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Aims and Scope:

PCD Journal of South and Southeast Asia's Power, Conflict, and Democracy Studies is an international refereed journal initiated by the Power, Conflict, and Democracy (PCD) consortium, a collaborative work by the University of Colombo in Sri Lanka, Gadjah Mada University in Indonesia, and the University of Oslo in Norway. It is a journal that comprehensively examines the dynamics of power and democracy, including practices of human rights, popular representation, and public policy, particularly, in Indonesia but still giving a space for comparative studies. Invitation is extended to authors with interest in making comparison experiences in Indonesia with those of the rest of the globe. PCD Journal publishes articles, literature review, field notes, and book reviews in major sub fields of political science, human geography, and political anthropology.

PCD Journal aims to address some of the most current issues of power, conflict, and democracy in Indonesia with comparative perspective. While the journal is open to all methodological approaches, all submissions are expected to be theoretically grounded. The journal can be of great value to teachers, students, researchers, experts, journalists, and social movement activist dealing with these issues and regions.

Submission

Submitted papers should be no longer than 8,000 words excluding tables and figures. Submit the manuscript via e-mail to the editor-in-chief at pcd@ugm.ac.id.

Manuscript preparation

For detailed instruction check our website: <https://jurnal.ugm.ac.id/v3/PCD> or <http://www.jurnal.ugm.ac.id/pcd>.

Peer Review

Every submitted article will be subject to peer review. The normal review period is three months. Most research articles in this journal have undergone rigorous peer review based on initial editorial screening and refereeing by anonymous referees. Authors should take care that the manuscript contains no clues as to identity. Nevertheless, articles published under 'Research Notes' section, aimed at setting up future research agenda, are non-peer-reviewed.

PCD Programme

The state of democracy in the Global South is marked by a striking paradox: while liberal democracy has attained an ideologically hegemonic position through two so-called waves of democracy, the qualities of such democracies is increasingly called into question. The "old" democracies in the global South like Sri Lanka are weakened. Democracy deficits have emerged within constitutional and institutional arrangements as well as in political practices. Further, the "third wave of democracy" is over. "New" democracies like in Indonesia have fostered freedoms, privatisation and decentralisation but continue to suffer from poor governance, representation and participation. Hence there are general signs of decline. Vulnerable people are frustrated with lack of actual influence and sustained elitism. Politicians winning elections often need to foster ethnic and religious loyalties, clientelism and the abuse of public resources. Powerful groups and middle classes with poor ability to win elections tend to opt for privatisation and return partially to authoritarian governance.

Critical questions are therefore asked about the feasibility of democracy in developing country contexts. Some observers say it is only a problem of better crafting of institutions. Others contend that "full" democratisation was premature in the first place and that necessary preconditions need to be created beforehand. Both positions are based on a narrow and static understanding of democracy. While the core elements of democracy are universal, real world democracies develop (or decline) over time and through contextual dynamics; in processes and contexts of actors, institutions and relations of power. Therefore, the crucial task is to analyse the problems and options of expanding the historically "early" freedoms and deficient elements of democracy that fortunately exist in spite of poor socio-economic and political conditions in countries such as Sri Lanka and Indonesia rather than giving up on these freedoms until the

other have somehow improved. This is to advance towards the universally accepted aim of democracy in terms of popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality, and to be able to use democracy to handle conflicts and alter unequal and unsustainable development.

With this in mind, researchers at the University of Oslo (Norway), Gadjah Mada (Indonesia) and Colombo (Sri Lanka) have come together in a collective research– and post- graduate programme. The idea is to pool their research projects and results, and to promote doctoral as well as master studies by way of, first, a joint framework for analysing power, conflict and democracy and, second, a basic electronic peer reviewed journal and report series (published by PCD-Press) to the benefit of students, scholars and priorities in the region. Basic resources—in addition to the participants own voluntary work and projects— are provided by their respective universities and the Norwegian Centre for International Cooperation in Higher Education (SIU).

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Women's Empowerment in Madura Villages: Examining Female Resistance within the Patriarchal Power Structure and Political Dynasties

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Abstract

The position of village head (klebun) in Madura is predominantly held by men, suggesting patriarchal power and political dynasties. This study explores how women klebuns responded to the situation by empowering themselves and other women. The analysis uses qualitative descriptive methods and Foucault's theory of power and legitimacy. Data was collected from observations of 11 women klebuns and in-depth interviews with four of them. The findings reveal that female klebuns face a choice between being extensions of their male relatives or being leaders themselves. To challenge the patriarchal constructs, they strategically use political influence, establish relationships with officials, and seek support from legal aid institutions. These efforts were made to address the issue of village security centering around the Madurese people in order to regain public trust. The study unveils the complexity of women's empowerment in Madura's male-dominated political landscape. This encouraged female klebuns to strive and transform the social and political

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dynamics, advocating for gender equality and challenging existing power structures. This research offers insights into promoting women's political empowerment at the village level, and fostering gender equity in local governance, inspiring change in Madura and beyond.

Keywords: *Madurese villages; female klebuns; patriarchal power; political dynasties; women empowerment*

Introduction

Villages are not only administrative areas but also social and cultural entities. Villages serve as the breeding ground for traditional values and cultural expressions, which reflect the local society's social and cultural identity. A village head in Madura, known as *klebun*, functions as not only a government leader but also an upholder of significant social standing and value

directly legitimated by their community. The *klebun* position is fiercely contested among social and kinship-based groups. In Java and Madura, village head elections have become battlegrounds among various social groups within the community. Consequently, the electoral competition for the village head position has evolved from personal contests between candidates to group-based ones. Being a village head provides a wide range of access to social, economic, and political spheres for the incumbent and their supporters. Economically, winning the village head's election means receiving various economic benefits. Quoting scholars like Elly Touwen-Bouwsma (1989), Dzulkarnain (2021) note the victorious *klebun* and their supporters gain various advantages, such as securing village administrative positions, obtaining access



to *percaton* land (endowment land) for cultivation, receiving subsidies, and participating in various government-sponsored credit programs. These 'payback' actions not only reciprocate the supporters' efforts but also bolster the incumbent's position and authority throughout their term. Over time, such economic interests, coupled with changes in state policies, have intensified the competition and the desire to maintain the status quo.

In the post-reformation era, political changes have redefined the role of the village head. As stated in Government Regulation Number 43 of 2014, village heads are now considered as part of the state bureaucracy with a salary-based system, no longer linked to *percaton* or land grant, at least officially. With this new system, the village head receives a regular monthly salary similar to that of civil servants. Economically, the guaranteed

income through the salary system offers more stability compared to the *percaton* models. Winters (2011) argues that economic justifications in a power struggle will lead to the emergence of power oligarchies. Touwen-Bouwsma (1989) explains that, in the long-standing tradition in the election process for *klebun* in Madura's society, formally anyone can run for the position, but candidates are usually those with economic and influential power. The strategic position attracts family-based social groups to seek and maintain this position. Various strategies are employed to ensure the continuity of power. After the term of office ends, and the incumbent can no longer run for the next election (because they have served two terms), candidates from the family will be prepared to maintain the political power. In this way, dynastic politics is built.



In the post-reformation era, the phenomenon of female *klebun* candidates has emerged in Madura. The Law No. 6 of 2014 concerning Villages has provided space for women's participation in village institutions, including the village head position. With the formal opportunities for women in politics, they have now been considered potential candidates and successors. These women typically come from the incumbent's family, such as a wife or a daughter. The personal relationship with the incumbent has given these women access to the political arena that otherwise remains closed. The entry of women into the political arena in Madura marked a significant change in the patriarchal tradition, as *klebun* positions had always been exclusively held by men. Nonetheless, Rahmawati et al. (2021) noted that the presence of women *klebun* (*klebun babine*) leaves a question

about whether their role is merely a continuation of family power or a genuine representation of women's independent presence and substance in the realm of power.

Women's leadership has become a debated discourse in Madurese society today. Women are now allowed to assume political power, a possibility that did not exist before. Laws, values, and norms provide the basis for the community to consider and implement the provisions. The discourse on women's leadership has mobilized women, community leaders, and voters to take action in nominating, supporting, and electing female candidates to become *klebun*. This discourse becomes part of history, showcasing how discourse contexts are formed and influence individual behaviors. According to Foucault (1980), power is a process that continuously evolves through



power relations. Power is not an object but a verb, constantly developing within existing relational spaces. Power is highly productive as it resides within each individual within the spaces of relations that continuously evolve. Each relation shapes behaviors differently, some of which may contribute positively to the *klebun's* victory, while others may limit or even hinder the success. In the context of female *klebun*, their journey through the village head election process is through complex power relations. Family, constituents, organizers, and *remo* groups play pivotal roles in determining the success of a village head or *klebun* in Madura. The presence of these groups simultaneously reveals the power relations that a female *klebun* must navigate to achieve her victory. On a practical level,

after being elected, a female *klebun* must confront a hegemonic environment that undermines her leadership abilities.

This research explores a significant development in Madurese villages—the emergence of women in leadership positions, particularly as village heads (*klebuns*). This phenomenon challenges the traditional patriarchal norms and raises questions about the extent of women's independent power within the deeply rooted patriarchal power structures and political dynasties. Through a qualitative descriptive approach and Foucault's theory of power and legitimacy, this research aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the strategies employed by female *klebuns* to challenge patriarchal constructions and promote gender equality. The question is how women in leadership positions navigate

their roles within the patriarchal power structure and political dynasties. The hypothesis is that, despite the challenges posed by these structures, female *klebuns* can exert agency and resist patriarchal norms through various means, such as forming alliances, mobilizing support, and advocating for women's participation in village administration. The primary purpose of this article is to shed light on the dynamics of women's empowerment in Madura villages. By documenting the experiences, challenges, and strategies of female *klebuns*, this research aims to contribute to the existing literature on gender and politics and provide valuable insights into how women negotiate patriarchal power structures, which contributes to the transformation of the social and political landscape in Madura.

This research employs a qualitative descriptive approach within the field of sociology. Data was collected through observations, interviews, document analysis, and literature review. The research subjects were female village heads. Observations were carried out on all village heads in Madura, involving 11 participants (the *klebuns* of Bilaporah, Tagungguh, Karang Asem, Klampis Barat, Tunagara Timur, *Blateran*, Lantek Timur, Morombuh, Pocong, Jaddung, Bancang). Meanwhile, repeated interviews were conducted with four participants (the *klebuns* of Bilaporah, Tagungguh, Pocong, and Bancang). The interviews aimed to gain insights into the experiences, challenges, and efforts of female village heads in confronting patriarchal power structures and political dynasties in Madurese villages. An analysis of official documents,



such as government policies related to women's leadership in Madurese villages, was conducted to support the primary data from the interviews. A literature review was also performed to gain a broader understanding of theories related to women's empowerment and patriarchal power structures.

The collected data from interviews, document analysis, and literature review underwent several stages of transcription, data organization and categorization, as well as data verification. The data were analyzed using Foucault's theory of power and legitimacy. This approach should unravel how patriarchal power structures and political dynasties affect female village heads in Madurese villages. The data analysis involved a thorough interpretative process to uncover meanings and patterns emerging from the collected data. By employing a

qualitative descriptive approach, collecting data through interviews and document analysis/literature review, and analyzing the data using Foucault's theory, this research aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of women's empowerment in Madurese villages and the resistance they employ to confront patriarchal power structures and political dynasties.

Results

Power and Legitimacy

Legitimacy is a crucial aspect in any political system, whether in societies and communities that are democratic or tyrannical, traditional or modern, homogeneous or heterogeneous. Therefore, anyone in power or struggling for power constantly strives to claim legitimacy. There are various ways to claim and maintain legitimacy in

a society. Efriza (2016:173-176) categorizes them into five forms. The first is legitimacy based on beliefs or myths, which refer to the realm of uncertain, irrational, and less critically analyzed beliefs within a society, including political beliefs. Leadership legitimacy is grounded in one's connection with specific myths. The second is ideology-based legitimacy. As an ideology comprises a set of rational and systematic beliefs, legitimacy is claimed by influencing actions. The third is symbolic legitimacy, stemming from moral, emotional, traditional, and cultural beliefs and values. In this case, legitimacy is claimed through ritualistic, sacred, and iconic symbolic representations. The fourth is material-based legitimacy, claimed and maintained by promising prosperity to the community.

The fifth is procedural legitimacy, obtained through procedural systems such as elections and referendums (Malau, 2021).

In terms of female leadership, Shimelis K (2015) distinguishes between descriptive and substantive representation. Descriptive representation focuses on the quantitative presence of women, while substantive representation refers to the elevation of women's genuine interests and the interpretation of their presence in politics beyond gender bias. Female presence in political positions can be analyzed based on these two categories, whether it is descriptive, substantive, or both. Analyzing the constraints women face when participating in politics, Walby (1990:20) highlights that lags, inequality, and injustice experienced by women stem from the patriarchal system that operates in both individual and public spaces.



Individual patriarchy exists within households, while public patriarchy manifests in public spaces such as work and the state.

Practically, Watson (2014:51) explains that patriarchy in politics includes the treatment women experience while participating in politics. Patriarchal practices include underestimating women's representation, perceiving men as having more knowledge and analytical skills, and 'imposing' higher political costs. The widely accepted assumption is that men are the primary breadwinners, while women only need to contribute supplementary income or rely on their husbands' financial support. This makes it nearly impossible for women to meet the financial demands of political campaigns. Aside from that, time also poses constraints for women. Most of their time is spent on household tasks during the day, and they

are expected to be at home by the evening. Meanwhile, political agendas and activities have no time restrictions and cater to men, who are not limited by household responsibilities or time expectations. This creates a constraint for women, as they must align their schedules to actively participate in politics. The fifth and final constraint is political dynasties. While political dynasties facilitate women's participation in politics, they often serve to replace or maintain the power of dynastic fathers, husbands, or sons. Women are treated as assets to their families, as they are perceived as capable of garnering votes and winning political contestations. Ultimately, patriarchal interests continue to dominate.

Patriarchy prevails in society because of the ongoing process of producing and reproducing patriarchal practices. Three institutions play a significant

role in sustaining patriarchy: cultural institutions through their curriculum in schools, religious institutions, and the media. Additionally, the basic institution that shapes patriarchal culture is the family (Millet, 1972:33), which preserves patriarchal ideology in traditional and modern societies alike. As the smallest unit of patriarchy, the family greatly contributes to reinforcing this ideology. Families encourage each member to think and behave according to the rules dictated by patriarchal society. Patriarchal ideology is instilled in family members, particularly in children, as they learn from their parents' behavior how to conduct themselves, develop characters, engage in hobbies, understand statuses, and adhere to other appropriate societal values. The behaviors taught to children are differentiated based on appropriate conduct constructed exclusively for men or women.

Perceptions of female village head in Madurese Patriarchy

The history of women's leadership in Madura is marked by various folk tales, including the legendary stories of Potre Koneng and Rato Ebhu. However, the prominence of women's leadership in Madura was overshadowed by patriarchal culture. Women have to start from scratch to strive for leadership positions, including within the village context. The development of women's leadership in villages re-emerged after the reform era, driven by the growing women's movement for gender justice. In Madura, the increasing political participation in various regions has prompted kinship groups to nominate women as village heads, known as *klebun*. Overall, kinship ties continue to strongly influence social, economic, and political activities, including the selection of candidates,



campaign financing, and support in village head elections. Consequently, a candidate's victory represents a victory for a specific kinship group.

In other words, women's leadership in Madura cannot be separated from the role of kinship. Most *klebun* are born out of dynastic interests. They serve the interests of kinship groups in maintaining dynastic power held by their male relatives. The mechanisms through which women obtain leadership positions include:

a. Village head elections: The mechanism of village head elections is regulated by Law No. 6 of 2014, which stipulates that village heads are elected through direct voting. Most women who become *klebun* are elected through this mechanism.

b. Interim replacements: This mechanism is regulated by the law governing the replacement of village heads whose term has not yet ended. Women who become *klebun* through this system are 'appointed' to replace their deceased husbands or male relatives until the end of the term.

c. Temporary officials: This refers to village heads appointed by the regent during the interim period until a new village head is elected. One female *klebun* in Bangkalan Regency was appointed as a temporary official to replace her husband, whose term had ended.

Despite these three mechanisms, the overall trend indicates that women's leadership positions as *klebun* remain closely tied to their kinship. Society perceives women as



merely symbolic representations rather than substantive figures occupying strategic political positions. This perception emerges because most women who become *klebun* have influential kinship ties in the village. Accordingly, the challenges they face predominantly arise from the prevailing cultural and societal norms, which include:

a. Patriarchal construction of leadership: Leadership is defined by society as the ability to maintain order in the village, which is why men are more easily accepted as leaders due to their perceived physical strength. When female candidates run for an election, the public questions their ability to, among others, catch thieves, mediate conflicts, and assist affected community members.

b. Strict division of labor: There is a philosophical belief that women are responsible for domestic tasks and should remain at home. This poses a challenge as *klebun's* job requires interactions with various stakeholders. Their husbands or male relatives would prohibit them from going out in public, especially among men.

c. Perception of women as mere symbols in their role as village heads.

The perception and societal beliefs regarding leadership in Madura are closely linked to the prevalent and multifaceted security issue. Madura has unique social dynamics and a rich cultural tapestry that influences the concept of leadership, including the concept of '*blater*' (strong figures or local strongmen), which reflects the link between leadership and the ability to establish security.



Social leadership is frequently led by individuals from the *blater* group. These individuals possess not only physical strength but also knowledge of traditional martial arts, mystical powers, and magical abilities, which further enhance their charismatic influence over the community. It is important to note that while *blater* may have some religious knowledge, their focus is primarily on personal development and maintaining their authoritative position within the village.

Meanwhile, at the elite level, religious figures known as “*Kyai*” hold prominent roles, commanding great respect and influence within their communities. They are often seen as spiritual leaders, guiding their followers on matters of faith and morality. The interplay between the spiritual guidance

of the *Kyais* and the social dominance of the *blaters* creates power dynamics that shape the leadership landscape in Madura.

Rozaki (2013) delves into the significance of *blater* in Madura’s social structure, highlighting their role as strong figures who maintain order and protect the community. The respect and fear they command make them essential actors in mediating conflicts, settling disputes, and ensuring the safety and well-being of the villagers. Their charisma and legendary status play a crucial role in preserving social order and enforcing traditional norms within the community. However, as the landscape of Madura evolves with societal changes and the influx of modernity, the role of a *blater* in leadership and governance has started to diminish. The younger generation may be drawn to alternative forms of leadership, influenced by globalization, education,

and exposure to external ideas. This shifting paradigm could potentially impact the traditional authority of the *blaters* and their place in the community's power structure. Nonetheless, Madura's perception of leadership remains rooted in its historical, cultural, and religious context, with the presence of the *blaters* representing a unique facet of its social fabric. Religious figures like the *kyais* play pivotal roles in spiritual guidance, but the *blaters* assume the mantle of social leadership, acting as strong figures responsible for maintaining order and security.

Resistance of Women *Klebuns*

The political power of women *klebuns* can only be maintained by demonstrating leadership credibility to the community. To achieve this, they need to turn themselves into a valuable asset. First, independent female *klebun*

have a high level of education and experience working in the public sphere. Education and experience provide them with the knowledge and bargaining power to negotiate and deal with leadership challenges. Higher education frees women from being mere puppets controlled by their male relatives. Through their education, they acquire skills that support their duties and responsibilities. Second, through their experiences, women *klebuns* build relationships with the village, sub-district, and district bureaucracies, which they can leverage to fulfill their tasks and responsibilities. Third, empowered and independent women *klebuns* possess strong willpower to become independent leaders. They have better political awareness, which motivates them to participate in politics.

Empowered and independent women *klebuns* establish relationships with law



enforcement officials, aiding them in addressing security issues, such as theft, which is a major concern in Madura's society. Additionally, female *klebun* broaden their connections with legal aid institutions as an alternative means of resolving issues, which are often resolved through violence traditionally. By employing these strategies, women *klebuns* can demonstrate better leadership performance compared to men *klebuns*. As a result, they gain recognition from the community and their male relatives. In the midst of patriarchal constructs that surround them, women *klebuns* continue to build their leadership to prove that women can fulfill their duties and responsibilities. The ability of women to carry out their tasks and responsibilities will foster trust in the community. Thus, the work of women *klebuns* becomes an act of resistance against the stereotyping of

women as symbolic figures in village leadership. In practice, women *klebuns* employ the following leadership strategies:

- a. Performing official village head duties defined by Law No. 6 of 2014
- b. Carrying out village head tasks based on knowledge and beliefs held by the community

Women *klebuns* carry out village head duties prescribed by the law through:

- a. Administering village governance: Improving the village governance system poses its own challenges for village heads since many village administrations do not function properly. This is because governance is centralized, relying solely on the village head.
- b. Implementing village development: Some women *klebuns* in Madura have



spearheaded the use of Village Development Funds (ADD) for constructing village facilities such as community centers and health clinics, which were previously nonexistent in their villages.

- c. Conducting village development guidance: This involves addressing and resolving social issues faced by the village community.

Regarding religious and social expectations, women *klebuns* consistently participate in community religious activities, proving that women can lead in religious affairs. Another duty is to assure the community regarding security, which is often questioned in relation to female leadership due to the high crime rates and recurring conflicts. Women *klebuns* address these challenges using various strategies. First, they build safety by reducing

the crime rate. Second, they mediate and resolve conflicts arising in the community. In Madura, social conflicts often escalate into violent clashes. Women *klebuns* seek legal channels to resolve and prevent clashes in, for example, inheritance disputes. Third, they address legal issues faced by community members.

In addition, women *klebuns* solve domestic issues through negotiations. Women's relationships in Madura's society are strictly regulated, especially when men are involved. This poses a challenge for female *klebun*, who must navigate relationships with individuals from diverse races, ethnicities, and genders. Their ability and courage to negotiate with their husbands have changed the conduct of public affairs and engagement for women. Moreover, their ability to independently



determine village policies, separated from their husbands' domination, is progress toward the autonomy of women as village leaders in Madura.

The strategies employed by women *klebuns* and their visible presence in Madura's villages have constructed a new perception of women's leadership. In practice, this has strengthened the position of women in leadership, as evident from the re-election of women *klebuns* with excellent track records and immense support from their communities. This demonstrates that discourse can transform societal behavior based on disseminated knowledge.

Negotiations between Women *Klebuns* and Their Male Relatives

One indicator of women *klebuns* becoming empowered is in the success of negotiations with their husbands or other male relatives. The negotiation process is influenced by gender differences, with men often seeking to assert dominance over women (Hapsari, 2021), ensuring that they hold control over women in the interactions. Since men often assert their dominance to achieve their predetermined goals (Lewicki, Barry, & Saunders, 2007), women's success in negotiations depends on their ability to influence others to act according to their desires (Gangl et al., 2015). These abilities include referent, coercive, informational, expert, and reward power (Raven, 2008). Manipulation is also employed by creating a situation where obedience leads to praise

or other rewards and failure to comply with the husband's orders results in punishments, physical or psychological. This is used as a means of exercising power during negotiations (Raven, 2008).

Madura's culture, characterized by a matrilineal residence pattern, paradoxically enforces patriarchal power dynamics, placing men in more dominant positions over women (Hefni, 2012). This is further strengthened by the concept of "*bhupa'-babhu-ghuru-rato*," a referential standard in Madurese society that enforces hierarchical obedience to central figures. According to this hierarchy, individuals deserving respect and compliance are ranked as follows: father, mother, teacher, and ruler/leader. Placing the father at the top and women in a secondary position reflects men's dominance in Madura. An example of failed negotiations

can be seen in the case of SF, the *klebun* of Pocong Village. In the negotiations with her husband, who was appointed as a civil servant in the Indonesian National Army (TNI), SF declined the proposal to run for *klebun* election. She cited reasons such as her lack of experience and the societal taboo associated with women holding positions of authority in Madura. The negotiation concluded when her husband threatened to resign from his position as a civil servant, which was crucial for their survival. Consequently, SF submitted to her husband and eventually assumed the role of *klebun*.

Similarly, SM, the head of Bilaporah Village, refused to replace her deceased husband, who had been in office for only two years. A meeting was held with community leaders to find a replacement through a process called "*pengisian anggota*



badan permusyawaratan desa” (PAW), which resulted in the appointment of a relative of the former *klebun*. Eventually, SM was compelled to accept the position of *klebun* since her son had not yet reached the required age criteria to take on the role. Once again, the negotiation between a woman candidate and men, as well as the community, ended in favor of the latter. The situation left SM with seemingly no other option but to accept, although she claimed not to fully understand the administrative and financial responsibilities inherent in the role of the village head. Even after assuming the position, both SF and SM lacked the power to negotiate and exercise independent leadership. In fact, SF could only meet others with her husband’s permission, highlighting her lack of bargaining

power in front of her husband. She merely complied with her husband’s decisions and acted according to his desires.

In contrast, the negotiations between MS, the *klebun* of Bancang Village, and her husband resulted in outcomes that accommodated her interests. Acts of rebellion through negotiations were achieved once they were in positions of power as village heads. During her negotiation with her husband, MS utilized her bargaining position, stating that Bancang Village was under her leadership while her husband’s jurisdiction was another village. Her husband accepted this, and he refrained from interfering in the governance of Bancang Village, except when requested for assistance by MS. During the formulation of her work programs, MS faced criticism

for proposing the establishment of community health posts (*polindes*). Nonetheless, she managed to defend her idea.

Similarly, HB, the *klebun* of Tagungguh Village, who was originally a midwife, faced strong rejection of her proposal to establish integrated health services posts (*posyandu*) from her husband and other male village officials. Nevertheless, after a tough debate, HB emerged victorious with her proposal. This success in negotiations led to their empowerment as a *klebun*. Moreover, MS's courageous actions became an inspiration for many other *klebuns*, including her husband, who emulated some of her programs.

These examples illustrate the gendered nature of negotiations in the empowerment journey of women *klebuns* in Madura. Successful negotiations empower them, enabling them to exercise leadership with

independence and authority. On the other hand, failed negotiations make them surrender their arguments and conform to traditional gender roles. The ability to navigate and transform negotiations plays a crucial role in determining the level of self-empowerment. By being assertive in negotiations, women *klebuns* can redefine the traditional power dynamics in Madura and challenge the patriarchal norms that have long constrained women's agency and leadership roles. The transformation of gendered negotiations among women *klebuns* demonstrates their capacity to shift societal paradigms, shaping a more equitable and inclusive future for Madura's communities.



Empowered Women *Klebuns* and their Impact on the Society

Aware of the difficulties faced by women in their pursuit of village leadership positions in the patriarchal landscape of Madura, women *klebuns* exhibit unwavering determination and employ a multifaceted approach to build a female-friendly environment within their communities. Foremost, they recognize that effective leadership thrives on collaborative partnerships with like-minded individuals who share a common vision, mission, and approach. To build solidarity and teamwork, women *klebuns* establish and nurture alliances in women's communities, which benefit the recruitment of female government employees.

However, navigating the patriarchal culture means challenging the notion that

men are innately predisposed to leadership and the belief that physical strength defines one's suitability for governance. Matters pertaining to the community's welfare have also been assumed as men's jobs, including security maintenance, conflict resolution, and involvement in cases with law enforcement. Nonetheless, women *klebuns* challenge this perception, advocating the idea that women possess the capability and resilience to undertake governmental responsibilities with equal efficacy.

Amidst their persistent efforts to shatter gender-based stereotypes, the presence of female village officials emerges as a powerful force that alters societal perceptions of women's competence within the domain of governance. Their performance in handling governmental tasks within the community becomes



a source of inspiration, eroding the prevailing biases that once confined women to domestic affairs. As a result, their visibility in public spheres transforms societal norms, paving the way for a more inclusive and gender-equal future. They not only transform their own lives but also become trailblazers, creating opportunities for other women to participate actively in leadership roles. This transformation goes beyond individual achievements; it is a societal endeavor that fosters an environment of inclusivity, diversity, and equal representation in the governance and decision-making processes of Madura's villages.

