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Room BA 403, 4th Floor, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences,
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Phone +62(0)274 555880
Email: pcd@ugm.ac.id

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Warih Aji Pamungkas
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**Aims and Scope:**

PCD Journal of South and Southeast Asia's Power, Conflict, and Democracy Studies is an international refereed journal initiated by the Power, Conflict, and Democracy (PCD) consortium, a collaborative work by the University of Colombo in Sri Lanka, Gadjah Mada University in Indonesia, and the University of Oslo in Norway. It is a journal that comprehensively examines the dynamics of power and democracy, including practices of human rights, popular representation, and public policy, particularly, in Indonesia but still giving a space for comparative studies. Invitation is extended to authors with interest in making comparison experiences in Indonesia with those of the rest of the globe. PCD Journal publishes articles, literature review, field notes, and book reviews in major sub fields of political science, human geography, and political anthropology.

PCD Journal aims to address some of the most current issues of power, conflict, and democracy in Indonesia with comparative perspective. While the journal is open to all methodological approaches, all submissions are expected to be theoretically grounded. The journal can be of great value to teachers, students, researchers, experts, journalists, and social movement activist dealing with these issues and regions.

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**PCD Programme**

The state of democracy in the Global South is marked by a striking paradox: while liberal democracy has attained an ideologically hegemonic position through two so-called waves of democracy, the qualities of such democracies is increasingly called into question. The "old" democracies in the global South like Sri Lanka are weakened. Democracy deficits have emerged within constitutional and institutional arrangements as well as in political practices. Further, the "third wave of democracy" is over. "New" democracies like in Indonesia have fostered freedoms, privatisation and decentralisation but continue to suffer from poor governance, representation and participation. Hence there are general signs of decline. Vulnerable people are frustrated with lack of actual influence and sustained elitism. Politicians winning elections often need to foster ethnic and religious loyalties, clientelism and the abuse of public resources. Powerful groups and middle classes with poor ability to win elections tend to opt for privatisation and return partially to authoritarian governance.

Critical questions are therefore asked about the feasibility of democracy in developing country contexts. Some observers say it is only a problem of better crafting of institutions. Others contend that "full" democratisation was premature in the first place and that necessary preconditions need to be created beforehand. Both positions are based on a narrow and static understanding of democracy. While the core elements of democracy are universal, real world democracies develop (or decline) over time and through contextual dynamics; in processes and contexts of actors, institutions and relations of power. Therefore, the crucial task is to analyse the problems and options of expanding the historically "early" freedoms and deficient elements of democracy that fortunately exist in spite of poor socio- economic and political conditions in counties such as Sri Lanka and Indonesia rather than giving up on these freedoms until the other have somehow improved. This is to advance towards the universally accepted aim of democracy in terms of popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality, and to be able to use democracy to handle conflicts and alter unequal and unsustainable development.

With this in mind, researchers at the University of Oslo (Norway), Gadjah Mada (Indonesia) and Colombo (Sri Lanka) have come together in a collective research—and post- graduate programme. The idea is to pool their research projects and results, and to promote doctoral as well as master studies by way of, first, a joint framework for analysing power, conflict and democracy and, second, a basic electronic peer reviewed journal and report series (published by *PCD-Press*) to the benefit of students, scholars and priorities in the region. Basic resources—in addition to the participants own voluntary work and projects— are provided by their respective universities and the Norwegian Centre for International Cooperation in Higher Education (SIU).

**CONTENT**


| Title | Pages | Author |
| --- | --- | --- |
| A tribute to our teacher: Cornelis Lay (6 September 1959 – 5 August 2020) | i-ii | Azifah R. Astrina |
| Political Scandal and Public Figure: A Survey of the Effect of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama and Veronica Tan's Divorce Scandal on the Political Attitude of "Ahokers" | 111-124 | Arum Sekar Cendani, Pulung Setiosuci Perbawani |
| Contesting Welfare Discourses in Post-New Order Indonesia | 125-157 | Dimpos Manalu |
| The Moluccas' Surviving Aristocracy in Indonesian Politics: Fragmentation and Land-based Political Support | 159-186 | Bayu Dardias Kurniadi |
| Shackled by Patriarchy and Poverty: Women's Experiences with Domestic Violence in North Central Timor and North Sumatra | 187-202 | Smita Tanaya |
| Why have Anti-Offshore Tin Mining Movements Failed in Bangka but Succeeded in East Belitung? Political Opportunity Structures and Political Settlement in the Context of Indonesia's Democratic Future | 203-227 | Eko Bagus Sholihin |
| Book Review Participation without democracy: Containing conflict in Southeast Asia | 229-234 | Ashari Cahyo Edi |

## CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS EDITION

**Ashari Cahyo Edi**
Ashari Cahyo Edi is a PhD student at the Department of Political Science, University at Albany, State University of New York.

**Arum Sekar Cendani and Pulung Setiosuci Perbawani**
Arum Sekar Cendani graduated from the Department of Communication Science, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.
Pulung Setiosuci Perbawani is a lecturer at the Department of Communication Science, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

**Bayu Dardias Kurniadi**
Bayu Dardias Kurniadi is a PhD Candidate at the Department of Political and Social Change, Australian National University, Canberra.

**Dimpos Manalu**
Dimpos Manalu is a lecturer at Master of Public Administration Programme, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas HKBP Nommensen, Medan.

**Eko Bagus Sholihin**
Eko Bagus Sholihin is a lecturer at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Raden Fatah State Islamic University, Palembang, Indonesia.

**Smita Tanaya**
Smita Tanaya graduated from the Department of Politics and Government, Universitas Gadjah Mada, and took part as a Junior Researcher for Women Collective Action research project.

A tribute to our teacher

# Cornelis Lay (6 September 1959 – 5 August 2020)

Azifah R. Astrina

On a Wednesday morning in August 2020, the world became a little quieter: Cornelis Lay departed this earth. Better known as Conny, he had been an important political figure since the 1990s to 2000s and a teacher of political science scholars in both Indonesia and abroad.

Cornelis Lay was born on 6 September 1959 in Dendeng, Kupang, a place that he described in his self-interview article 'Growing Up in Kupang' as being only two and a half kilometres away from the town centre yet so dark that nobody wished to live there. Coming from a lower-class family, Conny spent his entire childhood in his hometown. His life in Kupang was a happy one, wherein people never became selfish despite their economic difficulties. Interactions were intensive, familiar, and egalitarian, and Conny often played with his friends around the market where his parents operated a stall. At the same time, he developed a love for books and films, something that he delightedly shared with the young academics he mentored (such as myself). He moved to Yogyakarta in 1980 to study political science, then known as government studies, in Universitas Gadjah Mada, where he became permanently employed after he graduated seven years later.

One of his college friends remembers him as a man with character, one of the brightest academics at the Department of Government Studies. Having experienced a void in central power, Conny believed that intellectuals and scientists needed to stand side by side with the practitioners of power. This argument is perhaps best exemplified by his inaugural speech, delivered when he was made professor of political science at Universitas Gadjah Mada. He titled this speech 'The Three Roles of Intellectuals: A Convergence of Power and Humanity', emphasizing the dilemma inherent in the relationship between intellectuality, power, and science. In his speech, Conny reminded us that power and science are both born and developed from the ideals of liberty and humanity. In this case, an intellectual's greatest sin is not their mistakes, but lies told when they fear revealing the truths they know. Such a character made him accepted as a political strategist by some, and as a teacher for all who had the privilege to know him.

Conny had been a backbone of the *Journal of Power, Conflict, and Democracy* since it was first published in 2009, and played in integral role in the Power, Welfare, and Democracy project

that spawned it. He played a huge role in producing and developing knowledge within this network, which used collaborative North–South research assessments to promote and enhance the democratisation process. He played a huge role in uniting Universitas Gadjah Mada in Indonesia, the University of Colombo in Sri Lanka, and the University of Oslo in Norway. For Conny, the essence of power laid in its ability to be distributed and entrusted to others. In his words, the distribution of power gives humans the opportunity to practice empathy and humanity. He often jokingly referred to his writing as a little too poetic for academia, where everything has to be concise. However, little did he know that his writing reflected his capacity as a political strategist, academic, and a person with great humility.

His health began to decline after his first heart attack in 2011, and following a second heart attack in 2015, Conny had to use a Left Ventricular Assist Device (LVAD) to help his heart pump blood to the rest of the body. However, his declining health did not discourage him; rather, it made him more productive as an academic, and he published works in numerous peer-reviewed international journals. At the same time, he also mentored young scholars at the Department of Politics and Government, as well as the Research Centre for Politics and Government, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

For us, the younger generation, Cornelis Lay was a true life-learner. He was a man with character, the glimmer of gold did not blind him, and the waves of life did not discourage him. He was a man who stuck to his true calling. As such, although he has left us, his legacy remains alive.

Rest in power, Mas Conny.

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# Political Scandal and Public Figure: A Survey of the Effect of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama and Veronica Tan's Divorce Scandal on the Political Attitude of "Ahokers"

Arum Sekar Cendani[1] & Pulung Setiosuci Perbawani[2]

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**Abstract**

*Indonesian society is familiar with the terms 'public figures' and 'celebrities', but the distinction is often not understood properly. The public's interest in content that focuses on entertainment, lifestyles, and gossip, as well as the presence of a media that facilitates such content, makes the process of 'celebrating' common. This process has resulted in the private space of public figures being transformed into objects of public consumption.*

*Scandals are often quite popularly discussed among the public, especially when their subject is a public figure. However, studies of how scandals affect the public and its political behaviour have not been widely documented. In 2018, Indonesian news media began widely covering the divorce of well-known politician Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (BTP/Ahok) from his ex-wife Veronica Tan, and this brought questions of extramarital affairs to the surface in the midst of a heated local election atmosphere. This situation was divisive, and received various public responses.*

*Previous studies have shown that scandals tend to negatively affect popular attitudes towards the politicians involved in them. In Indonesia, scandals have been common, widely recognised by the public, but their effects are never discussed in depth. Therefore, this study, which involved around 400 respondents, seeks to provide an overview of how the Indonesian public responds to politicians involved in scandals and how such scandals affect politicians' electability. The results of this study show that scandals do affect the public's political attitude, but not in the ways suggested by existing studies.*

***Keywords:*** *Scandal, Public Figure, Political attitude, Electability*

[1] Department of Communication Science, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada. Email: cendanisekar@gmail.com

[2] Department of Communication Science, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada. Email: psperbawani@ugm.ac.id

**Background**

For the Indonesian people, there is significant intersection between public figures and celebrities. Indonesians understand celebrities as public figures, rather than recognise them as playing different roles. Consequently, the boundaries between celebrities and public are increasingly blurred, especially outside the entertainment industry. At the same time, celebrities possess a certain degree of popularity that makes them highly regarded by the public and grants them many privileges.

Boorstin defines a celebrity as 'a person who is known for his well-knowness' (1967, in Ahmad, 2020). The appearance of celebrities is made possible by the social structure, and it can therefore be understood that celebrities and the public are interdependent entities. Sternheimer, meanwhile, defines celebrities as individuals who are watched, cared for, and known by strangers; such a broad concept is more readily applied to everyday life (in Stever, 2018, p. 12).

Choi and Berger (2009) state that, in the 21st century, celebrities' influence has extended far beyond the entertainment sector. This better reflects the current condition, wherein celebrities are considered of equal influence to public figures. In this context, celebrities and public figures enjoy power relations with their audiences, defined as an asymmetric relationship in which social actors have the ability to influence the decisions of other social actors according to their wishes, interests, and values (Castells, 2009: p. 10). In current global society, individuals are no longer influenced merely by science or history, but also by celebrities (Choi & Berger, 2009, p. 13). The situation wherein celebrities act as influencers two-pronged: aside from gathering followers, creating trends, and even leading opinions, there is an obligation to be responsible for the privileges of popularity.

On the global scale, celebrity culture in Indonesia itself is quite unique, due in part to the easy and instantaneous process of celebritisation. Every day, new faces are introduced to the public through entertainment programmes such as soap operas, talk shows, and infotainment. Celebrity status is achieved not only by those with talent and/or who have gone through rigorous auditions, but by anyone who goes through the process and ritual of media celebritisation (Driessen, 2013, p. 643).

The mass media still remains the largest force capable of bringing celebrities closer to the public. Infotainment programmes that cover celebrities and their behaviour are widely consumed in society, producing an infotainment industry rooted in the commodification of social activities and gossip (Pratiwi, 2014). This infotainment also functions as a means for creating discourse on the meaning of celebrity, providing a medium through which social agents can extend celebrities' power. This is in-line with Castells' argument that power is exercised through the discursive construction of meaning (2009, p. 10), which is—in this case—a task performed by the mass media.

Today, gossip has become a significant media commodity. For the public, gossip is tantamount to entertainment, and as such celebrities are often exposed to shameful and scandalous coverage in infotainment. Such scandals have extended to a certain class of politician, i.e., politicians who have been identified as public figures. Cashmore (2006, p. 210) writes that, as "readers

favored lifestyle stories, politics started to give way to lifestyle. [...] *USA Today* [for example, has begun] incorporating colorful graphics and relatively short (500-word) stories with lots of entertainment news and limited reporting on government or world politics."

Although the public figure concept has been widely studied in various fields, it actually originates from the legal sciences. Many sources refer to the concept offered by Gertz, who defines public figures as those who have assumed a particularly prominent role in society. "Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment" (1974, p. 345).

Gertz' thorough definition indicates that public figures share a key element: they are individuals who stand out among the community. This has implications for the comments and attention they receive. Schauer, in his article "Public Figure" (1984, p. 917), agrees that those classified as public figures are individuals with a certain effect on public inquiries, public policy, organisations, and social issues.

One thing that must be understood regarding the celebrity and public figure concepts is that, although these terms may seem similar, there are slight differences, particularly in terms of context. Turner (in Stever, 2018) reveals that the public often bears witness to the moments when public figures are transformed, or transform themselves, into celebrities. This may occur, for instance, when media coverage of their activities shifts from topics of public interest to those regarding their personal lives. Such expression actually proves, and at the same time helps us understand, that there is indeed a gap between identity as a public figure and as a celebrity.

The fact that the media has become the main driver of lifestyle coverage has had significant impact on politicians both within and without Indonesia, driving a "celebritisation" of such public figures. One example, which will be the focus of this research, is the divorce of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (henceforth BTP/Ahok) and Veronica Tan, which was transformed from a personal problem into one that drew the attention of the Indonesian people. This case began on 5 January 2018, when BTP (then in prison, after due to another case) filed a divorce suit against his wife Veronica Tan at the North Jakarta District Court (Liputan6.com, 2018). To date, the exact cause of their divorce is not known, but at the time the speculation was rampant. As this case occurred at a time when Indonesian political discourse was already oriented towards the ongoing regional elections, the public's attention was divided.

Fong and Wyer (2012) understand scandals as events, often related to the private lives of public figures or celebrities, that should not have occurred or been exposed. Such events are often manifested in behaviour that deviates from social norms and values, such as drug consumption, violence, deviant sexual behaviour. and so forth. According to Ekstrom and Johansson (2008, p. 72), scandals are not merely revealed, but shown, reported, staged, and kept alive day after day. In other words, scandals may be deemed newsworthy for a period of several days.

Allern and Pollack (2012, p. 14), discussing the scandal concept in greater

detail, identify one particular class of scandal: the political scandal, defined as a scandal that involves political institutions, processes, or decisions, or that involves active politicians in their political capacity. Political scandals can be measured using the indicators provided by Ruderman & Nevitte (2015) and Maier (2010). The first dimension is related to the characteristics of the scandal itself: (1) awareness, (2) political interests, (3) political knowledge, and (4) news media exposure. The second dimension, meanwhile, is related to how politicians are seen as individuals, or their personal characteristics, including (1) candidate evaluation and (2) integrity of politicians.

The problems surrounding public figures often arise in specific situations. A common one is when public figures who are considered 'role models' by the public behave in a manner deemed inappropriate. When such a public figure is involved in a scandal, the 'role model' status itself enters an automatic state of dysfunction. Various data and research have shown that scandals can negatively affect the public's attitudes towards the politicians involved (Carlson, Ganiel, & Hyde, 2000; von Sikorski & Knoll, 2018, in Alern, & von Sikorski, 2018, p. 3017).

The above situation can thus be taken as illustrating the beginning of a complex series of actions and reactions involving celebrities, public figures, and the Indonesian people (as audiences). The multitude of celebrities and public figures, which increases every day, has resulted in the rise of alternative news sources and decreased sensitivity amongst the Indonesian people. On infotainment programmes, such scandalous topics as infidelity, drug consumption, sexual harassment, and prostitution are commonly exposed.

Compared to other countries, Indonesian society is anomalous. Generally, celebrities and public figures experience de-celebrification after a scandal, which is described by Mortensen and Kristensen as "a grave loss of public image, status, and positive media visibility" (2020, p. 91) that emerges from the scandal's negative impact on the public's perceptions of celebrities and public figures. However, the Indonesian public seems to have become immune to coverage of public scandals. Even when such scandals are widely reported and highlighted by the media, cases eventually disappear like dust in the wind. When political figures are or have been involved in scandals, their electability does not appear to be affected. The simple explanation to such occurrence are explained by Littlejohn & Foss (2009, p. 57), who stated that individuals' responses are shaped by the events that occur in their environment. Responses may also occur where individuals are stimulated by an event, then receive a new stimulus. McQuail (2010, p. 555) similarly argues that individuals are only affected by the media if first exposed to its messages.

Ultimately, It turns out that not all scandals that befall public figures become career-destroying factors. There is an interesting dynamic, wherein scandals may sometimes serve to revitalise the waning popularity of a public figure who has been forgotten by the public. Reactions to scandals may fall into four categories: condemnation, indifference, resentment, and approval (Cashmore, 2006, p. 155). Of these, only approval indicates support for the public figures involved. Such approval is often unlikely, especially given that scandals are associated with negative acts

and deeds. In this study, the four responses mentioned above will be main considerations when determining the situation in Indonesia.

This article reports the results of research into audiences' response to scandals regarding public figures in Indonesia, where scandals have become commonplace and widely recognised, but rarely discussed in depth. This research focuses on BTP/Ahok as a public figure, rather than as a celebrity figure. Being the former Governor of DKI Jakarta, he is a politician, and thus meets the criteria suggested by Schauer (1984, p. 917). He has been perceived as having a certain effect on public questions, policies, organisations, and social issues, and also has his own audience group. This article also examines the role of Indonesian society, particularly those who identify themselves as "Ahokers", i.e., supporters of BTP, and thus as watchmen in a society surrounded by media products. This research is expected to provide a step towards further investigation of political scandals in Indonesia.

This article is expected to bridge the gap between theoretical reality and empirical reality in the study of public figures in an Indonesian socio-cultural background. It does so within the specific context of political figures, scandals, and audience responses.

## Research Method

In this study, an explanatory survey approach was used to produce broad knowledge using regular methods and procedures, as well as to objectively look at the correlational relationships between variables.

This study will combine the indicators from previous studies by Ruderman and Nevitte (2015) and Maier (2010), who identify two categories of indicators relevant to this study. The first category is related to the characteristics of the scandal itself: (1) awareness, (2) political interests, (3) political knowledge, and (4) news media exposure. The second dimension, meanwhile, is related to how politicians are seen as individuals, or their personal characteristics, including (1) candidate evaluation and (2) integrity of politicians.

At the same time, this study's concept of response is taken from Cashmore (2006). It involves four main categories, which can be used to measure audiences' attitudes in response to scandals related to public figures: (1) condemnation, (2) indifference, (3) resentment, and (4) approval. Public behaviour, as a manifestation of the influence of the scandal itself, will be seen from whether or not audiences were still willing to elect BTP/Ahok if he campaigned for a legislative seat.

Based on the above theories and concepts, the following table explains the variables and concepts operationalised in this research:

**Table 1. *Research Variables***

| No. | Variable | Dimension | Indicator |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | Political scandal (X) | Characteristics of scandal | a. Scandal Awareness<br>b. Political Interest |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | | c. Political Knowledge<br>d. News Media Exposure |
| | | Characteristics of politician | a. Candidate Evaluation<br>b. Integrity of Politician |
| 2. | Supporters' attitude and behaviour | Political attitude | a. Condemnation<br>b. Indifference<br>c. Resentment<br>d. Approval |
| | | Feedback | a. Would Vote<br>b. Would Not Vote |

*Source: Author*

The working hypotheses applied in this research are:

H0: The divorce scandal of BTP/Ahok and Veronica Tan does not have a significant influence on Ahokers' political attitude towards BTP/Ahok.

H1: The divorce scandal of BTP/Ahok and Veronica Tan has a significant influence on Ahokers' political attitude towards BTP/Ahok.

The population in this study is geographically demarcated and limited by age group. The research targeted active internet users, between 19 and 34 years of age, who are also active voters in Indonesia. A sample of 400 respondents was taken using nonprobability sampling. Questionnaires were distributed online, through the researchers' own networks, until the predetermined quota was reached.

## Results and Discussion

Based on collected data, respondents were predominantly women (n = 232), and most were between the ages of 19 and 23 (n = 193). Respondents were predominantly students and private sector employees (n = 152 for each). Based on their level of education, the majority of respondents had completed an undergraduate degree (n = 238). Most lived in the Java–Madura region.

Although the political world seems to be dominated by men, and is sometimes identified with masculinity, the majority of respondents in this study were money. This may be the result of the research subject, which deals with a scandal related to divorce. Such an issue tends to be closer to women, who are more likely to be exposed to coverage of such incidents in their everyday lives.

Audiences who identified themselves as supporters of BTP/Ahok were categorised as millennials and Generation Z. Most were between the ages of 19 and 23; at that age, respondents are dynamic individuals, and tend to be open to diverse sources of information. In addition, the spirit of critical thinking within this cohort

encourages members to obtain as much information as possible about a particular issue.

In the mean analysis of Variable X1, almost all responses returned a value of more than 3; only one in returned a value less than 2. The highest mean value was associated with the statement "I think that the political situation in Indonesia is important to know", with a mean value of 3.94. These high mean values show that respondents tended to approve of the statements in Variable X1, and thus understood the political scandal being discussed (i.e., the divorce of BTP/Ahok and Veronica Tan).

Scandals are characterised by four indicators: (1) scandal awareness, (2) political interest, (3) political knowledge, and (4) news media exposure. Of the four indicators, scandal awareness was highest, with an average score of 3.94. This shows that respondents agreed that it was important to remain aware of the political situation in Indonesia and accessing information from various media sources. Respondents also expressed knowledge regarding the development of the divorce scandal.

The next mean analysis investigated the characteristics of politicians, which this study uses to describe how audiences see politicians (in this case, BTP/Ahok) as individuals. This dimension involves two main indicators: (1) candidate evaluation and (2) integrity of politicians. These two indicators were translated into five statements, almost all of which received an average score of higher than four; this indicated that BTP/Ahok is perceived as having a high level of integrity. Furthermore, the mean value of responses to the statement "I liked the performance of BTP/Ahok when he served as a politician in Indonesia" (mean = 4.40) were the highest of all statements, indicating that the audiences perceived BTP/Ahok's political performance positively. Among the dependent variables, the highest mean value was achieved by the statement "I would vote for BTP/Ahok if he ran for legislature" (mean = 4.31), which indicates that respondents who identified themselves as supporters of BTP/Ahok would still support him in the future.

Next is the analysis of the mean for the dependent variables, which is used to assess the political attitudes and feedback. Responses were defined as involving the tangible aspects of understanding, judgment, influence, or rejection.

The political attitudes dimension was used to determine how audiences responded to the news about the divorce of BTP/Ahok and Veronica Tan. The highest average score (4.10) was returned for the statement "I will respect whatever choice BTP/Ahok and Veronica Tan make in their divorce case". This indicates that approval was the most prominent. On the other hand, respondents tended to disagree with the statement "I felt angry and hopeless when I saw/heard about the divorce of BTP/Ahok and Veronica Tan" (mean = 1.95). It may be concluded that audiences viewed the divorce scandal as something that deserved to be accepted, rather than criticised.

The feedback dimension describes audiences' behavioural responses, and is measured using two indicators: willingness to support and/or vote for BTP/Ahok if he were to run for legislature. Respondents generally agreed with the statements " I would support BTP/Ahok if he returned to politics" and "I would vote for BTP/Ahok if he ran for legislature" (mean = 4.26 and 4.31, respectively). This illustrates that the

majority of respondents who identified themselves as supporters of BTP/Ahok did not immediately retract their support due to the scandal over his divorce, and instead expressed support for his continued political career.

To ascertain whether a linear relationship exists between variables in this study, a Pearson correlation test was conducted. Variables are deemed correlated if the dependent variable changes when the independent variable changes. Such changes may be positive or negative; positive change occurs when variables change in the same direction, while negative change occurs when variables change in the opposite direction. Testing was conducted using independent and dependent variables, with the former being defined as the characteristics of the scandal and the characteristics of politicians, and the latter being defined as respondents' attitudes and supporting behaviour (measured using the political attitudes and feedback dimensions).

Through Pearson Correlation testing, strong correlation was found between the independent and dependent variables, returning a figure of 0.515. This shows that the independent variables influence changes in audiences' attitudes, as seen in the responses of "Ahokers". In the next few paragraphs, the results of Pearson correlation analysis will be discussed to ascertain which independent and dependent variables influence each other most.

**Table 2.** ***Results of Pearson Correlation Test***

**Correlations**

| | | **Condemnation** | **Indifference** | **Resentment** | **Approval** | **Would Vote** | **Would Not Vote** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Pearson Correlation** | Scandal Awareness | .186** | 0.077 | .262** | .310** | .288** | 0.058 |
| | Political Interest | 0.027 | .170** | .112* | .405** | .418** | 0.061 |
| | Political Knowledge | 0.049 | .216** | .160** | .470** | .461** | 0.085 |
| | News Media Exposure | 0.033 | .207** | .152** | .424** | .468** | 0.066 |
| | Candidate Evaluation | 0.040 | .356** | .170** | .604** | .825** | -0.044 |
| | Integrity of Politician | 0.084 | .381** | .205** | .615** | .788** | 0.036 |

*Source: Questionnaire*

From the above table, it may be seen that not all independent variables have a correlational relationship with dependent variables. From the table above, it may be

seen that correlation tends to vary. Variables' correlation ranges from negative to very strong. A very strong correlational relationship (n = 0.825) is evident between candidates' attributes and voter attitude, which shows that audiences tend to agree that BTP/Ahok has a positive character.

To ascertain the values in question, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted. Regression analysis is used to estimate the average and value of dependent variables based on the value of independent variables, thereby testing the hypothesis and predicting the average value of the independent variable (based on the values obtained).

Regression testing conducted using the independent variable "Political Scandal" and the dependent variable "Attitudes and Supporting Behaviours" returned an unstandardised coefficient value of 1.893. The regression coefficient value obtained is 0.366, which means that for every additional 1% increase in the scandal's influence, attitudes and supporting behaviour increase by 0.366. Because the value obtained is positive, the scandal can be said to have had a positive effect on supporters' attitudes and behaviour. Regression testing returned a significance of .000; as such, H1 is accepted and H0 is rejected. This indicates that the public figure's political scandal did influence the political attitudes and behaviour of audiences. Regression testing returned a percentage of 26.5%, showing the extent to which political scandals have influenced the attitudes and behaviours of BTP/Ahok supporters; the other 73.5% of supporting attitudes and behaviours are formed by other factors.

In addition to conducting various analytical tests of respondents' answers, crosstab analysis was conducted in order to see the relationships and tendencies between questions. The results can be seen in Table 3.

**Table 3.** ***Results of Crosstabulation Test***

| No. | Statement | Chi-square Table | Chi-square Statistic | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | I liked the performance of BTP/Ahok when he served as a politician in Indonesia * Have you ever written (opinion) related to Indonesian political issues on social media? | 12.592 | 15.049 | Correlated |
| 2 | I feel that BTP/Ahok succeeded in carrying out his work during his tenure as a politician * Have you ever written (opinion) related to Indonesian political issues on social media? | 12.592 | 15.049 | Correlated |
| 3 | I would support BTP/Ahok if he returned to politics * Have you ever written (opinion) related to Indonesian political issues on social media? | 5.991 | 7.606 | Correlated |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4 | I would vote for BTP/Ahok if he ran for legislature * Have you ever written (opinion) related to Indonesian political issues on social media? | 5.991 | 7.606 | Correlated |
| 5 | The negative news coverage of BTP/Ahok made me reluctant to re-elect him if he ran for legislature * Which factor is the most important consideration for a candidate of leader? | 5.991 | 6.496 | Correlated |
| 6 | I would rather entrust a representative position to a politician other than BTP/Ahok * Which factor is the most important consideration for a candidate of leader? | 5.991 | 6.496 | Correlated |
| 7 | The negative news coverage of BTP/Ahok made me reluctant to re-elect him if he ran for legislature * Are you participating in one of Ahok fanbase? | 5.991 | 8.044 | Correlated |

*Source: Questionnaire*

Based on Table 3, crosstabulation of the items "I liked the performance of BTP/Ahok when he served as a politician in Indonesia" and "I feel that BTP/Ahok succeeded in carrying out his work during his tenure as a politician" shows a correlation with politicians' integrity. Furthermore, examining respondents' opinions and social media posts, all items are found to be correlated. This can be seen from items 3, 4, 5, and 6. Finally, in item 7, cross-tabulation of the non-voting feedback dimensions and the item "The bad news about BTP/Ahok made me reluctant to re-elect him if he ran for legislature" indicates that these items are mutually correlated. Although the unselected feedback response has the lowest mean value (= 1.56), the chi-square value is quite high compared to the previous cross tabulation tests that also took response or feedback items.

