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Department of Politics and Government - Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.
Room BA 403, 4th Floor, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada Building, Bulaksumur, Sleman.
Phone +62(0)274 555880
Email: pcd@ugm.ac.id

Aims and Scope:

PCD Journal of South and Southeast Asia's Power, Conflict, and Democracy Studies is an international refereed journal initiated by the Power, Conflict, and Democracy (PCD) consortium, a collaborative work by the University of Colombo in Sri Lanka, Gadjah Mada University in Indonesia, and the University of Oslo in Norway. It is a journal that comprehensively examines the dynamics of power and democracy, including practices of human rights, popular representation, and public policy, particularly, in Indonesia but still giving a space for comparative studies. Invitation is extended to authors with interest in making comparison experiences in Indonesia with those of the rest of the globe. PCD Journal publishes articles, literature review, field notes, and book reviews in major sub fields of political science, human geography, and political anthropology. PCD Journal aims to address some of the most current issues of power, conflict, and democracy in Indonesia with comparative perspective. While the journal is open to all methodological approaches, all submissions are expected to be theoretically grounded. The journal can be of great value to teachers, students, researchers, experts, journalists, and social movement activist dealing with these issues and regions.

Submission

Submitted papers should be no longer than 8,000 words excluding tables and figures. Submit the manuscript via e-mail to the editor-in-chief at pcd@ugm.ac.id.

Manuscript preparation

For detailed instruction check our website: https://jurnal.ugm.ac.id/v3/PCD or http://www.jurnal.ugm.ac.id/pcd.

Peer Review

Every submitted article will be subject to peer review. The normal review period is three months. Most research articles in this journal have undergone rigorous peer review based on initial editorial screening and refereeing by anonymous referees. Authors should take care that the manuscript contains no clues as to identity. Nevertheless, articles published under 'Research Notes' section, aimed at setting up future research agenda, arenonpeer-reviewed.

PCD Programme

The state of democracy in the Global South is marked by a striking paradox: while liberal democracy has attained an ideologically hegemonic position through two socalled waves of democracy, the qualities of such democracies is increasingly called into question. The "old" democracies in the global South like Sri Lanka are weakened. Democracy deficits have emerged within constitutional and institutional arrangements as well as in political practices. Further, the "third wave of democracy "is over. "New" democracies like in Indonesia have fostered freedoms, privatisation and decentralisation but continue to suffer from poor governance, representation and participation.Hence there are general signs of decline. Vulnerable people are frustrated with lack of actual influence and sustained elitism. Politicians winning elections often need to foster ethnic and religious loyalties, clientelism and the abuse of public resources. Powerful groups and middle classes with poor ability to win elections tend to opt for privatisation and return partially to authoritarian governance. Critical questions are therefore asked about the feasibility of democracy in developing country contexts. Some observers say it is only a problem of better crafting of institutions. Others contend that "full" democratisation was premature in the first place and that necessary preconditions need to be created beforehand. Both positions are based on a narrow and static understanding of democracy. While the core elements of democracy are universal, real world democracies develop (or decline) over time and through contextual dynamics; in processes and contexts of actors, institutions

and relations of power. Therefore, the crucial task is to analyse the problems and options of expanding the historically "early" freedoms and deficient elements of democracy that fortunately exist in spite of poor socio- economic and political conditions in counties such as Sri Lanka and Indonesia rather than giving up on these freedoms until the other have somehow improved. This is to advance towards the universally accepted aim of democracy in terms of popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality, and to be able to use democracy to handle conflicts and alter unequal and unsustainable development.

With this in mind, researchers at the University of Oslo (Norway), Gadjah Mada (Indonesia) and Colombo (Sri Lanka) have come together in a collective research— and post- graduate programme. The idea is to pool their research projects and results, and to promote doctoral as well as master studies by way of, first, a joint framework for analysing power, conflict and democracy and, second, a basic electronic peer reviewed journal and report series (published by PCD-Press) to the benefit of students, scholars and priorities in the region. Basic resources—in addition to the participants own voluntary work and projects— are provided by their respective universities and the Norwegian Centre for International Cooperation in Higher Education (SIU).

Content

Contributors to This Edition

Amara Elvita

Amara Elvita | Department of Politics and Government, Gadjah Mada University. Email: amaraelvita@mail.ugm.ac.id

Bara Muhammad Setiadi

Bara Muhammad Setiadi | Department of Politics and Government, Gadjah Mada University. Email: bara.setiadi@mail.ugm.ac.id.

Faris Rubiansyah

Faris Rubiansyah | Department of Politics and Government, Gadjah Mada University. E-mail: farisruby0@gmail.com

Fidiara Maharani

Fidiara Maharani | Works at Indonesia Global Compact Network. The view expressed in this article does not represent the institution where author works. Email: fidiaram0@gmail.com

Ghea Anissah Trinanda

Ghea Anissah | Trinanda Department of Politics and Government, Gadjah Mada University. Email: gheaanissah@mail.ugm.ac.id

Imam Satrio Novianto

Imam Satrio Novianto | Department of Politics and Government, Gadjah Mada University. Email: isatrio90@mail.ugm.ac.id

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Exploring the Relationships Between Democracy and Central Bank Independence: Empirical Evidence from 1989-2014 Panel Data

Bara Muhammad Setiadi[1]

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Abstract

This paper applies fixed-effect panel regression on observational data from both developed and developing countries to test the established models of the impact of democracy, political rights, civil liberties, and political institutions on central bank independence (CBI). Evidence shows that lower civil liberties and political risk statistically influence CBI in both developed and developing countries. The findings also show that well-exercised democracy and political rights significantly influence CBI in developing countries only. By contrast, most political variables do not significantly influence CBI in highly developed countries. Instead, CBI depends on macroeconomic variables such as higher taxes and international debt. These findings provide new insights that differ from previously established results, which predict that CBI is not sensitive to political variables. Overall, this paper reaffirms the interplay between politics (proxied by democratic practices) and economy (proxied by CBI) in the early stages of development which varies across different levels of development.

Keywords: *Central bank independence; Democracy; Civil liberties; Panel data; Comparative politics*

1 Department of Politics and Government, Gadjah Mada University. Email: bara.setiadi@mail.ugm.ac.id.

Introduction

A country's development and economic goals determine whether it needs to maintain an independent central bank. This independence may bring some advantages, such as lower inflation, increased attractiveness for investment, and higher confidence from international organisations. However, forgoing a central bank's independence also has benefits, such as the possibility of a government using the fiscal deficit to induce economic growth, commonly known as the fiscal multiplier effect (Hagedorn et al., 2019).

Central bank independence (CBI) and its relationship with the political system has been a contentious topic in developed countries, especially in Europe, but has been understudied in the context of developing countries. This article aims to fill the gap by studying the relationships using a recent and complete dataset. Improving on Bagheri and Habibi's (1998) model with a newer dataset, this study aims to infer a general relationship and as an exploratory analysis of the relationship between CBI, democracy, political rights, and civil liberties. The model uses a weighted least squares regression analysis examining the relationship between CBI and various variables, i.e., political liberty and stability, and macroeconomic indicators (Bagheri & Habibi, 1998).

This paper retains some of the variables used in Bagheri and Habibi (1998) while using a more complete and recent dataset to determine how the variables influence CBI across nations. Furthermore, the model analysis aims to corroborate the findings on the interaction between political and economic institutions. By detailing how economic and

political democracy intertwine, the findings can inform policy-making by central banks and promote democracy in developing countries.

Furthermore, much of the literature on CBI focuses on its effect on macroeconomic indicators, such as inflation (Berger et al., 2001; Eijffinger & Schaling, 1993; Waller, 1989), economic growth (Alesina & Summers, 1993), and price stability (Klomp & de Haan, 2009; Posen, 1998). More contemporary works, such as Acemoglu et al. (2008), examine economic policy as a whole and take account of constraints, as well as long-run and short-run changes. However, the study highlights only the macroeconomic indicators. Meanwhile, Epstein (2019) modelled monetary policy with four variables: capital-labour relation, industrial-financial relation, central bank independence, and national position in the global economy. In this context, CBI is a contestation for industrialists, labourers, and financiers who seek a looser or tighter monetary policy to suit their interests. However, Epstein's (2019) model has only been tested in OECD countries due to the unavailability of similar indicators in developing countries.

Existing literature in political science or governmental studies has examined case studies in different countries. For example, a past study has shown the politicisation of the Swiss Central Bank as an arena for domestic and foreign capitalist interests due to foreign capital investment (van't Klooster & Fontan, 2019). A previous study has also compared central bank governance practices using comparative case studies between the European Central Bank (ECB) and the United

States Federal Reserve (Pollard, 2003). Meanwhile, Hayo and Hefeker (2002) suggest that an endogenous 'inflation culture' determines inflation and monetary policies more than economic variables. Finally, Goodhart and Lastra (2018) examine the effect of nascent populism on CBI, showing how populism and populist leaders challenged policies aiming for price stability and the distributive consequences.

However, most studies on CBI focus on theoretical or normative grounds. For example, Issing (2006) suggests that the role of CBI is to promote a stability-oriented culture through price stability, thus reflecting national or societal commitment to monetary stability. Another point of contention is the redistributive consequences of CBI. Dietsch (2020) proposed institutional arrangements other than CBI and placed accountability towards monetary policies. Meanwhile, Fernández-Albertos (2015) argues that international cooperation is required because a monetary policy, especially CBI, has a spillover impact. Finally, Watson (2002) questioned the foundation of CBI, which creates an institutional guarantor for the continued reproduction of the current balance of social forces.

Past studies have also examined the relation between CBI and other political variables. For example, Way (2000) tested the relationships between CBI, inflation, unemployment, partisanship, and ideology among 16 OECD countries. Bernhard (1998) asserted that CBI is related to parliamentary variables, such as bicameralism, voter economic class, and the relationship between ruling party legislators and governing ministers.

This study draws on a model based on Bagheri and Habibi (1998), which analyses the effects of political liberty, political regime instability, political risk, and tax revenue on CBI. This paper's novelty lies in two aspects. First, it uses newer datasets, including more countries and longitudinal data from developing countries. Second, it uses fixed-effect panel regression to account for differences between countries. This study establishes that while higher democracy contributes to CBI in developing countries and in general, this is hardly the case in advanced countries, where political variables do not significantly influence CBI or promote a more independent central bank. This implies that the government's choice of central bank policy in developing countries is rooted in political institutions.

Different Measures of Democracy

The debate on what democracy is and how to measure it is ceaseless. Originally, democracy was defined simply as the government of the people for the people articulated through a supposedly free and fair election. However, this simplistic, dichotomous, or binary definition of democracy does not distinguish the quality of democracy. A semi-dictatorship with an election is equivalent to an established democracy since it does not distinguish anything else. Since then, continuous measures of democracy have gained traction as they enable a more substantial analysis of regimes (Wahman et al., 2013).

Coppedge et al. (2011) offered one of the most extensive conceptions of democracy, which proposes a multidimensional definition. It groups democracy into six types: electoral, liberal,

majoritarian, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian. These six conceptions of democracy are distinguished by their primary principle. For example, electoral democracy focuses on competition and contestation, while egalitarian democracy focuses on political equity. In essence, these different conceptions may contradict each other. For example, affirmative action may be suited for egalitarian democracy as it would increase political equity through increased representation of gender or minority. However, from the lens of electoral democracy, affirmative action could be an unnecessary intervention and reduce competition. While these conceptions better capture the complexity of democracy in society, they make it more challenging to analyse with other variables.

Storm (2008) offered an alternative interpretation of the mechanism of democracy, presenting it as a continuum based on Collier and Levitsky (1997): non-democratic electoralist (ED), procedural minimum (PM), expanded procedural minimum (EPM), and prototypical conceptions of established industrial democracy (PCEID). These typologies also have certain elements: reasonably competitive elections, devoid of massive fraud, with broad suffrage (RCE); basic civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, and association (BCL). Elected governments have effective power to govern (EG) and additional political, economic, and social features associated with industrial democracy (AF).

Storm's continuum model adopts Collier and Levitsky's (1997) model of democracy by removing its sequential nature

Figure 1. The Democracy Continuum



Source: Storm (2008)

to create a functional definition of democracy that accounts for regime changes' non-linearity. This model also resolves the question of what a 'maximalist' democracy is. However, this elementary definition is operationally discrete as a variable and unsuitable for numeric analysis.

Considering the shortcomings outlined above, this paper uses an index of democracy used by Teorell and Wahman (2018), which combines Freedom House and the Polity Index. Both indexes are continuous measures that enable the analysis of gradual rather than sudden regime changes, as with typologies such as those presented by Coppedge et al. (2011) and Storm (2008). While a dichotomous model has its methodological merit, this study adopts the continuous measure.

Determining Central Bank Independence and Central Bank Policies

Various studies have attempted to quantify, measure, and index CBI. Grilli et al. (1991) sought to differentiate

between economic and political independence with five indicators: appointments, relationship with government, constitution, monetary financing of budget deficit, and monetary instrument. On the other hand, Cukier et al. (1992) utilise four main indicators: chief executive officer (CEO), policy formulation, objectives, and limitation on lending to the government. More recently, Jácome and Vázquez (2008) have expanded these indices as a longer time series, allowing for comparative cross-sectional and historical data analyses from 1990 to 2002. However, the problem of bias in the dataset remains as it is limited to developed and OECD countries, incorporating only 24 countries. Garriga (2016) incorporated a more complete dataset, including 185 countries from 1970 to 2012. Nevertheless, the most comprehensive dataset by time range is the Central Bank Index Extended by Romelli (2022), which contains data on CBI from 1972 to 2017.

Both the Garriga and Romelli Index assess the central bank's position within the national constitution, legislation, and other legal documents regarding the central bank. The Garriga Index employs 16 indicators in four categories: CEO's characteristics, policy formulation attributions, central bank's objectives, and central bank's limitations on lending to the public sector (Garriga, 2016). Meanwhile, the Romelli Index employs 42 indicators in six categories: governor and central bank board, monetary policy and conflict resolution, objectives, limitations on lending to the government, financial independence, and reporting and disclosure.

The analysis of descriptive statistics shows that these indexes are almost similar. However, the Garriga Index is more lenient in classifying developing countries with higher CBI. To demonstrate the interaction of CBI and democracy, a scatter plot of each index of CBI and democracy is created. Values for democracy scores and CBI are standardised to obtain the distance for each state to the average. The following cases outline policies and historical aspects influencing central banks and CBI at different levels of democracy and CBI. A nation's development status is also obtained from World Bank income classifications.

Figure 2. The distribution between Democracy and CBI



Source: Romelli (2022); Teorell and Wahman (2018)

Figure 3. The distribution between Democracy and CBI



Source: Garriga (2016); Teorell & Wahman (2018)

Particular countries have attractive central bank policies that demonstrate how the CBI functions. For example, with the adoption of the Euro in 1999, the Austrian National Bank (OeNB) is no longer the sole national monetary authority. Like most countries adopting the Euro, OeNB, as the national central bank, must cooperate with the European Central Bank (ECB) to stabilise the currency and achieve other monetary objectives provided that they do not interfere with domestic prices as stipulated in BGBl (Federal Law Gazette) No. 50/1984 as Amended by BGBl (Federal Law Gazette) Part I No. 37/2018). The Governor of the OeNB is also not bound to the OeNB's institution.

Instead, they are bound to the ECB and have a seat and vote on the Governing Council and the General Council of the ECB.

The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) starkly contrasts many central banks because it does not fully operate under a professional board of economists. Instead, the board incorporate industrial stakeholders, such as those representing farmers, trade unions, and manufacturing industries (Eichbaum, 1993). As a result, the appointment of board members is often political. Compared to a classical central bank, which focuses on controlling the twin goals of inflation and unemployment, the RBA also aims to control other macroeconomic indicators such as current accounts, interest rates, and other unspecified risks (Bell, 2004).

Likewise, since establishing a currency board in 1997, the Bulgarian Lev is not managed directly by the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB). Instead, the currency is pegged to another foreign currency: the Deutsche Mark and the Euro subsequently. The BNB cannot print money independently but can still set reserve requirements for domestic banks and manage foreign currency reserves with recommendations from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Avramov, 1999; Gulde, 1999). The Bulgarian National Bank may also extend credit to the government to purchase special drawing rights from the IMF, working as an intermediary.

In Asia, as the de facto central bank, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) can issue currency since its merger with the Board of Commissioners of Currency in 2002 (Woo, 2023; Wood, 1992). After its independence, Goh Keng Swee, the Ministry of Finance of Singapore, made this

decision, noting that countries could not "spend their way to prosperity" (Singapore Board of Commissioners of Currency, 1992). Singapore presents a surprising conundrum: while the MAS has relatively low independence to the political process and low democracy, due to the political consensus, the government has never pressured the MAS to implement any policy against the central bank's decisions or objectives (Redawan, 2023).

While these are not exhaustive examples of how CBI operate, they illustrate how central banks may have varying degrees of independence and distinct functions in different political and economic contexts. Therefore, this study aims to test the established models of the impact of democracy, political rights, civil liberties, and political institutions on CBI.

Methodology

The dataset of cases in this study is accessed from the January 2022 dataset compiled by the Quality of Government Institute. The compiled dataset offers structured panel data, removing the need to merge and clean various data. Furthermore, the dataset is open and available, allowing reproducibility (Teorell et al., 2022). The data is cleaned from observation with no complete value of all covariates, as it is impossible to perform regression on incomplete data. This study includes 1013 observations of 88 states, 60 classified as developing states and 36 as highly developed states for the Garriga Index of CBI. This study also uses another 966 observations of 84 countries, containing 56 countries classified as developing and 37 as advanced, for the Romelli Index of CBI. It must be noted that in one year, a country may be

classified as advanced while it is developing, and vice versa, as the World Bank gradually adjusts its classification.

This study utilises large-N cases from recent data on CBI made available by Romelli (2022) and Garriga (2016). A large-N case is critical to this study as it has advantages over small-N cases. Large-N cases are less prone to selection biases, allowing researchers to incorporate multiple variables into account, and are more suitable for numerical analyses. However, over-generalisation must be avoided, and other avenues to check for validity and robustness in large-N cases must be sought. Considering the number of variables in this data and the goal of this study as an exploratory study, large-N cases are more suitable than small-N cases.

The method in this paper utilises fixed-effect panel regression. Fixed-effect models account for individual subjects as a significant variable variation source. Thus, we assume a different unobserved error component for each country in the constant ai. Generally, fixed-effect models are more suitable when substantial time-invariant heterogeneity exists among entities. However, fixed-effect models do not account for time-variant unobserved factors (Bell & Jones, 2015; Brüderl & Ludwig, 2014). As the sample examined in this paper includes various countries with varying differences in their political and economic systems, the fixed-effect model is more appropriate.

The key advantage of using fixed-effect models is controlling all time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Fixed-effect models are more interested in observing variables with

within-entity variations rather than time-invariant variables. As such, fixed-effect models account for characteristics of individual units that do not change over time, such as culture, history, and other relatively static or difficult-to-measure constructs. As it reduces the heterogeneity bias, the model will be more accurate (Bell & Jones, 2015; Collischon & Eberl, 2020).

However, the disadvantage of fixed-effect models also lies here. Excluding the analysis of time-invariant variables means the inability to capture the effect of cultures and geographic location of each country on CBI. Furthermore, due to the nature of fixed-effect models, each coefficient should be treated as a partial correlation rather than a true causality. Assessing an actual causal effect requires an exogenous shock. It is possible to capture reverse causality when analysing the result of a fixed-effect model (Bell & Jones, 2015; Collischon & Eberl, 2020).

This study considers and makes assumptions when using fixed-effect models. The focus is on each nation's CBI and several fluctuating political variables rather than time-invariant ones. While we do not dismiss the intricacies of culture and international geopolitics, the nature of the fixed-effect model allows us to control them. Additionally, due to the sample size, errors caused by individual crises or events within a country and similar time-variant heterogeneity will be assumed to spread out close to zero.

Modelling the Relationships between CBI, Democracy, Political Rights and Civil Liberties

Although studies have attributed the success of CBI or central bank reform to democracy and democratic institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2008; Way, 2000), few have specifically examined political rights and civil liberty. Among the few is a study by Strong (2021), which asserted civil liberty as a reliable predictor for inflation or lower effect of CBI. Another study by Agoba et al. (2017) uses political rights as a proxy for the institution's quality. Nonetheless, these studies are regionally exclusive to Africa.

To model how CBI interacts with democracy, political freedom, and civil liberties, we create a fixed-effect panel regression model based on replicating variables utilised by Bagheri and Habibi (1998). While we mainly focus on political rights and civil liberties, we also include other variables as control, as with previous models. The model is estimated as follows:

$$\mathrm{CBI}_{it} = a_i + \beta_1 \mathrm{DEM}_{it} + \beta_2 \mathrm{PR}_{it} + \beta_3 \mathrm{CL}_{it} + \beta_4 \mathrm{ECOMP}_{it} + \beta_5 \mathrm{RISK}_{it} + \beta_6 \mathrm{TAXREV}_{it} + \beta_7 \mathrm{DEBT}_{it} + u_{it} \quad (1)$$

Table 1. Variables used in the study

	Variable	Description	Source
Criterion			
	CBI	Central bank independence	Garriga (2016) Romelli (2022)
Predictor			
	DEM	Democracy	Teorell and Wahman (2018)
	PR	Index of political rights	Freedom House (2022)
	CL	Index of civil liberties	
	ECOMP	Index of electoral competition	Vanhanen (2019)
	RISK	Index of political risk	The PRS Group (2022)
Control			
	TAXREV	Percentage of national income as tax revenue	World Bank (2022)
	DEBT	Gross domestic product (GDP) to debt ratio	World Bank (2022)

The Hausman test on various samples is used to select between fixed-effect and random-effect models, as shown in the appendix (Hausman, 1978). Most results indicate that a fixed-effect model is most appropriate for testing. The only exception is the Garriga dataset covering advanced country samples, which indicates that a random-effect model is preferable for testing.

Central Bank Independence

Central Bank Independence (CBI) generally refers to the central bank's independence concerning other political

offices. An independent central bank with a high CBI may set its inflation target and pursue that target using legal instruments with minimal interference from the political system. In contrast, a central bank with a lower CBI is subject to interference from political offices.

While Bagheri and Habibi (1998) used the averaged value of variables of each country of CBI, this study uses longitudinal values for each country and two indexes, the Garriga Index and the Romelli Index, for robustness and triangulation. Both indexes of CBI check for de jure CBI mandated in law and official documents. We changed the indexes from a 0 to 1 numeric scale to a 0 to 100 for legibility. A higher number on the scale corresponds to a more independent central bank.

Democracy

This study utilises Freedom House's rescaled to 0-10 Nations in Transit Index (Teorell & Wahman, 2018). The Nations in Transit Index is one of the most prominent indices of democracy, referred to for both academic and policy comparative analysis alongside The Economist Intelligence Unit Index and Polity Project's Polity V. This index rates a country's democracy from 0, the lowest score, to 10, the highest score of democracy.

These indicators have been scrutinised more recently as they hold stark ideological assumptions about democracy. They are heavily biased towards negative rights, such as freedom from government and institutional intervention, while ignoring socio-economic rights. This bias reflects a neoliberal, market-led understanding of democracy (Giannone, 2010). Another critique is that all

quantitative measures of democracy are inconsistent, especially in transitory or semi-democratic regimes (Högström, 2013).

Nevertheless, this study adopts this index as it provides a cross-sectional base for comparing different nation-states. These indices remain powerful tools for inferring a general pattern in democratic institutions, provided we also consider these biases. The Freedom House index's measurement is imperfect, but it will nonetheless give us a measurement of democracy, provided that it considers the bias in using the Freedom House Index.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties

This study also utilises the "Freedom in The World" dataset, constituting two main categories: political rights and civil liberties. Bagheri and Habibi's (1998) results support the idea that political rights are positively related to CBI. The Freedom House Methodology employs several indicators to measure the categories. Political rights are measured by three indicators: electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of government. Meanwhile, civil liberties are measured in four indicators: associational and organisational rights, the rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights (Freedom House, 2022). Each variable is scored from 1 to 7, with 1 being the highest respect for political rights and civil liberty while 7 being the least respect for either.

Bagheri and Habibi used Gastil's (1990) index of freedom, a precursor to the Freedom in the World dataset. Freedom House adopted Gastil's methodology to create the Freedom in the World

index used in this article. In other words, the Freedom in the World index may be considered a successor or continuation of Gastil's dataset.

Electoral Competition

Initially, Bagheri and Habibi (1998) used the number of coups and assassinations for political instability to discern between party and regime instability. While party instability refers to a regular change that is not uncommon in a democracy, such as the number of electoral support and party changes, regime instability refers to much more radical and destabilising changes, such as coups and assassinations. Therefore, this article instead chooses electoral competition as a better proxy for party instability, especially in stable and developed countries.

This article uses electoral competition from Vanhanen (2019), originally published in Vanhanen (2000). Here, electoral competition is measured as the percentage of vote share obtained by non-coalition parties in presidential states or opposition in parliamentary states. Baghieri and Habibi's (1998) previous results support the hypothesis presented by Cukierman et al. (1992) that party political instability positively correlates with CBI.

Political Risk

Like the previous study, this article uses the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) as another proxy for political instability. The ICRG measures political instability using indicators such as the frequency of coups and revolutions, the potential for civil war, the frequency of political assassination, and the military's political power. Higher scores denote a stable democracy with low risk, while lower scores

denote political instability in the regime (The PRS Group, 2022). However, unlike the previous study, this article uses a panel dataset instead of averaging the ICRG to represent a country.

According to Cukierman and Webb (1995), developing and unstable countries with high political risk have low CBI. This is because countries with authoritarian regimes tend to focus less on monetary austerity and controlling inflation, while unstable regimes focus more on development and survivability.

Tax Percentage of National Revenue and Debt to GDP Ratio

Both variables are treated as control variables, as in Bagheri and Habibi (1998), presuming these variables are accounted for as proxies for the tax system's efficiency. Like in the previous study, both variables were acquired from World Bank data.

Additionally, the tax percentage of national revenue is thought to be positively correlated with CBI. Thus, countries with lower tax composition in their budget tend to compensate with inflation tax and print more money, causing lower CBI. However, ultimately, their study found no significant influence of the tax percentage of national revenue on CBI. Recent evidence has also suggested that national tax revenue indicates lower political stability (Prichard et al., 2018).

Table 2. Comparison of variables and method used in this study with Bagheri & Habibi (1998)

	Data Source Used	
	Bagheri and Habibi (1998)	**This Article**
CBI	Cukierman et al. (1992)	Romelli (2022) Garriga (2016)
Democracy	Barro (1991)	Teorell and Wahman (2018)
Political Rights	Gastil (1990)	Freedom House (2022)
Civil Liberties	-	Freedom House (2022)
Electoral Competition	-	Vanhanen (2019)
Political Risk	The PRS Group (various years)	The PRS Group (2022)
Tax Revenue %	World Bank (various years)	World Bank (2022)
GDP Debt Ratio	World Bank (various years)	World Bank (2022)
	Methods Used	
Data Type	Cross-sectional averages	Longitudinal data
Number of Countries	20 Industrial 52 Developing	37 High Income 62 Developing
Method used	Weighted least square (WLS) regression	Fixed (FE) panel regression

Main Findings

Table 3. Descriptive statistics table of variables used in this article

Variables	Total	Developing	Highly-Developed
CBI (Romelli, 2022)	58.76	57.05***	61.35
	(19.55)	(17.56)	(22)
CBI (Garriga, 2016)	54.9	54.56	55.5
	(21.63)	(20.27)	(23.79)
Democracy	7.761	6.893***	9.162
	(2.571)	(2.48)	(2.046)
Political Rights	2.513	3.159***	1.469
	(1.788)	(1.752)	(1.281)
Civil Liberties	2.722	3.435***	1.572
	(1.539)	(1.284)	(1.178)
Electoral Competition	49.28	44.58***	56.87
	(18.14)	(18.9)	(13.82)
Political Risk	0.644	0.529***	0.829
	(0.206)	(0.147)	(0.142)
Tax Revenue %	17.52	16.24***	19.58
	(6.191)	(5.261)	(6.982)
Debt to GDP Ratio	53.62	50.45***	58.74
	(35.84)	(35.58)	(35.72)

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for key variables used in this analysis. Furthermore, disaggregated data from highly developed and developing countries are also presented with the relevant test of differences in means. This article categorises highly developed and developing countries using World Bank

income classifications. In this paper, countries classified as "high-income" are categorised into highly developed countries, while the remainder are categorised into developing countries.