Secondly, female *klebun* establish networks with governmental institutions. Raising awareness about the functions of leadership is a priority for female *klebun*. This is done with the long-term goal of shaping the community's

definition of an ideal leader's role and function. Efforts to redefine the meaning of village leadership beyond physical power involve various approaches. The *klebun* of Tagungguh, for instance, explains that during the initial period of his village head tenure, conflicts between residents due to land inheritance issues, resulting in *carok* (violent fight or killing) incidents, were frequent. Within the community, *carok* incidents were traditionally addressed by village heads, who were considered skilled fighters.

Carok refers to the act of killing in Madura's society, performed to protect one's honor from perceived insults. The main causes of *carok* are acts of disrespect towards others' wives or disputes over land and natural resources. *Carok* is executed using only a machete. The requirements for engaging in *carok* include *kadigdajan* (bravery), *tampeng sereng*



(a specific stance), and *banda* (supernatural protection). In case of such incidents, women *klebuns* adopt a legal-based approach to conflict resolution. They collaborate with the judiciary and police to engage the community regarding land-related issues.

Over time, this model of conflict resolution has demonstrated its efficacy in transforming the approach to handling conflicts in Madura. By gradually shifting away from violence towards the legal realm, the association of leadership with physical power is challenged and redefined. The transformational impact of these efforts is profound, as it underscores the centrality of knowledge, administrative capabilities, and diplomacy in leadership. Through these strategies, women *klebuns* endeavor to establish a female-friendly environment that challenges patriarchal norms

and fosters an environment of inclusivity and empowerment for women. By bridging the gender gap and advocating for equitable representation, they set an inspiring precedent, not only within the context of Madura but also in the broader landscape of gender politics. The ripple effects of their endeavors extend far beyond their individual villages. As they continue to break barriers and pave the way for a more egalitarian society, they change Madura's social and political fabric permanently.

***Klebun's* Reconstructed Societal Perspective**

Competent women holding positions as *klebun* not only transform discourses within society related to women's leadership but also reshape other discourses rooted in Madura's traditions. Many of these traditions, such as the infamous



“carol,” can be harmful not only for women in terms of their rights and other aspects but also for society at large.

Traditions are not easily eradicated, so women *klebun* become extraordinary when they can alter the discourses related to these traditions. Another example of discourse embedded in tradition is the assumption of domestic tasks for women, implying that women should not participate in public affairs. In Madura’s context, this patriarchal view is a source of conflicts, particularly issues related to self-worth, which are often associated with women.

Before marriage, women in Madura are seen as the property of their fathers, and after marriage, they are considered the property of their husbands. In this perspective, women are perceived as belongings with no ownership over themselves. Married women are not allowed

to meet or communicate with other men, perpetuating the notion that women must remain confined to their domestic roles and only interact with their husbands, who are defined as the ‘owners’ of their lives. However, every human being inherently has their own agency, with the right to make decisions and choices and engage in activities freely.

As long as women are defined as property, they are denied the opportunity to choose their own path in life. Before marriage, their fathers determine when they will marry, what level of education they can attain, and even who they will marry. After marriage, their husbands dictate every aspect of their lives. Women *klebun* challenge these traditions. Through their communication and interactions, it becomes acceptable for women to deal



with men when necessary. It is no longer considered unusual for women to meet with men and appear in public spaces.

Showing the importance of coordination between women and men benchmarks a new discourse. Society gains a new understanding of the significance of such coordination and that women need interactions with men for their survival, including everyday matters like shopping or paying bills. This new discourse is built upon the empowerment of women *klebun* and challenges the idea that women are considered property. The new discourse normalizes women meeting and communicating with men so they can appear in public spaces and even participate in elections and become a *klebun*.

The competence of women *klebun* in their positions has also reshaped discourses of “*carok*”. MS, a female *klebun* from Bancang village, during an

interview on February 25, 2021, shared an incident involving a friend who visited her village and inquired, “*Oleh o wedok melu carokan?*” (Is it permissible for women to participate in *carok*?). She confidently replied, “*Ora lah, kuwi kan primitif*” (Of course not, that is primitive).

MS’s response clearly illustrates her efforts to challenge the discourse that “*carok*” is primitive. She further clarified when her friend asked if “*carok*” was no longer practiced in Bancang village. She asserted, “*Nang kene wes raono carok to?*” (Is *carok* no longer practiced here?). She answered, “*Kui primitif ora ono carokan nek ora penting penting*” (That’s primitive, there is no *carok* unless it’s a matter of utmost importance). In brief, women *klebun* eroded the discourse of “*carok*” as a method for conflict resolution by



introducing a peaceful resolution, which involves compromise, negotiation, and other non-violent approaches.

From the examples above, it can be said that empowered by their education, experience, and political awareness, female *klebun* navigate the challenges that come with their leadership roles with courage and determination. Through their experiences, they build strong relationships with the village, sub-district, and district bureaucracies, leveraging these connections to fulfill their tasks and responsibilities. Their ability to negotiate with diverse stakeholders, including law enforcement officials and legal aid institutions, helps address security issues and conflicts in a non-violent manner. By employing these strategies, female *klebun*

demonstrate better leadership performance compared to male *klebun*, earning recognition and support from their communities.

Within Madura's patriarchal constructs, female *klebun's* ability to address both domestic and public challenges is an act of resistance. By performing official village head duties and adhering to legal requirements, female *klebun* strengthen their leadership in their villages. They address social issues faced by the community, contribute to village development, and ensure proper administration of village governance. In matters of religion and community security, female *klebun* actively participate in religious activities and employ various security strategies to create a safe and harmonious environment.



Conclusion

The historical patterns of village leadership in Bangkalan were traditionally entrenched in patriarchal norms, with male leaders predominantly occupying positions of authority based on kinship ties. However, post-reform, changes in leadership selection emerged, including discourse around women's participation in village leadership. The presence of women in Bangkalan's village leadership can be attributed to elite interests, and female village heads typically had kinship ties to previous elites holding the position. While regulations allowed for merit-based candidacy, in practice, familial and economic factors remained dominant determinants in leadership selection and victory. Mechanisms for female leaders' appointments included

temporary appointments as an interim *klebun* or direct elections, with the latter being the most common route.

The discourse surrounding women's leadership in the context of village leadership in Bangkalan has transformed drastically. Women's perceptions of leadership in this setting are generally characterized by two dimensions. First, the role of the village head extends the influence of male relatives, ensuring that leadership remains within the family circle. Second, leadership is seen as a chance to prove women's capabilities in leadership to a community that remains doubtful of their capacity to lead.

The dominance of kinship ties influences women in village leadership. While some women accept and work within this system, others actively resist by implementing their own leadership strategies.

The variance in their leadership approaches is significantly shaped by factors such as education and social relationships. The categories of women's leadership that emerge within the context of Bangkalan are as follows.

a. Puppet-like Leaders: This group comprises women who, due to various constraints, choose not to resist the hegemony. They often lack the confidence, experience, education, and support necessary to perform their duties as village chiefs independently. Instead, they delegate their responsibilities to family members or trusted village officials, primarily handling administrative functions. This practice is culturally accepted and viewed as a local wisdom in Bangkalan.

b. Empowered Leaders: This category includes women who actively counter the prevailing discourse and power structures. They employ strategies such as building relationships with the community, government institutions, and other village stakeholders; demonstrating a commitment to independent leadership by actively participating in their duties; negotiating with their husbands for the freedom to engage with stakeholders; adhering to professional work practices; and engaging in open communication with the community to gather input and maintain their positions.

The presence of women as village leaders in Bangkalan has shifted the discourse within the local community, challenging the traditional belief that leadership is exclusively masculine. Women



klebun successfully gained the trust and confidence of the community, resulting in the re-election of several women *klebun* in subsequent periods.





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Challenges on Party Institutionalization: The Broken Linkage of Three Faces of Party in the National Democrats on Promoting Renewable Energy Bill

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Abstract

This article explores institutionalization challenges in the National Democrats (NasDem) Party in promoting the Renewable Energy Bill, viewed from the party's three faces. NasDem is strategically involved in policy decision-making in the Indonesian parliament, but the three faces of the party are yet to be seen. Despite being established over a decade ago, the direction of institutionalization is still transforming, especially in the linkage between public office and the party at the grassroots. The research question is: How do the three faces of the party in NasDem impact the challenges of institutionalization? Drawing from the Renewable Energy Bill case studies, we argue that three challenges exist. First, a personalistic party's strong influence leads to failure in two-way communications, especially at the grassroots. Second, the vision of the renewable energy law was not implemented at the grassroots because the party had to focus on regional policies. Third, although the renewable energy vision has not been fully implemented, the idea of 'green politics' has been realized by the party wing at the grassroots through the political education program.

Keywords: *NasDem, three faces of the party, party institutionalization, broken linkage, renewable energy bill*

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Introduction

The trend of political parties adopting green politics has been rising following pressures from various international agreements such as the Paris Agreement and the agendas promoted by Indonesia's Presidency in the G-20. This includes the development of the Draft Law on New and Renewable Energy (RUU EBET), which was on the agenda for a plenary session in March 2021. The planning of the RUU EBET has been in intense discussion, but the concept of renewable energy within this draft law is not new. Some academics criticize that the RUU EBET allows broader space and accessibility for oligarchs and businesspeople to use this not-new energy source (CNN Indonesia, 2023) because specific provisions allow for liquid coal, which contradicts the idea of renewable energy

(zero carbon). New energy, such as nuclear and liquid coal, must uphold the essence of renewable energy.

Political parties play a central role in determining policies, including the 'green' ones. This article analyzes the role of the National Democratic Party (NasDem) concerning its involvement in the formulation of the Draft Law on New and Renewable Energy Policy (RUU EBET). NasDem Party is selected based on several points. First, research involving the NasDem Party still needs to be explored, especially the dynamics of party organization in national policy-making. Second, we aim to explore how restoration and change-making ideology underpin the party and influence the dynamics of party institutionalization. Third, the strategic position of the NasDem Party in the VII Commission of the Indonesian Parliament (DPR-



RI) is assumed to have an impact on the promotion of policies, particularly in the areas of energy, research and technology, and the environment. The strategic party positions allow the placement of party cadres as the commission's chairperson.

Discussions on political parties and public policies associated with socio-technical transitions, such as new and renewable energy, are limited (Schmid, 2021), especially on issues surrounding new and renewable energy, which have gained prominence over the past decade, especially in third-world countries. The limited discussion is probably due to problematic characteristics inherent in the functioning of political parties in Indonesia, such as factionalization at the central and grassroots levels due to clientelism and patronage (Fionna & Tomsa, 2020). The status of party leaders

as veto players in decision-making processes allows this clientelism to proliferate at the grassroots level (Budi, 2013; see Tomsa, 2013, as cited in Savirani & Budi, 2023).

Using the institutional approach with Katz and Mair's (1993) on the three faces of political parties, this article examines why the dynamics of national public policies, such as the agenda for new and renewable energy, do not resonate at the grassroots level of political parties. What are the obstacles and challenges in distributing these policies among the three faces of the party? Grounded in the theory of the institutionalization of political parties developed by Randall and Svasand (2002), this article employs four criteria divided into two parts: structurally related to systemness and autonomy and attitudinally related to value infusion and reification.



In addressing the questions above, this article adopts a qualitative case study approach, with primary and secondary data. Primary data is obtained through in-depth interviews with key stakeholders at the grassroots level. In addition to primary data, secondary data was gathered, such as the opinions of the NasDem Party faction in the Indonesian Parliament (DPR-RI) Commission VII regarding the Draft Law on New and Renewable Energy, the party's constitution (AD/ART), media reports related to keywords such as NasDem Party and RUU EBET, the views of party figures on the RUU EBET, and the party's implementation of the RUU EBET at various levels.

A Brief Context on the Draft Law of New and Renewable Energy Bill

The proposal regarding the Draft Law on New and Renewable Energy (EBET) fundamentally

represents an effort of transformation and addition to the Energy Law enacted in 2007. Furthermore, the EBET Bill was introduced as the Indonesian government's commitment to addressing climate change resulting from fossil energy use and achieving net-zero emission targets. It recognizes that cleaner and more affordable energy is the answer to the global challenges of demoting fossil fuel-based energy sources. This is because fossil energy also has potential asset abandonment losses (Kontan.co.id, 2023). However, due to a lack of political will regarding new renewable energy, Indonesia has yet to follow this global energy transition trend (Siagian et al., 2022). Therefore, material and legislative support for new and renewable energy is needed to accelerate the



action. The proposal for the EBET Bill is considered crucial and prioritized as a significant step for Indonesia's energy transition.

To understand why the EBET Bill is essential to discuss and enact as a policy, recognizing the proposed policy direction in the bill is necessary. Through Presidential Regulation Number 112 of 2022, the government seeks to increase investment and accelerate the achievement of renewable energy targets. This regulation outlines the preparation of the electricity supply business plan (RUPTL), the roadmap for accelerating the end of the Steam Power Plants (PLTU) operational period, and the implementation of electricity purchases. This regulation forms the basis for a more in-depth exploration of issues, including the discussion of EBET sources, the use of nuclear energy, and the roadmap for energy transition. The explanation is outlined in

the 12 government focus points for regulating the EBET Bill (Humas EBTKE, 2022). In this policy direction, the government considers legal regulations as one of the juridical foundations, including Law Number 30 of 2009 concerning electricity and nuclear energy regulated in Law Number 10 of 1997 and Law Number 10 of 2020.

However, the EBET is far from perfect to address the challenges, including the unclear conceptual definition of new energy and renewable energy. Technically, the term 'new energy sources' remains vague, especially in Law No. 30 of 2007 concerning Energy. Similarly, some literature on energy sources states that energy is only grouped into renewable and non-renewable forms (Bertram & Clover, 2010; Zohuri & McDaniel, 2021; Rosen & Farsi, 2022). This idea contradicts the term 'new energy' in the EBET Bill. In the renewable



energy dimension, technological innovation is still needed to meet the energy demand, with outputs such as solar energy, wind energy, air energy, bioenergy, and geothermal energy (Kamran & Fazal, 2021). Thus, the terms new and renewable energy should ideally not be merged.

Institutionalism Theory and Three Faces of Party as an Analytics Framework

This research employs two frameworks. Firstly, we utilize the theory of institutionalization proposed by Randall and Svasand (2002). This theory is particularly relevant as it considers the context of a post-reform state transitioning into a new democracy as the scope of study. The initial theory of party institutionalization developed by Samuel Huntington (1968) or Kenneth Janda (1980) is essentially a combination

of values and stability. This perspective overlooks the role of party institutionalization as a feature for organizing the party's internal dynamics (Randall & Svasand, 2002:11-12). Meanwhile, Panebianco's (1988) model represents an evolution in the development of institutionalism theory by introducing two crucial dimensions: autonomy and systemness (see Kumbaracibasi, 2018:8).

According to Panebianco (1988), the concept of autonomy refers to the relationship between the party and its external environment. In Kumbaracibasi's (2018) interpretation, autonomy is when a party is dominated by veto actors and is able to move relatively freely. Meanwhile, systemness is related to internal relations and the party's organization, evaluated based on the party's ability to maintain its members' communication



at the grassroots level and the elites' communications in the central office or public office. The stronger the relationship among actors within the party in its political regions, the higher the effectiveness of intra-party democracy and the functionality of the party as a political institution (Borz & Janda, 2018; Kumbaracibasi, 2018).

Based on the criticisms and adjustments to the theories proposed by Huntington (1968) and Panebianco (1988), Randall and Svasand refined the four concepts, dividing them into two degrees of relationships and two typologies. As seen in Table 1, the structural typology is examined through the points of systemness and autonomy used by Panebianco (1988). Randall and Svasand then add the attitudinal typology, where value infusion and reification are introduced as complementary dimensions of institutionalization. The value

infusion refers to the party's value system or culture formulated within the party. This depends on the actions of party actors and supporters in identifying and committing to the incentives provided by the party. Meanwhile, reification refers to the party's presence in building public imagination (see Randall & Lars, 2002 in Kumbaracibasi, 2018). Using this institutionalization theory, we aim to apply the two typologies and four concepts in three domains: the degree of centrality, party communication patterns, and the implementation of values and ideologies in responding to public policies.

The second framework is the concept of party organization proposed by Katz and Mair (1993), who argued that the dichotomy attributed to political parties between parliament and extra-parliament or leaders and followers (representative and constituent) cannot be detached



Tabel 1. Dimensions of Institutionalization

	Internal	External
Structural	Systemness	Autonomy
Attitudinal	Value Infusion	Reification

Adapted from Randall and Svasand, 2002:13

from the faces and elements that drive the subsystem of a party. The term ‘faces of the party’ is used by Katz and Mair to examine how a party operates at various levels, consisting of three categories: the party in public office, i.e., elected members in legislative and executive branches; the party in the central office, i.e., the daily executives of the party, such as the chairman and department heads; and the party on the ground, i.e., party members and activists.

To elaborate, the party in public office includes elected party members who have successfully secured seats in the legislative body through general elections. Elected party members enjoy various benefits,

including material aspects of power and status (Katz & Mair, 1993). Additionally, elected party members can benefit from networking among parties, both within the commission where they are located and within the legislative network as a whole. With these advantages, a party cadre elected as a council member must have accountability and an agenda to build a government with a clear vision and mission.

The second category is the party at the central office. This typically refers to the NasDem Party’s Central Leadership Council (DPP) in the Indonesian context. The presence of the DPP in the party is crucial because it has a central function,



controls all issues, and can make essential decisions to direct the levels below it (Katz & Mair, 1993). Furthermore, the DPP motivates party cadres at all levels, providing input on public policy strategies and mediating between party networks.

Lastly, the third face is the party on the ground. Typically, parties at this level operate under the Regional Leadership Council (DPW) or Local Executive Board (DPC), both of which aim to mobilize cadres in specific areas. Relationships at this level are usually closer, as power relations operate vertically and horizontally. Such relationships can occur between DPW executives and party wings or local community organizations. The party on the ground can also assist in implementing party agendas. Thus, this party face can be seen as an extension of the NasDem Party's DPP. In this context, although functioning

as implementers, DPW or DPC plays a crucial role in identifying the roles of stakeholders in its region to promote the expansion function from electoral political victories.

This study uses the framework developed by Katz and Mair (1993) to dissect how parties interact and compromise on various agendas brought by each face of the party. Katz and Mair's framework does not limit the existence of other forms of party organization, especially in analyzing parties in the global south (see Roewer, 2020). It should be noted that Katz and Mair's concept implementation in this theory refers to parties in Europe. This article analyzes the differences between the three faces of party organizations to indicate the distinctive features of party organization functions, which are still ambiguous.



Ideology and Dynamics of the NasDem Party

To comprehend how a political party executes its agenda and formulates policy decisions within the government, it is imperative to consider the party's ideology and organizational dynamics (Harmel & Janda, 1994; Pedersen, 2011). The National Democrat (NasDem) Party has undergone a long process to become a political entity in Indonesia. It emerged during political regulation changes in 2011 and faced challenges, especially after the revision of the Political Party Law by the People's Consultative Assembly (DPR). The party successfully overcame these challenges and became the only new party to surpass the parliamentary threshold in the 2014 elections. NasDem brings a unique perspective to politics. Article 4 of NasDem's constitution in Section III, which discusses Principles and Characteristics,

highlights NasDem's distinctive identity as a Movement for the Restoration of Indonesia. This article describes NasDem's orientation as a change agent aiming to bring Indonesia to its 'restorative' values.

NasDem's political manifesto establishes its existence on the philosophical basis of national politics and the people's sovereignty, reaffirming its role as a pioneer of 'the Restoration of Indonesia.' This philosophy serves as a central pillar guiding all the party's steps and decisions. Aiming to restore the political values of democracy, the party mobilizes resources to promote democracy's quality and systemic changes in Indonesia's political processes. It strives to distance itself from identity-based political practices that often trigger conflicts by advocating idea-based politics. Although the party focuses its attention and activities in Jakarta,



the movement advocates change across Indonesia. The concentration of activities across Indonesia illustrates NasDem's commitment to advocating for national interests and the diversity and complexity of local realities. In this context, NasDem can be seen as a dynamic force centred on political power in Jakarta and embracing various regions' diversity and cultural richness.

NasDem introduced the concept of Unconditional Coalition in the presidential elections of 2014 and 2019, aiming to unite political forces. Moreover, NasDem also introduced the concept of Politics Without Fees in local elections, which can be considered a breakthrough in the Indonesian political landscape. This approach demonstrates NasDem's desire to eliminate economic barriers to political participation.

NasDem is not just a political party aiming to seize power but an agent of change. This translates into an achievement as the only new party to successfully surpass the parliamentary threshold in the 2014 elections. The achievement also indicates that the concept of Indonesian Restoration has a strong appeal in society. By combining a philosophical foundation, commitment to idea-based politics, and innovative measures such as Unconditional Coalition and Politics Without Fees, NasDem realizes its vision and mission of Indonesian Restoration. The policy-making by NasDem, both at the party and legislative levels, reflects how the party's ideology and direction. At this stage, party dynamics, such as the role of internal factions, political coalitions, and interactions with voters, contribute to shaping and influencing the policies.

NasDem bases its existence on the values of Pancasila, as reflected in the party's manifesto and Constitution/Bylaws (AD/ART). It prioritizes nationalism, referring to the spirit of unity among Indonesia's diverse ethnic and cultural groups. The democracy implemented by NasDem stems from the spirit of deliberation and consensus as a fundamental principle for resolving conflicts and discouraging aggressive actions. The party also acknowledges that Indonesian democracy grows from cultural values, especially the principle of '*gotong royong*' or collaboration among all elements of society. This principle is the foundation for the party to formulate political policies prioritizing national interests and the common good over individual and group interests.

The three main goals are political sovereignty, economic independence, and cultural

dignity. This understanding emphasizes that political and economic democracy serves as a means to achieve the welfare of the people and social justice. Restoration as the primary foundation is interpreted as a step to advance Indonesia as a key player on the global stage.

The Three Faces of NasDem Party

Party in Public Office

The primary key to success for political parties in public office lies in electoral victories, indicated by the success of party cadre members in securing the votes of constituents according to their respective electoral districts. Therefore, the representative aspect consists of varying ideas tailored to the represented regions' conditions. Table 1 shows the party's faction in Commission VII, which consists of five members,



including one serving as the commission's chair and four others as members. Sugeng Suparwoto, as the commissioner, has a central position with broader access to issues.

Second, the faction supports the development of nuclear energy as a new energy source but underscores its use for purposes like industry, medical applications, food production,

Table 1. Commission VII DPR-RI NasDem Faction Members

Commission VII DPR-RI NasDem Faction		
Member Name	Electoral Region	Position
Sugeng Suparwoto	Central Java VIII	Commission Chair
Arkanata Akram	North Kalimantan	Member
Rico Sia	West Papua	Member
Rian Firmansyah	West Java II	Member
Ina Elisabeth Kobak	Papua	Member

Source: dpr.go.id

The analysis of the faction's stance on the Draft Law on New and Renewable Energy (RUU EBET) results in eight key points. First, the faction asserts the need to develop EBET utilities, such as hydro, geothermal, wind, solar, marine, and biomass resources. Moreover, the dependence on fossil energy is deemed environmentally detrimental.

and others. Third, the faction is committed to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 29% by 2030, a commitment based on COP 21 or the Paris Agreement subsequently ratified through Law Number 16 of 2016.

Fourth, the faction emphasizes the importance of providing new and renewable energy at both



the central and local government levels to be managed sustainably. Fifth, the faction underscores the significance of drafting the RUU EBET because this agenda must have legal certainty in filling gaps or providing legal references to the regulations below it. Sixth, the faction highlights the necessity of setting prices for new and renewable energy based on economic value, considering the return rates beneficial for businesses. Seventh, the NasDem faction emphasizes the need for incentives for businesses involved in new and renewable energy and those in the electricity sector using non-renewable energy that meets renewable energy portfolio standards; Eighth, the faction encourages banking institutions, through specific schemes, to finance new and renewable

energy projects and promote coal downstreaming as a primary and environmentally friendly energy source.

From the above eight points, two overarching ideas emerge. Practically, based on the party's foundation and advocacy for related legal products, the party addresses the need for new and renewable energy, reflecting an awareness of narratives about dependence and the need for renewable energy. Economically, the party underscores the importance of economic factors in this RUU EBET. Points 5-8 touch on the role of the economic market considered most capable of driving the successful RUU EBET implementation. It differs from the perspective of the PKS Faction, for example, which highlights the setting of prices to be paid by the public rather than the market or producers. Additionally, points such as the discretion proposed by the PKS




Faction are more comprehensive than what NasDem offers regarding collaboration for sustainable energy.

Party in Central Office

The primary resources of a political party's central office include centralization, expertise, and formal positions at the top of the party organization. The NasDem Party's Articles of

Association (AD/ART) (Chapter XVIII Party Order Article 27) stipulate that the highest-ranking rules of the party are the Articles of Association (AD), followed by the Articles of Household (ART), then the Party Regulations (PP), Decisions of the Central Leadership Council, Instructions of the Central Leadership Council, Decisions of the Regional Leadership Council, and Decisions of the District

Figure 1. Structure NasDem Party's Central Leadership Council (DPP)



Source: Nasdem Party Regulation Number 1 of 2020

Leadership Council. The party regulations below must comply with or not contradict the AD/ART. It implies that all party policies must stay within the vision and mission because these are the core of the AD/ART.

The NasDem's DPP coordinates instructions and the flow of information the Chairman conveys. This information is directed downwards, following the hierarchical structure of the party from the Regional Leadership Council (DPW) to the branch level. Thus, the party's DPP plays a key role in mobilizing activists and determining the issues to be addressed in policies and the stance to be taken. It aligns with the principle of internal party democracy, as adjusted by the NasDem AD/ART in Article 26 on Decision-Making, stating that decision-making is carried out through deliberation for consensus.

This concept demonstrates the importance of the DPP and deliberation as the center of the party's formation. Shared understanding and consensus in decision-making are highly valued principles in the party's structure. This idea makes deliberation one of the main elements in shaping party policies and solidifying the party's stance on various issues. The primary resources of the party's central office are its central position, the expertise of DPP members, and its formal position at the top of the party hierarchy (Katz & Mair, 1993).

All these elements play a crucial role in facilitating practical deliberation and decision-making. The presence of party leaders at various levels also strengthens the party's capacity to reach agreements and coordinate various initiatives. With these resources, the political



party's central office guides, manages, and coordinates the party's efforts to achieve its political goals.

The Draft Law on New and Renewable Energy (RUU EBET) did not become a topic of discussion in internal party deliberations due to the absence of instructions from the NasDem's DPP. The only promotion of the RUU EBET was carried out personally by DPP officials through media reports on the party's website. However, it should be noted that the issue of the RUU EBET cannot be resolved solely within the elite circles. It should involve all faces and wings, including grassroots-level community organizations, which articulate and accommodate the needs for policy sustainability. To some extent, political parties function as intermediary actors connecting the government and the public.

Likewise, the RUU EBET did not become part of the agenda-setting discussions at the Regional Leadership Council (DPW) level, making national issues seem not based on the needs of the people. The focus of deliberations outlined in the AD/ART provides an overview of the system built by the NasDem Party, specifically in decision-making, but strategic party policies are still determined by DPP, from the upcoming election victories to publicity. NasDem's extensive coverage of the RUU EBET in the media has drawn attention. However, to what extent the articulation of the Regional Leadership Council (DPW) in terms of energy issues has been successful remains to be seen.



