth, it shows that the use of clientelism networks by the Tuasikal family expanded conflict and perpetuated the political divisions in society. Finally, this article concludes by discussing the links between clientelism, family power, and conflict.

Results and Discussion

a. The Roots of Clientelism in Maluku: From Trade Politics to Local Elections

An examination of the practice of political clientelism in Maluku quickly uncovers the co-optation of the *raja* by the Dutch East India Company (VOC). As shown by Chauvel (1990), the VOC worked by installing *raja* in Maluku as trade intermediaries at the village level. Chauvel (1990: 8) notes that the *raja* occupied

three important roles in the company's trade-politics chain: as community representatives at the village level; as representatives of the colonial government who held the highest authority in the village; and as colonial agents who served to regulate the supply and demand for cloves.

These three roles placed the *raja* of Maluku as brokers in trade politics and as despotic figures in conflict with the common people. *Raja*, as traditional leaders, were originally considered prominent figures in their villages, but this was eroded by their involvement with the VOC (Knaap, 1987). The expansion of political/trade interactions between the *raja* and VOC resulted in division between community members, based on their support or opposition to this situation (see Widjojo, 2013; Chauvel, 1990; Pamungkas, 2014).

These conflicts stemmed from the political tactic whereby colonial authorities arbitrarily appointed and replaced *raja* to advance their trade interests at the village level (Chauvel, 1990; Widjojo, 2013). Any *raja* who refused to cooperate was replaced (even when he came from a different clan), while *raja* who were willing to cooperate were retained. From a regulatory perspective, the customary laws of other lands were also introduced to advance colonial political interests (Ter Haar, 1948).

Such political intervention created conflict and confusion regarding matters of lineage and clan. Such practices have been echoed by the Tuasikal family, which used the conflicts of the *raja* as political capital for mapping its support and consolidating its networks in Central Maluku. This practice was identified by the community as

"Dutch politics" or "split bamboo politics"–one blade is stepped on, the other is lifted. Conflicts in villages in Leihitu and Seram,[4] for example, provided an entry point for clientelist political exchanges in support of Abdullah and Abua Tuasikal (Kelihu, 2021).

Aspinall and Berenschot (2019: 247) show that, in remote and economically backward parts of Indonesia, traditional leaders function as political brokers. Despite noting a link between economic growth and political clientelism, they agree that traditional leaders such as clan/*marga* or *fam* leaders have the political power to mobilise large numbers of voters.[5] The link between the *raja*, *saniri*, and *mataruma*, which had been institutionalised for generations, provided Abdullah Tuasikal (2007–2012) and Abua Tuasikal (2012–2021) with permanent support in every local election. The *raja* cleverly used their capacity to establish connections with the Tuasikal family through personal compromises before the elites' appointment. At the same time, as political incumbents, Abdullah Tuasikal and Abua Tuasikal have had the political discretion to appoint the raja according to their interests.

Ibrahim Ruhunussa—the former chairman of the Regional People's Representative Council (DPR; 2014–2019), who was involved with Abua Tuasikal in appointing the *raja*—explained that the scheme for determining the *raja* was designed from the start to appoint individuals whose interests aligned with those of the incumbent.

4 Leihitu is located on Ambon Island; Seram, meanwhile, refers to Seram Island. These two regions are home to the largest voter bases in Central Maluku; one-third of voters in the regency live in Leihitu, while half live in Seram area.

5 Based on the Clientelism Perception Index (CPI) / Survey Scored Districts and Provinces conducted by Edward Aspinall and Ward Berenschot, Eastern Indonesia has a CPI score of 6–7 (out of a range of 3–7). Maluku received a score of 6.06.

Many villages have regulated the process of determining their *raja*. So, when the process of determining the *raja* operates, they [incumbents] can use the *raja* to secure their political interests in their respective villages.[6]

These compromises became one way to ensure the loyalty of the *raja* as support providers in local elections. Although *raja* in Central Maluku are appointed based on hereditary considerations, the requirement for them to be approved by the regent has provided a political loophole for incumbents such as Abdullah Tuasikal and Abua Tuasikal. Local Regulation No. 3 of 2006 concerning the Nomination, Election, and Inauguration of the Heads of Village Governments requires that *raja* be ratified after being elected through customary processes at the village level; this holds the *raja*, *saniri*, and *mataruma* hostage to the clientelism networks of the Tuasikal family. This is exacerbated by the enduring ambiguity about the lineage of *raja* during the colonial period (see also Chauvel, 1990; Widjojo, 2013; Knaap, 1978).

The *raja* eventually became involved in clientelist networks that supported the Tuasikal family, becoming indebted through their compromises with the incumbents. The *raja* thus acted simultaneously as traditional leaders as well as political power brokers in every election. In this context, the *raja* of Central Maluku were not only connected to the Tuasikal family because of their control over society, but also held hostage by the political exchanges and loyalties they established with the incumbents in every election. Aspinall and Berenschot (2019: 197) include the *raja* as part of the

6 Interview with Ibrahim Ruhunussa in Hila Village, Leihitu District, May 2021

influence network of clientelism.[7] In the influence network, religious character or identity, the culture and social identity attached to traditional leaders are useful for organising support. *Raja* play an incredibly significant role because of their capacity as clan (*marga*/*fam*) representatives in various conflict resolutions, traditional rituals, and interactions with outsiders (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019: 194). This clientelistic network has shaped the power of the Tuasikal family and exacerbated the conflict and political division within society.

b. Clientelism and the Power of the Tuasikal Family

Important in the practice of clientelism during local elections in Central Maluku (2007–2017) was its use in expanding the power of the Tuasikal family. The clientelist networks that have operated in the 20 years since the election of Abdullah Tuasikal (2002–2007) and Abua Tuasikal (2012–2023) have underpinned half a century of Tuasikal rule.[8] The age calculation not only shows the durability of the clientelism network of the Tuasikal family, but also the success of the Tuasikal family in maintaining the loyalty of the king, the traditional institution as a provider of support.

The clientelist networks established in Central Maluku involving the *raja*, customary institutions, and local elites

7 Aspinall identified two types of mobilisation network: *influence networks* and *benefit networks*. Influence networks are organised through elites or traditional leaders who rely on their social, cultural, and religious influence. Benefit networks are formed through trade chains that connect candidates and entrepreneurs. Unlike influence networks, benefit networks rely on the benefits derived from trade/exchange relations.

8 Adding up the terms of every member of the Tuasikal family (children, wife, and siblings) results in more than fifty years of time served.

as support providers worked through two modes of operation: through political co-optation and personal compromise. The incumbents (both Abdullah Tuasikal and Abua Tuasikal) co-opted the *raja* and *saniri* into their network through formal hierarchies and regional political structures. The *raja* thus became subordinate to the regent, expected not only to obey their administrative instructions but also advance their political interests. Meanwhile, political clientelism operates through personal compromise between the *raja* and the incumbents, during which traditional processes are adjusted to suit the political interests of the incumbents. The operations of these clientelist networks can be described as follows:

Figure 1. Political Clientelism Networks in Local Elections Central Maluku (Kelihu, 2021)



As subordinates to the regent, the raja must not only be administratively obedient but also engage in political exchanges that position them as the political brokers of the incumbent. Meanwhile, the personal compromises between the *raja* and incumbents were converted into loyalty to the incumbent. The capacity of Abdullah Tuasikal and Abua Tuasikal as regional heads to appoint *raja*, pursuant to Local Regulation No. 3 of 2006, has provided them with a means of imposing their political interests. This loophole, it would appear, was adapted as a political exchange to ensure the loyalty of the *raja* as supporter providers.

Three important actors are involved in the clientelism network operated by the Tuasikal family. *First,* the incumbents themselves. *Second,* the go-between elites, including civil servants in regency/district offices and village-level elites such as community leaders, teachers, politicians or contractors.[9] *Third, raja* and customary institutions such as *saniri* and *mataruma*. These various actors serve to connect *raja* and incumbents in clientelistic political exchanges. In an interview, one member of the elite power circle surrounding Abdullah Tuasikal and Abua Tuasikal stated that the political co-optation of the raja was mediated by elites in the regency government. According to him:

Usually [control over the raja] goes through bureaucratic channels. Through BAN, the Village Administration Section, which is directly tied to the *raja*. BAN brings together the *raja*, to influence the regent. The regent

9 Generally, actors in the regency government are bureaucrats who are directly involved in village governance or have close ties to the *raja*. Meanwhile, the local village elites are generally community leaders, politicians, and contractors who are involved in a number of projects; it may also include small contractors or community leaders.

will usually ask, "how can you win 60%? How? How many polling stations are in the village?" In such a case, the raja may answer "there are 30 polling places, and *katong* (ours) can win."[10]

Civil servants in the regency government function as intermediaries that connect the *raja* and the incumbents in elections. Through these political relations, the *raja* further carry out the co-optation of traditional institutions (*saniri* and *mataruma*) to facilitate voter mobilisation. The role of the *raja* is further shaped by their willingness to obey the incumbent as the regional leader and as a political patron, in exchange for being appointed to their position. Through this hierarchy, political clientelism is practised, connecting the civil servants, contractors, and local elites, all of whom serve to facilitate the compromises between the *raja* and the regent.

Such personal political compromises between the *raja* and the regent occur during the appointment of the village leader. Although the position is filled along hereditary lines, the *raja* must still be appointed by the regent; in such cases, the regent chooses individuals whose political interests align with his. If the potential *raja* comes from two lineages (*mataruma parenta*), the one chosen is the one that reflects the incumbent's political interests. On the other hand, if they come from one lineage (*fam*), the raja is chosen in accordance with the incumbent's electoral interests. In an interview with Ibrahim Ruhunussa, he explained that:

In Wolu Village, in the last two periods, the process of determining the *raja* has

10 Interview with BSE in Masohi City, February 2021

been regulated from the start. For example, at that time (the appointment of the *raja*) was communicated by BMBG and Mr MS [a local politician]. They brought the future *raja* to meet the regent. Once the communication was completed, the process at the state level could proceed… They made sure that the [prospective *raja*] could be [invited to work together], [saw] his type and character. Finally, they approved the process.[11]

Such political compromise shows that the appointment of the *raja* at the village level is related directly to the incumbent's political interests in the local elections. As such, the appointment of the *raja* is a battleground for political elites, as it influences decision-making at the regency and provincial levels (Budiman, 2019: 298). Such political linkages not only hold the raja and traditional institutions hostage in clientelism networks but also positions them as support providers for the incumbent's relatives.

In Maluku's 2008 and 2013 gubernatorial elections, although Abdullah Tuasikal—the former regent of Central Maluku (2002–2012)—did not win, he received the largest share of votes in Central Maluku. Abdullah Tuasikal, who contested the 2008 gubernatorial election with Hematang Septinus, received 78,918 votes (of 192,112 total) in Central Maluku Regency. Meanwhile, in the 2013 Gubernatorial Election, in which Abdullah Tuasikal ran with Hendrik Lewerissa, he received 85,724 votes (of 162,525 total votes) in Central Maluku.

After these two failures, Abdullah Tuasikal ran for the People's Consultative Assembly in the 2019 legislative election; his wife, Mirati Dewaningsih,

11 Interview with Ibrahim Ruhunussa, Hilla Village, Leihitu, May 2021

contested a seat in the DPD. Both received the largest share of votes from Central Maluku Regency, as they benefitted from the same political networks and support systems. Abdullah Tuasikal received 38,269 votes (of 51,827 total), while Mirati received 42,246 (of 62,135). Previously, Mirati Dewaningsih had been elected to the DPD through the 2009 legislative election, having received 76,181 votes (out of 90,092 total) in Central Maluku (Maluku Province KPU, 2009). Tuasikal's nephew, Fatzah Tuankotta, was elected to the local legislature with 1,295 votes and appointed the Chairman of the Central Maluku Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD; 2019–2024). Previously, in the 2014 legislative election, Mirati Dewaningsih and her son Amrullah Amri Tuasikal were respectively elected to DPD and DPR through their network.

These electoral victories depended heavily on the clientelist networks that placed the *raja* and traditional institutions as support providers in every election. They not only played a role in organizing support during the local election but also used clientelist networks to support Tuasikal's relatives by exploiting the available political capital. In other words, the formation of family power is usually conducted through the same political networks and power bases (Purwaningsih, 2015; Querubin, 2012). In the context of Central Maluku, the power of the Tuasikal family is operated through a clientelism network that places the *raja* and customary institutions as ready-made political structures to be exploited by the Tuasikal family. One *raja* in Saleman Village, Northwest Seram, described his loyalty and support for the Tuasikal family.

Since the time of Abdullah Tuasikal, under two terms, and when his son (Amrullah Amri) was running for the DPR, we still won. Pak Abua Tuasikal, who served two terms, we still won them.[12]

This recognition shows not only political loyalty to the Tuasikal family but also the strong resilience of clientelism as a tool for political mobilisation used by the Tuasikal family. However, the iterative process of mobilising support for family members through the Tuasikal clientelism network received different responses from the community. Diverse political groups not only protested the involvement of the incumbent in co-opting the raja but also opposed the involvement of Tuasikal's relatives and supporters in the general election. These political implications, in turn, contributed to the perpetuation of social conflict between groups affiliated with the Tuasikal family and those opposed to it.

c. After Clientelism: The Permanence of Conflict in Society

The use of clientelism to support the Tuasikal family not only ensured the continued loyalty of the *raja* and customary institutions but also created conflict and division between supporters and opponents of the family. This division was maintained as family members used the same networks to mobilise voters in executive and legislative elections. For example, Abua Tuasikal's candidacy in the 2012 local election relied heavily on the clientelism networks created by his younger brother, Abdullah, during his term as regent (2002–2007). Through this network, Abua focused on networking and cultivating

12 Interview with AM, *raja* of Saleman Village, Northwest Seram, February 2022

support from the ideological mass segment he inherited from Abdullah. As such, the use of the clientelism networks perpetuated the conflict that has existed within society since the reign of Abdullah Tuasikal.

Likewise, the mobilisation of support for Mirati Dewaningsih during her efforts to contest the 2009, 2014, and 2019 legislative elections was organised through the clientelism network. The use of this network also encouraged the creation of a consensus, whereby supporters not only voted for Abdullah Tuasikal in the local election but were also obligated to support his wife in the legislative election. As a result, the support for Abdullah Tuasikal was reworked to provide his wife with a political support basis using the same organisational model, in which the *raja*, traditional institutions, and civil servants functioned as support providers. On the other hand, opponents—unwilling to accept dynasty politics—refused to support Tuasikal and his wife, and thus they switched their support to other candidates. One local elite in the village of Teon Nila Serua (TNS), who was involved in the 2007 election, explained:

In all the villages in Central Maluku, there are always divisions. There are two political forces. Politically, [the incumbent] already has political capital. This is no longer a secret; those who support the decision to legalise the *mataruma* (clan), which is considered able to provide support. So, it's like, villages are divided into two groups, with 50% in favour and 50% in opposition. That's why Pa Dulla [Abdullah Tuasikal] and Mrs Miranti can sit in DPR and DPD, because of that capital.[13]

13 Interview with DSM, August 2021

Society was thus divided between supporters and opponents of the Tuasikal family. Supporters of the family identified themselves as "pro groups", "Tuasikal people," or "*pandopo* groups." Opponents, meanwhile, identified themselves as a counter group. Each performed self-differentiation repeatedly, even as they maintained distance in their daily interactions. Society is thus divided into conflicting factions, even after the *raja* is appointed and the elections have concluded.