Based on the results of the cross tabulation, a graph of the distribution of answers is provided in Figure 1. Based on Figure 1, it can be noted that 77.4% of respondents agreed that performance is an important factor, something that is required of leaders. Wealth and personal life, conversely, are not perceived by respondents as important factors in choosing leaders.

**Figure 1.** ***Candidate Evaluation and Important Factors in Choosing Political Leaders***




| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance | 66.7 | 42.9 | 77.4 | 82.6 | 84.5 |
| Wealth | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Individual Character/ Attitude | 33.3 | 57.1 | 21.0 | 17.4 | 15.1 |
| Personal Life | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.6 | 0.0 | 0.4 |

*Source: Questionnaire*

This study of a political scandal, as related to a public figure, has collected data from more than 400 respondents who identified themselves as supporters of BTP/Ahok. In this study, the researcher sought to identify how the scandal of BTP/Ahok and Veronica Tan's divorce influenced the political attitudes of audiences.

To explore this political scandal, the researchers used two dimensions: the scandal characteristics (scandal awareness, political interest, political knowledge, and news media exposure) as well as the characteristics of the involved politician (as measured by candidate evaluation and perceived integrity). Meanwhile, to measure audiences' attitudes and supporting behaviour as a form of response, the researchers used two dimensions: attitudes (categorised as condemnation, indifference, resentment, and approval) and feedback (decision to vote/not vote for the candidate). These attributes were processed to ascertain the link between the political scandal of public figures and the attitudes of supporters.

In brief, although the political world seems to be dominated by men and is sometimes identified with masculinity, in this study respondents were predominantly women. This may be the result of the research subject, which deals with a scandal related to divorce. Such an issue tends to be closer to women, who are more likely to be exposed to coverage of such incidents in their everyday lives.

Audiences who identified themselves as supporters of BTP/Ahok were categorised as millennials and Generation Z. Most were between the ages of 19 and 23; at that age, respondents are dynamic individuals, and tend to be open to diverse sources of information. In addition, the spirit of critical thinking within this cohort encourages members to obtain as much information as possible about a particular issue.

Analysis indicated that the integrity of the politician, as represented by the statement "I liked the performance of BTP/Ahok when he served as a politician in Indonesia", achieved the highest mean score of all independent variables (4.40). This indicates that audience response to BTP/Ahok's performance during his tenure as a politician was positive. Meanwhile, of the dependent variables, the highest mean value (4.31) was returned for the statement "I would vote for BTP/Ahok if he returned to politics", which represents the feedback dimension. This relatively high figure illustrates that respondents who identified themselves as supporters of BTP/Ahok would still approve of a political career for him.

To measure the direction of the linear relationship between this study's variables, Pearson correlation testing was conducted. It was found that the independent and dependent variables in this study are 'strongly' correlated, with a value of 0.515. A very strong correlational relationship occurs between candidate evaluation attributes and voting attitudes, showing that audiences tend to agree with the positive characteristics and attitudes exhibited BTP/Ahok.

Based on these correlation value, a regression test was conducted to ascertain the influence of variables and test the hypotheses revealed in chapter one. Regression testing returned a significance of .000; as such, H1 is accepted and H0 is rejected. This indicates that the public figure's political scandal did influence the political attitudes and behaviour of audiences. Regression testing returned a percentage of 26.5%, showing the extent to which political scandals have influenced the attitudes and behaviours of BTP/Ahok supporters; the other 73.5% of supporting attitudes and behaviours are formed by other factors.

In addition to conducting various analyses of the answers given by respondents, , crosstab analysis was conducted in order to see the relationships and tendencies between questions. During these various crosstabulation analysis, three combinations returned particularly interesting results: Political Characteristics and Important Factors for Consideration in Choosing Prospective Leaders, Feedback and Opinions on Social Media, and Non-Voting Feedback and Participation in Fanbase.

The most interesting result of crosstabulation is returned for the Characteristics of Politicians and Important Factors for Consideration in Choosing Prospective Leaders; of the five items tested, three were deemed uncorrelated. This shows that the factors of wealth and personal life are not considered important. In addition, the graph shows that 77.4% of voters agreed that performance is an important factor in leadership selection.

From these results, it may be concluded that political scandals can affect audience attitudes. This study applies four categories for understanding audiences' responses to scandals involving public figures: (1) condemnation, (2) indifference, (3) resentment, and (4) approval. Overall, however, it finds that coverage of the scandal did not have much of a negative influence on research participants' political attitudes.

## Conclusion

This study examined audience responses to political scandal involving the public figure BTP/Ahok. Interestingly, analysis of the data generated found that

the scandal showed a positive trend in the formation audience attitudes. In that sense, the presence of the scandal made audiences (who were already supporters) firmer in their support; this differs from previous studies, which found that scandals can detrimentally affect, and even end, the careers of public figures. This supports the assumption that Indonesian society's response to scandals is anomalous. The results indicated that the divorce scandal was not simply neutral, but beneficial to the public perception of BTP/Ahok and this public figure's political power. Audiences' responses are very much in line with Castells' argument about power and the public.

Studies related to scandals in Indonesia, and even internationally, remain scarce. As previously discussed, the role of public figures in Indonesia has been somewhat refracted due to the community's process of "celebrating". As such, it would be understandable if this article contained biased answers from respondents. Moreover, the use of the internet for the survey may have skewed the demographic and geographic factors.

The explanatory survey method used in this study has not been able to achieve a deeper understanding of the ins and outs of Indonesian audiences' political attitudes and reasons for such. The method used in this research was only able to reveal information regarding scandals and their effects on the public. In order to achieve a deeper understanding, new theories about scandal and audience attitudes can incorporate ethnographic methods so that research results specifically regarding audiences' political attitudes can be obtained.

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# Contesting Welfare Discourses in Post-New Order Indonesia[1]

Dimpos Manalu[2]

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**Abstract**

*This article analyses the contestation of 'welfare' discourses in Indonesia since the fall of the New Order, employing the discourse theory offered by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in their Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (2001 [1985]). Its main argument is that welfare is an "empty signifier", the meaning of which may shift or change as a consequence of the unfinished discursive contestations of various subject positions. This article identifies four central discourses, or master signifiers, between 1998 and 2015 that serve as "nodal points" in the hegemonisation of welfare: "Social Safety Net", "Creative Innovation" versus "Electoral Strategy", "Sustainable Development", and "Right of the People and Constitutional Obligation of the State". The dominant and hegemonic meaning of welfare, understood here as a "nodal point", is only temporary; it is partially fixed, while at the same time experiencing ongoing discursive contestation. It is, is being, and will be subjected to unending dislocation.*

**Keywords:** *discourse, nodal point, hegemony, articulation, welfare*

## Introduction

Welfare, as seen through the analytical lens of Laclau and Mouffe (2001 [1985]), is an empty signifier that continuously experiences transformation and dislocation. It is never fixed, final, or complete, but rather undecidable and unfixed, being continuously contested by all involved actors. It is a signifier created through the intersection and relational combination of various signifiers, which are given a partially fixed yet dominant and hegemonic meaning. This meaning is continuously challenged and contested, and as such it is continuously and incessantly redefined.

Simply put, these thinkers explain how discursive social practices can systematically transform the identities of subjects and objects through articulation—the process through which connections are established between signifiers to create

[1] The majority of this article is adapted from a chapter in the author's dissertation, "Demokrasi sebagai Proyek Hegemoni: Wacana Politik Indonesia Pasca-Orde Baru 1998-2015" (Doctorate Programme in Political Sciences, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, 2019).

[2] Teaching staff, Master of Public Administration Programme, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas HKBP Nommensen, Medan.

meaning. Discourse, meanwhile, is the result of 'all articulation processes', the totality of meaning within a certain time frame. The signifiers that emerge within articulation may be identified as "moments", while those floating signifiers that are not discursively articulated are known as "elements". Depending on the articulation, any signifier may transform into a "moment" or an "element".

Subjects and objects may only receive such a partially fixed significance where nodal points exist. Such nodal points are special discourses that organise other discourses into a particular identity framework. As explained previously, this process is possible because the identity articulated is an empty signifier. It exists and does not exist simultaneously; it exists, because it is the subject of discursive contestation, and yet it does not exist, as it has never been permanently fixed.

In this context, discourse analysis serves to narrate how meaning is contested and created at every level of society or map the contestations through which signs are fixed, with this process being considered natural. In other words, discourse theory is interested in analysing how structures, in this case discourses, are created and transformed.[3]

In other words, as Andersen (2003) writes, the concept of discourse analysis offered by Laclau and Mouffe seeks to explore matters of hegemony and supremacy in society. It does not investigate the individual contestations through which individuals fix meaning, but rather the hegemonic relations in society and conditions that shape hegemony.[4] As such, Laclau and Mouffe seek to understand the social practices through which discourses are articulated and contested to create social reality.[5]

Departing from the discussion above, this article seeks to identify the nodal points through which the meaning of welfare is fixed through hegemonic intervention. Meaning is created through specific nodal points, within a specific period. In this case, these nodal points are "Social Safety Net", "Creative Innovation" vs. "Electoral Strategy", "Sustainable Development", and "Right of the People and Constitutional Obligation of the State". These nodal points bind a number of discourses, or moments, as well as unarticulated signifiers (floating signifiers) that seek to become moments in various discursive fields.

In this study, analysis is conducted through the following stages: *first*, it identifies a number of nodal points within Indonesian welfare discourse since the fall of the New Order. These nodal points were identified through a comprehensive study of the literature, which offered a means of comprehensively understanding the changing meaning of welfare between 1998 and 2015. The dominant signifiers were identified in order to identify the "partially-fixed meaning" that may be considered "representative" of welfare and its understanding.

*Second*, recognising that nodal points are produced through the fixation or hegemonisation of floating *signifier*s, albeit not final or decidable, this article acknowledges that signifiers are partially-fixed meaning that are continuously

[3] Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 24–26, 30.

[4] Andersen, 2003: 55.

[5] Howard, Norval, & Stavrakakis, 2000: 3.

contested by various subject positions. As such, this article seeks to identify the positions of the subjects involved in this contestation and in the creation of meaning.

*Third*, regarding these subjects' positions, it is necessary to identify and map the organisations, individuals, and political actors involved. This shows that the subject positions are inexorably linked to the political actors involved in the discursive contestation of meaning.

Following the perspective of Laclau and Mouffe, social categories should not be identified using traditional metrics, such as organisational and political affiliation (involvement in political parties, movements, etc.). Although these metrics are beneficial for actor analysis, social categories should be created based on their demands and the articulation of these demands within the logic of difference and the logic of equivalence. These demands are, in the classical text *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, identified as moments.[6]

This article will also show that welfare programmes are inexorably connected to, if not determined by, the extent to which political actors interact and establish relations with others over time. As they contest meaning, they signify welfare in accordance with their own perspectives and interests, even as they attempt to include others in a chain of equivalence. In other words, welfare programmes are subject to diverse actors' efforts to assert their own interests, as well as contemporary specific social, economic, political, and power dynamics.[7] As such, welfare discourses cannot be separated from the political economy and the dominant economic system.[8]

## Welfare: An Enduring Political Project

Before dealing with Reform-era Indonesia, it is necessary to first examine the history of welfare, including its articulation, in the Indonesian political and economic system. It is an arena, wherein domination and hegemony are subjected to unending contestation.

During the Indonesian National Revolution, welfare was not only demanded by Marxists, but also articulated by Nationalists and Islamists. Although all three shared a desire for welfare, they articulated it in different ways. For instance, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama—Indonesia's two largest Islamic organisations—clearly emphasised welfare discourses in their organisational visions. Given the widespread demand to stop the Indonesian people from being 'sucked dry' by the forces of capitalism and colonialism, it is thus not surprising that welfare principles were subsequently ensconced within the 1945 Constitution. This is particularly evident in Article 33 of the Constitution, which expresses that the Indonesian economy should be shaped, organised, and controlled by the State; and that the Indonesian government must not

[6] "The first path is to split the unity of the group into smaller unities that we have called **demands**: the unity of the group is, in my view, the result of an articulation of demands." See Laclau, 2007 (2005): ix–x, particularly Chapter 4. Compare with Laclau & Mouffe, 2001 (1985): 105: "The differential positions, insofar as they appear articulated within a discourse, we will call **moments**."—author's emphasis.

[7] Mas'udi & Lay, 2018: 287.

[8] Swasono, 2010: 48.

"allow it to be self-regulating, or surrender control to the free market". In the context of social welfare, Article 33 identifies the achievement of "economic democracy" as the State's main goal, with economic activities being used to achieve national welfare.[9]

Efforts to achieve the lofty goals of Article 33, however, have not been simple. In nascent Indonesia, the national economy was controlled by foreign corporations, and this has remained true (albeit with several modifications) even today. Market mechanisms have driven investment and enabled state-owned and private corporations (national/international) to gain control of the economy, even as cooperatives—the sort of democratic institutions mandated by the constitution—have been marginalised. Welfare has not become an integral part of the economic system, but been reduced to an altruistic and philanthropist goal[10] for the State and for private corporations.

Even in the early years of Indonesia's independence, however, there existed contestation between "pragmatists" or "administrators" and "ideologues" or "solidarity makers". Both sought welfare, and both had socialist tendencies, but the former (led and represented by Hatta) tended to be more accepting of a market economy and foreign corporations, while the latter (led and represented by Sukarno) tended to reject foreign corporations and emphasise the need for Indonesia's economic sovereignty. The first, although in a hegemonic position, made several concessions to the latter by nationalising several important Dutch companies (the "Big Five").[11] Similar contestations existed in the New Order era, this time involving three main economic discourses: pro-market, nationalist-bureaucrats , and economic populist (read: the Pancasila economy). Throughout the New Order, a liberal economic paradigm was articulated as hegemonic, even as it accommodated the demands of the other discourses by including 'indigenous' entrepreneurs in national development and seeking to achieve economic equality.[12]

In 1997/1998, the Southeast Asian economic crisis sent the New Order's much-praised economy into shambles. This crisis, in turn, undermined the power of President Soeharto even as it invigorated demands for political reform. Welfare discourses were subsequently reignited, with its meaning contested by various parties. Welfare again became an “empty signifier”, one that even today remains an arena for the contestation of dominance and hegemony. How has this contestation occurred?

## "Welfare" as a Nodal Point

If we were to examine the political discourse of democracy on a grand scale—something outside the scope of this article[13]—we would recognise that welfare discourses were not non-existent before Indonesia's political reform, but were nonetheless limited to specific demands within a specific discursive field. The dominance of political freedom discourses

[9] Swasono, 2010: 49, 67, 75.

[10] Swasono, 2010: 113-114.

[11] Higgins in Wie (ed.), 2005; Soesastro & Budiman, 2005.

[12] Chalmers & Hadiz, 1997; Mallarangeng, 2002; Wie, 2005; Boediono, 2016.

[13] For further discussion, see Manalu, 2019.

was evident, for example, in the "ten demands of the people" (popularly known as *Sepultura*) that were voiced by student activists in Java in the late 1990s. Approximately one decade later, calls emerged again, this time voiced by labourers and by populist actors who sought improved purchasing power, guaranteed pensions, health insurance, twelve years of compulsory education, and inexpensive housing.[14] Indonesia witnessed a shift in its hegemony, from political freedom to welfare, with the above-mentioned demands its moments. In the following sections, we will explore the dislocation and contestation of discourses during this shift.

### *Debate Regarding the Amendment of Article 33: "Popular Economics" versus "Market Fundamentalism"*

One major reform agenda undertaken by People's Representative Council/People's Consultative Assembly after the 1999 election was the amendment of the 1945 Constitution. There was a strong push for the constitution to be democratised, as for thirty-two years it had been used to "legitimise" the authoritarian powers of the executive branch (particularly the president). Over time, as the demands and articulations of actors in various sectors increased, the scope of these amendments was expanded to include not only political power (in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches) and human rights (as manifestations of political freedom and good governance), but also matters of welfare and economics.

Many have discussed the dynamic processes through which the 1945 Constitution was amended, as well as the numerous controversies that emerged.[15] In brief, to assist the Working Body of the People's Consultative Assembly in drafting constitutional amendments, through TAP IX/MPR/2000 several groups of experts advisors were appointed: the Political Group (led by Nazaruddin Syamsudin), the Society and Culture Group (led by Komaruddin Hidayat), the Legal Group (led by Sri Soemantri), and the Economic Group (led by Mubyarto). Acting as coordinator was Isma'il Suny.[16]

In this article, only one important aspect will be discussed: the dynamics of the amendments related to economic and welfare matters (Chapter VIII and XIV), including the discursive contestations revolving around these matters. Particularly important is Article 33, which—as mentioned above—is crucial owing to its regulation of economic systems, resource management, and the actors involved therein. This article was discussed by the Ad Hoc Committee I of the Work Unit, People's Consultative Assembly, which consisted of seven experts: Prof Mubyarto (chair), Prof Dawan Rahardjo, Prof Bambang Sudibyo, Prof Didik J. Rachbini, Dr Sjahrir, Dr Sri Adiningsih, and Dr Sri Mulyani Indrawati.

These economists were polarised, not along pro- and anti-welfare lines, but rather based on their understanding of

[14] See, for example, Hiariej, 2017.

[15] See Mubyarto, 2001; Indrayana, 2007; Fatwa, 2009; Hardjono, 2009; Asshiddiqie, 2010; Swasono, 2010.

[16] Asshiddiqie, 2010: 251.

welfare itself (as informed by the interests they represented). The first faction sought to maintain Article 33, without any changes; members perceived it as not only relevant to Indonesia's contemporary challenges, but also as manifesting the desire to create economic sovereignty while warding off colonialism. For these economists, the economic crisis of 1997/1998 was irrefutable proof that the nation had abandoned the spirit of Article 33 in favour of capitalism. It was the small and medium enterprises that ultimately provided the nation with a necessary safety net. Members of this faction, the "Popular Economists", included Prof Mubyarto and Prof Dawam Rahardjo.[17]

Members of the second faction, meanwhile, held that Article 33 required revision—if not total transformation—to ensure it remained relevant to contemporary challenges. The spirit of socialism embedded in this article was perceived as no longer relevant to Indonesia, especially since the countries that employed such an ideology (such as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China) had begun implementing a market economy. Change was necessary, they argued, to ensure that Indonesia was economically competitive and sustainable—both of which were foundational for public welfare. This article was deemed "outdated", incapable of anticipating the demands of the times and guiding the nation in a rapidly expanding global market economy. Article 33 was perceived as "handicapped", lacking legal certainty and potentially ambiguous. As evidence, they referred to the "principles of the family system" (*asas kekeluargaan*), which had been abused by the New Order regime to monopolise the market while advancing cronyism and dynastic interests.[18] Unlike members of the first faction, these reform-minded economists viewed Article 33 as a burden for the Indonesian people, an obstacle to the achievement of justice and prosperity. We may refer to this faction, which consisted of all members save Mubyarto and Dawam Rahardjo, as "Market Fundamentalists". It must be emphasised that these economists were not anti-welfare, but believed that welfare would be best achieved through market mechanisms.

Given these differences, it is not surprising that team members engaged in heated debates during their seven meetings, held between 19 March and 16 May 2001. Although from the beginning they had "agreed agree to disagree", a deadlock was unavoidable.[19] These differences of opinion were so severe that, ultimately, Prof Mubyarto and Prof Dawam Rahardjo resigned, citing a lack of support for the continued maintenance of Article 33. Before the 2002 General Meeting of the People's Consultative Assembly, Mubyarto announced: "As I, together with Prof Dawam Rahardjo, truly disagree with the dismantling of Article 33 … we realise that

[17] At the time, the term *status quo* was used to identify the position taken by those seeking to maintain Article 33, while those who sought to amend it were deemed *reformists*. Such terminology was most common among the latter group (see Mubyarto, 2001: 178).

[18] Adiningsih, 2001: 68–85.

[19] It was ultimately decided to submit two versions to Ad Hoc Committee I, Work Unit, People's Consultative Assembly.

our position on the Team of Experts is no longer appropriate."[20]

As touched upon above, behind these debates were the sharply different (if not mutually opposed) economic discourses promoted by members. These discourses had deep historical roots. In the Sukarno–Hatta Era, from 1945 to 1965, economic-minded administrators were positioned vis-à-vis history-minded solidarity makers, united only in their shared opposition to colonialism. Under President Soeharto, from 1966 to 1998, economic actors and their discourses fell into three categories: capitalistic technocrats, nationalist bureaucrats, and economic populists (promoting a "Pancasila Economy"). All three worked in conjunction, united by their disapproval of the economic policies implemented by the previous regime (particularly the Guided Democracy and Guided Economy implemented by Sukarno between 1959 and 1965). During the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, finally, economists fell into two main factions: those oriented more to a populist economy (the "Pancasila Economy") and those technocrats oriented towards capitalism. These actors were united solely in their shared disapproval of the New Order economy and its rampant corruption, collusion, and nepotism.

Let us next turn to the demands and positions undertaken by these factions in their discussion of the 1945 Constitution. Both discourses were hotly contested, and each had its own followers. The Pancasila Economy discourse was supported by a minority of economists and activists, including student and youth activists.[21] The Market Fundamentalism discourse, conversely, was supported by the Association of Indonesian Economists (ISEI); the largest such association in Indonesia, its members were predominantly pro-market. Market mechanisms were also promoted by the National Economic Council (Dewan Ekonomi Nasional, DEN), albeit with one provision: these mechanisms needed to be balanced by an institution designed to empower small-and-medium enterprises as well as cooperatives. It may be seen, thus, that DEN sought to hegemonise welfare discourse by embracing something that had traditionally been promoted by its opponents.

In its 1996 congress, ISEI formulated the Managed Market Economy Concept (*Konsep Ekonomi Pasar Terkelola*, KEPT), which it subsequently promoted through various activities. ISEI emphasised the importance of expanding the private sector, thereby increasing the competitiveness of the Indonesian market and its actors (both individuals and institutions). All economic actors must work towards realising a healthy, fair, and proportional economy. Competition, as facilitated by market mechanisms, will only increase efficiency (*pareto optimum*); this, in turn, will benefit both producers and consumers. However, ISEI recognised that market forces would not be capable of providing public goods and services, improving security, and promoting equity, on their own; government involvement was thus necessary. In other words, ISEI promoted a system wherein market mechanisms were forefronted, but still managed and controlled by the

[20] See the letter of resignation included in Mubyarto, 2001: 177–179; *Kompas*, 25 May 2001.

[21] Chalmers & Hadiz, 1997.

government.[22] DEN, established by the Abdurrahman Wahid government, sought to accommodate a broader range of demands and interests. On the one hand, this institution was a staunch proponent of market mechanisms. On the other hand, it recognised the importance of small-and-medium enterprises and cooperatives, as well as the need to provide a safety net to overcome the deleterious effects of market forces.

In their views regarding market mechanisms, ISEI and DEN shared several similarities. Both desired a climate wherein competition could be undertaken freely, healthily, and transparently, while simultaneously offering a means of attracting investments and integrating Indonesia's economy into the global market. For DEN, "market mechanisms should be the main ones, not the only ones; these market mechanisms should be complemented by other institutions capable of mitigating their negative social consequences". As such, DEN asserted the importance of providing Indonesians with economic empowerment, as realised through rural development and poverty eradication programmes. It argued that small-and-medium enterprises, as well as cooperatives, should be supported through partnerships with state-owned enterprises, the integration of alternative financial institutions into the banking system, and to improve the quality of Indonesia's human resources; only then could small-and-medium enterprises become the main actors in the national economy.[23] Such efforts to accommodate a range of welfare discourses may, applying the arguments of Laclau and Mouffe, be seen as acts of hegemonisation.

Similar hegemonisation was undertaken by DEN's opponents. For Mubyarto, the main issue was not "market mechanisms" as foundational components of the economic system, but rather the "economic system" itself. Citing Paul Samuelson, Mubyarto argued that "the political economy (Economics) is about economic systems, not about economists."[24] He asserted that the economic system outlined by Article 33 was neither a non-market (centralized) economy nor a capitalistic market economy, but rather a "socialist market economy".[25] Whereas liberalism and neo-liberalism originate from Western tradition, "the Indonesian economic ideology is one of equality and balance between (market) mechanisms and state control/management in resource allocation, as permitted by law". As such, a welfare state may only be achieved through a populist economy, which must be distinguished from socialism.[26]

Mubyarto noted that market mechanisms had emerged around the world, providing evidence that "markets" must not be equated with "capitalism". Germany and Scandinavia, for instance, developed social market economies; the People's Republic of China advocated market socialism; and Japan promoted humanistic capitalism. Based on these arguments, it may be understood that

[22] Association of Indonesian Economists (Ikatan Sarjana Ekonomi Indonesia, ISEI), 1996: 45–60.

[23] National Economic Council (Dewan Ekonomi Nasional, DEN), 2000: 118–130.

[24] Mubyarto, 2001: 9–12.

[25] Mubyarto, 2001: 5, it is sometimes identified as a "populist market economy".

[26] Mubyarto, 2001: 33–40.

Mubyarto's argument against the revision of Article 33 emphasised the article's continued relevance for contemporary Indonesia. Rather than revise Article 33, he underscored the importance of improving the public's understanding of its content. In other words, Mubyarto sought to ensure that market forces were controlled, even as other demands were accommodated. Another staunch opponent of the revision of Article 33 was Sri Edi Swasono, a senior economist who was the son-in-law of Mohammad Hatta (who had formulated the article). Although he was not team member, he was a member of the People's Consultative Assembly (representing experts).[27]

Further efforts to incorporate diverse interests were undertaken by Mubyarto's compatriot, Dawam Raharjo. In a mass media article regarding the ongoing controversy, Dawam voiced his support for maintaining Article 33. Any revision, he urged, should come from the addition of new elucidatory paragraphs. To realise that its goals were realised, Article 33 required the support of a social market oriented towards realising sustainable development (including environmental conservation). In this manner, he argued, Article 33 could provide a "middle road"—a "democratic economy"—capable of supporting the Indonesian people.[28]

As a consequence of this "democratic economy", Dawam argued, state-owned enterprises must be maintained, and cooperatives must be developed into small-and-medium enterprises. The private sector, he argued, would be best positioned as a tertiary actor, or recognised as existing at the same level as the aforementioned institutions; in this manner, all could develop equally. No less important, he emphasised, was recognising the importance of labourers, peasants, and consumers as economic actors, in accordance with the principles of the family system. Meanwhile, the state (acting simultaneously as an actor and as a regulator) must be guided and controlled by parliament. State intervention is permissible in fiscal policy, he wrote, where its influence was indirect. Such intervention should be oriented towards ensuring equitable development that accommodates smaller and less developed sectors, but avoid creating distortion.

Referring to Anthony Giddens' *The Third Way*, which was popular at the time, Dawam argued that it was inopportune to challenge market mechanisms and globalisation, and claimed that socialism's greatest weakness was its failure to recognise the power of the market. He wrote:

"Nonetheless, we must follow Gidden's concepts, which accommodate change. First, Indonesia must embrace an open economy and navigate the currents globalisation. Cooperatives, for instance, must act as global/world class actors. Second, both the state sector and cooperative sector must work using competitive market mechanisms. As such, both state-owned enterprises and cooperatives must be professionalised. Through professionalisation, state-owned enterprises and cooperatives will gain opportunities equal to those available to the private sector; after all, the private sector's success comes from its

[27] Asshiddiqie, 2010: 254; M. Dawam Rahardjo, *Kompas*, 3 June 2001.

[28] M. Dawam Rahardjo, *Kompas*, 3 June 2001.

professionalism. … At the same time, the Constitution must block the rise of monopolies, trusts, and cartels, and its prohibitions must apply to private enterprises, cooperatives, and state-owned enterprises. All have the opportunity to establish a conglomerate, within the limits of the Anti-Monopoly Law".[29]

The "Populist Economy" received the backing of a number of social scientists and activists.[30] While promoting public welfare and criticising capitalism, they advocated the "middle road" approach that was dominating Western politico-economic discourses.[31] Indonesian social scientists and economists also borrowed from Giddens' thought,[32] deeming it necessary to create a balance between communities, the state, and the market.[33] Although they had begun elaborating upon Giddens' ideas, their explorations were limited and had yet to influence policymakers. Ideally, it would have been best for the Ad Hoc Committee to pursue this "middle road", rather than defend their own views to the point of deadlock.