Party on the Ground/Party on the Grassroots

Party on the ground or party on the grassroots refers to the faction of a political party comprising activists, members, and those directly involved with the community. This segment's task is to provide education or cadre training at the grassroots level. In this context, the NasDem Party has conducted several activities. For example, the education and training in Bekasi involved stakeholders from SMEs, the community, and party activists, as well as NasDem as cadre members, sympathizers, or as NasDem's legislative candidates. The NasDem Party has a system for soliciting aspirations at the community level, with a total of 32 DPWs in Indonesia. The grassroots movement, aimed at formulating policies and cadre development at the community level, communicates and disseminates

information adapted to the local context. NasDem extensively conducts cadre schooling in the recruitment process of cadres at the DPW level.

Figure 1 shows that DPW ideally assumes the responsibility of developing communication by adjusting to the local context and approaching the community according to its characteristics and needs. As such, they can build a strong relationship between the party and the community. This function allows the party to garner broader support and establish better connections with their voter base at the local level. Moreover, in collaboration with DPCs, DPWs also control the executive and legislative work to conduct evaluations and ensure checks and balances. The monitoring carried out by DPWs and DPCs ultimately directly influences public policy processes in terms of evaluation, advocacy, and promotion.



Political parties at the local level also serves as political recruitment. As such, the discussion and aspirations related to the RUU EBET have not touched upon local needs and interests. The consolidations presented in Figure 2 show that the consolidation only discusses cadre training and 'sowing new seeds' for legislative candidates. Some issues are not highlighted locally as the focus is on strengthening mass support in votes and political recruitment. NasDem reports that provide

clarity and rationality regarding public or political policies within the central discourse only captured by public officials at the central level, not becoming the consumption and agenda-setting at the local level.

The NasDem's DPW is the closest policy articulation to the community, as stipulated in the party's organizational AD/ART, regarding the task of command instructions aimed at implementing all policies of the DPP and Party Regulations. The

Figure 1. Nasdem Worksheet

Misi	Masalah	Aksi		
		DPP	DPW/DPD	DPC/DPRt
Sistem politik yang demokratis dan berkeadilan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Oligarki - Politik Uang - KKN - <i>Distrust</i> Publik terhadap Partai 	Mendesain, mengawasi, mengatur pendanaan, dan mengkampanyekan Gerakan Akar Rumput. Bekerja sama dengan <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pengusaha pro demokrasi - Kampus - TV - NGO - Youtuber 	Memfasilitasi Gerakan Akar Rumput <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Menyelenggarakan Sekolah Kader Calon Legislatif - Membuat mimbar kampanye anti-politik uang - Membuat sikap dan pandangan partai terkait hasil evaluasi kerja eksekutif dan legislatif. 	Gerakan Akar Rumput <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mengusung kader potensial dan idealis sebagai DPR. - Menolak politik uang. - Mengontrol kerja eksekutif dan legislatif.

Source: Website Official Nasdem



Figure 2. Party Consolidation



Source: Official Instagram account DPW NasDem

focus is guiding party policy to the leaders of Regional People's Representative Councils (DPRD), faction leaders, and members of the DPRD according to their levels. These tasks clearly show that DPWs are responsible for articulating information from the center to the regional level.

The RUU EBET is one of the Indonesian Parliament's policies and is held by the Chairman

of Commission VII, a member of the NasDem Party, Sugeng Suparwoto. Therefore, the prioritization in articulating this policy must reach the party at the regional level to articulate the aspirations of the people in the region. This is because a political party must be able to set common goals with the community so the policies can contribute to political stability and accommodate the community's aspirations.



NasDem as Presidentialized and Personalistic Party: Challenges on Institutionalization

Another case study is the enactment of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation, which holds implications for the national social-political landscape. Despite the law's controversial nature, NasDem's support for this policy inadvertently indicated the party's support for presidential initiatives, unquestioning the government's decisions. This portrayal reflects the concept of presidentialized parties, where parties in a government coalition become vehicles for the president to implement policies outlined in the work plan (Scarrow et al., 2022). The approval of government-proposed policies means that the party rarely expresses dissenting opinions or contradictions.

In the case of the Electronic Information and Transactions Law (UU ITE), the party also showed its support. Its only concern was about articles being considered ambiguous or potentially prone to misuse, prompting the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia (POLRI) to review them. Ahmad M. Ali, the Chairman of the NasDem Party Faction in the Indonesian Parliament, conveyed this view in an interview, stating, "NasDem, as a party supporting the president, certainly supports government policies. The ITE Law has sparked controversy because some people feel criminalized using certain articles in it," (Girsang, 2021). This illustrates the party's consistent stance in supporting government policies while being aware of controversies or debates surrounding the law's implementation after its enactment.



The same situation also occurs in the New and Renewable Energy Bill (RUU EBET). The party offers full support without providing specific notes, even though it is aware of certain shortcomings. This is particularly relevant to the paradigm of new and renewable energy forms and the technology and economic systems surrounding the distribution processes of new and renewable energy. In this context, it correlates with the power-wheeling system, which was ultimately removed from the initial draft of the legislation.

Furthermore, the party's disposition toward the legislative landscape can also shape political discourse. While advocating the idea of restoration, NasDem's alignment with government policies highlights the nuanced dynamics between the party's commitment to systemic change and its support for existing legislative frameworks.

This gave rise to critical readings of NasDem's position in the broader political spectrum. Its position as a presidentialized party could shift at any time towards personalistic parties, which is inseparable from the shaping of the party's Articles of Association (AD/ART) as the reference for party organization.

The party's characteristics aligned with personalistic parties, as defined by Rahat and Kenig (2018). In this context, personalization refers to the increased centrality of individual politicians in the political landscape, while collective groups such as political parties decline in significance. This phenomenon is particularly evident in the organizational structure outlined in NasDem's Articles of Association (AD/ART). The concentration of organizational authority at the central level, especially with the Chairperson, reinforces NasDem's



personalistic nature. According to Article 7, Paragraph 5, Section II, in Chapter IV on Organizational Structure, the Central Leadership Council of the NasDem Party is empowered to enhance the party apparatus by establishing and appointing members of the Council of Consultation and the Council of Experts. The NasDem Chairman has the prerogative to determine the number and composition of the management, further consolidating that the decision-making rests solely on the party leader.

This organizational framework strengthens NasDem's personalistic nature. Critical decisions, such as the formation of councils and the appointment of members, rest in the hands of the Chairperson. The division of authority in the party structure indicates a centralized approach, where individual leaders play a crucial role in shaping the direction and composition of

the party. This aligns with the scientific understanding of personalistic parties, where the fame of individual figures surpasses the collective role of the party in decision-making processes (Calise, 2015). NasDem's organizational structure, as outlined in its Articles of Association (AD/ART), depicts characteristics associated with personalistic parties. The concentration of authority in the hands of the Chairperson emphasizes the significant role of individual leaders in shaping the party's trajectory. Such a phenomenon aligns with the broader trend of political personalization observed in the contemporary political landscape.

The structure of such a 'personal party' may evolve to be centered around the vision and preferences of the leader, potentially overshadowing the party's collective identity and

decision-making process. One form of personalization observed in the NasDem Party is the determination of the presidential candidate to run in the 2024 presidential election. Surya Paloh, as the party chairman, has the veto power to select, consider, and declare support for the chosen political actor to be endorsed by the party (Detik.com, 2022). This may become a path to more personalistic decisions that impact the degree of centralization and party decision-making for public policy.

Broken Linkage on The Grassroot

In an interview with the representative from the Regional Representative Council in Yogyakarta of the NasDem Party, it was revealed that discussions related to the Draft Bill on New and Renewable Energy have not received adequate attention. The

representative emphasized that issues of this nature are rarely discussed in depth, particularly at the central legislative level.

“Coincidentally, it hasn’t been discussed yet; usually, matters like the New and Renewable Energy Bill (RUU EBET) rarely get discussed, not even thoroughly. My usual responsibilities are with the municipal government of Yogyakarta, focusing on perspectives regarding education and retribution tax policies. Regarding that matter, indeed, it hasn’t been addressed much, and the formation of laws is usually infrequent.” (Interview A, June 2023)

Furthermore, the representative conveyed that the focus of discussions more frequently revolves around topics such as perspectives on



education and policies regarding retribution taxes, especially in the context of relations with the local government of Yogyakarta. On the other hand, the representative indicated that the formulation of laws was only in the Regional Representative Council (DPW) forums and is seldom the subject of in-depth discussions at the national level.

Policy articulation becomes the center of attention for the party only when it is widely discussed by the public. Thus, laws that the public needs help understanding, concepts, and meanings should be further disseminated to higher levels, becoming a benchmark for public participation in policies, especially in the RUU EBET.

"Regarding that notion, it hasn't, and indeed rarely if the formation of a law, it's really when it's busy, for example, when there was

the sexual harassment case, we formed a coalition of women." (Interview A, June 2023)

However, the agendas brought by the NasDem Party at the regional level are based on the focus on cadre development with the task of providing political education. Understanding policy like RUU EBET is needed in the articulation at the NasDem DIY DPW level.

"We are always instructed by the Central Leadership Council (party on the central office) to conduct political education...." (Interview A, June 2023)

In line with Katz and Mair's (1993) ideas, local-level party resources include the workforce, which is essential for election campaigns and other political propaganda/agitation, and also to fill various positions in government councils and



Figure 3. NasDem Cadre School



Source: Instagram Official DPW NasDem

local advisors. At the regional level, accumulated resources become part of the NasDem cadres in the region and area. This concept validates the focus at the DPW, which is working on cadre development and political education following the NasDem DPP's focus on political education. From the interview, the stance taken by the NasDem

DIY DPW regarding energy has yet to become a conversation articulated into policy priorities in the region.

Based on the results of interviews and the examination of the party's Articles of Association (AD/ART) discussed in the sections above, it can be observed that communication between party entities at the public office, the party's central



office, and the grassroots level is interconnected. However, the agenda of discussions only partially reflects the entire national-level discourse to be conveyed to the grassroots. The articulation of party interests must be connected. In Lawson's (1988) terms, this connectivity is called political linkage. It is the relationship between senior units within the party and junior units, individuals within the party, the party and the government, or individuals and the government. This relationship influences behaviors, recognition, and involvement in the party's agenda implementation that has been carried out thus far. However, we observe that political linkage in the case study of the NasDem Party in the EBET Bill is ambiguous at several levels.

We perceive this ambiguity as a consequence of NasDem Party's movement that inspires populism, which has thus

far adopted policies that dimensionally affirm the 'pro-people' value (Lawson, 1988, p. 30; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p 98-100). This ultimately affects how communication and the party's facial functions are carried out. When policies are dynamically made at the central and governmental levels, the linkages at the grassroots tend to fail. The grassroots party tends to accept whatever the central party or government gives. We refer to this ambiguity as a broken linkage. In this case, grassroots party cadres are asked to fulfill the facial functions of the party (Katz & Mair, 1993). Yet, the activation to engage in policies implemented at the higher levels still needs to be thoroughly socialized. This void is one of the issues in parties in the modern era. In the political context of Indonesia, the electoral focus on winning seats makes parties more catch-all and influences how



parties respond to challenges. Pedersen (2011) states that this situation compels parties to choose between remaining true to their ideology and party goals or following the direction and goals of only one or two actors, such as the chairman and the president.

Conclusion

Drawing from the discussion above, several crucial points regarding the NasDem Party and the oversight of the EBET Bill can be identified. First, the NasDem Party in the People's Council has proposed the EBET Bill to the central government for further decision-making. Through eight faction consideration points, NasDem emphasizes the importance of the EBET Bill by linking it to economic needs. Second, NasDem faces scrutiny for unequivocally supporting presidential initiatives, raising concerns about autonomy. Its

role in shaping discourse and commitment to 'restoration' turns out to be highly personalized. Despite the importance of grassroots input in politics, NasDem's organizational structure, centered on the chairman, lacks representation in the EBET Bill, remaining elite-centric. Regional Leadership Councils primarily focus on regional affairs, sidelining grassroots perspectives in policy decisions. Thirdly, the NasDem Party at the regional level (especially in the Yogyakarta region) needs to be better aware of the oversight of the EBET Bill. In addition, the agenda at the regional level is organized to assist party cadres in the regional representative council.

Fourth, we observe that the NasDem Party's movements primarily focus on agendas decided by the party's chairman at the central level (DPP). This also has a specific impact on



the political landscape, as the NasDem Party's agenda priorities until 2024 are preparing for the Legislative Elections and Presidential Elections. Thus, through DPP considerations, the party instructs cadre capacity enhancement through political education conducted at the DPW level to introduce legislative and presidential candidates who will participate in the elections. We perceive this phenomenon as a broken linkage, as proposed by Lawson(1988),statingthatpolicy-making with a populist concept

has implications for dynamic communication relationships between the faces of the party. Fifth, the institutionalization of the party based on the infusion of values and the degree of centralization creates ambiguity. This is due to the changingnature of the party, either becoming presidentialized parties as part of a previous coalition or becoming personalistic parties, which transpire in the AD/ART and the party's direction towards the 2024 presidential election.





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The Role of Civil Society Organizations in The Formulation of Presidential Regulation Number 7/2021 on Eradicating Extremism and Terrorism in Indonesia (Case of the Wahid Foundation, the C-SAVE, and the Inklusif Foundation)

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ABSTRACT

In January 2021, President Joko Widodo signed the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that Leads to Terrorism (Presidential Regulation Number 7/2021). The increasing threats of violent extremism and terrorism make ratification of this policy urgent. The policy seeks to coordinate government and stakeholders against terrorism in Indonesia. The policy formulation demonstrates the resolve to engage the entire government and society. One of them is the roles of civil society organizations (CSOs). This study aims to describe the roles of the Wahid Foundation, C-SAVE, and Inklusif Foundation in formulating Presidential Regulation Number 7/2021. This qualitative study uses Arnstein's ladder participation as its conceptual framework. This study showed that the Wahid Foundation and the government are partners. In comparison, the C-SAVE and the Inklusif Foundation contribute to

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the level of tokenism. The Inklusif Foundation is only in the consultation or deliberation phase. However, despite the three CSOs having distinct work foci and levels of involvement, they have all contributed to the impetus behind the promulgation of this policy.

Keywords: *Participation; Policy Formulation; Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Extremism*

Introduction

Civil society has become a crucial and increasingly important subject of concentration in modern development studies. The phrase 'civil society' has several meanings. According to Azis A. A (2016), scholars, social activists, and development professionals, civil society is a collection of various interest groups and social organizations that are strong enough to provide people with a certain amount of autonomy and protect them from states' authoritarian and

hegemonic tendencies. In contrast to markets and liberal states, civil society highlights the value of independent social life (Krieger, 2001). Citing Hegel's viewpoint, Blackburn (2008) views civil society as a social organization between the family and the state. One could counter that such generalizations about civic society lack specificity. The presented definitions demonstrate the lack of agreement among researchers on the theory and design of civil society.

In public policy theory, citizen involvement is an essential procedure that allows ordinary people to impact the government's choices. For a sizable amount of time, this practice has been a crucial component of the democratic decision-making process as a group that will be directly touched by the policies developed. According to Conyers (1994), the community should



be in charge of creating public policy since it has the most in-depth understanding of its own needs and conditions.

In Indonesia, the general public's participation in formulating policy is mandated under Law No. 12 of 2011's Article 96, subsection 1. To receive feedback from the community, a variety of techniques can be used, including public hearings, work visits, outreach seminars, and discussion workshops. Based on the terms of Law Nuber 12 of 2011, the term 'community' refers to people or collectives (civil society) with a vested interest in the subject matter of the proposed legislation under consideration. Civil society aspires to achieve autonomy by forming social and political groups, associations, or groupings, including social

and religious groups, non-governmental organizations, civil society groups, and group interests.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) play a significant role in some issues in Indonesia, for instance, in the fight against violent extremism. Sumpter (2017) explained that over the past five years, Indonesia has seen considerable improvements in the documentation and analysis of civil society organizations' efforts to reduce violent extremism. He classified CSO activity into three categories: primary, secondary, and tertiary. According to Milla (2020), there are five key areas where CSOs are crucial in preventing the development of violent extremism. These are education, social media, deradicalization, policies, and other sectors (economy, sociocultural, and politics). Presidential Regulation Number



7 of 2021 (hereinafter referred to as the National Action Plan on Preventing Countering Violent Extremism - NAP on PCVE) has been developed to involve civil society organizations in the prevention of violent extremism. This policy's primary goal is to safeguard citizens' rights to security from the dangers of violent extremist ideas that lead to terrorist activities.

The NAP on PCVE was issued in 2017. The National Counterterrorism Agency (the BNPT), which promotes the 'whole government and society' approach, also emphasizes the importance of societal and governmental participation in developing this strategy. The BNPT collaborates with civil society organizations during the first three stages of the policymaking process. Although CSOs have only had a small influence over policymaking in Indonesia, it can be said

that the involvement of CSOs in the creation of Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 is a significant advancement. The involvement of CSOs demonstrates the government's commitment to openness and transparency concerning sensitive and private national security issues to the general public. In other words, the role of CSOs is immense in the creation of NAP on PCVE.

CSOs must participate per NAP on PCVE as imposed by the United Nations. Among the CSOs that were directly or indirectly involved in the design of the PCVE study, three CSOs played a critical role in the advocacy process related to the study. Various articles and interviews have conveyed this information. The Wahid Foundation's report (2021), titled *Strategi Luar-Dalam: Wahid Foundation dan Advokasi Kebijakan Pencegahan Ekstremisme Kekerasan*



di Indonesia, highlights the organization's crucial role in observing the advocacy of CSOs using three different strategies: public lobbying, the inside-out strategy, and indirect pressure. According to numerous pieces of literature and interviews, the three CSOs are actively and extensively involved in overseeing the advocacy of this policy,

The three CSOs (Wahid Foundation, C-SAVE, and Inkulsif Foundation) are involved in promoting the implementation of PCVE policies in Indonesia regarding institutional programs. In doing so, the CSOs carry out specific activities with their unique strategies to achieve distinctive impact and positioning in the NAP on the PCVE. The current study demonstrates a paucity of research on CSOs' input into policy creation, particularly concerning violent extremism in Indonesia. This article aims to fill this gap. following Hadi,

O.H. (2010), this study aims to determine the CSOs' challenges in carrying out their duties in light of organizational capability, character development, and the enabling environment (external variables). This focus enables the formulation of policy recommendations and gives a thorough understanding of the profile of civil society development and its crucial role in furthering democracy. The findings on the role of CSOs, agenda setting, and empowerment of CSOs in forming policies can help prevent and combat violent extremism. The primary focus of this study is the engagement of CSOs in formulating Presidential Regulation Number 7 of 2021.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The development and implementation of the National Action Plan for Preventing and

Countering Violent Extremism that Leads to Terrorism (the NAP on PCVE), as stipulated by Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 in Indonesia, involved a complex and multi-phase procedures, rather than an immediate execution. Agenda-setting has been recognized as a complex phenomenon. The process is critical and strategic in the public policy domain. The contested subject is the allocation of space to interpret public problems and priorities on the public agenda. The factors that impact the process include the development of a democratic system of governance, and the four critical aspects are the governmental system's disposition, the governance conduct, how self-rule is implemented, community involvement, and public participation (Wahab, 2015; Kimber, 1974).

In the agenda-setting stage, various actors are involved. According to Anderson in Winarno (2012), the policy formulation process involves official and unofficial actors. Therefore, the BNPT and The Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs (Kemenko Polhukam) are involved in this scenario. Currently, the non-state actors, specifically Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), are not viewed as a threat to the state's power.

CSOs do not aim to gain political positions that resemble political parties (Beitinger-Lee, 2009). According to Medizabal (2006), CSOs' functions are representation, advocacy, technical input, capacity building, services, and social functions. CSOs exert their influence on public policy at various levels of governance, both national and local. CSOs and individuals



can express and communicate advocacy issues to policymakers and build dialogic relationships with the government.

The ladder of citizen participation shows the levels of participation and can be a useful tool in the context of

this discussion. This research employs a revised rendition of Arnstein's (1969) ladder of citizen participation as a theoretical framework.

Arnstein's conceptual framework outlines three tiers of involvement: the absence




Figure 1. A Ladder Citizen Participation by Sherry Arnstein (1969)





of participation, symbolic representation, and active citizen empowerment. The three categories encompass eight levels, as follows:

- a. The non-participation classification has two tiers: manipulation and therapy. The aim of this level is not to enable the engagement of communities in either the planning or execution stages but to present a chance for individuals in authoritative positions to disseminate knowledge and information to the broader populace.
- b. The tokenism category has three tiers: informing, consulting, and placation. The unidirectional flow of information at the informative level constrains citizens' capacity to influence decision-making. In addition, the consultation is limited to a specific cohort of individuals

formally invited to offer their perspectives. The wider populace's perspectives may not be adequately taken into account. At the placation stage, individuals are allowed to counsel, but the final power to make decisions still lies in the hands of stakeholders rather than the general public.

- c. The classification of citizen power has three tiers: partnership, delegation, and citizen control. At the partnership level, a cooperative endeavor is undertaken by the public and the government to fulfill obligations by creating policy councils, planning committees, and conflict resolution mechanisms. This stage involves a joint endeavor between the governing authorities and the populace to develop policies. Citizens are



dominant in decision-making for specific plans or programs at the delegation level. They are afforded increased agency in developing preliminary policies. At the citizen control, which is the highest level, individuals may execute decisions on specific plans or programs that the government has authorized. According to Arnstein's viewpoint, this level is rare but achievable. The government can facilitate this by adopting geographical or institutional improvements, such as allocating power to institutions in specific policy areas.

METHODS

This study employs a qualitative methodology with a political approach, with data collected through interviews. The

stages are determining research strategy and techniques, subjects to be researched, data collection instruments (interview and interview questions), and data analysis. The research framework helps focus the study area and answer all research questions and objectives. This model is adapted from Carpentier (2016) by changing the research setting.

Overviews of Wahid Foundation, C-Save, and Inklusif Foundation

The Wahid Foundation, established in 2004, emerged from an aspiration to institutionalize the humanitarian ideals and perspectives of Abdurrahman Wahid, a former president of Indonesia. This occurred during the aftermath of the Bali Bombings and the 9/11 attacks in the United States. During its establishment, the Wahid Foundation did not engage




Figure 2. An analytical model for the study of the CSOs' participatory process in the political approach.



in policy-related matters. Instead, it focused on providing alternative perspectives and counteracting the emergence of religious-based extremism in Indonesia. Taqwa, a Research and Advocacy Officer at the Wahid Foundation (2022), explained that the organization has focused on various initiatives, including alternatives and counter-narratives, research, surveys, and policy advocacy. One of the organization's primary programs since 2017 has been formulating and implementing the NAP on PCVE.

The Inklusif Foundation is an organization established by activists who advocate for freedom of religion and belief. The organization's primary focus is promoting diversity and researching the state of freedom of religion and belief in Indonesia. Compared to the C-SAVE and the Wahid Foundation, the Inklusif Foundation is the most recently established

organization. However, it frequently participates in formal and informal discussions with other CSOs regarding the NAP on PCVE. Ferdhi, Program Manager of the Inklusif Foundation (2022), emphasized that the Inklusif Foundation has committed to participating in diverse public hearings with the government. However, he restricted the involvement of the institution because it did not accord with the program's priority. According to Ferdhi (2022), the organization's objective is solely to promote the government's efforts in facilitating the optimal participation of civil society in implementing the NAP on PCVE. The balance of partnership initiatives can be achieved by ensuring the participation of civil society in the NAP on PCVE.

The C-SAVE, or Civil Society Against Violent Extremism, was established in 2016. The primary objective of this organization is

to foster concordance, promote enterprise, and conduct research to avert severe violence in the community. Additionally, the organization endeavors to assist governmental efforts, execute rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives, and formulate constructive and alternative discourses to promote peaceful coexistence. Masruroh, the Program Manager for the C-SAVE (2022), stated that the institution advocates for the active engagement of CSOs in diverse policies about terrorism, such as Law No. 5 of 2018 on terrorism, as well as government regulations associated with terrorism, such as the NAP on PCVE. Thus far, the C-SAVE has provided aid to the government in shaping counterterrorism policy and facilitating numerous training sessions, discussions, and dialogues.

Findings and Discussion

The Role of the C-SAVE, the Wahid Foundation, and the Inklusif Foundation in the Formulation of Presidential Regulation Number 7 of 2021

The phrase 'violent extremism' and its related terms, such as 'preventing' and 'countering extremism,' have become commonplace in the discussions between civil society organizations and the government in Indonesia. Despite variations in terminology usage, multiple interest groups and stakeholders concur that violent extremism is a serious concern. The term post-9/11 terrorism remains relevant within the context of Indonesia. Since its reform, Indonesia has encountered terrorist actions perpetrated by extremist groups



with jihadist ideologies. The occurrence of bombings at religious establishments, hotels in Jakarta, and other regions, including the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005, highlights the significance of acknowledging the local context of extremism amid their global implications. In the past decade, terrorist actions by individuals, which may also involve the participation of women and children, have been on the rise.

In this context, the prevention and management of violent extremism cannot solely rely on formal and institutional mechanisms. Implementing these endeavors necessitates a multidisciplinary approach that entails the participation of community stakeholders. Hence, the participation of CSOs is salient. In Indonesia, the responsibility for countermeasures has been assumed by the state, while

CSOs have taken a more proactive role in prevention efforts. This is achieved through the implementation of programs aligned with the priorities of each organization and partnerships with ministries and government agencies. BNPT (2018) shows that nearly 40 CSOs have been actively engaged, either directly or indirectly, in preventing violent extremism in Indonesia until 2018.

The impetus for enhancing the participation of CSOs in Indonesia stemmed from the predominant use of a 'hard' approach, commonly referred to as the 'war on terror,' for addressing terrorism. This approach was influenced by the worldwide campaign against terrorism, as exemplified by several foreign policies of the United States. The UN Security Council resolution on 'a world against violence and violent extremism' introduces a novel



approach that advocates for using terms and approaches to prevent and counter violent extremism (PCVE). This efficacy of the prevention posits that prioritizing a persuasive approach and emphasizing prevention prior to the occurrence of acts of terror is more effective, which can be achieved by encouraging the participation of non-state actors.

The participation of CSOs in community policy in addressing violent extremism is as essential as other policy communities, which consist of government agencies, pressure groups, media people, and individuals, including academics interested in influencing a particular policy area. (Pross, 1995). This collaboration is also essential in initiating policy formulation that balances the government's interests and the community's

needs. CSOs can disseminate information that can impact the actions and decisions of government officials.

The preparation of the NAP on PCVE that leads to terrorism acknowledges the substantial role of CSOs. This involvement is structured in a hierarchical continuum. The Wahid Foundation, the C-SAVE, and the Inklusif Foundation utilized diverse advocacy mediums to oversee the policymaking. One of them is in the research report: *Strategi Luar-Dalam, Wahid Foundation dan Advokasi Kebijakan Pencegahan Ekstrimisme Kekerasan di Indonesia* (2021), which explains the NAP on PCVE advocacy activities by CSOs and media (M. Djafar and Taqwa, 2019; Kompas.com, 2020; Okezone.com, 2020). Regarding policy, the C-SAVE has also produced a policy paper on the involvement



of CSOs in addressing terrorism. This study suggests that CSOs can stipulated in the revision of the terrorism law (Malik, no date).

The three CSOs exhibit distinct characteristics and functions based on their respective areas of engagement and efforts in formulating the NAP on PCVE. Nevertheless, their works intersect with each other. The collaborative efforts among the CSOs, as evidenced by the three CSOs under investigation, facilitate the establishment of a pliable partnership that is integrated and adjustable in a sequence of policy advocacy.

Challenges

One of the challenges in implementing prevention and response measures to violence-based extremism is the perceived inadequacy of the government's efforts to foster partnerships with civil society. In this context, there is an imbalance between

the government and the CSOs due to the power dynamics. The government holds a position of authority, while CSOs are relegated to a secondary role in the policy formulation process. Masruroh, a program manager of the C-SAVE Foundation (2022), asserts that one of the challenges is the government's apprehension regarding the disclosure of sensitive matters about state security. According to Masruroh (2022), the Indonesian government must reassess its approach toward involving CSOs in counterterrorism efforts and developing comprehensive and effective strategies. The role of CSOs in counterterrorism efforts in Indonesia is crucial, given the CSOs' wide range in addressing specific areas of concern. For instance, the Wahid Foundation has developed advocacy

strategies to proactively address terrorism, particularly concerning Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021.