Tactically, these conflicts and divisions mark the clear distinction between the supporters of the Tuasikal family and other groups. In the future, although this segmentation will enable members of the family to organise support and cultivate the existing supporter base, it will also perpetuate conflict between elites and ordinary members of society. The strict political segmentation of each group also enabled the Tuasikal family to detect potential defections. In every campaign, several people are assigned to assist with mobilisation and record the *raja*, civil servants, and local village elites who are considered disloyal.[14]

The network supporting the Tuasikal family facilitated the process of mobilising the masses. However, political divisions have endured at other electoral moments, such as during gubernatorial or general elections, and this has exacerbated the conflict between the supporters and opponents of the Tuasikal family. Over time, this political conflict has been strengthened by the political intervention of the incumbents

14 Village elites as well as village government officials spoke about the role of several people in recording and photographing people (civil servants and Tuasikal support groups) who attended the Jusuf Latuconsina/Leonard Lohy campaign activities in Hila and Kaitetu. Interview in Hila Village, May 2022

(Abdullah Tuasikal and Abua Tuasikal) who have regulated the appointment of *raja* according to their political interests. The compromises established between the *raja* and the incumbents in the process have expanded into physical conflicts.

The conflict between supporters of the Tuasikal family and supporters of Jusuf Latuconsina in the 2007 and 2012 regional elections, for instance, became known for the conflict between *orang lawan* (those supporting Tuasikal) and *orang nagri* (those supporting Latuconsina). This resulted in division within families and led to physical conflict. In Saleman Village, Northwest Seram, the conflict between the supporters of the *raja* who was appointed by the regent (king of the regent) and opponents exacerbated the polarisation between the political groups in the election. The involvement of Abua Tuasikal in appointing Arsad Makatita as *raja bupati* (king of the regent), outside the customary processes, was opposed by groups who associated themselves with traditional *raja* as well as groups who were against the Tuasikal dynasty.

This conflict even permeated the diverse governance structures within the village. Each group appointed its own *raja, saniri*, and administrative policy, based on distance and political affiliation with the Tuasikal family. Likewise, post-election conflicts have also been massive. The following table highlights the various conflicts and political divisions that have occurred in Leihitu and Seram, both during the appointment of the *raja* and during executive/ legislative elections.

Table 1. Political divisions in Leihitu and Seram during executive/ legislative elections (Kelihu, 2021).

Division of Conflict In Society	Village/ Ethnicity	Incumbent-Affiliated *Raja*	Non-Incumbent Affiliated *Raja*	Details
Merah/ Putih (Red/White)	Assilulu Village/ Leihitu	Merah	Putih	Often stronger during executive elections
Raja Adat/ Raja Bupati (Traditional Raja/ Regent's Raja)	Saleman Village/ Seram	Regent's Raja	Raja Adat	Began in 2014, after the appointment of the raja, and continued through the 2017 executive election. Saleman has two *raja* and two *saniri*, as well as two village offices.
Larike Atas/ Larike Bawah (Upper Larike/ Lower Larike)	Larike Village/ Leihitu	Upper Larike	Lower Larike	Often stronger during executive elections

Orang Ucu/ Orang Abdullah (Ucu's People/ Abdullah's People)	Hila Village/ Leihitu	Abdullah's people	Ucu's people	Formed in the 2007 and 2012 executive elections in response to the candidacy of Jusuf Latuconsina (Ucu), who was considered the candidate who would advance the Leihitu people
Matahari *Nai*/ Matahari *Maso* (Sunrise/ Sunset)	Liang Village/ Leihitu	Matahari Nai	Matahari Maso	This division has existed for a long time, even before the executive elections; it is often stronger during the process of appointing the raja and during local elections.
Orang Nagri/ Orang Lawan (Village People/ Opponents)	Kaitetu Village/ Leihitu	Regent's People/ Opponents	Village People	Began in the 2007 and 2012 local elections, but strengthened during the appointment of the *raja*

Orang dari Lau/ Orang Nagri (People from Across the Sea/ Village People	Wahai Village/ Seram	Orang dari Lau	Orang Nagri	Strengthened during local elections and administrative division; returned during the appointment of the *raja*
Orang Pandopo and Orang Panta Gunung/ Orang Sabalah (Pendopo People and Mountain People/ People from Nearby)	Tamilouw Village, Sepa Village/ Seram	Orang Pandopo/ Orang Panta Gunung	Orang Sabalah	Began and strengthened during the 2007 local election, when Lamdjal Waleuru ran for office. Strengthened again during the appointment of the *raja*
Orang Dong/Orang Katong (Their People/Our People)	Tehoru Village/ Seram	Orang Dong	Orang Katong	Began and strengthened during the 2007 local election, when Lamdjal Waleuru ran for office. Strengthened again during the appointment of the *raja*

Orang Pro/ Orang Kontra (Pros/Cons)	Wolu Village/ Seram	Orang Pro	Orang Kontra	Began during the appointment of the *raja* in 2007 and continued during every election.
Antua Bapa/ Orang Dong (Our Father/ Their People)	Seti Village/ Seram	Antua Bapa	Orang Dong	Began during the 2012 and 2017 elections; strengthened during the administrative division process

Political division did not only occur during local elections but also during the appointment of the *raja*. The incumbents' political intervention in the appointment of the *raja*, in accordance with their interests, exacerbated the conflict between these groups. These groups position themselves in local elections based on their political affiliations. Supporting the *raja* is considered equivalent to supporting the Tuasikal family, as the *raja* is considered a political agent of the Tuasikal family and involved in organising support for the Tuasikal family. The *raja* are perceived as loyal to the incumbents, those who appoint them, a situation only made possible by clientelist practices.

This conflict and political division emerged due to two factors. First, the Tuasikal family uses the same network to ensure that *raja* act as political brokers during local elections. Second, the incumbents—Abdullah Tuasikal and Abua Tuasikal—tend to use clientelism networks to win support for their family. Their intervention

in the appointment of the *raja* was rejected by individuals who felt that their interests were undermined. The incumbents were seen as destroying the traditional order, and thus resisting the Tuasikal family was considered equivalent to maintaining the traditional order. As a result, conflicts and political divisions have been common during political contestations.

Proponents and opponents of the incumbents are divided by region, primordial affiliation, and proximity to the regent. Territorial divisions include those between *matahari nai* and *matahari turung* in Liang Village, as well as those between Upper Larike and Lower Larike in Saleman Village. Such territorial divisions occur when political affiliations are concentrated in certain areas.

Meanwhile, division according to primordial affiliations occurs when communities' association with the *raja* is influenced by religious or ethnic considerations. In such cases, support for the Tuasikal family is considered opposition to customary institutions, as well as support for particular ethnic identities. Such a division can be seen, for example, in the villages of Kaitetu (*orang nagri/ orang lawan*), Wahai (*orang negri/ orang dari lau*), and Tehoru (*orang dong/ orang katong*).

Finally, there is division based on proximity to the regent. Such division occurs because of the groups' different political affinities. Such divisions occurred, for example, in Hila Village (*Orang Ucu/Orang Abdulla*), Wolu Village (*pro/ contra*), Tamilouw Village (*orang pandopo/orang sabalah*), and Seti Village (*antua bapa/orang dong*). This political division was also expanded during elections

through the polarisation between the elites associated with the Tuasikal family and those opposed to the family.

This results in mass polarisation, which was received differently by each group (Gunterman & Blaiss, 2022: 144). When the elites are polarised, the masses are likewise swayed. This polarisation, in turn, stresses the relationship between different segments of society (Levendusky, 2010) even as it sways like-minded individuals to support the cause (Druckman, Peterson & Slothuus, 2013). This situation, wherein elite polarisation results in mass polarisation, occurs because the elites' influence as patrons encourages the masses to act in a certain way (Nurchasim, 2005: 19).

On the one hand, this political division contributes to conflict during elections as well as the appointment of the *raja*, which is used as a precondition for mapping the family's support at the village level. These divisions and conflicts persist because they are nurtured through the clientelism network that supports the family. The political consolidation promoted by the Tuasikal family further divides society, due to their sentiments regarding the dynasty. At the same time, such segmentation is also organised to regulate clientelism networks and maintain support for the Tuasikal family from generation to generation through bureaucratic organisations, traditional institutions, and the political affiliation of the *raja* in local and general elections. In this context, political division not only strengthens the conflict but also creates recurring political loyalties to the Tuasikal family in Central Maluku.

Conclusion

Studies of clientelism and family power still tend to position these topics separately. Family power is operated through networks of clientelism that provide support, which is maintained through the repeated practice of clientelism. Through these networks, it is easier to mobilise support for family members, as every elite from the family who contests an election has the opportunity to use the networks as a ready-made campaign structure.

This use of clientelism has resulted in permanent political divisions and conflicts in society. This occurred because the political polarisation during local elections is also repeated during other electoral moments, such as legislative and gubernatorial elections. Patterns of conflict and political division are repeated, with the implication that the use of clientelism networks has not only successfully established family power but also resulted in permanent political conflict and division in society.

Clientelism, family power, and conflict are interrelated concepts. Clientelism operates by leveraging political loyalties and exchanges. Family power is formed when members of the same family use the same clientelism network in turn. Meanwhile, conflicts and political divisions occur because of the political polarisation that occurs during elections (local, legislative, or gubernatorial). In the case of Central Maluku, this power has been reaffirmed by the incumbents' use of the *raja* and traditional institutions as intermediaries between candidates and voters, either through personal compromise or political co-optation. Both practices mediate

political exchanges while simultaneously triggering conflict between groups who supported or opposed the Tuasikal family.

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Violent to Non-Violent Displacement: Corporate Land-Control Strategies in Register 45, Mesuji

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Abstract

This article discusses land contestation as a factor in the creation of agrarian conflict and the marginalisation of local people. Through field research in Register 45 Mesuji, Lampung, the author explores the geographical displacement of the indigenous people and forest squatters who occupied the land since the fall of The New Order. This paper attempts to explain the strategies used by corporations to displace local people and accelerate capital accumulation. In such situations, the state functions to legitimise the process of land displacement. However, where violence is used for displacement, this indicates a failure to uphold the global norm of human rights. This article shows that the process of displacement has continued through contract farming, i.e., partnership programmes used to control the land in Register 45 and limit squatters' access. In this situation, forest squatters are used as labourers who benefit the company by easing its capital accumulation. However, squatters have rejected this mechanism, preferring to remain independent.

Keywords: *displacement; marginalisation; capital accumulation; contract farming; partnership programme.*

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Background

In Indonesia, displacement is not a new phenomenon. Hedman (2008) argues that, in the context of conflict and violence, displacement has been an integral—if often overlooked—dynamic in the making of the Indonesian nation-state since its independence. Various political, economic, and religious factors have underpinned this displacement. After independence, the military used displacement to demolish separatist movements, such as the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia/ Universal People's Struggle (PRRI/Permesta) in Sumatra and North Sulawesi (Hedman, 2008). A similar strategy was also applied to separatist movements in Papua, Aceh, and East Timor. In these cases, the state was involved in the displacement process, and its apparatuses were often perpetrators of violence.

Studies of land displacement typically deal with political-economic concepts such as enclosure, primitive accumulation, accumulation by dispossession, and commodification. These concepts are not only useful analytical tools but may also offer distinct angles for understanding the issue of forced displacement (Thomson, 2014). Borras and Franco (2012) equate the term displacement with dispossession, using it to understand the land-grabbing phenomenon because of the explosion of (trans)national commercial land transactions, thus generating dual processes of inclusion and exclusion.

Some scholars have explored displacement as related to the special dynamics of land

and borders (Lunstrum, 2015; Vandergeest, 2003), viewing it as necessary to provide a space for capital accumulation. Environmentalists argue that displacement occurs as a result of the conservation agenda, wherein people are excluded from their land—which is the basis of their livelihood—in the name of protecting the land. Displacement may occur in contract farming schemes, thus leaving smallholders alienated from their lands (Lund, 2018). Through contract farming, direct dispossession can be avoided while continuing to increase capitalist production (Pérez Niño & Oya, 2021). Some problems related to contract farming include asymmetric contracts, minimal control and monitoring functions, and abuse of power (Rustiani et al., 1997). The process of displacement occasionally generates resistance from smallholders. A study by Ito et al. (2014) shows that the process of land dispossession always contains competition and contradiction.

Land displacement is an important issue in Indonesia, where it involves various actors with diverse levels of power and interests. In this paper, we use Register 45 as a case study to explain the process of displacement that has occurred since the New Order. Lampung has experienced numerous land conflicts, as colonial transmigration policies—which continued into the New Order era—have altered local social structures and created a multicultural society (Sania, 2010). In the colonial period, the government made a regulation to manage Sumatra's forests as state forests (*boschwezen*). At the time, local people were prohibited from accessing the forest (Kusrowo, 2014). Such a phenomenon has occurred

not only in Indonesia, but also in developing countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Colonial governments established conservation programmes to preserve flora and fauna, thereby excluding local communities from the areas that had been designated "protected forests" (Chatty & Colchester, 2002).

After independence, the state-controlled much of the forests in Lampung. During the 1970s, the New Order regime—which depended heavily on timber as an export commodity—began issuing permits allowing companies to start logging in state forests. In some areas, logging companies attempted to seize land, which faced resistance from local people (Davidson, Henley, & Moniaga, 2010; Kusrowo, 2014). At the same time, the transmigration policy created a dilemma for the land tenure system. Transmigrant families needed new land for residence and agriculture; as such, they cleared new land in state forests. This not only resulted in land contestation among transmigrants, corporations, and the state but also resulted in horizontal conflict between transmigrants and local people (Peluso, 2007).

The fall of the New Order's centralistic regime did not significantly resolve land displacement issues. Rather, the decentralisation that followed the regime change provided new arenas for contesting control over authority and resources (Hadiz, 2004), thereby creating new forms of territorial governance as well as spatialised governance and conflict (Peluso, 2007; McCarthy, 2004). In some cases, the enclosure of resources and exclusion of individuals and groups resulted in violence (Peluso, 2007). However, most land displacement works

through the logic of capital accumulation—with land and other resources framed as commodities.

Register 45 is an area in Mesuji District, Lampung Province, which has been designated a state forest since the colonial period. As with other states' forests in Indonesia, Register 45 was used by the New Order for timber production, first by state enterprises and later by private companies. The involvement of these companies resulted in conflict with local communities whose land was being exploited. However, these companies' exploitation of forest resources was legitimised by the state, which used various strategies to evict squatters—including violence.

This article will explore how displacement works in the process of capital accumulation. Economic globalisation thus facilitates displacement (Meyfroidt, Lambin, Erb, & Hertel, 2013). Sarkar (2007) argued that acquisition is necessary for industrialisation, which in turn is essential for long-term development. Furthermore, this article aims to understand the strategies used by companies to control land, especially after violent approaches were criticised by many actors. Several studies have suggested that partnership programmes may be used for conflict resolution (Ferdian & Soerjatisnanta, 2017). In this case, using qualitative research methods, the researcher reviewed relevant literature, documents, and news stories; conducted interviews with key informants (in 2017 and 2022); and observed the situation in Register 45. This paper argues that the partnership programme was designed to ensure corporate control of land and discipline squatters, even when they refused to accept the programme.