The Romelli and Garriga indexes differ when disaggregating between highly developed and developing countries. A test on the difference of means on the Romelli index indicates a positive bias towards CBI in highly developed countries (scoring on average 55.5 compared to the developing countries 54.56). At the same time, no such thing exists in the Garriga index of CBI. While this implies an inconsistency between the two indexes when measuring CBI, further analyses will assess CBI through both indexes for robustness.

Figure 4. Annual CBI Trend between Highly Developed and Developing Countries



Source: Romelli (2022); Garriga (2016)

A test on the difference of means on every other variable also denotes a significant difference between Developing and highly developed countries. Namely, developing countries are less democratic (scoring an average of 6.893 in comparison to the highly developed countries 9.162), have less respect for political rights (scoring an average of 3.159 in comparison to the highly developed countries 1.469), have less respect for civil liberties (scoring on average 3.435 in comparison to the highly developed countries 1.572), less electorally competitive (having a voting minority of 44.58 per cent in comparison to the highly developed countries 56.87), have higher political risk (scoring on average 6.893 in comparison to the highly developed countries 9.162), rely less on tax budget (composing 16.24 per cent of government budget in comparison to the highly developed countries 19.58 per cent), and have lower debt (composing 50.45 per cent of GDP in comparison to the highly developed countries 58.74 per cent).

Table 4. Regression of CBI (Romelli, 2022) for all samples

	Dependent Variable Central Bank Independence (Romelli, 2022)					
Independent Variables	**Model (1)**	**Model (2)**	**Model (3)**	**Model (4)**	**Model (5)**	**Model (6)**
Democracy		3.810***	8.042***	6.294***	6.218***	6.465***
		(0.352)	(0.716)	(0.858)	(0.943)	(0.923)
Political Rights			5.550***	4.870***	4.835***	4.533***
			(0.824)	(0.839)	(0.859)	(0.841)
Civil Liberties				-2.996***	-3.028***	-2.500***
				(0.823)	(0.839)	(0.825)
Electoral Competition					0.007	0.009
					(0.037)	(0.036)
Political Risk						-0.260***
						(3.947)
Tax Revenue %	0.415***	0.466***	0.456***	0.450***	0.448***	0.441***
	(0.152)	(0.144)	(0.140)	(0.139)	(0.140)	(0.137)
GDP Debt Ratio	0.044***	0.048***	0.056***	0.049***	0.049***	0.039***
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Constant	49.162***	18.499***	-28.562***	-4.761	-4.325	10.632
	(2.757)	(3.841)	(7.929)	(10.239)	(10.481)	(10.496)
Observations	1,013	1,013	1,013	1,013	1,013	1,013
R-squared	0.019	0.129	0.170	0.182	0.182	0.219
Number of Countries	84	84	84	84	84	84

Table 5. Regression of CBI (Garriga, 2016) for all samples

	Dependent Variable Central Bank Independence (Garriga, 2016)					
Independent Variables	**Model (1)**	**Model (2)**	**Model (3)**	**Model (4)**	**Model (5)**	**Model (6)**
Democracy		4.515***	10.570***	7.368***	7.099***	7.178***
		(0.485)	(0.973)	(1.175)	(1.287)	(1.286)
Political Rights			7.944***	6.599***	6.487***	6.320***
			(1.117)	(1.140)	(1.161)	(1.162)
Civil Liberties				-5.192***	-5.314***	-5.043***
				(1.094)	(1.120)	(1.126)
Electoral Competition					0.026	0.028
					(0.051)	(0.051)
Political Risk						-0.105**
						(5.225)
Tax Revenue %	-0.267	-0.186	-0.187	-0.178	-0.183	-0.195
	(0.204)	(0.195)	(0.190)	(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.188)
GDP Debt Ratio	0.062***	0.065***	0.079***	0.068***	0.069***	0.065***
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Constant	56.279***	19.770***	-47.777***	-5.007	-3.517	2.679
	(3.717)	(5.287)	(10.803)	(13.970)	(14.276)	(14.578)
Observations	966	966	966	966	966	966
R-squared	0.013	0.102	0.151	0.172	0.172	0.176
Number of Countries	88	88	88	88	88	88

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6. Regression of CBI (Romelli, 2022) for developing samples

	Dependent Variable (Developing Countries Only) Central Bank Independence (Romelli, 2022)					
Independent Variables	**Model (1)**	**Model (2)**	**Model (3)**	**Model (4)**	**Model (5)**	**Model (6)**
Democracy		3.590***	7.828***	6.358***	6.487***	6.602***
		(0.354)	(0.756)	(0.866)	(0.965)	(0.954)
Political Rights			5.446***	5.063***	5.125***	4.864***
			(0.866)	(0.865)	(0.890)	(0.882)
Civil Liberties				-3.075***	-3.024***	-2.654***
				(0.910)	(0.926)	(0.921)
Electoral Competition					-0.012	-0.010
					(0.039)	(0.038)
Political Risk						-0.161***
						(4.350)
Tax Revenue %	0.013	0.026	-0.007	-0.058	-0.055	-0.035
	(0.190)	(0.174)	(0.168)	(0.167)	(0.168)	(0.166)
GDP Debt Ratio	-0.007	0.006	0.025	0.020	0.019	0.011
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Constant	57.536***	32.705***	-14.004*	8.934	8.176	15.387
	(3.121)	(3.769)	(8.271)	(10.641)	(10.938)	(10.987)
Observations	606	606	606	606	606	606
R-squared	0.000	0.159	0.215	0.232	0.232	0.251
Number of Countries	56	56	56	56	56	56

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7. Regression of CBI (Romelli, 2022) for highly-developed samples

	Dependent Variable (Highly-Developed Countries Only) Central Bank Independence (Romelli, 2022)					
Independent Variables	**Model (1)**	**Model (2)**	**Model (3)**	**Model (4)**	**Model (5)**	**Model (6)**
Democracy		4.657**	4.992**	-4.050	-3.833	-0.357
		(1.879)	(2.367)	(3.958)	(3.960)	(3.791)
Political Rights			0.615	-3.924	-3.634	-2.473
			(2.632)	(3.059)	(3.067)	(2.912)
Civil Liberties				-6.424***	-6.231***	-4.771**
				(2.266)	(2.270)	(2.163)
Electoral Competition					0.121	0.089
					(0.100)	(0.095)
Political Risk						-0.579***
						(8.912)
Tax Revenue %	1.401***	1.480***	1.480***	1.554***	1.516***	1.331***
	(0.235)	(0.236)	(0.236)	(0.235)	(0.237)	(0.227)
GDP Debt Ratio	0.120***	0.113***	0.112***	0.109***	0.104***	0.089***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Constant	26.058***	-18.699	-22.613	76.403*	67.709	86.707**
	(4.822)	(18.682)	(25.116)	(42.880)	(43.459)	(41.292)
Observations	407	407	407	407	407	407
R-squared	0.158	0.172	0.172	0.190	0.193	0.277
Number of Countries	37	37	37	37	37	37

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8. Regression of CBI (Garriga, 2016) for developing samples

	Dependent Variable (Developing Countries Only) Central Bank Independence (Garriga, 2016)					
Independent Variables	**Model (1)**	**Model (2)**	**Model (3)**	**Model (4)**	**Model (5)**	**Model (6)**
Democracy		4.352***	9.528***	7.173***	7.040***	7.055***
		(0.476)	(0.998)	(1.159)	(1.290)	(1.290)
Political Rights			6.671***	5.930***	5.871***	5.770***
			(1.140)	(1.142)	(1.170)	(1.177)
Civil Liberties				-4.547***	-4.605***	-4.484***
				(1.178)	(1.205)	(1.214)
Electoral Competition					0.012	0.014
					(0.053)	(0.053)
Political Risk						-0.045
						(5.546)
Tax Revenue %	-0.071	-0.019	-0.059	-0.106	-0.109	-0.107
	(0.245)	(0.229)	(0.222)	(0.220)	(0.220)	(0.220)
GDP Debt Ratio	-0.041*	-0.031	-0.010	-0.017	-0.016	-0.019
	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Constant	57.843***	27.056***	-29.891***	5.365	6.142	8.342
	(4.082)	(5.079)	(10.908)	(14.123)	(14.514)	(14.765)
Observations	604	604	604	604	604	604
R-squared	0.006	0.139	0.190	0.212	0.212	0.213
Number of Countries	60	60	60	60	60	60

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 9. Regression of CBI (Garriga, 2016) for highly-developed samples

	Dependent Variable (Highly-Developed Countries Only) Central Bank Independence (Garriga, 2016)					
Independent Variables	**Model (1)**	**Model (2)**	**Model (3)**	**Model (4)**	**Model (5)**	**Model (6)**
Democracy		3.205	8.586**	-8.394	-8.591	-4.548
		(2.688)	(3.331)	(5.840)	(5.857)	(5.863)
Political Rights			10.730***	1.366	0.992	2.818
			(3.993)	(4.745)	(4.797)	(4.739)
Civil Liberties				-11.697***	-11.851***	-9.800***
				(3.331)	(3.346)	(3.336)
Electoral Competition					-0.084	-0.120
					(0.150)	(0.147)
Political Risk						-0.479***
						(13.460)
Tax Revenue %	-0.223	-0.175	-0.122	0.015	0.038	-0.166
	(0.336)	(0.338)	(0.335)	(0.332)	(0.334)	(0.333)
GDP Debt Ratio	0.267***	0.263***	0.254***	0.249***	0.252***	0.240***
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Constant	43.990***	13.354	-51.823	134.689**	141.562**	146.004**
	(6.976)	(26.619)	(35.828)	(63.730)	(64.968)	(63.822)
Observations	362	362	362	362	362	362
R-squared	0.180	0.184	0.202	0.231	0.232	0.261
Number of Countries	36	36	36	36	36	36

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The Effect of Democracy on CBI

All models suggest a consistent positive link between democracy and CBI, regardless of which index is used. In hindsight, this may refute theoretical views that CBI is unnecessary for or inconsistent with democracy (Fernández-Albertos, 2015; Hayo & Hefeker, 2002; van't Klooster, 2019). The link between the Imputed Polity Index and CBI proven here is specific to a liberal, electoral democracy with independent media and civil society as indexed by Freedom House. The regression results predict a 6.465-point increase in the Romelli Index of CBI and a 7.178-point increase in the Garriga Index of CBI for each point of democracy.

This is consistent with Arena and Salvadori's (2003) argument that CBI as monetary policy is a product of the political process. In a democratic country with strong democratic institutions, CBI can be considered a political consensus on how unemployment and inflation, two agonistic forces, should be managed. Likewise, Bodea and Hicks (2015) argue that CBI in authoritarian countries will be less effective because central banks are not able to provide accountable oversight in authoritarian nations.

Effect of Political Rights and Civil Liberties on CBI

While political rights have a strong positive effect on CBI, civil liberty has a similarly strong but negative effect. The regression results predict a 4.533-point increase in the Romelli Index of CBI and a 6.320-point increase in the Garriga Index of CBI for each point of political rights. The regression results also predict a 2.500-point decrease

in the Romelli Index of CBI and a 5.043-point decrease in the Garriga Index of CBI for each point of civil liberties.

Political rights consist of the rule of law and the guaranteed right of political opposition to exist. Increased political participation and plurality are also factors in political rights. Governments and societies with higher political participation tend to have better oversight and accountability (Blair, 2000). Agoba et al. (2020) also posits that higher political rights enable investors to comment on policies that may threaten their investments. Thus, it may be proposed that the increase in CBI political rights is due to many factors.

Examining the methodology of civil liberty, we find that one factor in deciding civil liberty involves access to the market and freedom from monopoly. This may be a possible reason civil liberty negatively correlates with CBI. However, the indicator also uses the freedom to organise and participate in a union, as many studies have also pointed out the interaction of centralised wage bargaining through a union with CBI (Franzese, 2001).

Another possible reason is that CBI undermines democratic accountability. When central banks are highly independent, their decisions may not be directly accountable to elected officials, which can lead to a perceived lack of responsiveness to the preferences and needs of the public (Elgie, 1998; Jones & Matthijs, 2019; Palley, 2019). While the result of this study finds a significant negative effect between CBI and civil liberty, the category is composed of too many factors to discern a concrete component. Thus, it may be concluded that civil liberty's relationship with CBI is nuanced and complex.

The Effect of Electoral Competition and Political Risk on CBI

As predicted by previous papers, political risk remains a significant negatively correlated variable with CBI. Meanwhile, the electoral competition does not significantly affect CBI with the Garriga and Romelli indexes. This corresponds to Bagheri and Habibi's (1998) thesis that while external political instability is unconducive to CBI, internal political regimes, referring to business-as-usual changes in political parties, largely do not impact CBI or monetary policy.

Other studies also argue that electoral and political systems structure state behaviour on monetary policy, including CBI and effectivity. Presidential governments are more likely to preserve CBI than parliamentary governments. In parliamentary governments, single-party governments are argued to be less likely to preserve CBI than coalition governments amongst parliamentary countries. Likewise, the efficiency of the CBI and the state's commitment to the inflation target corresponds similarly to the form of government (Bernhard, 1998; Broz, 2002).

This study found a -2.602-point decrease in the Romelli Index of CBI and a -0.105-point decrease in the Garriga Index of CBI for each point of political risk. As expected, regimes with unstable or non-functioning governments tend to have lower CBI because of their lower capacity to enforce regulations. However, neither regression on the Romelli nor Garriga index suggests any effect between electoral competition and CBI. This study found that stable governments and the rule of law are paramount for a state to enforce high CBI. Conversely, while no direct effect between

party composition can be inferred from the regression, it may influence CBI by interacting with other variables.

Macroeconomic Variables and Central Bank Independence

This paper also examines several macroeconomic influences on CBI, namely the percentage of tax revenue in the budget and the debt-to-GDP ratio, as control variables. Previously, Baghieri and Habibi established that while the debt-to-GDP ratio has an apparent effect on CBI, the effect of the percentage of tax revenue in the budget is subtler and is mediated by democracy, especially in developing countries. This paper presents similar evidence about the effect of both variables on CBI.

A possible reason countries with higher international debt may have more CBI is pressure from international institutions. Binder (2021) argued that countries with debt from international institutions such as the IMF are subjected to political pressure through IMF recommendations. If governments are partially funded by debt, global capital institutions will likely interfere with monetary policy.

The regression results predict a 0.039-point increase on the Romelli Index of CBI with each point of increase in the percentage of tax revenue in the budget. However, the effect on the Garriga index does not present a significant result for the percentage of tax revenue in the budget. On the other hand, the regression result also predicts a 0.441-point increase in the Romelli Index of CBI and a 0.065-point increase in the Garriga Index of CBI for each point of debt-to-GDP ratio.

Highly Developed Countries

and Political Institutions

Different patterns emerged from this group after the sample was discriminated between highly developed and developing countries. The significant predictors of CBI converge to two distinct patterns. In developing countries, macroeconomic variables, budget composition and the debt-to-GDP ratio are unreliable predictors for CBI. Instead, three political rights variables, i.e., democracy, political rights, and civil liberties, are more consistent predictors for both the Romelli and Garriga indexes of CBI. However, political risk remains a significant predictor for CBI in regression using the Garriga index.

In contrast, developed countries have less consistent predictors for CBI. Civil liberties remain among the few political variables influencing CBI for the Romelli and Garriga indexes. Additionally, in the Romelli Index of CBI, political risk is also a significant predictor of CBI. However, macroeconomic variables, such as the composition of the budget and the debt-to-GDP ratio, also play a significant role in determining CBI, especially in the Garriga index. Moreover, regardless of income classification or index used, civil liberties and political risks are significant predictors of CBI.

A possible interpretation of this observation is that political institutions correlate with CBI, as political institutions are prerequisites to formulating and enforcing complex policies such as CBI. Although governments are not forced or required to adopt certain monetary policies, political conditions such as higher levels of democracy and political rights may encourage

them to do so. This observation may suggest that reforming political institutions can also affect economic institutions.

This effect is, however, more substantial in developing countries with lower incomes. In developing countries with lower democratic accountability, respect for political rights, and higher political risk, political institutions are correlated significantly with the development of these institutions. By contrast, in developed countries, the effect of most political variables explored here is irrelevant to CBI apart from civil liberties and political risk. Macroeconomic variables such as budget composition and national debt are more reliable predictors of CBI. When democracy and political institutions have developed to a certain threshold, the effect may slowly rescind. Thus, macroeconomic indicators become the most significant predictor of CBI.

Subsequently, this study has significant implications regarding central banking policy and strengthening democracy in the developing world. As countries strive to enhance democratic institutions, they may also benefit from reinforcing CBI. This independence is paramount to maintaining monetary stability, attracting investment, and achieving sustainable economic growth. Policymakers and stakeholders may benefit from simultaneously promoting CBI and fostering democratic governance.

Furthermore, this study has also revealed that political variables have a less significant influence on CBI in highly developed nations. This divergence highlights the necessity for an institutional

arrangement and central bank policies tailored to a nation's socioeconomic conditions and societal values. In emerging democracies where institutions are yet to establish themselves, fostering democracy could directly contribute to more independent and effective central banks.

These observations offer a strategic map for central banks and governments in developing nations, emphasising complementary political and economic reforms. By simultaneously promoting democratic values and CBI, countries may create a more stable and resilient economic foundation, which is essential for long-term development and prosperity.

Conclusion

The results of this study have several theoretical implications. First, CBI in developing nations is more likely influenced by political factors such as democracy, political rights, and civil liberties rather than purely economic factors. Conversely, political factors do not significantly affect CBI in highly developed nations. Overall, this study improves on and elaborates on previous studies that discuss the influence of the political environment on CBI.

This research also has practical implications regarding CBI. International institutions interested in democratising developing nations may look to improve political democracy by implementing economic democracy as well. Central bankers may also consider how their monetary policies can support broader economic and political democratisation efforts, ensuring that their policies promote economic stability and growth, which are foundational for political stability.

This study demonstrates the interplay between democracy, political institutions and CBI. While the literature concerning CBI and political institutions is extensive, this work reaffirms the influence of political institutions towards economic policy, especially CBI. Based on findings and discussion, this study concludes that the development of CBI is embedded in political institutions during early development. When a country is 'mature' in most political variables, except for civil liberties and political risk, politics will no longer be a significant predictor of CBI. Macroeconomic indicators become more significant predictors of CBI.

This study also proposes several avenues for further research. First, the regression result highlights the significant influence of low civil liberties on CBI, but the underlying causes have yet to be explained. One possible hypothesis is that civil liberties are related to the rights of association required for strong labour unions and worker rights. Explanatory studies examining more specific civil liberties and CBI components may benefit employment, wealth distribution, and welfare. Second, with a more comprehensive and de facto dataset on CBI rather than de jure CBI, further inspection can offer insight into the short-term effect on political actors of CBI rather than the long-term institutional effect of CBI, which are constraints to written formal documents.

Appendix 1: Haussman Test for Model Selection

Coefficients (Romelli, 2022)

	(b)	(B)	(b-B)	sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
	Fixed	**Random**	**Difference**	**Standard Error**
Democracy	6.465406	5.321166	1.14424	0.2283117
Political Rights	4.532702	3.79416	0.7385414	0.098558
Civil Liberty	-2.499738	-2.295719	-0.2040195	0.2056891
Electoral Competition	0.0094109	0.0202223	-0.0108114	0.0050483
Political Risk	-26.02068	-29.49915	3.478475	1.42471
Tax Revenue %	0.4408506	0.2046747	0.236176	0.0586979
GDP Debt Ratio	0.0386373	0.0343354	0.0043019	0.0021419
$\chi 2$	24.44			
Prob > $\chi 2$	0.0010			

Coefficients (Romelli, 2022) High-Developed Only

	(b)	(B)	(b-B)	sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
	Fixed	**Random**	**Difference**	**Standard Error**
Democracy	-0.3571629	-5.05564	4.698477	2.419731
Political Rights	-2.472835	-4.394245	1.921411	1.053643
Civil Liberty	-4.771007	-6.365709	1.594702	0.9446648
Electoral Competition	0.0888012	0.0765427	0.0122586	0.0248011
Political Risk	-57.91981	-59.55328	1.633466	3.853395
Tax Revenue %	1.331268	1.005946	0.3253218	0.0983695
GDP Debt Ratio	0.0885685	0.0910656	-0.0024971	0.0037351
$\chi 2$	17.88			
Prob > $\chi 2$	0.0125			

Coefficients (Romelli, 2022) Developing Only				
	(b)	(B)	(b-B)	sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
	Fixed	Random	Difference	Standard Error
Democracy	6.601519	5.353309	1.24821	0.2699313
Political Rights	4.863586	4.012334	0.8512518	0.1443802
Civil Liberty	-2.654031	-2.854368	0.2003374	0.1912275
Electoral Competition	-0.0099783	0.0035995	-0.0135778	0.0070882
Political Risk	-16.08955	-16.79096	0.7014112	0.8979859
Tax Revenue %	-0.0352703	-0.1665082	0.131238	0.0686644
GDP Debt Ratio	0.0110446	0.0015991	0.0094456	0.0035323
$\chi 2$	43.07			
Prob > $\chi 2$	0.0000			

Coefficients (Garriga, 2016)				
	(b)	(B)	(b-B)	sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
	Fixed	Random	Difference	Standard Error
Democracy	7.177652	6.02026	1.157392	0.4252192
Political Rights	6.320441	5.625728	0.6947137	0.2381262
Civil Liberty	-5.043334	-4.293676	-0.7496583	0.3730786
Electoral Competition	0.0284416	0.0367131	-0.0082715	0.012284
Political Risk	-10.53194	-18.64149	8.109551	2.297418
Tax Revenue %	-0.1945208	-0.3460705	0.1515497	0.0963404
GDP Debt Ratio	0.0645184	0.0596245	0.0048939	0.0049015
$\chi 2$	59.27			
Prob > $\chi 2$	0.0000			

Coefficients (Garriga, 2016) High-Developed Only				
	(b)	(B)	(b-B)	sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
	Fixed	Random	Difference	Standard Error
Democracy	-4.548369	0.8565139	-5.404883	4.040002
Political Rights	2.81751	3.699085	-0.8815745	2.376391
Civil Liberty	-9.799985	-7.907913	-1.892072	1.802567
Electoral Competition	-0.1202707	-0.0782885	-0.0419821	0.053891
Political Risk	-47.99907	-56.29707	8.298001	7.755924
Tax Revenue %	-0.1662743	-0.1185864	-0.0476879	0.178589
GDP Debt Ratio	0.2403565	0.2385628	0.0017937	0.010244
$\chi 2$	5.03			
Prob > $\chi 2$	0.6561			

Coefficients (Garriga, 2016) Developing Only				
	(b)	(B)	(b-B)	sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
	Fixed	Random	Difference	Standard Error
Democracy	7.054517	5.732542	1.321974	0.451007
Political Rights	5.770322	5.022358	0.7479645	0.275806
Civil Liberty	-4.483622	-4.349677	-0.1339447	0.33929
Electoral Competition	0.0137058	0.0299418	-0.0162361	0.013822
Political Risk	-4.539183	-6.282051	1.742868	1.54656
Tax Revenue %	-0.1068538	-0.2497597	0.1429059	0.109954
GDP Debt Ratio	-0.0185069	-0.0250449	0.006538	0.006312
$\chi 2$	14.19			
Prob > $\chi 2$	0.0480			

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Advocacy Coalitions in Baduy Tourism Policy: Navigating the Dynamics Between Industry Interests and Sustainable Empowerment

Amara Elvita[1]

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Abstract

The political participation of the Baduy indigenous community in sustainable tourism policy has led to the emergence of two advocacy coalitions with differing views: one supports tourism for its economic potential, while the other opposes it to protect local values and the environment. This division reflects the community's involvement in policy-making. The pro-tourism group believes proper regulation can yield economic benefits without harming the culture or the environment. Conversely, the anti-tourism group prioritises cultural preservation and environmental conservation. The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) helps understand these interactions. Although pro-tourism advocacy dominates policy decisions, initiatives like tourist restrictions from the Baduy Customary Organisation are also recognised and implemented, indicating that political participation can result in more balanced policies. The opposing coalitions also highlight the dynamics of political participation in shaping sustainable tourism policies in an area where an indigenous community lives.

Keywords: *Advocacy coalition; Baduy indigenous people; Political participation; Sustainable tourism*

1 Department of Politics and Government, Gadjah Mada University.
Email: amaraelvita@mail.ugm.ac.id

Introduction

This research discusses the dynamics in the development of Baduy tourism, which is claimed to be sustainable on the one hand and detrimental on the other in the context of government policies involving various stakeholders and advocacy coalitions (UNEP and WTO, 2015). The analysis highlights the dilemma between economic growth and tourism's impact on the environment and customary order, as well as the influence of modernisation brought by tourism development on the younger generation of the Baduy Tribe.

More specifically, this research explores the struggle between the two opposing groups. The first group consists of those who highlight the economic growth from tourism development, such as increased revenue, jobs, and infrastructure in Baduy's surrounding areas. This view aligns with the interests of the industry and government policies to capitalise on the cultural and natural resources of the Baduy region to increase local economies. The opposing group stands for the preservation of local wisdom and ecological sustainability. This group upholds the integrity of traditional values and ecological balance that might be degraded by unregulated tourism growth. This study examines how advocacy coalitions navigate the tension between economic empowerment and sustainable cultural and environmental stewardship amid conflicting approaches. This discussion is set against the backdrop of a growing international emphasis on sustainable tourism (Bramwell & Lane, 2005). Sustainability is considered insufficient in the tourism development in the Baduy region. It often overlooks cultural and environmental issues and focuses more on

resource exploitation. Bramwell and Lane (2005) highlight the importance of sustainable tourism to ensure environmental protection and cultural conservation. They emphasise the need to balance the interests of various stakeholders, i.e., governments, local communities, and industry leaders, in developing policies for tourism to be sustainable in the long run. Their study forms the basis for understanding how sustainability principles are integrated into tourism policies and practices.

In the context of Baduy tourism, there is Kanekes Village Regulation No. 1/2007 on *Saba Budaya* and Protection of Indigenous Peoples of Tatar Kanekes concerning *Saba Budaya,* and Protection of Indigenous Peoples of Tatar Kanekes is one of the legal guarantees for the conservation of culture, environment, and self-management within the Baduy community. Through this law, a cultural gathering known as *Saba Budaya* has been made an integral part of tradition in this community and a place where they would pass on cultural values and heighten social cohesion. It also focuses on safeguarding indigenous practice and environmental viability in the conservation of community land against exploitation and over-tourism. Recognition of indigenous self-governance by the Baduy people means the regulation protects traditional leadership. As such, external policies cannot undermine their customs. This decree fits into the broader trend of preserving indigenous peoples' rights while allowing them to enter into contact with the modern world on their terms. It is an important model for indigenous protection in Indonesia and beyond. However, tourism development

in Kanekes Village remains extremely vulnerable to social, economic, and environmental risks (Khamdevi, 2016). The approach focuses mostly on economic growth and disregards the cultural and environmental aspects. Therefore, this research urges the need for another view of tourism development by balancing it with environmental preservation and the maintenance of local wisdom.

Against the backdrop outlined above, this research examines the tension between the sustainable development of Baduy tourism and its profitability, especially in the context of government policies on tourism that involve political participation and various advocacy coalitions in the Baduy indigenous community. The research question is, "How do advocacy coalitions shape tourism policies in the Baduy region, and to what extent does the concept of *'Saba Budaya* Baduy' address the balance between economic development and the preservation of Baduy cultural values?"

Literature Review

The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)

Advocacy is a strategic effort by individuals or groups to fight for certain issues to be included in the policy agenda and encourage solutions to existing problems. The goal is to influence gradual changes in public policy. Advocacy is also a tool for coalitions to influence decision-making to suit a particular agenda and an effort to achieve social change through various channels, including political democracy. Overall, advocacy requires collaboration and strong coalitions to support or for common issues (Topatimasang et al., 2016).