The Wahid Foundation has initiated a program named Prioritas-Go, formulated with a long-term perspective and endeavors, which one of the focuses is to incentivize the government in promulgating regulations and policies preventing terrorism. These measures aim to advance the NAP on PCVE from conceptualization to execution. Tawqa, the Research and Advocacy Officer of the Wahid Foundation (2022), believes that the program provides a more comprehensive approach. The Wahid Foundation's involvement in the policy formulation process has influenced the substance of the NAP on PCVE and its advocacy efforts. This includes engaging in lobbying activities

with other governmental entities, resulting in the status of NAP on PCVE rising to a presidential regulation.

The diverse range of activities undertaken by the Wahid Foundation underscores the organization's noteworthy contribution towards promoting advocacy for the NAP on PCVE. The Wahid Foundation is engaged in advocating for the dissemination of the NAP on PCVE for five reasons. *First*, this policy is more proactive than punitive measures. *Second*, The policy proposal PCVE is a secondary measure that underscores various governmental departments' degree of intervention and tactics. *Thirdly*, it offers an opportunity for the participation of civil society. *Fourth*, the point pertains to the NAP on PCVE, which aligns with global instruments by specifically targeting violent extremism. *Fifth*, the involvement of the Wahid



Foundation in the preparation process, as expressed by the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT), indicates a prospect to propose ideas and solutions drawing from the foundation's extensive studies and experiences.

The Wahid Foundation further enhances its assistance for the NAP on PCVE through different means, for example, by adopting a unique strategy towards religious institutions such as NU, PGI, MATAKIN, MLKI, and Ahmadiyah to endorse the NAP on PCVE. Additionally, the organization conducts online and offline campaigns, organizes discussions with policy experts, and releases publications that have been reviewed by academics. The Wahid Foundation also advocates for formulating the NAP on PCVE globally. One of the advocations was that the Wahid Foundations' researchers have contributed

to the literature on the NAP on PCVE advocacy in Indonesia. This written work was published by the Hedayah in 2021, which is a globally recognized think tank that focuses on preventing and addressing violent extremism. Besides, the representative of the BNPT and the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs (Kemenko Polhukam) stated that the Wahid Foundation's contribution has been instrumental in supporting the government's efforts in formulating regulations. Andhika Chrisnayudhanto and Alfrida Heanthy assert that the Wahid Foundation played a pivotal role during its inception by serving as an intermediary between the government's objectives and the civil society's concerns in initiatives aimed at averting and managing instances of violent extremism. Pribadi Setiono



shared a comparable perspective, emphasizing the significance of this collaboration between the government and civil society.

Comparing the roles of the three CSOs

Drawing upon Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation, it can be inferred that the C-SAVE and Wahid Foundation have attained citizen control owing to their active and extensive engagement in formulating the NAP on PCVE. The engagement includes the operationalization of the NAP on PCVE through the establishment of a thematic working group after the ratification of the NAP on PCVE, which accommodates the participation of the CSOs. The role above has surpassed the delegated authority phase, allowing the CSOs to be involved in programmatic strategies for executing the NAP on PCVE without any governmental

interference, specifically from BNPT. It is indicated that the C-SAVE has attained the placation phase. At this juncture, their duty entails providing counsel on formulating policy drafts. By contrast, the Wahid Foundation has taken a collaborative role, with the government to assume accountability via partnership, planning committees, and mechanisms aimed at preventing terrorist actions.

The Wahid Foundation and the government collaborate to develop policies and promote the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs (Kemenko Polhukam) as the primary coordinating entity responsible for political and security matters. Other collaborative efforts between the government and the Wahid Foundation include convening meetings, engaging subject matter experts to aid in developing and refining this



policy draft, facilitating dialogues with civil society organizations to incorporate feedback, and ultimately, ratifying and executing the NAP on PCVE. The Wahid Foundation also facilitates an inclusive platform for the CSOs to express their dissenting views on ratifying the NAP on PCVE to BNPT. The forum promotes public transparency and enables the participation of CSOs that are not engaged in advocacy.

The Wahid Foundation achieved and used delegated power by engaging in lobbying and coordination with the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law, and Security, Mahfud MD, to expedite the ratification of the NAP on PCVE. This lobbying effort was conducted autonomously by an independent institution, without the involvement or instigation of the BNPT.

In contrast, the C-SAVE and the Inklusif Foundation are involved in the tokenism stage. This indicates that despite having distinct levels of engagement, both institutions frequently offer advice and recommendations to the government during the development of the NAP on PCVE. At this juncture, the C-SAVE assumes a placation role, as it offers counsel to the government concerning the subject matter, as evidenced by its participation in select meetings and membership. Meanwhile, the Inklusif Foundation is in the preliminary phase of consultation or deliberation, as per the outcomes of the interviews. This phase is extended to select residents or institutions invited to provide their viewpoints. Nonetheless, there is no assurance that the viewpoints of the public are taken into account at this stage. The Inklusif Foundation's role limitations are



primarily shaped by institutional priorities and resources, which do not prioritize the NAP on PCVE. Nonetheless, through the

engagement facilitated by the C-SAVE, the Inklusif Foundation and the creation of opportunities,

A Ladder Participation of the C-SAVE, the Wahid Foundation, and the Inklusif Foundation on formulating the NAP on PCVE




Figure 3. Ladder Participation of the C-SAVE, the Wahid Foundation, and the Inklusif Foundation in Formulating the NAP on PCVE



advocating dialogues with the government in anticipation of the NAP on PCVE's draft. Despite variations in their respective areas of emphasis and degrees of engagement, the three civil society organizations have collectively played a role in driving the promulgation of the policy, albeit in various degrees.

Challenges from the Presidential Regulations

The NAP on PCVE is a comprehensive interpretation of the Law on Terrorism Number 5 of 2018, is inherently accompanied by but it has advantages and disadvantages. Likewise, this policy has also been subject to criticism. The critiques can be categorized into three. Initially, the concerns pertain to the potential for community engagement initiatives, such as community policing programs, to generate discriminatory practices, social unrest, and even

hostilities. The advantages and disadvantages of implementing the NAP on PCVE have been disseminated through media outlets, with particular emphasis on the efficiency of this measure in a broader societal context. Some apprehensions relate to the lack of a clear definition of extremism, which leads to suspicion towards certain groups. There is also a highlight that the policy fails to incorporate a gender perspective.

The advantages and disadvantages associated with the formulation and endorsement of the NAP on PCVE reflect the public's reactions and demonstrate how the engagement of the CSOs in the NAP on PCVE evolves following the CSOs' priorities, apprehensions, and advocacy approaches. Therefore, this function has the potential to expand across tiers and levels of

engagement, ensuring that CSOs are consistently involved in policy development with their respective roles and perspectives.

We conclude that the procedure is suitable for the bureaucratic system of Indonesia, which is unprepared to collaborate with civil society organizations in devising national security policies, such as the NAP on PCVE. The efficacy of CSOs' involvement in policy formulation can be enhanced by implementing an advocacy strategy that facilitates active collaboration between CSOs and the government from an internal perspective. However, specific individuals must serve as watchdogs, overseeing policies from an external standpoint through constructive criticism and alternative perspectives. In other words, the engagement of the CSOs should be accompanied by active oversight from external stakeholders.

The Role of Policy Advocacy

The formulation of public policy requires a minimum of five phases. Agenda setting refers to the initial phase of problem-solving, wherein issues that impact the public are identified for potential solutions. Policy formulation and decision-making processes involve government authorities selecting a specific course of action from various policy options after engaging in dialogues and discussions. Following this, the chosen policy is implemented and evaluated, with termination being a possible outcome. At this stage, the government will undertake a policy evaluation within a specified timeframe. Within the framework of Presidential Regulation Number 7 of 2021, not all CSOs are engaged in each stage.



The involvement of the C-SAVE and the Inklusif Foundation pertained to specific programs, discussions, and dialogues that fell outside the purview of their respective institutions. The participation of individuals in this policymaking is a voluntary endeavor facilitated by the Wahid Foundation and the government through various organized activities. Through interviews and analysis of the agendas of the C-SAVE and the Inklusif Foundation, it is evident that their work and research primarily focus on implementing the NAP on PCVE rather than its formulation. However, the C-SAVE initiative successfully catalyzed the East Java Provincial Government's formulation of a governor's regulation to mitigate violent extremism.

On the other hand, most of the Inklusif Foundation is only in activities organized by the Wahid Foundation and the

BNPT. On certain occasions, the Inklusif Foundation assisted in preparing the implementation report of presidential regulation number 7 of 2021 in the first year. However, these two institutions also participated in formulating presidential Regulation Number 7 of 2021. Meanwhile, based on various publications related to the preparation of the NAP on PCVE, the Wahid Foundation was involved in framing the issue to accelerate the issuance of the NAP on PCVE. One of the framings of the issue is to publish research results related to violent extremism that leads to terrorism, which urged the government to ratify the NAP on PCVE.

From a technical standpoint, examining the Wahid Foundation's involvement reveals that it has played a significant role in various stages of policy formulation. In the initial phase, the Wahid Foundation undertook

measures to enhance and guarantee the participation of civil society in the formulation of the draught policy document. In order to execute the plan, the Wahid Foundation convened a meeting with Suhardi Alius, the Head of the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT), on 28 October 2017. The outcome of the meeting was BNPT's acceptance and endorsement of the proposed collaboration plan with the Wahid Foundation, aimed at jointly formulating the NAP on PCVE. The meeting was reconvened on 29 November 2017 to provide further updates and progress on the previous collaborative endeavor. The workshop on 5-6 December 2017 was organized by the Wahid Foundation and the BNPT. In order to enhance backing from various ministries and agencies, the Wahid Foundation proactively organized a meeting with the Coordinating Ministry

for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs (Kemenko Polhukam) to communicate the advancements and significance of ratifying the regulation. The hearing discussion on 16 January 2020 sought the participation of the BNPT and direct assistance from Mahfud MD as the Minister of the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs. Hence, the regulation gained approval from the relevant ministries and institutions. This illustrates the significance of the Wahid Foundation's role in expediting the drafting and ratification of the NAP on PCVE.

From 2020 to 2021, the Wahid Foundation actively participated in multiple follow-up meetings alongside the BNPT and civil society. These meetings served as a platform for disseminating information about the NAP on PCVE to the broader community through engaging in various discussions and seminars. The



Wahid Foundation additionally supports the development of various strategic documents aimed at aiding ministries and agencies in effectively implementing the NAP on PCVE at the regional level.

These processes demonstrate that a systematic, programmatic, and structured approach characterizes the role of the Wahid Foundation in policy advocacy. The organization has actively engaged in academic endeavors related to the PCVE from 2017 to 2021. This involvement includes publishing approximately 20 books and articles on the subject nationally and internationally. Additionally, they have participated in over 40 lobbying and coordination meetings with government officials and religious and non-religious community organizations. Furthermore, they have organized and participated in more than 30 seminars,

dialogues, and discussions aimed at promoting the ratification of the NAP on PCVE in public spaces. Notably, they have contributed significantly to the drafting process as a member of the drafting teams responsible for compiling the prevention pillars. The approach employed by the Wahid Foundation, known as the 'from the outside and within' advocacy approach, delineates a robust and long-lasting partnership that actively pursues its objectives. This approach distinguishes itself from the advocacy strategies implemented by other CSOs. The involvement of the Wahid Foundation in the drafting process and engagement in joint activities has established its position as a critical partner of the government in implementing policies. In contrast, the inside-out strategy endeavors to implement an advocacy mechanism wherein the Wahid Foundation

assists the government and fosters a coalition of CSOs while expanding networks and conducting public campaigns.

Challenges in Policy Advocacy

There is limited engagement




Figure 4. The Wahid Foundation advocacy milestone (Dja'far, 2021)

With the various activities to assist the government, the Wahid Foundation thus conducts advocacy that revolves around three main aspects: lobbying and coordination, inside-out advocacy, and indirect pressure through various media both within and outside the networks.

from the CSOs in advocating for the NAP on PCVE in the context of policy advocacy. The findings of this study, based on data provided by the BNPT, indicate that while there are approximately 40 organizations expressing concerns regarding violence-based extremism, only a maximum of ten have actively engaged in advocacy efforts since the inception of this issue. In addition to the selection of organizational objectives,



the limited participation of the CSOs in policy advocacy is likely influenced by the requisite competencies and skills in advocacy aligned with the chosen policy cycle. In addition to financial resources, effective policy advocacy necessitates acquiring lobbying expertise, establishing networks with government stakeholders, engaging in legal proceedings, undertaking research endeavors, and actively participating in media platforms. The Maarif Institute and the Indika Foundation are two organizations that exemplify this scenario, as they prioritize educational efforts aimed at preventing violent extremism rather than engaging in policy advocacy. The C-SAVE and the Inklusif Foundation also encountered these challenges. For example, the C-SAVE initiative lacked a dedicated program addressing the institution's initial policy development phase.

Many of the organization's resources were allocated to an alternative advocacy initiative. The C-SAVE advocacy has significantly modified existing counterterrorism legislation, particularly in redefining the concept of terrorism and reevaluating the responsibilities of the BNPT. The C-SAVE, through its networks, presented a proposed definition of terrorism.

In addition to the challenges mentioned above, the formulation of Presidential Regulation Number 7 of 2021 was responded to with apprehensions regarding the efficacy of post-approval implementation. According to Syauqillah, the Head of the Terrorism Study Programme at the University of Indonesia and leader of the Indonesia Ulema Council's Committee for Countering Extremism and Terrorism, a major obstacle during the policy formulation process was the apprehension

expressed by the public regarding the budget allocation. The development and approval of policies directly impact the state's financial requirements regarding their implementation in practice. Syauqillah referenced various policies that encountered obstacles in their implementation due to budgetary constraints without explicitly specifying the nature of these policies. The hindered implementation was primarily due to the program's absence from the government's national priority program.

Among the CSOs examined in this study, the Wahid Foundation emerged as the most prominent in its role within power dynamics. This prominence can be attributed to several factors. The NAP on PCVE advocacy, implemented by the Wahid Foundation, is an officially mandated initiative incorporated into the organization's activity plan and receives

adequate financial backing. The condition facilitated the Wahid Foundation's advocacy work sustainably. Furthermore, the Wahid Foundation has implemented additional initiatives to promote the advancement of regulatory advocacy performance. Consequently, the NAP on PCVE has emerged as a focal point in its ongoing initiatives. Simultaneously, the aforementioned ministries are engaged in the NAP's ongoing formulation process on PCVE. One of the programs offered by the Wahid Foundation is the Peace Village and Peace School, which entails collaboration with the Ministry of Villages and the Ministry of Women and Children's Empowerment. These programs enable the Wahid Foundation to facilitate the introduction and promotion of support for formulating the NAP on PCVE. These endeavors are primarily directed toward engaging with



governmental bodies, including ministries and agencies, and influencing policies. Additionally, the organization collaborates with civil society organizations, educational institutions such as universities, diverse media outlets, the private sector, and religious organizations.

Besides, the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs significantly resolves bureaucratic impasses among various ministries and agencies. Consequently, it emerges as the predominant locus of power dynamics concerning the BNPT. The BNPT, the primary sector responsible for drafting the NAP on PCVE, must acknowledge the significant role played by the coordinating ministry. Revising and expediting improvements to the regulation can be effectively pursued without major hindrances until it is approved by the president, owing to

the initiation by the Kemenko Polhukam. Unfortunately, this study could not obtain interview data from a representative from the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs.

Regarding the funding sources of the CSOs, the Wahid Foundation has successfully obtained financial support from the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Justice 2 (AIPJ2) project for five years, from 2017 to 2022. This funding aims to facilitate the organization's active promotion of policies that seek to reduce the prevalence of violent extremism in Indonesia. The Prio Go Programme was initiated by the Wahid Foundation, supported by the AIPJ 2, which aims to assist the government in the execution of the NAP on PCVE. Besides, support is evident from multiple countries, including the United Arab Emirates and the Ministry of Education and Culture.

Nevertheless, it is crucial to acknowledge that this assistance is not directly associated with the advocacy efforts of the NAP on PCVE.

In contrast to the Wahid Foundation, the Inklusif Foundation does not have a specific initiative to promote the NAP on PCVE. The Inklusif Foundation obtains financial assistance from the Asia Foundation and the International NGO Forum on Indonesia Development (INFID) to support its initiatives that fall beyond the purview of the NAP on PCVE. Likewise, the C-SAVE Foundation obtained financial support from Australia to develop Presidential Regulation Number 77 of 2019 concerning safeguarding personnel involved in the implementation of the NAP on PCVE. The primary focus of this policy is to emphasize the prevention of crimes associated with terrorism while ensuring the

safety of individuals involved in the investigative, prosecutorial, judicial, and correctional processes. The normative relationship between Presidential Regulation Number 77 of 2019 and the NAP on PCVE leads to the involvement of the C-SAVE in advocating for the NAP on PCVE. However, it is worth noting that the involvement of C-SAVE in advocating for the NAP on PCVE is lower than in advocating for Presidential Regulation number 77 of 2019 and the terrorism law.

In conclusion, the analysis reveals that not all three CSOs have a distinct agenda-setting component within their NAP on PCVE advocacy. As mentioned previously, the only CSO with agenda-setting is the Wahid Foundation. However, despite the absence of a formalized and methodical agenda-setting mechanism, the involvement of the C-SAVE and the Inklusif Foundation has significantly



influenced the development of the NAP on PCVE. Within the framework of the Carpentier analysis model, power dynamics exist between the Wahid Foundation, the BNPT, and, to some extent, the Kemenko Polhukam. These power

Table 3. Comparison of three CSOs in agenda setting (policy advocacy)

The CSOs	The agenda-setting (Policy Advocacy)
The C-SAVE, The Inklusif Foundation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No specific allies are involved or purposeful in agenda-setting for legalizing the NAP on PCVE, especially in the context of specific programs, special activities, discussions, and dialogues that are not their institutions' agenda. 2. Their involvement in the policymaking process of the NAP on PCVE is a voluntary initiative as support to encourage the emergence of questions about the legitimacy of power in society. 3. Their work and research are driven more by the aspect implementation of the NAP on PCVE.
The Wahid Foundation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Published research results related to violent extremism that leads to terrorism (as framing issue); approximately 20 national and international publications of books and articles related to the NAP on PCVE during 2017-2021. 2. Around 40 lobbying and coordinating meetings with government and community organizations to support the government agenda in the context of ratifying the NAP on PCVE. 3. About 30 seminars, dialogues, and discussions for mainstreaming the ratification of the NAP on PCVE.

dynamics are characterized by a balance across domains and are upheld by considering the position of the institution, which differs according to its roles as a government entity and civil society organization. However, it should be noted that the power dynamics within the C-SAVE and the Inklusif Foundation are not characterized by dominance.

Conclusion

Perspectives about the term 'violent extremism' and its different derivatives, as well as 'preventing and countering extremism,' vary. However, several interest groups concur that acts of violent extremism are an alarming concern. Preventing and controlling violent extremism cannot be accomplished solely through a formal and institutional process in the state arena. In Indonesia, CSOs are taking a more active role in preventative efforts,

either through implementing programs based on individual organizations' goals or through collaborations with ministries and government organizations. In order to prevent violent extremism, some CSOs must be involved in community policy that collaborates other stakeholders. This is important to bridge the gap in policy development by balancing the interests of the government and the community.

Based on Arnstein's Ladder Participation, the C-SAVE and Wahid Foundation are in the citizen control stage of the NAP on PCVE formulation. Their involvement goes beyond only advocating for CSOs, which includes helping to execute the NAP on PCVE through the thematic working group established after the NAP on PCVE was ratified. This level has also gone beyond the delegated authority stage, which allows CSOs to choose which program



plans to use for implementing the NAP on PCVE without requiring the government's involvement, especially the BNPT. The C-SAVE participated in the placement step of the policymaking process. The Wahid Foundation is in the partnership stage, in which the organization and the government collaborate to develop policies and carry out advocacy. As part of public transparency, the Wahid Foundation also created an open venue for CSOs, not engaged in lobbying but disagree with the ratification of the NAP on PCVE to voice their opinions to BNPT. Meanwhile, the Inklusif Foundation was at the consultation or deliberation stage, where only invited residents or institutions were allowed to voice their opinions. However, the C-SAVE and the Inklusif Foundation's intense involvement contribute to the sustainability of the civil society's involvement in the discussion.

Although they have various areas of interest and levels of commitment, their contribution helped accelerate the creation of the policy.

Regarding agenda-setting (policy advocacy), only two of the three CSOs, namely the C-SAVE and the Inklusif Foundation, have no agenda-setting in the NAP on PCVE advocacy specifically. Although they lacked an organized and systematic agenda-setting process, the C-SAVE and Inklusif Foundation's involvement continues to influence the ratification of the NAP on PCVE.

Securing financial resources becomes an obstacle encountered by the Wahid Foundation, the C-SAVE, and the Inklusif Foundation for their contribution to the formulation of the NAP on PCEV. The Wahid Foundation has been granted financial assistance from the Australia-Indonesia Partnership

Project for Justice 2 (AIPJ2) for a duration of five years, spanning from 2017 to 2022, specifically allocated for the Prio Go initiative. This program not only focuses on preparing the RAN PE but also includes campaigning for its implementation and providing support for the Wahid Foundation's other programs. Therefore, the allocation of funding to support the preparation of the the NAP on PCVE is limited. Meanwhile, the Inklusif Foundation obtains financial assistance from the Asia Foundation and the International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID) to support its initiatives that are outside the scope of the NAP on PCVE. Therefore, the promotion of the NAP on PCVE is not the main concern of this organization. Lastly, the C-SAVE Foundation received financial support from Australia to draft Presidential Regulation Number

77 of 2019 concerning the security of personnel involved in implementing the NAP on PCVE. The normative relationship between Presidential Regulation Number 77 of 2019 and the NAP on PCVE led to the C-SAVE Foundation's involvement in the NAP on PCVE advocacy. However, the C-SAVE's level of involvement in advocating for the NAP on PCVE is lower than its involvement in advocating for Presidential Regulation Number 77 of 2019 and the Terrorism Law.

In conclusion, the results of this research showed that the involvement of the Wahid Foundation, the C-SAVE, and the Inklusif Foundation in the formulation of Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 is a significant advancement and is satisfactory. Even though the three CSOs have different agenda-setting components in the NAP on PCVE advocacy, they



have had a significant influence on the development of the NAP in PCVE. Within the framework of Carpentier's analytical model, power dynamics are apparent between the Wahid Foundation, BNPT, and, to a certain extent, the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs. These power dynamics are characterized by a balance in various domains and are enforced by considering the position of each institution, which varies due to their respective roles as government institutions and civil society organizations. However, it should be noted that the power dynamics in the C-SAVE and the Inklusif Foundation are not characterized by domination.





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Indonesian Political Populism in the Agrarian Sector: Reinterpretation of Marginalization of the Agrarian Sector and the Agrarian Populism Movement

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Abstract

This article seeks to understand the role of populist ideology in marginalizing the agrarian sector and the agrarian populism movement in Indonesia in the Reformation Era. Indonesia is an agricultural country, so such marginalization and the limited involvement of the agrarian movement is ironic. Development studies see the marginalization of the agrarian sector as a consequence of the reorientation of economic development towards the industrial and service sectors, mostly in urban areas. Studies like this often do not look at the political side of the marginalization. This study aims to fill this gap by analyzing the phenomenon in Indonesia utilizing Margaret Canovan's populist approach. The findings show the influence of political populism on the marginalization of the agrarian sector in the reformation era in Indonesia. Pragmatic, populist leaders exploited 'the people' as a political rhetorical tool to gain power without touching the agricultural sector where 'the people' reside.

Keywords: Populism, Agrarian, Development, Indonesia

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Introduction

This article discusses the relationship between populism and the process of agrarian marginalization in the structure of the Indonesian economy in the Reformation Era². In this article, populism is defined based on its two variants, namely political populism and agrarian populism. If political populism focuses on political aspects, then agrarian populism is sensitive to socio-economic aspects in villages and developments in agrarian issues (Canovan, 1981, 1982; Mudde, 2001). Agrarian populism emerged as a response to the expansion of capitalism in the agrarian sector (Canovan, 1981; Hicks, 1931; Roberts et al., 1990). Historically, agrarian populism was represented in two forms of movement: the peasant revolutionary movement in Russia and formal political movements

such as in America (Canovan, 1981). Therefore, agrarian populism is often recognized as a grassroots movement to respond to economic circumstances under a crisis (Canovan, 1981; Hicks, 1931).

Several studies have explained the relationship and impact of the agrarian populism movement on the dynamics of agrarian development. These studies show that populist parties or movements that exploit agrarian issues do not always positively impact the lives of farmers and rural communities. Even though it is in the name of the interests and desires of 'the people,' including the farming communities, the agrarian populism movement is often counter-productive to the socio-economic improvement of rural communities, especially farmers (Canovan, 1981). For example, in Thailand, the agrarian populism approach had a negative impact

² The agrarian sector in Indonesia in this article is rice-based agriculture.



on agriculture because it eliminated the competitiveness of its agricultural exports (Laiprakobsup, 2014). In Italy, the populist movement that articulated food and agricultural issues fueled nativism and authoritarianism (Iocco et al., 2020).

Regardless of its impact, the studies above show that the agrarian populism movement and the agrarian sector are interrelated. In the context of Indonesia, the agrarian sector has been the backbone of the economy for decades (Hill, 2000; Ruf & Gérard, 2001; Syuaib, 2016), but the agrarian movement has not been effective in strengthening the agrarian sector (Van Der Ploeg, 2013). This limited role raises questions considering the important role of the peasant

movement in fighting colonialism during the Indonesian revolution (Kartodirjo & Puradisastra, 1984; Scott, 1985; Tauchid, 2011).

Against this backdrop, the current study aims to examine the reasons for the marginalization of the agrarian sector in Indonesia and the absence of an agrarian populism movement. The findings can offer a new perspective in understanding the current relationship between populism and agrarianism in Indonesia. Simultaneously, the finding can explain one of the most important classes in the Indonesian economic structures: the farmer/peasant class. More specifically, this study aims to fill the knowledge gap related to agrarian studies in Indonesia, which are dominated by the following perspectives:

First, studies that frame agrarian issues related to food security and food sovereignty are instrumentalist in nature

and focus on food fulfillment in Indonesia (Hadiprayitno, 2010; Lassa & Shrestha, 2014; MacRae & Reuter, 2020; Neilson, 2018; Neilson & Arifin, 2012; Neilson & Wright, 2017).

Second, studies that explain the agrarian sector by utilizing a developmentalist approach explain Indonesian agriculture based on a structuralist perspective, positioning it in global political economy discourse (Arifin, 2004; Barichello & Patunru, 2009; Patunru & Basri, 2011; Syuaib, 2016; Van Der Ploeg, 2013; Wahyu Lolita et al., 2020; Warr, 2005). The developmentalist approach reads the dominance of the non-agricultural sector over the agricultural sector in Indonesia as a logical implication of changes in the direction of government economic policy. This view results in studies emphasizing the government's development ideology as the

main determinant of economic structure. Developmentalist studies also explain that the marginalization of agriculture is a natural phenomenon as developing countries move toward industrialization, where changes in development orientation using neoliberal market logic will shift the significance of agriculture in the country's economic structure.

In seeing the marginalization of agriculture in the structure of the Indonesian economy, the developmentalist approach is biased and deterministic and is often trapped in development jargon, such as the Development Paradox or Engel's Law (Arifin, 2004). The economic perspective in this approach does not leave room to view the agrarian phenomenon as a political space. This gap warrants further investigation, especially in explaining the absence of an agrarian



populism movement when the agrarian sector continues to be marginalized, and various other types of populism continue to emerge. Therefore, this article aims to answer (1) why the agrarian sector is increasingly marginalized in Indonesia's economic development context, (2) to what extent political populism influences this marginalization, and (3) why the agrarian populism movement is so limited in addressing these dynamics.