This article is divided into four sections. First, it explores the debate on displacement and how it relates to capital accumulation. Second, it explains the history of the land conflict in Register 45, Mesuji. Third, it explores the multiple displacements experienced by local people and forest squatters, as well as their social, economic, and political consequences. Fourth, it explains the practice of land displacement through the partnership programme after the cessation of violence in 2011.

Displacement and the Dynamics of Land Contestation

The study of displacement has long been a concern for scientists. Human displacement entails the uprooting of people, not only as refugees and asylum seekers in foreign lands but also—and more frequently—within their homelands (Feldman & Geisler, 2012). In Indonesia, the study of displacement is closely related to religious issues, as seen in the cases of Central Sulawesi, Maluku, and North Maluku (Sidel, 2008). In these contexts, anxieties about the "incompleteness" of religious identities, boundaries, and hierarchies prefigured the outbreak of violence, including the forced displacement of villages and neighbourhoods by armed groups, which promoted the spread, transformation, and, finally, de-escalation of the violence (Sidel, 2008).

Another study explored contested accumulations through displacement (Leitner & Sheppard, 2017). Based on the case of Jakarta, it explained three important things related to the concept. First, the variegated vectors of displacement range from forced eviction to residents' sales of land rights. Second, displacement engenders

multiple forms and conditions of possibility, including and even exceeding Marx's definition of capitalism's accumulation of profits for expanded commodity production. Third, these processes entail ongoing contestations that precede, respond to, and exceed the commodification of the urban commons (Jeffrey et al., 2012).

The concept of displacement has existed for a long time. Marx can be credited with the initial theory of displacement, which he linked to his history of capitalist modernity. His discussion of primitive accumulation, which required the massive displacement of peasants from their land, was one of the first to explore displacement on a large scale (Escobar, 2003). Based on his study of the Colombian Pacific, Escobar (2003) explained that displacement is an integral element of Eurocentric modernity and its post-World War II manifestation in Asia, Africa, and Latin America—i.e., development.

Another study explains the close association between development and displacement (Sarkar, 2007; Hussain, 2008) by arguing that development is fundamentally about reorganising space (Vandergeest, 2003). Based on his studies in West Bengal, Sarkar (2007) explained that industrialisation encourages the displacement of people from their traditional occupations and livelihood. Sarkar argued that the success of land acquisition depends crucially upon a well-thought-out compensation and rehabilitation programme, which is frequently lacking in the state. In this issue, the state has an important role in the process of displacement (Hussain, 2008, Levien, 2011), even though it never operates with one voice (Wolford, Hall, Scoones, & White,

2013). However, Twomey (2014) showed that the law's limits when addressing the displacement and dispossession resulting from land grabbing in Mozambique are rooted within how international norms—professed to resolve such issues—are implemented within a domestic context. Such a failure to implement international norms cannot be separated from the interests of the state and international actors to continue their development agenda.

Displacement implies not only physical eviction from a dwelling but also the expropriation of productive lands and other assets to make alternative uses of the space possible (Parasuraman, 1999). It is more than an economic transaction, a simple substitution of property with monetary compensation. Furthermore, Parasuraman (1999) argued that involuntary displacement is a process of unravelling established human collectivities, existing patterns of social organisation, production systems and social service networks. In some literature, displacement can be affected by conflict, disaster, war, persecution, political discrimination, and infrastructure development (Lin, 2008; Thomson, 2014). Based on their research in Bangladesh, Feldman and Geisler (2012) argued that naturalising displacement is an "inevitable" consequence of changing weather conditions and population dynamics. Displacement due to war is seen as universally problematic, while displacement due to large-scale development projects, such as agricultural investment, often embodies a grey area (Oliver-Smith, 2009, in Twomey, 2014). In addition to losing land rights, livelihoods, and resource bases, which are often undervalued

even when compensated, resettled people also lose their social networks and control over development (Lin, 2008).

Lunstrum (2015) argued that contemporary displacements were provoked by land and green grabs. Her research in Mozambique's Limpopo National Park additionally illustrates how various triggers of environmental displacement – here, conservation, agricultural extraction, and climate change mitigation – dovetail to place ever more pressure on local communities by both inciting displacement and ultimately interfering with it in ways that threaten livelihoods and provoke novel patterns of (displaced) labour (Lunstrum, 2015). Furthermore, displacement could simultaneously occur at multiple scales (home, community, nation) (Feldman & Geisler, 2012), which may affect the cultural, spiritual, psychological, institutional, environmental, and economic conditions of social groups (Cernea 1997; Oliver-Smith 2010, in Athayde & Silva-Lugo, 2018).

Direct displacement has received a lot of criticism from activists, humanitarian agencies, and NGOs for forcing people to lose access to land and sources of livelihood. To avoid large-scale land acquisition, global development agencies and international policymakers promote contract farming, which is considered beneficial for investors and farmers (Oliveira, et al, 2021). Although it seems to be a better solution than forceful displacement, the mechanism of contract farming is also hotly debated. Martiniello (2021) argues that, although contract farming might at first seem to not generate dispossession or displacement, it leads to other forms of expulsion and

the marginalisation of poor smallholders from sugar agro-poles through social differentiation.

Displacement is not just about physically moving in the same dimension. Li (2017) explains that land displacement emerges from other displacements. When people are displaced from the land and not absorbed as workers, they suffer from double displacement: the land is needed, but the people are not needed (Li, 2011). To this double displacement, a third form is added: the selection of workers according to tightly defined ethnic, age, and gender specifications (Li, 2017). In her research, Li showed that displacement involves not only expelling communities from the land but also has multiple effects that affect their livelihoods.

This paper shows that displacement in Register 45 was conducted through the *territorialisation* of state forests that were occupied by indigenous people. This paper argues that displacement does not always result in forceful eviction and land grabbing, but can also occur through non-violent situations—for example, through contract farming (Feldman & Geisler, 2012). Based on field research, this paper explains that displacement also involves violence against immigrants, who are considered illegal squatters. However, facing criticism from human rights activists, the companies initiated partnership programmes without abandoning the logic of capital accumulation that displaces farmers and reacquisitions land from forest squatters.

Register 45 Mesuji: The Historical Conflict

This section will explain the history of Register 45 and the emergence of conflict in

the area. Lampung consists of vast forested areas. Data from Statistics Indonesia indicate that, in 2014, the province was covered in 1,004,735 hectares of forests, consisting of Conservation Areas (462,030 hectares), Protected Forests (317,615 hectares), Limited Production Forests (33,358 hectares), and Permanent Production Forests (191,732 hectares) (BPS, 2014). Geographically, Lampung is the main entrance to South Sumatra Island (Verbist & Pasya, 2004). Meanwhile, its proximity to Jakarta, the national capital, makes it a buffer zone. Verbist and Pasya (2004) noted that 33,000 km^2 of Lampung has changed in use due to developments during the past fifty years.

Mesuji is a new autonomous region in Lampung Province, which was created as a result of the expansion of Tulang Bawang Regency in 2008. It had a population of 194,282, consisting of various ethnic groups. Geographically, Mesuji consists of a flat lowland area, one that is singularly suitable for agriculture. Products of the region include food crops, medicinal and ornamental plants, forestry products, livestock, and fisheries. Some of the region's primary commodities are rubber, cassava, and palm oil (BPS, 2016)

The colonial government's forest governance policy influenced the policies of the post-independence Indonesian government, including in Lampung. Between 1911 and 1944, the Dutch government registered fifty-one forested areas in Lampung: seven between 1911 and 1929, twenty-seven between 1930 and 1939, and seventeen between 1940 and 1944 (Charras & Pain, 1993, p. 293). At that time, Lampung was still a residential area that was administratively under the

Province of South Sumatra (Kusworo, 2000, p. 9). After these forested areas (*boscbwezen*/ BW) were registered, community members were prohibited from accessing or clearing the land; these forests thus became referred to as "prohibited forests" (Kusworo, 2000, p. 10; IPAC, 2013).

Register 45 in Mesuji was one of the forested areas designated by the Dutch government. Some areas in Register 45 had been inhabited by indigenous people since 1918. In 1940, the indigenous peoples of Kampung Talang Batu surrendered their land to the Dutch colonial government, which was represented by the Resident of Lampung, Bahoesin Gelar Tuan Pesirah. The resident of Lampung issued Besluit Resident Distrik Lampung no. 249, dated 12 April 1940, which certified the 33,500 hectares of surrendered land as "prohibited forest" (Putusan Mahkamah Agung No 38/G/2010/PTUN-JKT). This phase marked the beginning of the primitive accumulation process in Register 45. This land, a community asset, was controlled by the colonial government and legalised through state regulation. Community access to state forests was subsequently limited. After independence, all Dutch government assets were taken over by the Indonesian government, including the aforementioned prohibited forests.

The Indonesian government subsequently implemented regulations to privatise forests. At this time, the government granted Forest Concession Rights to PT B.G Dasaad, a corporation in Lampung. PT B.G Dasaad had several HPH areas in Lampung Province, one of which was in Way Kanan. Most likely, this company belonged to Agoes Muhsin Dasaad, a post-

independence conglomerate originating from Lampung-Sulu (Philippines). In the logic of capitalism, the forest was treated as a commodity for accumulating capital. The exploitation of the forest continued unimpeded until 1985, when the Indonesian government was under international pressure to stop deforestation (IPAC, 2013). The government thus implemented a policy of replanting forests using industrial crops, including providing opportunities for private companies.

During the New Order regime, the central government had the authority to control the country's natural resources. At that time, the New Order government granted forest management rights to PT Inhutani V, allowing the company to plant industrial crops such as Albizia. The government treated forests as productive assets and commodities. Industrial forests were needed to fulfil the needs of the timber and pulp industry, which were prioritised by President Suharto's economic policy. Forests that were originally prohibited or conservation forests, and thus not supposed to be exploited, were turned into production forests.

In the mid-1990s, PT Inhutani merged with PT Silva Lampung Abadi—a subsidiary of Sungai Budi Group—to form PT Silva Inhutani Lampung (SIL). This company was involved in plantation activities and the production of consumer goods, such as palm oil and tapioca powder (Novri & Wahab, 2014, p. 40). In 2005, ownership of the company shifted; PT SIL's shareholders consisted of PT Silva Lampung Abadi (99.99 per cent), Widarto (0.005 per cent), and Santoso Winata (0.005 per cent) (Pujiriyani & Wahab, 2013, p. 106).

PT Silva was suspected to belong to the Soeharto family. When the two companies merged, its concession area was expanded. In 1991, the Ministry of Forestry granted PT SIL the rights to 33,500 ha in Register 45, based on Decree of the Minister of Forestry No. 668/Kpts-II/1991. The decision to expand the concession was supported by the Governor of Lampung, who recommended that the Minister of Forestry expand the concession available to PT SIL from ± 9,600 ha to ± 43,100 Ha. This expansion was granted through Decree no. 93 / Kpts-II / 1997 and valid for forty-five years.

The government not only allowed investment in Lampung but also continued transmigration in the area. In the early 20th century, the Dutch government developed its first transmigration programme as part of its ethical policy (Irianto, 2011). During this programme, the government transplanted people from densely populated Java (which had a population of 38 million in 1930) to Lampung (which had a population of 300,000 that year) (Verbist & Pasya, 2004). This transmigration programme resulted in dissatisfaction and land disputes in much of Lampung (Tirtosudarmo, 2007). This led to the creation of Javanese enclaves, which were separated from the areas populated by indigenous peoples (Heeren, 1979, in Tirtosudarmo, 2007).

This transmigration policy continued into the New Order period. For instance, in the 1970s, large-scale unregulated migration from Java to Lampung took place, stimulated by the possibilities of coffee cultivation in upland areas, the accessibility of ancestral land that had been appropriated by the state (as government forests, including

logged-over and previously cultivated land), and the pressure associated with rural restructuring (landlessness and underemployment) in Java (Elmhirst, 2012). Population growth drove contestation for access to land, including the ability to cultivate land in state forests. Ultimately, transmigration created competition for dominance, not only between transmigrants and local communities but also transmigrants and the company.

Therefore, the New Order government established a local transmigration programme that was coloured by environmental authoritarianism and concern over the activities of "illegal forest squatters" (Elmhirst, 1999). In some parts of Lampung, the programme had the specific aim of removing (in the name of environmental conservation) all those who had settled within the bounds of what were now defined as state forests. However, many forest squatters refused to participate in the local transmigration programme. Accordingly, the government used violence to drive them out of the state forests. Some of the forest squatters decided to leave the area and moved to others state forests (Amin, 2018).

Multiple Displacements: A Process to Control Land

Land conflict in Register 45 is a complicated issue which involves companies, local communities, and transmigrants. The expansion of PT SIL's concession was a land grab that was facilitated by the state, disregarding the rights of the Talang Gunung and Labuan Batin communities. Talang Gunung refers to a hamlet that is administratively part of Talang Batu Village. It existed long before Dutch colonialism

and the division of the forest into several registers, and the expansion of Register 45 resulted in its enclosure.

The expansion of Register 45 resulted in the Talang Gunung community losing its land. The community claimed that its land was taken by PT SIL when PT SIL was granted an expanded Land-Cultivation License over 43,100 ha of land. As evidence of land ownership, community members had land certificates and tax payment receipts since the 1970s. The government's decision to expand Register 45 by taking Talang Gunung land indicates the continuation of the process of primitive accumulation. Land, as a means of production, was controlled by the company to meet market demands. The company also acknowledged that the Talang Gunung community already existed before the company received its operating license from the government (Nia, 2017).

Even as the problem with the Talang Gunung community went unresolved, the company had another problem: migration to the area. Transmigrants needed arable land to preserve their livelihood, thus encouraging them to enter Register 45. Some of the transmigrants experienced displacement when they occupied Register 45 after leaving Gunung Balak, East Lampung. This indicates that the displacement in Register 45 was part of the displacements that occurred in other regions of Lampung.

The arrival of forest squatters was not only driven by the need for land but also the company's failure to cultivate Register 45. Forest squatters entered the area because they saw an opportunity, especially when the company was not managing the entire

forest. During the economic crisis of 1998, timber was no longer a leading commodity, and thus production was sub-optimal. The economic crisis has also encouraged a wave of reforms at both the national and local levels. At the grassroots level, reforms encouraged people to take control of abandoned land, as seen in Register 45. The economic crisis also affected PT SIL, which led to the revocation of Industrial Plantation Forest Concession Rights through Decree of the Minister of Forestry No. 9983/Kpts-II/2002. There were two reasons behind the revocation of the company's license. First, PT SIL was deemed technically and financially unable to carry out industrial plantation development activities as it did not fulfil its financial and other obligations following applicable regulations. Second, PT SIL had not submitted its annual plans or quinquennial work plans since 1999 (Harisun, 2014).

The arrival of the Moro-Moro and Karya-Karya communities in Register 45 resulted in them being deemed forest squatters. The Moro-Moro community had occupied Register 45 area since 1997. In the beginning, the community came to the area to collect wood, which they sold for firewood and charcoal. Later, they decided to plant cassava and built shelters; ultimately, hundreds of hectares of cassava were planted, with these commodities distributed to PT Bumi Waras—the holding company of PT SIL and PT Bangun Nusa Indah Lampung (BNIL), part of the Sungai Budi Group—as raw materials (IPAC, 2013). The presence of migrants in Register 45 was not entirely detrimental to the company, as it received a supply of cassava

from migrants. Over time, the number of squatters increased. Many were second- and third-generation transmigrants from Java and Bali; some were local transmigrants from South Sumatra.