The initial step in resolving conflicts involves identifying the direction and exploring alternatives for resolution. The choice of strategy is crucial, as it can significantly influence policy outcomes. Advocacy strategies can be categorised into litigation and non-litigation approaches, each employing a combination of formal and informal channels. The selection of strategies depends on their suitability to the advocacy objectives (Sosin & Caulum, 1983). According to Loue (2006), there are four types of advocacy strategy classifications, namely through media, courts, regulation and legislation, and through coalitions. Meanwhile, the success of an advocacy strategy depends on the cooperation between organisations and institutions, as well as the network or coalition formed.

In advocacy activities, it is important to build coalitions between various parties to achieve common goals. These coalitions may consist of organisations or individuals focusing on the same issue and can be divided into core circles and allied networks (Topatimasang et al., 2016). The core circle consists of strategic parties who work in the front line and have similar perceptions and commitments, while the ally network is a party that has a common perception of the policy issue being advocated without strict requirements. The involvement of various parties in a coalition is crucial because it affects the success of advocacy.

Figure 1. Triangle Chart of Multi-Stakeholder Coordination



Source: Topatimasang et al., (2016)

The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is also an important tool in understanding policy-related learning and policy change. ACF analyses the interactions between policy networks and policy actors in impacting public policies through three main dimensions: stable relative parameters, policy subsystems, and external events. ACF highlights the importance of the policy arena where advocacy coalitions interact to influence a policy (Sabatier, 1991). The main objective of ACF is to influence decision-makers, gain support from the bureaucracy, and manipulate the decision-making forum. Although external changes can influence policy, a greater force is needed for policy shifts (Esa, 2016).

The ACF emphasizes the importance of policy-oriented learning as a driver of policy

change. Within a policy subsystem, key elements such as beliefs, resources, and strategies shape the process, with resources playing a pivotal role in determining outcomes. Policy debates often give rise to competing advocacy coalitions, necessitating the involvement of decision-makers and policy brokers to mediate conflicts and achieve balanced solutions. ACF provides valuable insights into the interactions and dynamics of these coalitions within the policy-making process.

Figure 2. Diagram of Advocacy Coalition Framework



Source: Sabatier, 1991

The ACF offers a valuable perspective for understanding how coalitions representing industry interests and advocates of sustainable empowerment interact within the policy subsystem of Baduy tourism development. It identifies three main components influencing policy outcomes: belief systems, resources, and strategies (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994).

1. **Belief System**: Each coalition's belief system forms the foundation of its goals and approach. The industry-focused coalition likely values economic growth, viewing tourism as an essential revenue source for the region, which aligns with core economic development ideologies. In contrast, the sustainability-focused coalition emphasizes cultural preservation and the protection of Baduy traditional values, grounded in a belief system that respects indigenous autonomy and ecological balance.
2. **Resources**: The resources available to each coalition determine how much influence it can exert on the Baduy tourism policy. For instance, industry coalitions may have financial and political backing, allowing them to afford lobbying, marketing, and access to policymakers. Conversely, the sustainable empowerment coalition may lack comparable funding but can draw on the social capital of the Baduy community and the moral authority associated with cultural preservation. This contrast in resources highlights the challenges that sustainability-focused

advocacy coalitions face in competing against well-funded industry stakeholders.

3. **Strategies**: Each coalition's strategies within the Baduy tourism policy arena reflect its beliefs and resources. The industry-aligned coalition may use lobbying, political networking, and economic incentive strategies to support tourism expansion. Meanwhile, the sustainability-focused coalition is likely to adopt grassroots approaches, community engagement, and environmental advocacy to emphasise the importance of protecting Baduy culture and land from exploitation.

This theoretical approach not only underscores the complexity of Baduy tourism policy but also provides insight into the advocacy dynamics that influence whether the policy will lean towards short-term economic interests or long-term cultural and environmental preservation.

In Salzia Raihan's 2022 study on street vendor arrangements in Cihideung, the ACF theory highlights how advocacy coalitions influence policy change. The Pepmatas coalition, with resources like public opinions, information, and leadership, used strategies including legislation and networking. Meanwhile, the Cihideung Street Vendor (PKL) Association, holding formal legal authority, focused on non-litigation and networking. Despite Pepmatas' advantages, the mayor's decision ultimately favoured the Cihideung PKL Association's pedestrian concept. This finding emphasises the importance of formal authority in policy outcomes (Raihan, 2022).

Netty Herawaty Manurung's (2005) study examined the policymaking process around the release and termination of transgenic cotton in South Sulawesi. The findings show how conflicting coalitions were formed due to differing value systems. Actors engaged in policy learning but maintained their core beliefs. The policy was terminated, driven more by political dynamics and external interests rather than internal changes (Manurung, 2005).

This study applies the ACF to analyse policy formation in Baduy tourism, focusing on the actors, their motivations, and coalition dynamics. The ACF enables a detailed comparison of coalition beliefs, values, and policy preferences, providing insights into the complex policy process.

This policy debate revolves around the development of tourism in the Baduy area and presents two main advocacy coalitions with opposing views. The pro-tourism advocacy coalition, consisting of the HPI-DPU Baduy (Indonesian Tourist Association – Baduy unit), local tourism actors, and the local government, advocates for tourism development as a tool for economic growth, believing that with proper regulation, it can align with sustainable principles. On the other side, the contra-tourism advocacy coalition, represented by the Baduy Customary Organisation, strongly opposes tourism development, fearing that it threatens their cultural traditions (*pikukuh*) and the environmental sustainability of their land.

The pro-tourism coalition enjoys a significant resource advantage, with support from the local government, financial backing for training programs, and media presence. Their strategy primarily involves

non-litigation tactics, such as engaging the public through deliberation and hearings while promoting tourism through mass media campaigns. In contrast, the contra-tourism coalition lacks formal political power but relies on the cultural authority of the Baduy *Puun* (traditional leaders), advocating for environmental and cultural preservation through moral appeals and negotiation. Despite their limited resources, they successfully voiced their concerns through a formal letter to President Joko Widodo, asking for the removal of the Baduy from Indonesia's tourism map, though this appeal did not receive broad political support.

Both coalitions demonstrated policy-oriented learning throughout the conflict. The pro-tourism coalition adapted its approach to incorporate more sustainable and culturally respectful practices, leading to the development of the *Saba Budaya* Baduy concept, which seeks to balance tourism with cultural preservation. The contra-tourism coalition, although unable to fully halt tourism development, managed to influence policy by advocating for stricter controls on tourist numbers and the renaming of "tourism" to the more culturally respectful "*Saba Budaya*" (cultural gathering). This shift reflects their success in pushing a policy framework that prioritises cultural integrity.

The Local Government of Lebak played a crucial role as a policy broker between the two coalitions. However, its neutrality was compromised due to its alignment with the pro-tourism agenda, as tourism brings significant economic benefits to the region. While the government facilitated separate hearings with both coalitions, it did not bring them together for joint deliberations, limiting the potential for a more balanced

consensus. The *Saba Budaya* Baduy compromise, which permits tourism while ensuring cultural and environmental safeguards, emerged from these mediations.

Ultimately, the *Saba Budaya* Baduy concept reflects a policy compromise. The pro-tourism coalition achieved its goal of continuing tourism under new terms, while the contra-tourism coalition succeeded in securing stricter regulations and preserving cultural values. Moving forward, the pro-tourism coalition should ensure that tourism development continues to integrate environmental protection measures. Meanwhile, the contra-tourism coalition could benefit from aligning with external environmental and cultural organisations to strengthen their advocacy. This case demonstrates the dynamic interplay between economic development and cultural preservation in policy-making, with the ACF providing a suitable framework to understand how coalitions adapt and influence outcomes.

The negotiation between the pro-tourism and contra-tourism coalitions reveals the steps that led to the policy shift, i.e., the *Saba Budaya* Baduy concept. The pro-tourism coalition, consisting of HPI-DPU Baduy, local tourism stakeholders, and the Lebak government, was primarily driven by economic motivations. They believed that tourism could boost local income, create jobs, and promote sustainable development. Their view was challenged by the Baduy Customary Organisation, which represented the contra-tourism coalition seeking to preserve the cultural integrity and environmental sustainability of Baduy lands and the social fabric of the community.

The pro-tourism coalition had several strategic advantages. They had political support from the local government, as well as financial resources to organise training and promotional activities. Their advocacy was primarily non-litigious, focusing on public engagement through media campaigns, tourism promotions, and community-level dialogues. These resources allowed them to dominate the public discourse around tourism and present it as a sustainable economic opportunity. The contra-tourism coalition, though lacking political and financial resources, held significant cultural authority through the leadership of the Baduy *Puun*. Their strategy was to use cultural advocacy, sending a formal letter to President Joko Widodo requesting the removal of the Baduy region from Indonesia's tourism map. While their appeal resonated with local cultural concerns, it did not carry the political weight needed to completely halt tourism development.

The policy-oriented learning on both sides has played a critical role in shaping the eventual compromise. The pro-tourism coalition realised the importance of incorporating sustainability measures into their tourism plans, responding to the cultural concerns raised by the Baduy community. This shift led to the development of the *Saba Budaya* Baduy, a model that reframes tourism (and its economic activities) as a cultural gathering that prioritises the preservation of Baduy customs. On the other hand, the contra-tourism coalition also learned to compromise. Instead of insisting on a total ban on tourism, they aimed for more manageable

goals, such as limiting the number of visitors and redefining tourism in a way that aligned with cultural preservation.

The Lebak government, acting as a policy broker, attempted to mediate the two coalitions. However, their role was complicated by their support for the economic benefits of tourism. While they organised separate hearings with both coalitions, the lack of joint deliberation meant that true consensus was difficult to achieve. The government ultimately leaned in favour of the pro-tourism coalition, but the shift to *Saba Budaya* Baduy reflects a degree of compromise. The concept introduced more culturally sensitive tourism regulations, including limits on tourist numbers and a focus on educating visitors about Baduy customs, thus addressing some of the concerns of the contra-tourism coalition.

The outcome of the negotiation demonstrates the power dynamics between the two coalitions. While the pro-tourism coalition achieved its goal of continuing tourism, it had to adapt to the cultural demands of the Baduy community. The contra-tourism coalition, though not halting tourism, influenced the policy framework to ensure that cultural preservation became a key component of tourism development. This resolution reflects the balancing act that policy brokers often face—navigating between economic interests and cultural preservation while also responding to the advocacy efforts of multiple stakeholders.

Methodology

The research method is a qualitative approach with a case study design. This method allows for a detailed description of the complexity

within communities or coalitions and the individuals representing various perspectives (Stark & Torrance, 2005). Data collection took place in Kanekes Village, Lebak Regency, Banten Province, specifically in Kampung Kaduketug I in the Outer Baduy area. This location was chosen because it is inhabited by the Baduy indigenous people and is a designated tourist destination for *Saba Budaya* Baduy. This research consists of informal discussions with nine figures representing varying perspectives on the topic of sustainable tourism in the Baduy area. Conversations were held with advocates of tourism in Baduy, such as *Himpunan Pramuwisata Indonesia Duta Pariwisata* (HPI DPU), *Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata* (Disbudpar), and the Lebak local government officials, as stakeholders involved in Baduy tourism initiatives. Meanwhile, discussions with individuals from the *Lembaga Adat* Baduy focus on the viewpoints opposing tourism development in the region. Field research in this investigation examined how the Baduy community handled challenges amid continued opposition from village elders and traditional authorities.

Secondary data was collected from journals, books, newspapers, and online platforms to examine tourism's impact on the socioeconomic and environmental aspects in the Baduy area. This strategy offers valuable insights into the community's perspectives on sustainable tourism practices.

Informants were selected based on criteria put forward by Spradley, as described by Satori and Komariah (2009), which include:

1. Individuals with deep understanding and experience in the enculturation process, such as members of the Baduy indigenous community who interact with tourists
2. Participants involved in the research activities, including customary institutions, traders, farmers, managers, local tour guides, customary village heads (*jaro*), and representatives from the Lebak Tourism Department and Lebak Regional Government
3. Those who provided unbiased information represented by the Culture and Tourism Office of Lebak Regency

The informants were divided into two advocacy coalition groups:

- Supporters of Baduy sustainable tourism: HPI-DPU Baduy, Disbudpar Lebak, Local Government of Lebak, and Baduy tourism actors.
- Opponents of Baduy sustainable tourism: Members of the Baduy Customary Organisation (Lembaga Adat Baduy).

The Local Government of Lebak Regency also acted as a policy broker, mediating between the two competing coalitions in policy-making. Data analysis follows the interactive model by Miles and Huberman (1992), consisting of three main stages: data reduction, data display, and drawing conclusions.

Findings and Discussion

Overview of Baduy Indigenous People

The Baduy Indigenous Community in Lebak Regency, Banten Province, Indonesia, is known for its strong cultural identity and dedication to preserving traditional practices. Governed by *Perdes No. 1/2007*, which protects cultural gatherings and indigenous rights, the Baduy prioritize environmental sustainability and simplicity. This regulation helps safeguard their customs, natural resources, and autonomy in managing their land.

Figure 3. Map of Kanekes Village where Baduy Indigenous People Live



Source: Iskandar & Ellen (1999)

The Baduy indigenous people are divided into two groups: Outer Baduy (*Panamping*) and Inner Baduy (*Kajeroan*). The Inner Baduy, who occupy about 30% of the Baduy area and live in the villages of Cikeusik, Cibeo, and Cikatarwana, strictly adhere to their traditions and reject outside culture that conflicts with their customary rules (*pikukuh*). They are also deeply concerned about their environment (Danasasmita & Djatisunda, 1984).

The Baduy people's cultural values are deeply rooted in *pikukuh*, a set of customary rules that prioritise environmental care and social order. *Pikukuh* prescribes behaviours to minimise environmental degradation, such as practising shifting cultivation, replanting, and prohibiting chemical use in agriculture. The regulation *(perdes)* complements these traditions by reinforcing Baduy's control over cultural and

Figure 4. Inner Baduy (*Kajeroan*) and Outer Baduy (*Panamping*)

Source: Author's photo documentation

ecological practices, reflecting a paradigm that values cultural sustainability over economic development.

However, this paradigm is challenged by policies that support the growth of the tourism industry, endangering the very customs that *Perdes* No. 1/2007 seeks to preserve. A community where land and tradition are deeply intertwined faces environmental degradation and the erosion of traditional knowledge due to pollution, waste, and external influences, all of which threaten the Baduy's environmental and cultural integrity as tourism grows. The need for a tourism policy that respects and protects the values inherent in *pikukuh* and *Perdes* No. 1/2007, rather than endangering them, is highlighted in the tension between sustainable preservation and economic interest.

Baduy Tourism Paradigm

Tourism development in the Baduy area presents a policy dilemma that requires balancing economic growth, community welfare, cultural preservation, and environmental conservation. Although tourism can boost economic growth, generate employment, and enhance living standards, it also threatens the preservation of local wisdom. There are two perspectives on sustainable tourism:

a. **Resource-centric**: This perspective focuses on using natural, socio-cultural, and economic resources sustainably, ensuring that tourism development does not harm the natural ecosystem. This approach is typically adopted by protected forest area managers for environmental conservation.

b. Tourist-centric: This perspective emphasises the needs and experiences of tourists.

The resource-centric view is often preferred for its emphasis on environmental conservation and maintaining the balance of the natural ecosystem in tourist destination development. However, in addition to the resource-centric and tourist-centric paradigms, there is also a community-centric paradigm (Saarinen, 2006), which addresses the issue of over-tourism, where tourism growth becomes unsustainable (Butler, 2019; Wall, 2020). In Kanekes Tourism Village, where the Baduy Community lives, tourism has led to environmental degradation and social disruption, causing the community to reject tourism on their land. Nonetheless, efforts to attract more tourists and economic benefits remain strong, often prioritising market growth and visitor expenditure over sustainable practices.

Figure 5. Graphic of Tourists Visiting Baduy



Source: Pahlevi, 2022

In 2019, Baduy experienced its peak tourist arrivals at 42,228, highlighting its national and international appeal. However, this surge has negatively impacted the environment, including river pollution from soap and other chemicals used by tourists (Ramadhian & Cahya, 2020). Additionally, there is a disconnect between the expectations of the Baduy Tribe as a tourist destination and the behaviour of the visitors (Ramadhian & Cahya, 2020).

In developing sustainable tourism in the Baduy area, both culture and nature are at risk. The community's strict customs could be disrupted by poorly managed tourism, leading to social changes and a shift toward modern lifestyles. To balance tourism growth with the preservation of culture and nature, careful policy-making and active involvement from all stakeholders, including the Baduy community, are crucial.

On the other hand, environmental sustainability is also a major concern in the Baduy area. The region's natural beauty is at risk from uncontrolled tourism, which can lead to forest destruction, pollution, and resource degradation. Since the Baduy community depends heavily on natural resources for their daily lives, environmental damage from tourism can directly impact their well-being (Tosun, 2001).

Sustainable tourism development is often viewed solely as a means of economic growth, contrasting with the community-centric perspective, which focuses on participatory planning, setting tourism boundaries through negotiation, involving local communities, and prioritizing their benefits.

Achieving sustainable tourism heavily relies on the government's political will. This process is complex and impacts national economic policies, public administration, environmental issues, and international tourism structures (Tosun, 2001).

Efforts continue to be made to bridge the differences in paradigms towards sustainable tourism (Mihalic et al., 2021). In theory, sustainable tourism can balance economic, social, and environmental goals through collaboration among industry, government, academics, and policy actors, but its implementation often faces challenges. Policy failures often reflect and result from the increasingly severe environmental impacts of tourism (Hall, 2011).

ACF Component in Baduy Tourism Advocacy Coalition

The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) includes three main components that influence policy changes: belief system, resources, and strategy (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994). To assess an advocacy coalition's capacity, these components are identified as follows: 1) **Belief System**: The core values and ideologies that shape the coalition's mindset and decision-making. 2) **Resources**: The various assets and advantages held by the coalition. 3) **Strategy**: The approaches used by the coalition to advance their goals in the policy arena. This section identifies the resources component, which consists of various resources, and the strategy used by each advocacy coalition in the policy battle arena.

Actors in Tourism Policy Advocacy Coalition in Baduy

The policy subsystem consists of various parties who have a role in the creation, dissemination, and evaluation of policy ideas. Observation of the policy chronology process as a whole revealed the configuration of stakeholders or related actors in the tourism policy process in Kanekes Village, where the Baduy Indigenous people live, as follows:

1. Baduy Customary Organisation (*Lembaga Adat Baduy*)
2. Indonesian Tourist Association - Baduy Unit Leadership Council (HPI - DPU Baduy)
3. Culture and Tourism Office of Lebak Regency
4. Local Government of Lebak
5. Baduy tourism actors (from among the Baduy community and outside Baduy)

To be able to explain the role and involvement of each actor, Sabatier's advocacy coalition framework is used in this study. An advocacy coalition can be defined as a group of actors who have different backgrounds but share a certain belief system and are believed to be a set of basic values, perceptions, and causal assumptions towards the problem at hand (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994).

The research identified two coalitions formed around shared beliefs, involving public and private actors at both regional and central levels. These coalitions are not resistance movements but alliances with diverse interests, reflecting the complexity of the Baduy tourism policy debate. The dynamics involve both internal community

views and external parties, transcending the traditional Inner and Outer Baduy divide. The analysis also highlights the influence of external events and factors outside the policy subsystem.

1. Pro-Tourism Advocacy Coalition

The pro-tourism coalition includes HPI-DPU Baduy, local and external Baduy tourism actors, and regional government agents, such as the Lebak Local Government and the Lebak Regency Tourism Office. They are united by their shared belief that Baduy tourism can enhance local economic growth and align with sustainable development principles, serving as a tool for sustainable empowerment.

Kanekes Village, home to the Baduy Indigenous People, has been designated a leading tourism destination by the Lebak Regency Government. Cultural tourism began in 1994 and grew significantly after Banten became a province based on Law Number 23 of 2000 on the Establishment of Banten Province, driven by government promotions. The village saw peak tourist visits in 2019 (lebakkab.bps.go.id, 2019). The Lebak Government supports tourism as a means of economic growth while emphasising cultural preservation and sustainability, including training the Outer Baduy community members as tour guides and benefiting nearby villages like Ciboleger.

Empirical evidence highlighting the economic benefits of opening Baduy as a tourist destination serves as a key resource for policy advocacy within the supporting coalition. Political influence, primarily from the Regent of Lebak and the Culture and Tourism Office of Lebak Regency,

plays a crucial role in advancing the tourism agenda. The Lebak Regional Government leverages media platforms to promote Baduy tourism, aiming to increase visitor numbers and enhance regional revenue (kompas.com, 2016).

Meanwhile, Baduy Indigenous Peoples, particularly tourism actors and guides engaged by the Lebak Regional Government and Dispar Lebak, support a coalition. They participate in MSME empowerment and national tour guide training initiatives. These efforts have led to the formation of the Indonesian Tourism Association - Baduy Main Leadership Council (HPI - DPU Baduy), advocating for tourism development in the Baduy region.

"Actually, the Baduy community in Kanekes Village is officially included in the HPI group or the Indonesian Tourism Association, which has a national standard, with local Baduy guides, tour guides, and others," (Aditiya, representative of Lebak Tourism Office, interviewed 09 November 2023).

The tour guide community in Baduy is organized into five key roles: Head, Secretary, Treasurer, Humanitarian Division, and general members. The community, known as HPI-DPU Baduy, has undergone multiple training sessions facilitated by the Lebak Regency Culture and Tourism Office. These sessions aim to enhance the skills and competencies of tour guides, focusing on language proficiency, public speaking, and effective guiding techniques to improve service quality in the tourism sector.

The pro-tourism advocacy coalition for Baduy holds a strategic advantage over its opposing contra group due to access to key resources, including financial support

and media outreach. Leveraging mass media, the coalition actively promotes Baduy tourism to attract visitors and garner public support. It also benefits from superior information resources, particularly regarding the needs of the Baduy community involved in tourism.

Unlike traditional mobilisation tactics, the coalition focuses on achieving its goals through consensus-building rather than demonstrations. Financial support from the Lebak Regional Government and the Culture and Tourism Office has facilitated frequent training and capacity-building initiatives aimed at enhancing the skills of both indigenous and non-indigenous tour guides.

Leadership within the coalition, notably through HPI-DPU Baduy led by Mulyono (Kang Mul), has played a pivotal role in managing tourism activities despite occasional conflicts with neighbouring communities. However, challenges remain, particularly in the absence of a long-term strategic plan for sustainable tourism development in Baduy.

The third component of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) involves advocacy strategies. For the pro-tourism coalition, most advocacy is non-litigation, focusing on audience engagement, discussions, and deliberations rather than legal action. When tourism issues arise, the coalition typically addresses them through hearings and meetings with relevant institutions and communities. Additionally, the local government and the Lebak Regency Tourism Office work on building networks by organising tourism actors from both within and outside the Baduy community.

2. Contra-Tourism Advocacy Coalition

This contra-tourism coalition emerged in response to a tourism development plan in the Baduy area by the Lebak Regency Regional Government. It is primarily composed of the Baduy indigenous people, represented by the Baduy Customary Organisation, which governs and preserves their ancestral customs. This institution plays a key role in the coalition, actively pushing the government to halt tourism development and protect the Baduy area from being exploited as a tourist attraction.

In July 2020, the Baduy Customary Organisation initiated advocacy by sending a letter to President Joko Widodo requesting the removal of Baduy's customary territory from the tourist destination map. This request was driven by concerns over environmental pollution, disruption of customary order, and the negative impact of technology and modernity on the younger generation of the Baduy community. The letter was also delivered orally by community leaders, including Jaro Tangtu of Cikeusik Village and Jaro Saidi. In response, the government agreed to hold a hearing to seek a compromise. However, the advocacy did not achieve its intended outcome, as the Tourism Office and Lebak Local Government quickly engaged in negotiations with the customary elders to establish tourism regulations for the Baduy region. In the letter, it is written:

"We request the President, through his bureaucratic apparatus, to make and arrange a policy, so that the Baduy customary area is no longer included as a tourist attraction

location. In other words, we request that the government can erase the Baduy customary area from Indonesia's tourism map,"

The negotiations resulted in limiting the number of tourists visiting the Baduy area. Hari Santoso from the Ministry of Tourism proposed creating an app for tourist registration and information. However, Uday Suhada from the Baduy community suggested using the term "*Saba Budaya* " instead of "tourism," in line with local regulations. Ayah Mursid, an Inner Baduy elder, called for clear rules and guidelines on allowed routes and activities. The Regent of Lebak, Iti Octavia Jayabaya, announced plans to provide land near the Baduy area for an information centre to educate tourists about *Saba Budaya* activities before entering the area.

The advocacy efforts by the Baduy Customary Organisation failed as the local government and the Lebak Tourism Office continued to promote Baduy as a tourist destination. Instead of heeding the advocacy, the government proposed a compromise by reducing tourist restrictions and developing an information centre in the Baduy area. The opposition to the Baduy tourism policy, however, emerged from a collective effort within the Baduy Customary Institution, driven by concerns over the negative impacts of tourism. These included issues such as waste, the exposure of the Inner Baduy area to the Internet, and the erosion of traditional lifestyles in favour of modernization.

According to Prasetyo et al. (2021) since the presence of tourism activities in the Baduy area, the Baduy indigenous people have begun to depend on their lives on the tourism sector

by opening stalls in the yard and selling goods, such as souvenirs, woven fabrics, and forest honey. The presence of stalls in the Baduy customary area has an impact on tourism activities; this becomes a problem because there is a shift in the values of the life of the Baduy indigenous people from traditional to modern and materialist. Of course, this is contrary to the law of Baduy *pikukuh*.

Horton (2009) explains that tourism can lead to consumerism, materialism, and commodification in communities. The Baduy community has experienced cultural shifts from traditional to modern due to the high influx of tourists with different cultural behaviours. This has resulted in the marginalisation of traditional values, cultural commodification, and the adoption of external habits, affecting the Baduy indigenous community.

The Baduy contra-tourism advocacy coalition lacks strategic positions within the formal authority and has no formal allies or support, placing it at a disadvantage compared to the pro-tourism coalition. This group rarely utilises mass media and instead seeks support through community engagement, particularly in Kanekes Village. The coalition relies on direct information from the Baduy Customary Organisation regarding violations of customary law in tourism activities. Rather than organising demonstrations, the coalition mobilizes its members by appealing to traditional teachings. Financially, the coalition is weak, as it focuses on preserving customs without significant operational funding. However, it benefits from strong leadership, as it is led by the Baduy traditional leaders or *Puun*, who hold considerable

authority over decisions affecting Baduy customary land. The *Puun*, through consensus within the customary institution, plays a key role in upholding and enforcing customary laws within the community.

The Baduy contra-tourism advocacy coalition primarily employs non-litigation strategies, focusing on deliberation, negotiation, and discussions with the Lebak Regional Government. Additionally, the coalition uses a network-based advocacy approach, engaging various stakeholders, especially within the Baduy community. Although the coalition generally avoids litigation, it did pursue a formal strategy by sending a letter to President Joko Widodo, urging the removal of Baduy from the tourism map of Lebak Regency due to concerns over the impacts of tourism.

Intermediary Coalition (Policy Broker)

The Lebak Regency Government acted as a mediator in the debate over opening the Baduy area for tourism, facilitating dialogue between the Baduy Customary Organisation and the Lebak Regional Government in response to an open letter addressed to President Joko Widodo to eliminate Baduy from the destination of tourist destinations. A key meeting on July 18, 2020, resulted in recommendations to rename Baduy tourism to *Saba Budaya Baduy* and build an information centre outside the customary land.

However, an audience or meeting that directly involves both coalitions has never been conducted. The hearing was conducted separately: the local government and the tourism agencies held a meeting with

the HPI-DPU Baduy group, and, at another time, the local government of Lebak held an audience with the Baduy Customary Organisation. To reach a consensus, Sabatier (1991) recommends including all parties in the negotiation and giving advocacy coalitions the right to veto. Sabatier (1991) also recommended that all relevant parties be included in negotiations and that advocacy coalitions be granted a right to veto. This is crucial in achieving a balanced consensus, especially in contentious issues like the opening of the Baduy area to tourism. In this case, although the local government has assumed a mediating role between the pro-tourism and contra-tourism coalitions, they have yet to implement an inclusive negotiation process, as Sabatier suggested. Meetings were conducted separately with each coalition—the Baduy Customary Organisation and the HPI-DPU Baduy group—instead of involving both sides at a single table for direct dialogue.