"It is naïve to think that [we can avoid] using a market system in our economic activities. At the same time, it is naïve to entrust all elements of the economy to the market system. The same goes for the state and the community (in this case, cooperatives). In the current stage of history, it is urgently necessary to achieve balance between the public and community sectors, and in this the state must play a certain role," wrote B. Herry Priyono.[34]

In brief, the debate over maintaining or amending Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, which was viewed as manifesting the tensions between the conservative older generation that supported the status quo and the reform-minded younger generation, was one between two paradigms: "Popular Economics" versus "Market Fundamentalism". The former argued that market mechanisms were biased towards the interests of capitalist elites, and thus the root of poverty and inequality; the latter, conversely, argued that a market system could be fair and just so long as welfare distribution systems were undistorted.

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[29] *Kompas*, 13 June 2001.

[30] See, among others, Francis Wahono, *Kompas*, 9 June 2001; I. Wibowo, *Kompas*, 11 June 2001; M. Dawam Rahardjo, *Kompas*, 13 June 2001; B. Herry Priyono, *Kompas*, 5 July 2001; Anwari WMK, *Kompas*, 10 July 2001; Idham Samudra Bey, *Kompas*, 18 September 2001.

[31] Giddens, 1999.

[32] To spread the thought of Anthony Giddens, a sociologist and the director of the London School of Economics, the Kompas-Gramedia Group has not only translated his works but also sponsored a discussion on the actualisation of the 'Third Way', which included a number of domestic historians. A summary of the discussion was presented in three articles in *Kompas*, 19 March 1999. At the beginning of the following year, *Basis*—an influential Yogyakarta-based philosophy magazine—published a special edition on Giddens and his work (No. 01–02, Vol. 49, January/February 2000). See also Priyono, 2000; and Wibowo, 2000.

[33] Giddens (1999: 115) identifies it as the "new mixed economy". He writes that the new mixed economy looks instead for a synergy between public and private sectors, utilising the dynamism of markets but with the public interest in mind. It involves a balance between regulation and deregulation, on a transnational as well as national and local levels, and a balance between the economic and the non-economic in the life of the society.

[34] *Kompas*, 5 July 2001.

In the midst of this debate, hegemonisation efforts emerged from DEN and Dawam Raharjo, both of whom attempted to accommodate a broad range of demands into their welfare discourses. They sought to follow "the third road", borrowing the terminology offered by Giddens. Such terminology may be accepted, so long as the third road is understood as a hegemonisation project, one that recognises welfare as an empty signifier, something that only holds meaning within a certain timeframe. In Giddens' conceptual framework, conversely, the "third road" is not hegemonisation, nor is it intended to maintain the dominance of empty signifiers. The "third road" is often framed as the best and final solution, or even a new "messiah" that will end the reign of the "empty".

Furthermore, both sought to transform the Indonesian economy and distance it from the corruption, collusion, and nepotism of the New Order era. Ultimately, their debate produced a minor change to Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution. The "socialist" spirit of this article was maintained at the conceptual level, but positioned within a hegemonic framework dominated by the market. This had significant implications for welfare programmes, which remain evident even today.[35] This will be discussed in further detail in the following section.

### *Welfare Programmes and the Subject Positions*

As shown above, the debate between the populist economy and market economy had significant implications for welfare programmes. Over time, it was evident that neither discourse was capable of accommodating welfare demands. In the following section, the author will explore the development of the welfare discourse, with a specific focus on the diverse moments involved.

As mentioned above, Indonesia's political landscape changed following the fall of the New Order regime. After 32 years of repression, new articulations rose to the surface, and thus a range of subject positions began reinterpreting and re-signifying welfare. These actors fell into three broad categories: government actors (both at the national and local level), international development agents, and activists. Central and local government actors understood welfare as encompassing the provision of social assistance and the payment of due compensation to individuals detrimentally affected by government programmes. At the same time, they used welfare programmes to accumulate public support, thereby reaping significant electoral benefits. International and multilateral development agencies, meanwhile, understood welfare as an instrument of political and economic liberalisation. Finally, civil society actors viewed welfare as a right, a constitutional obligation of the Indonesian state.

Even as the Reform-era government began implementing an increasingly free

[35] "With the amendments, no fewer than four, the Indonesian economy transformed into a social market economy. Personal ownership rights, as well as other individual rights, as well as efficiency—a pillar of the market economy—were ensconced in the Constitution. As such, it may be said that the principles of capitalism began to be recognised, but at the same time Indonesian society and economics was evident, as seen in various articles and paragraphs." See Adiningsih, 2005: 26.

(liberal) and democratic political system, it inherited a significant economic crisis. It took six years, from 1998 to 2004, for the Indonesian economy to recover from the Southeast Asian economic crisis; this recovery time, longer than that of neighbouring nations, may be attributed in part to its ongoing political crises.[36] Four years later, however, Indonesia was struck by another recession, part of a global economic crisis that was triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the United States. Recovery was quicker, and Indonesia had begun consolidating its exports by 2010.[37]

### *Welfare as a "Social Safety Net" and Welfare as "Social Assistance"*

In the early Reform era, two discourses dominated welfare discourse: welfare as a social safety net and welfare as a social assistance programme. Welfare, rather than being recognised as a constitutionally protected 'social right' (as argued by Swasono above), was reduced to the "kindness of the state". Take, for example, the key words "safety" and "assistance" mentioned above. Both suggest that social welfare programmes are "curative", being "medicine" made available to "victims" by the government or by another stakeholder. This paradigm emerged during the economic crisis of 1997/1998, and maintained prominent throughout the ten years of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's presidency (2004–2014).

As mentioned above, in 1997/1998, Indonesia experienced a major monetary crisis, and this ultimately produced an economic crisis in the real sector. To mitigate the deleterious effects of this crisis, the government implemented programmes that subsidised foodstuffs and provided a social safety net for Indonesia's poor. At its peak, the programme—known simply as the "Social Safety Net" (Jaringan Pengaman Sosial, JPN)—covered 8.7 million households (approximately 39.15 million individuals). This safety net was maintained for several years. In 2001, the programme's fourth year, it had a budget of Rp 2.2 trillion, with Rp 279.9 milliard (12.7%) allocated for rice subsidies.[38] The government also designed a District Development Programme (Program Pengembangan Kecamatan, PPK), wherein competitive grants were offered to thousands of villages throughout the Indonesian Archipelago. Most of these funds originated from World Bank loans or similar sources.

At the time, these programmes were criticised as temporary and unsustainable stopgap measures. Exacerbating the issue, corruption was rampant, Beneficiaries were poorly identified, and the number of poor was often manipulated. The programme was also criticised as failing to fully develop the potential and social capital of its recipients, instead trapping the poor in a cycle of dependency. Although presented as seeking to realise social empowerment, the programme was nonetheless created through a top-down and elitist process. It was even suspected that the programme was designed primarily to benefit President BJ Habibie and his Golkar Party, which was contesting the 1999 elections.[39]

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[36] Boediono, 2016: 217.

[37] Malarangeng, 2002; Boediono, 2016.

[38] Mubyarto, *Kompas*, 3 July 2001.

[39] http://staff.ui.ac.id/system/files/users/gumila

At the same time, the JPS programme—particularly its rice subsidies—limited farmers' purchasing power. Because the government had important vast amounts of rice during the economic crisis while simultaneously receiving grants from donor agencies, the price of processed and unprocessed rice plummeted. This was highly detrimental to farmers, who at the time constituted a majority of the Indonesian workforce. Even afterwards, when El Nino had concluded and domestic production had increased, rice imports continued; they had proven highly profitable to the elites involved. Faced with ongoing criticism, the government was urged to end the JPS programme and replace it with one oriented towards sustainable empowerment and poverty eradication (be it through the Presidential Instruction on Neglected Villages or another policy).[40] Important to note is that criticism focused not on the welfare discourses themselves, but the best means of distributing welfare.

In 2004, Indonesia held its first direct presidential election, which was won by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (best known as SBY) and his running mate Muhammad Jusuf Kalla. In the following election, in 2009, SBY was again elected president, this time with Boediono as his vice president. During his ten years presidency, SBY implemented three exemplary welfare programmes: the Direct Cash Assistance programme (*Bantuan Langsung Tunai*, BLT), the Family Hope Programme (*Program Keluarga Harapan*, PKH), and the National Social Empowerment Programme (*Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat*, PNPM). All except the last were funded through the national budget.[41]

BLT was implemented three times: first between October 2005 and September 2006, and again in 2008 and 2013. Designed to compensate for the rising cost of fossil fuels, it was hoped that this programme would reach the 30 poorest percent of Indonesia's population. In conjunction with BLT, the government implemented a subsidised rice programme colloquially known as Raskin (an abbreviation of *beras miskin*, rice for the poor), cash subsidies for certain classes of pregnant women, support for nursing mothers and infants, etc.

However, during the first phase of programme implementation, problems such as mismanagement were rampant and widely covered by the media. The government subsequently established the National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Eradication (*Tim Nasional Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan*, TNP2K), with a legal basis in Presidential Regulation No. 15 of 2010, and attempted to address policy problems and improve programme implementation. Its first goal was implementing a unified database through which beneficiaries' information could be validated by name and by address. Despite representing a significant step forward, this database had some shortcomings: it did not include individuals who lived apart from their families (including street children, orphans, and convicts), nor, owing to a lack of coordination between the central and local governments, was it regularly updated.

r.r09/publication/artikel-patutkahprogramjpsdilanjutkan.pdf, accessed on 31 October 2018.

[40] Mubyarto, *Kompas*, 3 July 2001.

[41] Manning and Miranti, 2015; Wisnu, Basri, Putra, 2015.

PKH, meanwhile, was designed for families with a monthly income lower than 80% of the poverty threshold—an estimated 1.5 million families. Through this programme, health indicators such as immunisation and postpartum check-ups saw significant improvement. Finally, PNPM was initiated in 2007 and formally concluded in 2014. Inspired by the PPK Block Grant programme, implemented with World Bank funds between 1997 and 1998, PNPM was made available to districts throughout Indonesia, and could be used for community development (infrastructure, revolving funds, healthcare, education, etc.). On the one hand, this programme was highly participatory, as communities were expected to develop their own plans and to become involved in development planning sessions. On the other hand, its ability to eradicate poverty was limited, as its benefits were enjoyed primarily by local elites. Furthermore, as with the PPK programme, funding was derived primarily from a World Bank loan.[42] As such, it tended to reflect international donors' interests more than communities' own priorities.[43]

SBY inherited Law No. 40 of 2004 on the National Social Security System, but was unable to realise its immediate implementation; discussion and planning continued for almost ten years. This law identified the National Social Security System as an important programme, one requiring the passage of a new law that would apply to all Indonesian (in accordance with applicable guidelines and considerations). However, rather than create a new system, the SBY government expanded existing ones: the Social Health Insurance (*Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat*, Jamkesmas) scheme, funded through the national budget, and the Local Health Insurance Scheme (*Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat Daerah*, Jamkesda), funded through local governments. The rationale for this decision is certainly understandable: SBY wanted to avoid funding the entire programme through the national budget,[44] and by expanding existing programmes he was able to ensure that local governments bore part of the financial burden. By June 2012, more than 60% of Indonesians were covered either by this scheme or the Maternity Insurance (*Jaminan Persalinan*, Jampersal) programme implemented in 2011.

In 2011, Indonesia's healthcare expenditures only reached 2.7% of the GDP, falling far short of the 5% recommended by WHO. It thus lagged behind its fellow ASEAN members (average, 4.1%) and its neighbours in the Asia–Pacific region (average, 4.8%).[45] Similarly, Indonesia spent less than 2.8% of its GDP on education, far less than Malaysia (5.1%), Thailand (5.8%), and Vietnam (6.6%), but more than the Philippines (2.7%). It is not surprising, thus, that Indonesian students' performance in the fields of mathematics and science decreased under the SBY government; literacy rates similarly decreased, ranking among the worst in the

[42] See http://www.worldbank.org/in/results/2009/01/21/indonesia-program-for-community-empowerment-in-rural-areas-pnpm-rural; https://finance.detik.com/berita-ekonomi-bisnis/d-1055438/60-dana-pnpm-berasal-dari-utangan; both accessed 2 November 2018.

[43] Wisnu, Basri, & Putra, 2015: 339.

[44] Wisnu, Basri, & Putra, 2015: 330.

[45] Wisnu, Basri, & Putra, 2015: 331.

world.[46]

Other healthcare indicators must be mentioned. In 2010, maternal mortality rates reached 220 per hundred thousand, while neonatal mortality rates reached 31 per thousand live births. Maternal mortality rates were significantly lower in Malaysia (29), Thailand (48), Vietnam (58), and the Philippines (99), as were neonatal mortality rates (Malaysia, 9; Thailand, 13; Vietnam, 29; and the Philippines, 30).[47] Ironically, as the programme continued, maternal mortality rates increased, reaching 305 per hundred thousand in 2015, with the most common cause being pre-eclampsia. Again, this was significantly higher than in neighbouring nations.[48] Neonatal mortality rates, conversely, decreased to 25.5 per thousand live births in 2016, but nevertheless remained higher than in neighbouring countries.[49]

In other words, the main problem in welfare programmes during SBY's ten-year presidency, particularly in the matters of social and human development through the health and education sectors, was minimal investment.[50] Although SBY was able to reduce Indonesia's poverty rate, the income gap (Gini coefficient) increased from approximately 0.3 to 0.41.[51]

More generally, the SBY government experienced several major obstacles in its implementation of welfare programmes. *First*, owing to the significant burden of subsidies (especially fossil fuel subsidies), available funds were limited. Between 2004 and 2014, the SBY government spent Rp 1,297.8 trillion (an average of Rp 129.7 trillion per annum) on fossil fuel subsidies. The previous government, under President Megawati Sukarnoputri, had spent Rp 198.6 trillion on similar subsidies over three years, an average of Rp 66.2 trillion per annum.[52] *Second*, there was difficulty maintaining programme coherence, as despite programmes' distribution amongst diverse ministries, departments, and agencies, coordination was lacking. The government had no integrated database, let alone a grand design for social welfare. *Third*, there was difficulty coordinating the central and local governments, and this hindered the implementation of programmes and their budgets. For example, when central government implemented the Social Insurance Administration Organisation scheme (Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial, BPJS) in 2014, several local governments already had existing programmes.

Finally, the government had difficulty creating jobs, especially in the formal sector. The dominant market economy

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[46] Wisnu, Basri, Putra, 2015: 335; *Kompas*, 12 November 2018.

[47] These figures are taken from Luc-Maurer, 2017: 620-621.

[48] https://katadata.co.id/analisisdata/2018/05/30/rapor-merah-angka-kematian-ibu-Indonesia, accessed on 2 November 2018.

[49] https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2016/11/25/meski-menurun-angka-kematian-bayi-di-indonesia-masih-tinggi, accessed on 2 November 2018.

[50] Luc-Maurer, 2017: 620.

[51] Manning & Miranti, 2015: 317.

[52] https://nasional.tempo.co/read/624005/10-tahun-presiden-sby-bakar-subsidi-bbm-rp-1-300-t/full&view=ok, accessed on 31 October 2018. During SBY's second term, the amount spent on fuel subsidies was equivalent to 1.7–3.4 per cent of the national GDP (Wisnu, Basri, Putra, 2015: 329).

perspective underscored the importance of creating jobs as a means of reducing unemployment and mitigating poverty, and yet the existing labour law (Law No. 13 of 2003) provided workers with significant protections that reduced investors' interest. In his first term, SBY's efforts to revise this law failed; as a result, employment decreased in the formal sector but increased in the informal sector. During his second term, after labour laws were loosened, new jobs were created in the formal sector (in *labour-intensive industries*), while informal-sector employment decreased. This situation was facilitated by significant increases in Indonesia's commodity exports.[53]

A contradiction is here evident: the SBY government was capable of financing more than a thousand trillion rupiah in fossil fuel subsidies, yet failed to provide similar support to the national welfare scheme. Even when Law No. 24 of 2011 regarding the Social Insurance Administration Organisation finally came into effect in January 2014, near the end of SBY's second term, this was the result of ongoing pressure from labour and civil society movements (as will be discussed below). It may thus be concluded that the welfare programmes developed by the SBY government tended to be oriented towards providing social assistance, and thus—as during the transitional period (1998–2004)—realised through stopgap measures that were temporary and unsustainable. The SBY government did not attempt to design a permanent social welfare system, but rather relied on programmes such as BLT to improve its public image and even buy votes.[54] Rather than increase Indonesia's healthcare and education budget, or implement a long-term social health insurance scheme, the SBY government spent ten years and trillions of rupiah subsidising fossil fuels. Such subsidies did not empower the poor, but rather benefited the middle and upper classes.

### *Welfare as "Creative Innovation" versus Welfare as an Electoral Strategy"*

It must be recognised that welfare discourses in Indonesia changed significantly after the implementation of regional autonomy. After Law No. 22 of 1999, more commonly known as the Regional Autonomy Law, came into effect on 1 January 2001, and after local leaders began to be directly elected by constituents (pursuant to Law No. 32 of 2004), governors, regents, and mayors throughout Indonesia raced to draft innovative and creative public services. Some were successful, and their innovative policies proved inspiring at both the local and national level. Others saw such policies as "mere" electoral strategies, as tools for improving their public image. In both cases, welfare was an important part of politics: candidates used welfare as a means of contesting their desired offices, while civil society actors it as an instrument of negotiation and bargaining. Often, welfare was used to quantify the public's satisfaction with current leadership. Welfare, in other words, became an integral part of electoral democracy at both the local and national levels.[55]

The magazines *Tempo* and *Gatra* both published special editions on local

[53] Manning & Miranti, 2015.

[54] Sumarto, 2014.

[55] Savirani, 2016.

leaders (regents/mayors) who had successfully implemented innovative programmes, and in doing so underscored that decentralisation had had some benefits. It was not, as pessimists often argued, simply a means of facilitating corruption, easing transactional politics, and creating local "kings" who controlled natural resources; it also allowed for the rise of creative and innovative leaders who dedicated themselves towards improving public welfare and developing local communities. Indeed, over time, these local leaders rose to national prominence; no longer was the government dominated by military elites and Jakarta-based political elites.[56]

With the authority and financial resources made available to them, local leaders created innovative policies, including "integrated public service facilities, free health and education, e-government and e-procurement, environmentally minded development programmes, the involvement of indigenous communities such as the *Nagari* in West Sumatra and the *Desa Pakraman* in Bali, increased food production, deep-rooted leadership, and many more."[57]

Of the numerous creative and innovative welfare policies introduced at the local level, not all were failures; several were noted successes. Welfare discourses presented as diverse and multidimensional; they could not be reduced to a singular national framework, but had to be understood within specific and contextual regimes. In other words, in decentralised Indonesia, understanding the welfare regime as singular and uniform would be an oversimplification.[58]

As mentioned above, public health and education are important indicators of welfare. This is not to say that public services in other sectors are not important; rather, access to health and education services are the best available instruments, especially among the lower classes. As will be shown in the discussion below, the agricultural sector was an important one at the local level, unsurprising given that the sector was the prime driver of most local economies. The following discussion will also show that welfare and human development programmes had been initiated by local governments, even before the national government. At the same time, it will highlight the disappointing reality that these welfare discourses were temporary, populist, and unsustainable, stemming from the "good intentions" of local leaders rather than the formal recognition of citizens' rights. Nevertheless, as will be shown below, these innovations inspired subsequent programmes at the local and national level.

Jusuf Serang Kasim, the Mayor of Tarakan between 1999 and 2009, was recognised as having transformed the city from a newly established one into a 'little Singapore' within ten years. Rather than

[56] *Tempo*, Special Edition, "10 Tokoh 2008: Mereka Bekerja dengan Hati Menggerakkan Daerah", 22–28 December 2008; and Special Edition, "Bukan Bupati Biasa", 10–16 December 2012; *Gatra*, Special Edition, "Kerja Inovatif Layanan Publik", 13–19 August 2015. Among those identified as one of 2008's top leaders was Joko Widodo, the mayor of Solo; several years later, he was elected Governor of Jakarta, and subsequently President of Indonesia.

[57] Andi A. Mallarangeng, *Tempo*, 22–28 December 2008.

[58] Mas'udi and Lay, 2018.

build a luxurious city hall, his government focused on developing waste management systems, improving educational facilities (from the primary to the tertiary level), providing grants and scholarships to teachers, easing access to public services, expanding the mangroves from 9 hectares to 22 hectares, developing 2.7 km of coastline to reduce abrasion and increase tourism, etc. For four years, the Tarakan Municipal Government allocated 20% of its budget to education. These various policies enabled Terakan to develop rapidly, with an annual economic growth rate of 12.71%; for comparison, at the national level, the average economic growth rate was 6% per annum.

In Yogyakarta, Mayor Herry Zudianto (2001–2011) began allocating 20% of the municipal budget to education in 2006. Consequently, bribery became less prevalent during student intakes, and favoured schools were no longer limited to the wealthy. In the health sector, meanwhile, Zudianto established nutritional centres in every subdistrict, wherein pregnant women could receive free consultations. Approximately ten% of the municipal budget went to providing health services to city residents. Similar results were achieved by David Bobihoe Akib, the Regent of Gorontalo (2005–2010), who focused his programmes on the health, education, and agriculture sectors. He established village-owned enterprises, which helped farmers recover their assets from loan sharks and purchased harvests in times of plenty. Under the leadership of Regent Andi Hatta Marakarma (2005–2010), East Luwu Regency in South Sulawesi implemented a "surrounding villages" policy dedicated towards improving the agriculture sector. He also eliminated tuition fees at the elementary and junior high level, and covered the medical costs of Class III inpatients. As a result, East Luwu Regency became one of the wealthiest municipalities in South Sulawesi, second only to Makassar City (the provincial capital).

In Jombang, East Java, Regent Suyanto (2003–2013) successfully transformed community health centres into small hospitals with extensive facilities, wherein specialists could bring their services to rural areas. Health services were provided free of charge for patients who showed a clinical card or poverty identification card, and at low cost for all other patients. A.A. Gde Agung, the Regent of Badung (2005–2010), achieved significant progress in the agricultural sector. This regency, the wealthiest in Bali, had a significant economic gap between its predominantly agrarian northern regions and its tourism-heavy southern areas. Gde Agung sought to bridge this gap by providing the agrarian sector with necessary infrastructure.

Any discussion of *Tempo* magazine's list of innovative leaders would be incomplete without reference to Mayor of Blitar Djarot Saiful Hidayat (2000–2010) and Mayor of Solo Joko Widodo (2005–2012).[59] Djarot became known for

[59] Two other leaders will not be discussed here, as both were tried and convicted of corruption: Regent of Sragen Sarono Wiyono Sukarno (2001–2011) and Mayor of Makassar Ilham Arif Sirajuddin (2004-2009). See https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/09/24/13040091/Mantan.Bupati.Sragen.Dihukum.7.Tahun.dan.Denda.Rp.11.Miliar, accessed on 14 November 2018, and https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/02/29/16131321/Mantan.Wali.Kota.Makassar.Ilha

advancing bureaucratic reform and good governance, as well as for protecting and empowering small enterprises and street vendors by, among others, prohibiting the opening of malls and supermarkets. The bureaucracy was reduced to 300 offices, with potential officials being recruited through independent channels. His government sponsored the rehabilitation of dilapidated homes and signed a citizen's charter with those living around the Bendo Community Health Centre; the clinic's service model ultimately became the standard for health facilities throughout Indonesia.

Last, but certainly not least, was Joko Widodo (popularly known as Jokowi). Although elected to two terms as Mayor of Solo, in 2005 and 2010, he ended his mayorship in 2012 when he successfully contested the Jakarta gubernatorial election. Only two years later, in 2014, he was elected president. His "only" capital in these elections was his experience in Solo, where he successfully used dialogue to relocate street vendors to the new Klitikan Market. He also successfully restructured the traditional markets, ensuring that they were properly and transparently managed. In the end, as a result of Jokowi's efforts, local government revenue from street vendors and traditional markets exceeded that from the hotel industry.

These are far from the only stories of creative and innovative policies developed to promote human development and welfare. Others may be seen, for example, from the experiences of Mayor of Surabaya Tri Rismaharini (2010–2020); Regent of Keerom, Papua, Yusuf Wally (2010–2020); Regent of Enrekang, South Sulawesi, La Tinro La Tunrung (2003–2013); Mayor of Sawahlunto, West Sumatra, Amran Nur (2003–2013); Regent of Kubu Raya Muda Mahendrawan (2008–2013; re-elected in 2018); Regent of Wonosobo Abdul Kholiq Arif (2005–2015); Mayor of Banjar, West Java, Herman Sutrisno (2003–2013);[60] Regent of Banyuwangi Abdullah Azwar Anas (2010–2020), Regent of Kulonprogo Hasto Wardoyo (2011–2019);[61] Regent of Bantaeng Nurdin Abdullah (2008–2018; elected Governor of South Sulawesi in 2018); Mayor of Bandung Ridwan Kamil (2013–2018; elected Governor of West Java in 2018); Regent of Batang, Central Java, Yoyok Riyosudibyo (2012–2017); Regent of Ogan Komering Ulu Herman Deru (2005–2015; elected Governor of South Sumatra in 2018); etc.[62] If those political leaders who implemented welfare policies simply as a means of "gaining face", of improving their political image before elections, this list could be even longer. Populism and welfare discourses developed hand-in-hand as the Indonesian government created policies that promoted decentralisation and established a multi-party system, wherein local and national elections could no longer be won solely through money politics (as such channels were available to all parties and candidates).[63]

These examples show that welfare programmes in any sector—be it education, health, or agriculture—remain vulnerable so long as they fail to incorporate democratic citizenship processes. Often, these

m.Arief.Sirajuddin.Divonis.4.Tahun.Penjara, accessed on 14 November 2018

[60] *Tempo*, Special Edition, 10–16 December 2012.

[61] *Gatra*, Special Edition, 13–19 August 2015.

[62] Vermonte, *Kompas*, 9 November 2018.

[63] Mas'udi & Lay, 2018.

programmes were unable to survive changes in leadership, as they depended on leaders' "good intentions" or specific commitments. Programmes were frequently implemented without any clear or standard targets, and thus had limited impact. It is not surprising that welfare programmes were clientelistic, often being accessed only by those already close to those in power. Such programmes were not understood as manifestations of citizens' rights, but rather as mere political tools through which power could be achieved and maintained. This very situation gave rise to populist leaders, who have sought and will continue to seek ever higher office.

In these cases, welfare discourses in Indonesia were articulated most strongly by the central government and by local executives. The counter-discourses of other actors had yet to have any significant impact.

### *Welfare as Part of the Global Agenda towards Sustainable Development*

The discourse of welfare as sustainable development has been advanced primarily through the agendas of international donor agencies and multilateral institutions such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, and the World Institute for Development and Economic Research (WIDER), as well as the World Bank, IMF, and World Economic Forum. It has been supported not only by state institutions, but also by a broad spectrum of non-governmental organisations, which have often served as brokers between international donors and government agencies (at the central and the local level).[64]

The global discourses of welfare and sustainable development have been reinforced by programmatically designed development goals, the most prominent of which are the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These programmes have been driven by several factors:[65] *first*, growing disparity between countries that have adopted neoliberal economic and political principles, including those identified by the *Washington Consensus* in the early 1980s (fiscal liberalisation, trade, foreign investment, privatisation, deregulation, etc.).[66] A study conducted by the World Institute for Development and Economic Research (WIDER) in the late 1990s found that almost all countries that had integrated themselves into the global capitalist market had experienced significant disparity, and this, in turn, had created significant social tension and disrupted political stability. The wealthiest fifth of the global population was responsible for 75% of global consumption, while the poorest fifth of the population enjoyed only 1.5% of global consumption.

Similar disparity is also evident in Indonesia. According to a World Bank report, the wealthiest 1% of Indonesians control slightly more than half (50.3%) of the country's wealth; the wealthiest 10% of Indonesians control 77% of its wealth. In the decade since the Southeast Asian economic crisis, the Indonesian economy grew consistently, averaging 5–6% per annum. Indonesia is the only Southeast Asian country included in the G20, a group

[64] See, among others, Ismail, 2019.

[65] Luc-Maurer, 2017: 626–630.

[66] See also Mas'oed, 2002.

of nineteen countries and the European Union that represents the world's largest economies.