To occupy the land, they paid compensation to the people who opened the land. They gained control of 7,000 ha of land, split among 4,000 people. The community spans five villages: Simpang Asahan, Moro Dewe, Moro Seneng, Moro Dadi, and Suka Makmur. The community occupied Register 45 for three reasons: economic, land, and envy. Community members were envious of the fact that the company had received concession rights to the land, when they themselves did not have any access to Register 45 (Ferdian & Soerjatisnanta, 2017).

The other community is Karya-Karya, also known as the Pekat community, which consists of several smaller groups—Marga Jaya, Tugu Roda, Sido Rukun, Mekar Jaya, *Karya* Tani, *Karya* Jaya, and Maju Jaya. It consists of 9,000 households, each of which controls 2 ha of farmland and 1/8 ha of other land. After riots broke out in 2011, people from other regions, including land brokers, thugs, and capital owners, came to register and control the land. The community and land brokers in Register 45 have a grey relationship (Ferdian & Soerjatisnanta, 2017). Brokers are paid to recoup part of the cost of clearing the land. Likewise, capital owners buy land from brokers, and then rent it to farmers or entrust it to others. Each group in the Karya-Karya community is coordinated by a leader, who is responsible for coordinating with other community leaders. The group leaders have the courage and physical strength to defend their followers.

Land displacement generated political, economic, and social displacement in Register 45. According to the government and PT SIL, the people living in Register 45 are squatters. They are not recognised as residents of Mesuji, as they have occupied Register 45—a protected forest. As such, community members do not have national identity cards. At the same time, since 2002 the government has frequently tried to evict the community members.

To deal with these evictions, the Moro-Moro community established an organisation, the Peasant Community Moro-Moro Way Serang (Paguyuban Petani Moro-Moro Way Serdang/ PPMWS) in 2006. Several NGOs, like the Alliance of Agrarian Reform Movement (Aliansi Gerakan Reformasi Agraria/ AGRA) and the Democratic People's Party (Partai Rakyat Demokratik/PRD), organised PPMWS to teach residents about popular movements. The community attempted several strategies to defend their stake in Register 45, buildings schools to provide education as well as places of worship such as a mosque, a church, and a temple. At that time, their goal was to prevent their forced removal from Register 45. However, the government did not recognise the schools built by the community, and these too were evicted.

The increasing number of squatters in Register 45 drove the government to attempt to control the forest area. To overcome this problem, the government implemented a policy of evicting squatters from the registered area. The government attempted enforcement by creating a Joint Forest Protection Control Team consisting of police, soldiers, prosecutors, and government officials. This team is responsible for removing illegal residents from Register 45. Meanwhile, the

company restricted community access to the land by digging a five-metre-deep trench around the squatters' settlement. The peak of the conflict between the company and squatters occurred in 2011, culminating in a large riot that left several squatters injured and resulted in the prosecution of several others.

Following up on the riot, the central government established a Joint Fact-Finding Team, which made several recommendations. First, it recommended reviewing forest expansion permits, improving law enforcement, and encouraging mediation. Therefore, in dealing with Talang Gunung community, the central and local government made a special enclave encompassing three villages. This enclave consisted of 2,600 ha; the remaining 4,400 ha were still under the control of SIL. Ultimately, however, this enclave was rejected by the community (Novri & Wahab, 2014).

Although the Team made several recommendations, the conflict in Register 45 was not resolved. For example, the company retained a strong position, in part due to its proximity to state officials. Widharto, the chairman of the Sungai Budi Group, has a close relationship with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY)—the former Indonesian President. According to informants, Widharto had funded SBY's 2009 campaign, and therefore the president was unwilling to take a firm stance. In addition, Widharto enjoyed a close relationship with Wiranto (Interview with Tisnanta, 2017). Meanwhile, at the provincial and district levels, the local government has no power to resolve the conflict. According to the head of the Local People's

Representatives Council, per Law No. 23/2014 concerning Local Government, the local government has no authority over Register 45 because forestry management is a provincial and central authority.

Land Control Through the Partnership Programme

After the 2011 riots, the government was encouraged to resolve the conflict in Register 45. Meanwhile, PT SIL was required to respect the principles of human rights. The government and the company sought to avoid the use of violence as a means of conflict resolution, choosing to use a new strategy to deal with forest squatters. Based on Law No. 39/2013, PT SIL established a partnership programme and invited the community to participate. Generally, the Ministry of Forestry issued regulations to empower communities. However, the government and the company perceive the partnership programme at Register 45 as intended primarily to discipline squatters, who are held to have occupied the land illegally (Interview with Lampung Province Forestry Office, 2017), through contracts that bind squatters, limit their land tenure, and restricts their ability to profit from cassava production.

The partnership programme was established through negotiation between the company and squatters. The forestry office and police agencies were also involved in this process. As of writing, seven groups from the Karya-Karya community have joined the programme and signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Ministry of Forestry: Marga Jaya, Karya Jaya, Karya Tani, Maju Jaya, Tugu Roda, Sido Rukun, and Mekar Jaya. Through these groups, 6,252 ha of land is used for the partnership programme.

Through the partnership programme, the mode of production began changing. The corporation was responsible for providing participants with the means of production, such as seeds, fertilisers, and machinery. In return, farmers are required to sell their products to PT SIL at a price determined by the market price. Per the MoU, squatters must plant staple crops (such as acacia) on 20% of the total cultivated land in the first year, with 20% added in subsequent years. Ultimately, however, this partnership programme is more profitable for the company. For timber, the company receives 75% of profits; the other 25% of profits go to the squatters. For seasonal crops, the company receives 50% of profits, while squatters earn 50%.

However, not all persons occupying Register 45 have agreed to join the partnership programme. The Moro-Moro community refused to join the programme, despite repeated offers, as it argued that the programme solely benefitted the company. The community, meanwhile, would not be able to farm independently, as the company would retain control over the means of production (land, farm equipment, and seeds). At the same time, the company was solely responsible for determining the sale price of crops. This scheme would not only leave the squatters heavily reliant on the company but also be detrimental to the long-term economic welfare of the squatters.

Although not all of the communities joined the partnership programme, the company still benefitted from squatters' cassava production. The cassava produced by squatters is sold to PT Bumi Waras, which does not have to pay them for their labour.

In this case, the accumulation process does not stop simply because the land is occupied. Even when industrial crops are no longer a strategic commodity, other commodities can be exploited for the companies' benefit.

However, the community has faced various obstacles and inconsistencies in the company's implementation of the partnership programme. Several times, when they experienced trouble with their machinery, the company was unwilling to solve the problem immediately (Amin, 2018). Moreover, after two years, forest squatters who were involved in the programme complained that it provided them with minimal benefits (Rosario, 2018). Members also complained about the company's

Map of Corporate Partnership, PT Silva Inhutani Lampung



Source: Lampung Province Forest Office

lack of transparency. Siska, a woman who has lived in Register 45 since 2011, explained that she decided to leave the programme because of transparency problems. She only received a profit of around two million rupiahs per hectare of land, without any explanation of the calculations used to determine this sum (Interview with Siska, 2022).

In addition, the programme also faced other obstacles. According to the company and forestry office, thugs have disturbed the implementation of the partnership programme (Nia, 2017) and pressured potential participants. Furthermore, several communities— especially Labuhan Batin and Talang Gunung—have refused to join the programme because they consider the land to be customary land. To ameliorate such issues, the government established the Integrated Team for the Implementation of the Partnership Programme, a joint military–police task force (Hendy, 2017).

Since the implementation of contract farming, forest squatters have no longer experienced violent displacement. However, this programme has caused other forms of displacement. First, forest squatters' land tenure has been limited. The partnership programme has been used to control lands that were occupied by forest squatters. By law, programme participants are only allowed up to 2 ha of land. As such, those who control more land feel threatened by the programme. Unfortunately, those squatters who do not agree to the partnership programme are dealt with firmly by law enforcement. In this case, a partnership programme that normatively aims to empower farmers is being used by companies to retake land occupied by squatters.

Second, the partnership programme has encouraged the displacement of workers. The squatters in Register 45 are farmers with their own means of production. However, when they join the partnership programme, they rely on others for the means of production, the timing of the harvest, and the sale of crops. However, the company continues to accumulate capital in managing Register 45 as well as the partnership programme. However, efforts by the state and company to discipline forest squatters have faced several challenges. Many squatters have rejected the partnership programme and chosen to be independent in both producing and selling cassava. Moreover, some have brought their issues with the partnership to the district court, with the support of a local legal aid agency (Interview with Yanuar, 2022).

Conclusion

This paper shows that land displacement occurs within the framework of capital accumulation. The case of Register 45 shows that the agenda of capital accumulation has successfully converted protected forests into production forests to fulfil market needs. At the same time, the company and the state have displaced local communities by extending Industrial Plantation Forest Concession Rights through state regulation. As a result, local people lose access to the land.

Displacement processes have occurred in various regions, where the state and company have not only displaced local landowners but also those perceived as forest squatters. Such land displacement allows the practice to spread to other regions. Forest squatters move

to other state forest areas to maintain their livelihoods, even though they would be subject to eviction threats.

The company used various strategies to displace forest squatters from the land. When negotiations failed to persuade squatters to leave, the government and the company began using violence through hired thugs and security forces. However, the violence that was used by the state was criticised by human rights activists. The state began working to resolve land conflicts by considering the value of humanity and justice. As a result, the partnership programme was implemented in place of the previous approach. However, such farming contracts ultimately alienated communities from their access to land.

This paper shows that the partnership programme has been used to ensure corporate control over land without requiring forced displacement. At the same time, the companies have sought to integrate forest squatters within the framework of capital reproduction by requiring them to plant crops that are chosen by the company and must abide by the agreement. This programme has not been fully successful, however, as it has been rejected by communities that do not want to rely on the company.

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Recent Practices of People's Participation in Different Avenues of Rural Local Government: Realities and Challenges behind Strengthening Decentralisation in Bangladesh

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Abstract

People's participation in various avenues of local administration is crucial for strengthening decentralisation in Bangladesh, despite the fact that such participation faces significant. The main purpose of this research is to explore the most current trends in people's participation in different avenues of local government. This research also examines the realities and challenges involved in strengthening decentralisation in Bangladesh. Using a quantitative methodology, this research found that different avenues of people's participation in Union Parishads has fostered successful decentralisation since these avenues certify independent participation and enable them to share their opinions and influence decision-making processes. Since decentralisation facilitates the transfer of power from the central to the local level, people's participation is functional within Union Parishads. Moreover, this research demonstrates that most rural people are severely challenged in participating in the different avenues of Union Parishads due to political complexity, institutional corruption, poor education, and general unawareness. The authors therefore suggest that, by implementing public awareness programmes, ensuring the maximum autonomy of local government units, and confirming the accountability and transparency of service providers, people's participation can strengthen the decentralisation of rural local government in Bangladesh.

Keywords: *decentralisation; people's participation; local government; union parishad; avenues of participation; Bangladesh.*

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Introduction

Decentralisation is a widely discussed issue in development discourse, having a very positive relationship with democracy, good governance, public administration, development, and people's participation. From a democratic perspective, decentralisation enables close contact between local residents and governmental institutions' functionaries (Khan, 2009). The autonomous decision-making power of lower levels of government and citizens' access to decision-making are buttressed by the national constitution, which provides the framework within which local government is to function. Decentralisation—which means the transfer of the locus of decision-making (i.e., the transfer of responsibility) from the central to the local level—promotes grassroots involvement in the day-to-day decision-making process (Boko, 2002). In this regard, participation is essential for ensuring decentralisation. Many mechanisms are available in the decentralised governance system through which people participate in decision-making (Kessy, 2013). The World Bank (1994) defines participation as the process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives (World Bank, 1995). Participation is a function through which people can come to share their development vision, make choices, and manage activities. It is also one of the most important elements of good governance, which means the active involvement of stakeholders in decision-making (Marume et al., 2016). Involvement in local government is made possible by both direct and indirect awareness of participation. In this regard, people's participation

is seen as a fundamental aspect of democratic and decentralised government (S.I. Mohammad et al., 2019).

Union Parishad (UP) is the lower tier of local government in Bangladesh. Through this institution, administration is handled closer to the beneficiaries (Insider, 2013). The Local Government (Union Parishad) Act of 2009 provides for the inclusion of local residents and elected representatives in different communities, meetings, Ward Shabha (ward council) and other activities. Each Union Parishad offers six avenues of people's participation: Ward Shabha, open budget sessions, village courts, standing committees, citizen charters, and access to information (Uddin, 2019). Each UP consists of nine wards, and each ward includes a Ward Shabha—an institution created as a result of decentralisation and the aforementioned Local Government Act. The Ward Shabha is made up of all the ward's voters, with the elected general member of each Ward serving as the meeting's chairman and the elected female member serving as an advisor. These institutions are primarily responsible for choosing development plans and evaluating development initiatives, and thus provide democratic procedures for local governments to hasten the process by which citizens participate in decision making. At least five per cent of the ward's voters must attend each meeting, ensuring that the public's opinions are taken into consideration while making decisions (Muhammad Ahsan & Jahan, 2022)policy formulation or implementation, people's participation at all levels of policy process, decision-making and service delivery has become the prime prerequisite in the prevailing development

paradigm. Although in practice there remains huge argument regarding people's effective involvement in the development process due to unwillingness of the supply side and inefficiency, political ignorance of the demand end, it is an undeniable fact that the government of Bangladesh in the recent past has enacted laws for all levels of local government bodies with especial focus given on the people's participation in different phases of development process. This study aims at reconnaissance of the degree of rights and opportunity given to the general people to participate in the development process presented in the existing Local Government Acts, both in rural and urban local government tiers. The study mainly focuses on the secondary sources, exclusively on the existing Local Government Acts and ordinances. The study finds that all acts have significantly included the opportunities for local people to participate in the decision-making process. It is interesting to say that the lower the tier of local government, the higher opportunity to participate in decision making process (Muhammad Ahsan & Jahan, 2022).

Prior to 2009, the budgeting process was centralised. However, the passage of the Local Government Act of 2009 provided a statutory basis for citizen engagement in local policymaking and budgeting: the open budget meeting mechanism. The main purpose of this mechanism is to guarantee that the people's opinions are heard and that representatives are held accountable to the citizens. According to the Local Government Act of 2009, each UP is to hold two open budget sessions each year, inviting all community members to attend regardless of colour, religion,

sex, class, or background. During these budget sessions, the UP typically presents its proposed budget, together with its revenue and expenses. Moreover, based on participants' opinions, the UP makes recommendations for amending the proposed budget (Uddin, 2019).