The separation of meetings between the two coalitions resulted in missed opportunities for a more inclusive and productive discussion, preventing direct dialogue, understanding, and compromise. By not bringing both sides together, the local government missed the chance to foster effective policy negotiation. Granting each coalition veto power, as suggested by Sabatier, would have ensured a more balanced and legitimate decision-making process, supporting sustainable and consensus-based outcomes that consider both cultural protection and tourism interests in Baduy.

The local government has positioned itself as a neutral party in the tourism debate despite being aligned with the

pro-tourism coalition from the outset. This reflects an inconsistent stance, where bureaucratic reasoning is used to present a neutral image, aiming to accommodate the aspirations of all parties involved. However, political motivations are evident as the government continues to prioritise Baduy as a key tourist destination in the region. This political stance is reinforced by the designation of six major tourist destinations in Lebak Regency, with Baduy prominently featured among them. The designation of Baduy as one of the main tourist destinations in Lebak Regency aligns with the local government's strategy to boost tourism in Banten. Among the six "fantastic destinations" prioritised by the Lebak government, the Baduy area stands out due to its unique cultural heritage and traditional practices, attracting both domestic and international visitors. However, this prominence raises concerns among the Baduy indigenous community, particularly regarding the cultural and environmental impact of increased tourism. The government's efforts to balance tourism with sustainable practices, including initiatives like *Saba Budaya*, emphasise responsible tourism that respects local traditions and conserves resources (Umarella et al., 2020).

The dynamic reflects the tension between the government's push for tourism and the community's focus on cultural and environmental preservation. While a policy broker should remain neutral, the local government favoured one coalition, contrary to Sabatier's model of impartiality.

Government's Decision on the Baduy Tourism Policy

The final decision on the Baduy tourism policy, made by the Regent of Lebak Regency, involved changing the term from "tourism destination" to *Saba Budaya,* reflecting the Baduy tribe's preference for more culturally respectful tourism. This decision followed a deliberation with the Baduy Customary Organisation's leader and the Head of the Lebak Regency Culture and Tourism Office (Antara & Budiman, 2020). Despite the shift from traditional conventional tourism, visitors can still visit Baduy under specific conditions.

The *Saba Budaya Baduy* concept is a tourism approach that focuses on cultural and environmental preservation, with the Baduy community playing a central role in managing sustainable tourism. Unlike previous models that prioritised economic gains over culture and the environment, *Saba Budaya* emphasises community involvement and includes educational efforts to promote respect for local culture and environment. This concept aims to establish a fair, sustainable tourism model aligned with Baduy values.

Saba Budaya Baduy is a tourism approach designed to align with the cultural and environmental values of the Baduy people. It shifts the focus from traditional tourism, reframing the experience as an interactive cultural and educational engagement that respects Baduy traditions. This model represents a sustainable tourism paradigm that integrates indigenous cultural principles into tourism practices, prioritising community-led management, ecological preservation, and

cultural integrity. By granting the Baduy community authority over tourism regulation, the model aims to prevent environmental harm and preserve traditional values, ensuring that visitors interact with Baduy culture in a manner that respects local customs.

"Here, we prioritise good relationships rather than just tourism, naming *Saba Budaya Baduy* means *Saba* is a relationship because if it is categorised as tourism, it is like a spectacle and there is development everywhere. While we reject that, the word relationship is the right word to see the culture and customs of the Baduy community." (Jaro Saija, Interview on 21 October 2023).

Regent Iti Octavia agreed to replace the term "tourist destination" with *Saba Budaya* and will evaluate policies to prevent environmental pollution and preserve nature. Dedi Mulyadi, from the House of Representatives, emphasised that tourists should respect and learn about the Baduy community rather than view it as a spectacle. The Indonesian Ministry of Tourism and Economy supports limiting tourist numbers and embracing sustainable tourism (Mutiah, 2020), with Hari Santosa Sungkari suggesting an application to manage and record visits to the Baduy area.

The concept of *Saba Budaya Baduy* was chosen because it can fulfil the demands and desires of the two competing advocacy coalitions. This is due to the continued economic activity of Baduy tourism, alongside the implementation of visitation limits and the shift to the Saba Budaya tourism concept. Therefore, the concept of *Saba Budaya Baduy* was considered the most viable solution by the Lebak Regency

Government. This may not fully indicate a consensus in the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) sense. Within ACF, a consensus involves compromises across coalitions where each party's core values and beliefs are acknowledged and upheld through policy, often requiring open dialogue and negotiation.

In the case of *Saba Budaya Baduy*, the "compromise" largely reflects the local government's strategic attempt to maintain tourism activities in a format that superficially acknowledges Baduy cultural principles without fundamentally shifting the balance of influence away from pro-tourism interests. Changing the term to *Saba Budaya* and setting certain visitor limits may appear to address Baduy's preservation concerns, but if the primary decision-making power remains with the government and tourism proponents, this may not meet the conditions for true consensus.

In a true consensus, as per Sabatier (1991), both coalitions, the tourism supporters and the Baduy advocates for cultural preservation would have not only their input considered but also possess the power to negotiate terms that uphold their core values. This would entail giving the Baduy Customary Organisation an active role in managing tourism limits and visitor conduct and determining the extent of cultural presentations, aligning with the concept of community-led tourism (Bramwell & Lane, 2005). Thus, while *Saba Budaya Baduy* may be a step toward compromise, the absence of significant control by the

Baduy over these processes suggests that it may fall short of a true consensus or balanced power-sharing model.

The final decision on tourism policy in Baduy favours the pro-tourism advocacy coalition, which holds significant advantages over the contra-tourism coalition. The pro-tourism coalition benefits from strong support from influential parties, such as the Regional Government and the Regent of Lebak Regency, which shapes the policies in favour of sustainable tourism development in Baduy. However, the advocacy efforts of the Baduy Customary Organisation, despite being less powerful, have led to positive outcomes, such as the implementation of tourist number limitations and the shift towards the concept of *Saba Budaya*, marking a compromise between tourism development and cultural preservation.

Conclusion

Tourism development in Baduy has raised a conflict between economic growth and preserving local culture and the environment. While tourism activities offer economic benefits, concerns about its impact persist. Efforts to balance resources, tourist visits, and community needs have been challenging due to environmental issues and policy shortcomings.

The advocacy coalitions surrounding Baduy tourism are divided into two main groups. On one side, the pro-tourism coalition supports the development of tourism to stimulate economic growth in the local community while upholding sustainable tourism principles. In contrast, the opposition coalition focuses on environmental preservation and the protection of traditional customs, which they feel are increasingly threatened by the influence of tourism. The

division reflects a balancing act between enhancing local livelihoods through tourism and safeguarding Baduy's cultural and environmental heritage, which is at risk of erosion due to growing tourism activities.

The pro-tourism coalition, supported by the local government and tourism stakeholders, advocates for eco-friendly tourism to boost the economy through hearings and discussions. In contrast, the contra coalition, led by the Baduy Customary Organisation, prioritises tradition and limits tourism, promoting the *Saba Budaya* concept. The Lebak Regency Local Government acts as a mediator, supporting tourism development while attempting to reconcile the opposing coalitions through discussions. However, this approach has been ineffective due to the failure to unite both sides and inconsistencies in the government's position.

The final decision on the Baduy tourism policy, made by the Regent of Lebak Regency, was to change the term from "tourist destination" to *Saba Budaya Baduy*, based on recommendations from a deliberation with the Baduy Customary Organisation and the Local Government. While this decision aimed to balance both advocacy coalitions' wishes, it largely favours the pro-tourism coalition. Despite this, the Baduy Customary Organisation's advocacy successfully limited tourist numbers and shifted the tourism concept, contributing positively to policies that prioritise the sustainability and preservation of the Baduy culture.

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Contestation and Representation Claims: Analyzing Companion Groups of Anak Dalam Indigenous Community in Jambi Province

Fidiara Maharani[1]

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Abstract

Theory of "the representative claim" opens up the political space of representation beyond the formal realm, and contestation over representation can take place both in the electoral and non-electoral arena. This contestation takes the form of narrative claims to justify and legitimize the representation carried out on the claimed constituents. This research analyzes the contestation between the NGOs who facilitate the Anak Dalam Tribe Indigenous Community (Suku Anak Dalam, or SAD) as a non-electoral representation actor in the alleged conflict between the SAD Indigenous Community and one of the palm oil companies in Jambi Province. Using a qualitative approach to obtain depth of data and analysis, this research shows that in the contestation of claims between companion groups, at least three claims are produced, namely representation claims, misrepresentation claims, and representation claims of interests or values. Contesting claims center on differences in views regarding the best way to improve the welfare of the SAD Indigenous Peoples. This claim itself produces various responses of acceptance and rejection by the constituents – the SAD Community – which the companion group claims to be the group they represent.

Keywords: *Representation Politics; Representative Claim; Suku Anak Dalam, Indigenous Peoples.*

1 Works at Indonesia Global Compact Network. The view expressed in this article does not represent the institution where author works. Email: fidiaram0@gmail.com.

Introduction

The realm of representation does not only relate to representatives from the formal, electoral sector, but also non-formal (non-electoral) such as civil society (Lay, 2018). Civil society groups including *Non Governmental Organisation* (NGOs) are often considered as a speaker or representative for groups that are marginalized or powerless and excluded in the decision-making process (Hahn & Holzscheiter, 2013). Just as representation in parliament is contested, the realm of non-electoral representation is also full of contestation. As explained by Kopecký & Mudde (2003) who say that NGOs are not homogeneous entities, but are heterogeneous and sometimes oppose each other. This competition takes the form of control of narrative as a non-material resource and source of legitimacy and for actors who claim to represent it (Holzscheiter, 2005).

Along the way, the play narrative and meaning that shows one's superiority becomes a form of representation to gain access to powerful non-material resources and defeat other narratives issued by other groups with a similar agenda. This means that sometimes contestation takes the form of narrative competition among different groups that focus on the same field, including civil society groups that facilitate the indigenous people of the Anak Dalam Tribe (SAD).

As a minority group, the indigenous community of Anak Dalam Tribe (Suku Anak Dalam, SAD) has attracted the attention of civil society groups. Since the 90s, various parties have involved and facilitated SAD so that they are familiarly called

the "companion group (*kelompok pendamping*)".[2] These groups are actively engaged in education, empowerment, and advocacy for customary rights, including customary land, which has become a chronic conflict in the palm oil area in Jambi Province (Asra et al., 2017; AMAN, 2012; Fitria, 2020). As will be shown in this article, this companion group is not homogenous, but consists of different groups with similar vision and mission.

This paper analyzes the contestation of representation claims from SAD companion groups in cases of alleged conflict between several groups of the SAD community and one of the palm oil companies in Jambi Province in 2022. The author found that there was a contestation in the narrative claims regarding the living conditions of the SAD community, their relationship with the company, and the best way to advocate the SAD community itself. This contestation sharpened when allegations of conflict emerged, sharpening discourse competition among the groups.

Using qualitative research methods with data collection strategies in the form of in-depth interviews with related parties, this paper emphasizes narrative analysis using Michael Saward's theory, *The Representative Claim*. The author focuses on analyzing the dynamics of representational claims produced by SAD indigenous community companion groups, and the claim contestation that occurs, especially when issues of alleged conflict arise. In addition, the author explores the claims responses produced

2 Information from local government from two districts in Jambi Province during the author's 2022 field research

by looking at responses from their constituents who are the target audience of the accompanying groups.

Results

About Conflict: Who was Involved in the Conflict?

The relationship between the SAD community and palm oil company operating on their livelihoods is quite dynamic. This relationship is sometimes filled with tension but not always. One of the companies that has this relationship is Company X which is located in Jambi Province. The tension was triggered by the decreasing number of forests as a source of livelihood for the SAD community, converted to palm oil plantations. Small-scale conflicts began to occur frequently between security officers who work for the company and the SAD indigenous community because of their activity of picking up palm fruit kernels that fell from trees on the company's land.[3] The root of the problem relates to different concepts of land ownership. According to the SAD community, anyone has the right to have fruit in nature, especially if it is in their area of life. Meanwhile, the company views that all natural products in their area belong to the company, according to the permit they possess. In 2018, Human Rights Watch issued a statement that the presence of palm oil companies had eliminated the livelihoods of the SAD indigenous people (Sitanggang, 2021).

In 2017, the company hired a public consultant, Daemeter, to analyze the situation so that it could better mitigate the company's relationship with the SAD Indigenous

3 Information from Tumenggung, guardian groups, and local government in direct interviews, March 1-8, 2022.

Community.[4] The results of the consultant's analysis stated and recommended the company to provide living space for the SAD indigenous community living in Company X's operational area. Based on these recommendations, the Company made various CSR programs, from health, education, and economic support. The hope is that this program can reduce conflict and make coexistence possible between the SAD indigenous community and Company X.

Although there have been efforts to fulfill Daemeter's recommendations, apparently the friction has not disappeared. Sparks appeared again when one of the companion groups, namely Companion Group 1 which focuses in the environmental sector, sent a written report in the name of the impacted SAD indigenous communities to Komnas HAM in September 2019 regarding human rights violations that occurred against the groups around Company X's HGU area[5] (Project Multatuli, 2021; Komnas HAM, 2021). In response to this, the government under the ministry that is responsible for land and special planning (will be called Ministry A) dispatched a team to the field in June 2022. Discussions were then held with the SAD indigenous community in the Air Hitam area which was the object of the report and the local regional government. However, official representatives from the relevant SAD indigenous community groups were absent, and the absence of reports submitted to the regional government meant that discussions did not reach a strong legitimacy.

4 Information from Company X and Companion Group 4 in a direct interview on March 5, 2022.

5 Information from Company X and Companion Group 4 in a direct interview on March 5, 2022, and supported by an article from Project Multatuli.

Exploring the complex nature of the conflict, Komnas HAM then decided to conduct a more in-depth study in 2022 by doing a field visit. In response to this, the Ministry A then collaborated with an independent institution that will be addressed as Institution C to conduct field research. Institution C is usually engaged in mediating agrarian and natural resource conflicts. With consideration that the information and data from the companion group's complaint report and government documents cannot yet be verified as conflicting, this study then focuses on verifying the alleged conflict report. The results of the Institution C research concluded that there was no conflict as reported by the companion group, and there were no human rights violations by Company X. Nevertheless, SAD Indigenous Community indeed face massive dispossession due to reduced living space and modernization clashes due to land control by Company X (Institution C, 2021).

Even though the results of Institution C's field research show that there is no evidence on the conflict between several SAD Indigenous Community Groups and Company X, their research has succeeded in highlighting the process and dynamics of claims of representation from the advocacy groups who claim to be representatives. Due to different results between Institution C and the report sent to Komnas HAM, the conflict can be labelled as "alleged conflict" and this article uses this term.

From those various reports, it shows that both the SAD Indigenous Community Group and the accompanying group are not homogeneous units. There are at least four groups (*rombong*) and four companion groups that are involved in this

alleged conflict. First group is who reported to Komnas HAM; the second group is the local civil society group who claims the opposite. Third group is focusing on education while the last group is the advocacy group with most of its members coming from the Third Group. Most companion groups involved representing a different group of the SAD Indigenous community. Thus, the claims become very dynamic with various actors involved in it and contestation is inevitable.

Expressed and Implied: Mapping and Analyzing the Elements of Representation Claims

The representative claim theory by Saward (2006) focuses on the claim making process. The process of making a claim and the events after the claim is made can be mapped as follows:

> *A **Maker** of representation (M) puts forward a **Subject** (S) which stands for an **Object** (O) which is related to a **Referent** (R) and is offered to an **Audience** (A).*

Makers of representational claims (Makers) produce claim narratives regarding one party as a representative (Subject) of certain constituents who are described as requiring representation (Objects) (Saward, 2010). An object is an image of a Referent – here a person, group, or something else in the real world. The narrative of the claim is then directed to the audience. The audience can be referents (constituents) and other groups outside it. A successful claim is one that the audience responds to.

The mapping of the accompanying group's representation claims can be seen as follows.

Companion Group 1:

[Companion Group 1] … (name of organization) **(M)** is a companion group **(S)** from marginalized indigenous tribes who are marginalized by narrowing living space, low levels of welfare, and beginning to fade their identity due to the impact of development that is not in accordance with their identity **(O)**, one of them is the SAD indigenous community **(R)**. This group's activities involve various interested parties at various levels, from local to international **(A)**.

Here, Companion Group 1 claims as an assistance to the SAD indigenous community whose existence is threatened due to the depletion of forests which causes the loss of their livelihood space. The loss of forests not only causes the SAD indigenous community group to lose their place to live, but also their source of livelihood, even customs and culture that are connected to the existence of the forest. Currently, Companion Group 1 is advocating for assistance to begin the transition from hunting and gathering communities to farmers by providing subsistence land. One performative form of this representation claim is a letter of demand to Komnas HAM that Company X provide land which is part of the company's core land for the livelihood of the SAD indigenous community.

Companion Group 2:

[Companion Group 2]… (name of organization) **(M)** is an institution that focuses on research and community empowerment, especially SAD indigenous communities **(S)** which has difficulty in carrying out cultural and economic transformation due to minimal intervention. Supporting

Group 2 then formed the "SAD Partnership Forum" as a catalysator for all parties to work together in empowering the SAD indigenous community **(O)**. The SAD indigenous community **(R)** needs encouragement and intervention to adapt to the conditions of forest loss and the demands of the times. Synergy from all parties is needed for the success of the program, including the government, companies, and other support groups (A).

Companion Group 3:

[Companion Group 3]… (name of organization) **(M)** is an NGO in the field of education for SAD indigenous communities. So far, the SAD indigenous people have found it difficult to receive education and are not accommodated by the government due to the lack of an educational concept that adapts to the needs and lifestyle of the SAD indigenous people and their different cultural contexts **(S).** Our main focus [Companion Group 3] is to provide education for the SAD indigenous community in accordance with the wishes and needs of the SAD indigenous community **(O).** SAD indigenous people **(R)**, especially the Makekal Hulu group, admitted that the assistance from this group was very helpful to them. Currently, Companion Group 3 has been recognized not only by the SAD indigenous community itself but also by the government and internationally **(A).**

The representation claim by Companion Group 3 was not made explicitly. Furthermore, the representation claim was produced to support the Advocacy Group 4 advocacy group as "cadre", referring to the SAD indigenous people who are the result of being assisted, Companion Group 3.

The uniqueness of this group lies in its curriculum which was created through discussions with the *rerayo* or elders of the SAD indigenous community group and involving the SAD indigenous community directly (participatory and inclusive). As a group that goes directly into the field and interacts directly, Companion Group 4 has the justification as a group that knows the conditions and problems of the SAD indigenous community well.

Companion Group 4

[Companion Group 4]... (name of organization) **(M)** is an advocacy group that fights for the rights of the SAD indigenous people as a form of emancipation and proof that the SAD indigenous people are able to fight for their own rights **(S)**. The focus of this group is of course the SAD indigenous community, especially those located around the Bukit Duabelas National Park (TNBD). which was previously threatened due to TNBD regulations that were not in accordance with community customs **(O)**. SAD Indigenous Peoples **(R)** must be involved and heard in policy making related to them by stakeholders and the community **(A).**

In the representation claim for Companion Group 4, the justification for the representatives used comes from the same background as the group being advocated for, namely the SAD indigenous community. Although Companion Group 4 only contains members from the Makekal Hulu group and no representatives from other groups such as Air Hitam and Kejasung, claims show they are advocating for all SAD indigenous groups. This is also

demonstrated by the advocacy movement regarding the division of TNBD zones which ultimately binds all SAD community groups.

From the explanation in the 4 cases above, the elements of representation claims by the four companion groups can be mapped as follows.

Table 1. Mapping of Companion Group Representation Claim Elements

	Claim Makers	Claimed Representative	Claimed Constituency	Claimed Linkage
Companion Group 1	Non-electoral representation	Companion Group 1 claims itself as a companion group (representation).	SAD indigenous people.	An advocacy group that has long accompanied the SAD indigenous community.
Companion Group 2	Non-electoral representation	Does not claim to be a representation. But initiating social change through the SAD Partnership Forum involving local governments and companies.	SAD indigenous people.	Justification of claims based on research results.

Companion Group 3	Non-electoral representation	Companion Group 3 as an educational NGO. Companion Group 4 as an advocacy group.	SAD indigenous people.	The relationship comes from the relationship established with the one of the SAD Indigenous group and the Companion Group 4.
Companion Group 4	Non-electoral representation	Companion Group 4 claims to be an advocacy group for the SAD indigenous community.	SAD indigenous people.	The relationship between SAD groups and society is not explicitly stated. But the justification is because they comes from similar backgrounds.

From the table above, there are several points that we can conclude. First, the focus of this research is *claim makers* as a form of non-electoral representation. In other words, this time the focus is on companion groups as claim producers outside the electoral institution. In the representation claims section, *claimed representatives* include two institutions, namely Companion Group 1 and Companion Group 4, which in itself, means there is explicit recognition. Meanwhile, the other two companion groups

(Companion Group 2 and Companion Group 3) did not explicitly declare themselves to be a representative.

Broadly speaking, there are at least two forms of claims that occur, namely complete claims with a clear representative subject and stated explicitly by the companion group, and incomplete claims with a narrative of not naming oneself as a companion but carrying out mentoring activities. In other words, an accompanying explicit narrative can be found in groups with complete claims. Groups with incomplete claims often require further in-depth research and examining the implied meaning in the narrative of their representative claims.

Dynamics of Claim Contestation: Conflicting and Constituent Responses

1. Claim Types and Friction Points

Guasti & Giessel (2019) divide claims into four types, representation claims, misrepresentation claims, claims for certain interests or values, and proclamations. This division is carried out based on the main semantic features of the claims produced. The accompanying group produces at least three types of representation claims, namely claims for representation, misrepresentation, and claims for certain interests or values.

The research results show that Companion Group 1 issued two different types of claims, namely representation claims and misrepresentation claims.

Representation claims are identified through statements made during the data collection process through interviews.

> *"If we ask about our attitude, as those who accompany orang rimbo (the jungle people) (another name for the SAD community), we recommend that the government and companies develop the livelihoods of the jungle people. Not just a house, but a livelihood," (Informant Interview 1, March 8, 2022).*

In this statement, the claim maker clearly states that he is a companion who speaks for the interests of the SAD indigenous community. A claim is included in a representation claim when the claim maker speaks on behalf of or in the interests of constituents and gives an indication of the existence of a representative and constituent relationship between them. So, the claim above includes a representation claim.

Claims of misrepresentation were also produced by Companion Group 1 in interviews. The claim reads as follows:

> *"...they set up a partnership forum. Even though this forum invites other parties, management remains with them – local NGOs. Forums are the same, if the activity is not related to Company X, they don't move. This forum was greatly utilized during the visit of the Deputy Minister [from Ministry A]. They made a press conference, Company X," (Informant Interview 1, March 8, 2022).*

The statement above shows the accusations of Companion Group 1 against one of the members of the accompanying Group 2, who was deemed

to be biased towards a company which (according to the claims of Supporting Group 1), was in conflict with the SAD indigenous community. Claims that contain accusations that representatives other than themselves (the claim maker) do not represent constituents well are called misrepresentation claims. This means that Companion Group 1 produced a misrepresentation claim.

Companion Group 2 is an unique NGO. Facts on the ground show that his name is not well known, but their program, namely the SAD Social Development Partnership Forum, has become a guide in SAD indigenous community development programs by the regional government and Company not an implementing agency but a catalyst to synergize parties who care about the welfare of the SAD indigenous community. Some other statements indicating claims of representation are as follows:

> *"We have seen, so far, their failure to carry out transformations in terms of culture, production patterns and various things so that they remain like this. Minimal policy intervention.* ***We must encourage the acceleration of their social change.*** *Everyone has to do it. Companies have funds, through CSR programs, but sometimes they don't know what they want to do. The government is always limited by the budget, but they have power, those who have territory, they can protect it according to regulations. NGOs, have militant souls.*

Why not collaborate?" (Informant Interview 2, March 8, 2022, underline from the author).

The above statement refers to claims of representation of interests (*claim of interests/values*), where the claim maker speaks about constituents without claiming a representational relationship with the constituents. Here, Companion Group 2 does not explicitly claim to be a representation, but claims are issued and actions are taken in the form of a program. This program is believed to be the most appropriate answer to facing existing problems. This indicates the group is part of the representation group.

Companion Group 2 also produced claims of misrepresentation in the form of accusations leveled at the Support Group:

"Because one of the companion group, if I may say so, the person who was the biggest sin against SAD was [Companion Group 1] who pushed for a change in the status of National Park. Then [because of that] the SAD is pushed out," (Informant Interview 2, March 8, 2022).

The statement above is a claim of misrepresentation made by Companion Group 2 when discussions regarding the issue of alleged conflict between the SAD indigenous community and Company X arose. This claim was followed by another statement regarding how the Companion Group 1 program had not had a significant impact even after years of assisting the SAD indigenous community.

Companion Group 3 emphasized that the focus of their institution is in the field

of education, both through the website and during interviews regarding the issue of alleged conflict between the SAD indigenous community and Company.

> *"We [Companion Group 3] ourselves are related to [establishment] of the National Park, because of that, initially we advocated for the land of the jungle people, right? From there we started networking," (Informant Interview 3, March 5, 2023).*

The claim above indicates a narrative of acting in the interests of the SAD indigenous community, namely advocating for the land of the SAD indigenous community. However, subsequently there were no claims regarding the relationship between Companion Group 3 and the SAD indigenous community regarding advocacy activities. Although when talking about education, Support Group 3 firmly states that their movement aims to empower the SAD indigenous community. Thus, the statement above can be classified as a type of claim for representation of interests (*Claim of Interests/ Values*).

Companion Group 4 was identified as making claims of representation during interviews. The claim reads:

> *"This [Companion Group 4], is a local organization that works, to fight for the rights of our own indigenous communities. So we are intermediaries between the jungle people themselves and external affairs. What we fight for, we voice to outside parties. In particular, we convey this to the government," (Direct interview with Informant 4, March 5, 2022).*

From the statement above, there are two important things to note. First, there is a narrative of fighting for which can be interpreted as acting for certain interests. Second, the claim maker clearly states their relationship with the constituent, namely as an intermediary. From the two semantic features above, the claims produced are classified as representation claims.

However, if we delve further into the relationship between Companion Group 3, which does not claim to be a representative, and Companion Group 4, which claims to be a representation, there is a fairly close relationship. All actions of Companion Group 4 are the result of discussions with Companion Group 3 because the administrators are advisors and teachers of the members and founders of Companion Group 4. So, even though they do not claim directly, Companion Group 3 also participates in the contestation indirectly through Companion Group 4.

The accompanying group produces at least three types of representation claims, namely claims for representation, misrepresentation, and claims for certain interests or values. The results of the analysis of these four companion groups can be read in the following table.

Table 2. Forms of Companion Group Claims

	Representation Claims	Misrepresentation Claims	Claims to Interests or Values
Companion Group 1	✓	✓	
Companion Group 2		✓	✓

Companion Group 3	✓		
Companion Group 4	✓		

From the table above, we can learn the types of claims produced by the companion group. Three of the accompanying groups produced representation claims, namely Companion Group 1, Companion Group 3, and Companion Group 4. Companion Group 2 did not produce representation claims but claims for interests, namely the interests of the SAD indigenous community. An interesting thing can be seen in the section on misrepresentation claims with two companion groups making claims attacking each other, namely Companion Group 1 and Companion Group 2. Thus, although there is contestation in terms of representation claims between companion groups in general, there are cases of alleged conflict between Company.

2. The Constituents Feedback: Various Responses to Representation Claims from the Audience

Claims of representation will not work if there is no response from the audience. The audience here refers to the parties the claim maker wants to convince. In Guasti & Giessel (2018), there are two parties who are very important in seeing the response, namely constituents and related authorities. The response from the audience can be in the form of acceptance of the claim, but it can also be in the form of rejection. Furthermore, audience responses cannot be measured equally. In one case, constituents may accept the claim but the authority rejects it

and *vice versa*. In this case, the author will focus on responses to claims from constituents of the companion group, namely the SAD indigenous community.