This study uses secondary data from relevant documents and sources to answer the research question. Each data is analyzed with sensitivity to the discursive construction of agrarianism developed over time. This analysis requires a sensitive reading of the hegemony of discourse surrounding ideas, concepts, and categories

related to agrarianism, through which agrarian phenomena are interpreted, produced, and reproduced (Hajer, 2006).

This article is divided into several sections. The first section discusses populism and places the meaning of populism in the context of this article. The second part explains the agrarian historical background in Indonesia's political economy structure and explores the trend of marginalization of the agrarian sector in Indonesia that has been occurring for a long time. The third part discusses the influence of the dominance of political populism on the role of the agrarian sector in the structure of the Indonesian economy, as well as explains why the agrarian populism movement cannot address agrarian marginalization. The fourth part concludes the study.



Defining Populism

Populism is synonymous with the idea of 'the people' in the political system (Berlin et al., 1968; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Müller, 2017). However, the meaning of populism is often ambiguously and elusively constructed and is heavily dependent on the context in which populism emerges (Taggart, 2000). In the United States, populism is defined as a peasant political movement (Canovan, 1981; Mudde, 2001) or a phenomenon of right populism such as Donald Trump (Anselmi, 2017). In Latin America or Western Europe, populism is associated with charismatic populist leaders and movements based on socialism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Weyland, 2017). In Russia and several countries of the former Soviet Union, populism is closely related to 'the narodniki,' a cultural movement of urban intellectuals

who mobilized the peasant masses (Andrzej Walicki, 1969; Mudde, 2001; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017).

Difficulties in understanding populism have required scholars to define populism based on several approaches, namely the ideational approach, the socio-cultural approach, and the political strategy approach (Hadiz & Robison, 2017; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). The ideational approach understands populism based on the dichotomy of two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: 'the pure people' and 'the corrupt elite.' Populism is also understood as 'a thin-centered ideology,' which depends on other, more solid forms of ideology (thick-centered or full ideologies), such as fascism, liberalism, capitalism, or socialism (Mudde, 2017; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017).



In contrast, the socio-cultural approach emphasizes the role of socio-cultural context in the acceptance of populism. The relational definition of populism that emphasized by this approach believes that the acceptance and development of populism cannot be separated from the socio-cultural and politico-cultural contexts in society (Ostiguy, 2017). Indirectly, the socio-cultural approach requires sensitivity to discursive processes in reading socio-cultural and politico-cultural constructions formed in society (Laclau, 2005).

Unlike the two previous approaches, the political strategy approach emphasizes the role of actors in the working of populism. It relies on personalistic leadership that obtains direct, unmediated, and non-institutionalized support from large masses of unorganized followers (Weyland,

2017). Therefore, this approach emphasizes the importance of actors' political strategies in social movements (Mouzelis, 1985; Weyland, 2017).

The political strategy approach is often used in the study of Indonesian populism and has produced studies on certain populist political figures (Aspinall, 2015; Masaaki, 2009; Ziv, 2001), the use of populism in the electoral context (Ahmad, 2020; Hamid, 2014; Margiansyah, 2019; Mietzner, 2009, 2015; Setijadi, 2017), populism in the context of democracy and prosperity (Hadiz & Robison, 2017; Lay & Praktikno, 2011; Mustofa, 2019; Rahmawati, 2018), and actors and political movements of Islamic populism (Jati, 2017; Jayanto, 2019; Mudhoffir et al., 2017; Savitri & Adriyanti, 2018; Shukri & Smajljaj, 2020).

The dominance of the above approaches limits the scope of populism studies and the

issue coverage. For example, studies have yet to focus their studies on the agrarian context. Therefore, this article uses another approach that can read and explain populism and agrarian approaches in Indonesia without losing sensitivity to political aspects. This approach to populism was offered by Margaret Canovan, who differentiated populism based on two approaches: political populism and agrarian populism.

Political populism, as a perspective, emphasizes the political aspects in explaining populism. In this case, populism is divided into four. First, populist dictatorship is an approach used by charismatic leaders in building dictatorships, such as Caesarism, Bonapartism, and Peronism. Second, populist democracy is an approach used as a practical political ideology in applying the democratic value of 'government by the

people.' Populist democracy is usually represented by holding referendums, popular initiatives, or recall procedures (Canovan, 1981, 1982).

Third, reactionary populism is used to mobilize conservative groups, or those with ignorance and prejudice. This populism is used to counter the progressive and enlightened views of more educated and liberal elites. Fourth, politician populism is an approach pragmatically used by politicians by exploiting the ambiguous definition of 'the people' to mobilize as many supporters as possible without having to commit to certain policies or ideologies. This fourth type of populism is widely used by Indonesian politicians, where 'the people' are often exploited as rhetorical tools and elite political maneuvers (Canovan, 1981, 1982).



Unlike political populism, the agrarian populism approach can be a tool in reading the populist movement, which is identical to the peasant movement, farmer's radicalism, and intellectual agrarian socialism. While political populism is utilized as a political tool and is not identical to movements in rural areas, agrarian populism is sensitive to socio-economic aspects in villages and the development of agrarian issues (Canovan, 1981, 1982; Mudde, 2001).

Agrarian populism originated from two movements at the end of the 19th century in the United States (the US People's Party) and in Russia (the *narodniki* or *narodnichestvo*) (Richard Hofstadter, 1969; Roberts et al., 1990). Although they have different forms of movement, they both use peasants as the moral source of the struggle against the capital elites (Andrzej Walicki, 1969; Canovan, 1981;

Mudde, 2001). This peasant movement originates from the same anxiety in facing modernization, especially in facing a free-market economy that hugely impacts rural life (Canovan, 1981, 1982).

Based on the agrarian populism approach, the farmers' movement emerged as a stance on expanding agricultural capitalization. Populism movement was born from the peasant class as their agrarian political resistance against the concentration of wealth and economic power in the hands of the rich (Canovan, 1981, 1982; Hicks, 1931; Roberts et al., 1990). In developing countries, this movement is often led by radical intellectuals, who idealize the peasantry and their traditions. It can take shape through the institutionalization of farmers' movements through formal political channels. In any case, agrarian populism is inseparable

from applying indigenous socialist values, which uphold the idea of equality and justice for the peasant class (Canovan, 1981). This definition of agrarian populism differs from political populism, which often capitalizes on the peasant class for the pragmatic interests of populist actors.

Indonesia's Agrarian Sector and a Brief Overview of Its Political Economy

This section explains the dynamics and historical background of the agrarian sector development within the Indonesian economic structure in two political periods: the New Order and the Reform Eras. Explaining the dynamics of the political economy in the New Order Era is necessary to understand the political-economic structure of Indonesia today.

New Order Era

Agriculture was one of the priority sectors during the New Order Era to achieve food self-sufficiency and meet domestic needs. At the beginning of the era, agriculture became a reference in interpreting welfare discourse, prioritized as one of the main bases of the national economic development strategy, with a growth rate of more than 5.7% from 1978 to 1986 (Arifin, 2004).

It is important to note that such development depended on the context of political constellations outside the agrarian sector, including the global political-economic structure³. There was a phase of deconstruction and ignorance by policymakers as they considered the

3 One example is the Green Revolution policy, which shows how the agrarian sector is relatively independent in the structure of the Indonesian economy (Bachriadi & Wiradi, 2011; Gollin et al., 2018).



agricultural sector insignificant to the economy's structure⁴. This phase had implications for the contraction of agricultural growth rates below 3.4 percent in 1986-1997 and a decline in the contribution of agriculture to the economic structure from around 50% (the 1960s) to 20.2 percent (1988) and 17.2 percent (1996) (Arifin, 2004).

Ignorance about the role of the agrarian sector also had an impact on the number of workers, which continued to decline from 73% (1961) to 50.1% (1990) (Hill, 2000). The agrarian sector also experiences discrimination in land use because the land available for smallholder

agricultural activities is left over from industrial activities. As a result, the average land holding by farmers continued to decline from 0.99 Ha (1973) to 0.83 Ha (1993) (Bachriadi & Wiradi, 2011). This discrimination also decreased the agrarian sector's contribution to GDP by up to a third compared to the mid-1960s, when the industrial sector's contribution increased more than threefold (Hill, 2000).

The degradation of the agrarian sector in the New Order era was exacerbated by economic liberalization policies, which provided opportunities for foreign capital to participate in exploiting Indonesia's agrarian resources (Sutaryono et al., 2014). Through the signing of the Letter of Intent (LoI) in October 1997, the MEFP on 11 September 1998, as well as Indonesia's ratification of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) from the World Trade Organization (WTO),

4 While the agricultural sector's contribution continued to decline, the government increasingly focused on developing other economic sectors, such as industry, services, or mining. The priority of developing the non-agricultural sector increased the contribution of these sectors to the Indonesian economy (Arifin, 2004). The consequence of this development logic orienting toward profit and growth was the negligence of the seemingly less profitable agricultural sectors.

agricultural liberalization has become increasingly stronger with the elimination and reduction of tariffs and subsidies. With this liberalization, the players in the sector, especially farmers, are increasingly pressured to consume new agricultural technology products from agribusiness transnational corporations (TNCs) and large importers from developed countries (Setiawan, 2006).

Politically, the 30 September Movement in 1965⁵ also impacted the development of the agrarian sector during the New Order era. The coup took casualties of hundreds of thousands of lives in villages or farming communities and resulted in the following implications:

5 The 30 September Movement (G30S) produced a discourse that accused the leftist movement, especially the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), as the masterminds in the coup attempt in 1965. This belief was rejected by John Roosa. He stated that PKI was represented only by several PKI leaders who collaborated with several senior armies as coup initiators. Therefore, PKI was not the only actor. In general, the 30 September Movement showed an attempt at a coup from Soeharto to Sukarno. G30S became an important point in Soeharto's efforts to take over the power from the leader of the Indonesian Revolution, Sukarno. Apart from that, this coup marked the downfall of the leftist ideological discourse and movements in Indonesia. This tragedy also became a starting point for new imperialism in Indonesia, which became stronger due to the free market system and capitalism (Roosa, 2006).



1. The exclusion of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and President Sukarno from the Indonesian political stage.
2. The downfall of all leftist ideological political power.
3. The efforts to reorganize all social forces and reintegrate Indonesia into the capitalist world economy.
4. The strengthening of anti-communist discourse gave rise to movements counter-productive to the spirit of anti-imperialism and colonialism in Indonesia.

As a result, the pro-Western movement continued to proliferate and lock the stream of Indonesia's political and economic policies at the international level (McGregor & Kammen, 2012). Therefore, when all leftist ideological power was fully excluded in the New Order Era, the agrarian

sector became increasingly marginalized, overshadowed by the pragmatic, growth-oriented economic system.

Reformation Era

The economic structure that marginalized the agrarian sector continued during the Reformation Era. During this era, democratic consolidation was unable to provide democratic space for all Indonesian citizens, including ensuring the basic political and economic rights of those engaged in the agrarian sector. The logic of development that followed the neoliberal economic system is discriminatory towards agriculture. In this era, the percentage share of agriculture in Indonesia's GDP declined gradually from 15.6% in 2000 to 12.72% in 2019. In addition, the number of agricultural workers decreased from 45.3% in 2000 to 30.5% in 2018 (Bank, 2019).

The agrarian sector also continues to face challenges, such as the increasingly limited agricultural land area due to the rapid land conversion. Other economic sectors dominated and displaced the agrarian sector without protection from the government. In President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's (SBY) administration (2004-2014), the promise of agrarian reform ironically led to a national development model that was anti-agrarian, with implications including denying people access to natural resources, increasing agrarian conflicts, loss of food sovereignty, and environmental damage (KPA, 2014).

The pragmatic development logic continues and is strengthened during President Joko Widodo's administration (2014-present). Under President Joko Widodo, the government issued Act Number 11/2020 on Job Creation as an Omnibus

Law to encourage the creation of a conducive climate for foreign investment. Many believe that the Job Creation Act can accelerate the conversion rate of agricultural land for non-agricultural economic purposes. For example, with its derivative regulations, i.e., Government Regulation (PP) Number 26 of 2021 concerning the Implementation of the Agricultural Sector, the government has relaxed regulations on converting rice fields for national strategic projects.

Neoliberal policies in the Reformation Era exacerbated injustice and inequality in land ownership and control, making farmers increasingly isolated from their main production base (Wardhani, 2020). The Job Creation Act has also worsened farmers' conditions through agricultural liberalization policies, such as importing rice cheaper



than local rice (Setiawan, 2006). In this condition, the government is often absent in eliminating price gaming involving large traders and rice millers with large capital, whose practices include hoarding rice during difficult times (Arifin, 2004). The liberalization of food imports shows how the government no longer cares for small farmers' interests (Hendriyanto, 2020).

Based on the description above, it can be understood that the agrarian sector in Indonesia bears the accumulated burden spanning a long history. The marginalization of the agrarian sector today is a continuation of the development logic built in the New Order, which is detrimental to farmers' lives (Fauzi, 2008). This fact raises the question of why this condition prevails, considering the agrarian sector has been the backbone of the Indonesian economy for a long time. This condition also raises

questions about the absence of a critical agrarian movement that can fight for farmers' welfare. These questions are answered in the following sections, arguing that agrarian marginalization in Indonesia is not only about the economy but also politics, especially related to the populist leadership.

Populism in the Reformation Era: Pragmatic Leadership in Indonesian Politics

Understanding leadership in Indonesia requires the reading of populism, and vice versa. The eminence of populism in Indonesian politics does not mean that it is a generic concept that can be used to label every leadership pattern. Instead, this condition is possible due to the elite networks in Indonesia, which are also connected to the masses (the people) who support

them. These masses were formed through the exploitation of various issues sensitive to and highly relevant to the public.

Populism was used by Sukarno in the Old Order⁶ era as a political strategy by exploiting the identity of the peasant class, resulting in the issuance of policies that benefited the agrarian sector (White et al., 2023). This approach to populism changed when used by Soeharto, who had a totalitarian and authoritarian populism character (Hadiz & Robison, 2017). Soeharto's populist

character had implications for manipulative elections and the state's dominance and control over the mass media (Crewe & Sanders, 2020). Soeharto used populism to create centralized power through a repressive depoliticization process for development policies⁷ detrimental to the agrarian sector (Morelock, 2018).

The transformation of the populism approach from the one used by Sukarno (agrarian populism) to Soeharto (political populism) shows how different types of populism empirically determine political dynamics. Then, the collapse of the New Order was expected to open up more democratic political

6 Several significant policies were issued for the agrarian sector in the Old Order Era. One of the most fundamental laws for agriculture was Law No. 5 of 1960 concerning Basic Regulations on Agrarian Principles. Apart from that, there were other agrarian policies, namely 1) Law of the Republic of Indonesia no. 1 of 1958 concerning the Elimination of Particular Lands; 2) Law of the Republic of Indonesia no. 2 of 1960 concerning Production Sharing Agreements; 3) Law no. 56 Prp of 1960 concerning Determination of Agricultural Land Area; 4) Republic of Indonesia Government Regulation No. 224 of 1961 concerning Implementation of Land Distribution and Provision of Compensation.

7 In the name of economic development, the New Order issued several legal instruments, such as the Law on Basic Forestry Provisions Law No. 5/1967, the Law on Basic Mining Regulations (UU No. 11/1967), and the Foreign Investment Law (UU No. 2/1967). These policies provided legitimacy to foreign companies to accumulate capital and exploit various agrarian resources in Indonesia (Sutaryono et al., 2014).



space, including space for the agrarian populism approach. At the beginning of the Reformation era, President B.J. Habibie committed to agrarian improvement by issuing Presidential Decree Number 48 of 1999 (Salim & Utami, 2020; Sutadi, 2018), and President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) campaigned for land reform for agrarian justice (Rachman, 2012). Apart from that, Gus Dur also proposed abolishing the TAP MPRS of 1966, a policy that had an impact on the prohibition of leftist ideology during the New Order and the demise of the agrarian movement in Indonesia (Habibi, 2022; Suparyo, 2020). However, the wind of change did not last long.

The opportunity to develop agrarian populism was discontinued as the short leadership period of the two presidents ended, which was even before the policies were

well implemented (Hairani, 2014; Salim & Utami, 2020). The lack of development of agrarian populism is also due to B.J. Habibie and Gus Dur's use of populist democracy, which is another type of political populism. B.J. Habibie's leadership focused on implementing democratic values, especially in interpreting a government system led by the people⁸. Meanwhile, Gus Dur focused on eliminating the centrality of the government and the oppressive hierarchy during the Soeharto era by providing space for parties previously excluded from power. The impact of utilizing political populism is that the government was insensitive to socio-economic

8 B.J. Habibie issued several policies related to this, such as granting political rights to East Timor through a referendum, upholding human rights, releasing political prisoners during the Soeharto regime, preparing for democratic elections in 1999, granting press freedom, minimizing military involvement in politics, and political decentralization to the regions (Kurniawan, 2021).

aspects in the villages, which can be seen empirically from the limited budget allocation pattern for agricultural development (Arifin, 2001).

Following Gus Dur's administration, the prevailing elite structures in the previous era helped President Megawati use political populism (Purwaatmoko, 2022). Megawati's populist character has been built since she led the resistance movement against the intervention of the New Order regime, which tried to derail her political career (Marijan, 2019). After the New Order collapsed, Megawati continued to shape her image as a representative of the people and a politician who fought for the interests of the people (Ziv, 2001).

However, Megawati's populist approach only showed that political populism was the default, i.e., the exploitation of the identity of 'the people' for

the interests of the elites. This exploitation can be seen from Megawati's leadership approach, which was increasingly distant from the interests of marginal groups, especially peasants or farmers. Megawati even issued Presidential Decree No. 34/2003, which supported the pro-market land system promoted by the World Bank and dampened the enthusiasm of agrarian activists and experts (Rachman, 2012). Megawati also rejected the formation of the National Commission for Resolving Agrarian Conflicts (KNUPKA). This independent institution was set to help resolve Indonesia's chaotic agrarian conflicts (Salim & Utami, 2020).

The dominance of political populism continued under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's (SBY)



administration⁹. SBY exploited the populism approach to achieve his pragmatic political interests, such as winning the elections (Mietzner, 2009). SBY's political populism may also reflect his development vision¹⁰, which eliminates agrarian/land from the state's priorities. Based on this policy, the image of Indonesia as an agricultural country was increasingly shifting to an archipelagic country oriented towards maritime

development¹¹. This national development policy has denied that the agricultural sector is the backbone and source of livelihood for most Indonesians (Sutaryono, 2012).

Moreover, SBY's populist political orientation can also be seen in his commitment to inviting foreign capital to invest in strategic infrastructure development projects. This was achieved by implementing the Master Plan for the Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia's Economic Development (MP3EI) 2011-2025, a program that targeted an investment worth 450 billion US dollars (Murtadho,

9 Some political scholars consider that SBY implemented a populist approach called economic populism or thaksinomics (Mietzner, 2009). This populist approach is based on several pro-poor SBY policies, such as providing cash assistance to the poor (especially before the 2009 election period) and the policy of reducing oil prices. This policy is synonymous with political populism because it does not emancipate the peasant class and becomes rhetoric for electoral interests (Hardiyanto, 2021).

10 Based on the development vision in the National Long Term Development Plan 2005-2025 (RPJPN 2005-2025).

11 Indonesia often constructs an image of itself as an agricultural country, referring to the dominance of the agricultural sector in the economic structure. Even though this term is often employed for political rhetoric, the discourse of Indonesia as an agricultural country is actually starting to shift. The strengthening discourse on Indonesia as an archipelagic country, which emphasizes the development of the marine sector, illustrates the shift from agricultural dominance to other economic sectors, such as maritime.

2022). This program allowed the provision of as much foreign investment as possible, giant infrastructure projects, massive industrialization, and integration Indonesia into a free trade zone that accelerated the marginalization of the agrarian sector in Indonesia (Rachman & Yanuary, 2014).

Subsequent to that, President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) continued the legacy of political populism, using the jargon 'the people' as a tool of political rhetoric and winning the elections. Jokowi's victory in two presidential elections reflects this phenomenon. His populism allowed him to portray himself as a politician who comes from and fights for the grassroots (Hamid, 2014). In practice, with his close alignment with Western interests, Jokowi often does not build his development policies upon the interest of the people (Mietzner, 2015; Power, 2018).

For example, Jokowi issued controversial policies contrary to public will, such as Act Number 11/2020 on Job Creation. As mentioned in the previous section, this neoliberal policy will further marginalize the agrarian sector due to agricultural liberalization (Setiawan, 2006). Therefore, even though Jokowi's political communication approach is populist, Jokowi's policies show that 'the people' are only a means to strengthen the dominance of the oligarchic elites in Indonesia.

In the Jokowi era, a fiscal decentralization policy called the Village Fund was expected to encourage development and reduce poverty in villages (Sidik & Habibi, 2023). This policy is a continuation of the institutionalist intervention in villages sponsored by the World Bank, which, in practice, emphasizes administrative decentralization or the top-



down approach (Sidik & Habibi, 2023; Widodo, 2017). Apart from strengthening patronage patterns between villages and the state, Village Funds have also given rise to the local elites phenomenon. This policy also increases the practice of clientelism in the village because these funds could benefit village elites who control the village fund allocation (Habibi, 2022; Sidik & Habibi, 2023). Therefore, instead of solving the main problems, the Village Fund policy is more like a political program that widens inequality in the village.

Apart from the policies above, the political populism approach is also reflected in Jokowi's policy of selling

the agrarian reform jargon¹². Jokowi began rolling out agrarian reform as a national priority set out in the 2015-2019 National Medium Term Development Plan (RPJMN) and further regulated in Presidential Regulation no. 45/2016 concerning the 2017 Government Work Plan (RKP) and Presidential Decree no. 86/2018 concerning Agrarian Reform. This agrarian policy focuses on the legalization and redistribution of Land Objects of Agrarian Reform (TORA). In actuality, this policy is the opposite of agrarian reform's

12 The agrarian reform policy advocated by Joko Widodo is welcomed by the world community. One of the positive impacts of this government's commitment was the appointment of Indonesia as the host of the eighth Global Land Forum in 2018. This forum was vital because it discussed various strategic issues such as true agrarian reform, land grabbing, food sovereignty, and so on (Era.id, 2018). However, on a practical level, this forum did not have a significant impact because various policies labeled agrarian reform in the Joko Widodo era did not address Indonesia's agrarian problems. In fact, policies that are detrimental to farmers continue to be produced, such as food import policies and land grabbing for investment purposes.

goals. This policy only speeds up and simplifies land buying, selling, and acquisition for significant capitalist purposes. This certification program is a foundation for Jokowi's neoliberal development, aiming to accelerate investment rates with legal certainty over land (Murtadho, 2022).

The use of a political populism approach in Indonesia continues to date¹³, especially in welcoming the presidential election in 2024. The dominance of political populism as a political approach or strategy is not neutral, driven

13 For example, Prabowo is a politician with a military background and an ultra-nationalist ideology. Several studies see Prabowo as a phenomenon of the emergence of oligarchic populism, authoritarian populism, or maverick populism (Aspinall, 2015; Levitsky & Loxton, 2013). In short, these labels lead to Prabowo's classification as another phenomenon of strengthening political populism, which only exploits people's identities for personal political interests. Besides, there is also Islamic populism, which leads to reactionary populism. Islamic populism mobilizes the masses to fight against the ruling elites by using religion as a shared political identity (Hadiz, 2016).

more by pragmatic political logic exploiting the people for political interests. This condition has practical implications for Indonesia's political and economic structure, especially in terms of agrarian development. The following section explains these implications in more detail.

The Impact of Political Populism on the Agrarian Sector in the Reformation Era

The entrenched political populism in Indonesia shows how 'the people' have been used as objects to benefit the political elites. This populism is based on individual politicians, not political parties or people's movements. Instead of emerging from 'the people,' it is formed and directed by political leaders or elites who exploit the identity of 'the people' for the elite's pragmatic interests. The dominance of this political approach has implications not



only for the distance between leaders and the people but also for pragmatic leadership patterns. This pragmatism is reflected in development policies that only focus on economic development patterns that pursue growth rates without paying attention to the quality of welfare of most people. Pragmatism, due to the dominance of political populism, also has an impact on development projects that encourage neoliberal enclosure, which has further marginalized agriculture in Indonesia (Fauzi, 2008).

The strengthened neoliberal enclosure cannot be separated from market processes and government intervention in capital accumulation. In this context, the government, dominated by pragmatic leaders, is the central actor in strengthening capitalistic ownership relations, which can reduce the relative power of the

rural poor (Akram-Lodhi, 2007). The neoliberal enclosure also allows for the private ownership of land and natural resources that ultimately contribute to the rural, agrarian, and peasant world expulsion through the practices of deruralization, deagrarianization, and depeasantization. The burden on village communities and farmers here is increasingly heavy due to the pragmatism of political populist leaders who continue to issue structural adjustment policies and market liberalization globally, which can dissolve the farmers' lives (Fauzi, 2008).

Therefore, the supremacy of the political populism approach has significantly impacted the creation of an ultra-pragmatic leadership character, which is absent from noticing the centrality of agriculture in Indonesia's development. In fact, government policies often



inhibit agricultural economic growth. For example, under Jokowi's administration, the Indonesian government has continued increasing rice imports despite a surplus in production¹⁴. Continuing a similar policy to be implemented is burdensome for farmers because imported rice is cheaper than local rice. This tendency means that agriculture cannot develop and continues to decline in Indonesia's GDP, from 15.6% in 2000 to 12.72% in 2019. Degradation in the agricultural sector has implications for the high level of job transfer from agriculture to non-agriculture. During the Reformation Era,

the share of agricultural labor in Indonesia decreased from 45.3% in 2000 to 28.5% in 2019 (Bank, 2019).

At the same time, the agricultural sector also faced other challenges in the form of massive agricultural land conversion of up to 600,000 Ha per year (Humas, 2020). Conversion of agricultural land is a major challenge to agricultural development because this dynamic illustrates the transfer of the main assets of agricultural production to other economic sectors, such as manufacturing, mining, or service industries. Unfortunately, this conversion of agricultural land is often maintained by the government with a repressive approach. For example, during Jokowi's administration, in 2020 alone, there were 241 agrarian conflicts in 359 villages involving 135,337 heads of families on land covering an area of 624,272,711

14 Excluding the economic crisis, the largest average annual rice imports occurred during President Joko Widodo's time (Purnomo, 2019). The highest level of imports was carried out in 2018: 2.2 tons. This import was carried out during a rice surplus, resulting in suboptimal rice distribution patterns, inadequate management of rice stocks, and a decline in rice quality (Asikin, 2021). This import policy continued to be implemented in the following years.



hectares. As a result of these agrarian conflicts, 134 cases of criminalization occurred, 19 cases of persecution, and 11 people died in the agrarian conflict area (KPA, 2020). These figures demonstrate that the process of exclusion and discrimination against agrarians has been carried out structurally and is fully supported by state power.

The marginalization of agriculture above is in sharp contrast to Jokowi's populist rhetoric, which portrays himself as a representative of the people who will develop Indonesia from peripheral areas, including villages (Presiden, 2019). This conflict shows that the marginalization of agriculture is not only related to changes in the flow of Indonesia's economic development but also the dominance of a pragmatic political style rooted in political populism in the Indonesian

political constellation. These populist leaders can act hypocritically. They always use populist rhetoric to achieve political legitimacy. However, they are pragmatic in policy making because the attachment of populist leaders to the supporting masses is built only in political pragmatism but not politically substantive ties. The political rhetoric will be enough for populist leaders to gain false legitimacy without a political contract that can be used as a reference for people to demand their political and economic rights.