Although the Village Courts Act of 2006 included a mechanism for local inhabitants and elected officials to participate in village court proceedings, the Local Government Act of 2009 actively encouraged this participation. The chairman of the UP, together with four others—at least two of whom must be UP members and two of whom must be community members—rules over the village court. In this regard, village courts improve people's participation in local government institutions, i.e., Union Parishads (Uddin, 2019). There is thus no room for arbitrary conclusions, as decision-making processes in the village courts are guided by law (Islam, 2015). The village court mechanism strengthens community cohesion and improves people's sense of ownership in local peace-building processes. Indeed, village courts are crucial for giving economically disadvantaged and vulnerable rural residents access to alternative legal systems (Islam, 2015). The village court system is ideal for rural people as it provides justice at a very low cost and in a friendly, informal setting. It is also emblematic of decentralisation, as it encourages people's involvement in alternative legal systems by delegating power.

Similarly, UP standing committees offer more institutional avenues for creating people's engagement. In accordance with Article 45 of the Local Government Act of 2009, 13 permanent committees on certain subjects

are established. According to the Act, each standing committee is led by one UP member and five to seven other members. Additionally, several clauses in the Act allow ordinary citizens to be appointed as members of standing committees and other bodies. This statement clearly indicates that ordinary people can participate in standing committees and share their views with elected representatives. In essence, standing committee members arrange frequent meetings among themselves to discuss the issues they face in their individual fields (Uddin, 2019). Additionally, members of the standing committees find ways to address local issues in a methodical fashion via their general sessions. The major responsibilities of the standing committees are to assist in local development planning and to keep an eye on service providers' activities and implementation procedures. To gauge the needs and demands of the community, standing committees also gather feedback from general citizens and provide regular reports to the UP (Local Government Division, 2012).

Correspondingly, **people's right to access information is acknowledged under the Right to Information Act and Articles 78–81 of the Local Government Act. These laws also** provide legal protection for the free movement of information, ensuring that citizens can obtain the information they require. These laws clearly demonstrate that there is no legislation that restricts access to information or forbids the dissemination of information. Indeed, every person has a right to seek information from the government, and the government is required to comply with such requests under the Right to Information Act of 2009 (MRDI and

Asia Foundation, 2013). Correspondingly, a citizen charter clause is included in local government statutes (Local Government Act, 2009) and is required at every level of local government in Bangladesh. Under the Right to Information Act (Article 49), UPs are also obliged to develop a citizen charter outlining several categories of services and ensure that citizens can check the validity and availability of services. This charter should include lists, terms, and costs of services, time limits for some services, complaint procedures, and service assurance. Giving citizens more control over the provision of public goods and services is the straightforward goal of these charters, which seek to provide citizens with a thorough understanding of their rights and privileges (Uddin, 2019). In this vein, it can be said that the Right to Information Act (2009) and citizen charters have provided a new dimension wherein local government institutions (i.e., Union Parishads) can fulfil citizens' demands for participation. Both promote the practice of decentralisation by transferring authority from the central government to the local level, seeking to ensure that people's participation makes local government institutions (LGIs) effective.

However, the public's lack of faith in the government is now seen as the greatest obstacle to local government institutions in Bangladesh (Tawfique & Haque, 2009). Even while it has shown some promise, public involvement in local governments has yet to meet statutory requirements and popular expectations. The poor capacity of local resources, public unawareness, and domineering central–local interactions are the key causes of such problems. For such reasons, UPs have mostly

failed to realise the people's expectations along with their mandated duties for national development (P. K. Panday, 2019). Furthermore, Muhammad Ahsan and Jahan (2022) argue that the laws of budgeting, planning, and resource management are very poorly understood by elected officials, which has very dangerous consequences, like limiting the scope of people's participation in local government institutions. Moreover, the efficient operation of local governments is hampered by this poor knowledge and aptitude gap (Muhammad Ahsan & Jahan, 2022)policy formulation or implementation, people's participation at all levels of policy process, decision-making and service delivery has become the prime prerequisite in the prevailing development paradigm. Although in practice there remains huge argument regarding people's effective involvement in the development process due to unwillingness of the supply side and inefficiency, political ignorance of the demand end, it is an undeniable fact that the government of Bangladesh in the recent past has enacted laws for all levels of local government bodies with especial focus given on the people's participation in different phases of development process. This study aims at reconnaissance of the degree of rights and opportunity given to the general people to participate in the development process presented in the existing Local Government Acts, both in rural and urban local government tiers. The study mainly focuses on the secondary sources, exclusively on the existing Local Government Acts and ordinances. The study finds that all acts have significantly included the opportunities for local people to participate in the decision-making process. It is

interesting to say that the lower the tier of local government, the higher opportunity to participate in decision making process. Social Science Review, Vol. 38(1. Through a literature review, it has been found that, while reform measures signalled a prospective increase in local people's engagement, these initiatives failed to meet expectations. Similarly, it has been observed that field administrative units (i.e., Upazila Parishad and Union Parishad) cannot function properly due to the absence of a meaningful transfer of authority and responsibility to elected representatives, along with the presence of a centrally-controlled administration and the considerable intervention of politicians and bureaucrats (P. Panday, 2017). Similarly, people's participation in development initiatives at the local level in Bangladesh is lacking because the local institutions do not have the authority to formulate development plans or the financial autonomy to implement programmes. As such, ensuring people's participation in development processes at all levels is challenging in Bangladesh (Khatun & Ara, 2019).

Decentralisation is crucial for enhancing the autonomy and capacity of local government institutions in Bangladesh. With a view of enhancing the political footing of these institutions, Bangladesh's political leaders have implemented several reforms to modify the structure of local government institutions in the name of decentralisation. In some cases, these reform initiatives have been taken for regional self-interest, which goes against the ultimate purposes of decentralisation. Such mismanagement prevents local government institutions from becoming hubs for growth, even as individuals

also fail to participate in and oversee the activities of these institutions (P. K. Panday, 2011). In contemporary democratic society and the governance system, people's participation affects their standards of living and thinking. Decentralisation, as a sustainable solution for the local community, ensures effective resource utilisation and allows citizens to participate in formulating and implementing decisions, development plans, policies, etc. It also plays a significant role in ensuring the effective delivery of services, e.g., natural resource management for marginalised communities. In particular, the apparent benefits of decentralisation include greater access to decision-makers; higher levels of participation in decision-making by various social groups; decision-makers being held more accountable; etc. (Andersson et al., 2004).

Citizens' participation in procurement processes has added new dimensions to the avenues of formulating and implementing UPs' annual development plans. There is no way to promote local socio-economic development in Bangladesh without considering the public procurement process. In this context, the participation and awareness of local people in the public procurement process play a praiseworthy role in enhancing public accountability in local government. At the same time, it is crucial that civil society can monitor public procurement to keep the process open and free of corruption. As numerous challenges (poor knowledge of public procurement processes, political biases, and corruption) limit public participation in the public procurement processes of local governments, it is essential to create a favourable environment wherein local people

and civil society institutions can participate in development processes at the grassroots levels (Razzaque, 2014). Economic progress and social justice rely heavily on the engagement of the people in local administration, but local administration is ineffective in most developing nations—including Bangladesh. In particular, the looming black clouds of inefficiency, resource scarcity, and political corruption continue to cast a shadow over elected local institutions (i.e., the UP), which continues to be weak. Although the different standing committees of UPs are the primary institutions for citizen participation in local decision-making processes, the local government is frequently overshadowed by national policies, practices, and initiatives for economic growth and social/political development. These factors negatively affect public engagement and people's faith in various local government institutions (Tawfique & Haque, 2009).

Moreover, through decentralisation, local people are empowered directly. The process enables the general public and civil society to participate in the formulation and execution of public policies and programmes in field administrative units (Roche, 2008). In developing nations like Bangladesh, decentralisation is the ideal strategy for including rural populations in development networks. In practice, however, elites often obstruct the helpless majority in their efforts to participate actively in development programmes. In Bangladesh, those who are poor or disadvantaged cannot be effectively integrated into local government organisations. Although the male and female elected members of UPs engage equally in planning development

initiatives, the participation of rural peoples in these programmes is minimal. Moreover, Project Implementation Committees (PICs) uphold rigorous official procedures in which the members are neither sufficiently consulted nor appropriately informed of projects' progress during implementation. Public participation in PICs is highly artificial and undervalued. At the same time, the characteristics of involvement in the process of development planning are greatly influenced by the profiles, education, and economic standing of UPs. In fact, the selection of public needs-based initiatives and engagement of members of underprivileged sectors in local development projects are frequently hampered by influential local persons. In essence, rural elites gain from one another, keeping the poor and disadvantaged outside of the growth process. To promote and encourage beneficiaries' participation in local development projects, it is crucial to implement a large-scale awareness campaign, foster a culture of local participation, ensure accountability, implement guidelines that are friendly to participation, and work with local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) (S. N. Mohammad, 2010).

Citizens' participation in inter-local cooperation and public administration is crucial in developing the local government system in Bangladesh. Although participation in the affairs of the local government bodies is significantly improving and general citizens are trying to make their presence felt and voices heard, elected officials are less interested in creating participation mechanisms. Elected officials are engaged and concerned with the efficiency of service delivery.

People's participation at the local level has remained problematic due to the persistence of patron–client relationships in rural societies, which is the fundamental basis for this debate (Zeemering, 2008). In Bangladesh's current development paradigm, the general public's engagement at all levels of policymaking, decision-making, and service delivery has been sorely needed. The primary concerns in this context are rights and opportunities provided to the general public to engage in the development process by taking part in various local government avenues. On the other hand, it has been recognised that current local government statutes offer considerable opportunities for local people to participate in decision-making. Even so, the lowest tier of rural local government (i.e., Union Parishad) gives citizens a greater chance to participate in the decision-making process (Muhammad Ahsan & Jahan, 2022)policy formulation or implementation, people's participation at all levels of policy process, decision-making and service delivery has become the prime prerequisite in the prevailing development paradigm. Although in practice there remains huge argument regarding people's effective involvement in the development process due to unwillingness of the supply side and inefficiency, political ignorance of the demand end, it is an undeniable fact that the government of Bangladesh in the recent past has enacted laws for all levels of local government bodies with especial focus given on the people's participation in different phases of development process. This study aims at reconnaissance of the degree of rights and opportunity given to the general people to participate in the development process presented in the existing Local

Government Acts, both in rural and urban local government tiers. The study mainly focuses on the secondary sources, exclusively on the existing Local Government Acts and ordinances. The study finds that all acts have significantly included the opportunities for local people to participate in the decision-making process. It is interesting to say that the lower the tier of local government, the higher opportunity to participate in decision making process. Social Science Review, Vol. 38(1. Due to rapid economic development and extraordinary advances in information technology, the topics of decentralisation, governance, and good governance have attracted a great deal of attention among practitioners of public administration, international assistance agencies, and OECD nations. Similarly, with a desire to eradicate poverty in third-world countries, the concepts of decentralisation, governance, and good governance have played a significant role since the 1990s. In this context, decentralisation supports public involvement in decision-making, fosters political education, ensures equitable and efficient resource allocation, and ensures dependable relationships between diverse central and local governments. Conversely, political reluctance, administrative confrontation, dishonesty, limited resources, poor harmonisation, insufficient information, and fragile organisational structures significant affect the practice of decentralisation in field administration and its ability to promote good governance that meets citizens' needs. Therefore, a participation-based local government structure can address the issues of local government in Bangladesh (Asaduzzaman, 2008).

In this vein, people's participation, leadership, transparency, and accountability are critical in demonstrating the importance of good governance in Bangladesh. The participation of the local population is a prerequisite for creating good governance at the rural level in Bangladesh. It integrates people's experience, knowledge, and commitments into the development process while upholding democratic values (P. K. Panday & Rabbani, 2011)the article explores the governance situation of the lowest local government tier (Union Parishad. At the grassroots level, to empower the people, local governments in Bangladesh have begun to implement democratic and participatory governance practices. In this regard, in the planning, implementing, and monitoring processes, there are some formal mechanisms for ensuring community participation. Citizens are involved in local decision-making because elected representatives are accountable to the public for the money paid to local citizens. Similarly, citizens can complain about their local government and services (Uddin, 2019). In this context, effective decentralisation can significantly improve the overall efficacy and quality of the governance system while also enhancing the power and capability of sub-national levels (UNDP, 1997). Decentralisation and participation are thus closely intertwined (Saxena, 1998).

However, although numerous academics have written extensively in recent and past years about decentralisation and public participation, a preliminary review of the literature reveals that there are surprisingly few studies that explain the factors that contribute to people's participation in local government

in Bangladesh. No research has concentrated on the six avenues of people's participation in promoting decentralisation in local government in Bangladesh in the twenty-first century. Earlier studies also differed in their methodology, sample, and strategy. In addition, although the 21st century has brought multiple advances in governance systems, many people in rural areas still face substantial challenges when participating in decision-making processes at the local level, i.e., UPs in Bangladesh (Uddin, 2019). To demonstrate functional decentralisation and improve people's participation in decision-making, the present study aims to identify recent practices of people's participation in rural local government by exploring the realities and challenges of strengthening decentralisation in Bangladesh. In brief, the current study seeks to discover knowledge and status gaps between the theory and practice of people's participation in UPs in Bangladesh. In particular, the study aims to explore the recent practices of people's participation in different avenues (open budget sessions, Ward Shabha, village courts, standing committees, local elections, and access to information) to strengthen decentralisation in Bangladesh. Based on the study results, the authors then suggested a number of strategies to address the issues with people's participation in local government organisations, i.e., UPs in Bangladesh. Therefore, the research contributes both theoretically and practically to the improvement of the practice of local government and public policy in Bangladesh. Theoretically, this research contributes to the body of knowledge by elucidating existing facts and expanding the literature in the fields

of decentralisation, civic engagement, local government, and governance systems. Practically, the study's results will help policymakers come up with solid policies for ensuring effective decentralisation in the 21st century by answering questions such as: What are the perceptions of people regarding participating in the different avenues of local government? How can people's participation in existing avenues of local government be enhanced? How can good governance in local government units in Bangladesh be promoted? In light of these considerations, the authors argue that this study offers a very pertinent and crucial contribution to strengthening decentralisation and people's participation in local government organisations (i.e., UPs) in Bangladesh.

Research Method

The study was conducted using a quantitative approach and positivist philosophy, whereas an exploratory research approach was also applied. Quantitative methods were applied to collect survey data. Data were gathered from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data were gathered from rural people who belong to selected UPs under Trishal Upazila in Bangladesh, while secondary data were gathered from books, peer-reviewed articles, reports, theses, websites, and newspapers. Close-ended questionnaires were used as instruments to collect survey data. Finally, the data were analysed using MS Excel and SPSS software. A total of 320 respondents, inhabitants of six UPs under Trishal Upazila, Mymensingh, Bangladesh

(Amiabari, Bailar, Bali Para, Dhanikhola, Harirampur, and Trishal Union Parishads), participated in this study.

Since the study was conducted using a quantitative approach, the collected data were organised characteristically

Figure 1: Study Area

Source: Trishal Upazila (Hossain et al., 2019)

and coding was done manually. The prepared data were analysed statistically and presented using two pieces of data analysis software: MS Excel and SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences). The principal purpose of data analysis is to extract worthwhile information for decision-makers (Ali & Bhaskar, 2016). Correspondingly, this research was systematically connected to the ethical doctrines of social responsibility (Žukauskas et al., 2018). Ethical issues were maintained strictly to ensure a balance between the probable threats of research and the possible benefits of research, all ethical issues were maintained strictly. In particular, voluntary involvement, privacy, and consent were obtained before interviews and surveys, and respondents' confidentiality was strictly maintained (Yip et al., 2016)related to the subject and researcher. This article seeks to briefly review the various international guidelines and regulations that exist on issues related to informed consent, confidentiality, providing incentives and various forms of research misconduct. Relevant original publications (The Declaration of Helsinki, Belmont Report, Council for International Organisations of Medical Sciences/ World Health Organisation International Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, World Association of Medical Editors Recommendations on Publication Ethics Policies, International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, CoSE White Paper, International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use-Good Clinical Practice. The researchers

followed a no-harm policy, ensuring that no participants, entities, or groups were abused in any way.