Constituent Testimony: No Land Claims

In theory *The Representative Claim*, constituents can be part of the audience. In the case of alleged conflict between Company In the initial conflict study process, there were several leaders of SAD groups or indigenous groups who were met and willing to be interviewed.

The loudest response came from the head of the group (*rombong*) of the SAD indigenous community, Tumenggung, which has a roaming area around the core plantation of the Company X. They really regret this because they feel they never signed it.

> *"The fact that my name was listed there itself surprised me, because I don't think I ever signed it [letter of claim]. So, it's like they secretly took my name. This is what we experienced and honestly. We don't know who is suing or where. We as the community declare that there is no dispute," (Interview Tumenggung SAD 1, March 3, 2023).*

Apart from shock, other reactions that emerged from Tumenggung SAD 1 and the leaders were irritation and even anger. As head of the group, the name Tumenggung SAD 1 was given of course has quite a big significance. Apart from that, if any of their group members participated in the reporting, they felt that their authority as elders had been overstepped.

Furthermore, the land being sued is land within their territory so other groups should not have the right to make claims.

Regarding their welfare condition, this group considers that they are already prosperous enough that they do not need to demand anything. This is because the company's assistance includes monthly *jatah hidup* (jadup) (living allowance) which contains basic food packages, educational assistance from elementary school to university scholarships, planting assistance, and ambulance assistance and health services. Apart from that, each of them already has a house and is free to carry out all customs on the existing land. In short, they feel they have no problems with the company and are quite secure in terms of welfare.

Based on author field observations, there are indeed schools built specifically for the SAD indigenous community. Statements from the children there also said that they were picked up by company cars for school, especially those who were carrying out the tradition of *melangun* or traveling the forest to express grief. The children also said that their teachers were very kind and patient so that even though they were a little lazy about wearing uniforms, they felt that school was not something bad.

The information from Group 1 and Tumenggung SAD 1 was also supported by Tumenggung SAD 2 who had the status of former Tumenggung. He resigned because he had converted to Islam and was deemed no longer qualified as a traditional leader. Despite this, he admitted that he was still part of SAD and this was acknowledged by other elders who were present at the time of the interview.

According to the former Tumenggung SAD 2, there was no conflict between his group and Company X Just like the *group* from Tumenggung SAD 1, assistance in the form of basic food packages, health, agricultural program assistance and education has been provided by the company.

> *"We were very surprised, because up until now we had not noticed any conflict between the company and the our community. Because, all of us as a community, feel that we have been helped," (Tumenggung SAD 2 Interview, March 3, 2023).*

Regarding land, Tumenggung SAD 2 said that currently they are facing a land crisis for livelihoods. Even though they can still hunting animals and collecting fruits in the forest, the former Tumenggung SAD 2 states their numbers have been steadily decreasing in recent years. But the former Tumenggung SAD 2 said that they submitted their demands regarding livelihood land to the government. Besides the land, they also want the government to create a development programs that involve the SAD indigenous community in their planning stage.

Adding to the previous statement, Tumenggung SAD 3 also admitted that he did not know anything about the land claims because most of them were inside [the forest] than outside. However, he said that land demands were not something new. Considering the limited living space and the threat of declining welfare, this demand is not entirely wrong.

Personally, he chooses not to side with anyone. According to him, all parties involved were wrong. The company made a mistake because it initially

focused more on transmigrant people than on the indigenous SAD community. But the public is also wrong because they are only demanding now, after the company has been operating for years. As head of the SAD group which did not receive assistance from the company, Tumenggung SAD 3 chose not to comment much on this alleged conflict case. Apart from that, he chose a neutral position to maintain good relations with other SAD groups.

Different from the three *rombong* above, Tumenggung SAD 4 has other opinion. In a joint interview with Tumenggung SAD 4, he explained that there was indeed an agreement to report land claims due to the group's worrying conditions with Companion Group 1. However, based on several considerations, Tumenggung SAD 4 chose to withdraw the claim. The first consideration is related to the assistance that the SAD Group 4 has received from Company X.

> *"The problem with the Company X, actually, I have indeed tried to sue the Company X. However, no matter how hard I demand, the Company X will also help us as much as they can. So, [in the end] I feel reluctant. Apart from that, we were also influenced by some party [Companion Group 1], as supporters of SAD," (Tumenggung SAD 4 Interview, March 6, 2023).*

Based on information from Tumenggung SAD 4, the condition of the *rombong* was quite worrying. Although there is assistance from Company X in the form of housing, guiding and access to develop plantation and health. However, this is not enough for several reasons. Firstly, plantation products,

namely cassava plantations, can only be harvested once every six months with the harvest only sufficient for one week's needs. Second, the loss of their livelihood area because theirs is not included as protected region as part of the Bukit Dua Belas National Park. Third, the number of animals that can be hunted has decreased so their income has also decreased. For these reasons, The SAD Group 4 considers education to be useless because they are already threatened with starvation before feeling the impact of education.

> *"If you continue like this, let's be honest, all the groups in this region, both adults and children, gather us at the regent's office and just shoot us sir. Shot us dead, we couldn't eat either way. Well, that's it. Now, it's up to the government. If we want to sue the Company X, they already helped us a lot," (Tumenggung SAD 4 interview, March 6, 2023).*

This statement illustrates the despair of Tumenggung SAD 4 regarding the welfare of his group. According to him, compared to others such as *rombong* SAD 1, 2, and 3 where they still have their forest areas since it is part of the national parks, hence protected, the *rombong* of SAD 4 is much sadder because they no longer have forests for their livelihood. With the difficulty of hunting, gardening or farming due to the small amount of land make Tumenggung SAD 4 quite pessimistic regarding the welfare of his group in the long term.

If simplified, then the constituent response to the companion group's claim is as follows:

Table 3. Constituent Responses to Companion Group Claims

SAD Troupe	Claims of Worrying SAD Conditions	Farming Ability	Relation-ship with Company	The Existence of Conflict	Companion Group
Tumenggung SAD 1	Not true	Can	Good	No conflict	Companion Group 2
Tumenggung SAD 2	Not true	Can	Good	No conflict	Companion Group 2
Tumenggung SAD 3	True	Can	Neutral	No conflict	–
Tumenggung SAD 4	True	Can	Good	No conflict	Companion Group 1

From the table above, it can be seen the constituent response to the claims produced by the companion group. First, regarding the general claim that the welfare conditions of the SAD indigenous community show differences, where two of the four groups stated that their group was quite prosperous and sufficient. These two groups are groups that receive full assistance from the company.

The other three claims are farming ability, good relations with Company X, and the existence of conflicts. Second, regarding the claim of the farming capability of the SAD indigenous community, all informants stated that they had the knowledge to farm even though they did not reject the mentoring program. Third, when discussing good relations with Company X, all informants from the constituent

sides stated that there is no conflict. Finally, regarding the existence of the companion group, two of the informants stated their closeness to the Companion Group 2 while the other mentioned mentoring by the Companion Group 1.

From the results of the analysis of the study above, it can be seen that the ongoing claims contestation has escalated into issues of alleged conflict. Each has narratives and claims to be the group that provides the best solution to the SAD indigenous community problems. The clashing point was found in the best solution in resolving the problems of the SAD indigenous community, with the two accompanying groups throwing claims of misrepresentation at each other.

The results of interviews conducted with various parties above show statements that are quite contradictory to the information in the previous section. Some firmly rejected the existence of the conflict referred to by Companion Group 1, although some agreed that there were welfare problems. Several other parties said that a small conflict did occur, related to the extraction of palm fruit kernels (brondol) as stated by Companion Group 4, but stated that there were no problems between Company X and the SAD indigenous community.

On the other hand, there are several parties who are unhappy with the issue of this alleged conflict. Firstly, from Tumenggung SAD 1, former Tumenggung SAD 2, and Tumenggung SAD 3 whose names were included in the complaint letter without their knowledge. Tumenggung SAD 4 himself stated that he was interested in the land offer because their condition was much worse than the

Tumenggung SAD 1 and former Tumenggung SAD 2 groups, but decided not to include his name in the letter of demand.

Conflicting opinions regarding the existence of conflict, conditions of mutual accusation and suspicion between the accompanying groups. This condition did not interfere with the provision of assistance or assistance from each party to the SAD community under its guidance, but succeeded in causing disharmony between CSOs and even the potential for division within the SAD community itself. Thus, there is implicit competition that occurs between the companion groups. This competition then affects relationships among parties involved, whether between the SAD community and the company X, the SAD community and companion groups, as well as between the companion groups themselves. The peak was the conflict that occurred in the alleged conflict between Company X and the SAD indigenous community.

Conclusion

The realm of representational politics is described by Saward (2010) as a realm filled with contested claims between representational actors. Departing from the development of the political concept of representation, the representative world is no longer dominated by the arena of formal legislative institutions but instead becomes an informal space that can be entered by anyone, including civil society groups, like NGOs. These civil society groups appear in various forms. names, and various sectors. In this article, they are in the form of a companion group for the SAD Indigenous Community in Jambi Province.

Representation often takes the form of a "claim" to represent a group. In the context of this informal representational space, it also produces forms of representative claims for a group, including contestation between these claims. This happened with NGOs, the SAD Indigenous Community companion group. This contestation of claims is very prominent when cases such as alleged human rights violations and conflicts between the SAD Indigenous Community and Company X which operates in the SAD Indigenous Community's living area occur.

There are three conclusions from this article. *First*, the representation claims produced by the companion group are not the same, because each of them produce their own narratives. The companion group must have problem framing and creativity to promote their claims so that it is acceptable to the audience.

Second, in the relationship between parties who claim to be representatives and constituents, there are at least two variations of representation claims, namely express and implied representation claims. There are companion groups that state clearly (explicitly) their representation claims in the discourse produced; and, groups that do not state their claims clearly (implied). Express claims can be seen from claims in the form of representation claims and misrepresentation claims. Both claims clearly state the party representing (or not representing) and those represented. For claims of interest or value, ambiguity over the constituents may characterize these claims as implied claims. It should be

noted that both claims can be produced simultaneously. For example, Companion Group 2 produces representation claims for implied interests or values, and simultaneously issues misrepresentation claims that corner other companion groups. This shows the flexibility of claims within the world of representation itself.

Third, the dynamics of claim formation are full of contestation and involve many actors. Support Groups are required to convince their constituents of the validity of their claims. This is related to the assessment of the success of the claim, which is seen from the audience's acceptance. In this study, there were groups that succeeded in convincing their audience and getting their claims recognized, but there were also those that only succeeded in convincing part of the target audience. It can be concluded that claims can be rejected or accepted by constituents with varying degrees of claim acceptance.

Acceptance and rejection of these claims is one of the causes of contestation because it is not uncommon for representative actors to attack opponents' claims to make their own claims more convincing. However, not all contestation takes the form of attacking each other and countering the opponent's claims as a whole. Claim contestation can also be carried out with groups who agree on several aspects, but choose different paths. In other words, contestation of claims also occurs at different levels.

In short, the various forms of representational claims, actors, and levels of acceptance and contestation describe the fluid world of representational politics in non-formal arenas. When all actors are free to enter

and have to share space, then contestation to dominate that space is inevitable. This is the essence of representation which departs from representational claims in the informal arena. It is not very relevant to map out who succeeded in making the strongest claim, but what is focused on is how the process of forming claims and competition between claims takes place, which has been shown in this article.

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Beyond Factory Walls: Transformation of Labor Movement Through Community Unionism in Bekasi Regency[1]

Faris Rubiansyah[2]

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Abstract

This study explores the practice of Community Unionism (CU) as a response to the challenges that member of labor union faced in the area of Mega Regency Housing complex in Bekasi Regency, Indonesia. CU emerges as an alternative strategy that expands the role of union member from mere workers in the workplace to be part of the wider community. CU views workers are not only as economic entities, but also social ones, which in return can strengthen social solidarity among union member and political bargaining power. This research uses qualitative methods, including literature review, in-depth interviews, observation, and document analysis, to answer a question and analyze how CUs operate in one of housing complexes populated by union members in the region. The results show that CUs are able to improve the bargaining position of workers while providing significant benefits to local communities. This study contributes to the Indonesian labor literature by filling the knowledge gap regarding CUs in Indonesia, as well as offering insight into the potential of CUs in strengthening the labor movement and promoting social justice at the community level. The research emphasizes the importance of community-based approaches in contemporary labor movement strategies to achieve broader social transformation.

Keywords: *Community Unionism; Labor Movement; Political Participation; Social Solidarity.*

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2 Department of Politics and Government, Gadjah Mada University.
E-mail: farisruby0@gmail.com

Introduction

The labor movement in Indonesia remains a focal point for academic inquiry, with many studies addressing its challenges, such as fragmentation (Habibi, 2013) and limited political influence (Caraway et al., 2014; Savirani, 2015; 2022). Amid these issues, some research shifts attention to community unionism (CU), a strategy that fosters collaboration between labor unions and communities to strengthen solidarity in pursuit of social justice (Tattersall, 2008). Scholars such as Tufts (1998), Ellem (2003), Cockfield et al. (2009), and Wills and Simms (2004) underscore CU's role in enhancing unions' leverage over employers and the state, while also benefiting communities by increasing political participation and improving access to social services.

In Indonesia, CU-relevant practices have emerged, notably the "Buruh Go Politics" (BGP) and Jamkes Watch (JW) initiatives in Bekasi Regency. The BGP initiative, spearheaded by the FSPMI labor union, aims to train and support union members to engage in electoral politics, enabling them to run for legislative and executive positions to amplify workers' voices in policymaking. On the other hand, JW, established by KSPI, is dedicated to monitoring and advocating for fair implementation of health insurance policies, ensuring marginalized communities can access their rights to healthcare services. Although not explicitly framed as CU, previous research has explored these initiatives. Savirani (2015) and Saleh (2017) examine BGP from an electoral perspective, while Djani et al. (2017) and Herwinanda (2016) analyze JW's organizational

dynamics. This article aims to advance the understanding of CU by examining its application among labor unions in Mega Regency Housing, Bekasi Regency, one of the largest housing complexes in Bekasi.

Employing a qualitative approach, this study integrates literature reviews and case studies to trace CU practices, assess their alignment with CU theory, and evaluate their impact on the labor movement and democratic society. Primary data is collected through in-depth interviews with labor activists and field observations, complemented by secondary literature on CU practices in Bekasi Regency. The article seeks to: (1) reinterpret BGP and JW initiatives as CU practices, and (2) introduce CU as a conceptual framework within Indonesian labor studies.

Community Unionism

The concept of Community Unionism (CU) originated in the 1960s to describe student-led organizing in economically disadvantaged urban neighborhoods in the United States (Tufts, 2017). Over time, geographers adopted the term to analyze coalitions between labor unions and communities within labor geography (Banks, 1991; Tufts, 1998; Tattersall, 2010). Tattersall (2010) defines CU as a spatially-focused organizing strategy that mobilizes communities beyond workplace concerns, is identity-driven, and fosters coalitions between unions and non-labor groups. Key features of CU include its emphasis on activities outside the workplace and its pursuit of shared goals among unions, labor activists, and communities (Cockfield et al., 2009).

CU gained prominence in the 1990s amid a global labor union crisis (Tattersall, 2008). Scholars such as Banks (1991) and Brecher and Costello (1990) describe CU as encompassing diverse coalition forms. Its growth reflects unions' strategic response to declining membership, diminishing political influence, and weakening pro-labor regulations (Baccaro et al., 2003; Wills, 2001).

The significance of CU lies in its ability to transcend workplace-centric perspectives by incorporating broader community concerns (Duncan, 2015). However, interpretations of CU remain contested. While some scholars view CU as a spatial, identity-based strategy operating beyond workplaces, others see it as an alliance or coalition that fosters novel organizational forms (Tattersall, 2008; Tufts, 2017).

Figure 1: The Three Elements of Community



Source: Tattersall (2008)

Tattersall (2008) posits that spatial, shared identity, and organizational perspectives on Community Unionism (CU) are complementary rather than competing. This research adopts the core attributes of these three dimensions as its analytical framework.

Spatially, CUs are shaped by external environments and geographic contexts. Tattersall (2008: 425) identifies three spatial variables critical to CU success: the structure of political opportunities, such as electoral cycles and state openness, which refers to a government's willingness to engage with its citizens and provide opportunities for their influence in political processes; local participation spaces that serve as platforms for member engagement, fostering solidarity and decision-making; and mobilization capacity, which entails the ability to scale actions, allocate resources, and sustain organization across multiple levels.

On the aspect of shared identity, CUs rely on a unifying relationship between unions and communities, grounded in shared concerns (Tattersall, 2008: 422-423). This relationship is supported by three variables: alignment with movement goals, capacity to foster political and member participation, and a social framework that influences public opinion and advances a transformative agenda.

Organizationally, CU effectiveness depends on how unions and communities structure their engagement. Four indicators define this aspect: organizational capacity and culture, coalition structure, decision-making processes, and the presence of bridge builders. Capacity and culture are reflected in leadership,

organizational style, funding, and communication (Tattersall, 2008: 420). Coalition structures involve staffing, membership openness, and external relationships that balance solidarity with autonomy. Decision-making success hinges on shared organizational ownership, fostered by transparent structures and informal trust. Bridge builders play a pivotal role in navigating cultural differences, managing conflicts, and operating across scales (Tattersall, 2008: 422).

Tattersall (2008: 420) further identifies four dimensions of CU success[3]: political outcomes, political climate change, external relationships, and internal capacity. A CU succeeds when it achieves political victories such as policy reforms or support for worker-friendly candidates, shifts public discourse to influence policy and action, maintains alliances with external organizations to expand its network and influence, and strengthens internal capacity by building member skills, enhancing structures, and attracting new participants.

In the context of Mega Regency Housing, Bekasi Regency, this research applies these indicators to analyze how the labor movement incorporates CU principles and contributes to the transformation of the local labor movement. The subsequent section examines CU practices in Bekasi Regency, contextualizing them within the CU framework.

Tracking the Practice of Community Unionism in Bekasi Regency

Community Unionism (CU) serves as a conceptual framework and an actionable strategy, that

3 Success here is not defined as outcomes, but as the achievement of a relentless effort.

is not just theoretical but can be practically implemented through specific actions, within the labor movement. In Bekasi Regency, the principles of CU have been operationalized through initiatives such as *Buruh Go Politics* (BGP) and *Jamkes Watch* (JW). The BGP initiative, led by the FSPMI labor union, seeks to empower cadres to actively participate in electoral politics, both as legislative and executive candidates. Meanwhile, JW, initiated by KSPI, focuses on advocating for equitable access to health insurance for marginalized communities.

This section examines the practices of BGP and JW through the CU lens. The analysis of BGP draws primarily from Savirani's works, "Bekasi, West Java: Buruh Go Politics and the Weakening of Patronage Politics" (2015) in *Politik Uang di Indonesia: Patronase dan Klientelisme pada Pemilu Legislatif 2014,* and "Unions and Elections: The Case of the Metal Workers Union in Election in Bekasi, West Java" (2022) in *The Jokowi-Prabowo Elections 2.0*, which comprehensively explore the involvement of FSPMI in electoral politics. Additionally, Saleh's (2017) study, "Labor Movement and Political Experimentation: Case Study of the Indonesian Metal Workers Union Federation [FSPMI] in Bekasi Regency", serves as a critical reference for understanding BGP.

For JW, the discussion is grounded in Herwinanda's (2016) study, "BPJS-K Policy Advocacy by Jamkes Watch Bekasi Regency", and Djani et al.'s (2017) research, "Claiming Welfare State: Universal Health Insurance and Labor Movement: Case Study of Jamkes Watch in Bekasi, West Java". These works provide detailed insights into JW's advocacy for universal health insurance

and its broader implications for labor movements. Together, these studies contextualize the CU framework within the labor movement practices of Bekasi Regency, offering a comprehensive understanding of how CU operates in this specific context.

1. Buruh Go Politics

Buruh Go Politics (BGP) emerged from the awareness among the FSPMI leadership in Bekasi Regency about the need for political involvement to advocate for labor rights as citizens. The initiative was conceived by the FSPMI Branch Council and later approved by the FSPMI National Board (Saleh, 2017: 12). The decision to engage in electoral politics stemmed from both internal and external factors (Savirani, 2022: 129-30). Internally, unions recognized their potential electoral influence. Externally, negative experiences with politicians who failed to fulfill promises, government restrictions on demonstrations, and regulatory control over wage negotiations spurred unions to seek political involvement.

Although FSPMI does not have its own political party, it participates in electoral politics through a strategy referred to as political diaspora (Saleh, 2017: 12) or *zigzag politics* (Savirani, 2015: 254). This strategy involves nominating union members through existing political parties without providing financial incentives, thereby countering the practice of money politics. When selecting legislative candidates, FSPMI adheres to five principles: organizational experience, equitable distribution of cadres, union representation, a bottom-up process, and politics without money (Savirani, 2015: 252-3).

For the 2019 elections, FSPMI revised its political strategy by aligning exclusively with the Gerindra Party, following a challenging history of partnerships with multiple political parties (Savirani, 2022: 136). Gerindra was chosen because of its relatively weak voter base in Bekasi, enabling workers to exercise greater bargaining power with the party.

During the election, BGP volunteers played a crucial role in mobilizing votes at the factory and regional levels (Savirani, 2015: 267-8). These volunteers formed teams to support labor candidates across administrative units such as sub-districts, villages, housing complexes, and local neighborhoods (Saleh, 2017: 22; Savirani, 2015: 262; Savirani, 2022: 133). Most team members were FSPMI affiliates, though individuals from other labor organizations and community groups, such as the KSN (Konfederasi Serikat Nasional) and Kasbi (Kongres Aliansi Serikat Buruh Indonesia), also participated (Saleh, 2017: 22). Volunteers were not compensated but financed their activities through *saweran* (community fundraising) and the sale of merchandise (Savirani, 2022: 133).

The strategy unfolded in three phases: pre-voting, voting, and post-voting (Savirani, 2015: 267-8). The pre-voting phase focused on securing worker loyalty at the factory level and reaching non-labor voters in the community. In the voting phase, volunteers monitored election proceedings, receiving training on election observation from the Trade Union Rights Center (TURC) and Fisipol UGM (Savirani, 2015: 266). In the post-voting phase, volunteers supervised the vote counting and recapitulation

process at various levels, from the village to the regional Election Commission office (Savirani, 2015: 267-8).

Through this strategy, BGP succeeded in mobilizing worker votes and achieved significant electoral victories, including the election of two BGP candidates, Nurdin and Nyumarno, to the Bekasi Regency Parliament in 2014, and Obon Tabroni to the House of Representatives in 2019 (Savirani, 2022: 130-133; 136-139).

From a CU perspective, several critical aspects of BGP are noteworthy. *First*, BGP fosters identity and solidarity by encouraging unions to build a political identity among workers and the broader public. The movement emphasizes that workers' struggles extend beyond workplace issues to encompass broader citizen rights. This approach mobilizes solidarity not only among workers but also bridges connections with the wider community to address shared concerns.

Second, BGP's active participation in electoral politics demonstrates how unions can transcend their traditional role and emerge as significant political actors. The initiative proves that workers can engage in electoral politics not only as voters but also as candidates, advocating for workers' interests at the political level.

Third, despite lacking a formal coalition structure with community organizations, BGP effectively collaborates with NGOs and other groups. By connecting with farming communities, fishermen (Saleh, 2017: 22), and other social organizations, BGP broadens its network and influence. This underscores that labor

power is often strengthened through external partnerships and alliances beyond industrial contexts.

Fourth, BGP's commitment to combating money politics and elite influence stands as one of its defining characteristics. By refraining from providing financial incentives to political parties, BGP maintains its independence from elite-driven political power, positioning itself as a movement based on collective interests, not financial or political elite agendas. This illustrates that BGP is not merely a tool for elite political maneuvering but a transformative force advocating for workers' rights.

In conclusion, BGP exemplifies a deeper, more expansive approach to labor movement politics, seeking to create a more inclusive political space for workers. Through a combination of union identity, broad community engagement, and resistance to corrupt political practices, BGP stands as a clear example of how labor unions can play a pivotal role in local political contexts.

2. Jamkes Watch

JW is an initiative that emerged in response to the need for equitable access to health, especially for the poor and marginalized groups (Djani et al, 2017: 22). Like the BGP, the JW was born from a paradigm shift in the labor movement towards broader social issues, including social security and health insurance (Djani et al, 2017: 21). The paradigm shift was driven by the success of the labor movement involved in the Social Security Action Committee (KAJS) together with other civil society movements, in pushing for the formation of Law (UU) Number 24 of 2011 concerning the Social Security

Organizing Agency or BPJS Law. This transformation expanded the scope of the labor struggle from the labor aspect to the public welfare aspect by placing health issues as an integral part of the workers' struggle.

JW is a continuation of the KAJS struggle and a *diaspora* of BPJS Watch[4] (Djani et al, 2017: 21). Institutionally, JW is part of KSPI, one of the largest labor confederations in Indonesia (Djani et al, 2017: 21). Among the KSPI leadership, Said Iqbal, who in 2010 served as the presidium of KAJS, played an important role in the formation of JW. This reflects the indirect relationship between KAJS and JW (Herwinanda, 2016: 51) as well as the moral responsibility of KSPI, as part of KAJS, towards the implementation of social security.

JW's main mission is to ensure health rights for workers, workers' families, the poor, and marginalized groups through the BPJS Health (BPJS-K) scheme. They also oversee the management of BPJS-K, ensure the payment of contributions by local governments and companies, and ensure that health facilities serve patients properly. The birth of JWs was aimed at demanding effective implementation of universal health coverage, building solidarity between workers and the poor and marginalized, and improving the image of the labor movement in society (Djani et al, 2017: 23).

JW membership is referred to as volunteers recruited from KSPI members and the general public. JW adopts the FSPMI organizational structure with four areas: education, advocacy, organization, and media and publication. The organizational

4 According to Djani et al., BPJS Watch is an institution formed by KAJS to supervise the implementation of the SJSN Law and BPJS Law.

structure is loose and relies on the solidarity and collectivity of volunteers. At the beginning of its establishment, each labor union in KSPI was required to send 20 of its members to volunteer (Djani et al, 2017: 23).

To achieve its mission and goals, JW has two principles, namely preventive and responsive, which are then translated into a socialization strategy and a mentoring and advocacy strategy. Socialization is conducted to increase people's understanding of social security programs and their health rights. Socialization methods include campaigns, social media, and direct socialization (Herwinanda, 2016: 67).

Meanwhile, assistance and advocacy strategies are carried out to resolve obstacles in the field, such as: assisting with administrative arrangements; ensuring health facilities serve patients well; negotiating with health facilities for patients without BPJS; and advocating to various parties, including utilizing labor networks in the Regional Government and DPRD (Djani et al, 2017: 27). The assistance strategy has two models, namely assistance through call centers and direct assistance at health facilities (Djani et al, 2017: 24-5).

Initially, JW volunteers had no experience in health advocacy. The mentoring model applied was sporadic and spontaneous, with no standard guidelines. In the process, volunteers learned more as they went along, adjusting to the conditions and needs faced in the field (Djani et al, 2017: 23-4). Over time, JW created the Jamkes Watch Volunteer Handbook as a guide for volunteers (Herwinanda, 2016: 77).

There is a difference of opinion among volunteers regarding rewards or donations

from patients (Djani et al, 2017: 25). Some argue that it should be banned altogether, while others argue that donations are acceptable as long as they are submitted to the organization's treasury for operational purposes. In terms of funding sources, JW does not rely on union dues. Most volunteers use personal funds to support their mentoring activities. Volunteers who are still working as laborers allocate a portion of their income from the factory. Meanwhile, non-labor volunteers usually have a side business that they use as an additional source of funding.

JW is an example of class solidarity building among workers and communities. With a focus on socialization and mentoring, JW volunteers actively fight for people's rights regarding social security and health. Their actions reflect the spirit of *rights claiming* (Djani et al, 2017: 30) that underlies the movement, where they fight for better access to health services and social security for everyone. The initiative taken by the JWs in Bekasi has the potential to develop into a broader social movement, which not only results in changes in access to health services, but also gains greater political support from different layers of society.