Although Indonesia has successfully reduced the poverty rate, from 24% in 2009 to 11.3% in 2014, the gap between the rich and poor has grown; the Gini coefficient, a measure of statistical dispersion intended to represent income inequality, increased from 0.37 in 2009 to 0.41 in 2013. Ironically for the only Southeast Asian nation in the G20, Indonesia's income inequality is among the worst in the world, with a Gini coefficient similar to that of Ethiopia and the Ivory Coast in Africa.[67]

*Second*, programmatically designed development goals emerged in response to new economic concepts and thoughts that reached beyond Smithian neoclassical theory, arguing that inequality would stymie growth and hinder governments' efforts to eradicate poverty. These thinkers included Amartya Sen, Joseph Stiglitz, and Paul Krugman, who had won the prestigious Nobel Prize in Economics in 1998, 2001, and 2008 (respectively). Their paradigm did not reject the market economy—Stiglitz, for instance, served as the World Bank's chief economist between 1997 and 2000—and thus was readily accepted by international and multilateral institutions. The Indian economist Amartya Sen, meanwhile, is recognised together with the Pakistani economist Mahbub Ul-Haq for significant contributions to human development theory, including the Human Development Index introduced to the UNDP in a 1990 report.[68] Economic development is no longer measured solely through economic growth, but also through human development.

Since 2000, the UNDP has designed two sets of global development goals, each lasting a fifteen-year period: the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs, from 2000–2015) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs, 2016–2030). The MDGs, designed as a global development paradigm, were announced at the Millennium Summit at the United Nations headquarters in New York, which was held from 6 to 8 September 2000. The SDGs were discussed and passed by the UN General Assembly between 25 and 27 September 2015, coming into effect on 1 January 2016. Unlike the MDGs they replaced, which were formulated using a top-down approach by experts at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and international development agencies, the SDGs were formulated in conjunction with civil society actors and other stakeholders. As such, they have been seen as more comprehensive, inclusive, and equitable (see Table 1). Ultimately, however, both the MDGs and the SDGs were built around three pillars: human development, environmentally conscious development, and sustainability.

**Table 1. *Differences between MDGs and SDGs***

| MDGs, 2000–2015 | SDGs, 2015–2030 |
|---|---|
| **50 Per Cent** | **100 Percent**<br>Ultimate target: complete eradication of poverty. |

[67] *Kompas*, 9 December 2015.

[68] Maurer, 2017: 619.

| MDGs, 2000–2015 | SDGs, 2015–2030 |
|---|---|
| Ultimate target: to reduce poverty by half. Minimal. Already achieved by many nations. | • Eradication of poverty<br>• 100% of citizens should have a birth certificate<br>• Focus necessary to accommodate the marginal and distant |
| **From developed nations, for developing nations**<br>MDGs are envisioned as the duty of poor and developing nations, with developed nations playing a supporting role as donors/financiers | **Universal**<br>SDGs seen as duty and obligation of all nations.<br>All nations obligated to achieve sustainable development<br>All nations required to cooperate towards funding development programmes and implementing/revising relevant policies. |
| **Top-Down**<br>MDGs formulated by UN and OECD elites in New York, without consulting, meeting, or surveying ordinary people | **Bottom-Up and Participative**<br>SDGs formulated by team, involving face-to-face meetings in more than 100 countries as well as numerous surveys |
| **Partial Solution/Stopgap Measure**<br>Contains eight goals, mostly oriented towards addressing the symptoms of poverty<br>Does not recognise ecological and environmental issues<br>Does not deal with economic inequality or disparity<br>Does not deal with taxation or development funding. | **Comprehensive Solution**<br>Contains seventeen goals, which are designed to promote structural and systematic transformation:<br>• Gender equality<br>• Governance<br>• Revised consumption and production models<br>• Revised taxation systems<br>• Recognition of inequality/disparity<br>• Recognition of urban issues |

*Source: Hoelman et al., 2015: 15.*

Neither the MDGs nor the SDGs are binding, nor can they be easily achieved, as their lofty targets are often beyond the reach of poor and developing nations. As such, countries are free to implement them in accordance with their own specific capacities, priorities, and development policies. At the same time, however, it cannot be ignored that both the MDGs and the SDGs have influenced development discourses around the world—including in Indonesia. Both incorporate elements of financial support, albeit not always in accordance with beneficiaries'

expectations or developed nations' promises.[69] Similarly, both represent a shared commitment, one that has consistently driven UN members' domestic agendas and overlapped with their desire to eradicate poverty and minimise inequality.

In Indonesia, the MDGs were implemented through Presidential Instruction No. 3 of 2010 regarding Justice in Development. Ultimately, however, Indonesia was deemed to have failed in its commitment to achieve these goals and realise their targets. Owing in part to the government's top-down approach, lack of government commitment, poor intersectoral coordination, minimal involvement of civil society, and limited socialisation of its policies, stakeholders were unable to contribute significantly to government programmes. Furthermore, although the MDGs had been announced in 2000, the Indonesian government was late in implementing them, as it was oriented predominantly towards achieving domestic political reform. Data from the National MDG Secretariat, Indonesia had only achieved 13 of 63 indicators by 2015;[70] for instance, it failed to reduce maternal and neonatal death rates. In the end, Indonesia was only able to achieve four of the eight MDGs.[71]

As for the SDGs, the Indonesian government has committed itself to their implementation, as announced by a delegation consisting of Vice President Jusuf Kalla and several ministers before the before the United Nations General Assembly. At the time, Kalla stated that the SDGs corresponded with the Jokowi–Kalla government's nine priorities (popularly known as “Nawacita”).[72] Indonesia also played an active role in the formulation of the SDGs. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, then the incumbent president, was a member of the committee that discussed the SDGs; other members included Prime Minister of the United Kingdom David Cameron and President of Liberia Ellen Johnson.[73]

In realising such global agendas, Indonesia has been hindered by more than its administration, socialisation, and implementation approaches. Its greatest challenge has been its citizens' limited income, ranking 128th globally. More than half of Indonesians live below the international poverty line, and income inequality remains omnipresent. The global economic crises and recessions that have detrimentally affected Indonesia's economic growth have also been problematic. Furthermore, decades of revenue-oriented development programmes have had severe environmental consequences throughout the Indonesian Archipelago. Such programmes continue today, even though conservation is an important component of the SDGs. There is an ongoing tug-of-war between economic growth, conservation, and social welfare, a classical issue that nevertheless remains crucial today, being found not only in Indonesia, but around the globe.[74]

[69] Between 2013 and 2014, the OECD recorded development aid of US$ 135 milliard per annum. See Pakpahan, "Agenda Pembangunan Berkelanjutan 2030", *Kompas*, 17 September 2015.

[70] *Kompas*, 8 August 2015.

[71] *Kompas*, 28 September 2015.

[72] *Kompas*, 26 September 2015.

[73] Suyono, *Kompas*, 7 October 2015.

[74] *Kompas*, 12 October 2015.

According to Jose Graziano da Silva, Director of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), 72 of 129 nations were able to reduce malnutrition by half by 2015. Likewise, the global population living in extreme poverty was reduced from 43% (1990) to 17% (2015). However, such advances were not evenly distributed. More than 800 million people worldwide continued to suffer from hunger, and almost a billion lived in extreme poverty. Da Silva wrote that these ongoing issues could not be resolved simply by stimulating economic growth in the agriculture sector, but required social protections and access to cash/non-cash financial assistance programmes. Only then could true independence be created amongst the poor.[75]

From this discussion, it is evident that national and global welfare discourses have remained dominated and hegemonised by a social assistance paradigm, rather than one oriented towards achieving justice by restructuring the economy. In this hegemonisation of welfare discourses, international donor agencies and multilateral institutions play an important role, as do central and local governments.

### *Welfare as a "Right of the People" and Welfare as a "Constitutional Obligation of the State"*

In Indonesia, demand for improved public welfare, as a manifestation of citizens' rights, emerged in the early years of the nation's political reform, with roots reaching far into the past. Peasant movements and customary communities throughout the Archipelago sought to reclaim lands that had been taken by the New Order government. Labour movements, similarly, demanded the right to unionise as well as such normative rights as increased wages, paid holidays, occupational health and safety insurance, etc. However, these demands were but drops in the sea of contemporary political discourses, mere floating signifiers (elements) in the discursive field. Political actors, including the mushrooming political parties, failed to accommodate these demands in their political programmes.

It must be recognised that, of the plethora of actors active at the grassroots level, labour movements had particular activities and their outcomes that resulted in their welfare demands becoming important moments in the ongoing contestation of welfare discourses. This may be attributed, at least in part, to their concentration in urban areas, where they were close to those in power and could easily access the mass media; neither was true for peasant movements or indigenous communities. Every year, on International Workers' Day (1 May), hundreds of thousands of labourers descended to the streets to demand that their rights be fulfilled and their welfare be improved.[76]

[75] *Kompas*, 17 October 2015.

[76] Several labour unions with significant memberships have contributed significantly to the mobilisation of workers in Jakarta and the surrounding area. These include, for instance, the All-Indonesia Confederation of Labour Unions (Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia, K-SPSI), with an estimated 1.5 million messengers; the Indonesian Confederation of Prosperous Labourers (Konfederasi Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia, K-SBSI), with an estimated 250,000 members; the Confederation of Indonesian Labour Unions (Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia, K-SPI),

Such demands are no longer sectoral; ten years after Indonesia began its political reform, labour movements had already established intersectoral chains of equivalence and networks, and were demanding (among other things) a universal health insurance scheme. As will be discussed below, labour movements contributed significantly to the ultimately implementation of this system.[77]

Beginning in 2014, labour movements pressured the Indonesian government to recognise International Workers' Day as a national holiday. They also called for a revised Labour Law, increased wages, and the transformation of outsourced contract workers into permanent employees. At their peak, these movements demanded the implementation of a national health insurance programme.[78] They began establishing chains of equivalence, first through the Action Committee for Social Insurance (Komite Aksi Jaminan Sosial, KAJS)[79] and later through the newly establish Indonesian Council of Labourers and Workers (Majelis Pekerja Buruh Indonesia, MPBI). Established on International Labour Day, 1 May 2012, MPBI consisted of three influential labour unions: KSPI, K-SBSI, and K-SPSI.[80] Activists recognised that Indonesia's political parties had paid little heed to their interests in the first years of political reform. As such, labour activists indicated that MPBI was perceived as a step towards establishing an alternative labour party, or even an umbrella organisation that could accommodate grassroots activists in all sectors.[81] Unfortunately, since the 2014 presidential election—when some unions supported Prabowo Subianto and his running mate Hatta Rajasa, while others backed Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla—this initiative has become fragmented.[82]

with an estimated 1,000,000 members; the Allied Congress of Indonesian Labour Unions (Kongres Aliansi Serikat Buruh Indonesia, KASBI), with an estimated 100,000 members; the National Confederation of Unions (Konfederasi Serikat Nasional, KSN), with an estimated 100,000 members; and the National Confederation of Labour Unions (Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Nasional, K-SPN), with an estimated 500,000 members. Interview with Anwar Sastro Ma'aruf, labour activist, leader of the Popular Labour Party (Partai Rakyat Pekerja, PRP), and Secretary General of the Indonesian Confederation of Popular Movements (Konfederasi Pergerakan Rakyat Indonesia, KPRI), Jakarta, 5 March 2016.

[77] KAJS was formally agreed approved between 6 and 8 March 2010 by a number of labour unions (K-SPI, K-SPSI, and Kobar), as facilitated by FSPMI and supported by the Trade Union Rights Centre (TURC) and Friedreich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES); see Tornquist et al., 2018: 143.

[78] See Ma'ruf, 2015: 455–476.

[79] Tornquist, et al., 2018: 142–143.

[80] Tjandra, 2014; Lane, 2014: 473–474.

[81] Tjandra, 2014; Ma'ruf, 2015; Interview with Anwar Sastro Ma'aruf, labour activist, leader of the Popular Labour Party (Partai Rakyat Pekerja, PRP), and Secretary General of the Indonesian Confederation of Popular Movements (Konfederasi Pergerakan Rakyat Indonesia, KPRI), Jakarta, 5 March 2016.

[82] During the 2014 presidential election, there was significant polarisation in Indonesia, both within labour movements and in the public arena. Ultimately, although Joko Widodo and his running mate, the labour movement's support was divided. KSPI (chaired by Said Iqbal) supported Prabowo–Hatta, while K-SPSI (chaired by Andi Gani Nena Wea) and K-SBSI backed Jokowi–Kalla. Andi is the son of Jacob Nuwa Wea, a senior PDI-P politician who had served as Minister of Labour under President

Returning to Law No. 40 of 2004 regarding the National Social Insurance System, as reinforced by Law No. 24 of 2011 regarding the Social Insurance Administration Organisation, it must be recognised that both laws were concrete manifestations of a constitutional mandate.[83] Article 34, Paragraph (2), of the amended 1945 Constitution reads: "The state shall develop a system of social security for all of the people and shall empower the inadequate and underprivileged in society in accordance with human dignity". Law No. 40 of 2004 was passed on 19 October 2004 by President Megawati Sukarnoputri, towards the end of her presidency. For years, this law went unimplemented, having received little attention from the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono government. Only after extensive lobbying by KAJS did the government pass Law No. 24 of 2011, which was staunchly opposed by a number of private insurance companies and labour organisations. Without widespread demonstrations and protests, few would have known of the planned social insurance scheme. In this context, it is important to recognise the contributions of labour movements and civil society organisations, who articulated a new welfare discourse: welfare as a "right of the people" and as a "constitutional obligation of the state". Using a discourse that was contested, rather than "offered" as a gesture of goodwill, these movements shifted the nodal point away from the hegemonic discourse of welfare as "social assistance", "electoral strategy", and "sustainable development".[84]

Law 40 of 2004 and Law 24 of 2011, which came into effect in 2004, collectively represented the beginning of a new and different welfare discourse in Indonesia (especially in the health sector). Above, this article has shown how regional autonomy stimulated innovation and creation in welfare discourses, including in the education, health, and agriculture sectors. New policies generally lacked clear standards and targets, with their implementation changing from year to year in response to local political dynamics. Often, these welfare programmes were developed as electoral strategies, and prone to clientelistic practices.

These new laws sought to transform the situation. Their welfare programmes were not sectoral, but universal, accessible to all Indonesians—provided certain criteria were met[85]—without discrimination and without short-lived political gains. SJSN/BPJS was designed as a centralised, standardised, and uniform health insurance programme that spanned the entire Indonesian Nation. Under these laws, the government was obliged to follow specific guidelines under parliamentary supervision. At the conceptual level, this programme was

Megawati Sukarnoputri. Unlike in previous years, when International Labour Day was commemorated with a joint action, in 2014 these influential labour unions held their own activities. See, for example, Tjandra (2014), "Politik Buruh 2014", https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/05/01/1403157/Politik.Buruh.2014, accessed on 7 August 2018.

[83] Sulastomo, 2011.

[84] Refer to Section 3.

[85] Essentially, all SJSN–BPJS members are required to pay a premium, the amount of which is determined based on their socio-economic class. For the poorest Indonesians, premiums are covered by the State through the national budget.

excellent; indeed, it is not excessive to identify these laws as having a revolutionary effect on the welfare discourse.

It is thus unsurprising that there was considerable public interest in these programmes. Indonesians, previously worried about the cost of healthcare, flocked to treatment centres—from clinics to hospitals—in droves. When the programme was first implemented in 2014, approximately 133.4 million Indonesians (40% of the population) registered. By 1 November 2018, in the programme's fifth year, the National Health Insurance/Healthy Indonesia Card (Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional/Kartu Indonesia Sehat, JKN-KIS) scheme reached 205,071,003 members; approximately 60 million Indonesians remained unregistered. As such, it covered 77% of all Indonesians.[86] Approximately 8% of all members were civil servants; 15% were private-sector employees; 15% were independent labourers; 3% were unemployed; 14% were beneficiaries of locally funded programmes; and 45% were beneficiaries of nationally funded programmes.[87] From these figures, it may be seen that healthcare facilities became increasingly accessible, especially to low-income households. Many, particularly those who suffered from long-term health issues such as heart disease, cancer, and diabetes, benefitted significantly from this welfare scheme.[88]

Nevertheless, many technical issues became evident in the field. The most common complaints revolved around the long queues, the complicated referral process, the difficulty accessing intensive care, and the medication being lacking in availability, quality, and amount unavailable. Many expressed disappointment that their cards were not accepted for all services, and that regulations changed frequently. Many indicated that BPJS patients were treated discriminatorily by hospitals and other facilities, being marginalised in favour of paying patients.[89]

Another major problem, according to Professor of Public Policy and Health Administration Laksono Trisnantoro (Universitas Gadjah Mada), was that JKN services were biased towards urban areas. Urban healthcare facilities were more comprehensive, and their staff was more skilled. In rural areas, beneficiaries had difficulty accessing the same services, even as they paid the same premiums.[90] The limited availability of health facilities, as well as the uneven distribution of doctors/medical staff, overlapped with infrastructural and bureaucratic shortcomings. Further complicating the issue was the disparate level of development in various territories and provinces; health services in major cities were quite different than those in smaller cities—let alone those in rural areas and border regions. Nonetheless, the overall

[86] Growth in BPJS membership has fallen short of predictions. According to the National Roadmap for National Health Insurance, the Indonesian government had hoped to achieve universal health coverage by 2019 (*Kompas*, 13 November 2018).

[87] *Kompas*, 13 November 2018.

[88] *Kompas*, 12 November 2018.

[89] *Kompas*, 12 November 2018.

[90] *Kompas*, 12 November 2018.

quality of health services in Indonesia has improved.

Another issue, according to BPJS staff themselves, is budgetary; except for 2016, when the programme had a surplus of approximately Rp 160 milliard, the amount of revenue received through premiums has fallen short of the amount claimed. In 2014, the programme had a deficit of Rp 1.93 trillion; deficits were also reported in 2015 (Rp 4.41 trillion), 2017 (Rp 10.19 trillion), 2018 (Rp 9.1 trillion), and 2019 (Rp 28 trillion);[91] all such shortcomings had to be covered through the national budget. In order to reduce deficits, the government began examining the possibility of increasing premiums.[92] Per 1 July 2020, premiums have been increased, even as this decision was broadly opposed by civil society organisations.[93]

Finally, and no less importantly, welfare programmes have long been implemented by non-state actors (both religious and cultural) in the health, education, and micro-finance sectors religion.[94] Many studies have shown that religious communities have often used welfare programmes as "entry points", and as such have been integral to their proselytisation and their services.[95] Many of Indonesia's most prominent hospitals, schools, universities, cooperatives, and credit unions were developed by religious organisations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama or by churches. These welfare programmes, the first and oldest in Indonesia, have had a lasting effect.

However, these programmes are not discussed in detail in this article. Although these religiously and culturally driven welfare programmes are well established, they have had limited influence on Indonesia's political dynamics (including, for example, the political reform that began in 1998). Religious and cultural actors tend to extricate themselves from politics, and thus have little influence on Indonesia's political and power structures. Their welfare discourses, though evident in the discursive field, tend to support those of state and global actors.

**Conclusion**

Welfare discourses have deep roots in Indonesia's political and economic history. Since the country's independence, a welfare discourse has been embedded in Indonesia's economic system. This is regulated through Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, which understood the ideal economy as one built on a foundation of cooperatives, complemented by state-owned enterprises and private corporations, with welfare stemming from an inherent social solidarity. However, in reality, the Indonesian economy has been oriented predominantly towards capitalism, liberalism, and market mechanisms. It has been difficult to realise

[91] *Kompas*, 13 November 2018; https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2019/08/08/iuran-semua-kelas-naik-berapa-defisit-bpjs-kesehatan.

[92] *Kompas*, 14 November 2018.

[93] https://money.kompas.com/read/2020/07/01/084657526/iuran-bpjs-kesehatan-resmi-naik-mulai-hari-ini.

[94] Mas'udi & Lay, 2018.

[95] Aritonang, 1988, 2004; Alwi Shihab, 1998.

the idealism inherent to Article 33, let alone maintain it across diverse regimes.

The twenty-year period since Indonesia began its political reform is no exception. Welfare discourses have been contested by a wide range of actors, all of whom have sought to achieve hegemony. Between 1998 and 2015, welfare discourses revolved around four nodal points, each of which had its own subject positions and actors. *First* were those subject positions who understood welfare as social assistance; these actors were predominantly government agencies at the national, provincial, and local levels. *Second,* were those subject positions that understood welfare as creative innovation and/or an electoral strategy; these were predominantly individual politicians, again at the national, provincial, and local levels. *Third* were those subject positions—mostly international donor agencies and institutions working in conjunction with the Indonesian government and civil society organisations—who understood welfare as sustainable development. Fourth were those subject positions, most prominently members of KAJS, who understood welfare as a right (for citizens) and as a constitutional obligation (for the state).

Gosta Esping-Anderden, in *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*,[96] identified three types of welfare regimes: liberal, conservative, and social democratic. Borrowing these categories, and referring again to the history of Indonesia's dominant and hegemonic welfare discourses (especially over the past two decades), the Indonesian welfare regime may be understood as liberal one. This is supported by several points. *First*, the nation's economic system leans heavily on market mechanisms. *Second*, welfare programmes were initially developed as social security nets. *Third*, before the mid-2010s (when labour and civil society movements successfully pressured the government to implement a national social welfare scheme), programmes had been initiated at the local and national level by benevolent elites at the local level.

If, following Giddens (1999),[97] we categorise welfare discourses as negative and positive discourses, we would recognise that the dominant and hegemonic welfare discourses that have circulated in Indonesia have understood welfare as "the war against suffering, disease, ignorance, dilapidation, and sloth". As such, it has been perceived as a burden for the Indonesian nation and budget. According to Giddens, these are not characteristic of positive welfare, which would perceive welfare as the state's investment in its citizens—social investment. Positive welfare is oriented towards developing human capital rather than providing direct financial assistance. As such, it would emphasise programmes that improve education and health services or create an active civil society over subsidies and direct cash transfers.

Why has such a "liberal welfare" or "negative welfare" regime become dominant and hegemonic? It may be understood that, reflecting the assumptions of Laclau and Mouffe, political articulations in post-reform Indonesia almost universally understood welfare as a form of social assistance, as an electoral strategy, and/or as an element of sustainable development. These articulations advanced the views of important actors such as government

[96] Mas'udi & Lay, 2018: 279.

[97] Giddens, 1999: 136ff.

officials, politicians, economists/technocrats, entrepreneurs, academics, and even international organisations, most of which embraced a neoliberal paradigm. Such a liberal understanding of welfare has endured owing to its ability to establish chains of equivalence with other understandings, including that which understands welfare as the right of citizens and as the constitutional obligation of the state.

Surveys conducted by Demos (2007) and the Department of Government and Politics at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, UGM (2013) may also help us understand these welfare discourses and their development. In the first survey, respondents did not identify welfare as an important public issue. In the second survey, conversely, 55% of respondents identified welfare services such as health insurance, education, security, public transportation, and housing as issues of paramount importance. Only 14% prioritised citizenship and civil rights, even though these had dominated the Demos survey. This supports the argument that, in the early 2010s, democracy discourses were increasingly dislocated by welfare discourses.[98]

In a broader context, welfare began to become a prominent nodal point in Indonesian democracy when direct local and national elections were first implemented in 2005. This political momentum was supported by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were incorporated into the national development agenda through Presidential Instruction No. 3 of 2010 regarding Justice in Development. Welfare discourses were strengthened by labour and civil society movements, which pressured the government to implement a universal healthcare scheme—pursuant to Law No. 40 of 2004 regarding the National Social Insurance System, as reinforced by Law No. 24 of 2011 regarding the Social Insurance Administration Organisation—after almost a decade of neglect. Since then, welfare discourses have developed within a context unprecedented in Indonesian history, wherein the health of Indonesians—especially the poor—is guaranteed by the state. If seen through the hegemony lens of Laclau and Mouffe, welfare discourses have become increasingly broad. No longer are they restricted to liberal paradigms; through extensive articulation and re-articulation, labour and civil society movements have created a shared discourse that can nonetheless be subjected to further dislocation. Welfare discourses, as always, continue to be contested.

[98] Savirani, 2016: 24–26.

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# The Moluccas' Surviving Aristocracy in Indonesian Politics: Fragmentation and Land-based Political Support

Bayu Dardias Kurniadi[1]

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**Abstract**

*The article demonstrates how the Sultanate of Ternate in the Moluccas has survived in post-authoritarian Indonesian politics by analysing the political performances of the Sultan of Ternate and his immediate family members. The success of Sultan Mudaffar Syah in the political arena has contextualised the literature on land-based political economy, something that has largely been neglected. Combining in-depth interviews, observations, and document study, I argue that the Sultan's political achievements were the result of his transforming Ternate's coastal aristocracy into a land-based one, sidestepping the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) of 1960 by transferring land management and ownership to indigenous communities while still maintaining economic control. However, his wife and children have failed politically, not only because they are not part of the traditional aristocratic structure (and thus have no control over land) but also because of internal fragmentation.*

***Keywords:*** *Moluccan aristocracy, land politics, sultan*

## Introduction

In his famous 'King's Dilemma', Samuel Huntington (1968) argued that the integration of monarchies into modern institutions leaves monarchs with an unfavourable dilemma: promoting reform would eventually result in challenges from reformist cadres, while delaying reform would result in popular protests. There is no place for monarchs in modern political architecture, which allows them to 'rule, but not reign' by limiting them to symbolic and traditional activities.

However, recent scholars have challenged Huntington's argument. Corbett, Veenendaal, and Ugyel (2016) show that monarchies in smaller states have been able to persevere and maintain political power. Based on a review of approximately twenty absolute or semi-absolute monarchical regimes in three small states (Tonga, Bhutan, and Liechtenstein), they argue that the endurance of monarchical power is inversely correlated with state size. First, small states tend to lack revolutions,

[1] Bayu Dardias Kurniadi is a PhD Candidate at the Department of Political and Social Change, Australian National University, Canberra. His email is bayu.dardias@anu.edu.au.

thereby creating 'institutional fidelity' that helps monarchs to survive. Second, small states tend to have political systems that are 'personalised' to the monarch (rather than dispersed amongst political institutions). In such states, important political figures have multiple social, political, economic, and religious roles.

This article neither neglects nor accepts the above theories. It proposes a new argument regarding surviving aristocracies in electoral politics. Owing to low levels of institutionalisation and high levels of fragmentation, Indonesia's aristocracies and traditional institutions—unlike monarchies, which are dominated by one king—exist at the sub-national level (mostly at the district and sub-district level). Since 1998, aristocrats have tried (with various results) to compete in electoral arenas at national, provincial, and local levels. I argue that their success has depended on their ability to control land, as an economic resource, and to maintain cohesive internal relations. This will be shown using the example of the Sultanate of Ternate, which Sultan Mudaffar Syah transformed from a coastal aristocracy into a land-based aristocracy to sustain his political power. His political support came predominantly came from traditional areas, where land is under his direct control. However, such control cannot be genealogically transferred to his children and wife, as they are not part of the coastal sultanate structure. Lacking the capacity to maintain internal cohesiveness, his family has failed to achieve its political agenda. This finding fills important gaps in the theoretical debate on the political economy, which has largely ignored the importance of land in Indonesian politics.

I will present my argument chronologically, starting with the colonial period but emphasising post-authoritarian Indonesia. To achieve an understanding of local politics in Ternate, I will overview the role of land politics in Indonesia, as well as the political background of Ternate and the formation of the North Maluku Province (where ethnic competition has become a feature of local politics). I will then depict the fragmentation within the royal family, as revealed by members' political party affiliations and trajectories in post-Suharto politics. The next section will lay out this article's argument regarding land-based political transformations, as shown in the political performance of the Sultan and his immediate family members, who have received significant support from areas where the Sultan maintains control of land. I will then conclude this article with a reflective summary of the findings.

To begin, Ternate, an island located in the northern part of the Moluccas, has long been known as the home of four sultanates: Ternate, Tidore, Bacan, and Jailolo (*Fala Raha*) (Amal, 2010, p. 7). Historically, the strongest and the most influential sultanate in north Maluku has been the Sultanate of Ternate (Hanna & Alwi, 1990). Its palace is located on Ternate Island (37.23 km$^2$), which is dominated by the Gamalama stratovolcano; 56 of 77 villages are in coastal areas, and no settlement is located more than 500 metres from the sea (BPS Ternate, 2014, p. 9).

Early European explorers and merchants first travelled to the Moluccas for spices, especially nutmeg, pepper, and clove. Trade led to colonisation, first by the Portuguese, then by the Spanish and the Dutch (Burnet, 2011). When the price of these spices dropped during the late colonial period, the Dutch concentrated more on the sugar plantations of Java and

Sumatra. As such, under Sukarno and Suharto, Ternate was part of Maluku Province (with its capital in Ambon).[2] In 1999, this province was split into Maluku and North Maluku provinces—the first administrative split in post-authoritarian Indonesia.