Results

1. Demographic Information

As the main objective of this study was to explore recent practices of people's participation in rural local government as part of decentralisation, a quantitative approach was used to gather primary data. Data were gathered primarily through a close-ended (i.e., yes/no) questionnaire. In terms of demographics, Table 1 shows that 65% of study participants were male and 35% were female. Of the respondents, 20% were from the 21–30 age group, 45% were from the 31–40 age group, and 35% were from the 41–50 age group. Participants came from diverse economic backgrounds; as shown in Table 1, 28% of respondents were day labourers, 36% of respondents were businessmen, and 24% of respondents were homemakers. Merely 12% of respondents were public/private officials. Most of the respondents had attained some level of basic education.

Table 1: Demographic Analysis

Variables		Frequency	Per Cent (%)	Cumulative Per Cent (%)
Gender	Male	208	65	65
	Female	112	35	100

Age	21–30	64	20	20
	31–40	144	45	65
	41–50	112	35	100
Education	Basic Education	147	46	46
	Higher Education	58	18	64
	Less Knowledgeable (Illiterate)	115	36	100
Profes-sion	Day Labour	90	28	28
	Businessmen	115	36	64
	Public/Private Official	38	12	76
	Homemaker	77	24	100

Source: Field Survey at 6 Union Parishads (Local Government Bodies) under Trishal Upazila, Mymensingh, Bangladesh (January-April 2021).

2. Recent Practices of People's Participation in Ward Shabha

The following chart demonstrates the people's participation in Ward Shabha, local government units under the UPs in Bangladesh. Survey data indicated that 59% of local people knew these units, while 41% of respondents had no knowledge about Ward Shabha. It was found that only 26% of local people participated in the Ward Shabha; 74% did not, due to rural politics, grouping, and unwillingness.

Figure 1: Study Area



Source: Trishal Upazila (Hossain et al., 2019)

Conversely, only 18% of respondents' opinions were held in the Ward Shabha, whereas 82% of respondents' opinions were rejected. Although the Local Government Act of 2009 established Ward Shabha as a form of direct citizen involvement in decision-making (Panday, 2011), the above statistics demonstrate that many rural people fail to participate in these institutions, which may weaken the decentralisation of rural local government in Bangladesh. Since the Ward Shabha certifies people's participation in local government organisations (i.e., UPs), and people can independently participate to share their opinions, the Ward Shabha fosters successful decentralisation through people's participation in local government. The main basis for this argument is that decentralisation ensures

the transfer of authority from the central to the local level (Farid Uddin, 2018), which is similar to people's participation in the Ward Shabha. Therefore, about 93% of local respondents held that people's participation in Ward Shaba would play a remarkable role in strengthening decentralisation within local government institutions in Bangladesh.

3. People's Participation in Open Budget Meetings to Strengthen Decentralisation

The bar chart below illustrates people's participation in open budget meetings in the different UPs under Trishal Upazila. The survey found that 45% of respondents had knowledge about open budget meetings, whereas 55% did not. The survey also found that only a small number of local people, i.e., around 35%, participated in these meetings; the majority (65%) did not. Astonishingly, only 22% of respondents' opinions were included in the meetings; 78% of respondents' opinions were generally rejected. These statistics indicate that most rural people were unaware of the opportunity to participate in open budget meetings, and that—due to immense political complexity—the opinions of most respondents' (78%) were rejected. In this regard, the authors argue that the participation of rural people in open budget meetings is crucial for preparing effective and efficient budgets that promote overall development at the grassroots levels. In addition, these open budget sessions allow community members to give voice to their views and engage in decision-making processes and development initiatives (Chowdhury, 2017).

Figure 3: People's Participation in Open Budget Meetings



Source: Field survey of Six UPs under Trishal Upazila, Mymensingh, Bangladesh (January–April 2021).

Since open budget sessions ensure that people can participate in local government organisations (i.e., UPs) and exercise authority alongside elected leaders, these sessions foster successful decentralisation through people's participation (Uddin, 2019). Therefore, the majority of respondents—92%—argue that the participation of rural people in open budget meetings plays a noteworthy role in directly and indirectly strengthening decentralisation in Bangladesh.

4. People's Participation in Village Courts to Strengthen Decentralisation

The bar chart below demonstrates the people's recent participation in village courts at the UP level in Bangladesh.

Survey data illustrates that 84% of respondents were acquainted with the village courts, while 16% of respondents had no knowledge about these institutions. Of the respondents, 35% had participated in village court activities in the selected study areas, while 65% had never become involved. Although 66% of respondents argued that village courts could conveniently resolve local disputes, 34% disagreed with this statement. In this respect, it has been noted that participation in village court activities is challenging since the members of the village courts (who come from the local population) tend to be politically motivated. Moreover, political interference, nepotism, corruption, and unwillingness have been identified as the main barriers to community participation in village court activities in Bangladesh.

Nevertheless, the village courts of Bangladesh encourage effective decentralisation by certifying citizens' involvement in local government organisations (such as UPs) and allowing them to take part in an alternative judicial system to deal with local matters (Islam, 2015). This argument is primarily supported by the fact that decentralisation facilitates the transfer of power from the central to the local level, where village court members wield significant power. In this context, the majority of respondents—82%—held that village courts could play a significant role in resolving local disputes by ensuring the effective application of laws and strengthening decentralisation through public participation.

Figure 4: People's Participation in Village Courts



Source: Field survey of Six UPs under Trishal Upazila, Mymensingh, Bangladesh (January–April 2021)

5. People's Participation in Standing Committees to Strengthen Decentralisation

The bar chart below illustrates people's participation in the standing committees of UPs as a means of strengthening decentralisation. Survey data demonstrates that only 28% of respondents were acquainted with the standing committees; the majority of respondents (72%) had no knowledge of these institutions. Likewise, only 16% of respondents had participated in committee meetings; 84% had not. These results indicate that rural people care little about participating in the standing committees, which limits their

ability to share their views with their elected representatives. In this regard, the researchers argue that poor education, lack of knowledge, and political antipathy are the primary factors driving the poor knowledge of UP standing committees and public participation in said institutions.

As the UP standing committees are tasked with involving locals in the rural development agenda, it promotes the decentralisation of power by transferring authority to the general populace (Local Government Division, 2012). From this point of view, UP standing

Figure 5: People's Participation in UP Standing Committee



Source: Field survey of Six UPs under Trishal Upazila, Mymensingh, Bangladesh (January–April 2021)

committees are crucial avenues for participation that add a new dimension to local development in Bangladesh. Around 78% of respondents argued that the participation of rural people in UP standing committees plays a momentous role in strengthening decentralisation in Bangladesh.

6. Perceptions of Citizen Charters and Access to Information

The following chart depicts respondents' perceptions of citizen charters and access to information in terms of strengthening decentralisation in rural local government units (i.e., Union Parishad) in Bangladesh. Survey data found that the majority of respondents (62%) were familiar with the citizen charters, whereas 38% of respondents had no knowledge of them. However, survey data also showed that merely 32% of respondents received services from their UP according to its citizen charter; the majority of respondents (68%) did not. Similarly, it was found that only 22% of respondents used access to information services of their UP; the majority of respondents (78%) could not access information. These findings indicate that, despite the creation of citizen charters and the passage of the Right to Information Act, the majority of respondents were unable to access the services and information they required. In this regard, the researchers observed that respondents' poor education and unawareness, institutional corruption, and delays in service provision are the primary factors contributing to respondents' failure to receive services from UPs in Bangladesh.

Figure 6: People's Perceptions of Citizen Charters and Access to Information



Source: Field survey of Six UPs under Trishal Upazila, Mymensingh, Bangladesh (January–April 2021).

The Right to Information Act (2009) and citizen charters guarantee the people's participation in local administration (i.e., Union Parishads) and also improve the practice of decentralisation by enabling the exercise of power (delegated from the central administration) within local government institutions. In this regard, 84% of respondents held

that the Right to Information Act (2009) and citizen charters could improve decentralisation in rural local government units (Union Parishads) in Bangladesh.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Decentralisation is a form of administrative reform that distributes and transfers the powers, activities, rights, and duties of the central government to local administrative entities. People's participation, meanwhile, refers to the independent engagement of individuals in decision-making; through this process, a large number of individuals may exert influence on government activities. People's participation and decentralisation are closely intertwined, and in Bangladesh, the former significantly contributes to the strengthening of the latter at the local level. In particular, by exercising power delegated from the central administration, the different avenues of Union Parishads (open budget meetings, Ward Shabha, village courts, standing committees, and citizen charters) enhance decentralisation by regulating citizens' participation. At the same time, strengthening decentralisation in Bangladesh depends largely on people getting involved in local government institutions in Bangladesh. This study finds that, although decentralisation ensures the delegation of power, authority, and responsibility to field administrative units (i.e., Union Parishads), most rural citizens cannot participate independently in the aforementioned avenues of local government. Most rural people are unaware of their right to participate in the decision-making process. It has also been observed that, due to rural politics and grouping, the bulk of people's viewpoints are often

disregarded by relevant officials. Since decentralisation empowers field administrative units, promotes good governance, and increases the opportunity for people to participate actively, concerned authorities should implement appropriate initiatives to address the existing issues of people's participation in different avenues of local government in Bangladesh. The authors believe that the following policy recommendations will address the key challenges to people's participation in local government with respect to enhancing decentralisation.

First and foremost, authorities at both the central and local levels should take the proper measures (awareness-raising programmes, camps, etc.) to increase public awareness and strengthen effective decentralisation. Secondly, local government authorities should regulate grouping, nepotism, and rural inflammatory political activities to encourage people's participation in different avenues of local government. Thirdly, local government legislation should be amended and altered as required to minimise corruption within local governments. Fourthly, existing patron–client relationships in local government organisations should be balanced to improve local government capabilities, central–local relationships, and decentralisation effectiveness. Fifthly, the cooperation, coordination, and professionalism of local government authorities should be bolstered to enable successful decentralisation through the people's participation in field administrative units. Sixthly, the financial autonomy of local government bodies should be strengthened to address the issues of decentralisation and people's participation in local

government in Bangladesh. Seventhly, by using effective information and communication technology (ICT), access to information, and citizen charters, the central administration should clarify the roles and responsibilities of local officials/ politicians. Last but not least, the central administration should ensure the effective monitoring of UPs so that citizens can enthusiastically participate in the various avenues of local government (open budget meetings, Ward Shabha, village courts, standing committees, and citizen charters).

Declaration of Conflict of Interest

The content is original and free of any instances of plagiarism. Moreover, the authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest in relation to this research, authorship, or publishing of this paper.

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Knowledge Mobilization of Anti-vaccine Movement in Social Media

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Abstract

This study observes social movement in the digitalized era, especially on how the actor of anti-vaccine movement connected as well as spread and formed the knowledge in the social media. This study is essential to be further explored to enrich the theories of anti-vaccine in the digital era. The case to be studied here is the anti-vaccine movement on Facebook, which has developed in the context of the socio-politics of the Indonesian people in 2018-2019. Using Content Analysis as the method, this study finds that the Anti-vaccine Movement in Indonesia rejected the vaccine program by attacking the knowledge hegemony created by medical institutions and the government. It has formed new knowledge by issuing a counter toward the medical discourse. The argument centered on moral anger and structural repression by government agencies, worldwide institutions, pharmacy industries, and media and showed strong logic based on religious belief. This fact indicates that social media plays a role in spreading anti-vaccine ideas and gives way for the movement to develop and to have a dynamic network that can survive for a long of time. By mobilizing knowledge through a social movement in the digitalized world, the anti-vaccine movement in Indonesia has a broader network. It has the potential to influence the success of the government program.

Keywords: *anti-vaccine; health social movement; social media; social movement*.

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Introduction

This study is significant because the anti-vaccine movement is often highlighted as one of the factors that interfere with vaccination coverage. The governments in various countries, including Indonesia, have recognized how significant the impact of this movement is on decreasing vaccination coverage. Moreover, the coronavirus pandemic that hit the world at the end of 2019 to 2020 has raised the discourse on the importance of vaccines as an effective antidote. If this is left unchecked, such conditions will certainly affect the public health status in general and create a new crisis in the world. The main problem of this study lies in the need for clarification of the reality of when a social movement against the government in the digital world can influence public policies.

Why is the social movement in the health sector related to the anti-vaccine issue so significant to be observed? Nowadays, health is an aspect of life with a powerful and broad influence. As science pertaining to health and the provision of world health services takes place, a social movement has also emerged that responds to the existence of the two. The best-known concept of the social health movement is Health Social Movement, introduced by a sociologist named Phil Brown (Brown & Zavestoski, 2004). The emergence of the HSM concept has contributed to and even made significant changes to the reference of world epidemiological science and methods.

Several theories show that at least three things indicate that the phenomenon of social health movements, especially the anti-vaccine movement

in cyberspace, still needs to be understood. First, how the anti-vaccine movement works in the digital world so that it can influence the success or failure of a public policy. Second, what forms of knowledge drive vaccine skepticism on social media? Third, as stated by Blume (Blume, 2006), literature containing studies on the anti-vaccine movement as an organization that has an agenda, ideology, network, actors, resources, and the socio-political context in which the anti-vaccine movement is carried out are still not widely found. This is about how the anti-vaccine movement works in the digital world so that it may influence the success or failure of a public policy. This study believes that the results of a study conducted by Orsini (Orsini & Smith, 2010) confirm that social movements, science, and public policy, are closely related. Through a case study of Autism in Canada, Orsini demonstrated how civil society accesses, modifies, and disseminates knowledge and discussed the implications of conceptualizing knowledge mobilization in the public policy process. However, the Orsini's study has limitations, that is raising the case of social movements in non-digital areas. Social movements in social media have different methods and characteristics from those in non-digital areas. This study is an answer to the criticism of how Orisini's work is applied in the the case of social movement in the digital world. The assumption is that when social movement works against the government in the digital world, science becomes the primary topic of debate. The strength of each party's argument determines the development of pro-vaccine and anti-vaccine partisans. How this social movement works in the media in accessing, modifying,

and disseminating knowledge and its influence on the public policy process still needs to be observed further through this study. However, this study will not focus on the impact of the anti-vaccine movement on health policy. This study aims to explore how the anti-vaccine movement actors connected and spread and formed knowledge in social media.

The theoretical and empirical debates show that there are different beliefs on vaccine rejection in the digital world. Some experts still focus on the belief that vaccine rejection is an individual decision. However, other experts believe otherwise. Vaccine experts say that today's anti-vaccine phenomenon exists not only in because of medical reason or in personal decisions. They also emphasize the existence and importance of "vaccine doubt" and forms of vaccine rejection as a social condition that driven by skeptical behavior towards vaccination (Peretti-Watel et al., 2014; Yaqub et al., 2014).