There are several parallels that can be drawn from the CU in looking at JW. *First*, JW operates in the context of local spaces in Bekasi, and other cities (Herwinanda, 2016: 78), with a focus on monitoring the implementation of health insurance programs and social services. This is in line with the space-based organizing strategy in CU that emphasizes community mobilization beyond workplace issues. On the spatial aspect, JW can be seen from three main dimensions: political opportunity

structure, local participation space, and mobilization capacity. In the political opportunity structure dimension, JW sees opportunities in the suboptimal implementation of the Social Security Law and BPJS. Although JWs face obstacles such as lack of resources and advocacy capacity that needs to be improved, they see opportunities to conduct oversight of the program and fight for public health rights.

In the local participation space, JWs actively assist patients at health facilities, conduct socialization and mentoring in the community, and utilize social media to disseminate information and increase public understanding. Meanwhile, in the dimension of mobilization capacity, JW can utilize multi-scale volunteer networks for the benefit of the movement, including through existing networks in the Regional Government and DPRD.

Second, JW is driven by a common interest to ensure better access to health for workers, the poor and marginalized groups. JWs are based on a shared identity and unrest between labor unions and the poor/ marginalized as "*little people*" for fair and equitable access to health. Therefore, JW indicates the beginning of the formation of class solidarity (Djani et al, 2017: 34). In addition, in terms of common interests, JW responded to people's difficulties in accessing quality health services, injustice in the health insurance system, and lack of control in the system.

Third, the JW is a clear example of cooperation between labor unions and non-labor groups in forming a coalition for a common cause. The JW

involves KSPI members and the general public as volunteers, creating a close relationship between the union and the community in an effort to ensure the right to health for all. This reflects one of the key aspects of CU, which is coalitions between labor unions and non-labor groups to achieve broader social and political change.

Through the CU, we can see how the BGP and JW in Bekasi Regency have successfully expanded the role of labor unions in society more broadly. The BGP is not only a transformative agent in electoral politics, but also forms identity and solidarity among workers and fights for democratic principles and social justice. On the other hand, JW shows how cooperation between labor unions and other community groups can fight for more equitable access to health for everyone, especially the poor and marginalized groups.

By adopting strategies of space-based organizing, building collective unrest, and forming coalitions between labor unions and non-labor groups, BGP and JW became living examples of CUs fighting for social and political rights for all. Their actions emphasize the important role of labor unions in shaping a more just and equitable society. Thus, BGP and JW not only represent the aspirations of workers in Bekasi Regency, but also serve as inspiration for movements elsewhere in fighting for collective interests and shared prosperity.

Next, the author will present how the two initiatives, BGP and JW, operate in a more specific space, namely Mega Regency Housing. By directing the analysis at this more detailed scale, we can understand more deeply how CU practices in the neighborhood.

Community Unionism in Mega Regency Housing

Mega Regency Housing (Perum Mercy) is one of the largest labor-based housing estates in Bekasi Regency[5]. Located in Serang Baru Sub-district, Perum Mercy has a population of around 9,600 - 11,000 households, mostly consisting of workers and their families. This demographic condition makes Mega Regency Housing a strategic location for the labor movement, both in terms of quantity and organizing potential.

In its management, Perum Mercy is faced with unique challenges due to its administrative structure that is divided between two villages, namely Sukaragam Village and Sukasari Village. Perum Mercy consists of 16 Rukun Warga (RW) spread across the two villages. Five RWs, namely blocks A, C1, C2, H, and P, are located in Sukasari Village, while the other eleven blocks are located in Sukaragam Village. This creates complexity in institutional management, especially in terms of establishing a hierarchical relationship with the local government.

In response to this, the RW Chairman Association was formed as a coordination forum between RW heads who then became representatives of the housing community and became important stakeholders at the village level. This organization is chaired by the RW head of Block D, CC, who is a non-activist laborer[6]. Although dominated by laborers, each block has RW heads with diverse occupational backgrounds, reflecting the social and economic complexity of the Perum Mercy community.

5 Interview, Mr. S, labor activist and community leader in Perum Mercy, July 25, 2023.

6 Not in a labor union

In addition to the RW Chairman Association, Perum Mercy also has a TPU & Ambulance Mercy organization[7] which plays an important role in taking care of all death-related needs and managing health needs by providing ambulance services for housing residents. TPU & Ambulance Mercy is chaired by the head of RW Block C2, Mr. S, who is also the head of BGP at Perum Mercy and a JW volunteer. In its organizational structure, the organization has six administrators who are not only from the labor group.

In its social structure, Perum Mercy has a number of important figures, some of whom have a background as labor activists or labor union members, which strengthens the sense of collective identity in the housing estate. In addition, it is also a significant local political arena with a very large population. In the 2024 legislative elections, several blocks in Perum Mercy had legislative candidates from various political parties, both from the Labor Party and other parties. Some of the residents of Perum Mercy who became legislative candidates from the Labor Party ran for various positions, such as the Bekasi Regency Parliament, West Java Provincial Parliament, House of Representatives or the DPR RI and Regional Representative Council or the DPD RI.

Thus, Mega Regency Housing is not just a place for workers to live, but also a complex arena of local political dynamics. This makes it an interesting research location to examine the working practices of the CU in the relationship between the labor union and the community there. This section will discuss how the CU works in Perum

7 Organizational documents of RW Mercy Association and TPU & Ambulance Mercy.

Mega Regency. In addition, it will also discuss the dynamics of the relationship between the RW Head Association and the TPU & Ambulance Mercy organization with the labor groups in the housing complex.

1. BGP Mega Regency Housing[8]

As mentioned in the next section, BGP, which started in 2014 legislative election, carries out a vote mobilization strategy at the regional level by forming a team of volunteers based in administrative units, including housing. In Perum Mercy, the BGP volunteer team was formed in 2013 and became the first BGP community and has become an integral part of the Perum Mercy community. In addition to the interests of labor electoral politics, BGP Perum Mercy (hereinafter referred to as BGP Mercy) was also formed as a forum for cross-union labor communication and friendship to facilitate the exchange of information about community affairs in housing.

Structurally, BGP Mercy has a core management structure consisting of the Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, Secretary, Treasurer, Public Relations, and two Field Coordinators. The core management is tasked with coordinating voter mobilization strategies to support labor candidates in Perum Mercy. In the momentum of the 2024 elections, there are five labor candidates, and this time the workers have their own party, the Labor Party, as well as three non-labor candidates from other parties. The five candidates include: Ely Setyarini for DPRD of Bekasi Regency,

8 Most of the data presented in this section, the author obtained when participating in the Mercy BGP Consolidation activity on July 29, 2023, which took place at the Block L Community Hall of Perum Mercy. This activity was attended by all Labor Party candidates, from all levels, who live in Perum Mercy.

Surohman for DPRD of Bekasi Regency, Rudol for DPRD of West Java Province, Abdul Bais for DPR RI, and Taupik Hidayat for DPD RI. Each candidate has a volunteer team that is formed by themselves by utilizing the individual networks of each candidate. Therefore, the capacity of the BGP volunteer team will differ from one another following how extensive the network is owned by individual candidates.

BGP Mercy functions to ensure that the voter mobilization that will be carried out by the volunteer team for each candidate is effective and well coordinated. Moreover, there are two labor candidates contesting in the same arena, namely candidates Ely Setyarini and Surohman. The implication of this situation is that the two candidates are the main focus of BGP Mercy. In dealing with this situation, BGP Mercy plays an important role in minimizing the potential friction between the two candidates related to voter mobilization. In addition, since the Bekasi Regency DPRD is the smallest parliamentary level, mobilization from Perum Mercy has a significant impact, especially in Electoral District (Dapil) 1. By consisting of two villages and having a large population, votes from Perum Mercy residents have the potential to generate two to three seats[9].

Ely and Surohman's situation puts BGP Mercy in a dilemmatic position in formulating strategies. On the one hand, Ely's profile shows that she is only an "assignment" candidate (from union) to fulfill the minimum quota of 30% women. In addition,

9 In the 2024 legislative elections, the Bekasi Regency DPRD allocates a total of 55 seats and seven electoral districts. Perum Mercy is in Dapil Bekasi 1, which consists of Setu, Central Cikarang, Serang Baru, Cibarusah, and Bojongmangu sub-districts. Of the 55 seats, Dapil Bekasi 1 is allocated nine seats.

she is only active in the union and does not have significant activities in the community. Therefore, BGP Mercy tends to prioritize Surohman as a more potential candidate, as Surohman is well known by the non-worker residents of Perum Mercy. In addition, in Surohman's residence stands Posko Orange, a complaint and service center established by the Labor Party for Dapil 1 area of Bekasi Regency, as Surohman is also the administrator of the Bekasi Regency Labor Party Exco for Advocacy, which also reflects his capacity as a potential cadre.

Photo 1. Surohman's winning post in Mega Regency Complex

Source: Research Documentation

On the other hand, there is an organizational directive to win the Labor Party without regard to individual candidates, the most important thing is that the Labor Party wins. In addition to being homework for BGP Mercy, Surohman himself, together with his BGP volunteer team, also carried out two strategies to solve these problems. First, Surohman's BGP team regularly holds discussions and continues to communicate with Ely's BGP team. Second, in every socialization and campaign activity, the BGP Surohman team will invite all Labor Party candidates to attend[10]. In the end, Surohman managed to secure one seat in the Bekasi Regency DPRD, while Ely did not[11].

In addition to carrying out mobilization strategies for electoral interests, BGP Mercy also acts as a forum that assists workers in carrying out their functions as members of society and strengthens workers' solidarity in social issues. It aims to enable workers to mingle with other community groups in Perum Mercy. The community dimension that BGP Mercy pays attention to arises from several things. First, because BGP operates at the local level where social interaction and residence are intertwined, it is natural for BGP Mercy to feel an active part in community affairs.

Second, the relationship between the two dimensions, namely electoral and societal, being the main focus of BGP Mercy's operations, is reciprocal. Electoral success requires community support to gain votes, while communities need MPs who can represent their interests

10 Interview, Surohman, July 26, 2023.

11 Based on the decision letter of the KPUD Bekasi Regency, the Labor Party managed to get 2 seats in the Bekasi Regency DPRD. The 2 candidates are Ali Nur Hamzah (District 7) with 6,981 votes, and Surohman with 3,651 votes.

in parliament as an integral part of community identity and needs. The "housing ego", where there is a desire of Perum Mercy residents to have a member of parliament, was also utilized by Surohman in his campaign with the slogan "It's Time for Mega Regency to Have a Council". Third, there are actors who act as bridge builders at the leadership level, such as BGP Mercy Chair Mr. S, who also serves as RW Chair, TPU & Ambulance Mercy Chair, and Jamkes Watch volunteer. In addition, nine of the 16 RW heads in Perum Mercy are laborers, indicating a very strong informal relationship and configuration of interests between BGP Mercy and the Perum Mercy community.

Photo 2. Surohman's Campaign Props

Source: Research Documentation

In its efforts in the electoral dimension, BGP Mercy prioritizes the principle of respect for regional stakeholders at the RT/RW level. Socialization and installation of Campaign Props (APK) are carried out by taking into account the approval and coordination of local stakeholders, as a form of

recognition of their authority and presence in the community. In addition, BGP Mercy also actively encourages cadres, especially candidates, to attend forums in housing, allowing them to interact directly with residents.

In addition to efforts in the electoral dimension, BGP Mercy also plays an active role in building strong relationships with the community through the community dimension. One concrete manifestation of this commitment is through the coordination of assistance in the health sector through JW, which provides access to health for Perum Mercy residents. Not only that, BGP Mercy also allocates the remaining funds from their activities, which come from PUK dues, for infrastructure development and social religious activities, as a concrete effort to improve the welfare and sustainability of life together at Perum Mercy.

2. Community in Community Unionism in Mega Regency Housing

There are two important stakeholders, from the community side, namely Paguyuban RW Mercy and TPU & Ambulance Mercy. Savirani (2015: 262) emphasizes the crucial role of RW heads in voter mobilization among labor voters. Their position as community leaders at the local level makes them the main gateway for candidates to reach constituents in their area. They have the advantage of direct access, trust, influence, networks, and knowledge of the residents in their area.

This strategic position encouraged BGP Mercy in 2014 to mobilize workers to get the position of regional leaders, both in the management of RT, RW, and other regional organizations. This effort proved

effective, where currently out of sixteen RWs in Perum Mercy, nine of them are led by workers, both activists and non-activists. The Mercy RW Association itself is chaired by CC, a non-activist laborer and Head of RW Block D.

Nevertheless, there are several challenges in the political mobilization of workers through RW heads. Firstly, as area leaders, they must prioritize the interests of residents in general over the political interests of workers. Second, not all workers' RW Chairpersons are labor union activists, so they do not have strong ties to the interests of workers collectively. Third, as representatives of the state at the smallest administrative level, RW Chairpersons are required to be neutral and not involved in the electoral political arena.

In the face of these challenges, the labor RW leaders have developed several strategies. First, they opened up space for all parties to campaign in their area. However, to ensure the success of the BGP, one RW decided to only give permission to other parties if the party volunteers were its residents, while also making it difficult for activity proposals to be submitted[12].

Second, they do not show explicit support for the Labor Party. Support for the BGP is done implicitly, for example by using Labor Party attributes in daily life, or through small talk at the security post. When initiating conversations, they focus more on the individual candidates rather than the organization or the Labor Party. They also encourage people to vote for candidates with a good track record, who do not engage in money politics, and who are committed to fighting for the interests of the Perum Mercy community. In addition, they emphasized the social

12 Interview, Mr. A, Head of RW Block L, July 26, 2023.

benefits provided by labor to the community, such as the JW and the fogging action during the dengue outbreak[13].

Besides the Mercy RW Association, some workers are also active in the TPU & Ambulance Mercy organization. TPU & Ambulance Mercy is a self-help organization established on the initiative of a group of workers and residents of Perum Mercy to help and serve the health and death needs of residents. The organization provides vital services such as helping to take care of death-related needs and providing free ambulance services.

Institutionally, TPU & Ambulance Mercy is under the RW Mercy Association with a small structure of 6 core administrators and 3 core ambulance drivers. Led by Mr. S, who is also the Head of RW Block C2, Head of BGP Mercy, and JW volunteer, the organizational structure of TPU & Ambulance Mercy consists of Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, Secretary, Treasurer, R&D Division, and Maintenance Division. The R&D field is tasked with conducting research and development of organizational services while the maintenance field is tasked with caring for and maintaining ambulance cars.

The six administrators of TPU & Ambulance Mercy have diverse backgrounds in terms of profession and organizational experience. Two are laborers, two are non-activist laborers, and two are non-laborers. Therefore, TPU & Ambulance Mercy not only provides emergency medical services, but also becomes a symbol of solidarity between workers and people in the housing community. In addition, Mr. S's position as a JW volunteer gives him access to

13 Interview, Mr. B, Head of RW Block K, July 26, 2023.

various resources and networks for TPU & Ambulance Mercy and the Perum Mercy community. Mr. S's relationship in JW enables him to assist the community of Perum Mercy in accessing quality health services and getting the latest information on health policies, health programs, and health services available at[14].

3. Significance of Community Unionism in Mega Regency Housing

To understand how the CU works in Perum Mercy, we need to draw on three aspects within the CU itself. *First*, in the spatial aspect, there are dimensions of political opportunity structure, local participation space, and mobilization capacity. In the context of the structure of political opportunities, BGP Mercy utilizes the existence of housing as a base for mobilization and relies on social structures and networks that have been formed. Thus, they became the first BGP community in Bekasi Regency. In addition, the presence of the Labor Party provides a new impetus for the political mobilization of workers, opening up new opportunities for Perum Mercy residents to participate in political contestation at the local level. While on the community side, the existence of organizations such as Paguyuban RW Mercy and TPU & Ambulance are important platforms for workers to engage in politics and community life at the local level. In particular, the opportunity to obtain the strategic position of RW Chairman is an important opportunity for the labor movement.

On the participation dimension, Perum Mercy is a key participation space for workers, with their involvement in various activities and

14 Interview, Mr. S, July 25, 2023.

organizations at the housing level. Forums such as Paguyuban RW Mercy and TPU & Ambulance Mercy are important platforms for BGP Mercy to interact with residents and strengthen their support base. BGP Mercy plays a role so that workers can be involved in political and community activities at the housing level. Meanwhile, the informal relations and configuration of interests formed between the workers and the Perum Mercy community also helped strengthen participation and solidarity.

In terms of mobilization capacity, BGP Mercy showed significant efforts to strengthen their ability to mobilize the masses and achieve political and societal goals. Furthermore, there is Mr. S's role, as a "broker" who can provide access to various resources and cross-scale networks that benefit BGP Mercy, TPU & Ambulance Mercy, and the Perum Mercy community in general.

Second, the aspect of shared identity/unrest. BGP and the people of Perum Mercy have shared interests in political representation and communal identity. Workers and communities in Perum Mercy want to have a voice in decision-making that affects their lives, and feel united in their community identity. In addition, BGP Mercy serves as a platform for workers to discuss and advocate for solutions to the problems they face. Through campaigns and activities, BGP Mercy not only raises community awareness about issues facing laborers, but also strengthens solidarity among them.

Third, organizational aspects. Organizational capacity and culture play an important role in the success of CUs. BGP

Mercy, as the main motor of political mobilization, has a clear organizational structure with a core management consisting of various key positions. Strong and inspiring leadership, as demonstrated by Mr. S, provides direction and motivation for members. The coalition structure within the CU in Perum Mercy shows close cooperation between various organizations, especially BGP Mercy, Paguyuban RW Mercy, and TPU & Ambulance Mercy. In addition, BGP Mercy's membership, which is open to all workers from various unions, strengthens inclusivity and participation.

Last but not least is the important role of a broker, a *bridge builder* in facilitating relationships between various organizations in Perum Mercy. Some individuals, such as Mr. S, have become *bridge builders*, active in various organizations and building strong relationships with all relevant parties. They bring extensive experience in the labor union and community worlds, enriching their networks and understanding of social dynamics. They not only strengthen coalitions by building bridges between workers and communities, but also help in handling conflicts and diffusing cultural differences that may arise.

From what has been described above, the CU practice at Perum Mercy shows significant roles. *First*, the CU at Perum Mercy succeeded in delivering one labor candidate, Surohman, to the Bekasi Regency DPRD seat. This shows that the CU at Perum Mercy is successful in supporting political outcomes. *Secondly*, the CU at Perum Mercy has increased community awareness and the importance of political participation. In addition, CU practices at Perum Mercy have helped change the

public discourse on the role of labor in society and strengthened the political power of labor. Therefore, CU practices at Perum Mercy have shown success in changing the political climate. *Third*, the practice of CU in Perum Mercy has shown how the labor group is able to maintain relationships with external organizations. This can be seen from the strong relationship between BGP Mercy and community organizations in Perum Mercy. And, *fourthly*, by having legislative members representing Perum Mercy, the potential for internal capacity building of CUs in Perum Mercy becomes greater.

While the CU practices in Mega Regency Housing are commendable, some criticisms regarding potential weaknesses need to be considered. Firstly, the heterogeneity of the residents in Perum Mercy poses a challenge, so the labor-focused mobilization strategy may not fully cover the interests of the whole community. In addition, the success of CU practices in Perum Mercy seems to be highly dependent on Mr. S's central role. This dependency poses a risk if Mr. S is no longer active or leaves his position.

This creates room for improvement. For example, the socialization of labor candidates should be tailored to the characteristics of the community in order to increase their electability. In addition, the adoption of more inclusive mobilization strategies, along with the development of collective leadership, can help reduce dependency on specific individuals. By making improvements, the practice of CUs or labor and community associations in Perum Mercy has the potential to increase their success in achieving their desired goals.

Conclusion

This paper has shown that as part of a democratic society, labor groups with their resources will have greater bargaining power if they are able to move out of the confines of internal factory and labor issues, and into broader community welfare issues. In this context, workers are not only seen as isolated entities within their work environment, but as important actors in the wider political and social arena. By broadening the focus of their struggles, labor groups can build stronger solidarity with the general public.

The perspective of Community Unionism is used in this article to offer a new nuance in labor studies by seeing workers as an integral part of the community, not just as workers in a factory. When they are in the factory, they are workers, and when these workers go home, they are community members. This becomes important when the traditional labor movement is considered to have no significant impact.

The findings of this research reinforce the thesis that CUs can provide potential benefits to the communities they represent and enable unions to raise their political profile and access other groups. In addition, CUs are also a form of transformation of the labor movement that seeks to build relationships with society and redefine social values. This study shows the positive achievements of CUs in Perum Mercy, such as increased political participation and community awareness. Although, there is still room to improve the success of CU, especially in strengthening inter organizational cooperation and mobilization capacity.

This research also has some limitations that need to be considered. Data from

the literature study may lack relevance as most of them were conducted before 2019, while the involvement of non-labor actors in CUs has not been explored in depth. In this context, further research with a broader scope is needed to deepen the understanding of CU in Indonesia and maximize its potential in the transformation of the labor movement. Through this research, the author hopes to contribute to the development of labor studies and labor politics in Indonesia.

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Advocacy Strategies of Labour Unions in Demanding Workers' Rights during the COVID-19 Pandemic: The Case of "Sejahtera Mandiri Jogja Bay Waterpark" Workers' Union (Spektram JBW)

Imam Satrio Novianto[1]

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Abstract

This paper explores the strategies and advocacy steps taken by Serikat Pekerja Sejahtera Mandiri Jogja Bay Waterpark (Spektram JBW) during the COVID-19 pandemic causing 31 relieved of duty workers and 8 laid-off workers. This research uses a qualitative method with a case study approach. Through the analysis of advocacy theory from Sharma (2004) and contentious politics theory from Tarrow (2011), this paper shows that Spektram JBW's advocacy strategy follow five advocacy steps, namely identifying the root of the problem, formulating solutions, building political awareness, policy implementation, and evaluation. The five steps illustrate the process of contentious politics (movement process) with the formation of the union, and the unity of ordinary workers against the corporate elite. The advocacy resulted on two main demands were achieved but demand for worker status failed, and the process continued to the Industrial Relations Court (Pengadilan Hubungan Industrial, or PHI). The success of Spektram JBW is an example of success story providing a bright spot for other unions in Yogyakarta. The failure stems from the union culture in the area of DIY which lacks unions and the small scale of industry which makes it difficult to mobilise large numbers of workers.

Keywords: *Industrial Relations Disputes, Advocacy, Spektram JBW, Labour.*

1 Department of Politics and Government, Gadjah Mada University.
Email: isatrio90@mail.ugm.ac.id

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on labour conditions in all countries around the world. In the early phase of the pandemic, the International Labour Organization (ILO) estimated that approximately 25 million work activities stopped during the COVID-19 pandemic (ILO, 2020). This was due to the company's policy of laying off workers due to the company's bankrupt situation. In the context of Indonesia, a journal article written by Ngadi et al. (2020) shows that the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in as many as 15.6 per cent of workers in Indonesia being laid off, and 13.8 per cent of them did not receive the right to severance pay. According to data from Economic Growth of the Special Region of Yogyakarta (D.I. Yogyakarta) Quarter IV, published by BPS Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (2021), D.I. Yogyakarta during the pandemic experienced an economic contraction of 2.69 per cent compared to 2010. As a province that relies heavily on the tourism industry, the pandemic led to a dramatic drop in both domestic and foreign tourists. As a result, there were 11 business sectors that contracted, six of which were service sectors. The highest contraction was in transportation services at 20.21 per cent, followed by other service sectors that experienced a double-digit contraction, namely services for providing accommodation and eating and drinking (16.91 per cent), other services 15.74 per cent, and company services 14.89 per cent (BPS Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, 2021). In this province too, the COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on the tourism industry.

In Sleman Regency, there are 1,084 unemployed workers with details of 499 people

experiencing termination of employment (PHK) and 585 workers being relieved of duty. This number is obtained from accumulated data with details of 202 people being relieved of duty and 383 people being laid off (Sintasari, 2021). The increase in layoff cases and cases of workers being relieved of duty has raised new problems related to labour conditions in several companies, including the non-fulfillment of workers' rights, including severance pay for laid-off workers and delays in providing health insurance for laid-off workers.

This paper explores advocacy strategies for the prosecution of workers' rights, using the case of Serikat Pekerja Sejahtera Mandiri Jogja Bay Waterpark (hereinafter referred to as Spektram JBW) in conducting advocacy for the prosecution of the rights of workers relieved of duty and laid off by PT Taman Jogja (hereinafter referred to as PT TWJ). PT TWJ itself is one of the tourism businesses under the ownership of the Yogyakarta Sultanate (Nugraha, 2021). During the COVID-19 pandemic, PT TWJ "relieved of duty" (meaning reducing numbers of working hours into half), approximately 200 workers and laid off eight workers. In the process, the relieved of duty process occurred in February 2021 while the eight people who were laid off occurred between April and June 2021. Of the hundreds of workers who were relieved of duty, plus the eight laid-off workers, there are different views that divide them into two groups of workers. The first group is the one that demands workers' rights while being relieved of duty, while the second group agrees and accepts all company decisions while relieved of duty workers. The first group belonged to a labour union called Spektram JBW with

39 members, consisting of 31 relieved of duty workers and 8 laid-off workers. The second group accepted the company's decision (approximately 150 workers) and did not join the union. This second group later formed their own union under the name SP Sahitya and affiliated with Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (SPSI).

Spektram JBW's demanded the company to provide severance pay to eight workers who were laid off, pay wages to thirty-one workers who were relieved of duty, and provide holiday allowances (THR) in 2020 and 2021, along with BPJS benefits that were also not paid by the company. Workers have been relieved of duty from April 2020 to mid-2022.

Research Method

This paper tries to answer the questions, how has the advocacy strategy process carried out by Spektram JBW, and why is this strategy used by Spektram JBW in an effort to demand the rights of workers who were relieved of duty and laid off during the pandemic by PT Taman Wisata Jogja? To answer these questions, this research uses a qualitative method with a case study approach. Data were collected using in-depth interviews and secondary data through media, documentation, and government publications.

The analysis technique used is the interactive model data analysis, proposed by Miles and Huberman (1984). In this interactive model of data analysis, there are three main components, namely: (1) data reduction, (2) data presentation, and (3) conclusion drawing/ verification.

Theoretical Framework

This paper uses two main theories, namely, contentious politics theory by Tarrow (2011) and advocacy strategy theory by Sharma (2004). The contentious politics theory (Tarrow, 2011) is the theory used to analyse the industrial relations dispute between the PT TWJ workers' union Spektram JBW and PT TWJ. The industrial relations dispute between the union and the company can be seen as a political agenda in the form of collective action that leads to a feud. According to Tarrow (2011), contentious politics occurs when ordinary people who are often allied with more influential groups of people who can bring about changes in public views, then allied to confront elites, authorities, and other opponents. The contentious politics theory aligns with the Spektram JBW advocacy case by looking at the industrial relations dispute by Spektram JBW, which is a group of ordinary workers, trying to seek help from other influential parties to fight PT TWJ, as an elite in the form of a company that has more power over its workers.

The second theory analyses Spektram JBW's political movement by viewing it as an advocacy strategy. Strategy in the advocacy process is a dynamic process because it involves various parties, ideas, and agendas that are constantly changing. To implement an advocacy strategy, Sharma (2004) highlights five important steps that need to be considered, namely identifying the root of the problem, formulating and selecting solutions, building awareness and political will, implementing policies, and conducting evaluations. The

five steps do not have to be implemented linearly and some stages can be done simultaneously.

Disputes Chronology

The conflict between Spektram JBW and PT TWJ is documented in the Sleman Department of Labour Recommendation No. 565/0590 of 2022. The document states that the process began with the decision of PT TWJ management meeting on 15 April 2020 through a text message in the Jogja Bay Engineering WhatsApp group, which is a communication medium for information notification of the engineering division at PT TWJ. The message from the PT TWJ managerial in the engineering division was sent by P as the Maintenance and Utility Supervisor. The notification of PT TWJ's management decision contains the following statements:

a. Some staff will be laid off and a picket system will be implemented,
b. April salary is set to be paid 100% but gradually,
c. As of 16 April 2020, all field maintenance/operational activities will be stopped (only a few departments will remain on duty),
d. For May 2020 progress and payroll will be informed next,
e. Memo will be issued soon.