During Indonesia's struggle for independence in the 1940s, Jabir Syah—the 47th Sultan of Ternate—refused Sukarno's offer to integrate the Sultanate into the nascent Indonesian republic; this resulted in a soft exile, which lasted until Jabir Syah's death in 1974. At the same time, newly established Indonesian government tried to eliminate the aristocracy. Using a series of land regulations, it prohibited aristocracies from owning land and established ownership ceilings; this allowed the government to claim their material resources.[3] Nonetheless, the Moluccan people's strong sentiments regarding the aristocracy have never abated. According to one local sociologist, this is because the Sultanate offered the people of Ternate a means of connecting the people of Ternate with their past and incorporating it into their identity.[4]

After the death of Jabir Syah, the Sultanate remained inactive until his son Mudaffar Syah was coronated as the 48th Sultan of Ternate in 1986. Benefitting from his status as a member of the People Representative's Assembly (*Majelis Permusyaawaratan Rakyat*; MPR), representing Maluku, the new sultan maintained strong relationships with *adat* (indigenous) communities in Ternate as well as western and northern parts of Halmahera Island. When Sultan Mudaffar of Ternate died in Jakarta in February 2015, thousands of people gathered in the street, escorting the palanquin carrying his body in a two-hour procession from the airport to the palace (*Kadato*). Strong sentiments are similarly held for the Sultanate of Tidore, which historically encompassed the southern part of Halmahera Island and extended eastwards towards Papua (Andaya, 1993), as well as the sultanates of Bacan and Jailolo.[5] This has had consequences for gubernatorial contestations in North Maluku, as discussed by Wilson (2008).

## Land, Political Economy, and Elite Formation

The literature on land and politics in Indonesia is dominated by four themes: land reform and peasants, land law, forestry and environmental management, and land disputes. In the first, writers concentrate on the implications of land reform for economic distribution—especially as related to landless farmers. Most writers (i.e. Sajogyo, 1970; Selosoemardjan, 1962; Utrecht, 1969, 1973) argue that land reform had enhanced the livelihoods of the Indonesian people until it was stopped by President Suharto in the 1970s. In the second, writers focus on Indonesia's legal framework for land

[2] See Law No. 20 of 1958.

[3] See Law No. 5 of 1960 and Law 56/Prp/1960.

[4] Interview with Syafruddin Amin, 25 September 2014, Ternate.

[5] Jailolo was formed out of the Ternate Sultanate's area. It consists of approximately 25 villages along the western coast of Halmahera Island. According to Bubandt (2014, p. 126), the name 'Gilolo' (found in Dutch and Portuguese records) was derived from Jailolo and used to refer to the entire island of Halmahera.

issues. Most deal with the Basic Agrarian Law (*Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria,* BAL), which they see as generally having been reduced by actors (thereby limiting its potential operationalisation). Others have emphasised the Forestry Law, introduced by Suharto in 1967, which covers almost 70% of Indonesia's total area. In the third, scholars have concentrated on forestry and environmental management. Particular focus has been given to the situation since decentralisation began in 2001. Although this resulted in authority over forestry management being delegated to local authorities, it has also created tension between local and national governments. One of the most striking has been a bylaw issued by the Wonosobo Regency Government, which unilaterally stipulated that forest areas previously managed by state enterprises would to be 'communally managed by the people' (Thorburn, 2004). In the last, writers have examined how the overlapping land laws in Indonesia have created conflict in many areas in Indonesia. Land management regulations and policies are unclear, and thus state/corporate actors have often come into conflict with local people/*adat* communities. The literature on land politics in Indonesia has thus recognised state actors, enterprises, peasants and *adat* communities, but have not properly considered land as a significant aspect of the political economy in post-authoritarian Indonesia.

Analysis of Indonesia's elite formation has largely ignored the importance of the political economy of land since the late 1960s, when the Suharto government reduced mass politics to a minimum level and focused primarily on ethnicity, bureaucracy, and military matters. A classic work of Crouch (1979), for instance, argues that New Order elites came from military, technocratic, and bureaucratic backgrounds. Moreover, 'the elite of the New Order was dominated by officers and the Western-Educated technocrats who helped them formulate economic policy'. Gregory (1976) similarly found that New Order-era elites came primarily from three institutions (the military, political parties, and technocracy) and were shaped primarily by four aspects: education, social status, religious background, and ethnic origin. She noted, for example, an underrepresentation of non-Javanese in elite formations. Emmerson (1976) defines Indonesian elites as 'members of the higher central bureaucracy and the national legislature.' In his research, he found that elite culture is an interplay between ethnicity and religion, as well as institutional and organisational background. In post-Suharto Indonesia, Shiraishi (2003) writes that the 'majority of local parliamentarians have a background in New-Order era political parties and youth and mass organization.' Therefore, there is a continuation of New Order elites.

To some extent, this current study might expand on previous studies by Savirani (2004) and Hadiz (2010). Using the cases of North Sumatra, East Java, and Yogyakarta, Hadiz explores the political basis of elite dominance in the context of the localisation of power. He argues that 'successful local elites in Indonesia tend to be those who already have access to substantial material resources as well as some degree of control over instrument of political intimidation.' Local elites use material resources for money politics, as well as for corruption activities. This paper is novel, however, in that it contributes to the literature on land and political economy by showing the importance of land control in the political survival of the Sultanate of Ternate.

**Ethnicity, Conflict, and Political Contestation in North Maluku**

Initially, northern Maluku was divided between two regencies, which resembled the islands' traditional aristocracies: the Sultanate of Ternate and the Sultanate of Tidore. North Maluku Regency, with its capital in Ternate, covered an area traditionally controlled by the Sultanate of Ternate; Central Halmahera Regency, with its capital in Soa Sio, covered an area traditionally belonging to the Sultanate of Tidore. On 20 March 1999, Ternate City was incorporated in preparation for the creation of North Maluku Province; by law, a minimum of three regencies/cities was required for a new province to be created (Firman, 2013; Fitrani, Hofman, & Kaiser, 2005). Four years later, North Maluku Regency was divided into four regencies: West Halmahera, South Halmahera, North Halmahera, and Sula Islands. Central Halmahera, meanwhile, was divided into Tidore City Islands Regency (with its capital in Soa Sio); the capital of Central Halmahera thus moved to Weda. Therefore, the formation of North Maluku Province was an extension of the traditional power of the Sultanate of Ternate, whose traditional territory covers eight of the ten newly established regencies/municipalities in the province.

The formation of North Maluku Province resulted in power struggles, especially in the matter of appointing its first governor. One political party, Golkar, dominated the parliaments of both North Maluku (then still a regency) and Central Halmahera after winning the 1999 elections. Sultan Mudaffar, who chaired Golkar's North Maluku branch, was the region's main political actor. He soon became seen as the most likely candidate, as he wielded power in both a traditional institution (the Sultanate of Ternate) and a modern political institution (Golkar). However, according to Wilson (2008, p. 47), three other prominent politicians were also pursuing the governorship: Bahar Andili, the Regent of Central Halmahera; Syamsir Andili (Bahar's younger brother), the Mayor of Ternate City; and Thaib Armaiyn, a long-serving bureaucrat. Of these four candidates, only Sultan Mudaffar was of Ternate heritage;[6] the latter three are ethnic Makians, coming from a minority group that had dominated North Maluku's bureaucracy and parliament. Ultimately, as argued by Wilson (2008), Sultan Mudaffar's failure to manage ethnic sentiments and horizontal conflicts resulted in him losing the struggle for governorship.

At the time, North Maluku was engulfed by a bloody conflict, one that began as a land dispute but developed into an ethnic and religious conflict. The Sultanate of Ternate was at the centre of the conflict. In 1975, the North Maluku Regency government—citing the danger of regular volcanic activity—had begun relocating the Makians (most of whom were Muslim) from Makian Island to northern Halmahera, the traditional home of the Kao ethnic group (most of whom were Christian) (Burnet, 2011; Duncan, 2014; Wilson, 2008). After decades of tension, stemming from the Kaos' political and economic marginalisation at the hands

[6] Ethnicity is identified based on male bloodline. For instance, individuals who trace their heritage to Makian Island will continue to be identified as Makians, even after living in Ternate for generations, if there is no intermarriage with ethnic Ternates.

of the Makian, open conflict was ignited when the Habibie government issued Government Regulation No. 42 of 1999. This regulation, which created Makian Malifut District in North Halmahera Regency, was seen as violating the Kaos' traditional rights, officially marginalising them in their own lands and acknowledging Malifut as belonging to the Makians. Although most Kaos agreed with the creation of a new district, they opposed the use of the word 'Makian' to describe their land. Nevertheless, their protests failed to influence the Makian-dominated North Halmahera parliament. In August 1999, the first incident broke, when two Kao villages were attacked by Makians. Two months later, Kaos—both Muslim and Christian—destroyed Makian villages in Malifut and expelled all Makians from Kao land, thereby indefinitely ending the discourse regarding the formation of Makian Malifut District. Makians tried to elicit the sympathy of their fellow Muslims, both the ethnic Ternates and Tidores, by describing the conflict in Malifut as a religious one—even though no mosques had been destroyed (Wilson, 2008).

Sultan Mudaffar saw this as an opportunity to increase his political profile, especially in his stronghold of Dufa Dufa, in the lead-up to the gubernatorial selection process. To prevent further conflict in Ternate, Sultan Mudaffar mobilised his traditional guard (*pasukan Baru Baru*, commonly known as the *Pasukan Kuning* ['Yellow Squad'] for the colour of their uniforms) to patrol the city and prevent Muslim Makians from retaliating against Ternate's Christians. In this, the Sultan positioned himself as *Kolano,*[7] the protector of all and the bridge between this world and the hereafter. Owing to the minimal presence of military and police personnel in central and northern Ternate, Makians politicians and bureaucrats throughout North Maluku saw Sultan Mudaffar and his *Pasukan Kuning* as a threat and feared that his governorship would end Makians' domination of local politics. The Sultan's political opponents thus created pan-Muslim solidarity, especially amongst the ethnic Tidores who dominated the southern part of Ternate Island. These opponents created what became known as the *Pasukan Putih* ('White Squad').

As an extension of the political struggles between Bahar Andili and Sultan Mudaffar, two sultanates were resurrected: the Sultanate of Tidore by Andili and the Sultanate of Jailolo by Mudaffar Syah. The Sultanate of Tidore, which had existed in a vacuum since the 1960s, was reactivated to challenge Sultan Mudaffar's traditional dominance among the ethnic Ternates, Makians, and other ethnic groups in Ternate, Tidore, and Halmahera. It is thus no surprise that, soon after the coronation, Sultan Djafar Syah of Tidore allied himself with Bahar Andili. In response to Andili's resurrection of the Sultanate of Tidore, Mudaffar Syah recreated the Sultanate of Jailolo in Halmahera, a puppet sultanate that had been destroyed by Ternate in the 17th century (Bubandt, 2014; Leirissa, 1996).

The defeat of Sultan Mudaffar in the conflict between *Pasukan Kuning* and

[7] The title *Sultan* replaced the traditional title following the spread of Islam. Today, these titles are used for different purposes. *Kolano* is used to represent both the physical and spiritual worlds, the leader of all human beings and living creatures; it is not restricted to Muslims. The *Kolano* is seen as the bridge between worlds.

*Pasukan Putih* thus mirrored his stance in governorship and continued centuries of rivalry. In his quest for governorship, Andili had successfully reduced Sultan Mudaffar's traditional support by exploiting religious sentiments. Afterwards, Sultan Djafar Syah of Tidore received significant support, which enabled him to successfully contest the 2004 election for the Regional Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Daerah*, DPD).

Since then, the governorship of North Maluku has continued to be strongly contested. The first Governor of North Maluku, Thaib Armaiyn, came to power in 2002 with the support of the Indonesian Demokratic Party of Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*, PDIP), the ruling party of the time. Abdul Gafur, a Golkar politician who had also sought the governorship, had received the support of the North Maluku Parliament, but the Central Government had blocked his governorship after Gafur was investigated for alleged bribery. Sultan Mudaffar had been Abdul Gafur's running mate; as such, his aspirations were blocked after the intervention of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (The Jakarta Post, 2002). Ultimately, in North Maluku parliament, Thaib Armaiyn was chosen over Bahar Andili.

In 2007, the North Maluku elections commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah Maluku Utara*, KPUD Malut) denied Sultan Mudaffar's candidacy after he failed to receive the support of parties representing 15% of parliamentary seats (based on the 2004 elections); shortly before the deadline, one party—with less than 1% of votes—had withdrawn its support for Mudaffar. Several days of rioting, involving the Sultan's loyalists and centred on the Baabullah Airport, followed. Even though Sultan Mudaffar won his challenge in the Constitutional Court, he could not participate in the election, leaving incumbent Thaib Armaiyn and Abdul Gafur to continue their rivalry (Bubandt, 2014).

Ultimately, KPUD Malut declared that Thaib Armaiyn—backed by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's Democrat Party (*Partai Demokrat*, PD)—had won over Abdul Gafur—supported by Vice President Jusuf Kalla's Golkar Party—the winner by a margin of 900 votes. This decision, however, was annulled by the Indonesian Elections Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU), citing concerns of vote rigging—including two members of KPUD Malut. After KPU conducted a recount, it declared Abdul Gafur the winner. This case, however, was far from over: the Constitutional Court ordered a recount in three regencies. After fifteen months of 'double governorship', the central government intervened for a second time, installing Thaib Armaiyn as governor through Presidential Decree No. 85 /P 2008 (Nurhayati, 2008). KPUD Malut's appeal was denied by the Constitutional Court (Christanto, 2009).

Vote rigging continued in the 2013 governor election. As a result, the Constitutional Court blocked the winner of the second round, Ahmad Hidayat Mus (Regent of Sula Islands Regency), and mandated new elections in seven districts in Sula Islands. Abdul Ghani Kasuba, the incumbent deputy governor, was thus appointed Governor of North Maluku for the 2013–2018 term.

The political history of North Maluku since its creation in 1999 shows that ethnicity has been an integral part of local politics. The people of Ternate lost a series of political contests against candidates from other ethnic backgrounds. Also

influencing this loss was fragmentation within the sultan's family, as will be discussed in the following section.

**Political Fragmentation in the Sultan's Family**

Even though Sultan Mudaffar failed to gain executive office, he readily received support in national legislative elections, representing North Maluku. The Sultan's legislative performance since 1998 was been a continuation of his performance during the Suharto's New Order. Sultan Mudaffar began his political career as a member of Parliament of Maluku in Ambon (serving from 1971 to 1977). After this term's conclusion, he was chosen as heir apparent (*Sultan Muda*) of the Sultanate of Ternate, but the members of the royal family I interviewed said that he rejected the position and chose to work for various private companies in Jakarta. In 1986, he was inaugurated as the 48th Sultan of Ternate, a position that lacked any significant influence after decades of inactivity. His profile increased as he reactivated the *adat* communities under his domain, and again when he represented North Maluku in the MPR from 1998 to 2002, during the North Maluku conflict (Anggoro & Nara, 2010).

In 2004, Sultan Mudaffar won a seat in the National Parliament (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, DPR) with the short-lived United Democratic Struggle Party (*Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan*, PPDK; 2002–2009). He was one of the party's four DPR members, which only received 1.16% of votes in the 2004 election. He received 24,692 votes, a higher number than the other two members of parliament representing North Maluku. Initially, the Sultan had turned to PPDK because Golkar had not nominated him for deputy governorship (Aryanto, 2002). However, seeing no prospects in PPDK, Sultan Mudaffar left the party and pursued DPD membership in 2009 and 2014. He ultimately passed away in January 2015, at the age of 79 (Indonesian Elections Commission, 2014).

During Sultan Mudaffar's first term in DPD (2009–2014), several political parties tried to get close to him, not only to receive his support but also to reduce the influence of his fourth wife, Boki Nita Budhi Susanti, who had taken the Sultan's place in DPR. Initially, politicians had hoped that Sultan Mudaffar would give equal support to all parties and placed him above party politics, being the protector of all (as represented by his title *Kolano*). After Boki Nita, who was allied with the Democrat Party, received significant support in DPD (2004–2009) and DPR (2009–2014), local politicians had no choice other than asking the Sultan to join or become affiliated with their party. According to Ridwan Tjan, the head of the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), North Maluku Branch,[8] Sultan Mudaffar had become an advisor to the North Maluku PPP soon after he secured his seat in DPD in 2009. PPP, meanwhile, supported Sultan Mudaffar's son Ofa Hidayat Syah[9] in Ternate's 2010 mayoral election and backed his national parliamentary

[8] Interview with Ridwan Tjan, 11 November 2014, Ternate.

[9] *Ofa* is derived from *Jong Ofa*, an aristocratic title for the sons of the Sultan of Ternate. The Sultanate follows a male hereditary line, and all sultans add the title Syah to their name.

campaign in 2014. In 2014, it was expected that both Sultan Mudaffar and Ofa Hidayat would be PPP candidates, and if the Sultan were elected, he would resign after brief period and give his seat to Hidayat (thereby symbolically showing the smooth political transition in the Sultanate). However, the reality of the matter was different; Sultan Mudaffar refused the agenda for many reasons, and the electoral system changed from a closed list system to an open list system. Furthermore, interviews with local historian Herry Nahrawi and Golkar politicians Asgar Saleh and Syamsir Andili[10] indicate that the Sultan had 'returned' to Golkar as an advisor in 2013, as symbolised during a visit by Golkar Party Chairman Aburizal Bakrie to the Palace of Ternate's Palace. Parties' competing claims of closeness to Sultan Mudaffar further evidences that they sought to position him as the protector of all parties.

Sultan Mudaffar's political performance in the democratic arena cannot be separated from his immediate family's political journey, including their use of Sultan Mudaffar's charisma and Sultanate symbols to gain political support. Therefore, understanding the political participation of the Sultanate of Ternate should include Sultan's wives and children performance. The following section briefly describes members of the family and their political successes and failures since 1998.

The late Sultan Mudaffar had four wives from four different ethnic backgrounds: Manado–Caucasian, Arab, Ambonese, and Javanese. However, only Boki Nita Budhi Susanti—his fourth wife—has made any inroads in politics. Much about her past life and educational background remains a mystery, and this has become a source of internal conflict (Indonesian Elections Commission, 2009; Kompas Research Department, 2010). Sultan Mudaffar wed Boki Nita, who already had three children from a previous marriage, in 2000. Their marriage was unusual, as no celebration was held.[11]

A brief overview of Sultan Mudaffar's family is presented in the table below.

**Table 1.** ***The Family of Sultan Mudaffar Syah***

| Elisabeth Manoppo (Manado-Caucasian) | Thalha al-Mahri (Arab) | Deetje Drevenlya Amahorseya (Ambonese) | Boki Nita Budhi Susanti (Javanese) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Monalisa Mudaffar Syah (b. 1958) | Nulzuludin Mudaffar Syah (b. 1969) | Sofia Mudaffar Syah (b. 1971) | *Nesya Fitri Handayani (b. 1987)** |
| Iskandar Mudaffar Syah (b. 1959) | | Wiriawati Mudaffar Syah (b. 1973) | *Nadiah Tsabitah (b. 1989)** |

[10] Interview with Herry Nahwari on 16 November 2014, Asgar Saleh on 30 October 2014, and Syamsir Andili on 3 November 2014 (all in Ternate). The Sultan replaced Syamsir in Golkar after Syamsir contested the North Maluku governorship, disregarding the party's support for Ahmad Hidayat Mus.

[11] Wiriawati and Nulzuludin said that they had not been informed about the Sultan's last wedding, as no celebration was held (Assegaf, 2015).

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Soraya Mudaffar Syah (b. 1960) | Firman Mudaffar Syah (b. 1974) | _Hafizt Ayyashy (b. 1991)*_ |
| Muhammad Gozali Mudaffar Syah (b. 1962) | Sahmardan Mudaffar Syah (b. 1977) | Nabila Mariam Mudaffar Syah (b. 2002) |
| Usman Mudaffar Syah (1964–2015) | | Azka Nukila Mudaffar Syah (b. 2004) |
| Hidayat Mudaffar Syah (b. 1966) | | _Ali Muhammad Tajul Alam Mulk Putra Mudaffar Syah (b. 2013)**_ |
| | | _Gajah Mada Satria Negara Putra Mudaffar Syah (b. 2013)**_ |

_*: Sultan Mudaffar's stepchildren from Boki Nita's previous husband._

_**: Contested children due to internal conflict. The court concluded that neither Ali Muhammad and Gajah Mada are Boki Nita's sons._

Although the political performance of the Sultanate of Ternate was largely dominated by Sultan Mudaffar, two other figures within the family have made political achievements. First, the Sultan's fourth wife Boki Nita has been influential in the politics of North Maluku, having served as a member of DPD (2004–2009) and DPR (2009–2014). Her political journey began in 2004, when she won a whopping 36% of total DPD votes; the remaining 60% was divided between four other elected candidates. In 2005, she contested Ternate's mayoral election, losing by a slim margin against incumbent Syamsir Andili. In 2009, she entered DPR with the Democrat Party, 'swapping places' with Sultan Mudaffar, who had been elected to DPD (receiving 57,167 votes, the third most of the province's four representatives). His main support base was in Ternate, where he received 32,569 votes (40% of all DPD votes in the city). However, in 2014, Boki Nita failed to maintain her seat in DPR. This was largely due to internal tension, as well as her incapacity to receive the support of land-dependent *adat* communities (as I will discuss later).

Second, since 2004, Sultan Mudaffar's descendants have rarely performed well in elections. Of all of his sons and daughters, only Hidayat Mudaffar Syah has consistently participated in electoral competitions. His career began in 1997, when he was elected the youngest member of the North Maluku local parliament (representing Golkar). In 2004, he ran an unsuccessful parliamentary campaign under the short-lived Pioneer Party (*Partai Pelopor*, PP). In 2010, he campaigned unsuccessfully for deputy mayor of Ternate; he and his running mate received only 7.8% of votes, coming in last (Ternate City Elections Commission, 2010). Interestingly, Wahda Z. Imam—his running mate—had been a leader of the Makians

during the *Kuning–Putih* conflict of 1999. The union of both *Pasukan Kuning* and *Pasukan Putih* leaders, as represented by Hidayat Syah and Wahda Z. Imam, respectively, was part of an electoral strategy to gain the support of both ethnic Ternates and Makians. Finally, in 2014, Hidayat was backed by PPP in an unsuccessful parliamentary campaign, in which he competed against the Democrat Party-backed Boki Nita. In none of these competitions did Hidayat Syah receive significant electoral support.

Thirdly, Sultan Mudaffar's descendants have contested elections with the backing of many different parties, showing that their political careers have been more a matter of luck (benefiting from the Sultan's influence) rather than persistent effort and political calculations. As seen in Table 2 below, Sultan Mudaffar's children have been dispersed amongst many parties. In 2004, Ofa Hidayat and Ofa Gozali contested elections with the backing of parties that differed from those of their father; the former has changed party affiliations several times. In 2014, six of the sultan's children campaigned with six different parties.

Of Sultan Mudaffar's seven descendants (six children and one grandchild) who have contested elections, only his daughter Soraya had made inroads: during the 2004 election in the Sultan's stronghold in West Halmahera, where she benefitted greatly from her father's charisma. Ultimately, she only occupied the seat for six months, not only due to transportation difficulties—it was approximately ninety minutes by speedboat from Dufa-Dufa in Ternate to Jailolo—but also due to her lack of interest in politics. Sultan Mudaffar had asked her to become involved. In an interview regarding her involvement in the 2004 election, Soraya explained:[12]

*At the time, my father was more powerful than his sons or daughters. The party was not as popular as my father. I never campaigned (for myself) and I never (volunteered) to join that party. My father asked me to join (the election); just like that. (You) must win. That's all right. I did nothing. My father asked me (to compete).*

*Two or three years ago, he told me as I am not a highly educated woman, just a Grade 12 graduate, (I did not continue my studies) because of economic factors. At the time, my father did not have enough money to send us to university. Only Hidayat went to university, in Bandung. He said: 'You don't need a high level of education. You'll be too busy (doing assignments). Later I will make you the deputy mayor of Ternate.'*

Interestingly, despite limited previous electoral success, many still campaigned in 2014 election. Ultimately, seven members of the family participated in legislative elections at the national, provincial, and local levels. None but Sultan Mudaffar succeeded. In addition, the 2014 election was also marked by the participation of Sultan Mudaffar's granddaughter, Achita Nurain Zulkarnain (daughter of Soraya Mudaffar Syah), who was backed by the Golkar Party in the Ternate municipal election; in this, she challenged her uncle Firman Mudaffar Syah (backed by the National Mandate Party, [*Partai Amanat Nasional*, PAN]) and her aunt Wiriawati Mudaffar Syah (backed by the Crescent Moon Party [*Partai Bulan Bintang*, PBB]).

[12] Interview with Soraya Mudaffar Syah, 12 November 2014, Ternate.

Achita received only 108 votes; Firman and Wiriawati received 367 votes and 29 votes, respectively. None received the 500–1500 votes needed to be elected.

**Table 2.** ***Political Participation of Sultanate of Ternate Family Members, 2004–2014***

| | 2004 | 2005 | 2009 | 2010 | 2014 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sultan Mudaffar | DPR RI (PPDK) – *Won* | – | DPD RI – *Won* | – | DPD RI – *Won (73,815 votes)* |
| Boki Ratu Boki Nita Budhi Susanti (*fourth wife*) | DPD RI – *Won* | Mayor of Ternate *Lost (came in second)* | DPR RI (PD) – *Won* | – | DPR RI (PD) – *Lost (25,685 votes)* |
| Hidayat Mudaffar Syah (*son, from first wife*) | DPR RI (PP) – *Lost* | – | – | Deputy Mayor of Ternate- *Lost (came last)* | DPR RI (PPP) – *Lost (5,108 votes)* |
| Monalisa Mudaffar Syah (*daughter, from first wife*) | DPRD Ternate (PPDK) – *Lost* | – | – | – | – |
| Soraya Mudaffar Syah (*daughter, from first wife*) | DPRD West Halmahera (PPDK) – *Won* | – | – | – | – |
| Muh. Gozali Mudaffar Syah (*son, from first wife*) | DPRD Ternate (PDIP) – *Lost* | – | – | – | – |
| Iskandar Mudaffar Syah (*son, from first wife*) | – | – | DPR RI (PKP) – *Lost* | – | DPRD North Maluku (Golkar) – *Lost* |
| Firman Mudaffar Syah (*son, from third wife*) | – | – | – | – | DPRD Ternate (PAN) – *Lost (367 votes)* |
| Wiriawati Mudaffar Syah | – | – | – | – | DPRD Ternate |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (*daughter, from third wife*) | | | | | (PBB) – *Lost (149 Votes)* |
| Achita Nurain Zulkarnain (*Granddaughter, from Soraya*) | – | – | – | – | DPRD Ternate (Golkar) – *Lost (108 votes)* |

Source: Official election results, 2004–2014.

The participation of the Sultanate's family members in the 2014's election, in which only Sultan Mudaffar was successful, was a clear example of internal fragmentation within the family. Rather than choose a prominent political party as their vehicle, members of the aristocracy were targeted by small and short-lived political parties that required the support of traditional leaders to increase their popularity. Neither PPDK and PP, which were used in 2004, passed the parliamentary threshold for the 2009 election; both dissolved shortly after the election. Boki Nita had successfully represented the party of then-president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2009, but suffered from the massive loss of support for the party after massive corruption was reported.

Boki Nita's selection of different political parties represents internal conflict, both between Boki Nita and Sultan Mudaffar's other wives and children and between Boki Nita and the *adat* community. This conflict peaked when, two years before the Sultan's death, she made a claim regarding a 'twin sultan' that challenged the most important aspects of Ternate's male-dominated Islamic society. As a result, both *adat* communities and the Sultan's children banded together to oppose Boki Nita.[13]

Several other incidents have been detrimental to Boki Nita's relationship with *adat* communities. First, she built a 'women's mosque' next to Grand Mosque (*Sigi lamo*), the Sultanate's second-most important site after the palace. Second, she has positioned herself as equal to the Sultan, extending the palanquin tradition to include not only carrying the Sultan to *Sigi Lamo* but also to carry herself to the 'women's mosque'; in this, the Sultan's palanquin is used. The third source of conflict has been her reshaping of the Sultanate's structure, which is seen as going against centuries of tradition. This has resulted, for instance, in the displacement of the Sultan's brother, *Kapita Lao* Effendi Syah.

The most significant internal conflict, which has deeply influenced the political performance of her children with the Sultan, was the nomination of two boys (claimed to be Boki Nita's sons) as 'twin sultans' (*Kolano Maduro*). In 2013, Boki Nita—then 41 years old—claimed to have delivered twin boys fathered by 77-year-old Sultan Mudaffar. On September 11, 2013, when the senior twin Ali Muhammad and junior twin Gajah Mada were three months old,

[13] Islam has had significant influence on the history and politico-social structure of the Ternate Sultanate. See, for instance, Andaya (1993), Lay (2001), Putuhena (1980).

the boys were declared were declared the 'twin young sultans' (*Kolano Maduro*) by decree of the Sultan (*Jaib Kolano*). Until the boys reached the age of majority, Boki Nita would act as regent. Through this decree, the succession processes in the Sultanate of Ternate were transformed by introducing the Javanese concept of crown prince (Sidik, 2013; Usman, Husain, & Saraha, 2014). It eliminated the role of the *Bobato 18*, concentrating political and economic power in the hand of the Sultan and forcing an inland aristocratic structure on Ternate. This internal conflict significantly affected the political performance of the Sultan's family in the 2014 election.