Moreover, some experts say that "the antivaccine movement" is regarded as a social movement and consists of "anti-vaccine groups" and "anti-vaccine activists." These groups are, often cited by scientists, believed to be the leading cause of all forms of doubt in vaccine hesitancy or radical vaccine rejection (Betsch, 2011; Betsch et al., 2012; Zylbermand, 2017). Amidst this debate, research on the anti-vaccine phenomenon as a social movement has not been widely conducted. This leads to no theoretical reconstruction of the phenomenon of the anti-vaccine movement as a social movement related to particular ideological views. Therefore, this study attempts to explore the phenomenon more deeply.

Blume (Blume, 2006) said that literatures on studies of the anti-vaccine movement as an organization that has an agenda, ideology, network, actors, resources, and socio-political context in which the anti-vaccine movement operates had not been found. The assumption that the anti-vaccine movement is not a single movement but is a movement that is being carried or carried by and on other socio-political agendas has been conveyed by Jeremy Ward et al. (Ward, 2016a). Allegations of different agendas that take advantage of the vaccine controversy issue also strengthened when the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Indonesia released the results of immunization coverage in Indonesia. According to them, one of the reasons for vaccine rejection is misinformation and misperceptions about vaccines. One of the causes of low immunization achievement relies on several factors, such as religious beliefs, fear (the effects of vaccines), belief in conspiracy theories, and public distrust of the government (Ministry & Health, 2014a).

The anti-vaccine actors are suspected to be behind the dissemination of misinformation, including the spread through social media in Indonesia (Ministry & Health, 2014b). The Ministry of Health of the Republic of Indonesia stated that religious narratives are part of the reasons developed by the anti-vaccines. The issue of religion is one of the main concerns among citizens who usually access cyberspace in Indonesia. The current trend is that religious issues are also the easiest consumption material compared to other issues, especially those related to vaccines. Therefore, when the MUI doubted about the haram status of

several vaccines in 2010 occurred (Pauzi & Man, 2017), people looked for information on the internet. This is used as the right moment by the anti-vaccines as the material to develop negative campaigns against vaccines. Similarly, many AEFI and conspiracy issues have been found on social media when the anti-vaccines give opposing arguments about vaccines.

For this reason, a certain attention to the strategy of how Indonesia's anti-vaccine movement works in social media is very relevant to be observed amidst the euphoria of the widespread internet network and the socio-political conditions in those years. The 2017-2020 period was a very "noisy" year in cyberspace, especially in Indonesian's social media related to the presidential and legislative elections. In the same years, Indonesia's immunization coverage achievements decreased dramatically. It is the time when the virtual world is clamorous, and the socio-political context is "hot," where there is a very strong 'push-pull' of war between social and political actors in cyberspace. Thus, it is interesting to observe if it has a significant connection with the anti-vaccine movement.

Method

Facebook was chosen because it has high capabilities in social networking, content sharing, virtual world community, and high collaborative work (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2020), making this type of social media more widely used by Indonesian anti-vaccine activists. The data collection began with identifying individual accounts, fan pages, and anti-vaccine groups. The first step was to crawl data with a specific date and backdate method, starting from December 31, 2019, to January 1, 2017.

The data consisted of posts, comments, and reshares from accounts, fan pages, and groups containing related keywords. In this process, 4,535 posts relevant to the issue of vaccines were found. Based on the screening process, 30 personal accounts of anti-vaccine actors were obtained, and six anti-vaccine groups in Indonesia were accessible. These accounts were then used as sampling. In terms of all the sampled accounts, each of them was compiled into one file containing information in the form of profiles, statuses, posts (photos, videos, posters, etc.), reshares, and comments with complete arguments regarding criticism and rejection for vaccination.

This study also conducted a content analysis of all posts for each account during the 2017-2019 period. By observing all the posts, the researchers could understand the actors' actions and reasons when publishing their thoughts on vaccines. The accounts did comprehensively depict their profile, agenda, network power, and public interests behind each of their posts. Therefore, this study also conducted semi-structured interviews with 15 participants consisting of 10 Facebook account owners, one head of AEFI victims handling, one social media expert, two observers of the anti-vaccine movement, and one pediatrician. The participants are the members of the sample from Facebook and the key figures with good knowledge and understanding of anti-vaccine phenomena and social media. Therefore, offline interviews were conducted to rectify this flaw and to corroborate the content analysis result. The interviews were conducted, recorded, transcribed, analyzed, and made anonymously. All interviewees gave their consent in the form

of verbal permission to be quoted prior to the interview. The interview guideline was managed to be three main questions: a) how can the actors be interested in vaccines, b) why they believed that the vaccines are dangerous and require public mobilization, and c) how do they increasingly get involved in public criticism of the vaccination during that period and with whom they get involved? The information is obtained using semi-structured interviews, such as their history, reasons, and motives behind the anti-vaccine movement, the network of actors (individuals and/or groups they represent) as well as the strategies they use to mobilize their discourses on social media.

The data collection was performed using the Facebook Graph API, which provides public data. The downloaded pages and data are Facebook entities for the public and are accessible to anyone. The user contents used in this study are public so that the researchers could retrieve them unless the users set them up in privacy for the researchers, thus making them inaccessible. During the in-depth interview process, the interviewees gave verbal consent to interview before the meeting. The interviewees' consent for recording and reporting purpose were received orally before the interview was conducted.

Literature Review

Vaccine refusal in the early 19th century relied on mass deployment and demonstrative means to press its interests (Koopmans, 2003). Meanwhile, vaccine rejection in the digital era uses discourse and knowledge mobilization as weapons of debate (Bromberg, 2013; Kata, 2010; Sierra-Caballero, 2018). The power of narrative and argumentation is important

to win debates with opposition groups with different opinions (Jansen, 2010; Joyce, 2010; Klimburg & Mirtl, 2012).

In the digital era, the attitudes of vaccine-repellent actors are presented through the discourse they spread about vaccines. From the outset, the attitude of these vaccine-repellent actors was simplified as a rejection caused purely by health-related matters, particularly vaccines. This is reinforced by a study conducted by Kerr (Kerr, 2009) which confirms that in terms of theory, the anti-vaccine group has the same characteristics as one type of the Health Social Movement, namely Embodied Health Social Science (Brown & Zavestoski, 2004). Kerr's theory clearly illustrates that the group's activities are designed by actors who have experienced a type of disease or disability and believe it to be " truth" based on what they feel. However, this has been criticized by Ward because, according to him, when referring to the concept of "vaccine hesitancy," the attitudes of these actors can arise due to different motives, perhaps even due to the existence of cultural, political, and other interests (Ward, 2016a). Ward also asserts that the notion that the of vaccine-repellents is a social movement should lead to the study that the anti-vaccine movement is an "impure" social movement (Ward, 2016b; Ward et al., 2016). The Anti-vaccine Movement, understood as a New Social Movement that has its characteristic. It is not oriented to ideological based on the social class attached to the Old Social Movement. This anti-vaccine strategy also has organizing tactics that lean more towards "disruptive" and focus more on the mobilization of public opinion (Ward, 2016a; Ward et al., 2016). The Word Study reinforces this by mentioning that vaccine-

repellent groups are not just collection of people with skeptical views, but they move in unorganized, intentional, even ideologically manner (Singh, 2001). Thus, it can be said that the actors of the anti-vaccine movement are not who simply move with homogeneous motives and health frameworks (Kata, 2012). Whether or not in an organized and structured manner, the actors of the anti-vaccine movement are believed to have used issues outside the vaccine discourse as an effort to lower one's intention to vaccinate (Broniatowski et al., 2018; Fadda et al., 2015; Olive et al., 2018; Schmidt et al., 2018; Ward et al., 2016). Reinforced by Blume's argument, currently, the phenomenon of vaccine refusal cannot be seen as a social movement with single purpose and interest (Blume, 2006). Vaccine-repellent actors have taken advantage of discourses beyond health issues so that the anti-vaccination movement emerged as a dynamic, fluid, networked movement with issues outside the realm of health.

The discourse debate in health issues stems from the emergence of parties opposed to the ruling party (Singh, 2001). As is well known, the health issue is a space for public discussion and not a monopoly of medical authority or the state (Baumgaertner et al., 2018). Meanwhile, the Social Health Movement is a form of resistance to the medical or state authorities' monopolistic attitude around health information (Brown et al., 2004). Gieryn explained that this movement usually occurs when two parties claim they are the "more legitimate" party. In scientific debates, such as the historical debate between doctors and homeopaths in the early 1900s, both sides used science as

a trade tool. Therefore, knowledge is used by any arguing party to expand or seek followers, the rejection of ideas, and protect interested parties, to a truth claim (Gieryn, 1983). Along the way, Health Social Movement as a form of public resistance to authority in the field of health can be categorized into the following three types:

- movement of access to health that addresses issues related to improving or gaining access to health services,
- constituent-based health movement protesting disproportionate outcomes and treatment by the scientific community, such as a health movement based on efforts to end gender inequality, SARA (Tribes, Religions, and Races), social class, and sexual orientation in health services,
- the Embodied Health Social Movement (EHSM), which is a movement formed by a group of people with experiences of illness or disability who believe in "truth" based on what they feel yet social movement theory has not yet been applied to these movements. Health social movements (HSMs(Brown et al., 2004)(Brown et al., 2004).

In the researchers' initial observations, EHSM can be adopted to explain the discourse of the vaccine rejection movement. This push for vaccine refusal with the EHSM type carries the characteristic of "understanding disease, disability or sick experience by challenging the knowledge, diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of diseases derived from dominant medical knowledge" (Brown et al., 2004)(Brown et al., 2004). The key to this EHSM is how activists organize and criticize

"epidemiological dominance" through personal awareness and understanding derived from their experiences (Brown et al., 2004). Explicitly, Brown defines the epidemiological dominance paradigm as "the codification of beliefs about diseases and their causes by science, government, and the private sector. It includes established institutions authorized to issue diagnoses, methods of treatment, and treatment of people with diseases, as well as journals, media, universities, medical philanthropy, and government officials. (Brown et al., 2004)Domination of the epidemiological paradigm departs from the results of a century-long campaign by the field of general medicine for cultural authority as described by Gieryn (1983). The EHSM makes the argument that the patient's experience (what is felt) and level of knowledge should be included in both treatment methods and patient care decisions – including court decisions – regarding certain diseases. The decisive reason for the need to consider the patient's experience is because, during this time, sociologists believe the body interacts with the social environment and influences social actions (Klawiter, 1999).

The most prominent characteristic of the EHSM is the tendency of EHSM constituents and activists to become "lay experts". Being a "lay expert " means adapting the biomedical tools and knowledge they have as well as familiarizing themselves with technical knowledge on the topic of a particular disease. In the end, these lay activists claim to have more understanding than traditional or accredited experts (Brown & Mikkelsen, 1990).

In addition to being lay experts, activists apply their knowledge by combining popular

epidemiology with reflections on their own disease experiences. Lay experts also seek to form alliances with trusted health professionals and scientists in pursuit of their movement's goals, including disease prevention, research, funding, and ownership of access to limited resources. (Brown et al., 2004; Brown & J.Mikkelsen, 1990).

Brown added that ESHM also refers to the commonality of grievances it has to form a collective identity that will be politicized. There will be resistance when this collective identity conflicts with a dominant discourse. In order for the politicized collective identity to be easily formed, Brown assessed the need to connect it with broader social and political criticism, such as issues of fairness, political interests, SARA, and equitable development. The whole issue is managed in such a way as an integral part of the emergence of a particular disease (Brown et al., 2004).

On the other hand, sociopolitical factors have been identified by some researchers as one of the causes behind the rejection of vaccines (Debus & Tosun, 2021; Estep, 2017; Hornsey et al., 2020). The chances of vaccine rejection are stronger when the ideology of parents interacts with politics (Engin & Vezzoni, 2020; Hornsey et al., 2018; Rabinowitz et al., 2016). The stronger a person considers himself to be the jealous k wing and the more interested he is in politics, the more likely it is that the ideology of the envious k wing generates skeptical attitudes and beliefs towards vaccines and vaccinations (Baumgaertner et al., 2018). Meanwhile, Cadeddu found that Italians who put themselves on the right in the left-right ideological spectrum and

they tend to perceive vaccines as something dangerous (Cadeddu et al., 2020). The politicization of policy became a phenomenon that emerged later, as was the case in France. Ward, et al. (2020) found that French people who feel close to established parties in the center-left, center, and center-right will choose to be vaccinated. In contrast, peple who identify with the left and right wing, or do not identify with any party will refuse the vaccine. This helps us understand that political and social factors play an important role in vaccine decisions.

It can be said that the narrative spread by the anti-vaccine movement is a discourse that is contrary to the discourse developed by the government (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Bovet & Makse, 2019; Isaac, 2016; Schackmuth, 2018; Shirsat, 2018). Often these different discourses use conspiracy theories to strengthen the arguments of government attackers. The findings from a study conducted by Kim and Chao which examined the effects of exposure to government conspiracy theory videos were proven to cause cynicism toward the government (Kim & Cao, 2016). This cynicism will eventually lead to a decline in social trust in government administrators. In the context of health policy, several previous studies have suggested that health service providers may experience program failure if they lose their "Social Trust" (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Bovet & Makse, 2019; Isaac, 2016; Schackmuth, 2018; Shirsat, 2018). Trust is something that is sometimes not fairly distributed. Sometimes this trust is controlled by certain social groups, and when the controller is an irresponsible social group, or conversely, when certain social groups experience

disappointment with something, they will build opinions that are detrimental to a program so that it harms the targets of a policy.

Result

Based on the results of the content analysis on Facebook, there has been a process of knowledge mobilization by anti-vaccine actors. The actors, the process of knowledge mobilization, and the dynamics of communication patterns that occur on Facebook are presented in Figure 1. There are three main components in the figure. The first component shows the process of interconnecting anti-vaccine discourse from two types of anti-vaccine actors. The second component provides an overview of the methods used by the actors in distributing and conducting counter discourse-against the opposing discourses. The third component describes what happens on the Facebook page when anti-vaccine activists interact and communicate. The consequences arose during the process of interaction and communication. In the end, all the activities of the anti-vaccine driving actors can influence people's decisions to vaccinate. Someone with a bad experience after getting vaccinated and people who use the issue of vaccines as a means of pressure on the government will quickly be attracted and become sympathizers of this anti-vaccine social movement.



Figure 1. Mobilization of the Knowledge on Anti-vaccine Movement on Facebook 2018-2019

A. Interconnection of Anti-vaccine Discourse Among the Actors

Anti-vaccine discourses emerged through a knowledge mobilization process distributed by two groups of anti-vaccine. They are actors who reject vaccines for health or biomedical reasons. The group consists of those who consistently reject all types of vaccines by using arguments from health aspects. They are pure vaccine-repellents because they aim to reject vaccine administration. The characteristic of the actors is "consistent rejection of all types of vaccines on an ongoing basis." This can be seen from their respective Facebook posts, where very little space is devoted to other topics. The second characteristic is that the arguments and discourses they used are principles that attack vaccines. Vaccines have the primary function of increasing immunity, but it is precisely this principle that this group attacks. They make use of narratives based on health sciences to support their arguments. They even constantly issued hypotheses explaining that vaccines are dangerous. Medical evidence had been used to support the anti-vaccine idea. The posted by the actors stated that human immunity can be obtained from healthy foods or lifestyles.