The decision notification was not in the form of an official letter and only a decision from a text message on WhatsApp. Furthermore, an official letter from the company was issued with the title Internal Office Memo dated 15 April 2020 with number: 033/IOM/HRD-TWJ/IV/2020 issued by HRD, which stated:

a. The closure of Jogja Bay Waterpark to the public will be extended by looking at the situation and conditions related to handling and overcoming the Corona/ COVID-19 outbreak;

b. With the non-operation of Jogja Bay Waterpark, we regret to inform you that workers are temporarily relieved of duty;

c. Workers will return to work normally after further notice from management;

d. This memo is effective as of the date of stipulation and is submitted to all workers with the provision that if there are errors and/or matters that have not been sufficiently regulated, they will be corrected accordingly.

Management also informs that on 24 April 2020, the proportion of April 2020 salary paid for relieved of duty workers was 25% of the total salary, for picket workers is 30% of the salary, and the remaining April 2020 salary will be paid after PT TWJ resumes operations. There has been no decision or notification regarding the May 2020 salary. This message was also sent via text message in the Jogja Bay Engineering WhatsApp group by P.

On 15 May 2020, through a text message in the Whatsapp group Engineering Jogja Bay conveyed information containing:

a. THR will be paid to workers by 20 May 2020,

b. The amount of THR is around 25%-30% of salary (the exact percentage will be announced on Monday or Tuesday (18/19 May 2020),

c. BPJS health is still paid by the company,

d. Payroll for the month of May 2020 will be informed on 25 May 2020,

e. Jogja Bay Waterpark owes workers the remaining 75% of the April 2020 salary and the remaining THR for Idul Fitri 2020 which was promised to be paid after Jogja Bay Waterpark (PT Taman Wisata Jogja) is normal or operating again.

Starting from 18 November 2020, workers gradually began to be called back to work because it was planned that on 1 December 2020 Jogja Bay Waterpark would resume operations. However, there are two union members, RD and KBS, who have not been called back to work until now. During the period of being laid off from April 2020 to 18 November 2020, workers were only paid 25% of their salary in May 2020. Between 17 and 27 February 2021, HRD summoned all workers to sign a Letter of Agreement for the Period of Cessation of Employment Relations. Workers who are members of Spektram JBW refused to sign it, with the exception of one member, SD. The refusal to sign the agreement was for several reasons that were taken into consideration by Spektram JBW, namely:

a. Spektram JBW members still want to work at Jogja Bay Waterpark and feel that there is no report whatsoever that Spektram JBW members have made fatal mistakes that have resulted in layoff issues;

b. There are overlapping issues in the letter, namely the matter of Termination of Employment Relations with the matter of payment of salaries in April 2020 and THR 2020. That these issues are two very different things that should be separate agreement;

c. There is a difference in the amount of repayment of the remaining April 2020 salary which should be 75%, but only 20% of the remaining salary will be paid;

d. And all of the above issues have never been communicated before to Spektram JBW.

Two Groups of Workers

As mentioned above, in the agreement process, there are two groups of workers at Jogja Bay Waterpark (PT TWJ), namely the group of workers who agree and the group of workers who reject the agreement letter. The group of workers who agreed to the agreement letter consisted of approximately 150 individuals and were not part of the Spektram JBW. On the other hand, the group of workers who rejected the agreement letter belonged to Spektram JBW, which had 39 members, although only 31 were called to sign the letter. It can be concluded that the workers who agreed to the agreement have lost their employment status at Jogja Bay Waterpark, while those who rejected it remains the workers and demand to retain their employment status. However, there was a discrepancy in practice, as the group who agreed to the Agreement Letter for Employment Termination were recalled to work as casual labourers, while those who refused to sign the letter were not rehired and were not given work schedules.

Meanwhile, eight members of Spektram JBW were not called to sign the Agreement Letter for Employment Termination in February 2021 and continued to receive work schedules. These eight individuals were gradually laid off between April and June 2021. The company claimed that their contracts had expired and

would not be renewed, although the eight workers argued that they were permanent workers. Their claim relied on the fact that they had never been provided with a prior contractual agreement, and according to Article 59, Paragraph 7 of the Labour Law, they should be regarded as permanent workers. However, their entitlements arising from the termination of employment have not been fulfilled to date.

With 31 Spektram JBW workers not being called, alongside the additional eight workers who were laid off, the company experienced a shortage of workers in several divisions previously staffed by those who rejected the agreement letter. As a result, the company recruited new casual labourers via the PT TWJ website and job search platforms around April, May, and October 2021. Labourers were taken from new people because the vacant division needed people with the same skills as those who were relieved of duty but reject the agreement letter, resulting in the search for new labour. This situation led to a sense of injustice among the Spektram JBW workers.

The rights of the Spektram JBW members remain unmet. As the group that rejected the Employment Termination Agreement Letter and who are technically still employed by Jogja Bay Waterpark, Spektram JBW believes they are entitled to the 2021 religious holiday allowance (THR), which has yet to be paid. Additionally, reports from Spektram JBW members indicate that, during the pandemic, the healthcare provided through BPJS was not accessible, and contributions to BPJS employment benefits were not paid by the company.

At the time this document was completed, PT TWJ had settled the outstanding payment for April 2020 wages and the 2020 THR. However, there remains uncertainty about the continuation of employment, as no recall notices have been issued. By the time mediation occurred in April 2022, the total period of furlough had extended to 18 months. No agreement was made regarding the duration of the furlough, and as a result, Spektram JBW workers have not received wages for more than three months, entitling them to request termination of employment in accordance with Article 169 of the Labour Law. Alongside their request for termination, Spektram JBW submitted several additional demands, including:

1. Unpaid wages;
2. Severance pay, service recognition compensation, and entitlements due to termination of employment; and
3. The 2021 religious holiday allowance (THR).

In summary, two disputes can be identified. The first pertains to the wages for April 2020 and the 2020 THR, which have been resolved. The second dispute relates to the workers' employment status, wages for those furloughed, and the 2021 THR. The cause of the first dispute was the discrepancy in the April 2020 wages and the unpaid 2020 THR. The second dispute arose from the absence of a formal agreement on the furlough process and the request for an employment termination letter when workers still wished to continue working for the company, as well as the unfulfilled rights of eight Spektram JBW workers who were

laid off. This was followed by the failure to recall workers who had rejected the agreement letter. Ultimately, the workers felt discriminated against and unclear about their employment status within the company.

Actor Mapping

This conflict involves multiple actors. Based on the research findings, there are key actors directly or indirectly involved in the advocacy process. Mapping these actors helps to clarify both positive and negative relationships regarding the demands of Spektram JBW against PT TWJ. The actors are divided into three groups:

1. The pro-demand group, consisting of Spektram JBW, Indonesian Federation of Labour (Federasi Buruh Indonesia, or FBI), and Confederation of Labour Unions of Nusantara (Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Nusantara, or KSPN).
2. The neutral group, consisting of the Sleman Department of Labour (Disnaker Sleman).

Figure 1. Actors Mapping



Source: Processing research data (2023)

3. The opposing group, comprising PT TWJ, SP Sahitya, SPSI, and the Yogyakarta Sultanate (Keraton Yogyakarta).

Wage Demands

After being placed on furlough for six months, from May 2020 to November 2020, Spektram JBW initiated negotiations and decided to formally address the company. They requested clarification regarding the wages for April 2020, which had only been paid at 25%, and the 2020 Religious Holiday Allowance (THR), which had not been paid at all. The letter to the company was sent in November 2020, and the response was an invitation to meet with the Human Resources department in December 2020.

This correspondence aimed to initiate bipartite negotiations in accordance with Law No. 2 of 2004 concerning the Settlement of Industrial Relations Disputes.

The first mediation session (bipartite meeting) between Spektram JBW and PT TWJ resulted in a decision to escalate the matter to senior management. A second letter requesting further bipartite negotiations was sent, but the company did not respond. A third letter was sent, again without any response from PT TWJ. Due to the lack of replies, Spektram JBW concluded that the company was not acting in good faith to resolve the wage issue.

In February 2021, PT TWJ issued a "Work Termination Agreement" to all workers, except for eight Spektram JBW members who were dismissed several months later. The agreement included clauses regarding the April 2021 wage and the 2020 THR, stating that the THR would be 20% of the salary. Spektram JBW considered this unacceptable, as the initial announcement promised 75%, not 20%. Consequently, Spektram JBW rejected the agreement.

As a result of this rejection, Spektram JBW members involved in the dispute were not given work shifts, leading to a second demand concerning job status clarification. However, Spektram JBW prioritized resolving the issues surrounding the April wage and the 2020 THR, as they believed the amounts paid were incorrect. Spektram JBW planned a demonstration and sought permission, which was eventually revoked at the company's request. PT TWJ then requested for a mediation meeting at Depok District. Spektram JBW accepted the invitation, emphasising the importance of a familial approach in industrial relations

disputes. The mediation would be attended by PT TWJ's general manager, who had the authority to make company decisions.

The mediation took place in mid-May 2021, attended by 20 Spektram JBW members, a legal representative, and 20 PT TWJ representatives, including the general manager, supervisor, human resources staff, and security. Also present were the Head of the Depok District Office (Camat Depok) and two representatives from Disnaker Sleman. The mediation was chaired by Camat Depok, with the aim of facilitating a calm discussion. However, with over 40 participants, the large forum quickly became chaotic as everyone tried to voice their opinions. Consequently, Camat Depok proposed forming a smaller group to facilitate a more productive discussion.

Based on information from the interview with EY, the Chairman of Spektram JBW, in the smaller forum held in the evening, Camat Depok moderated a conversation with a few key representatives. Spektram JBW was represented by their union leader, EY, and legal counsel, AM, while PT TWJ was represented by the general manager, CI, and a human resources representative, AY, alongside two mediators from Disnaker Sleman. The small forum proceeded more calmly, with relaxed conversations and some humour. Spektram JBW's leader and lawyer presented their demands, referencing a text message from the division supervisor stating that the full April wage would be paid. They also outlined the legal basis for the workers' rights to full wages.

> *"We are actually very open to mediation in a family manner because negotiations are also more*

comfortable, so revoking the licence is also not a problem. But of course, there were many of us who wanted to talk at the mediation, so it was not conducive. Then the head of the Depok sub-district invited us to a small forum so that the discussion would be more relaxed and there would be no tension and humour. At that time, there was a small forum with Mr. CI, who was the General Manager, and AY from HR, while from Spektram it was just me and Mr. AM as the legal representative. In the forum, I explained everything that the company did was wrong and of course used the legal basis that I knew, assisted by Mr. AM. Finally, there was a negotiation, but the percentage was still quite small. So, I discussed it again with the members," (EY, Chairman of Spektram JBW, interview conducted on 8 October 2023).

The negotiation progressed, with PT TWJ initially offering 20% of the unpaid wages, but then raising the offer to 50%. However, the Spektram JBW leader could not decide on the offer in the small forum, as the proposed percentage was still significantly lower than the amount promised in the initial text message. A discussion with other members was necessary. The final outcome of the small forum was an offer of 50% of the remaining 75% of the unpaid wages and the 2020 THR, with Spektram JBW asked to discuss the offer with their members.

Both sides reconvened in the larger forum to discuss the results. The Spektram JBW leader informed the gathered members of PT TWJ's offer, but the members still could

not accept the proposed wage percentage. Spektram JBW continued to reject the offer, and PT TWJ stated that any further decision on raising the percentage required discussion with higher management. The mediation returned to its initial stage, but PT TWJ promised to invite Spektram JBW for a further negotiation session after consulting with senior management about the wage increase.

Two weeks later, PT TWJ invited the union for further discussions on the April wages and the 2020 THR. In this session, both parties agreed on a final settlement: PT TWJ would pay 80% of the remaining 75% of the unpaid April wages and 100% of the 2020 THR. These payments were made on 3 June 2021. Thus, the first advocacy process concerning the April wages and 2020 THR was resolved.

Demands for Employment Status and Severance Pay: Roles of Local Government

This demand arose due to the rejection of the agreement letter for 31 workers and the termination of 8 workers whose contracts had expired but had not yet received their entitlements. In this claim, Spektram JBW engaged with various government actors to find a mediator for the issue.

In early November 2021, Spektram JBW attempted advocacy by filing a report with the Department of Labour and Transmigration of the Special Region of Yogyakarta (Disnakertrans DIY). In December 2021, Spektram JBW was invited to Disnakertrans DIY for clarification and was brought together with PT TWJ's Human Resources, AY. However, after the clarification, no further

process was taken regarding the issuance of a supervisory note—only clarification from both sides. According to Spektram JBW, a supervisory note would have helped them in meeting their demands. As a result, no further steps were taken through Disnakertrans DIY, prompting Spektram JBW to contact PT TWJ for bipartite mediation again.

According to a statement from AS, the Head of General Affairs of Disnakertrans DIY, the absence of a supervisory note from Disnakertrans DIY was due to their view that the issue between Spektram JBW and PT TWJ was still an industrial relations dispute that could be mediated and did not yet require supervision. This is consistent with the principle of resolving industrial disputes through family-based negotiation. Disnakertrans DIY has mediators and is also authorised to conduct mediation. In general, provincial Disnaker offices have supervisory authority since there are no supervisors at the city or district level, only mediators, although the provincial office retains mediation authority. Therefore, Disnakertrans DIY conducted clarification before issuing supervision to decide whether a case requires mediation or supervision. Based on this, Disnakertrans DIY decided to conduct simultaneous clarification from both disputing parties—Spektram JBW and PT TWJ—followed by joint mediation (Interview with AS, Head of General Affairs of Disnakertrans DIY, 2023). However, this was not in line with Spektram JBW's expectations, as they believed that Disnakertrans DIY should have more authority over supervision rather than mediation.

"The reason no supervisory note was issued in this case is that it was deemed unnecessary. As long as mediation and family-based approaches are still possible, those are prioritised. Disnakertrans DIY is often thought to focus more on supervision because supervisors are only at the provincial level, but we also have mediators. We always assess the case first to determine the appropriate handling," (AS, Head of General Affairs, Disnakertrans DIY, interview conducted on 13 October 2023).

As the clarification by Disnakertrans DIY and bipartite mediation with PT TWJ failed, a tripartite process was conducted at the Sleman Department of Labour. The tripartite process, held at the Sleman Department of Labour—which has the authority to handle dismissals in industrial relations disputes—was overseen by a mediator who, at the end of the process, would issue a recommendation for both parties. The tripartite process took place three times on 7 April 2022, 21 April 2022, and 28 April 2022, and was recorded in the Sleman Department of Labour Recommendation No. 565/0590 of 2022. During the tripartite process, Spektram JBW was represented by its chairman, legal counsel, and several members, while PT TWJ was represented by AY from Human Resources and PT TWJ's legal counsel. Throughout the three tripartite meetings, Spektram JBW presented the chronology of the dispute and supporting data.

PT TWJ responded to the chronology presented by Spektram JBW, which was recorded in Sleman Department

of Labour Recommendation No. 565/0590 of 2022. Their response included the following points:

a. PT TWJ had implemented a policy to furlough workers while PT TWJ (Jogja Bay Waterpark) was not operational, and an agreement had been made to facilitate this furlough;

b. PT TWJ confirmed that the termination of employment for 8 workers was based on the expiration of their fixed-term employment contracts (PKWT), and certificates of employment had been issued;

c. PT TWJ indicated that there was no decision or guidance from company leadership regarding a solution;

d. PT TWJ referred the matter to the next stage of industrial relations dispute resolution.

After both sides had responded, the mediator issued conclusions and recommendations that could be used as a basis for resolving the industrial dispute. The mediator's conclusions regarding the dispute were as follows:

1. The employment relationship status was that of permanent workers.

2. There were two issues in this employment termination dispute:

    a. A dispute over termination of employment due to a lack of agreement on the calculation of severance pay, service appreciation pay, and compensation for entitlements resulting from the termination of employment.

b. A dispute over termination of employment due to unpaid wages as stipulated in Article 36, Section g, Number 3 of Government Regulation No. 35 of 2021.

Following these conclusions, the mediator issued written recommendations to both parties, under No. 565/0590 dated 23 May 2022, which essentially stated the following:

1. The employer should pay severance pay in the amount of one time the provisions of Article 40(2), service appreciation pay in the amount of one time the provisions of Article 40(3), and compensation in accordance with the provisions of Article 40(4) of Government Regulation No. 35 of 2021, as well as wages that were unpaid during the furlough and the 2021 religious holiday allowance (THR).
2. The workers should accept the calculation of payment as specified in point 1 above.

The recommendation from Disnaker Sleman demonstrated the government's neutrality in this case, based on Government Regulation No. 35 of 2021. The recommendation upheld Spektram JBW's demands regarding employment status, unpaid wages, and severance pay for those terminated. Based on the statement of EY, Chairman of JBW Spektram from the interview, the recommendation was not legally binding as it was the result of a family-based deliberation. Nonetheless, the recommendation from Disnaker Sleman could serve as leverage in the next advocacy stage, such as litigation through the PHI.

"The recommendation from Disnaker Sleman is not legally binding, so the company may not respond, but it is enough to help us to use it as leverage in the trial later," (EY, Chair of Spektram JBW, interview conducted on 2 August 2023).

The recommendation had to be responded to within 10 days of issuance. Spektram JBW accepted the recommendation, while the employer did not respond, which was interpreted as a rejection. Therefore, the tripartite advocacy process was deemed unsuccessful, and no resolution was reached. As the deadline passed without a response, Spektram JBW decided to proceed with litigation by registering the case with the PHI.

"After the final tripartite session, a recommendation was made by the mediator, and both parties were given 10 days to respond. If there's no response within that time, it means rejection. Spektram accepted because it aligned with what we wanted, but the company didn't respond, meaning they rejected it. From there, we held another meeting and decided to proceed to the next step, which was to file with the PHI." (EY, Chair of Spektram JBW, interview conducted on 2 August 2023).

During the tripartite mediation process, Spektram JBW's advocacy efforts were not limited to formal procedures but also included informal actions. These advocacy strategies included staging protests and holding collective prayers in front of Jogja Bay Waterpark to attract public attention to the issue. The protest took place at 1 pm on 22 April 2022, the day after

the second tripartite session. In this advocacy strategy, Spektram JBW followed the proper bureaucratic procedures for obtaining permits, from the neighbourhood head (RT), community head (RW), sub-district, district, Depok Timur police, and PT TWJ. In addition to onlookers at the protest site, the event was covered by various media outlets, which disseminated information through online articles, thereby spreading the issue more widely.

After the tripartite process failed to reach a resolution, Spektram JBW proceeded to file the case with the PHI. The court hearings began nearly a year after the tripartite mediation. During this time, Spektram JBW held regular monthly union meetings to conduct advocacy and union education with the assistance of FBI affiliates. They also transferred knowledge from members who had received advocacy and union education from external parties. These efforts aimed to equip them with the necessary skills for courtroom advocacy.

The first court hearing took place on 27 March 2023. Before the hearing, Spektram JBW and other unions affiliated with FBI staged another protest, displaying banners to raise public awareness about the issue. Once again, the media helped disseminate information through articles, making the issue more widely known. The court proceedings are still ongoing and Spektram JBW continues to hold meetings for training and preparation ahead of future hearings.

Analysis

In the first demand regarding the April salary and the 2020 Religious Holiday Allowance (THR), Tarrow's (2011) theory of contentious politics is evident

in the steps taken by Spektram JBW, particularly in the collective discussion to invite bipartite meetings and seek explanations from PT TWJ management. When the company failed to respond, Spektram JBW followed the contentious politics strategy by seeking support to bolster their efforts. This is seen in their attempt to obtain permits from relevant authorities for organizing protests aimed at pushing the company to act. However, PT TWJ had the power to revoke the protest permit later and insisted that Spektram JBW follow the company's preferred process, which involved mediation with other influential actors in the dispute. The subsequent conflict between the two sides was reflected in the larger forum's mediation process, where Spektram JBW members collectively voiced their grievances about the company's broken promises. Eventually, after various negotiations, the dispute over the April salary and the 2020 THR was resolved. After this agreement, Spektram JBW shifted its focus to the second demand regarding worker status, unpaid furlough wages, the 2021 THR, unpaid advocacy wages for 31 Spektram JBW members who refused to sign the Work Suspension Agreement, and severance pay for 8 laid-off workers.

In the second demand, Tarrow's (2011) contentious politics theory is once again reflected in Spektram JBW's numerous actions against PT TWJ. They sought help from various actors, with the first being Disnakertrans DIY, though Spektram JBW disagreed with Disnakertrans DIY's approach. Consequently, they turned to Disnaker Sleman, which Spektram JBW believed could better assist them in resolving the industrial relations dispute. Disnaker

Sleman facilitated mediation, where the mediator sided with Spektram JBW based on the data they provided, concluding that they were entitled to the benefits they sought. In addition, Spektram JBW sought public support through protests, subtly pressuring the company by framing PT TWJ as unjust. Despite these efforts, Spektram JBW did not succeed in getting PT TWJ to comply. Ultimately, Spektram JBW escalated the matter by seeking assistance from the PHI and staging a protest before the first hearing.

Using Sharma's (2004) advocacy theory, advocacy can be viewed through five steps: identifying the root problem; formulating a solution; raising political awareness; implementing policy; and evaluation. In the salary dispute, these advocacy steps can be identified as follows. First, problem identification was evident in the recognition of salary and THR issues for April 2020. Second, formulating a solution involved issuing three mediation requests and obtaining permits for protests. Third, raising political awareness was achieved through bipartite mediation with the company, as well as mediation involving Depok sub-district officials, the regional police, and Disnaker Sleman. Fourth, policy implementation occurred with the agreement to pay the April salary and THR on 3 June 2021. Finally, evaluation took place when Spektram JBW assessed the effectiveness of their advocacy strategy and prepared for the next round of advocacy regarding the second demand.

In analyzing the second demand regarding worker status and severance pay using Sharma's (2004) advocacy theory, the first step was problem identification, which involved recognizing the

potential loss of severance pay rights, the unclear employment status of 31 workers, unpaid furlough wages, entitlement to the 2021 THR, and the rights of the 8 laid-off workers. Second, formulating a solution involved reporting to Disnakertrans DIY, seeking bipartite mediation, filing a complaint with Disnaker Sleman, and obtaining permits for protests. Third, raising political awareness was seen through clarification at Disnakertrans DIY, bipartite mediation with PT TWJ, tripartite mediation at Disnaker Sleman, protests and prayers outside Jogja Bay Waterpark, and union advocacy education with external affiliations. Fourth, policy implementation did not occur due to a lack of agreement on salary and severance pay. Fifth, evaluation involved discussions that concluded the failure of the advocacy was due to external factors, such as PT TWJ rejecting the mediator's recommendations. Spektram JBW then prepared for Industrial Relations Court proceedings and further training in advocacy and labour law for its members.

Conclusion

The analysis of Spektram JBW's advocacy strategy in its fight for rights against PT TWJ demonstrates that the advocacy process was dynamic, involving several stages to achieve success while acknowledging the potential for failure. Spektram JBW's advocacy strategy evolved through internal and external challenges, reflecting the complexity of contentious labour relations. The two theories used in this analysis, Tarrow's (2011) contentious politics and Sharma's (2004) advocacy strategy, are well-aligned. Contentious politics is embedded within the third stage of the advocacy process—raising political awareness.

In contentious politics, actors seek cooperation with influential allies to challenge elites, which parallels the third step of the advocacy process, where political will is mobilized to strengthen the union and garner external support. Thus, these two theories are interconnected, as contentious politics forms part of the broader advocacy strategy. In evaluating Spektram JBW's advocacy steps using Sharma's (2004) framework, two analyses emerged. The first pertains to the salary demand, where all five stages of advocacy were followed. In the demand for worker status and severance pay, the policy implementation stage was not realized due to the lack of resolution from PT TWJ.

Despite this, the overall advocacy process adhered to applicable labour laws and was executed effectively, especially considering the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the second demand's policy implementation failed, Spektram JBW remained committed to advancing their advocacy through the PHI. Throughout these five advocacy steps, Spektram JBW encountered both internal and external obstacles, including communication difficulties during the pandemic, local cultural tendencies to accept situations, conflicts among workers, declining membership, and limited understanding of advocacy processes among union members. The Spektram JBW leadership addressed these challenges by organizing protests, reinforcing solidarity among remaining union members, and providing continuous education in advocacy and union matters.

The Spektram JBW case highlights the difficulties faced by a small union in confronting a company with powerful ownership ties. Although

Spektram JBW's advocacy faced significant obstacles, it also demonstrates the potential for successful small-scale union movements in Yogyakarta, a region where union activity is relatively limited compared to large industrial centers. This movement could serve as a reference for other small unions in fighting for their rights in the face of injustice and company misconduct. Although it may take a long process to achieve a massive union movement in Yogyakarta, it is not impossible if there is a strong awareness and political will to organise and establish good cooperation with external partners. Furthermore, the stages of the advocacy strategy must comply with the regulations concerning the resolution of industrial disputes as stipulated in the Labour Law, focusing on the issues that have been raised as demands.

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From Competition to Configuration: The Convergence of Scientific and Local Knowledge in the Design of Mount Merapi Disaster Mitigation Policy in Yogyakarta

Ghea Anissah Trinanda[1]

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Abstract

This article examines the transformation of two types of knowledge—government/official knowledge, which represents "scientific" and "expertise"; and local knowledge, represented by the "Jalin Merapi" community, considered as "non-scientific" and layman's understanding. Both types of knowledge are linked by a common "boundary object" (Gieryn, 1983) of Mount Merapi, but they are often in a competition to influence public discourse. The main argument of this article is that integrating government/scientific and local/non-scientific knowledge can result in more effective disaster mitigation strategies. However, in Indonesia, there is a significant gap between these two types of knowledge systems, and competition often overshadows collaboration. Using a qualitative case study approach, the research highlights a shift in knowledge dynamics, from competition to collaboration, facilitated by the "Jalin Merapi" community. Despite this progress, the inclusion of local knowledge in policy making in Indonesia remains limited. This finding emphasises the importance of more inclusive policies that combine scientific knowledge with local insights to improve disaster management system in Indonesia.

Keywords: *Local Knowledge, Scientific Knowledge, Competition, Boundary Object, Disaster Management.*

1 Department of Politics and Government, Gadjah Mada University. Email: gheaanissah@mail.ugm.ac.id

Introduction

The unpredictability of when disasters might occur represents one of the most significant challenges in risk mitigation efforts. Addressing this uncertainty requires disaster mitigation planning that relies on the collaboration between local and scientific knowledge. Local knowledge provides insights into the characteristics of specific regions, often passed from generation to generation (Simanjuntak & Chintia, 2022). In contrast, scientific knowledge offers systematic data, supported by technical tools for evidence-based decision-making (Carby, 2015). Halffman (2003) emphasises that collaboration is a crucial preventive measure.

Indonesia, located within the Pacific Ring of Fire, is a region characterised by high seismic activity. As a result, tectonic and volcanic earthquakes frequently occur in this area (Hinga, 2015). Aligned with postmodern thought, Seidman (1998) argues that knowledge is dynamic and constantly in a state of contestation. This diversity of perspectives within cultures positions local and scientific knowledge as subjects of debate, often entangled in complex discussions. Wisner (1995) highlights the importance of harmonising these two forms of knowledge, as both are shaped by power dynamics that influence their application in disaster mitigation.

This article examines the challenges and opportunities in integrating local and scientific knowledge for disaster mitigation with a focus on Mount Merapi. Situated across four districts—Sleman, Magelang, Boyolali, and Klaten in Central Java—Mount Merapi's location complicates coordination efforts in disaster management (Hayati et al., 2019). The 2010 Emergency

Response Report by the Sleman Regional Disaster Management Agency (BPBD) highlights Mount Merapi's significant volcanic hazards, primarily from pyroclastic flows and lava streams. Despite the high risk of disasters, the fertile volcanic soil continues to attract communities for settlement and agriculture (Crosweller & Wilmshurst, 2013). The 2010 eruption, with a Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI) of 4, was one of the most significant in Merapi's history. It released 140 million cubic meters of volcanic material and resulted in 346 fatalities, marking the highest death toll since the 1930 eruption (Hartmann, 1934; Surono et al., 2012).