The dominance of political populism over agrarian insignificance in Indonesia's economic structure is strengthened by the character of populist leaders who are eager to maintain the status quo by avoiding political antagonism. At least two status quos are constantly maintained. The first



is a discourse inherited from the New Order authoritarian regime that has eliminated leftist ideology and movements in the Indonesian political constellation (Habibi, 2022). The lack of opportunities for the left to exist has emptied the antagonistic political space. This condition allows for an ideological monopoly, which in the Indonesian context continually follows global norms campaigned by international donor institutions. Dependence on fiscal assistance and political morals from developed countries has an impact on the reluctance of populist leaders to challenge the dominance of Western-oriented development ideologies.

The domination of discourse that forms a negative image of leftist ideology has also affected the minimal contribution of the agrarian populism movement in Indonesia (Canovan, 1981). The ideologically monopolistic

system has prevented the agrarian populism movement from directly engaging in politics. The consolidation of democracy in the Reformation Era did not improve conditions because, empirically, it perpetuated the hegemony of political discourse created by the New Order. The dominance of this discourse continues to place the peasant movement and the critical left movement in a biased space and negative perception as



enemies of the state¹⁵. Therefore, the pragmatism of populist leaders in maintaining this discourse will just preserve the marginalization of the agrarian sector and agrarian movements from the Indonesian political space. This situation explains

why a real agrarian movement cannot live and grow like the peasant movement in Russia or the agrarian political movement in the United States.

The second is the romanticization of the village as homogeneous, harmonious, and always working together for the common good (Pincus, 1996). Populist leaders often romanticize this village imagination and deny the existence of class differentiation in agriculture and fragmentation in the farmers' movement (Habibi, 2022; Rachman, 2017). Class differentiation in rural farming communities has strengthened since the New Order Era, especially during the Green Revolution. In the Indonesian context, the Green Revolution as a geopolitical project is more profitable for large-scale farmers because of the accessibility to new technology and other infrastructure to accelerate

15 There is an agrarian movement in Indonesia called the Agrarian Reform Consortium (KPA), which is important in revitalizing the idea of agrarian reform in Indonesia. However, this movement was criticized because many people within the KPA joined the government and participated in several government policies, contrary to the basic ideas of agrarian reform. The KPA's involvement with state policy also shows the powerlessness of agrarian groups in changing the status quo. The continuation of neoliberal policies shows that the fusion of the agrarian movement into the regime's political approach has practically silenced the agrarian movement. The involvement of agrarian groups in government circles also creates horizontal friction between agrarian groups, which leads to the weakening of this movement in supporting substantive agrarian agendas. KPA was also criticized for being involved as a member of the International Land Coalition (ILC), which has a neoliberal perspective because it has close relations with international donor institutions such as the World Bank. This proximity has created a distance between the KPA and the interests of agrarian reform that fight for the peasant class.

agricultural production (Welker, 2012). Inequalities in accessibility and production patterns in villages have affected the formation of class polarization in agrarian society until the Reformation Era (Eng, 1996). This polarization creates societal inequality in controlling the land and agricultural resources, which constructs village communities in non-single socio-economic classes.

The birth of Law No. 6 of 2014 concerning villages can be an example of a policy that continues to romanticize villages as homogeneous entities. This policy shows the state's perspective, which often fails to see the class differentiation of village communities. Village romanticization, by burying the class differentiation, can pose a barrier in articulating the interests of the peasant class under a single umbrella of interests. The unrecognized

farmer class differentiation can blur the latent conflicts, which is counterproductive to agrarian development. The maintained differentiation of the farmer class will also inhibit the consolidation of the farmer movement. Even though there are movements that strive for farmers' rights and agrarian reform in Indonesia, such as the Agrarian Reform Consortium (KPA) and the Indonesian Farmers' Union (SPI), these movements are vulnerable to being trapped in the romanticization of farming communities and missing the main problems of fragmented farming communities (Habibi, 2022). This movement also cannot fully offer the growth of an agrarian populism movement that can compete discursively and practically in the political space.

Therefore, the populist leaders' romanticization of the village has blurred farmer



class differentiation as a latent problem growing in the village. The romanticization of villages will also create a gap between the image and actual conditions in the village¹⁶. Ultimately, the village is only at a crossroads, not sensitive to specific class struggles. This condition explains why the agrarian movement could not be born in one strong and autonomous movement, both culturally and structurally. The pragmatism of populist leaders in pushing for neoliberal agendas exacerbates this condition, evidenced by the capital inflows and the criminalization of farmers, which results in the despair of farming communities fighting for their economic and political rights.

Ultimately, farming communities continue to be trapped in a monopolistic system that limits their space for articulating their interests. The peasant class continues to be positioned as the political object of the populist elites in the electoral process and other political rituals.

The impact of political populism on agriculture in Indonesia explains that historical linearity (from the New Order-Reformation Eras) plays an essential role in controlling the structure and discourse that marginalized agrarians in Indonesia. The historical traces of the New Order and the political populism approach prevail, giving rise to pragmatic leaders who romanticize the village and demonize the leftist ideology. The dominance of the political populism approach continues to strengthen the dominance of the development of the non-agricultural economic sector,

16 An example is the Indonesian Farmers' Harmony Association (HKTI), which acts on behalf of farmers but is dominated by the interests of the political elites who control HKTI. The movement's interests are not based on the interests of farmers but rather the pragmatic interests of the political elite who lead HKTI (Setiyono, 2011).



which is supported by the state under the umbrella of the neoliberal project. In addition, this domination creates the political space to become monopolistic, eliminating the struggle for multi-ideological-based discourses in interpreting development. This condition persists with the absence of the agrarian populism movement that benefits the people, i.e., peasants or farmers.

Conclusion

This study starts from the question of why the agrarian sector continues to be marginalized in Indonesia's political economy structure, to what extent political populism factors influence this marginalization, and why the agrarian populism movement has a limited presence in response to this phenomenon. Unlike studies that use a developmental perspective, this study offers a political

perspective on this phenomenon. By utilizing Margaret Canovan's theory of populism, this study argues, firstly, that political populism influences the process of marginalization of the agrarian sector in Indonesia's Reformation Era. Political populism works in the form of pragmatic populist leaders who exploit 'the people' as a tool of political rhetoric to gain power and a model of mass mobilization of supporters.

Second, the cause of this political populism is the neoliberal economic development and ideology. Third, there is a restriction of political space for the people to articulate their imagination and meaning of development. Economic development is ultimately dominated by an approach oriented towards profit and growth without being based on the interests of the peasant/farmer class.



Fourth, the dominance of political populism in the agrarian sector creates pragmatic leaders who perpetuate the two status quos inherited from the New Order Era: 1) political structure that continues to exclude leftist ideologies and movements; 2) political structure that romanticizes villages as homogeneous units. By maintaining the status quo, populist leaders maintain a monopolistic system that closes down the dimensions of antagonism that are constitutive of the peasant class-based agrarian populism movement. The peasant class continues to be positioned as the political object of the populist elites in the electoral process and other political rituals without being able to influence political discourse. This fact explains why the agrarian populism movement—as a populist movement emerging from the farming community

and fighting for the interests of the farming community—has limited power in the Indonesian political constellation.





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Environmentalism for Nature to Environmentalism for Profit: Discourse on Andesite Mining in Wadas, Purworejo

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Abstract

This research discusses the discourse related to the mining of andesite stone for the construction of the Bener Dam in Purworejo, Central Java, as part of the National Strategic Project. The discourse constructed among actors is highly diverse. The dominant discourse is led by the government, which views the use of the forest for environmentalism for profit, while local residents see the forest as environmentalism for nature. Michel Foucault's discourse theory on the production of knowledge and power underscores the discourses brought forth by the government, the community, and NGOs. Meanwhile, Anja Nygren's concept of environmental discourse complements the various discourses that have emerged. The objective of this research is to observe the dynamics and discourse constructed by pro and contra actors regarding the construction of the Bener Dam. The research utilizes both primary and secondary data, with primary data obtained through direct interviews with sources such as Indonesian Forum for the Environment of Yogyakarta, Community Movement for Environmental Care in Wadas Village (GEMPADEWA), and Legal Aid Institute of Yogyakarta. The conclusion drawn from this research is that the dominant discourse constructed by the government can influence

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public opinion, especially through negotiations that lead to mutually beneficial agreements.

Keywords:

discourse, environmentalism, Bener Dam

Introduction

This study focuses on the dynamics and discourse constructed by pro and contra actors regarding the construction of the Bener Dam in Purworejo Regency, Central Java. The dam construction is part of the Indonesian Government's National Strategic Project, as documented in the Governor of Central Java's Decree Number 539/29 of 2020 concerning the extension of the land location determination for the construction of the Bener Dam in Purworejo. The Bener Dam project is carried out through collaboration between two ministries, namely the Ministry of State-Owned

Enterprises PT Brantas Abipraya and the Ministry of Public Works and Housing through the Regional River Basin Office (BBWS) Serayu Opak of the Directorate General of Water Resources (Anggraini, 2022). In the future, the Bener Dam is suspected to be the tallest dam in Indonesia with a height of 159 meters, a dam length of 543 meters, and a bottom width of approximately 290 meters, as stipulated by Presidential Regulation Number 56 of 2018 regarding the acceleration of the implementation of National Strategic Projects (Bramasta, 2022).

The construction process of the Bener Dam, which requires the use of andesite rock material, has resulted in various responses and objections from different actors. The local community in Wadas Village is divided into pro and contra camps. On one side,



pro actors, dominated by the government and local residents, support the project to proceed. One indicator of why the local community supports mining is the assurance of substantial compensation from the government for the land acquisition of those who agree to mining for the construction of the Bener Dam. Additionally, the Bener Dam is expected to provide high economic value in the tourism sector, benefiting not only Purworejo Regency but also the surrounding areas. On the other hand, contra actors, divided among the local community and external parties (environmental NGOs), consider the project too risky because it neglects ecological and economic impacts.

The pro and contra actors in the development of the Bener Dam claim discourse and knowledge regarding the benefits and impacts that

will be incurred when using andesite rock as its construction material. The economic or material discourse brought forth by pro actors is that the construction of the Bener Dam will provide significant benefits to the community. These include supplying water for irrigation across 15,519 hectares of rice fields, mitigating flood disasters in Purworejo Regency, Central Java, and Kulon Progo Regency, Special Region of Yogyakarta, generating approximately 10 megawatts of electricity, providing 1,500 liters per second of drinking water to Kulon Progo, Yogyakarta, as well as Kebumen and Purworejo, Central Java. Additionally, there is the potential for tourism development to enhance the local economy (Ministry of Public Works and Housing, 2022).

In short, the stance taken by the government is closely related to a developmentalism



pattern that prioritizes economic growth and progress. In other words, rapid economic growth is considered an indicator of a nation's advancement. However, the economic progress achieved so far has also resulted in significant losses, encompassing wide-ranging aspects such as social, cultural, and environmental impacts. These aspects should be considered in mitigating environmental conflicts.

Escobar (2006) highlighted that the increasing environmental conflicts are a result of the influence of neoliberal globalization. Conceptually, these conflicts can be understood through three interrelated dimensions: economic, ecological, and cultural. Escobar emphasizes the importance of placing economic, ecological, and cultural distributions on equal footing and in proportion. This

means that, for the economic and ecological domains, the value of nature cannot be assessed solely based on its economic sector. Nature is considered 'sacred' and cannot be commodified. Similarly, culture creates practices that determine how nature is adapted to and utilized.

The discourse from pro actors (the Government) as the organizers faces opposition from contra actors. Contra actors engage in discursive construction through environmental issues, emphasizing the negative impacts of andesite mining, including environmental damage. Contra actors are represented by the local community in Wadas, who initiated the formation of GEMPADEWA (Community Movement for Environmental Care in Wadas Village), and the women of Wadon Wadas



supported by NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) such as Indonesian Forum for the Environment of Yogyakarta and Legal Aid Institute of Yogyakarta. These contra actors believe that the Government has failed to understand the close relationship between the local residents and the environment in Wadas.

There are several reasons why contra actors reject andesite mining. First, the discourse constructed by the Government regarding the Bener Dam claims to irrigate the community's rice fields. However, in reality, the water becomes contaminated and cannot be reused. Second, concerning the Environmental Impact Assessment for andesite mining. In the process, the Government does not specifically explain the environmental impacts that will occur, including potential dangers to several villages around the mining area

(Akbar, 2022). Third, there is the issue of not having the Mining Business License from the central government (Guitarra, 2022). These three factors are what drive the resistance from the community in Wadas Village.

In addition to the form of opposition from contra actors against andesite mining, another reason that strengthens the bond between the Wadas community and their environment is related to the longstanding dependence on nature. The potential wealth of Wadas Village from the plantation sector has provided significant benefits to local farmers. Plantations serve as the primary source of daily income for the local community in Wadas. According to a report from the Indonesian Forum for the Environment, the potential yield from plantations in Wadas Village, Purworejo, reaches Rp. 8.5 billion per year. Additionally, income from

hardwood commodities can also reach Rp. 5 billion per year. The highest income comes from the plantation of palm trees. In addition to palm trees, many other commodities also have high value, such as mahogany, teak, durian, sengon, and kemukus. This includes everyday food items like chili, stink beans, bananas, and coconuts, which also have considerable potential (Heksantoro, 2022).

The local residents' dependence, especially farmers, on the commodities from the forest is the fundamental reason why andesite mining is deemed unnecessary. From there, various contested discourses emerge. The discourse contestation led by each pro and contra actor becomes its own carefully crafted agenda. Of course, the most highlighted here is the discourse developed by contra actors against andesite mining. These contra actors play a

central role in their continuous efforts to reject andesite mining. Nonetheless, the efforts made by contra actors are seen as tentative because ultimately, pro actors tend to benefit the most. Moreover, this study becomes more interesting as it explores the dynamics and processes among contra actors who were previously actively resisting but later experienced a decrease in intensity due to agreements or compromises reached afterward.

Furthermore, why is the issue of environmental discourse an important discussion? The urgency in further discussing environmental discourse and development stems from the fact that there is a reinforcement of the rhetoric of "crisis" in public discourse. It can be argued that development leads to an ecological crisis (Kurniawan, 2012). Humans, as rulers and the center of nature, often



perceive themselves as free to utilize the environment and exploit it without considering its sustainability. Escobar (1996) explains that there is no material that is not mediated by discourse because no discourse is unrelated to material. In this context, discourse cannot be separated from the lens of discursive materialism. The construction of the Bener Dam represents a discourse of sustainable development to demonstrate the mediation between nature and capital influenced by the discourse developed in this study.

Therefore, by using an environmental discourse approach, contra actors to andesite mining argue that human efforts will be in vain due to the occurrence of natural disasters. This is a result of neglecting the impacts on the environmental ecosystem. Thus, the well-being of development

can vanish in an instant with the occurrence of various disasters, including floods, landslides, extreme rainfall, and so on (Adhistry, 2020).

Recognizing this, the researcher believes that if the planning and management concepts applied can create the belief that social change can be directed, engineered, and produced at will. The researcher considers that nature can be capitalized even if it is done by the people. A previous study (Muthmainnah et al., 2020) assumed that usually, capitalization is carried out by a group of people with power or private entities. However, in the context of andesite mining, the capitalization of nature is carried out by local residents. Therefore, it becomes clear that capitalist restructuring is increasingly occurring at the expense of environmental conditions. Local residents



initiate various contradictory efforts to restructure these conditions to achieve the desired goal, namely, to increase profits.

Starting from the above issues, a central question arises that needs to be explored further: how is the discursive approach brought by contra actors to andesite mining, where they believe that the forest must be preserved and protected? This involves highlighting the dynamics and discourse that occurred when the intensity of resistance was high initially but gradually decreased towards the end of the resistance. This allows us to see what factors underlie or weaken the struggle of these contra actors, whether compromises or agreements have occurred between the Government and the contesting contra actors.

The focus of this research then utilizes Anja Nygren's environmental analysis, with the

specification of transforming nature into an environment for profit. This is because, based on the fact that Wadas residents who initially disapproved of andesite mining, considering it detrimental in ecological and economic terms, later agreed due to compensation from the government that was deemed sufficient to meet their daily needs. Therefore, the researcher suspects that the resistance by Wadas residents was likely because the compensation provided by the government did not match the amount of land affected by mining. Then, when the compensation offered by the government became more favorable, Wadas residents no longer resisted.



Theoretical Framework

1. Environmental Discourse Theory

This writing is underpinned by the ideas of Dryzek (1997), Kurniawan (2012), and Nygren (1998), who specifically employ environmental discourse in their studies. From their perspectives, this research will elucidate the environmental discourse brought by each pro and contra actor—particularly in the concept of sustainable development, viewed from ecological, economic, social, and cultural aspects without disregarding ‘justice crises’ and ‘humanitarian crises’.

The basis of discourse studies is crucial to explain how knowledge is a part of discourse and is not neutral. According to Foucault, discourse is always identified as a production of knowledge and a wheel of power that is

interdependent and concurrent. Discourse becomes essential for producing knowledge, power, and politics because power can be exercised coercively or productively, distinguishing between dominant and minority discourses. The production of discourse can become dominant by involving actors who organize knowledge systematically, making it authoritative and legitimate in explaining something. Therefore, the logic constructed by the local residents of Wadas will be against mining because mining always has adverse effects on the environment (Sholihin, 2019).

The discourse on the environment has been growing since the 1960s. Marxist-oriented sociologist James O’Connor once stated in the 1980s that contra actors emerged in response to development theories that



emphasized economic growth as the primary reference and were very pro-capitalistic economic systems (Wardana, 2017). Later, Christopher Stone, in his book “Should Trees Have Standing? Law, Morality, and Environment,” sued law enforcement in the United States to make trees and the environment legal subjects. Therefore, the discourse on the environment has been debated by experts for a long time, placing environmental issues as an essential part of the current context.

The discourse framework is necessary for analyzing and identifying the discourses that occur. Foucault’s discourse provides the foundation for Dryzek (1997) to delve deeper into environmental issues from the perspective of environmental discourse. Particularly, as expressed by Dryzek: environmental discourse begins in industrial society, and so has

to be positioned in the context of the discourse of industrialism (Dryzek, 1997: 14). Departing from Dryzek’s statement, the author believes that the context of industrial society may not be suitable for application in the local community of Wadas Village, as it needs to consider not only environmental discourse but also the social-cultural aspects and local wisdom that have been believed since ancient times. Thus, to gain a deeper understanding of environmental discourse, it is necessary to know the ontology of discourse, identify the relationships between humans and living beings, and recognize the rhetoric and metaphors used to justify the interests and environmental actions of the actors (Dryzek, 1997).

Studies related to environmental discourse have also been conducted by Nygren (1998), focusing on the case of



Costa Rica. From her findings, there are three dimensions that need to be traced to understand environmental discourse: imperative (driving factors), aims (goals), and strategies. The research in Costa Rica indicates the existence of discursive competition at the global, national, and local development strategy levels, resulting in four dimensions of environmental discourse: environmentalism for nature, environmentalism for profit, environmentalism for alternative, and environmentalism for the people (Nygren, 1998).

The four dimensions of environmental discourse need to be examined more deeply when related to the social conditions in Wadas Village. First, environmentalism for nature focuses on the principles of sustainable development to enhance environmental sustainability. Second,

environmentalism for profit recognizes that the process of sustainable development is closely tied to economic growth. Third, environmentalism for alternative suggests that the impact of environmental damage is influenced by the expansion of Western modern culture on non-Western cultures. Fourth, environmentalism for the people emphasizes that an unsustainable production system can also be a result of excessive degeneration in modern culture (Kurniawan, 2012).

The environmental discourse approach in the Third World and Costa Rica by scholars such as Dryzek (1997) and Nygren (1998) provides insight into how environmental issues have become a global agenda continuously discussed to this day. Kurniawan's research (2012) argues that "the most important aspect in understanding



environmental discourse and development lies not only in 'humans' and 'nature' but in the relationship between the two. Therefore, the next challenge for sustainable development is to continuously redefine the relationship between humans and nature." Kurniawan (2012) used analytical tools from Dryzek and Nygren, similar to the approach used in this research. Kurniawan's study found that environmental NGOs in Indonesia often incorporate various elements from different discursive approaches. This phenomenon indicates that environmental NGOs are actively involved in the dynamics and efforts to redefine the boundaries and new agreements of sustainable development in Indonesia.

2. Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution is an effort or solution designed to reach a mutual agreement so that it can be accepted by the parties in conflict. In other words, the goal of conflict resolution itself is efforts to be made more effectively as a result of conflict, which involves the involvement of various parties with various underlying issues. Conflict resolution focuses on the source of the conflict between two parties, so that they can jointly identify more real issues (Irwandi; Endah R. Chotim, 2017).

According to (Nasikun, 1993), conflict resolution has a pattern that can be carried out in several approaches, namely:

- a. Negotiation, namely an agreement that is tried to be created between one party and another party through negotiations in resolving



- a. dispute. Negotiation is also defined as a way of peacefully resolving disputes through negotiations between the litigants. In this case, negotiation is also interpreted as two-way communication designed to reach an agreement when both parties have the same or different interests.
- b. Conciliation means controlling a conflict by carrying out conciliation which can be realized through certain institutions which enable the creation of a pattern of discussion and decision making between the conflicting parties.
- c. Mediation means that the conflicting parties agree to appoint a third party. The third party will be responsible for providing advice in efforts to resolve a conflict. So, a more compromise agreement can be created.
- d. Arbitration means that the parties in conflict agree to accept a third party, whose role is to provide decisions in order to resolve existing problems.

Environmental discourse and conflict resolution approaches are the reference in this research to see the dynamic and conflict processes that occur in Wadas Village, especially from related actors, namely the Government, NGOs and Wadas residents themselves who are fighting against andesite mining as a development material. True Dam.

Research Methods

This research employs discourse analysis to examine the narratives and meanings produced by actors against andesite mining. Furthermore, discourse analysis, as the chosen research method, is utilized to comprehend the



reasoning and dynamics within the current andesite rock mining. The author aims to explore hidden meanings behind the discourse by employing Michel Foucault's theory on discourse construction. According to Siregar (2021; cited in Foucault, 1976: 117), discourse can be a collection of statements, varying in forms of what is written, spoken, or communicated through specific procedures. Additionally, another form of discourse can be rules that bind what can be said, who is allowed to say it, how to say it, and when to say it. This implies that discourse encompasses all language and practices within its scope.

The type and research method employed by the researcher is discourse analysis with a qualitative approach aimed at addressing questions by emphasizing how the contestation of opposing actors

unfolds. The discourse analysis method is used by the author to uncover and understand the hidden meanings behind the phenomenon of andesite rock mining. In this research, the researcher utilizes Anja Nygren's discourse analysis, which is not only perceived as a language study but also as an analysis of language while considering relationships within a specific context.

Meanwhile, the researcher carried out data collection, namely by interviews and document studies such as journals, articles and websites. Interviews were conducted with local residents who were against and Walhi Yogyakarta who were against andesite mining, and also LBH Yogyakarta who provided an understanding of the legal aspects and forms of injustice felt by the community in Wadas, including:



- a. Indonesian Forum for the Environment of Yogyakarta (Walhi Yogyakarta), regarding why this NGO supports the rejection of andesite mining.
- b. Community Movement for Environmental Care in Wadas Village (namely GEMPADEWA), relates to the form of resistance carried out by community members in Wadas Village who reject andesite mining.
- c. Legal Aid Institute of Yogyakarta, related to advocacy and understanding provided to residents from a legal perspective, that andesite mining has violated the rights and interests of the community in Wadas.

Results and Discussion

1. Discourse on the construction of the Bener Dam as a form of sustainable development

Foucault's discourse serves as the primary tool to frame the agrarian conflict occurring in Wadas Village. One of the main indicators justifying the andesite rock mining conflict in Wadas is attributed to power and knowledge, emerging between the various actors, the Government, and the Community. For Foucault, power is not an ontology but a strategy. Power works from bottom to top, not the other way around; it is not centralized in one person or a group but is dispersed and omnipresent. Power is practiced in everyday life through discourse. Therefore, the exercised power is related to knowledge because knowledge would not exist



without the exercise of power, and conversely, power would not exist without knowledge. Power and knowledge have become an inseparable unity (Siregar, 2021).

According to Siregar (2021; in Sarup, 2011; 112-113), power can both create and give birth to new objects of knowledge, and conversely, knowledge can create influences on power. Without knowledge, power would be challenging to wield. Building on this idea, Foucault asserts that power is no longer merely oppressive and limiting; instead, power is more productive than repressive and negative. For Foucault, power is not solely defined by the social and political structures within a country, but it involves the formation of mechanisms and strategies of authority, how it is practiced, accepted, and considered to be a truth (Siregar, 2021; in Lubis, 2014a; 177).

Sustainable development can easily find its place in the discourse of development truths, but without careful conceptual analysis of what needs to be sustained, for whom, and by whom (Redclift, 1993). Therefore, the main research object is not only the primary population being developed, but also the development apparatus that aims to realize sustainable development. Sustainable development and strategies framed around biodiversity play a crucial role in the discursive production of conditions of production (Escobar, 1996). The conditions of production are transformed not only through models but also through discourse. In political discourse, marginalized groups seek to challenge hegemonic discourses dominated by the government by placing people within the constraints of normal entities to liberate



games of difference. From this perspective, a discourse is formed that can strengthen the emergence of power because through this discourse, it can create norms that are logical, rational, and true (Kellner, 2003).

According to the Bruntland report, the entire movement towards sustainable development is an effort to withdraw from nature, resources, the earth, and human life itself, on a scale that may not be immediately visible. Environmental struggles are raging worldwide. It's as if one way to declare war on nature and humanity is through conflict and struggle (Escobar, 2006). Therefore, it is not surprising that counter-actors worldwide are becoming more steadfast, insistent, and articulate in defending their places, environments, and ecosystems. Thus, questions related to how differences in economic,

cultural, and ecological equality are possible or rejected. For some critical analyses, the uneven distribution of income and material resources is the basis of conflict (Escobar, 2006). Economic distribution is a political issue and is related to social power.

There are two conflicting interests in mining. First, issues related to environmental damage are always debated as the most fundamental reasons continuously presented by those against it. Thus, anti-mining actors establish dominance by articulating discourse on the negative impacts of andesite mining on the environment based on the rejection of andesite mining. Second, for groups that are pro-sustainable development to improve community welfare, it is always presented as a pretext for why the construction of the Bener Dam must be carried out even



by engaging in mining. From this perspective, we can see that there are two major interests that are carefully played, namely the interest in preserving the environment and sustainable development. These two interests will ultimately clash to influence the mindset of each interested actor (Adhistry, 2020).

Discourse on environmental sustainability is not seen as a social construction in the politics of the modern world, where the emergence of new perceptions about global relations makes environmental questions no longer a local but a global issue (Nygren, 1998). It is assumed that the assessment of natural resources is only subject to economic conditions, and that all aspects of nature can be fully reduced to market prices (actual or fictitious). There is an ecological and political process that contributes to determining the value of natural resources

that cannot be reflected solely in market prices (Escobar, 2006). In many cases, there is a mismatch between economic and ecological processes as far as communities assess the environment not for economic reasons, such as when they consider nature as something sacred and not commodifiable. Unequal wealth, economic growth, due to the time and requirements of capitalist production and natural processes are not the same. Then, if production is under uneven distribution, it will negate ecological processes. This also negates the cultural processes that form the basis of human judgment about nature.