Vaccines are defined as inserting viruses into the human body, and not everyone has sufficient strength, so it will result in the danger of adverse events following immunization (AEFI) and other serious diseases. Arguments related to the chemical content of vaccines resulting in blood clots, organ damage, autism, and brain damage were also used by this group. The narrative is a typical argument that is often mentioned.

The actors shared the jargon "fight for safe vaccines." This is the main claim by literature on scientific controversies regarding the dangers of vaccination.

The results of the interviews show that, in general, the actors were not initially ignorant of the vaccination. They become critics and reject getting the vaccination since there are family members who are claimed to be suffering from AEFI. At first, some of them were the parents who had given vaccines to their children. However, their perspective on vaccines has changed. They did not really care about vaccine-related issues, but then they rejected them. The parents feel that they have followed all the recommended procedures to get their children vaccinated and have chosen a trusted health facility. However, they are then faced with an incident that makes their child or family member sick and even die after getting the vaccination. They found out that they were the victims of AEFI after they searched for the information on the internet and connected with a anti-vaccine group. They obtained information that their child had the same experience as those described as AEFI. After observing and joining the groups against vaccines, both on Facebook and on WhatsApp, their perspective on vaccines changed. During this process, the anti-vaccine discourse was supported and disseminated through their posts on Facebook.

The second group consists of actors who use the issue of refusing vaccines as their political and ideological agenda. It indicates that the group of actors is not a pure vaccine-repellent. The actors are more heterogeneous and have the most significant number. All actors in the two groups also refuse all types of vaccines. All of them said the same argument as

the previous group. However, the actors differ in one key aspect "Vaccines are not their main concern." The actors' narrative does not directly relate to the vaccines. The narrative is often used to accompany or form the basis of an argument against vaccines. If it is compared to the previous group, they are firmly against "conspiracy theory." However, it is the actors of this group who emphasize the conspiracy theory as a reason for refusing vaccines. Finally, this is performed continuously and consistently.

The incident that encouraged this group to campaign for negative aspects about vaccines was when their ideology was disturbed by the medical and government authorities. The motivation for refusing vaccines comes from information about the illegality of vaccines. The context of halal-haram vaccines is the primary debate and has the highest quantity of conversation on Facebook posts. Such an issue is a crucial topic, considering that Indonesia is a Muslim country as its majority population. Islamic values have become one of the rules for the Indonesian Muslim behavior.

Another big issue is a trade conspiracy or political conspiracy behind the production and distribution of vaccines. The issue has sparked a debate about vaccines on the Facebook walls of these actors. The topic of the Chinese workers' arrival in Indonesia in 2019, for instance, then led to the discussions about vaccines on several Facebook walls of this second group. They spread the argument that the vaccine was produced by a Chinese company. The vaccine is injected by the Chinese people into Indonesian children as an effort to make the Indonesian human resources destroyed and weak. The human resources

will not be able to have adequate capacity and competence to compete, so they need foreign workers from China.

The mobilization of conspiracy issues also emerged when the incident of the "Criminalization of ulama" incident resulted from political polarization due to the Indonesian Presidential Election 2019. The issue of vaccines was associated with attempts to destroy Muslims by countries that hate Islam. The content of metals and chemicals in vaccines is a weapon to weaken Islam. The Muslim children's brains and minds are weakened using the vaccines so that they will be easily controlled by the Islamic opposition countries. The incumbent government, in this case, is often associated with being involved in attempts to destroy Muslims through vaccination programs.

The actors of pure and impure anti-vaccine groups then interact and support each other by following, sharing, and resharing anti-vaccine content. They provide mutual reinforcement in terms of conveying arguments on vaccine rejection in the comments section and creating anti-vaccine groups on Facebook and even on WhatsApp groups. The anti-vaccine discourse is strongly disseminated by them. It is also obvious that they are not only producing and spreading anti-vaccine discourse, but they are also fighting against pro-vaccine arguments and discourses.

B. Method of Anti-vaccine Discourse Mobilization

The second component of Figure 1 shows the methods used to disseminate the anti-vaccine discourse and fight pro-vaccine discourse. There are at least five recorded methods used

in this study. The first method used by the anti-vaccine actors is by describing an attempt to "Obscure information and knowledge." In general, the anti-vaccine actors try to obscure information through posting and distributing videos or posters. They reject and denigrate information and knowledge that does not support the anti-vaccine position. Arguments are drawn from studies promoting an anti-vaccine agenda. The information they share often contains untrusted and unproven information. Popular stories of vaccine failure are shared along with misinformation by medical and government assumptions. The second method used by the anti-vaccines is that they also make "Experience-based hypotheses." The presence of several types of diseases and improper human behaviors are considered the result of vaccination. Many children today, for instance, are disobedient to their parents, indicating that it is the result of chemicals that have been put into their bodies when they were children and produced hormonal imbalances. The hormones then made the children disobedient to their parents. Another example is that the presence of chronic diseases in the human body is assumed to be the effect of vaccines. The arguments from foreigners' anti-vaccine posts abroad are widely used as references to strengthen this narrative.

Also, "Religious-based arguments" is the most prominent argumentation framework that emerges. The anti-vaccine actors declared the dangers of vaccines since it has been against religious values. The issue of halal vaccines is the most frequent discussion on the Facebook page. They also criticized medical practitioners for abandoning the religious aspect of making

or administering vaccines. In the end, they performed treatments and disease prevention using methods that are believed to be suitable with religious beliefs as an alternative to administering the vaccines.

Meanwhile, in disseminating narratives and arguments, the anti-vaccine group often "holds open debates" through captions or comments on their social media posts. Besides, the strategy of blocking vaccine supporters" accounts and attacking individuals who oppose their arguments are also performed. To strengthen the support and networking, the group "forms other groups" both on Facebook and WhatsApp. They intensively strengthen each other's support and participate in discussions about health and religion.

C. The process of Interaction and Dynamic of Anti-vaccine Discourse

The presence of photos, videos, posters, and captions about anti-vaccine depicts the dynamics of communication patterns and discourse on the Facebook accounts of the anti-vaccine actors. The actors, both from groups that use medical arguments (most of them have personal experience related to AEFI) and religious belief as well as political arguments (some of them have political agendas outside of vaccines), actively participate in anti-vaccine discussions on Facebook. Based on observations and interviews, at least four interaction processes can be identified.

1. Ideological polarization in society

One of the consequences of the pro-vaccine and anti-vaccine debate is ideological polarization

among Facebook users. Anti-vaccine groups are actively creating anti-vaccine discourse on Facebook, and aggressively pushing information without facts and credible sources. They tend to actively deliver personal opinions to the fact that is sometimes biased by personal interests. They aggressively try to influence opinions, thoughts, and decisions on vaccine administration decisions without providing factual information. They even tend to be fanatical about their opinions and do not try to validate their beliefs and thus, making them have closed thoughts. This creates a pretty strong polarization between the anti-vaccine and pro-vaccine actors.

2. Cut and create network

The decision to reject vaccination and actively participate in anti-vaccine campaigns has brought an effect on the personal relationships of supporters. The argument against this vaccine is proven to be able to break the relationship of people who previously have been nurtured. However, they could create new relationships with like-minded people even though they have never met. The anti-vaccine activists on Facebook also consciously add and/or delete friends on social media. This is very relevant to how a social movement is formed. The similarity of opinions in discourse can lead to similarities in viewpoints and attitudes, so this may become a process of increasing members of a social movement.

3. Information Bias

The anti-vaccine actors tend to promote their favorite narratives, and this is often performed without information from reliable sources. When the information matches their ideology and

beliefs, they like, promote, or share it on their Facebook page. This will automatically add an echo chamber and an anti-vaccine bubble filter. When anti-vaccine actors become part of the echo chamber, they will repeatedly receive information that will influence their personal judgment. Meanwhile, the pro-vaccine actors will turn away from the narratives and arguments since they take it as something unpleasant, so they finally reject the information. It confirms that whether a social media user accepts a fact or not is greatly influenced by their previous ideological preferences, thus carrying out a confirmation process to prove the truth.

4. Distrust in Government

The findings of this study confirm that many arguments and narratives from the anti-vaccine actors using conspiracy theories that attack the medical world and the government have proven to be able to generate cynicism against the government. The discourse promoting government conspiracy theory has the potential to generate long-term cynicism against the government. Therefore, the actors disseminate the information on Facebook, and thus, the impact on government distrust increases rapidly.

Using the communication pattern that occurs on Facebook, the actors of the anti-vaccine movement often manage to get new partisans in the end. The new partisans are generally "the vaccine doubters," those who are questioning and unsure about vaccines. They possess the same characteristics as the anti-vaccine actors (i.e., those who have had bad experiences with vaccines and people who have certain socio-political agendas.

D. Discussion

The anti-vaccine movement mentioned in this study referred to the social movement with the same characteristics as one of the Health Social Movement types called the Embodied Health Social Science (Brown & Zavestoski, 2004), a movement formed by people who have illness or disability who believe in the "truth" according to the state they feel. However, the anti-vaccine movement is not merely moving for personal reasons related to the experience of illness and disability that led to the decision to reject the vaccination. This study found that there are ideological aspects with the socio-political background of the individual that also influence it. The discourse to reject vaccination using arguments against medical knowledge and ideology is obviously seen here. As these two arguments exist, Indonesia's anti-vaccine movement has developed and networked and is continuously reproduced, so the anti-vaccine movement has never disappeared but has been getting solid and intense in Indonesia.

The anti-vaccine movements in social media have different methods and characteristics from social movements in non-digital areas (Bromberg, 2013; Hill et al., 2018; Jansen, 2010; Juris, 2005; Mavragani & Ochoa, 2018; Turner, 2013). In line with Orsini (Orsini & Smith, 2010), the role of knowledge is very dominant in the activities of the anti-vaccine movement on Facebook to spread its interests in the digital world. Instead of relying on street protest movements, the anti-vaccine movement organizations are required to win in discourse debates in the digital world. The main goal is to attract new members as well as to spread its interests. To win the debate in the discourse

battle in cyberspace, the anti-vaccine movement organizations utilize knowledge. They explore how social movements in the digital world use knowledge as a means of discourse battle. Knowledge and expertise are fiercely contested by the actors of the anti-vaccine movement, the government, and medical practitioners. Even when the anti-vaccine movement activists clash with the government, they try to "disrupt" the scientific definition of the knowledge mainstream for their own goal.

Public knowledge about vaccination outside the dominant government and medical discourse managed by the anti-vaccine movement actors has proven to be able to move many Facebook users to reject vaccination. In the end, the anti-vaccine movement is identified as an action against the administration of vaccines either individually or in groups. The group is then suspected to be one of the important reasons for the increase in vaccine rejections in recent years (Lutkenhaus et al., 2019; Meyer et al., 2019; Paterson et al., 2016; Schmidt et al., 2018; Yusmawati, 2018). Using such a strategy, the anti-vaccine movement on Facebook has become a strong factor that plays a key role in sparking controversy and can raise doubts about vaccines.

The presence of religious and political discourse that exists from arguments outside of the vaccine issue in the anti-vaccine movement campaign on Facebook shows that the agenda of the anti-vaccine movement is not something pure. There has been a unification of anti-vaccine issues with struggle issues in other socio-political contexts. There are even actors who focus on the struggle in other areas but use the issue of vaccines as their tool. It was found

that political factors influenced the discourse carried by the anti-vaccine actors. The discourse on distrust of the government went hand in hand with the religious discourse. The emergence of this issue can be assumed due to the situation ahead of the 2019 Presidential Election.

The discourse on the same bad experiences of patients was politicized by actors of the anti-vaccine movement to produce a collective identity. At the end, when this collective identity conflicts with a dominant discourse, there is resistance. These impure anti-vaccine actors were aware that once a politicized collective identity is formed, the identity of collective disease complaints must be linked with broader social and political criticism (e.g., issues of structural justice, political interests, and racial inequality and equitable development as triggers for the emergence of the disease).

The most influential medium for disseminating the anti-vaccination movement for parents' beliefs about immunization is the internet. Internet users search for information online to get information about immunizations or vaccinations of government programs. They also search for pages on the internet that discuss vaccines. Facebook is the most widely used platform for discussions about this issue. However, the availability of inaccurate information on Facebook has provided misinformation, and one of the researchers name the internet as the 'modern Pandora box' (Mayer & Till, 2019). Meanwhile, the arguments put forward by the anti-vaccination actors' posts provide arguments used to

support the vaccine rejection. The general arguments are focused on: (1) the safety and efficacy of vaccines (i.e., contain poison, cause disease of unknown factors, cause reduced brain function; (2) The focus is more about alternative medicine - the promotion of other treatments that are better than a vaccination and the 'natural' approach; (3) freedom of religious belief; (4) conspiracy theory; (5) morality and religion - vaccination is against the God's will.

It highlights that the narrative disseminated by the anti-vaccine movement is false news or a hoax. The existing research on the effects of false news or hoax generally focuses on political issues, such as presidential elections (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Bovet & Makse, 2019; Isaac, 2016; Schackmuth, 2018; Shirsat, 2018), several issues related to industrial products and services. False news or hoaxes often contain conspiracy theories to strengthen their arguments against government attackers. The findings of this study examining the effects of exposure to government conspiracy theory videos shared by anti-vaccine groups were proven to incite cynicism against the government. The belief in the government conspiracy was then followed by distrust in the government. This suggests that the messages of media promoting government conspiracy theories have the potential to generate long-term cynicism against the government. Therefore, if the posts disseminated through social media have an impact on government distrust, they will then increase rapidly.

Conclusion

The anti-vaccine movement is a movement that opposes government policies, especially those related to vaccine

administration to the community. It has a position as actor representing civil society in the health sector who disagree with the government policies and the dominant medical knowledge related to administering vaccines to the community. To achieve their goal, the anti-vaccine movement attempts to compete between discourse and knowledge amidst the dominant discourse brought by the government. The government uses medical science as the basis for the issuance of its policies.

In this case, the knowledge and expertise created by the anti-vaccine movement are used to be disseminated through the digital world to influence public policy. Social movements have proven to be one of the pillars that are considered in the public policy process while running their agency by mobilizing and disseminating knowledge. Like other social movements in the health sector, the anti-vaccine movement produces discourse from the sources of knowledge and research outside biomedicine and disseminates it through various ways, including online campaigns. The discourse presenting that vaccines are the product of the world drug companies' conspiracy that may cause autism, even against one religion, has become the basic knowledge disseminated by this movement.

In the context of health policy, health service providers need to understand the climate of "social trust." Trust is sometimes not distributed fairly and, sometimes, is controlled by certain social groups as the controller of an irresponsible social group. Conversely, suppose certain social groups are disappointed with something. In that case, they will deliver an opinion that is detrimental to a program, and thus, it will have bad

effects on the target of the policy. Healthcare providers are required to understand what trust, distrust, and antitrust are for related health issues.

This study has a limitation, such as only examining an anti-vaccine movement through the discourse that circulated through the media (i.e., Facebook). Meanwhile, there are many media used by the anti-vaccine actors as a medium of counterwork. Further study should aim to broaden its scope on the propaganda tools used by an anti-vaccine movement, especially in the digital world, to obtain a more comprehensive and varied depiction of the phenomenon of the anti-vaccine movement on social media.

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