Boki Nita's influence ended when the Sultan died in February 2015; the people of North Maluku were loyal only to Sultan Mudaffar. In January 2015, when the Sultan was spending his last days unconscious in his deathbed, a new *Kapita Lao—the* son of previous *Kapita Lao*, Effendy Jabir Syah—was inaugurated. Boki Nita was refused access to the Sultan when he was being treated at Pondok Indah Hospital in Jakarta; she was likewise prevented from joining her husband's funeral in Ternate (Malut Post, 2015). Two weeks later, her queen title (*boki*) was rescinded (Marwoto, 2015); her supporters in the Sultanate's structure were removed; and a new *Bobato 18*, traditionally responsible for choosing the next sultan, was established (Kasman, 2015). In August 2015, Boki Nita was investigated for suspected identity fraud regarding her twin sons; ultimately, she was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. Her political career thus ended with the death of her political patron.

Boki Nita's attempted abolishment of the *Bobato 18* was a perfect example of her incapacity to understand the politico-economic relations within the Sultanate. The eighteen delegates represented by *Bobato 18* were the leaders of the *adat* communities integrated into the Sultanate of Ternate. Unlike the centralised political system in Java, the Sultanate of Ternate was a federalist sultanate that depended heavily on the *adat* communities spread around Ternate and the surrounding islands. This will be explored below.

**From coastal to land-based aristocracy**

The sultanates and kingdoms of Southeast Asia have been variously identified as coastal and land-based (Bastin & Benda, 1968; Wolters, 1970). The coastal aristocracies of Indonesia are characterised by the 'absence of land property'; they rely on trade and fishery products, orient their palaces toward the sea, are ethnically heterogenic, and utilise a decentralised power structure. As such aristocracies rely on their control of harbours, their facilities, and the flow of goods, land property is not an important element of their economic and political power (Siddique, 1977). Coastal aristocracies tend to build up their navies to protect their interests. Naval chiefs are very important in their aristocratic structure, and most are either members of the inner family or the aristocracy.

On the contrary, inland aristocracies strongly emphasise agriculture, and water farming is an important political and economic element. Siddique (1977) characterises the agrarian proto-state as being characterised by social division (court and peasantry), court control over the agrarian economy, the absence of a substantial land-owning class, and administrative power being channelled through an appointive quasi-bureaucratic nobility. Wittfogel (1967), in his classic

work, notes that the largest aristocracies are hydraulic societies and civilisations that depend on water systems for rice field irrigation. The Unlike agrarian societies, which develop small-scale irrigation systems, hydraulic societies exert significant control over water—up to and including creating flood control systems.

The political structure of Ternate Sultanate was never designed as a land-based aristocracy; it was intended for a commercial aristocracy, one that strongly emphasised naval power and benefited greatly from the geographical conditions of Ternate. Geographically, the palace faces the sea and has its own port; together with its surroundings, known as *Dodoku Ali*, have been the sultanate's most important infrastructures for centuries. Second, Ternate's military forces (now the palace guard) are under the command of the *Kapita Lao* (the captain of the sea), a position traditionally held by the Sultan's brother. This *Kapita Lao* was traditionally responsible for both maritime trade and security, and thus the position was one of the most important in the sultanate. Third, institutionally, the Sultanate of Ternate has no special section for recording and managing land issues. Such issues are handled by the General Secretary of the Sultanate (*Tuli Lamo*), which is also responsible for many other affairs. The *Tuli Lamo* is required to possess a mastery of both Arabic and the Ternate language, further emphasising the importance of trade. Fourth, Ternate has no rivers and only limited fertile land on the slopes of Mount Gamalama. As such, it could not possibly create the hydraulic society described by Wittfogel (1967); indeed, before rice was imported, sago was the staple foodstuff in Ternate. Finally, traditional activities and rituals have emphasised the sea. This includes *Kololi Kie*, a ritual that involves circling the island by sea.

In the 1950s, during the reign of Sultan Jabir Syah, the Indonesian government replaced Ternate as the ruling sea trade authority. During this period, Ternate's sultanate was dismantled and inactive. Sultan Jabir Syah had been close to the Allies during the Indonesian National Revolution (1945–1949), and was the only Sultan who was 'saved' by the Dutch when the Japanese invaded in 1943. After his return to Ternate in 1945, Sultan Jabir Syah served as commanding officer of Netherland Indies Civil Administration (CONICA), leading a regional detachment of the Dutch-run semi-military organisation. During the United States of Indonesia era, when Maluku was part of the State of East Indonesia, Sultan Jabir Syah not only refused to become part of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia but also sought to buttress his position by creating a coalition between the sultanates of eastern Indonesia (Amal, 2010). After independence, President Sukarno exiled the Sultan to Jakarta, where he held an idle position (*Pejabat Tinggi Diperbantukan*)[14] under the Minister of the Interior. He visited Ternate only a few times before his death (Djaafar, 2005). When his son, Sultan Mudaffar, reactivated the Sultanate in 1986, it had already lost access to the economic revenue produced through trade.

[14] Sultan Jabir Syah's position in the Ministry of the Interior Minister was unclear. He had no staff and no definite tasks.

Land, therefore, was its only available means of controlling its *adat* subjects.

The Sultanate of Ternate has traditionally enjoyed a political basis at the village and district level, wherein *adat* communities pledge their loyalty to the Sultanate while simultaneously positioning themselves as his subjects. The Sultan chooses their leaders to serve as his vassals, but at the same time grants them rights in the succession process. Traditionally, the Sultan is chosen by an eighteen-member council known as *Bobato 18* (*Bobato Nyagimoi se Tufkane*). Members consist of *adat* communities, and collectively represent the 41 clans (*soa*) of Ternate[15] (Leirissa, 1996; Soelarto, 1976). During succession, it is the highest institution in the Sultanate of Ternate, and responsible for choosing the next sultan (Syah, 2009, pp. 6–7). It may choose the next Sultan from any of the late Sultan's sons and grandson, following the male hereditary line. Its decision is only deemed valid if its meetings are attended by the *Kapita Lao,* even though he has no voice. There is thus a mutually reciprocal relationship between *adat* communities and the Sultan: the *Bobato 18* chooses the new sultan from among the late Sultan's sons and grandsons, then become the subjects of this new sultan.

The unity between the Sultan and *adat* communities is evident in many ways. The Sultanate's emblem, the *Limau Gapi* (a two-headed eagle with a single heart), symbolises two leaders (i.e., the Sultan and the *adat* communities) with a common interest. Similarly, the people of Ternate often make cones of 'yellow rice' topped by an egg. The rice symbolises the people (*bala*), while the egg symbolises the Sultan (*kolano*); it thus indicates that the Sultan can only stand with the support of the people. Unity is further underscored by the colour of the dish: inside the white egg is yellow yolk, and inside the yellow rice is white rice (Syah, 1998). The unique 'democratic' form of the Sultanate of Ternate is quite unlike that of Indonesia's other sultanates, and has been perceived as the origin of Indonesia's political structure—or, at least, during the New Order era (1968–1998), when the president was chosen by the MPR, just as the Sultan of Ternate is chosen by the *Bobato 18* council.

The unique structure of Sultan–*adat* relations in Ternate have been economically and politically beneficial in post-authoritarian Indonesia. Economically, customary land is not subject to the 1960 BAL,[16] and as such *adat* communities have maintained access to and control of land.[17] Moreover, even though the BAL abolished land ownership for current and former sultanates, its

[15] The *Bobato 18* council consists of eighteen *adat* communities, which are identified with different names based on their territorial area: five *kimalaha* (Marsaoli, Tomaito, Tomagola, Tamadi, and Payahe), four *fanyira* (Jiko, Jawa, Tolangara, and Tabala) and nine *sangaji* (Tamajiko, Malayu, Limatahu, Kulaba, Malaicim, Tobolen, Tafmutu, Tafaga, and Takafi).

[16] See the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL), Law No. 5 of 1960.

[17] See Article 3 of Law No. 5 of 1960: "In regard to abovementioned Article 1 and 2, the implementation of *ulayat* rights and similar rights from indigenous law communities, if they exist, has to be concordance with national and state interests, based on national unity, and not contradict other laws and higher regulations."

framing of customary land was open to exploitation. In the case of Ternate, the sultanate has had the authority to use land through *cocatu* (royal decrees granting land to farmers while maintaining *adat* ownership). Many of the *adat* communities affiliated with the Sultanate are spread throughout the previous North Maluku Regency, but the strongest support has always come from Ternate.

*Based on Ternate's customary law, the sultanate's land is the land that is managed and controlled by the Sultan but not owned by him.*[18]

Even though the Sultanate of Ternate has historically relied on maritime trade and naval might, it has created rigid regulations related to agrarian issues. First, it distinguishes between coastal/sea management and management. The former is permanent, while the latter may be either temporary or permanent; individuals must exercise several temporary before being granted permission to permanently manage land. In some areas, the sultanate's people still guard the land. Such a practice has been used for centuries.

The Sultanate of Ternate divides maritime affairs into three categories, based on distance from the coast. The first is *Ngolo Sahe*, covering the coastal areas where people normally swim. *Adat* communities can harvest oceanic products in this area, including seaweeds, crabs, prawn, fish etc. Secondly, the deeper areas, where people cannot swim and fishermen require nets, is called *Ngolo Ngido*. Last is the open sea, called *Ngolo Lamo*. Such management is important in mediating disputes between fishermen, especially as modern equipment has been used. Larger boats are only allowed to operate in *Ngolo Lamo*, while more traditional fishermen can exploit *Ngolo Ngido* using simple nets and rods.

*Adat* communities receive temporary land rights based on the assumption that land was previously a forested area controlled by the Sultanate of Ternate. Temporary land usage rights begin with *Tolagumi* (cutting the rope), which is related to the traditional belief that designated forests were owned by the spirit world and that special ceremonies were necessary. This process must be approved by the Sultan in his capacity as *Kolano*, master of the seen and unseen worlds. By making offerings, *adat* people officially 'cut the rope' between the spirit world and designated forests. *Tologami* mostly involves communities. The second right is *safa* right ('cutting and peeling'), which allows the *adat* community to exploit forests by cutting and peeling the outer parts of trees, or by collecting resin; felling trees is not permitted. In this system, the first person to peel trees is the first to receive temporary rights. Third are *Ruba Banga* (forest opening) rights, which provide individuals with the right to fell trees and cultivate more economically viable crops (Taib, Soetarto, & Tonny, 2010).

Permanent land usage is fully under the control of the Sultan, as *Kolano*, but may be transferred to *adat* communities. Even though land is under the control of the sultanate, *adat* rules prohibit the Sultan from owning land individually (Asyhari,

[18] Interview with Gunawan, *Tuli Lamo* (secretary) of the Ternate Sultanate, 22 October 2014, Ternate.

2008). The *Kolano* receives two types of rights: *Aha Kolano* and *Raki Kolano*. The former is mainly used for food security, while the latter is used for other economic purposes. Only sago palms (*metroxylon sagu*) may be planted on *Aha Kolano* land, while other crops may be cultivated on *Raki Kolano* land. Both can be transferred to individual and *adat* ownership by decree. Before such a decree may be issued, the *adat* community or individual must be part of the sultanate's traditional structure and demonstrate their loyalty. The *cocatu* includes detailed administrative information about the land, including its size[19] and borders, as well as the name of the sultan and the subject. Signed and administered by the *Tuli Lamo*, this document has no time limit to its usage rights. Most *Aha Kolano* and *Raki Kolano* rights have distributed to *adat* communities since the 15th century.

The lands distributed to the *adat* communities may be owned by communities or individuals. Community-owned lands, known as *aha soa*, are managed by village chiefs, known as *fanyira* or *kiemalaha*. However, such rights have yet to be recognised by national law (Asyhari, 2008). The second type of traditional land right, called *aha cocatu*, confers individual ownership. This ownership is recognised by special decree; previously written in the Malay and Ternate languages (using the Arabic script), since 1960 such decrees have been used by the Ternate Land Office as proof of ownership when issuing private land ownership rights.[20]

Aside from the non-palace lands discussed above, the Sultanate of Ternate also has control over its palace land. These include the palaces (*Kadato* [main palace] and *Kadato Ici* [small palace]), the royal grounds (*Ngara Lamo* [main grounds] and *Ngara Ici* [small grounds]), the port (*Dodoku Ali*), three mosques (*Sigi Lamo, Sigi Cim*, and *Sigi Heku*), as well as several retreats and places around Ternate and West Halmahera. However, like other aristocratic artefacts in Indonesia, these lands have been subjected to the 1960 BAL and the national legal certification process.

Politically, both *adat* communities and the Sultanate are in mutually exclusive relationship. As such, *adat* communities have always given their votes to the Sultan. On one hand, the Sultan is representative of *adat;* on the other hand, he requires their support. This mutual relationship has been strengthened by the *adat* communities' loyalty to the Sultan. Gunawan, the sultanate's general secretary, describes this loyalty as follows:

*On one occasion, the minister was scheduled to come to the Kadato* (palace) *at 1 p.m. At 10 a.m., the Sultan said that he needed no more than 500 people to gather at Kadato at 1 p.m. By 1 p.m., more than 1,000 people had gathered at the Kadato. If, three hours previously, he had asked (for) 1,000 people to come, 1,500 would have come. They all came with adat clothes. They gave up everything they were doing to*

[19] The Sultanate uses *depa* for land measurement. It is approximately the hand span of a 1.7-meter-tall adult male. Ten *depa* is equal to one *taran* (Asyhari, 2008).

[20] Focus Group Discussion with the head of Ternate Land Office and his staff, 18 November 2014, Ternate.

*answer the Sultan's call. This has happened many times.*[21]

On some occasions, he used the traditional *Gura Gam* ceremony wherein *adat* communities gathered to meet the Sultan to campaign for himself and Boki Nita. He also used the *kololi kie* tradition to meet with supporters. On all such occasions, *adat* communities voluntarily gathered and prepared for the Sultan's visit. Such a visit was perceived as an honour.

As a central part of the economic and political structure of the Sultanate of Ternate, any challenge against sultanate's supremacy in *adat* land would face significant challenges. This can be seen in the case of the Hypermart supermarket, located a few hundred meters from the palace. Hypermart, a subsidiary of the Lippo Group, was built on reclaimed land after signing a contract with the Ternate City Government. It has become an important part of Ternate's economy, as Lippo invested Rp 150 billion (US$ 15 million) and created 350 jobs. According to Indonesian land law,[22] ownership of reclaimed land is granted to those who have transported land to the reclamation site (in this case, the Ternate City Government). However, this land is located in the sultanate's traditional domain, part of *Ngolo Sahe*, the circumlittoral area.[23]

Ultimately, the Lippo group was only willing to deal with the Ternate City Government, and the Ternate City Land Office did not provide a definite solution or official written recommendation (Ternate City Land Office, 2014). Syamsir Andili had begun the reclamation to create open space, and had never intended to construct buildings in the area. Construction had begun under Burhan Abdurahman, a mayor of Tidore heritage. In this, Burhan was supported by the Sultan Mudaffar; his deputy mayor was the sultan's nephew. However, he faced strong protests from other members of the Sultan's family. The Sultanate, in this case represented by Boki Nita, protested that the Ternate Government had not consulted the Sultanate regarding the reclamation and encroached on the Sultanate's asset (Seputar Malut, 2014). Boki Nita threatened to mobilise *adat* forces (*bala kusu sekano-kano*) to occupy Hypermart (Kabar Timur, 2014). Although this threat was never realised, it was sufficient for Hypermart to sell of its stock at deep discounts and close its store—only months after its grand opening. It re-opened a few days later.

Many of my informants claimed that, at the time, Boki Nita required financial support to finance her 2014 election campaign. She was always the Sultanate's representative in negotiations regarding Hypermart, while the Ternate City Government wanted to directly discuss the matter with Sultan Mudaffar. Ultimately, however, this case did not bolster support for Boki Nita, but was detrimental to her public image among voters in southern and central Ternate (many of whom benefited from Hypermart). The case seems to have stagnated after July 2014, not only because of Boki Nita's disappointing electoral results but also because of the succession scandal. The Hypermart case show how

[21] Interview with Gunawan, Tuli Lamo (secretary) of the Ternate Sultanate, 22 October 2014, Ternate.

[22] See Presidential Decree No. 122 of 2012.

[23] Traditionally, ownership of land controlled by the Sultanate was granted through *Aha Cocatu*, while ownership of land controlled by the Dutch colonial regime was granted through *eigendom*.

members of the Sultan's family failed to control land access during their political activities, as will be elucidated below.

**From Land Control to Ballot Box**

To measure political support in Ternate is to understand the interplay between ethnic and geographical boundaries. During the province's early years, land, ethnicity, religion and communal conflict was used by politicians to improve their political support or to undermine their rivals (Duncan, 2014; Klinken, 2007; Wilson, 2008). In 2014, Ternate City consisted of seven districts, with uneven population distribution. The three largest, South, Central, and North Ternate, represented 87% of Ternate's total population. Around 34% of Ternate's population lived in South Ternate; 28% lived in Central Ternate; and 25% lived in North Ternate (BPS-Ternate, 2014). North Ternate's population is predominantly of Ternate heritage, while South Ternate has a more heterogeneous population, one that is dominated by the Makayoas (Makian/Kayoa), Tidores, and Javanese. Such segregation was created during the colonial period, when the area south of Fort Orange was under colonial rule, while the Melayu Cim mosque northward was controlled by the Sultanate of Ternate. Central Ternate blended both, with south and north being demarked by Kesatrian Road.

Electoral constituencies in North Maluku Province, both DPR and DPD, have largely been determined by traditional ethnic lines. In the 2014 election, North Maluku Province had three DPR representatives and four DPD representatives. For the North Maluku Parliament, Ternate City and West Halmahera district constituencies have strong relations with the Ternate Sultanate. DPRD Ternate has four constituencies, marked by district boundaries: first, South Ternate and Moti Island; second, Central Ternate District; third, North Ternate; and fourth, Ternate Island, Batang Dua Island and Hiri Island (Ternate City Elections Commission, 2014).

Therefore, it is not surprising that Ternate royal family members have maximised their support in its traditional northern domains. In the 2014 election, Sultan Mudaffar (DPD), Boki Nita (DPR, PD) and Hidayat Mudaffar Syah (DPR, PPP) competed in the North Maluku Province constituency. Iskandar Mudaffar Syah (DPRD Malut, Golkar) competed in Ternate City and West Halmahera Constituency. In the Ternate Parliament, three family members competed, in Central Ternate (Achita-Golkar), North Ternate (Firman Syah, PAN) and Ternate Island, Batang Dua Island, and Hiri Island (Wiriawati, PBB) constituencies, respectively. None competed in the South Ternate and Moti Island constituencies. The figures below show the election result for DPR and DPD of the Ternate Sultanate in the Ternate constituencies from 2004 to 2014; due to administrative divisions in each election, the figures are divided into three tables, representing three consecutive elections.

**Figure 1.** ***Sultan Mudaffar and Boki Nita: Performance in 2004 Election***




*Source: Smith (2009, Annex D)*

The above figure shows that, in the 2004 election (with four districts), both Sultan Mudaffar (DPR-PPDK) and Boki Nita (DPD) received relatively similar electoral support from the Sultanate's traditional area in the northern Ternate and Ternate Island Districts. Sultan Mudaffar's campaign in North Maluku was more difficult than Boki Nita's, as he had more political rivals and was running with a relatively unknown party. In North Ternate, Boki Nita received 43% of valid DPD votes. While data on the total number of DPR votes are not available, it is known that Sultan Mudaffar received 9,034 votes; assuming that the total number of valid votes were not significantly unlike those of 2009 and 2014, Sultan Mudaffar received almost a third of the valid DPR votes. In Ternate Island District, Boki Nita received massive support (76% of votes), while Sultan Mudaffar received 4,193 votes (almost half of all valid votes). Of the three candidates seeking to represent North Maluku, the Sultan by far received the most votes: a total of 16,184 votes. For comparison, Abdul Gani Kasuba (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, PKS) received 5,425 votes and Abdul Gafur (Golkar) received 5,670 votes (Smith, 2009).

**Figure 2.** ***Sultan Mudaffar and Boki Nita: Performance in 2009***



*Source: Ternate City Elections Commission 2009*

The 2009 election produced similar results, wherein both Sultan Mudaffar (DPD) and Boki Nita (DPR, PD) received support from the Sultanate's traditional area. Central Ternate District had been created out of South Ternate and North Ternate districts, while Batang Dua had been created out of Ternate Island District. Both Sultan Mudaffar and Boki received massive support in North Ternate and Ternate Island districts, and to some extent in Central Ternate. They had less success in South Ternate and Moti. In North Ternate, Sultan Mudaffar received 63% of all valid DPD valid votes (competing among 27 DPD candidates), while Boki Nita received 22% of all valid DPR votes (competing among 81 DPR candidates). These included her son in-law Iskandar Syah, who received only 735 votes.

**Figure 3.** ***Sultan Mudaffar, Boki Nita and Hidayat Syah: Performance in 2014***




*Source: Ternate City Elections Commission, April 2014*

A similar trend was identified in the 2014 election, wherein Sultan Mudaffar again received the support of the Sultanate's traditional area; running amongst 32 candidates, he received 30% of all valid DPD votes in Ternate. In the newly formed Hiri Island District, long home to Sultanate loyalists, Sultan Mudaffar received an enormous 89% of valid DPD votes, while Boki Nita (running amongst 36 candidates) received 60% of all valid DPR votes. In North Ternate, Sultan Mudaffar received more than half of all valid votes. In North Maluku constituency, Boki Nita received 25,685 votes and Hidayat received 5,108 votes, but neither received a seat. Boki Nita received 2,500 fewer votes than Mohammad Yamin Tawary, running with the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN).

The above figures show that Sultan Mudaffar's political support came from areas where he controlled traditional land. In order to maintain political support, he used both the material basis of land and traditional practices. In terms of land control, he continued the traditional practice of distinguishing between temporary and permanent rights. Meanwhile, in terms of traditional practices, he used both *kololi kie* and *gura gam* to meet with his loyalists. Unlike other politicians, who must finance their visits to communities, *adat* communities considered Sultan Mudaffar's visits an honour. With the acknowledgement of *cocatu* as a means of transferring ownership and registering it in the national land system, this material relationship became stronger.

On the contrary, the capacity to turn land into political support was not transferred to Hidayat or Boki Nita. Hidayat did not receive control of land rights, as he is not sultan, while Boki Nita—as shown

previously in the Hypermart case—has had no capacity to use land issues for her electoral benefit.

## Conclusion

This article discusses one of few surviving aristocracies in Indonesian electoral politics, which exists within a newly formed province where ethnic identities remain strong. It demonstrates how the Sultanate of Ternate has been relatively successful in its political endeavours. Before his death in 2014, Sultan Mudaffar had won every electoral competition he contested since the beginning of political reform. His wife and immediate family, meanwhile, have a mixed record. I argue that Sultan Mudaffar's individual success stemmed from his capacity to transform land control into political support, as shown in the electoral results from areas traditionally under his control. His family failed to achieve a similar level of success, owing both to their inability to control land and internal fragmentation within the family. Rather than establish political coalitions and dominate local politics, family members have used newly formed political parties to gain support amongst the ethnic Ternate.

This paper gives an alternative answer to the King's Dilemma advanced by Huntington (1968), wherein monarchies would lose their influence as a result of modernisation and reform. The case of Ternate shows that, in a multi-ethnic society where the dominant ethnic group is struggling to maintain political supremacy, the Sultanate is seen as the cornerstone of their efforts to defend their ethnic interests. During the formation of the North Maluku Province, the ethnic Ternate had lost political control even though Sultan Mudaffar played a prominent role in the province's creation. Both the Sultan and *adat* communities benefited; the Sultan received political support by controlling traditional land use, while the Ternate people were able to defend their access to traditional land—an important part of their identity and livelihood.

Moreover, Corbett, Veenendaal, & Ugyel (2016) argue that personal attachment is key to the survival of small monarchies. I argue that, even though monarchy personalisation is important for accumulating political support and ensuring the survival of the monarchy, it cannot be analysed without considering the politico-economic relationship between leaders and their people. By analysing the political history of Ternate more deeply, this article suggests that material resources are also key to the survival of the aristocracy.

This article contextualises classical works on feudal society, wherein land is the primary resource in almost all feudal structures. Although feudal structures have been replaced by democratic institutions in modern democracies, this paper suggests that land control and democracy might be intertwined, where political support is accumulated through the combination of land access and loyalty to traditional leaders.

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# Shackled by Patriarchy and Poverty: Women's Experiences with Domestic Violence in North Central Timor and North Sumatra[1]

Smita Tanaya[2]

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***Abstract***

*This article discusses how patriarchal elements of society and culture, in conjunction with poverty, is necessary to comprehend the domestic violence experienced by women. This article departs from a qualitative case study of the experiences of women in Taekas Village, North Central Timor, East Nusa Tenggara, and Pondok Batu Village, Labuhanbatu, North Sumatra, and seeks to obtain a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of how patriarchy and poverty contribute to domestic violence. This article emphasizes that, although domestic violence knows no class, religious, or geographical boundaries, rural women who live in poverty are more vulnerable to domestic violence. This article is hoped to shed light on domestic violence in Indonesia, thereby increasing awareness and providing further impetus for eradicating said practice.*

***Keywords:*** *domestic violence, women, patriarchal culture, poverty*

## Background

*"There was this one time, when my husband and I were fighting about money. He hit me, then kicked me strongly in the back. I still remember... for three months, I could only lie down. To leave the room, I had to crawl. I don't know why I didn't divorce him from the beginning."* – Gani (age 40), mother of two children, Labuhanbatu Regency, North Sumatra.

Gani's experience with domestic violence is but one of many such cases in Indonesia. Data from the National Commission for Women (Komisi Perempuan Nasional, Komnas Perempuan) indicates that 348,446 cases of violence against women were reported in 2018; of these, 335,062 were cases of domestic

[1] The data in this article is collected through MAMPU, The University of Melbourne, and Universitas Gadjah Mada research project, "Forging Pathways for Gender-Inclusive Development in Rural Indonesia: Case Studies of Women's Collective Action and Influence on Village Law Implementation" in 2019.

[2] Smita Tanaya graduated from the Department of Politics and Government, Universitas Gadjah Mada, and took part as a Junior Researcher for Women Collective Action research project.

violence that resulted in divorce. The Commission's annual report for 2018 found that women often experience domestic violence 'behind closed doors', within the private sphere; domestic violence and dating violence accounted for approximately 71% of cases. More cases of domestic are reported every year; however, these reports fail to provide a comprehensive portrait of the reality of domestic violence in Indonesia.

Domestic violence in Indonesia remains as an iceberg phenomenon, with only a minority of all cases reported and publicly known. Owing to public taboos against discussing household issues, many women are afraid to discuss their experiences or report their abusers (WHO, 2009). Further exacerbating this issue is victim blaming culture, widespread both amongst general society and authorities, which results in women having difficulty in accessing appropriate services and finding necessary protections. Domestic violence does not recognize social class, ethnicity, religion, or location; all women are vulnerable.

Dobash and Dobash (1979) describe violence against women, including domestic violence, as a by-product of patriarchal culture. Patriarchal culture shackles women in both their public and private lives. According to Walby (1990), patriarchy refers to the aggregate values and concepts that justify men's dominance over women, and is often enforced and implemented through violence. The power disparities inherent to patriarchal culture are clearly evident, for example, in the household (Dobash & Dobash, 1979).

Patriarchal culture is one factor that contributes to the perpetuation of domestic violence. In many cases, it is significantly informed by women's class and socio-economic situation. World Health Organisation (WHO) research found that violence is particularly problematic amongst the economically vulnerable (WHO, 2002). Similarly, in the 2016 Survey of Violence against Women and Children in Indonesia, approximately 32.4% of respondents identified financial problems as the primary trigger (Utami, 2006). This survey also found that domestic violence is more common in rural areas than in urban ones. In rural areas, financial difficulties and socio-cultural pressures make it difficult for women to escape abusive relationships. Even after divorce, women may remain trapped below the poverty line; one study found that divorced and widowed women in rural Indonesia are far more likely to live below the poverty line than any other segment of society (Schaner, 2012). Furthermore, when violence occurs, women in rural areas have limited access to public services such as safehouses and hospitals (Eastman, Williams & Carawan, 2007).

Such findings have driven the researcher to expose rural Indonesian women's experiences with domestic violence. In doing so, it uses the cases of Taekas Village, North Central Timor Regency, East Nusa Tenggara, and Pondok Batu Village, Labuhanbatu Regency, North Sumatra. These villages were selected owing to their high levels of violence against women and children, as a result of which they have often been targeted for government and civil society programs designed to curb domestic violence (MAMPU, 2019). Previously, cases of domestic violence had been reported in both villages. However, owing to social taboos that limit women's ability to discuss their experiences, information on their intensity and victims was lacking. Interviews found that women experience both physical and psychological violence.