2. Discourse of actors against andesite mining

The emergence of environmental actors has been evolving since the early 1980s in response to environmental



issues. The pattern followed by environmental actors involves responding to the development organized by the New Order government, which prioritized the economy and was centralized. Meanwhile, the concept of environmentally and locally based development received less serious attention from the government. Environmental actors fought against and challenged the development paradigm, advocating for the protection of local activities and knowledge (Adhistry, 2020). Discourses on conflicts are always grounded in heated situations resulting from disputes, disagreements, quarrels, and conflicts involving two or more parties. For instance, the rejection of andesite mining in Wadas Village initially sparked due to a study by experts related to the Environmental Impact Assessment conducted by

the Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing, which recommended Wadas Village as an andesite mining area to support the construction materials for the Bener Dam. From this point, various forms of rejection arose from villagers around the mining area. Due to the differing interests between the opposing actors and stakeholders, it eventually led to the arrest of villagers by authorities accompanied by violent actions (Pariyatman et al., 2022). Clashes between Wadas Village residents and police guarding the measurement of former andesite mining land occurred on Tuesday, February 8, 2022. Residents in Wadas Village believe that there have been mistakes in the decision-making process that designated Wadas Village as an andesite mining area, including cultural-spiritual aspects. The residents of Wadas have a spiritual connection with



the nature of Wadas Village, as well as an understanding of cultural values that have been believed for a long time, as the natural resources in Wadas have greatly benefited the residents.

From the cultural aspect itself, the land in Wadas has long been believed to be the source of life for the local residents. This socio-cultural aspect is also strengthened by the Javanese proverb “sedumuk bathuk, senyari bumi,” which means no matter how little is taken away from us, we will resist to the end. On the other hand, the spiritual aspect believed by the Wadas community is that the land they have occupied for hundreds or even thousands of years has been bequeathed by their ancestors as land with spiritual value due to the emotional bond established since ancient times. From the natural land of Wadas, there are also many natural resources that can be

processed and utilized to meet daily needs. Therefore, one form of effort to preserve the heritage of the ancestors is to protect the natural land of Wadas (Pariyatman et al., 2022).

This is because the majority of Wadas residents make a living as farmers. The economic aspect is a fundamental reason for the Wadas residents’ rejection of efforts to manage their land. One of the reasons for the rejection of andesite rock mining is that it will directly impact the damage to the farming and plantations of Wadas residents, which have been their source of livelihood. In addition, there is a fear among the Wadas residents regarding their environment; for example, andesite rock mining can cause damage to the environmental ecosystem, disrupting clean water sources, and posing other significant risks such as floods and landslides.



The same issue arises in postmodern cultural analysis. Although postmodernists agree that nature is socially and culturally constructed, they do not specify what kind of nature we want to construct. Local communities, often constructed as beneficiaries or victims of development interventions, are seen as self-motivated actors actively engaged in environmental and development discourse (Nygren, 1998). This perspective aligns with Anja Nygren's theory regarding "Environmentalism for Nature."

"Environmentalism for Nature" is a discourse aimed at supporting environmental preservation efforts within the concept of sustainable development. In short, it can be observed in the efforts made by the government or environmental NGOs to protect and conserve the natural environment and biodiversity

(Kurniawan, 2012). Humans are assumed to be outside this ecosystem. When related to the current context, the activities causing the environmental crisis are created and caused by human arbitrary actions towards nature. Therefore, adherents and experts of this discourse always try to emphasize and promote the importance of ecological order, with little attention to economic and social arrangements. Humans are viewed as external to the ecosystem, and the emergence of the environmental crisis is assumed to be a consequence of human excesses that harm nature, with little consideration for socially unequal utilization of natural resources. Mining is defined as a global problem that threatens the existence of all humankind. In this context, the ecological aspect is considered highly important.



Then, when the intensity of rejection is high, what happens is that the local residents of Wadas resist. This is a form of disagreement with the andesite mining. The discourse brought by these opposing actors regards the forest as a natural asset. Therefore, the forest must be protected and preserved. Opposing actors resist to prevent the government from carrying out andesite mining. According to Sidney Tarrow (2001) in his book titled “Power In Movement and Contentious Politics,” there are indicators used to resist, including:

2.1. Repertoire

Repertoire is defined as a tool or instrument that can be used by specific community groups in an effort to achieve a collective agreement. In other words, a repertoire is a way or strategy through which people can engage in collective action in the

context of political resistance (Tarrow, 2001). The forms of repertoires vary, according to the needs and political context faced. Repertoire becomes a resource used by actors to claim a resistance movement, so it is packaged by actors into a collective identity that can be accepted and relatively easily carried out by the community without the need to incur significant costs or take great risks. Furthermore, forms of resistance are collective actions taken by certain groups of people in specific situations to challenge opponents using incentives that support their networks of trust and solidarity.

Therefore, repertoire is crucial for understanding the assumptions behind specific resistance actions, the methods taken, and the existence of certain forms of action, as well as why changes occur. There are several forms of



repertoire as manifestations of resistance actions, such as street demonstrations, work stoppages, damaging public property, issuing petitions, creating resistance hashtags on social media, and so on. In the case of Wadas, the resistance employed involves the use of symbolic meaning. Simultaneously, the community needs to experiment with alternative productive strategies and cultural resistance against the material and symbolic restructuring of capital and

modernity (Escobar, 1996). In this context, the materials brought by the Wadas community during the rejection, especially when the intensity of rejection is high, are symbolic in nature.

Symbolic struggle emerges as a result of the creation of competition, contests, or rivalry in the effort to seize or maintain power over other social actors. Its forms are diverse, whether it involves existence, viewpoints, perceptions, or others (Jazeri,

Picture 1. Action wrapping the cloth to the tree



Source: (Konde, 2023)



2009). The style of symbolic struggle primarily uses language as its tool, without direct physical contact. In executing its actions, the form of discursive warfare in symbolic struggle is by emphasizing doxa, which is power or legitimacy. Doxa is the discursive world that dominates life (Wijaya & Santoso, 2022). One form of symbolic discourse carried out by the residents of Wadas in their resistance is the act of tying cloth around trees by the Wadon Wadas women as an effort to reject andesite stone mining. Wearing traditional Javanese attire, the Wadon Wadas women wrap long white cloths around the trees.

The action took place on December 6, 2022, with the slogan “Wadon Wadas Mangku Bumi Pertiwi” (Wadon Wadas Guardians of Mother Earth) carried out symbolically. In Javanese tradition, it is believed that a mother always

takes care of her child, and this is what the Wadon Wadas did, hoping that the land of Wadas has provided life for the residents, and therefore, the nature of Wadas must be preserved and protected (Konde, 2023). Approximately forty Wadon Wadas women participated in the action, joined by villagers affiliated with the Village Environmental Care Movement of Wadas (GEMPADEWA). In an attempt to acquire the land of Wadas from its residents, the government used invitations and sweet promises by offering relatively high prices, allowing Wadas residents to release their land. However, the Wadon Wadas women and the GEMPADEWA environmental care movement rejected these invitations. One member of Wadon Wadas expressed, “We want to show that

Picture 2. Dumb action of the wadas.



Source: (Purworejo24.com, 2022)

there are still Wadas residents who consistently reject andesite mining,” said Tri Handayani (Wiji) from Wadon Wadas.


In addition, there was a symbolic action carried out by members of the GEMPADEWA association, namely a silent procession around the village of Wadas. This action was nothing less than a firm rejection by the residents against all efforts related to the planned mining

activities in Wadas, including the inventory activities conducted in Wadas from July 12 to July 15, 2022.

The dumb action was carried out by the Wadas by circling the village with various attributes each wearing, such as beech capes, posters, bringing durian seeds and rambutan, and shutting their mouths with rides. The attributes used have their own meaning for the people of Wadas. For example, the action of bringing plant seeds



Picture 3. Symbolic action to the ground



Source: instagram @kepadatanah

is carved as a symbol or form of consistency keeping the natural sustainability of Wadas Village. Besides, there are also those wearing beeches, believed to be a symbol of the traditional women beech craftsmen who are threatened with extinction if mining activities continue.

There's an unbeatable act, too, of shutting your mouth with a run. The action is an expression that the people of Wadas Village have run out of words with the efforts that have been voiced as a form of protest against the Government. Finally, there's an act of putting money in the



mouth that suggests that any form of environmental damage that will occur in Wadas Village, will not be replaced by anything, including billions of rupees.

Symbolic resistance, not only by the people of Wadas, but also by the outside parties, Walhi Yogyakarta, who supported Wadas resistance. The symbolic action was carried out by the artists to respond to the situation that occurred at the time in Wadas. The agenda is being held in six major cities and six provinces, namely Bali, Batu, Semarang, Jakarta, Bandung, and Yogyakarta.

The symbol was made by the artist as a form of support for the Wadas people to commit a rejection of the Andesit mine because nature must be protected and preserved. The exhibition in these six


cities aims to make the entire community aware of the conflict in Wadas and to empathize with the people of Wadas.

Some of the symbolic resistance carried out by the Wadas, it is a form of discourse built with "Environmentalism for nature" because forests must be protected for their survival and sustainability. Although with the construction of the Bener Dam can prosper society, but they chose to do rejection.

2.2. Framing

Framing is a process of alignment, collective interpretation, and social construction to form a consciousness that those who feel harmed must be actively engaged in collective action to change the situation. The framing process requires the media as an instrument of framing. In this case, framing is a process of framing or discourse

Picture 4. Publications made on social media instagram @jogja_darurat_agraria and @wadas_melawan



Source: Instagram @jogja_darurat_agraria

carried out by the counter actor as a form of resistance to andesit stone mining. This framing refers to the social media account of @wadas_combat. In this case, the framing used by counter-actors activists is not free from campaigns and mass mobilization. How through the social media campaigns,

counter-actors can influence the public to share sympathy and can change the government's policy not to do mining in Wadas.

Various media used by counteractors as a form of resistance by conducting demonstrations using banners. The implicit message in the banner is that Wadas residents rejected the Andesit stone mine for damaging the environment



and interfering with the lives of the citizens. The demands of the people of Wadas are to stop the construction of mines in Wadas because expansionist capitalism will continue to plunder people's lands as commodities or distribution routes for accelerating the accumulation of capital.

Conflict Resolution in Wadas: Environmentalism for Nature to Environmentalism for Profit

Conflict resolution arises when a conflict has been ongoing for a long time, continuously and has not found a clear point in its resolution. Joint efforts and agreements to resolve conflicts can involve governments, communities, and NGOs in resolving the mining conflict in Wadas Village, Purworejo. According to Nasikun (1993), a conflict settlement scheme can be resolved in the following ways:

a. Negotiation

Negotiation is an agreement that is attempted between one party and the other party through negotiation in the settlement of a dispute. In this case, negotiations are also understood as two-way

communication designed to reach agreement when both parties have the same or different interests.

The negotiation process has actually taken place between the village government and the community in connection with the construction of the Bener Dam since 2013, when it was first laid. As a result, the community agreed and supported the development acceleration programme through a national strategic project scheme. (PSN). However, in the middle of the journey, precisely in 2018, the construction work of the Bener Dam requires the material of andesit as its main material, one of which is in the area of Wadas Village. From here, protests and rejection arose from some citizens when the mining of andesit occurred in their village. The root of this problem was the response of the Wadas citizens because the process

of socialization related to the acquisition of andesit stones for construction materials was not discussed from the beginning. Indeed, what is very unfortunate is that the negotiation process is not created from the outset, tends to be ignored until the conflict grows wider and wider. Besides, there has not been a clear meeting point and further clarity from each side between the government and the public.

As a result, the aspirations that the government and the public are trying to agree through the negotiation process do not necessarily work. Certainly, there is a tendency that the government permits and ignores the voices of the community groups that are around the Andesit stone mining area. The public is disappointed in the unilateral decision of the government and, as a result, generates a conflict that is widening and widespread.



b. Conciliation

The control of a conflict by conducting conciliation that can be realized through certain institutions that enable the creation of a pattern of discussion and decision-making between the parties to the conflict. Reconciliation becomes an important part when conflict escalates and violent or repressive acts occur to the detriment of either side. For example, representatives of citizens joined in the GEMPADEWA (Wadas Village Nature Movement) visited several state institutions scheduled for 23-25 February 2022. These institutions include: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Ministry for Environment and Forestry, Ombudsman, Women's Chamber, Human Rights Chamber, and Presidential Staff Office.

This citizen came to ask for a solution to the andesit rock mining plan for the construction of the Bener Dam.

However, the aspirations and attitudes of Wadas citizens have received varying responses from government agencies. There are some who are pro and supportive of andesit rock mining, but some agencies propose to review the implementation and licensing processes. As a result, no reconciliation efforts were made between the parties.

c. Mediation

Mediation is the process and effort by which parties to a conflict agree to designate a third party. Third parties are then responsible for providing advice in efforts to resolve a conflict between the parties, the government and the public. That way, a more compromise deal could be created. One of them is through the law enforcement

apparatus of the State Business Court Semarang. The mediation attempt was carried out by the mediator judge in the process of negotiation or negotiations between Central Java Provincial Government and the society. The mediator judge facilitated the course of mediation between the two parties as a form of response to the complaint submitted by the citizens in connection with the permission to renew the establishment of the construction site of the Bener Dam in Purworejo district.

d. Arbitration

Arbitration means that the parties to the conflict agree to accept a third party, who has a role in delivering a decision in order to resolve an existing problem. Through this arbitration, the parties in the dispute must accept the decision taken by the arbitrator, because of its absolute nature.

A third party or arbitrator can be a court who is prepared to settle a lawsuit over a conflict that has arisen. In this case, the decision of the judge of PTUN Semarang No. 68/G/PU/2021/PTUN.SMG dated August 30, 2021 issued by PTUN Semarang through a lawsuit made by the citizens of Wadas in connection with the permission to renew the location of land acquisition for the construction of the Bener Dam in Purworejo district, is declared rejected. Although the citizens' lawsuit was rejected by the PUTUN Semarang, it does not indicate who wins or loses, but it is about the truth of attitude and sustainability of life. Regarding the ongoing efforts made when it concerns humanitarian aspects and injustice.

Environmental conflicts have been widely discussed at various global, national and local levels. Moreover, environmental conflicts are always associated



with the roles of the individual actors involved. An actor can be a differentiator in resolving environmental conflicts if it is considered capable of delivering new knowledge. The conflict in Wadas Village is one example of how the role of an actor is so visible in alleviating a problem. The people of Wadas, who were originally very resentful of action and forms of rejection of andesit rock mining, have turned into 'supportive actors'.

The conflict in Wadas shows that the government's approach to suppressing public resistance has not been well implemented. From the conflict that has taken place in Wadas, it is clear that the conflicts that emerge to the surface are vertical and horizontal conflicts. The vertical conflict between the government and the people is caused by a disagreement that ends in the loss of public confidence in the government,

while the horizontal conflict is created because of the pros and cons associated with the andesit mining, involving parties such as government, the public, and the NGO. Thus, this horizontal conflict results in the creation of a gap between government and its people as well as between the Government and NGOs. The distance is born from the form of disappointment and frustration shown by the people as a result of the authority or decisions taken by the Government against the reality of the problem. The runaway of social and cultural values, arbitrary actions, and dehumanization are basic examples in it. As a result, society will become fragmented in the capture of existing situations, excessive anxiety and fear of the survival of life ahead because of the loss of their livelihoods (Astuti, 2012).

The people of Wadas Village have become 'pro-building the Bener Dam', of course because of the negotiations and compromises that have been agreed afterwards. One real form can be seen from the right to damages on land paid at a high price. From here, it can be seen that there is a shift in the narrative below by the actor against the miner andesit to the 'pro' actor of the mining. The way that this counter-actor built is from environmentalism

for nature to environmentalism for profit. That means that, there has been an agreement between the public, the government, and NGOs in breaking the chain of prolonged conflict. There's a dynamic process of resistance to resilience. Retrieved from the mass media NUonline on February 12, 2022, as follows:

"Why are we willing to surrender our land to the material of the Bener Dam, because of the wealth of the people. As a farmer,

Picture 5. Compensation for the losses to the Wadas Society



Source: Investor.id



I want our lives to be better than ever before,” Sabar said. “In addition, the government has promised to plant mines as a tourist destination. “The government has planted them as tourist sites. So this is the reason we’re willing to give up our land because we think the government has done no harm, both in terms of price and promise. That’s why we’re willing,” clearly. (NUonline, 2022).

The underlying reason emerging from Wadas citizens is that citizens will accept andesit mining because it is entirely a government-run program. Therefore, Mr. Sabar believes that the government will compensate for the nominal losses by a large amount. For example, by compensating for land losses belonging to citizens, which can reach 5-8 billion.

“So we agreed we can give up our rights. We have no burden, no compulsion whatsoever anyone to give up the right. We also always socialize to anyone. For me there are no pros and cons because we are always socializing,” Sabar said.

Besides, there is another Wadas citizen, Khoirul Rizal who initially made a rejection by taking part in a demonstration then turned into agreeing to an andesit stone mine. He accepted a loss of 3 billion that would be used to build a store.

“Yes, I used to refuse because it was from my own discretion. In addition to adding experience and information from the side what it looks like and what this side looks like,” said after receiving compensation money at the Wadas Village Hall, Friday (4/11/2022) (Investor.id).

The above picture shows that there has been a process of payment of land damages belonging to residents in the village hall, Friday, November 4, 2022. The payment of damages is a government commitment to pay the land belonging to the citizens whose location is affected by the occurrence of mining activities and used as construction material of the Bener Dam. Later, the same thing was also launched by Zaenal Arifin who previously strongly rejected the mining of Andesit stone. However, he accepted the mine andesit because of the damages on three areas of land he owned amounting to 8 billion. Thus, a total of approximately 193 billion damages have been liquidated by the Government according to the report of National Economic Agency of Purworejo Regency.

The writers realize when the people who were initially opposed became pro, because they felt that compensation for losses was enough to meet their needs. The government has also approached the people of Wadas so that their land can be sold into a feasible thing. Then, from environmentalism for nature to environmentalism for profit is a key indicator that forests that used to be protected for their sustainability, are lost when they can be sold at a high price.

Conclusion

Sustainable development, which is seen as modernization, turns out not all can have a positive impact on the local population. Development has always been judged to sacrifice everything that is considered important to the life of society. The way the actors are built is very different. The discourse built by the government believes



that the forest can be used as a profit, if the construction of the Bener Dam remains in place while the locals believe that the woods should be preserved. In the political concept of the discourse itself, certain marginalized groups are constantly trying to oppose forms of hegemony and reopen the boundaries that have created the power gap. The locals have always rejected anything that could take away their living space.

In this study, the main issues raised are related to the environmental discourse from environmentalism for nature to environmentalism for profit conducted by local citizens. In the context of the discourse environmentalism for nature, citizens are opposed to andesit stone mining, so they do a rejection with a repertoire, that is, a symbolic action. The purpose of the local people to take action

is to prevent andesit stone mining from happening. Actually, they agreed to the construction of the Bener Dam, but they refused when the material for building the dam had to take away their living space.

Moreover, in spite of the compensation made by the government, the citizens refused to consider that compensation for the loss did not meet their living needs. However, when the amount of compensation exceeded the amount due by the Government, the local people became pro with the mining of andesit stone and their land could be used for mining. The form of compensation only limits the material losses experienced by the Wadas community, without considering the long-term effects of the loss of land and livelihoods. As a result, citizens are affected by the patterns and ways shown by the government. People in Wadas Village are more

realistic and take a supportive stance as there is negotiation or negotiations going on. Then, the discourse built by the people here has changed, that is to say, to become environmentalism for profit.



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
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Three Faces of the PKS Political Party in the Formulation of the New Energy and Renewable Energy Bill

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Abstract

Political parties play an important role in aggregating people's interests, including in the formulation of the New Energy and Renewable Energy Bill (RUU EBET) or the EBET Bill, both at the central and regional levels. This study aims to look at the dynamics between the three faces of a political party, namely the party in the public office, central office, and at the grassroots level (Katz & Mair 1993), during the formulation of RUU EBET or the EBET Bill. Using the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) as a case study, this research finds that parties in the public and central office actually depoliticize the roles of parties at the grassroots level. This depoliticization manifests itself in three ways: (1) assumptions about the inability of party structures at the regional level to discuss the EBET issues, (2) not including the interests of developing EBET at the regional level as part of the EBET Bill, and (3) narrow definitions and restrictions of the EBET Bill as a central and elite issue.

Keywords: *New energy; renewable energy; political parties; public policy; EBET Bill*

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Introduction

This paper seeks to analyze the role of parties at the grassroots level using a case study of the New Energy and Renewable Energy Bill (RUU EBET) discussion within the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). The selection of PKS as a case study is because the party was one of the three factions in the People's Representative Council of Indonesia (DPR) that expressed their opinion on local stakeholder's involvement in the formulation of RUU EBET (the EBET Bill henceforth). Ironically, we found an exclusion mechanism perpetuated by the party's structures in the public and central offices toward the grassroots level. Instead of explicitly excluding and negating the role of parties at the grassroots level, the public and central offices excluded covertly by stating that the EBET Bill discussion was "not

a concern" of parties at the grassroots level. To understand this phenomenon, we use the three faces of political parties and depoliticization theory as our theoretical framework. The questions are how stakeholders at the grassroots level participate in the case of policy advocacy for the EBET Bill and whether they have any policy advocacy power or their role is merely proforma in official party forums.

The over-dependence on fossil energy and demands from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change in 2016 has forced Indonesia to make an energy transition. One of the steps taken towards this transition is to encourage the ratification of the EBET Bill. This bill promotes the use of new and renewable energy through four steps: (1) setting national targets for new energy and renewable energy, (2) increasing the accessibility and availability of new energy and



renewable energy, (3) providing financial support and incentives, (4) establishing stringent regulations and arrangements regarding new and renewable energy, and (4) increasing investment in new energy and renewable energy. The bill was first proposed by the Government of Indonesia in 2013 but has only been passed recently. The discussion was heated with debates, both inside and outside of the parliament.

In the parliament, the debates over the EBET Bill cover technical matters, i.e., the use and development of new and renewable energy, such as the debate over the implementation of the feed-in tariff scheme in the development of new and renewable energy through Article 51. This scheme regulates the provision of financial incentives to private producers of new and renewable energy as the main suppliers of national energy

(Couture et al., 2010). The aim is to boost the development of new and renewable energy, especially from the private sector. However, the concern is that this scheme will increase the electricity prices from new and renewable sources for the public (sindonews.com, 2021). Another technical issue concerns the development of nuclear energy, regulated in Article 7. Some observers think that Indonesia is not yet ready to develop nuclear energy due to issues in security, technical expertise, transmission and distribution, and geographical conditions (cnnindonesia.com, 2022). The next technical issue regarding the EBET Bill is about the division of authority between the regional and central governments. In this bill, the regional government bears the responsibility to provide facilities and infrastructure for

the development of renewable energy but without proper budgeting powers and schemes (PUSHEP, 2021).

Meanwhile, outside the parliament, the pressure is more substantial than technical, such as the demand to involve the regional community in the development of new and renewable energy. The motivation is not solely democratic but also rational, considering the negative impacts of such energy development on the regional community. This condition can be observed in the development of geothermal energy in Banjarnegara, Central Java, by one of the State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN), PT Geo Dipa Energi. The exploration and exploitation of geothermal energy have caused environmental problems, which have prompted protests from the community. The Central Java Indonesian Forum for the Environment (WALHI) found

that the company's operations have caused water and air pollution in Banjarnegara. The water pollution can be observed from changes in the color and taste of water in one of the villages, Karangtengah Village (Laila et al., 2022). This pollution will likely expand because the Sethulu Spring, the main source of water, will continue to be contaminated by the company's operations. Furthermore, the air pollution is apparent from the death of a worker due to a toxic gas leak on March 12, 2022, caused by the poor management of toxic gas disposal (Muharman et al., 2022).

Another demand is to develop new and renewable energy at the regional level. The Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY) is one of the provinces that has the potential to develop new energy and renewable energy. According to Sugiyono (2010), there are two reasons to earmark DIY.



First, there is no source and potential for developing fossil energy, such as fuel, gas, and coal, in DIY. The fossil energy demand in the province is supplied by other provinces. Second, there is a potential for the development of renewable energy sources, such as biofuels (BBN), biogas, micro-hydropower plants (PLTMH), wind power plants (PLTB), and solar power plants (PLTS). In fact, DIY has attempted to develop these renewable energy sources in various regions, such as Gunungkidul and Kulon Progo.

Gunungkidul has independently established a solar-power plant named PLTS Atap, which successfully produces 7,500 Watts of electrical power, sufficient to supply the electricity for the lighting of one hamlet in Piyaman Village (merdeka.com, 2021). Meanwhile, in the Kalibawang Irrigation Area in Kulon Progo,

three hamlets, namely Jurang, Kedungrong, and Semawung, are currently developing alternative micro-hydropower (PLTMH) (harianjogja.com, 2019). It is believed that, when utilized optimally, the PLTMH can produce up to 700 kilowatts of electricity. Unfortunately, these endeavors to develop energy independently are constrained by the lack of support and funding from the DIY government.

Such problems and opportunities in the efforts to develop new and renewable energy at the regional level were not highlighted in the debate on the formulation of the EBET Bill at the People's Representative Council of Indonesia (DPR). This can be seen from the opinion notes of the DPR RI factions on the EBET Bill. Of all the factions expressing opinions, only the Democrat, National Democrat (Nasdem), and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)

factions mentioned the regional stakeholder's involvement in the development of the EBET Bill. This undermines the function of political parties as actors aggregating public interests (Randall & Svasand, 2002) in policy-making.

Literature Review

Party studies have contributed to the development of modern political science. One prominent approach to reviewing problems in political parties is that developed by Katz and Mair (1993), namely the theory of the three faces of political parties. The three faces consist of parties in the public office, parties in the central office, and parties in the grassroots, often used to dissect and analyze the workings of a party. This theory is also used to analyze the behavior of political parties that specifically seek to respond to or formulate a policy.

Ramadhan (2018) researched the role of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) for DKI Jakarta Province in the formulation of labor policy in DKI Jakarta. The study seeks to explain the responses and actions of PDI-P on labor issues in Jakarta province. Ramadhan dissects PDI-P into the three faces and analyzes their roles and relations. The findings show that the PDI-P in DKI Jakarta only carried out labor policy advocacy at the public office level, one of which was pushing for the revision of Jakarta Regional Regulation Number 6 of 2004 concerning Manpower. Meanwhile, parties at the grassroots level are positioned as helpless entities subjected to coordination and direction from the central and public offices.

Similarly, Widiyanto's (2022) research on PDI-P autonomy in Surakarta examines the PDI-P party organs into three typologies



of party faces and then explores the extent to which the party at the grassroots level is autonomous from the other two party super-structures. This study found that PDI-P has a centralized structure that has implications for the political resources at the central and public offices. The party has a strong mass base in Central Java. However, when the political choices of PDI-P cadres at the grassroots level are not in line with the central and public offices, they are left with two choices: submit to the center or leave the party. This research briefly tapped into the informal coordination of PDI-P cadres at the grassroots level with some of their informal sympathizers. It did not explore other dimensions because the cadre's choices were reduced to two: submit or leave.

Outside Indonesia, similar studies have been conducted, including research by Crulli

(2021) and Roewer (2020) in Italy. Crulli's study seeks to explain the evolution of a populist Italian Five-Star Movement party from 2009 to the present. This populist party deviates from the norm and has evolved into a state-centric party. The findings of this study conclude that it is caused by the helplessness of internal party organs, especially at the grassroots level, against pressure from party actors in the public and central offices. Meanwhile, Roewer's research in Italy shows that the National League for Democracy (NLD) party has developed into a centralized party because it was pressurized by military-authoritarian political actors, who intervened in the party's internal organs, especially those in the central and public offices.

Various studies using the three-faced approach of political parties have emphasized the dominance and power of the party

in the public and central offices in internal party organization and policy formulation. Less attention is paid to the role of parties at the grassroots level despite their important role. Dalton and Wattenberg (2002) stated that there are at least four functions that can only be carried out by parties at the grassroots level: (1) political education, (2) simplification of political choices, (3) identity formation and public loyalty, and (4) mass mobilization at the grassroots level. Despite their importance, these roles are under-researched. Therefore, this research aims to identify a party's political agency at the grassroots level. By using the formulation of the EBET Bill as a case study, this study identifies the political agency of the Regional Leadership Council (DPW) of PKS as an organ of a political party at the grassroots level in negotiating with the public office and central offices.