In the context of disaster mitigation, a contestation exists between "scientific" knowledge (produced by the government), and "local" (produced and understood by ordinary citizens) in responding to disasters. This is evident in the interaction between "Jalin Merapi", a local-based community, and BPBD (the Regional Disaster Management Agency), a government institution which claimed to employ a scientific approach. The scientific approach to disaster management refers to applied sciences aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of prevention, mitigation, preparedness, emergency response, and recovery through systematic observation and disaster analysis (Carter, 2008). The competition between these two knowledge also reflects power dynamics. Dahl (1957) emphasises that power is evident when one party, such as the government, can direct and dominate another, even if it goes against their interests. Maarif et al. (2012) highlight this dynamic, but the competition between local and scientific knowledge has not been thoroughly explored

in the literature. This article examines this competition, particularly regarding the production and types of knowledge.

Research on the 2010 eruption emphasises that trust between the community and authorities was crucial for effective mitigation (Mei et al., 2013). Lavigne et al. (2008) found that local communities outside the official danger zones had low risk perception, stemming from misunderstandings of volcanic processes, over-reliance on prevention measures, and cultural beliefs. This knowledge gap, due to limited hazard information, often conflicts with scientific approaches, hindering disaster response. Novia (2012) highlights the need for collaboration between formal institutions, such as BPBD, and community organisations, such as Jalin Merapi, to address these knowledge conflicts and enhance disaster management.

This article applies several concepts, starting with "boundary work", first introduced by Gieryn (1983) and further developed by Langley et al. (2019), to explain the discursive strategies used by scientists to distinguish science from non-science. Boundary work serves to establish, modify, or clarify the boundaries between different entities, whether they are groups, professions, or organisations (Lamont & Molnar, 2002; Phillips & Lawrence, 2012). These boundaries play a crucial role in understanding the dynamics of contestation in the field, including situations involving the separation of scientific and local knowledge.

The second concept is Bourdieu's (1977, 1984) theory of "practice", which is relevant for analysing competitive boundary

relations within two different contexts. This theory introduces the concept of "fields of practice" encompassing the social, historical, and material aspects that influence specific practices. Status differences within a field arise from individuals' access to various forms of capital—economic, cultural, social, and symbolic—which are essential for success in the field.

In relation to the first concept, Langley et al. (2019) expand on boundary work by emphasising how individuals or groups influence social, symbolic, and material boundaries. Competitive boundary work involves efforts to maintain, challenge, or create boundaries that separate one group from another to gain a particular advantage. This process often creates paradoxes, tensions, or conflicts when individuals or groups try to distinguish themselves from others (Bucher et al., 2016).

This study aims to identify the application of boundary work in the context of boundary setting, using an approach that incorporates concepts like demarcation (Bourdieu, 1977, 1984). Certain boundaries are created and maintained to achieve advantages in the field of practice. Additionally, this research also considers the concept of "boundary infrastructure", introduced by Garud et al. (2014), which describes how materials, technologies, and physical spaces can serve as boundary infrastructure to facilitate interaction and coordination between groups.

Figure 1. Analytical Framwork



Source : Author's Analysis

This article refers to Chikodzi et al. (2014) who explore the alignment between scientific and non-scientific local knowledge, outlining their differences based on specific criteria that serve as the foundation and key focus of this study.

Table 1. Differences between Local Knowledge and Scientific Knowledge

Character-istic	Scientific	Local
Tools	Instruments that are designed are limited, focused, and recorded. Rain gauges, water level recorders.	The instruments are undefined and undocumented Observations are unfocused. Passed orally from generation to generation.

Accuracy	More precise, and errors can be corrected. Measurement tools can be repeated.	Contextual, individual, and errors are difficult to evaluate. Each individual has a different perception, and potentially with bias.
Communi-cation	Easy to translate and com-municate. Standardised terms, such as "porosity." Porosity is a measure of the amount of empty space in a material that allows liquids or gases to flow or be stored.	In local language and re-quires interpretation.

Source : Chikodzi et al (2014)

This research uses a qualitative approach with a case study design to explore the dynamics of disaster mitigation at Mount Merapi and the roles of “scientific” (produced by the government) and local knowledge (non-scientific and produced by the layman). Data analysis is carried out through triangulation of multiple data sources to ensure validity and reliability. The data collection methods include in-depth interviews with key informants from BNPB (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana Nasional), BPBD (Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah) Sleman, BPPTKG (Balai Penyelidikan dan Pengembangan Teknologi Kebencanaan Geologi) Yogyakarta, and local communities. The study was conducted at the Jalin Merapi office in Klaten, Central Java, which acts as a central information hub for the local

community. In addition to interviews and direct field observations, this research also includes a literature review to gather relevant disaster mitigation planning documents.

ANALYSIS

Science-Based Knowledge in Mount Merapi Disaster Management

Government Authority in Science-Based Policy for Mount Merapi Disaster Management

The government plays a crucial role in ensuring public safety during disasters through preparedness coordination approaches and mechanisms among its apparatus. The government holds the authority to manage this responsibility. It regulates the roles, tasks, and functions of agencies to collaborate in disaster mitigation, including assessing social, economic, and cultural vulnerabilities. In the context of Mount Merapi disaster mitigation, the government establishes units, agencies, and actors involved based on the increasing disaster status, with actions adjusted accordingly. The validation of field data and information is essential to ensure that disaster management is effective and targeted.

Figure 2. Mount Merapi Status Flow



Source : Contingency Plan Document for Mount Merapi Eruption 2020

The status flow includes several notes when the level changes, adjusted according to the institutions responsible for evacuating the public. These notes serve as a reference in the concept of Mount Merapi's status.

1. When Mount Merapi's status increases from "Waspada" (Alert) to "Siaga" (Caution) as determined by BPPTKG, the Sleman District Government establishes a "Siaga Darurat" (Emergency Alert) status.
2. If Mount Merapi's activity level increases from "Siaga" (Caution) to "Awas" (Danger), an "Emergency Response" status is declared.

3. When the Merapi status is downgraded to "Waspada" (Alert), the Sleman District Government implements a "Transition from Emergency to Recovery" status.

The status categories mentioned above are based on scientific knowledge, serving as a reference for the government in volcanic disaster management policies. These categories are used throughout Indonesia and follow the international standard of Volcanic Alert Levels (VALs), with some have been adapted to the local context with some adjustments. In addressing the potential risk of eruptions, the government adopts science-based policies supported by the latest technology to provide accurate data for decision-making and policy formulation.

> *"...The eruption events of volcanoes are usually recorded, and one of the best observations of volcanoes is in Indonesia. There is PVMBG (Center for Volcanology and Geological Disaster Mitigation), which has offices at every volcano that is at risk of eruption, and this is something unique to Indonesia; no other country has such a system," (Interview with Mr. Berton, Director of Disaster Mitigation at BNPB Jakarta, January 10, 2024).*

In volcanic crisis management, PVMBG is structured at every district/city level and is based on recommendations provided by the Center for Volcanology and Geological Disaster Mitigation (PVMBG). PVMBG is the agency responsible for assessing and monitoring volcanic activity across Indonesia, while BPPTKG is the operational unit focused on the Mount Merapi region, with more specific technical and operational tasks (Mei et

al., 2013). This hierarchy allows a swift and relevant crisis response at the local level. However, despite the potential for the application of science and technology in disaster identification and diagnosis, bureaucratic regulations and authority limitations often restrict the efficiency of mitigation and emergency response. These limitations define the extent to which agencies can act during a disaster.

> *"BPPTKG provides hazard characteristics, which are not yet linked to the population after modeling is conducted and scenarios of events and risk impacts are created. Of course, there are authorities held by the district and provincial governments," (Interview with Mr. Agung, Disaster Mitigation Analyst at BPBD DIY Yogyakarta, January 22, 2024).*

Collaboration between institutions, stakeholders, and local governments is key to implementing disaster management mechanisms. The approach that demonstrates "integration" between science and policy (Bocher, 2016) emphasises that scientific information must be optimised in the policymaking process. In this context, Mount Merapi is managed through the Sleman District Disaster Emergency Response Command System, which integrates scientific knowledge with right policies to reduce the risks and impacts of disasters.

Command Line of Science-Based Knowledge in Mount Merapi

The information and data on Mount Merapi's activity are provided by technical institutions such as BPPTKG,

which plays a crucial role in monitoring and providing follow-up recommendations. Data is a key factor in decision-making. BPPTKG, as the primary source of scientific information, processes monitoring data to quickly identify potential risks. However, further decisions lie with BPBD, which works closely with the local government. The collaboration between BPPTKG, BPBD, and the local government is essential to ensure a quick and effective response to the threats posed by Mount Merapi's activity. However, all of this operates within the scope of each level of government's authority.

> *"The authority only extends to providing recommendations; the execution is handled by BPBD and the local government. We cannot intervene in decisions or what can be done for execution, as well as disaster prevention, management, and post-disaster actions, alongside providing support in the form of data," (Interview with Mr. Alam, Head of the Geological Disaster Information Dissemination Task Force, Yogyakarta, January 18, 2024).*

The division of tasks (based on authority) in Mount Merapi disaster mitigation creates clear boundaries (boundary work), by defining responsibilities according to the capabilities, knowledge, and authority of each party. BPPTKG plays a central role in the production of scientific knowledge by processing data from studies and technologies related to Merapi's activity. BPPTKG also serves as an information link for the public, presenting study results in a popular format that is easy to understand. This process shows how BPPTKG not only generates scientific data, but

also bridges the gap between scientific knowledge and public understanding. Therefore, this division of labor ensures that the knowledge produced can be effectively applied and understood, forming the basis for the legitimacy needed to encourage the public to follow government instructions during emergencies.

The message production process at BPPTKG Yogyakarta is focused through the Media Centre (Syafuddin & Purworini, 2021). In addition, BPPTKG has adopted application technologies to send real-time data, enabling the communication of Merapi's current condition and accelerating recommendations and decision-making when certain signs occur. The use of this technology improves efficiency in responding to and preparing for potential disasters.

The disaster management of Mount Merapi is based on policies that integrate scientific knowledge, the latest technologies, and government authority. BPPTKG plays a key role in monitoring volcanic activity, while policy execution is carried out by BPBD and local governments. Clear collaboration between institutions and stakeholders ensures a swift and effective response, supported by real-time technology and communication that is easily understood by the public, thus enhancing preparedness and risk mitigation efforts.

Local Knowledge-Based in Mount Merapi Disaster Management

The Knowledge Construction of the Jalin Merapi Community

The Jalin Merapi community emerged as an initiative to provide more balanced information tailored to the local conditions and to meet the need for accurate communication during disasters. Previously, slow information flow from the government to the public resulted in significant losses, including loss of life, as seen in the eruptions of 1994 and 2006. Jalin Merapi was initiated by civil society groups such as the COMBINE Resource Institution, WALHI, and the Community Radio Network. The community's goal is to reduce information uncertainty by delivering accurate, fast, and up-to-date information. Since its establishment, Jalin Merapi has grown into a key communication channel in disaster mitigation, strengthening community response and preparedness around Mount Merapi.

> *"BPPTKG intensively collaborated with Jalin Merapi in 2010. In 2010, it felt like we were disconnected from the information from BPBD," (Interview with Mr. Sarjino, Livestock Coordinator of Jalin Merapi, Deles, February 23, 2024).*

According to Novia (2012), Jalin Merapi utilises accessible communication tools as a tangible effort to facilitate the acquisition of factual and up-to-date information about the conditions of Mount Merapi. Its main goal is to enable quick and accurate decision-making or actions in response to potential disasters. To achieve

this, Jalin Merapi developed an approach where information is sourced directly from the field and obtained through the active involvement of local communities and volunteers engaged in this initiative.

Platform X, used in 2010 to disseminate real-time updates on Mount Merapi's conditions, shared information across other platforms. This aimed to offer balanced information to the public. The Jalin Merapi positions the community as the subject, rather than the object, of disaster response. Therefore, information about affected communities is regarded in high importance. Through various information flow mechanisms established by Jalin Merapi, transparency ensures that balanced news reaches both the public and the government.

Figure 3. Platform X Jalin Merapi

Source : https://twitter.com/jalinmerapi *Accessed on January 31, 2024*

According to Mahaswari (2012), Jalin Merapi uses various multi-platform media. The distribution of this information helps support the data that is shared across the agreed-upon platforms. The effectiveness of information distribution is measured by the level of public trust in Jalin Merapi, which is reflected in the increase in donations received through Jalin Merapi during the disaster.

Local Knowledge of The "Juru Kunci" (Key person) and the Convergence of Knowledge

In traditional Javanese belief (Kejawen), there are two key cultural leaders: the Sultan of Yogyakarta and the "Juru Kunci" (a culturally resourceful person usually living in the hotspot of disaster area). The Juru Kunci holds the symbolic key to the volcano and acts as an intermediary between humans and the spirits that protect the mountain (according to local belief). Despite modernisation and advancements in various fields, the local community around Mount Merapi continues to revere a local mystic, Mbah Marijan, who serves as the Juru Kunci (Lavigne et al., 2008). The community's belief in the Juru Kunci and their ability to access supernatural sources of knowledge remains strong and continues to develop. However, this knowledge is not considered "scientific", while the local people considered Mbah Marijan, who lived in Kinahrejo, Cangkringan, as a figure who provided safety.

The local knowledge held by the Juru Kunci is a blend of natural knowledge, gained from previous events, and supernatural knowledge (*ilmu titen,* lit: observe). As a result, the justification for scientific knowledge does not always align with the local and non-scientific

knowledge in monitoring the signs of a potential eruption of Mount Merapi. The community places full trust in the figure who bridges this knowledge and carries it forward. The local knowledge approach, by understanding the situation of the Juru Kunci, provides valuable experience for BPBD Sleman staff in dealing with situations related to Mount Merapi. It requires them to gain a deep understanding of the patterns and needs of the community. Through the socio-cultural approach implemented by BPBD Sleman, they are able to build closer relationships with the community, provide effective means of socialisation, and create a positive impact for the community in facing the threat of disaster.

> *"...Mbah Asih, the Juru Kunci, still asks for scientific opinions and sometimes visits the office (BPPTKG)..." (Interview with Mr. Alam, Head of the Geological Disaster Information Dissemination Task Force, Yogyakarta, January 18, 2024).*

> *"If Mbah Asih sees something, we still listen to him (all decisions and warnings), even though we don't use it 100%, but it's part of the recommendations." (Interview with Mr. Sukiman, Coordinator of Jalin Merapi, Deles, February 23, 2024).*

Mbah Asih's visit as the Juru Kunci of Mount Merapi to the BPPTKG office to inquire about the condition of the volcano is a concrete example of the interaction between local and scientific knowledge. This offers a new perspective on how local knowledge can create space for scientific knowledge, and vice versa. So far, the understanding of the Juru Kunci who plays an

important role as representative of the local knowledge. While their approaches may vary, their presence in the collaboration concept emphasises the importance of respecting and preserving local knowledge in disaster mitigation efforts. This reflects recognition of the value of traditional and local knowledge in facing disaster challenges and demonstrates a commitment to incorporating local perspectives into decision-making and mitigation planning.

Boundary Person: The Sultan as an Intersection of Local and Scientific Knowledge

The Sultan of Yogyakarta, Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, who symbolises the intersection of traditional and modern values, plays a significant role in this dynamic. The Sultan was actively involved in the success of the 2006 evacuation efforts, emphasising the importance of evacuating residents, despite it conflicting with the advice of the Juru Kunci. Sanggrahan, the Sultan's residence in Kaliurang, is believed to have played a key role in diverting the pyroclastic flow from Mount Merapi in 1994, preventing it from reaching the village of Turgo. The local community also believes that the tomb of Sheikh Maulana Kubro at the top of the Turgo Hill provides spiritual protection (Lavigne et al., 2008).

The Sultan of Yogyakarta not only serves as a figure who bridges tradition and modernity but also acts as a spiritual guardian and protector for his people in the face of serious natural threats. In 2010, during the eruption of Mount Merapi, one of the key figures representing local knowledge of the volcano, Mbah Maridjan, became a victim (Maarif et al., 2012). This occurred because

Mbah Maridjan refused to evacuate from Kinahrejo Village, despite being urged by Sultan Hamengkubuwono X to do so. He rejected the request and chose to remain in the village. This illustrates how the government has been insufficient in addressing the risks and habits of the people living around Mount Merapi, particularly in relation to the majority of their occupations. It is crucial for the government to pay closer attention to and understand the dynamics and diverse needs of the community, especially concerning disaster mitigation and emergency response for Mount Merapi.

In confirming the activities of Mount Merapi, the Sultan as the leader of the region and in his capacity as the Governor of Yogyakarta, ensures the monitoring of the volcano through the scientific knowledge provided by BPPTKG, the institution responsible for monitoring. Sultan Hamengkubuwono X serves as a mediator and bridge between modernity and tradition within the community, playing a key role in both areas.

> *"Ngarso Dalem (Sultan HB X) has visited here several times, and in his role as the Governor of DIY, on New Year's Eve, December 30, he contacted the local government and requested that monitoring be increased on the afternoon of December 31, saying he had a bad feeling. It turned out that there were two pyroclastic flows," (Interview with Mr. Alam, Head of the Geological Disaster Information Dissemination Task Force, Yogyakarta, January 18, 2024).*

The Sultan of Yogyakarta, in his role as a symbol, reflects the dynamics involving the

relationship between traditional values and elements of modernity (Maarif et al., 2012). This process demonstrates that the Sultan plays a crucial role as a central actor in bridging two types of knowledge, positioned within the middle corridor. In his role as a boundary figure, the Sultan not only acts as a link between the two distinct bodies of knowledge but also as a mediator, facilitating interaction between these two domains.

The Process and Dynamics of Knowledge Construction

The Construction of Local and Scientific Knowledge

The construction of local and scientific knowledge can be viewed through the roles of institutions that represent these types of knowledge. From the explanation above, it can be concluded that patterns emerge in the segmentation of knowledge, aimed at preserving knowledge within society. Within the authority of institutions and organisations, there is the development of knowledge internalisation, which forms a process of strengthening knowledge, supported by stakeholders and key actors who play a vital role in this process.

The process of knowledge construction is carried out through the internalisation of the knowledge being shared. This not only creates a solid foundation for deeper understanding but also builds a strong support network among stakeholders. Thus, the various actors involved in this process not only act as knowledge keepers but also as agents who aim to secure and develop knowledge sustainably. Knowledge construction becomes not just a passive process but an active effort to shape, support, and protect knowledge from various challenges and the dynamics of the social environment.

Figure 4. Construction Area of Knowledge



Source : Author's Analysis

Government and Jalin Merapi: The 2010 Mount Merapi Eruption Experience

The competition between scientific knowledge and local knowledge arises due to the differences between the knowledge developed by the community. Jalin Merapi, in managing information for disaster mitigation, accommodated the two types of knowledge, and exercised an adaptation of knowledge. Government institutions, such as BPPTKG, are responsible for generating scientific knowledge related to disaster mitigation, which forms the basis of policies.

The analysis of the 2010 Mount Merapi eruption provides insight into the management of disaster situations by both the community and the government. This eruption had distinct characteristics compared to previous ones, seen in the type of

eruption, the safe zone radius, the direction of the pyroclastic flow, and Mount Merapi's activity. The 2012 Mount Merapi Contingency Report by the Sleman District Government shows that the impact of the 2010 eruption was widespread, affecting nearly the entire Sleman Regency and the Special Region of Yogyakarta. The consequences of this disaster included fluctuating evacuations due to repeated changes in the safe zone, such as 10 km, 15 km, and 20 km, along with several major eruptions during that period.

As mentioned before, communities living on the slopes of Mount Merapi have a strong belief in the informal figure of the Juru Kunci, Mbah Marijan, who is believed to have a strong sense on the condition of Mount Merapi. Local knowledge was spread through digital media, providing a space for community actors like Jalin Merapi to deliver up-to-date information. The contestation between local and scientific knowledge created interactions between key actors in disseminating information related to the 2010 Mount Merapi disaster. Two main groups emerged: one based on local knowledge and the other on modern knowledge. This contestation led to the emergence of key actors responsible for providing information to the public.

As these actors mapped out their interests, they operated within the concept of "boundary work", combining relevant discourses and narratives within the context of Mount Merapi. The 2010 event highlighted the struggle of the Juru Kunci, where Mbah Marijan chose to stay despite his house being only five kilometers from the volcano's peak. He stated, "I still feel comfortable and at home

here. If I leave, who will take care of this place?"—reflecting a local perspective of resilience (Maarif et al., 2012).

Post-Eruption Knowledge Construction after the 2010 Mount Merapi Eruption

Jalin Merapi opened space for community participation in providing information about Mount Merapi in 2010. The role of the government in building and spreading knowledge and information remains insufficient to increase public trust in the government. According to Novia (2012), the public's trust in information from Jalin Merapi was higher because it was considered more accurate compared to government information, which was seen as less responsive.

This process offers insight into the existence of a pathway used to contest power dynamics within the community. This attitude and principle serve as guidelines for each type of knowledge to create space for constructing knowledge. Typically, boundary work tends to benefit those already in power, and boundary relationships, in general, are likely to be maintained over time to serve the interests of the dominant group (Allen, 2000; Bucher et al., 2016; Sanders & Harrison, 2008; Langley et al., 2019).

RESULTS

Contesting the Knowledge

According to Foucault (1980), power is not only a physical or legal tool but is also influenced by processes of knowledge. In complex power structures, knowledge functions as a crucial

instrument in the formation and maintenance of power. Those in power, whether government institutions or dominant groups, actively produce and distribute knowledge that supports their agendas, meaning that knowledge not only reflects but also shapes social reality.

However, this dynamic is not without challenges. Competition between different discourses of knowledge creates complexity in the politics of knowledge, where both powerful and marginalised groups strive to maintain or challenge their respective dominance. By reducing the dominance of one group, marginalised knowledge has the opportunity to be recognised and accepted in public discourse, creating a diversity of information beneficial to society. This dynamic shows that the relationship between power and knowledge is not merely hierarchical, but also a complex process of negotiation and contestation in the production and reproduction of knowledge.

Figure 5. Contested Area of Existence of Knowledge



Source : Author's Analysis

Breaking the Boundaries of Knowledge Construction

Jalin Merapi in 2010 intensified the practice of competitive boundary work with the government, taking on a role previously held by BPBD. However, this shift occurred when Jalin Merapi began to integrate itself with the government as an integral part, transforming the competitive concept into a configurational one. This represents a specific form of configurational boundary work that maintains a paradoxical balance between competitive and collaborative forces, supporting boundaries through the creation of boundary organisations.

Figure 6. Boundary Work Pasca Letusan 2010



Source : Author's Analysis

This configurational boundary work attempts to establish boundaries that facilitate collaboration among organisations from incompatible social worlds or actors with competing interests. It does so by creating a special space to mediate these relationships, a practice known as "buffering boundaries" (Langley et al, 2019). The concept of "buffering boundaries" is highly relevant in understanding the new role of Jalin Merapi. Buffering boundaries refer to the creation of boundaries designed to facilitate collaboration between organisations or actors with incompatible or even conflicting interests.

In 2010, Jalin Merapi exhibited a strong contestation pattern against the government, reflecting tensions and differing views in disaster management. However, over time, following the 2010 Merapi eruption, this shift marked the emergence of Jalin Merapi as a third actor, taking a more active role in configuring the relationship between the community and the government. Boundary work, emphasising configuration, presents its own challenges for its members, who must manage the tensions between cooperation and competition, while maintaining trust from both parties involved (O'Mahony & Bechky, 2008; Perkmann & Schildt, 2015; Langley et al, 2019).

Through the application of this concept, Jalin Merapi successfully created interactive spaces that allowed for constructive dialogue and cooperation between the affected community and the government. In the context of Jalin Merapi, the application of buffering boundaries created a special space that mediated the relationship between the

community and the government post-2010 eruption. This space functioned as a neutral zone where both sides could collaborate without domination or confrontation.

Implications in Boundary Contestation

The shifting boundaries between scientific and local knowledge at Mount Merapi play a critical role in disaster mitigation, with Jalin Merapi acting as a third party that facilitates collaboration and integration between the two types of knowledge. While the boundaries of each knowledge system remain distinct, the space for interaction and information exchange allows for the development of more holistic solutions. The evolving agreements between the government and other stakeholders over time require adjustments, which affect the dynamics and structure of boundary work. As a configuration actor, Jalin Merapi plays a key role in maintaining balance and facilitating interaction between scientific and local knowledge, while also adapting mitigation strategies to the continuously changing political and social conditions.

Figure 7. Configurational of Boundary Work Local



Source : Author's Analysis

The phenomenon of configurational boundary work around Mount Merapi emerges when there is a need for information validation from the local community. Jalin Merapi plays a key role in this shift, integrating local knowledge with scientific knowledge. This change creates a new space within scientific knowledge that was previously unaccommodated, becoming an integral part of the local knowledge dynamics.

The boundary object becomes a central focus in this work, allowing for more integrative interaction between different types of knowledge. Jalin Merapi facilitates the

integration of rooted local knowledge with evidence-based scientific knowledge, creating opportunities for both to unite and complement each other. This effort strengthens disaster risk mitigation at Mount Merapi, enhancing understanding and responses to the complex challenges faced by the community.

Figure 8. Configurational of Boundary Work Scientific



Source : Author's Analysis

Scientific knowledge requires interaction with the public, not only through the formation of formal knowledge. Scientists as stated by Garud et al. (2014), must build communication bridges with the public using stories rather than complex scientific terms. A reluctance to engage in this interaction can limit the understanding of science. Configurational boundary work, which emerges from the interaction between local and scientific knowledge, creates new boundaries that facilitate the flow of information. This pattern allows knowledge to move as a boundary object that remains relevant across various contexts, supporting collaboration and understanding.

Conclusion

The eruptions of Mount Merapi in 2006 and 2010 marked significant reflection points in efforts to enhance disaster preparedness and mitigation in the region, particularly concerning the types of knowledge—scientific knowledge (reproduced by the government) and local knowledge (reproduced by the community). The communities living around Mount Merapi have developed a collective awareness that natural disasters are an inseparable part of the natural reality of life.

First, there are two types of knowledge: scientific knowledge produced by BPPTKG, and local knowledge produced by the citizens and bridged by Jalin Merapi. This local knowledge is based on the community's understanding, which emphasises local beliefs and the concept of self-reliance in efforts to mitigate Mount Merapi's disasters. Over time, there has often been friction between these two types of

knowledge due to differences in approach and perspective in influencing the public regarding Mount Merapi disaster mitigation.

Second, despite the friction and contestation between scientific and local knowledge, a convergence point exists where both types of knowledge can be used together to influence the public. This process begins with the formation of an initial construct, which is often influenced by sectoral egoistic interests, where each party strives to dominate the knowledge they possess. However, over time, there have been adjustments in the use of this knowledge on the ground. This involves careful consideration of the available information and data, as well as reactions to the dynamics occurring in the surrounding environment, leading to a more configured response.

Third, from the discussion above, it can be seen that a shift has occurred in the boundary work process, where contestation has evolved into configuration based on mutual understanding. The boundary work process during the contestation between these two types of knowledge is not merely an effort to build a bridge, but more about a paradigm shift. Configuration becomes the core of this process, enabling the acquisition and adjustment of information from both knowledge systems according to the specific needs on the ground.

With this configuration, there is an exchange of information, understanding, and best practices between the two sides. This ultimately enhances the effectiveness of disaster mitigation efforts for Mount Merapi and provides a more adaptive response to evolving

situations on the ground. Jalin Merapi became a configuration actor, particularly after the 2010 eruption, bringing together the community and government, thus providing perspectives from both sides. This configuration process involves a deep understanding of existing knowledge boundaries and the ability to adapt to changes on the ground. Expanding the understanding of boundary work allows us to view it as a bridge in the infrastructure of knowledge. Furthermore, it involves a dynamic, flexible, and adaptive process to accommodate changes in context and the needs of the local community. Here, expanding the understanding of boundary work will not only improve the quality of disaster mitigation policies but also help build a stronger foundation for the protection of the community and environment in the Mount Merapi region. It emphasises the importance of an integrative and adaptive approach in addressing the complexities of disaster mitigation, combining both scientific and local knowledge for more comprehensive and sustainable solutions.

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