Geographically, both villages are located at the edge of their respective districts (Taekas is located 5.7 km/15–20 minutes from its district seat, while Pondok Bantu is located 19.6 km/30–45 minutes from its district seat). These villages remain reliant on agriculture. Owing to their relative isolation they lack access to public services, such as those designed to protect women, and thus victims often have trouble accessing appropriate protections.

These villages were also selected due to their distinct cultural characteristics. Taekas, in North Central Timor, has a relatively homogenous society. Residents adhere to social values that are rooted in Timorese customs and Catholic religious norms. All residents of Taekas are Catholic, and the majority are Timorese in heritage. Meanwhile, the social structure of Pondok Batu Village, in Labuhanbatu, is relatively heterogeneous. Residents are predominantly of Javanese and Batak heritage. The majority are Muslim (63%), with a sizeable Christian minority (25%); other religions are also present. Drawing on these villages' experiences with domestic violence, this article will discuss how the social values, religious norms, and economic conditions shape and even influence the practice of violence against women.

This study employs a qualitative case study approach. The qualitative method was selected for its major strength: its ability to provide in-depth exploration and written description. Case studies, meanwhile, were chosen to better explore the dynamics of violence against women in the selected villages. Primary data were collected in June, July, and October 2019, through interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), and participant observation. Fieldwork and primary data collection were conducted under the umbrella of the MAMPU research project, held by the University of Melbourne in conjunction with Universitas Gajah Mada. Secondary data were collected through a review of the literature, including local government reports.

This article is divided into several sections. The first section provides the background to the study and reviews the relevant literature. In the second section, data collected in the field are presented, first from Taekas Village and second from Pondok Batu Village. The third section will comparatively discuss and analyse the findings. Finally, the fourth section provides this study's conclusions.

## Patriarchy: Social Values, Religious Norms, and Poverty contributing to Domestic Violence

This article's main goal is to obtain an in-depth and comprehensive understanding of how the patriarchy and poverty contribute to domestic violence. It emphasizes that, although domestic violence does not recognize social class, ethnicity, religion, or location, rural women who live in poverty are most vulnerable.

### *Understanding Domestic Violence*

It must first be acknowledged that domestic violence is a complex issue that is influenced by a range of factors (Summers & Hoffman, 2002). Domestic violence covers various forms of physical violence, sexual violence, and economic violence, as well as psychological intimidation and assault perpetrated against one's intimate partner (Ganley, 2008; Lockton, 1997; Mullender, 1996). Such violence may also be understood as a

means of coercively proving a husband's power, dominance, and control of his wife (Litke, 1992); it thus reflects a series of complex power dynamics (Easteal, 2001). Although the term domestic violence can also be used to refer to various forms of interfamilial violence, including violence against children and the elderly, this article focuses on acts of violence perpetrated by husbands against their wives.

Records of domestic violence may be traced back to the 15th century, when husbands justified the use of violence to force their wives to behave as desired (Mullender, 1996). Such acts of violence were commonly used by men as 'punishment' for wives' failure to meet their expectations, perceived as men's prerogative as husbands, and used to assert men's superiority (Dobash & Dobash, 1981). Research has shown that domestic violence is gendered, with women more commonly falling victim to abuse than men (Graycar & Morgan, 2002). Geographically, domestic violence is endemic and commonplace around the world; it knows no racial, cultural, or economic bounds.

For instance, in 2016–2017 Australia recorded 4,600 cases of women requiring inpatient hospital care after experiencing domestic violence; this represented a 23% increase from 2014 (AIHW, 2019). In India, two in five married women between the ages of 15 and 49 have experienced domestic violence (Kishor & Gupta, 2009). According to the National Health Survey, in 2005, approximately 35% of married women between the ages of 15 and 49 reported physical violence; 81% reported that they had experienced such violence within five years of marriage (Kishor & Gupta, 2009). According to the Office of National Statistics, in England and Wales two women are killed by their partners (married or non-married) every week (ONS, 2018).

***Influence of Patriarchal Culture on Domestic Violence***

Dobash & Dobash (1979) describe physical violence against women as the most brutal and explicit expression of the patriarchy. In this, the patriarchy's dominance is often supported by local value structures, cultural customs, and moral standards that reinforce men's dominance over women (Dobash & Dobash, 1979) and ultimately result in power gaps and disparate relations (Eleanora & Supriyanto, 2020). As a result, women are often unable to escape abusive relationships and the cycle of violence. When women do attempt to escape their subordination, they are commonly perceived as behaving immorally, inappropriately, and abrogating the respect and owner owed to their husbands (Dobash & Dobash, 1979).

Violence is often reinforced, both structurally and ideologically, by patriarchal culture. Patriarchal elements are manifested within institutional hierarchies and within social relationships; individuals of specific backgrounds and classes (i.e. men) are given special rights, powers, and leadership roles, and thus positioned as deserving obeisance (Dobash & Dobash, 1979). Men are ideologically positioned as deserving and wielding control (Dobash & Dobash, 1979).

Structurally, meanwhile, women are subordinated in their everyday interactions with men (Walby, 1990). Such subordination is reinforced by the institutions of marriage and family. Titles such as "wife of" and "daughter of" follow women throughout their lives, shape public

expectations of them, and filter society's understanding of their "womanhood". Wives, similarly, are framed as the property of their husbands, and are thus secondary in the hierarchy of marriage. Morally and legally, wives are expected to behave as expected and desired by their husbands, and this further reinforces their framing as the objects of their husbands' control (Dobash & Dobash, 1979).

Such disparate power relations ultimately contribute to domestic violence (Dobash & Dobash, 1979). Institutionalized within the patriarchal family structure and shaped by patriarchal economic, political, and belief systems, power disparity between husbands and wives is viewed as natural and morally just—and even as sacral (Dobash & Dobash, 1979). For instance, one study of violence against women in Muna, Southeast Sulawesi, found that the disparate gender relations are manifested through dominance, subordination, marginalization, discrimination, and violence experienced by women is influenced simultaneously by the strong patriarchal culture and by economic factors (Obie, 2018). These conditions are exacerbated by the public perception that domestic issues are private ones, and thus inappropriate topics of outside discussion or intervention; as a result, many women have difficulty discussing their experiences (Dobash & Dobash, 1981).

A cross cultural study of traditional societies has found that domestic violence against wives is commonplace, and its intensity is strongly informed by social and structural factors (Ganley, 2008). Similar findings were made by Buzawa and Buzawa (1990), who show that sexual inequality and violence against women are influenced by social and cultural factors.

Domestic violence is commonly used by communities to emphasize men's control of women. For instance, in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Iran, dowries are commonly used to control women, and associated violence. This has produced what is known as dowry deaths: the deaths of married women, either by suicide or murder, often justified by the payment of dowries. Rather than honouring brides and their families, as initially intended, dowries have become seen as a means of 'buying' wives and gaining 'ownership' of their lives. Dobash and Dobash (1981) write that such violence tends to receive ideological and institutional support, both within the family and within the patriarchal society. Such traditions remain particularly strong amongst members of the lower economic class, whose financial instability results in unpredictability (Dobash & Dobash, 1979).

### *Influence of Economic Factors*

Economic factors also contribute to domestic violence. According to Goode (1971), individuals without power (income, education, employment) are more likely to use violence to gain control of their relationships (in Moe & Bell, 2004). A study conducted by WHO in 2002 showed that poverty is the greatest factor contributing to violence in intimate relations (WHO, 2002). It also found that women from lower socio-economic classes were more vulnerable to domestic violence (WHO, 2002). Studies by Zorza (1994) and Kurz (1995) found that domestic violence is a major factor contributing to homelessness among women. Kurz (1995) also shows a positive correlation between the intensity of women's poverty and the intensity of the violence they experience; the worse the poverty, the worse the violence (Kurz, 1995).

In *Beyond Gender: Class, Poverty and Domestic Violence*, Evans (2005) shows a complex relationship between domestic violence, class, and poverty. Evans finds that higher levels of poverty and class distinction results in women experiencing higher levels of violence. WHO's 2002 report *Violence and Health Laporan* similarly found that poverty is the largest factor contributing to violence, including 'violence in intimate relationships'. It found that levels of domestic violence were nine times higher in 'centres of poverty' such as urban ghettos than in more prosperous areas. Through a comprehensive review, Straus (1991) similarly found that the intensity of domestic violence is inversely correlated with class.

In *Women's Economic Inequality and Domestic Violence: Exploring the Links and Empowering Women*, Hughes, Bolis, Fries, and Finigan (2015) provide a theoretical and conceptual understanding of how micro-finance institutions, conditional cash transfers, and employment can transform household power relations, and this has implications for domestic violence (Hughes, Bolis, Fries, & Finigan, 2015). The authors recognize that poverty and gender inequality are related, and show that women are more vulnerable to poverty and economic instability than men. As such, the economic empowerment of women can reduce their risk of experiencing domestic violence. Although the relationship between women's economic empowerment and domestic violence is a complex one, being highly contextual and informed by the specific characteristics of various empowerment projects, addressing economic disparity ultimately has a positive influence on gender equality and reduces violence against women (Hughes, Bolis, Fries, & Finigan, 2015).

Eastman, Williams, and Carawan (2007) likewise show that poverty contributes to domestic violence, intensifying stress and hindering victims' efforts to escape abusive relationships. A study conducted by Logan et al. (2001) similarly found a correlation between poverty and violence against women, which was particularly strong in impoverished rural areas. A study conducted by SMERU in North Sumatra, Central Java, West Kalimantan, Southeast Sulawesi, and East Nusa Tenggara similarly found that poverty and limited access exacerbated gender disparity within the household, thereby making domestic violence more likely. Cases of domestic violence frequently occur when main breadwinners (most commonly husbands) are unable to provide for their families (SMERU, 2019).

## Domestic Violence in Taekas Village

Social norms in Taekas Village limit women's capacity to become involved in the public sphere, as they are expected to orient their everyday activities towards their families. Although women are not precluded from becoming involved in their communities, their activities tend to oriented towards improving family welfare. For example, many are included in Family Welfare and Empowerment (Pemberdayaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, PKK) and Women Farmers' Groups (Kelompok Wanita Tani, KWT). In Timorese tradition, women are expected to handle household duties such as cooking, cleaning, and caring for their children, parents(-in-law), and husbands. From a young age, women learn these mindsets and duties from their mothers, and over generations said mindsets and duties have shaped ideal Timorese womanhood (interview with Veronika, 30 June 2019).

Strong Catholic norms also inform Timorese understandings of family, including the perception that the family institution is a sacred one (interview with Father Gabriel, 29 June 2019). Outside the home, many women are actively involved in church activities, often forming small groups for religious activities such as Bible studies and choir practice. Nonetheless, their lives are still centred around their families. In the Timorese system, men must be honoured and respected as the heads of their households, while women must act as caretakers and followers (interview with Athalia, 6 July 2019). Men commonly use violence to maintain control of and power over their wives.

In Taekas, rampant poverty has limited the employment opportunities available to both men and women. According to data from Statistics Indonesia, approximately 56,940 North Central Timorese (22.45% of the regency's population) lived below the poverty line in 2019 (BPS TTU, 2019). As such, women have been driven to seek employment to financially support their families. Most work in agriculture, cultivating crops (corn, tubers, and jackfruit) or raising cattle. Other residents of Taekas make and sell food and drink products such as ginger wine and palm oil. One litre of ginger wine sells for Rp 15,000.

Outside harvest season, some women weave traditional textiles known as *ikat*. Weaving is an important Timorese tradition, one that has been maintained for centuries. Traditional textiles may sell from Rp 250,000 to Rp 2,500,000, or even more, depending on their colour and the complexity of their patterns. Such textiles can provide families with an important source of income; however, weaving is a lengthy and time-consuming process. Furthermore, owing to intergenerational gaps and changes in living conditions, many young women lack the necessary skills. As such, younger women are limited to collecting natural dyes from the forest or selling textiles elsewhere.

It may thus be concluded that the average household in Taekas Village ranges between Rp 500,000 and Rp 1,500,000/month. Approximately 60% of this income is used to cover everyday household expenses; the remaining 40% is allocated for education and other expenses. Economic conditions often force parents to dedicate themselves to working or sell their cattle to pay for their children's education. As education is perceived as a luxury, opportunities for education are limited to male children. Before the 1990s, it was rare for female children to attend school. It was held that educating daughters was a waste of time and money, as ultimately they would only be limited to domestic activities.

The strength of the social and religious norms that limit women to the domestic sphere has strongly informed the character of domestic violence in Taekas, including its continued secrecy. At the surface, no culture of violence is evident, as acts are perpetrated behind closed doors. Many women, when asked about domestic violence, indicate that they have never experienced such problems. They assert that domestic violence is not an issue in the village.

Nonetheless, in 2018, the Amnaut Bife Kuan (Yabiku) Foundation responded to six cases in the village (Yabiku, 2018). These were only reported cases; many other instances occurred below the radar. In interviews, many women indicated that they would not seek aid if they were to experience domestic violence, but would

rather discuss it with their husbands or their families. Some indicated that they would discuss the matter with their *mama* and *papa serani*.[3] Discussing matters outside the household would be seen as taboo. For them, domestic violence is a personal problem, and thus must be resolved within the family. As such, women generally feel ashamed to discuss matters with outsiders. Similarly, many women indicated that they were unwilling to become involved in their neighbours' households, as they believed that it was inappropriate to become involved in others' personal affairs (interview with Esther and Kristine, 3 July 2019).

Owing to this situation, women tend to normalize violence within the family. Disparate male–female power relations have become ensconced in Timorese culture, and thus they are not recognized or acknowledged by most women. An FGD with KWT members found that women in Taekas had varied views of the relationship between men and women, as well as the violence that occurs. They recognize both 'refined' and 'severe' abuse and violence. The former, which includes verbal abuse, emotional abuse, and light blows, is perceived as 'normal'.

*"A slap across the head, a small blow, that's normal for us. Shouting and cursing during fights, that's also normal. So long as there is no blood, no bruising, we will see it as normal living rather than domestic violence."* – Christiana, KTW member (Taekas, 2 July 2019).

Many of the women understood 'severe' abuse as domestic violence that leaves the victim bruised or bleeding (FGD KWT, 2 July 2019). Physical wounds are understood as the sole evidence of violence. Blows that do not leave such wounds are not perceived as acts of violence.

Aside from physical violence, men's control over women is also symbolically evidenced through the Timorese dowry tradition (*belis*). Although this tradition was initially intended to honour women, in recent years there has been a shift in public understanding (interview with Father Gabriel, 29 June 2019). Certain beliefs have become normalized; this includes, for instance, the adage "Once the dowry is paid, we surrender the rattan to the husband" (interview with Father Gabriel, 29 June 2019). In this adage, the rattan is understood as indicating power and ownership. Not only does it indicate that husbands are responsible for guiding their wives, but it also provides social legitimization for violence against women. Meanwhile, women tend to view violence as a valid response to their failure to fulfil the needs of their husbands and children. They thus normalize abuse as a means of teaching them to become better wives (FGD KWT, 2 July 2019).

In the CNT, the Church has recognized domestic violence as a social problem with severe detrimental effects on women. Pastors provide women with advice for dealing with domestic violence. However, they do not directly advocate for separation or divorce. At most, they will urge women to spend time apart from their husbands to address these problems (interview with Father Gabriel, 29 June 2019).

[3] In Timorese Catholic tradition, the *mama* and *papa serani* are a married couple chosen by newlyweds to witness their marriage and guide them in domestic life. As such, they may be consulted to discuss marital or family issues.

Ultimately, Church-led consultation and rehabilitation services cannot guarantee the transformation or cessation of domestic violence, and many women are trapped within the cycle of violence. Annulment processes are difficult, and only permitted without verification where the marriage itself is inherently flawed (for example, if either spouse is infertile). In all other cases, the Church must investigate the claim, which requires a significant amount of time. It is thus inappropriate for cases of domestic violence, which require immediate action and response (interview with pastor, 6 July 2019).

## Domestic Violence in Pondok Batu Village

Social norms in Pondok Batu strictly distinguish between men and women in their division of domestic labour. Men are expected to work outside the household and support their families, while women are tasked with handling domestic affairs. Women's domestic roles are constructed and narrated as part of ideal womanhood. Interviewees in Pondok Batu explained that domestic labour and childcare were their duty and their obligation (interview with Soemiyati and Uwak Titi, 12 October 2019). It would be considered strange for men to be involved in childcare.

Many women also face a double burden, being expected to support their families' finances by working outside the home. Often, Pondok Batu's women work as day labourers in the palm oil plantations that surround the village, receiving Rp 100,000 for five hours of work.

Some women leave Pondok Batu to find employment as domestic workers in Medan, the provincial capital. When doing so, however, they face significant stigma, being branded 'easy women' (i.e. prostitutes). One informant explained that, after deciding to seek employment in Medan, her neighbours accused her of irresponsibly abandoning her children and even of selling herself (interview with Soemiyati, 12 October 2019). Owing to such stigmas, it is difficult for women in Pondok Batu to find employment elsewhere. Several women involved in the Independent Women's Union of Pondok Batu (Serika Pekerja Independen, Pondok Batu) indicated that, before seeking outside employment, they had to give their husbands 'their share'[4] before receiving permission to leave. In such cases, children were left with their husbands (interview with Yuli, 13 October 2019).

*"Yeah, they say… 'Go, give your husband his share. So he'll let you join our meeting. Only afterwards can my friends and I join SPI activities in the City"* – Yuli (Chair of SPI Pondok Batu, 13 October 2019).

Women are driven to seek employment outside the home owing to significant financial pressures (interview with Soemiyati, Inem, and Siti, 14 October 2019). Often, they are economically neglected by their husbands, and thus must seek an alternative income to ensure household needs are met. Women's frustration with their role serving others is compounded by their fear of their husbands (interview with Gani and Larasati, 17 October 2019). Men hold power both in the household and in society, being the primary decision makers; women are positioned in a subordinate supporting role

[4] In Indonesian, *jatah*. In Pondok Batu Village, this euphemism is commonly used to refer to sexual/intimate relations between husbands and wives.

(interview with Tari, 13 October 2019). This is used to justify the perpetration of violence, both physical and psychological, against women. One informant indicated that she had experienced severe violence and financial neglect; however, as her husband was a respected member of the community, and was active in mosque activities, few believed her (interview with Gani, 17 October 2019).

For the women of Pondok Batu, domestic violence covers not only physical violence, but also emotional abuse and financial neglect. Several women indicated that their husbands had never provided them with the money to fulfil their household needs (interview with Larasati, Gani, and Ani, 17 October 2019). One woman's husband travelled outside the province and severed all communications. She was thus abandoned, without a formal divorce or even any knowledge of her husband's whereabouts.

Pondok Batu society associates childcare and domestic labour with women's work. Members of the community also hold that men have the right to control their wives, who must obey. This permeates all aspects of everyday life in Pondok Batu; women must be available for sexual intercourse, serve their husbands, and ensure their wellbeing.

*"Men feel as though they have a rightful authority over women. For instance, when they want conjugal relations, it is their right, and women must obey. It does not matter whether the woman has just given birth, or is menstruating... she must serve her husband. And this is a mistaken belief."* – Tari (Deputy Chair of SPI Pondok Batu and Chair of LBK, 13 October 2019).

Other common forms of neglect include divorce and extramarital affairs, the latter of which was experienced by almost all of the informants interviewed. Often, such extramarital affairs are precursors to violence against women, financial neglect, and ultimately divorce. Where such affairs occur, it is common for the women to be blamed; men's behaviours are often justified with claims that "the wife failed to care for her husband", that "the wife should have made herself up better, so her husband was proud and not ashamed", or that "the wife complained too much " (interviews with Tari, 13 October 2019, and Ani, 17 October 2019). Although such affairs involve both men and women, it is the women who are blamed.

*"Of the victims I've helped, mostly, when husbands and wives fight and fail to resolve their differences, the men leave the home and find another woman. One couple we helped, the wife had tried her best to serve her husband and to fulfil his needs, whatever they were, and he still cheated."* – Tari (Deputy Chair of SPI and Chair of LBK, 13 October 2019).

Violence against women in Pondok Batu Village is further complicated by alcohol and drug abuse (FGD with Village Administrators, 16 October 2019). When husbands become addicted to such substances, they are often unable to control their urges. When their wives are unable to satisfy them, they may experience violence. Alcoholism also contributes to violence against women.

Domestic violence and extramarital affairs are the two main causes of divorce in Pondok Batu Village (FGD with Village Administrators, 16 October 2019). Many of Pondok Batu's women have divorced at least once and then remarried (of the ten interviewees, five had been divorced and remarried at least once). Data from the Rantauprapat Religious Court indicates

that 30% of divorces cited financial neglect in 2016 (PA Rantauprapat, 2016).

Further violence against women is evident in the practice of child marriage, which is widespread not only in Pondok Batu Village but throughout Labuhanbatu Regency. The prevalence of the practice was confirmed through interviews; informants indicated that they had married between the ages of sixteen and eighteen. Child marriage is particularly prevalent owing to the widespread belief that it ensures social acceptance of young couples. However, new couples lack of knowledge regarding marriage and related values contributes to violence against women (interview with Liana and Hanna, 22 October 2019).

## Discussion

The violence experienced by the women of Taekas and Pondok Batu Village is influenced by cultural and economic factors. In Taekas, the homogeneous social and religious values of society have contributed to the normalisation of domestic violence. Owing to rampant poverty, the women of Taekas have difficulty escaping the cycle of violence. This finding supports the argument that, as tend to strictly adhere to cultural and religious customs, domestic violence is most severe amongst lower-class families and that women in such families are more likely to be subjected to male dominance and control (Dobash & Dobash, 1979).

Meanwhile, the economic structure of Pondok Batu—rooted in agriculture, but flexible enough to accommodate alternative opportunities for earning an income—has given women more ways to earn an income. As a result, violence against women in Pondok Batu tends to be psychological, including financial neglect and extramarital affairs. It may also be related to the dual burden of caring for the family while earning money outside the house.

Following Walby (1990), this article underscores that social values, religious norms, and economic conditions combine to shape the normative values and power structures that justify men's dominance of women and perpetuate the patriarchy. Following Dobash and Dobash (1979), this article holds that the patriarchal system is most evident in the practice of domestic violence.

This article discusses two factors that affect the practice of violence against women, as well as how these factors influence women's ability to escape the cycle of violence. These two factors are as follows: normative factors (social values and religious norms) and economic factors.

### *Normative Factors: Social and Religious Norms*

Timorese social norms that enable men to dominate public spaces, in conjunction with the conservativism of the Catholic Church, have contributed significantly to the perpetuation of social norms that subordinate women in Taekas. Owing to the marginalization of women in social relations, as well as the sacralization of marriage, violence in Taekas has been predominantly physical. Nonetheless, it remains an invisible problem, as the women of Taekas remain shackled by cultural and religious values that preclude them from escaping or discussing their experiences with violence.

The women of Taekas remain trapped within culture traditions that

perpetuate the cycle of violence, including a dowry (*belis*) system that justifies men's dominance of women's bodies as well as a moral structure that sacralises the institution of marriage (Dobash & Dobash, 1979). As a result, women cannot easily escape men's dominance or social control. Within both customary culture and Church canon, women who attempt to escape their husbands' control are seen as immoral people who have failed to properly honour and obey their husbands (Dobash & Dobash, 1979). Idioms such as "Once the dowry is paid, we surrender the rattan to the husband" perpetuate husbands' power over and 'ownership' of their wives, and are ultimately used to justify violence against women.

In Taekas, violence against women is often triggered by trivial everyday matters. For instance, a man may respond violently if his wife is late making and serving coffee, or if she has been too busy to prepare dinner for himself and the children. Such violence is supported by the Timorese cultural belief that 'service' and 'domestic duties' are part of ideal womanhood. Women's subordination within the family is also legitimized socially through such statements as "To become a true Timorese woman, one must serve wholeheartedly". As such, where women are unable to fulfil their domestic duties, men feel it is their right to punish/educate them with violence. Also contributing to conflict and violence in Taekas are: (1) economic difficulties, (2) knowledge gaps between husband and wife (male egotism), (3) jealousy, and (4) drunkenness.

These factors underscore that, in Timorese culture, men are viewed as the wielders of power and privilege. Because such patriarchal culture is strongly institutionalized, when women attempt to escape it, they are perceived as challenging the structure of society and thus pressured—often through violence—to return to their 'place in the hierarchy' (Dobash & Dobash, 1979). Previous studies have shown that domestic violence is influenced by a range of factors, and may even occur in response to them (Lockton, 1997). In Taekas, the stress of poverty has amplified the potential for spousal abuse. Furthermore, the practice of alcoholism—itself driven in part by poverty—has further increased the prevalence of domestic violence (Lockton, 1997).

Similar phenomena are indicated in Pondok Batu, where the social construction of women and womanhood has subordinated women in the household. Nonetheless, as social values and religious norms are not as tangible in Pondok Batu as they are in Taekas, men and society control women using different means. Physical violence against women, thus, is not as prominent. Rather, women in Pondok Batu are more commonly subjected to psychological violence, including financial neglect and extramarital affairs.

This has been influenced by the social construction of ideal womanhood in Pondok Batu. For local residents, the perfect wife is one who nurtures her children and serves her husband. Women are expected to understand, serve, and obey their husbands, as well as to become good mothers for their children; indeed, in Pondok Batu, there is even a belief that childcare is exclusively women's work, and this construction of ideal womanhood often contributes to domestic violence. Furthermore, in Pondok Batu, both men and women see men doing domestic labour (cleaning, caring for children, etc.) as inappropriate and even taboo. Women's

subordination and disparate positioning is thus clearly evident.

Field research in both villages found that social norms, rooted in religious values, normalize the practice of violence against women. These norms legitimize husbands' use of physical, verbal, and economic violence against their wives. In Taekas, for instance, women understand physical violence as their husbands' means of educating them, and thus accept it to an extent. Similarly, in Pondok Batu, women's perceived shortcomings are often used to justify men's decision to neglect them or to conduct extramarital affairs. Ultimately, as a result of normative values that subordinate them and legitimize their husbands' dominance, women are unable to oppose male control or escape the cycle of violence.

***Economic factors***

Without economic capital, women lack bargaining power within the household and they are positioned as inferiors. Research shows that lower-class women, particularly those that live in poverty, are more vulnerable to domestic violence (Evans, 2005; Moe & Bell, 2004; WHO, 2002; Eastman, Williams & Carawan, 2007; Hughes et al., 2015). This also holds true for Taekas and Pondok Batu, where most incidents of domestic violence can be traced to household financial difficulties.

In both Taekas and Pondok Batu, women and children are financially dependent on their husbands. As such, when husbands fail to earn enough to support their everyday needs, this causes domestic problems and conflict. Usually, women must ask their husbands for the money necessary to meet their daily needs, as men do not set aside money for food, education, etc. In Taekas Village, families must also allocate sufficient money for expensive social activities, including traditional rituals and church gatherings; failure to contribute to such activities would bring a family great shame. However, single-income families tend have difficulty covering all of their expenses. Where every day needs are not met, friction and ultimately violence may occur.

In both Taekas and Pondok Batu, women contribute significantly to their families' finances. However, as they are the heads of their families and as they are not burdened with domestic duties, men have greater control (Munoz, 1998). Women, conversely, are constrained by their dual domestic and economic burdens. The economic disenfranchisement of women within their families, thus, leaves women and children more vulnerable to domestic violence.

In Taekas, husbands' limited income—coupled with the financial burden of family expenses and social rituals—leads to women entering the workforce. However, even with two incomes, families are sometimes incapable of ensuring their needs are met. Earning an income, it appears, does not guarantee that women can escape domestic violence.

Also contributing to domestic violence is the knowledge gap between husbands and wives. For generations education was only available to male children; the vast majority of female children were not sent to school. Only in recent decades have families educated their daughters, some to the university level. Many have shown themselves to be more dedicated and committed to their studies than their male classmates. Often, young women continue their studies in the cities of Kefamenanu or Kupang, then

return to Taekas to marry a local man. Knowledge gaps frequently result in friction within the household. Even when they dropped out of school, men feel themselves superior to their wives, and use violence to assert their dominance within the household.

Meanwhile, owing to rampant drug abuse and financial neglect, the women of Pondok Batu have no choice but to become financially independent. To cover their families' everyday expenses, such as food and education, women are forced to bear a dual burden. Many work as day laborers at palm oil plantations, while others seek employment in Medan and other major urban centres. However, women who travel in search of employment face significant stigma. One young woman, who sought employment outside Pondok Batu after being economically neglected by her husband, narrated that local gossips had branded her a cheap whore. She explained that such stigma was commonly attached to women who had experienced financial neglect.

Although residents of Pondok Batu have more opportunities to improve their economic welfare than residents of Taekas, this does not significantly affect their bargaining power within the household. Owing to local beliefs, the women of Pondok Batu are limited in their ability to act. Often, they have difficulty obtaining their husbands' permission to work/travel outside the village, even when travelling in a group and returning the next day. Women's inability to become 'perfect wives' often leads to them experiencing psychological violence.