Three Faces of a Political Party

For Katz and Mair, analyzing a political party as an organization with multiple elements or faces is more productive than using simple dichotomies, such as parliamentary versus extra-parliamentary or leaders versus followers. Therefore, political parties are divided into three faces, namely, parties in the public office, parties on the ground, and parties in the central office. This division sees the role of political parties at different levels and places. The three faces are followed by their respective resources, constraints, opportunities, and motivations.

Regarding parties in public office, Katz and Mair highlight members of political parties currently occupying the public office. Actors in this face can be driven by several objectives,



including material gain, power, and status (Katz & Mair, 1993, p. 594). The important characteristic of this face is its transience. Public positions cannot be occupied forever, so the actor concerned must be re-elected to maintain their position. This is also the first obstacle of this face. The need to win the general election (Pemilu) forces the actor to balance between the electoral process and other elements that contribute to the success of the campaign. The second obstacle is the public office's responsibility as a government, as parties that enter the government must be sensitive to the public welfare. Nonetheless, this face has its advantages, namely the governmental decision-making authority (e.g., voting policies, directing bureaucrats, etc.), patronage, time, experts, and information (Katz & Mair, 1993, p. 596).

Parties on the ground refer to ordinary party members, party activists, donors, supporters, and sympathizers, as well as loyal voters. Katz and Mair (1993, p. 597) do not limit the actors in this face with formal membership, so the key characteristics are voluntary, permanent, and regular membership. The motivations are not far from public goals (e.g., access to policies), symbolic, and solidarity. Even though it sounds simpler than the previous face, the party on the ground has important resources, namely labor, voice, money, and local knowledge to the party. However, this face also has its own obstacles, namely the inability to have direct access to government decision-making and the voluntary nature of parties on the ground (Katz & Mair, 1993, p. 598). Therefore, the leader of the party on the ground must win the hearts of the party members.

Parties in the central office are those who occupy positions in political parties at the national level. In Indonesia, this face can be understood as the Central Leadership Council (DPP) of a party. According to Katz and Mair (1993, p. 600), this face is relatively ambiguous because many actors in the central office overlap with the other two faces. The resources of this face are centralization, expertise, formal position at the top of the party, and ability to do assigned work. These resources provide the central office with several functions, namely as the nucleus of the other two faces of the party, controlling the parties on the ground on behalf of the parties in the public office and, vice versa, providing various services for them. Even so, the central office still has obstacles. First, the central office functions only if the members are unified. Second, the central office cannot

implement public policies. Third, when alternative ways are found to complete the work assigned to the central office, the value of central office resources also decreases.

Using the framework of the three faces of the party, the analysis of the dynamics of political parties does not stop within parliament but extends to the internal organs. Understanding the internal dynamics is important for mapping actors at various levels and understanding the connectivity between these actors. In this case, the actors to be analyzed are those in PKS. The question to be answered is what role the three faces of parties in PKS play in drafting the EBET Bill.

Data was obtained from primary and secondary sources. The primary source for the face of the party on the ground is interviews with the Yogyakarta Regional Leadership Council



(DPW) in the Economic, Finance, Technology, and Environment (Ekuintek-LH) section. The three interviewees were the Head of the Ekuintek-LH Division of the DPW PKS Yogyakarta, Ms. Ekantini; the Head of the Department of Economics and Finance, Mr. Basith; and the Head of the Technology and Environment Department, Mr. Ipung. The primary source for the faces of the party in central and public offices is interviews with members of the DPR from the PKS faction, Diah Nurwitasari, and her expert staff. The secondary source is from the archives of the DPR regarding the faction's views and opinions on the EBET Bill.

Results and Discussion

A Brief History of PKS

The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) is an Islamic political party in Indonesia that, to date,

maintains its representatives in the People's Representative Council (DPR RI). PKS has an Islamic ideological orientation that is different from other Islamic parties in Indonesia, such as the United Development Party (PPP), the National Awakening Party (PKB), and the National Mandate Party (PAN), all of which have an Islamic-nationalist ideology. The ideology of PKS is relatively more conservative than these three parties, which means a more robust application of Islamic principles that reflects pure Islamic teachings (Rahmat, 2008).

The establishment of this political party was a dynamic process. The journey of the founders of PKS dates back to the New Order era when these groups were on a mission to oppose the New Order regime, which was considered deviant and unjust towards the general public (*ummah*) (Basyir, 2014).

The forerunners of PKS started with *da'wah* groups under the Campus Da'wah Institute (LDK) in the 1970s. The LDK movement delivered its missions through recitations and student activities on campus due to restrictions on religious-related activities in the New Order era.

The situation changed slightly when President Soeharto, in the 1990s, took a different approach to the Islamic group's movement. Instead of responding with repressive measures, Soeharto acted more subtly toward Islamic groups by making them allies. The movements on campus gradually changed their name to the Tarbiyah Movement. Tarbiyah activists come from various backgrounds, from academics to former activists from the Masyumi Party, which Suharto disbanded in the early days of his leadership (Arrasyid et al., 2020). This allowed

the Tarbiyah Movement to expand its network and influence in various ways, both on campus and outside campus.

The turning point was in 1998 when the reformation era started. The fall of the New Order regime was the gateway for Tarbiyah to play a more active role in Indonesian society. This group of intellectuals fought for the establishment of a party grounded in Islamic teaching and called it the Justice Party (PK). PK was declared at the Al Azhar Mosque, South Jakarta, on August 19, 1998, with the first Party President, Nur Mahmudi Ismail. With its intellectual background, PK seeks to correct the stigma in society by presenting educated intellectuals from the United States, presenting an image that PK is not an extreme Islamic political party.



After taking part in the first election in 1999, PK obtained only seven seats in the DPR RI. At that time, the election constitution of the Republic of Indonesia did not allow PK to continue to exist as a political party. PK was presented with two choices: it must change the name and symbol of the party, or else it would be disbanded. PK agreed to transform and join the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) by changing the name and symbol of the party that we know today. Then, the new PKS was declared on April 20, 2002, at the Silang National Monument Square, Central Jakarta, with the Party President Hidayat Nur Wahid.

The new PKS took part in its first election in 2004 and passed the parliamentary threshold of the DPR RI by securing 45 seats, or an equivalent of 7.34%. Since then, PKS has consistently won around 7-8% of the votes in every election in Indonesia,

with the most recent held in 2019. With a background in political ideology and the strength of its activists, PKS is currently active in the political arena in Indonesia by continuously recruiting and regenerating through various networks and party wings. This political party's cadre system adopted various methods, one of which has survived to this day is the Tarbiyah (education) method which is similar to the violent Islamic movement in Egypt.

However, PKS is now transforming into an Islamic party with a more moderate ideology. Since 2020, PKS has had the vision to become an Islamic party that is *rahmatan lil alamin*, strong, and at the forefront, serving the nation and state of Indonesia. The party's mission is to increase the number of party members in accordance with the values and principles of PKS as a political party. In a more general sense, the mission is to become

a pioneer in serving the Indonesian people and supporting the wider community (*ummah*). In line with the founders' missions, PKS seeks to revive the spirit of youth activeness in society.

Just like other parties, structurally, PKS has management from the central to regional levels. At the central level, PKS has a Central Executive Board (DPP). The PKS DPP has a national (Indonesian) management scale led by a Party President. Like other Islamic parties, at the central level of the PKS DPP, there is also a Shura Council led by the Chairman of the Shura Council. At the provincial level, PKS has a Regional Management Council (DPW) led by a chairman. At the district/city level, PKS has a Regional Management Council (DPD). At all levels of regional management, both

the DPW and the PKS DPD have a Regional-level Party Advisory Council led by a Chairman of the Advisory Council.

PKS in Public and Central Offices

The issue of the EBET Bill in the public office is on the agenda for discussion for Commission VII, which is engaged in the scope of energy, research and innovation, and industry, at the DPR RI. There are 49 members of the DPR RI who are members of this commission. Commission VII is chaired by Sugeng Suparwoto from the National Democrat (NasDem) party faction and four vice chairman, namely Dony Maryadi Oekon from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) faction, Maman Abdurrahman from the Golongan Karya (Golkar) party faction, Bambang Haryadi from the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) faction, and



H. Eddy Soeparno from the National Mandate Party (PAN) faction. There are five members of DPR RI from the PKS faction who are members of this commission, namely H. Tifatul Sembiring, H. Rofik Hananto, H. Mulyanto, Nurhasan Zaidi, and Hj. Diah Nurwitasari.

The views of the PKS faction regarding the EBET Bill were also published in the DPR archives. In general, the PKS faction agreed to ratify the EBET Bill with several notes. The faction believes that the energy transition from non-renewable energy to EBET is urgent in Indonesia (DPR RI, 2023). Environmental preservation needs to be a priority, but such energy transition cannot be carried out without clear planning.

Member of the Republic of Indonesia DPR, Diah Nurwitasari, conveyed twelve important notes regarding the EBET Bill. First, the EBET Bill and its derivative

regulations must be clear and not conflict with other laws and regulations. Second, the transition from fossil energy to EBET must be gradual and with a clear deadline. At this point, PKS expressed the urgency to replace diesel power plants that were no longer economical with EBET power plants. Third, PKS does not want a “bigger peg than the pole” incident in EBET research and exploration.⁵ This means that the economic benefits of EBET must be greater than the research and exploration costs.

In the next point, PKS wants the government to be realistic too. Although it is important to encourage EBET, the use of fossil energy cannot be completely eradicated. This takes into account the uncertain global political climate, such as the Ukrainian-Russian war. Fifth, PKS prioritizes domestic EBET

⁵ Interview with Diah Nurwitasari, member of the DPR RI PKS faction

producers. Sixth, the purchase of electricity from EBET must pay attention to the capabilities of the State Electricity Company (PLN). Seventh, PKS demands clear rules regarding the Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard (SPET) and the development of EBET, which are not environmentally friendly.

Eighth, PKS expects proper funding to accelerate the development of EBET in Indonesia. Ninth, PKS supports EBET innovation research and development activities. Tenth, PKS expects the active role of local governments in developing EBET so that electricity supply to remote areas can be accommodated and EBET-producing areas can be prioritized. Eleventh, PKS supports the government in conducting EBET coaching. However, if this coaching does not run optimally, PKS suggests

working with a credible party. Finally, PKS demands stringent law enforcement for those who violate the EBET regulations.

Furthermore, the PKS faction, through Diah, also revealed additional notes regarding the government's commitment to the energy transition and the development of EBET.⁶ According to the PKS faction, the government does not take this issue seriously, as reflected in the delay in sending the Problem Inventory List (DIM) from the government to the DPR RI. Apart from that, the PKS faction also highlighted the absence of an energy roadmap in Indonesia. Without a clear roadmap, the implementation of the energy transition in Indonesia may not succeed.

The PKS faction also tends to reject the idea of the power wheeling scheme, a direct

⁶ Interview with Diah Nurwitasari, member of the DPR RI PKS faction



electricity distribution scheme from the private sector through borrowing (leasing) PLN's electricity lines, at RUU EBET.⁷ They added that, although the practice of power wheeling was commonplace abroad, electricity distribution monopolized by PLN would not work well in Indonesia. The PKS faction also understands the huge burden borne by PLN if power wheeling is allowed for EBET. They consider the rent costs, maintenance of the PLN electricity network, and overloaded electricity supply in Java. The suggested middle ground is a selective power wheeling scheme, whereby it is only permitted in areas with low electricity supply.

Various notes from the PKS faction regarding the EBET Bill are the result of discussions by members of the DPR RI who are engaged in the DPP PKS

Ekuintek-LH field. This shows that discussions on the EBET Bill are still being carried out at the central level, not yet reaching the regional level, let alone the grassroots. In the view of Diah and her expert staff, the absence of party faces at the regional level in the EBET discussion is caused by the nature of energy issues, which is arguably elitist. The issue of energy, especially EBET, may not be well understood by the general public.

“When we talk about fuel prices, all of them, from parties on the ground, to the public office, to the central office, must be unified in their voices. But, for EBET, I don’t think they understand much either. When we talk to them, they also don’t know or don’t understand the issue. So actually, this issue has little relevance to actors at the regional level.”⁸

7 Interview with Pranoto, PKS DPP expert staff

8 Interview with Pranoto, PKS DPP expert staff

For PKS, the sensitivity of the Indonesian people towards green energy and environmental preservation is still minimal. In terms of energy, for example, people generally do not care what power plant their electricity comes from as long as the electricity is available in their homes. Therefore, extra efforts are needed to educate the public regarding the urgency of the energy transition, which will involve the faces of parties at the regional and grassroots levels. This is why PKS parties are reluctant to coordinate with party officials at the regional level.

PKS actually has a mechanism to coordinate with party officials at the regional level. The party claims that the communication channel between the DPP and party organs at the regional level is excellent and structured.⁹ They have an open house scheme

that opens opportunities for cadres at the regional level to express their concerns. PKS also accommodates concerns online through various short message applications. These two mechanisms tend to be informal. For the formal mechanisms, PKS will usually hold discussions through the National Working Conference (Mukernas), scientific forums, and various socializations, which tend to be top-down rather than bottom-up. In a sense, the PKS DPP acts more as a patron directing the understanding and actions of cadres at the regional level. This also applies to the issue of the EBET Bill. PKS has a short- and long-term orientation to educate and equalize understanding of EBET issues at the regional level first, assuming that party organs at the regional level have a lower understanding of the issue dynamics.

⁹ Interview with Diah Nurwitasari, member of DPR RI PKS faction



However, an interview with DPW PKS Yogyakarta showed otherwise. The DPW PKS, as a party institution at the grassroots level, is by no means an entity that does not understand and does not study EBET issues. The author finds that the face of PKS on the ground in Yogyakarta shows sensitivity, knowledge, and even concern about the EBET Bill, which has not been heard at the central level of PKS. DPW PKS has even taken several actions to encourage sustainable EBET management, at least at the regional level.

PKS at the Grassroots Level

Referring to Katz and Mair (1993), political parties need to be seen as organizations consisting of various faces that interact with each other. That way, a party has the potential for fragmentation regarding strategic issues. This condition can be observed from

the relationship between the PKS organizational structure at the central level, both those in the DPP and those holding public positions, and the PKS organizational structure at the regional level, i.e., the DPW.

Although structurally, the DPW PKS Yogyakarta is a delegate from the face of the party that occupies the center. They cannot be called an extension of the central office. Our findings show that the DPW PKS Yogyakarta has its own specific political agency regarding the condition of EBET issues in the region, which is related to the debate on the EBET Bill. The opinion of the DPP PKS, which stated that the issue of the EBET Bill was a “difficult” and “irrelevant” issue at the regional level, was refuted by Ekantini’s statement, Head of the Department of Economics and Finance of the DPW PKS Yogyakarta, as follows.

"PKS's view of the EBET Bill is actually in several official party publications. PKS actually often publishes about the faction's response to bills and laws, especially bills, because inputs from the public are needed before the law is passed. In fact, we discussed this PKS view at the end of March 2023, but in fact, we could read the final response to the bill around July 2022. Almost a year. Then the final response was that the government did not immediately include this Problem Inventory List (DIM). A bill without DIM is actually unable to answer the problems faced by this nation. DIM is a series of requirements needed to become law. If you read this, there are actually five PKS responses, but actually, there are twelve."¹⁰

10 Interview with Ekantini, Head of the Department of Economics and Finance DPW PKS Yogyakarta

Ekantini's statement shows that the PKS DPW, as a party structure at the grassroots level, has a fairly comprehensive general understanding of the EBET Bill. Even though the DPP PKS stated that the DPW may not understand the problems related to the EBET Bill, it turned out that the DPW PKS had a detailed understanding of the dynamics of the EBET Bill. This can be seen from how the PKS DPW understands that the PKS DPP is concerned about the Indonesian Government's delay in sending DIM to discuss the EBET Bill. The PKS DPW can even explain in detail the twelve arguments for the PKS DPP's response to the EBET Bill.

Furthermore, the DPW PKS also has different and specific views on new and renewable energy issues. Ekantini stated that, within the scope of Yogyakarta, EBET is not a new issue. This issue has been



discussed for a long time at the provincial level since 2000. In fact, the draft of local regulations related to EBET has been initiated since 2018. Ekantini said that EBET is not just a national or regional need. The two domains must work together so that the resulting legal products can be synergistic and able to provide input for the EBET Bill at the central level.

In addition, the Yogyakarta DPW PKS considers that the EBET Bill does not yet have a clear priority, so the concern is that the legal product will further boost the consumption of new energy instead of renewable energy. In this case, the PKS DPW's opinion aligns with the PKS DPP's opinion regarding the lack of priority and delays in DIM. However, unlike the PKS DPP, the Yogyakarta PKS DPW did not explicitly show its support for the outline of the EBET Bill which is currently rolling out at the central

level.¹¹ If the DPP PKS views the regions as entities that “have difficulty to understand” and are “irrelevant” in the discussion of the EBET Bill, the DPW PKS actually sees great potential in developing EBET at the regional level, especially in Yogyakarta.

In fact, several areas in Yogyakarta have developed renewable energy, such as Kulon Progo and Gunung Kidul. The development of alternative energy in Kulon Progo can be seen from the existence of a micro-hydropower plant in the Kalibawang Irrigation Area, which was built in 2012. The power plant utilizes wastewater from the Progo River in the primary ditch of irrigation canals in Kedungrong Hamlet, Jurang Hamlet, and Semawung Hamlet. Apart from these villages, several areas in Kulon Progo have the potential to develop micro-hydropower.

11 Interview with Ekantini, Head of the Department of Economics and Finance DPW PKS Yogyakarta

Experts say that the power plant is capable of producing up to 700 kilowatts of electricity if it can be processed optimally. However, the development of alternative energy is constrained by the district government's budget, so support from the central government is needed.

In Gunungkidul, the solar-powered energy source has been operating since 2018. Developed independently, the alternative energy is capable of producing 7,500 watts of electrical power. In addition to being able to reduce dependence on the use of electricity from fossil energy sources, the power plant helps reduce the expenses of micro, small, and medium enterprises.

"If we look at Indonesia, there is quite a lot of potential for new and renewable energy. Yogyakarta is one of the pioneers in the development of new

and renewable energy. [Renewable energy] in Yogyakarta has been around for a long time, but the most famous one was around 2000-2018 when Gunungkidul developed wind and water energy for fishermen. Then, there was also a development in Kulon Progo. Our regencies/cities already have concerns about working on draft local regulations regarding this."¹²

On the other hand, the DPW PKS also critically debated the discourse on "new energy" and "renewable energy" in the EBET Bill, which is rarely even mentioned at the central level. In the EBET Bill, these two discourses lead to different debates. In Article 1 of the general provisions of the EBET Bill, new energy is defined as a type of energy originating or produced from new technologies

¹² Interview with Ekantini, Head of the Economics and Finance Department of Yogyakarta DPW PKS



for processing non-renewable energy sources and renewable energy. Meanwhile, renewable energy is defined as energy that originates or is produced from renewable energy sources.

Further explained, Article 9 of the EBET Bill states that new energy consists of several sources, such as nuclear, hydrogen, methane gas from, liquefied coal, gasified coal, and other new energy sources. Ipung, the Head of the Yogyakarta PKS DPW Technology and Environment Department, said that there is confusion in the discussion of new energy in the EBET Bill, which is contrary to the target of a sustainable energy transition. The central government encourages investment and development of sustainable new energy, such as nuclear energy. In fact, this energy has emissions that are not friendly to the environment and are not conducive if applied

in disaster-prone areas, such as Indonesia. Academic papers in the EBET Bill do not provide further explanation about the side effects of nuclear and its handling, which can take up to thousands of years.

"In fact, if we look at the academic papers, this bill is not too far from the 2007 Energy Law. Many chapters and articles repeat the essence of the law. What is somewhat ambiguous is the new energy. If we look at the articles, they immediately raise an issue of nuclear management. Well, we read the current government, and in the future, it seems that new energy development will focus on nuclear energy. Technically, the issue of nuclear power has been debated in the world, especially regarding the Fukushima earthquake, which posed a problem to the reactor and eventually shut it down. But this law

actually includes nuclear energy in a separate chapter. We read whether the government prioritizes nuclear development or is in a position as if this law does not talk too much about renewable energy, but more about new energy.”¹³

Apart from the negative externalities in the development of nuclear energy, the Yogyakarta DPW PKS also highlighted the budget allocations presented in the EBET Bill. When the discussion of new and renewable energy is combined into one legal product, which results in an unclear roadmap for a sustainable energy transition, the concern is that a lot of the budget will be allocated to one energy only. The EBET Bill shows a tendency to prioritize new energy, which encourages much of the APBN investment to be

absorbed in fossil and nuclear development. In fact, this energy source can only be managed by large business entities because it requires large financing.

The emphasis presented by Yogyakarta DPW PKS here is the involvement of the local government in terms of management. Management of new energy with large capital will make it difficult for local governments. This process will be significantly different in the case of renewable energy. In other words, the existence of the EBET Bill must encourage the management of renewable energy so that all levels of society can receive the incentives and benefits of the large budget disbursed by the government for the energy transition. This is because renewable energy will open greater opportunities for local governments to the

13 Interview with Ipung, Head of the Department of Technology and Environment DPW PKS



smallest level, such as Village Owned Enterprises (BUMDES) to be actively involved in its management.¹⁴

The DPW PKS expresses its views and concerns regarding the EBET Bill at the National Working Meeting (Mukernas) forum every year. They always encourage the government to ensure there is a clear roadmap for a sustainable energy transition. It is clear that the road map in the energy transition process clarifies the division of roles between the central and regional governments significantly. If the road map is clear, local governments can also carry out programs that align with the law. However, the proposals from the DPW at Mukernas were often not conveyed to the center because there were conflicts with the PKS DPP as the central office, which assumed that the regions were unable to deal with EBET

14 Interview with Ipung, Head of the Department of Technology and Environment DPW PKS

issues and cadres in the public office, who had to negotiate with other parties and the interests of the old energy oligarchy.¹⁵

Parties at the Grassroots Level

Katz and Mair's argument about the three faces of political parties is relevant in the case of the drafting of the EBET Bill. There was a moment when the three faces of PKS aligned in terms of political opinions and choices. However, there are also moments when these three faces show different interests. This difference is obvious when the party structure in the public and central office seeks to depoliticize party political agencies at the grassroots level. This depoliticization is evident in three ways: (1) assumptions about the inability of party structures at the regional level

15 Interview with Basith, Head of the PKS DPW Economics and Finance Department

to discuss the EBET issues, (2) not including the interests of developing EBET at the regional level as part of the EBET Bill, and (3) narrow definitions and restrictions of the EBET Bill as a central and elite issue.

Discussion about the inability of the grassroots party structure to administer the EBET Bill can be seen from the statements of Diah and Pranoto. Diah stated that “it is still a long way to go” to discuss the EBET Bill issue with party officials at the grassroots level. Pranoto also stated that it was “very difficult to imagine” party officials at the grassroots level discussing the EBET Bill issue. These two statements imply that party structures at the grassroots level need to be educated before being invited to discuss and push the formulation of the EBET Bill.

“We have an Aspiration Day forum that functions to accommodate aspirations,

including from the regional level. Cadres in the public office also have a recess period which serves to socialize our views, including about the EBET Bill. Central and regional are relatively the same. We need to unify views through FGDs, scientific forums, etc. The orientation is to build a common understanding.”¹⁶

The urgency to educate party officials at the regional level is questionable. Because, according to our findings, the DPW PKS, as a party administrator at the grassroots level, has a deep and comprehensive understanding of EBET issues. Likewise, the urgency to unify views needs to be questioned as well. This is because the PKS DPW has its own political orientation and choice to develop EBET at the regional level. Uniform

¹⁶ Interview with Diah Nurwitasari, member of the DPR RI PKS faction



understanding and views will only be an excuse to ignore party political agency at the grassroots level. Forums, such as Aspiration Day, Legislative Corner, and FGDs, are nothing but a one-way outreach from the center to the regions.

In addition to the discourse on “incomprehension” which castrates the political agency of grassroots party structure, the depoliticization of the party at the grassroots level is also carried out through the dichotomy of EBET and non-EBET issues. The PKS structure in the public and central offices positions the development of new and renewable energy at the regional level, not as an integral part of the EBET Bill.

“Many local communities have built biomass cofiring and micro-hydropower plants. It is usually developed through BUMDES alone. So, why

is the development of the EBET Bill so slow? There are various factors. One of the factors is the government’s delay in submitting DIM to the DPR. It’s been delayed for months. The government in the G20 seems very serious, but the bill is not being seriously discussed. There are 574 problem lists, and only about 170 have been discussed. Many points have not been discussed. Another factor is the roadmap for the energy transition that the government has not yet discussed. The third problem is about power wheeling. There are still differences of opinion about this.”¹⁷

In the above statement, the party structure in the public and central offices dichotomizes the EBET and non-EBET issues. The development of EBET at the

¹⁷ Interview with Diah Nurwitasari, member of the DPR RI PKS faction



regional level, such as biomass and micro-hydropower, can be completed by organs at the regional level, such as BUMDES. Meanwhile, the issue of the EBET Bill is defined in an elite-centric manner. There are three main issues that are considered to be problems with the EBET Bill: (1) the government's lack of seriousness as shown by the delay in collecting DIM, (2) the absence of a clear energy transition road map, and (3) the debate over the power wheeling scheme. Problems and potential for developing EBET at the regional level are not included in the problems of the EBET Bill.

The final depoliticization mechanism is the affirmation that the EBET Bill is an elite issue that only certain circles understand exclusively. Diah and Pranoto stressed this repeatedly to deny the involvement of party officials at the grassroots level in deliberating the EBET Bill.

"One of the objectives of the EBET Bill is to reduce carbon emissions. But what happened? For example, when the price of pertamax, a type of gasoline that is lower in carbon than pertalite, went up. Were people willing to make sacrifices to spend more money to use pertamax? No, people preferred to return to pertalite, which was cheaper but emits more carbon. Well, this shows that people still lack an understanding of EBET. They are not ready to preserve the environment. It must be admitted that this is indeed an elite issue."¹⁸

The three forms of party depoliticization at the grassroots level by parties in the public and central office castrate the party's political agency at the grassroots level. In fact, contrary to these assumptions, parties

¹⁸ Interview with Diah Nurwitasari, member of the DPR RI, PKS faction



at the grassroots level have a detailed and comprehensive understanding. In fact, they can observe and aggregate their own political interests related to the development of EBET at the grassroots level.

Conclusion

The global demand for an energy transition has forced the Government of Indonesia to formulate supporting laws and regulations, one of which is the EBET Bill. Political parties, as instruments of aggregation and channeling the interests of the people, play an important role in the formulation of this bill. One of its important roles is to coordinate with party structures at the grassroots level to accommodate the interest in issues and develop new and renewable energy potentials at the grassroots level.

Theoretically, the relationship between the three faces of political parties, namely parties in the public office, central office, and grassroots, is not always ideal. Even though they are in the same party organ, the three are often at odds and have conflicting interests. This is evident in the coordination between PKS at the public and central offices with PKS at the grassroots level. The conflict between the two did not take place in a firm and confrontational manner but manifested in depoliticization efforts by the PKS in the public and central offices against PKS at the grassroots level. Nonetheless, PKS, at the grassroots level, was able to show its political agency. They are able to demonstrate in-depth knowledge of new and renewable energy issues and actively aggregate interests in efforts to develop new energy and renewable energy at the regional level.



This finding shows that, in a study of the three faces of political parties, parties in the public and central office are not always the dominant actors. The initial assumption of viewing parties in the public and central office as dominant actors made efforts to review party political agency at the grassroots level more deeply constrained. Therefore, the political agency of each face of the party, especially at the grassroots level, which is often not reviewed in depth, should be the focus of research on the study of the three faces of political parties.



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