**Conclusion**

Through its study of two villages, this article has found that social values, religious norms, and economic difficulties are major drivers of the domestic violence they experience. For instance, in Taekas, patriarchal values are institutionalized within the everyday lives of the women through Timorese culture. This is exacerbated by poverty, which limits their ability fulfil their everyday needs and ultimately drives domestic violence. Patriarchal culture is similarly tangible in Pondok Batu, where men are perceived as the breadwinners and primary decision-makers. However, there are differences: poverty is omnipresent in Taekas, and women are thus required to seek additional income to support their families, while in Pondok Batu economic problems are driven by widespread drug abuse. Although families' average incomes in Pondok Batu are relatively higher than in Taekas, this money is often used to acquire narcotics; as a result, women are unable to ensure their families' everyday needs are met. In both cases, where families' needs are not met, women are more vulnerable to domestic violence.

This article has shown that domestic violence is experienced by women of various class, economic, religious, and cultural backgrounds. However, poor rural women who live in a patriarchal society are most vulnerable. Consequently, programmes that seek to eradicate domestic violence must recognize and consider these factors.

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# Why have Anti-Offshore Tin Mining Movements Failed in Bangka but Succeeded in East Belitung? Political Opportunity Structures and Political Settlement in the Context of Indonesia's Democratic Future

Eko Bagus Sholihin[1]

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**Abstract**

*Civil society movements have occupied an important position in Indonesia's democratisation. This article seeks to determine why anti-offshore tin mining movements in the post-authoritarian era failed in Bangka but succeeded in East Belitung, an area where tin mining has historically been important. By analysing the political opportunity structures and political settlement mechanisms involved, this article argues, first, that the movement's success in East Belitung can be attributed to open political access, fragmentation within elite circles, and alliances with influential elites; such political opportunities were not available in Bangka. Second, in Bangka, the local bourgeoisie and brokers used clientelistic approaches in their political settlement and prevented resistance by co-opting local communities within the extraction chain. In East Belitung, meanwhile, such efforts were stymied by the lack of local bourgeoisie, the strength of environmental awareness, and the availability of alternative economic resources. It may thus be concluded that, while a clientelistic approach to settlement may prevent conflict, it also limits the political participation of civil society movements—an important element of democracy.*

***Keywords:*** *Resistance movements; political opportunity structures; political settlement; offshore tin mining; Bangka Belitung*

## Introduction

Since the fall of Suharto's authoritarian regime, Indonesia's transition to democracy has coincided with the rise of local resistance movements and increased conflict. Since the late 2000s, ethnic violence has given way to widespread conflict over natural resources (Diprose, 2008). Such conflicts are often triggered by

[1] The author is a lecturer at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Raden Fatah State Islamic University, Palembang, Indonesia. Email: ekobagussholihin@gmail.com

the arrival of extractive industries, which stimulate land disputes and opposition to mining activities (Diprose & Azca, 2020; Manalu, 2007; Situmorang, 2013).

One major driver of conflict over natural resources in post-authoritarian Indonesia has been anomalies in its democratisation process. The country's democratisation has resulted in the duplication of local predatory elites, who have co-opted democracy for their own purposes. Through patronage and clientelism mechanisms, those who have access to natural resources remain capable of strategically influencing policy (Aspinall, 2011). Although clientelism in political and economic structures varies in form and level from region to region, as a rule it is generally used to ensure that political and economic power structures advance elite interests rather than the common good. As such, extractive activities often face resistance (Aspinall, 2011).

Elsewhere, political scientists have argued that civil society movements, which serve a social control function, have proven a breath of fresh air for democratisation (Della Porta, 2013). In linking resistance movements with democratisation, the political process approach—as well as its political opportunity structure (POS) concept—has been particularly popular (McAdam, 1996). According to this concept, it is political structures—rather than internal factors—that shape the rise, structure, scope, and success of movements (McAdam, 1996; Wahlstrom, 2016).

Reflecting on the political and economic structures of post-authoritarian Indonesia, it is apparent that increased political openness has coincided with the rise of clientelism in and conflict over resource extraction. As such, this article explores the dynamics of resistance movements in democratic Indonesia and said movements' power relations with formal/informal institutions in the extractive sector. More specifically, this article seeks to determine why resistance movements in East Belitung were more extensive and successful in opposing offshore mining than similar movements in nearby Bangka.

Both Bangka and Belitung have strong historical ties with tin extraction (Erman, 2009). However, while offshore mining has become widespread in Bangka, it remains scarce in Belitung. When plans to commence offshore in East Belitung were announced to the public in 2016, they faced heave resistance from local fishermen and residents (Ibrahim et al., 2018; Diprose et.al., 2020) As of 2020, resistance movements have successfully blocked offshore tin mining in East Belitung. Conversely, resistance movements were less widespread in Bangka. If the social, economic, and environmental impact of such extraction was equally detrimental in both areas, why was resistance less extensive in Bangka? This question will be answered herein, leaning on two key concepts: political opportunity structures and political settlement.

In its analysis of resistance movements in Bangka–Belitung, this article's theoretical contribution lies in its operationalisation of the political opportunity structures (POS) concept within the framework of Indonesia's local politics. In the literature on political processes in Indonesia, POS are commonly defined as democratic and open configurations of the political system that

provide the public with more opportunities to participate in local politics and influence policy (Manalu, 2007). Such a definition views POS as a national project, one that began with *Reformasi* in 1998. By operationalising the definition of POS offered by Sidney Tarrow (1996), this article returns to Eisinger (1973) and his emphasis on the local dimensions of POS—dimensions that have often been neglected in analysis (Heidjen, 1997; Heidjen, 2006; Manalu, 2007; Wahlstrom, 2006; Clayton, 2018; Gomza & Zajaczkowski, 2019). Political and economic structures vary from region to region, and this affects the characteristics and achievements of local resistance movements.

This article also seeks to explore the future of narrow political settlement, answering the question posed by Diprose and Azca (2020): what will happen to political settlement when brokers fail, and what will happen when the environmental consequences of natural resource extraction are so extreme that potential benefits are deemed insignificant? (Diprose & Azca, 2020). In this article, the economic and political dynamics of the extractive industries in Bangka will be used to represent a narrow political settlement (clientelist political settlement) that has succeeded, while those in Belitung will be used to represent one that failed.

Finally, and practically, this article employs a comparative method—especially in its analysis of political settlement. Studies of tin mining in Bangka and Belitung are commonplace, as are studies of related conflicts (Harahap, 2012; Erman, 2010; Zulkarnain, 2005; Indra, 2014; Zulkarnain, 2018; Ibrahim et al, 2018; Nugraha, 2020). However, no such studies have employed a comparative approach, even though such an approach offers a beneficial means of identifying the particular social, political, cultural, and economic characteristics of areas with similar natural resources, distinguishing between these areas, ascertaining when and how differences emerged, and understanding how these differences influence local communities' specific responses to resource extraction.

## The Future of Democratisation: Rediscussing Political Opportunity Structures, Political Settlement, and Social Movements at the Local Level

In the literature on social movements, it is commonly concluded that successful movements originate from the financially disadvantaged and socio-culturally marginalised, and that they are made possible by democratic political practices (Fishman, 2017). In other words, democracy is commonly perceived as providing ideal conditions for social movements to rise and thrive. At the same time, social movements are recognised as contributing importantly to the democratisation process (McAdam, 1996). In the political process approach, democracy is understood as an opportunity structure. As argued by Gamson and Meyer (1996), democracy provides social movements with the opportunity to access channels for political protest; at the same time, social movements contribute to the creation of democracy.

Although the reciprocal relationship between POS and social movements was most popular amongst political process scholars, this approach remains relevant today. Worldwide, urban social movements have mushroomed at the local level,

embracing a range of issues and establishing transnational and international networks. The availability of political access, thus, may be supplemented by another variable: access to technology (Domaradzka, 2018). Consequently, technology may be considered a new instrument for analysing POS, one absent from the studies undertaken by Brockett (1991), Kriesi et al. (1992), Tarrow (1994), and McAdam (1996), almost three decades ago.

Given the strengthening of transnational and international ties between social actors and local regulators in recent years, it is becoming increasingly important to employ a dynamic analysis that reaches beyond the national. For example, the transnational environmentalist movement Friends of the Earth has urged global media (*The Guardian*, BBC, and CNN) and global electronic companies to pressure local regulators and extractive industries to implement a sustainable tin supply chain in Bangka–Belitung (Diprose et al., 2020). Such global pressure on regulators and local industries has shaped the specific political and economic characteristics of local actors, underscoring the power of local and global interactions. This underscores the importance of employing the POS concept for local-level analysis.

Over the course of Indonesia's democratisation and decentralisation, one authority that has been delegated to local governments is the authority to issue extraction permits (Diprose & Azca, 2020). This has significantly transformed local political and economic power structures throughout the country, and each area has developed its own specific economic and political structures that reflect its unique socio-historical, economic, and geographical conditions.

At the same time, decentralisation has intensified competition between local actors in their efforts to control the distribution of resources and related benefits (Diprose & Azca, 2020). McCarthy (2004) argues that decentralisation has created an unstable socio-legal configuration, and this implies conflict in the natural resource sector. In Bangka–Belitung, the liberalisation and deregulation of tin policy since 1999 has created a tug-of-war between the central, provincial, and regency governments, as well as conflicts of interest between local communities, entrepreneurs, and governments (Zulkarnain, 2005). As such, political settlement is necessary to prevent potential conflict.

Understanding the mechanisms of political settlement, and the specific effects of said mechanism, is thus important. In Riau, political settlement has been realised through narrow and exclusive means, i.e. by increasing local governments' share of the profits while simultaneously increasing elite brokers' control by allowing them to distribute benefits amongst residents involved in the extraction chain. Such settlement and brokerage not only stifled potential separatist movements, but also prevented conflict over natural resources in Riau (Diprose & Azca, 2020). We ask, however, what happens when elites and brokers fail to distribute their profits, or when external factors (such as environmental considerations) result in continued opposition? In the democratisation process, is it better when civil society movements are controlled through narrow and exclusive approaches to political

settlement, or when said movements have access to broader and more inclusive approaches? This study's novelty and contribution to the politics of settlement in Indonesia thus stems from its answer to this question.

**Political Opportunity Structures and Political Settlement**

This article employs two concepts: political opportunity structures and political settlement. These concepts, used in conjunction, provide a means of ascertaining why the anti-offshore mining movement succeeded in East Belitung but failed in Bangka. The author's decision to use these two concepts in conjunction will be explained below.

Social movements—including their motivations, goals, targets, strategies, and tactics—do not exist within a vacuum. Activists' knowledge, creativity, and activities can only be understood and evaluated by considering the political structures that determine the rules of the game (Meyer, 2004). It is this assumption that underpins the concept of political opportunity structures, as well as said concept's application in examining social movements (Heijden, 2006).

As a concept, POS was first introduced by Eisinger (1973), who used it to analyse the extent of unrest in forty-three cities in the United States. He found that protests were most prominent in cities that employed a mixed political system—open and closed simultaneously (Eisinger, 1973, in Heijden, 2006). Eisinger thus defined POS as "the degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to power and to manipulate the political system" (McAdam, 1996). Interest groups' ability to manipulate the political system is strongly informed by said system's openness. As argued by Kitschelt (1986), the inclusiveness (or exclusiveness) of political structures is informed by the number of political parties, the independence of legislative institutions, and the presence of intermediates (Kitschelt, 1986, in Heijden, 2006).

After reviewing these definitions, the author reviewed the elements that enable POS to function. No fewer than four scholars have sought to identify the operational dimensions of such structures: Brockett (1991), Kriesi et al. (1992), Rucht (1989), and Tarrow (1994). In this article, the author will borrow the dimensions offered by Tarrow (1994), i.e. the inclusivity/exclusivity of political access, the existence of elite fragmentation, and the ability to establish alliances with elites (Tarrow, 1994, in McAdam, 1996; Heijden, 2006; Gomza & Zajaczkowski, 2019).

POS has become known for its highly inclusive operational dimensions (Heijden, 2006), and McAdam (1996) argues that this inclusivity has dulled its analytical edge and invited misinterpretation. To avoid such problems, this article uses the three dimensions offered by Tarrow (1994): political access (open/closed), degree of elite fragmentation (fragmented/consolidated), and alliances with elites (existent/non-existent) (Heijden, 2006). All are relevant to the case of Bangka–Belitung, and all would contribute to this article's analysis of POS and its influence on the success of resistance movements in the area.

This study's second theoretical pillar is the concept of political settlement, which is used to analyse the power relations between social movements and their

competitors (i.e. state and private sector actors) in resource conflict as well as the power relations between state actors and extractive industries (Bebbington, 2015, in Winanti, 2020). By employing this concept, POS' inability to recognise the influence of informal actors (local bourgeoisie and brokers) on formal institutions' policymaking will be mitigated. POS lacks the tools necessary to explain how informal actors influence government actors' agenda setting, thereby ensuring that their own interests are advanced.

Scholars' use of political settlement stems from their concern for local political and economic elites' ability to maintain power and advance their specific interests by co-opting formal institutions, and the skill with which they do so (Di John & Putzel, 2009, in Winanti et al., 2020). Di John (2009) defines political settlement as "the balance or distribution of power between contending social groups and social classes, on which any state is based" (Di John & Putzel, 2009, in Winanti et al., 2020). Key to its analysis, thus, is an understanding of how power is distributed and how those in power compete to control the distribution of resources (Khan, 2010). Political settlement is achieved when profit-sharing mechanisms are approved and supported by the institutions that distribute power in society, thereby enabling said institutions to endure, to create political stability, and to minimise conflict—albeit sometimes without political justice or inclusiveness (Diprose & Azca, 2020)

In the context of post-authoritarian Indonesia, political settlement is often associated with power contention and efforts to control the distribution of profits from the extractive sector. It has emerged within a context where many are economically and politically reliant on the extraction of natural resources (Winanti, 2020). Power is created not through the structural distribution of social and economic power, but rather through elite alliances' competition to control the distribution of the extractive sector's economic and political benefits (Diprose et al., 2020 in Winanti et al., 2020)

Khan (2010) identifies four types of political settlement, with the two most relevant for this discussion being capitalist political settlement and clientelist political settlement. Capitalist political settlement refers to situations where power is wielded by formal institutions and by individuals who enjoy legal ownership. It is characterised by impersonal compliance mechanisms (following "rules of the game" rather than personal rules), and by formal institutions wielding power that is legally bestowed upon them (Khan, 2010). Such capitalist political settlement is generally found in developed countries, where it is realised using an inclusive, coordinated, and impersonal approach (Kelsall, 2016).

Conversely, clientelist political settlement relies on personal compliance mechanisms (patronage and clientelism). In this form of political settlement, power is generally wielded by non-formal institutions, who use paternalistic mechanisms to control access to the distribution of natural resources and related benefits. Generally, they do so in direct opposition to formal institutions and regulations (Khan, 2010). Clientelist political settlement—characterised as exclusive, spoils-driven, and personalised—is most common in developing and authoritarian countries (Kelsall, 2016).

Considering both forms of political settlement is necessary when comparatively analysing the distribution of natural resources in Bangka–Belitung. Reflecting Diprose and Azca (2020), who found that the application of narrow political settlement in Riau limited the rise of separatist movements, this article argues that clientelist political settlement was used by Bangka's local bourgeoisie and brokers to curtail the growth of the anti-offshore mining movement. Conversely, in Belitung, the rise and ultimate success of the anti-offshore mining movement was not indicative of a truly capitalist political settlement process, but rather reflected the failure of clientelist actors. Why did they fail? This will be explored below.

This article employs qualitative research, using the comparative method, and uses empirical evidence to identify similarities and differences in the social, political, and economic conditions of Bangka and Belitung (within the context of offshore mining), as well as the implications of these similarities and differences (Chilcote, 2004). Data were collected between 2017 and 2019 through in-depth interviews, participant observation, and a review of secondary sources. Data were subsequently validated using the triangulation method. To answer the research question, data were analysed comparatively.

## Tin Mining in Bangka–Belitung: Its History, Dynamics, and Distinctions

The islands of Bangka and Belitung, which collectively form Bangka–Belitung Province, are Indonesia's largest producers of tin. Almost 90% of the country's tin originates from these two islands (Hodal, 2012, in Diprose et al., 2020). Historical records indicate that tin mining in Bangka–Belitung had begun in the pre-colonial era, with widespread exploitation beginning in the colonial era (Erman, 2007, in Diprose et al., 2020). Colonial extraction companies in Bangka, Belitung, and Singkep were nationalised by the Indonesian government after the country's independence, combining them into one company: PN Timah. In 1976, this company was reorganised to create a state-owned enterprise (PT Timah), which maintained a monopoly over tin production that endured until the fall of the authoritarian Soeharto regime. Owing to this lengthy history, local culture has been strongly influenced by the extraction and trade of tine (Diprose et al., 2020).

As Indonesia democratised following the fall of the authoritarian New Order regime, the authority to manage tin extraction was delegated to local governments and private-sector actors. This decentralisation and liberalisation, which coincided with the creation of Bangka–Belitung Province, resulted in fierce competition for access to tin mining and its profits. Competition occurred between central, provincial, and regency governments; between state actors and private-sector actors; and between state actors and local residents (Zulkarnain, 2005).

Nevertheless, the economic benefits of decentralisation and liberalisation have primarily benefited local actors (Erman, 2007). Tin extraction has become a cornerstone of the local economy. This is especially evident in Bangka, where the state-owned PT Timah operates onshore and offshore mines in conjunction with dozens of local entrepreneurs, and where

tin smelting furnaces are commonplace. Through taxes, royalties, and exports, tin extraction provides an important economic resource for local governments (Diprose et al., 2020). Indirect benefits are also evident; through their investment activities and their employment of local residents, tin extraction companies have contributed significantly to the provincial economy.

Unfortunately, however, excessive tin mining in Bangka–Belitung has significantly and deleteriously affected local society. Extraction's environmental impact reaches far beyond mines, being felt in the protected forests, rivers, and coasts of the province. At the same time, the aggressive—and even predatory—mining economy has resulted in conflict between governments and communities, as well as between miners and non-miners (Erman, 2007). At the same time, smuggling and other black-market activities have proven problematic, and much of Bangka–Belitung's tin exports were mined illegally (interview with activist, December 2018). The rampant practice of illegal mining results in the loss of taxes and royalties, accelerates environmental degradation, promotes the exploitation of child and woman labour, and subjects miners to unsafe environments where workplace health and safety protocols are non-existent.

This discussion has shown that Bangka–Belitung has a long history of tin exploitation, and this has shaped the specific social, political, and economic conditions in which present-day mining occurs. At the same time, however, it is important to note the differences between Bangka and Belitung, which have distinct social, political, and economic conditions that have affected residents' response to tin extraction.

The *first* key difference lies in the tensions between local residents and PT Timah. In the early 1990s, PT Timah withdrew from Belitung and ceased operations after announcing that the island's tin reserves had been depleted (Diprose et al., 2020). To ameliorate its financial situation, the company downsized most of its local employees (Erman, 2009) without paying adequate compensation. As a result, many of Belitung's residents suddenly lost their livelihood, and their financial difficulties disrupted the local economy. Tensions endured for decades in Belitung, and many local residents directed their hatred and anger at PT Timah (Diprose et al., 2020). In Bangka, meanwhile, tensions between PT Timah and local residents have been temporary and sporadic, occurring (for instance) when residents are driven by falling pepper and rubber prices to supplement their incomes by smuggling tin, thereby leaving them at risk of arrest and detention (Erman, 2007).

The second difference lies in the economic paradox of tin mining. In Belitung, rapid and rampant exploitation resulted in the industrial exploitation of tin deposits becoming economically unviable within ten years. Tin deposits available to artisanal miners were likewise limited (interview with a miner, 2018), and many lost their livelihoods and were forced to seek alternative employment. Tin collectors and sub-collectors, most of whom had access to more capital, migrated to the tourism and the oil palm sectors. Conversely, Bangka—an island three times the size of Belitung—had significantly larger tin deposits. Furthermore, exploitation has not been

limited to onshore mining, but also involved offshore mining, which has developed rapidly and become a backbone of the industry. As a result, the people of Bangka have not faced the same economic paradox.

The third difference lies in the value chains of post-decentralisation tin exploitation. In Bangka, the Bangka Regency government rapidly seized the momentum of tin deregulation, issuing Local Bylaw No. 2 of 2001 regarding the Issuance of Tin Ore Export Permits and Tin Mining Permits for Local Residents and Local Bylaw No. 21 of 2001 regarding the Implementation of General Mining in Bangka Island. These bylaws stimulated the rise of dozens of local companies, employing approximately 130,000 people (formal employees and artisanal miners) in 2002; these companies were involved in both mining and export activities (Erman, 2009).

However, in June 2002, these export policies were cancelled by the Ministry of Trade, which required that all tin ore be smelted prior to export. This promoted the rise of new tin smelters in Bangka. Owing to their close association with the regent, local entrepreneurs had ready access to permits, and dozens of smelters had been constructed within a decade. These entrepreneurs, in conjunction with the regent, also found a way to sidestep export restrictions; the regent began issuing Permits for Inter-Local Trade (Surat Izin Perdagangan Antar Daerah, SIPAD). Although these permits were claimed to facilitate the smelting of tin in other parts of Indonesia, they were ultimately used to facilitate the smuggling of ore to foreign buyers (Erman, 2009). Through these processes, new businesses emerged that concentrated on mining, smelting, trading, and exporting tin. The rapid and radical response of government officials, in conjunction with local entrepreneurs, resulted in the rapid maturation of the tin value chain in Bangka. This, in turn, stimulated the rise of a local bourgeoisie with significant capital, who worked in conjunction with politicians, officials, bureaucrats, and brokers to achieve a political settlement and prevent conflict.

Conversely, the Belitung Regency government did not issue any radical tin extraction policies immediately after the creation of Bangka–Belitung Province. As such, tin extraction and trade were handled predominantly by local actors (many of whom were working illegally), sub-collectors (district-level brokers) and collectors (regency-level brokers). Collectors purchased and amassed tin from the sub-collectors underneath them, then sold this tin to their patrons.

Diprose et al. (2020) have shown that Bangka and Belitung have differed significantly in their response to demands for a sustainable value chain. Stakeholders in Bangka have ignored the Tin Working Group's demands for a sustainable value chain, for fear that such a chain would disrupt the established order. Stakeholders in Belitung, meanwhile, have been more open to sustainable mining discourses.

In conclusion, deep-rooted grudges against PT Timah, the paradoxes of the mining economy, and diverse value chains have all shaped the specific political opportunity structures in Bangka and Belitung. The aforementioned study by Diprose et al. (2020) has reinforced the argument that the islands' specific historical, socio-political, and economic

contexts have influenced how Bangka and Belitung have approached tin extraction.

This section has provided an introductory overview of the historical context and political/economic dynamics of tin extraction in Bangka–Belitung. These islands' different contexts have implications for local residents' response to offshore mining, resulting in the people of Belitung strongly opposing such mining and the people of Bangka accommodating it. In the following section, the author will provide a brief overview of the resistance in Belitung that has blocked (successfully, as of writing) plans to commence offshore mining. This will be contrasted with the experiences of Bangka, where resistance was sporadic and temporary, and ultimately where residents ultimately failed to block offshore mining.

## Extensive Resistance to Offshore Tin Mining in Belitung

Public opposition to offshore tin mining in East Belitung peaked with a 2,000-member demonstration, which was held in October 2016 on a beach across from a planned offshore mine. Uniquely, this demonstration not only involved a coalition of fishermen, tourism actors, local officials, students, and environmentalists, but was led by two regents: the regents of Belitung and East Belitung. Protestors demanded the withdrawal of suction vessels,[2] and sought to ensure that Belitung's waters would remain free of offshore mining (Arumingtyas, October 2016).

This demonstration, however, did not occur in isolation; it was the culmination of a series of activities oriented towards blocking offshore mining in Belitung. Five years previously, the residents of Belitung had successfully blocked marine dredging intended to facilitate the construction of a tourism resort. Since 2016, large demonstrations had been interspersed with routine creative activities and discussions, as well as efforts to reach local and national media outlets. Using technology, including Facebook and WhatsApp groups, activists were able to frame and mobilise their issues online. At the same time, they allied themselves with local elites, holding demonstrations in front of the regency parliament and seeking audiences with parliamentarians and government officials (interview, 2018). In short, the anti-mining movement in East Belitung began in 2015, grew rapidly, and remains strong today.

Though Fishman (2017) argues that effective social movements most commonly originate from the financially disadvantaged and socio-culturally marginalised, this is not true in East Belitung. Many learned from the experiences of fishermen in Bangka, whose household incomes suffered significantly after the commencement of offshore mining. Before mining began, these fishermen had been able to catch 10 kilogrammes of fish less than a mile from the beach. After mining began, they sometimes had to travel thirty miles for a catch of the same size; this was significantly more dangerous and costly (Kumparan, 2018). Offshore mining was

[2] Vessels equipped with the technology necessary to remove underwater materials. In Bangka, such vessels are widely identified with offshore tin mining.

seen as causing water pollution, damaging coral, and killing sea life (Kumparan, October 2018). The empirical experiences of Bangka motivated the people of Belitung to promote conservation efforts, thereby protecting the oceans and all life contained within (interview with fisherman, 2018).

Conversely, the people of Bangka were slower and more varied in their response to offshore mining. Some protested; others were more accommodating. Residents' responses were influenced predominantly by their access to tin resources, rather than their concern for the environment. Those who resisted were predominantly fishermen, whose livelihoods were detrimentally affected by water pollution. Those who accepted offshore mining, meanwhile, were mainly fishermen who had become offshore miners (Erman, 2010).

**Political Opportunity Structures in Bangka–Belitung: Similar Opportunity Structures, Different Effects**

Tarrow (1996) identifies three main approaches for analysing political opportunity structures: the policy approach, the movement approach, and the state approach. The first two approaches are used primarily in local-level analysis, while the third is most beneficial for international comparison. Seeking to understand how changing formal structures affect the specific dynamics and political opportunities of movements, this article employs a specific opportunity structure approach.

Tarrow's concept of political opportunity structures is not limited to formal structures. It also includes conflict structures and resource-providing alliances (Kriesi, 1991, in Tarrow, 1996), both concepts that significantly strengthen this article's analysis. Elite fragmentation, as well as movements' ability to exploit said fragmentation by establishing their own alliances, significantly influences their access to political channels and necessary resources. When such features are lacking, movements tend to be weaker.

This article's analysis uses three of the dimensions offered by Tarrow (1994): political access (open/closed), degree of elite fragmentation (fragmented/consolidated), and alliances with elites (existent/non-existent) (Heijden, 2006). These will be defined in detail below.

**1. Political Access**

The fall of the authoritarian Soeharto regime marked a turning point in Indonesian history, being the beginning of the country's democratisation and the momentum for creating political access (Robison & Hadiz, 2004). Over time, Indonesians became increasingly able to provide input and voice their demands regarding national and sub-national policies (Wahlstrom, 2006). Political channels became increasingly open to collective action and civil society movements, which used these channels to promote media freedom and demand diversity in media ownership. At the same time, dozens of new political parties emerged, and thus Indonesian politics shifted from a three-party system to a multi-party one.

After decentralisation—at least until the passage of Law No. 3 of 2020—laws regarding local governments (including Law No. 22 of 1999; Law No. 32 of 2004; and Law No. 23 of 2014) and oil-and-gas

resources (Law No. 4 of 2009) provided local governments with the authority to issue and rescind mining permits. This decentralisation significantly transformed the dynamics of local governance, introducing a greater level of independence in the local arena.

Together with the local government's authority in mining matters, the availability of various political channels was a determinant factor in the success of the anti-offshore mining movement in East Belitung. Institutionalised resistance was activists' main channel, and demands were conveyed through such diverse strategies as dialogue with government officials, demonstrations, and media campaigns.

Activists first sought to create dialogue by attending public hearings at the provincial and regency-level parliaments. Second, they sought an audience with the regent; however, as the governor was the final authority in the matter, the regent could only issue a statement. Finally, activists reached out to Susi Pudjiastuti, the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, and established networks within the national government.

In analysing the political access dimension, it is necessary to consider the state's response to activists' demands. Scholars have identified two common strategies used by states when responding to popular pressure: repression and facilitation. Authoritarian states tend to employ repressive approaches, while democratic nations are normally more facilitatory (Tarrow, 1994). In the case of East Belitung, the regency and provincial governments both employed facilitatory approaches; however, they differed in their level of acceptance.

Also necessary when analysing the political access dimension is answering the question of whether states involve civil society associations as partners in political dialogue (Wahlstrom, 2006). It is apparent that, in the case of East Belitung, the regency and provincial governments were more open and accommodating in their response to civil society movements than in Bangka. Nevertheless, the provincial government still sought to convince the people of Belitung to accept offshore mining (interview with fisherman, December 2018).

Technology should also be considered as an analytical variable, given that technology contributes significantly to civil society movements' ability to effectively network with other movements and convey their demands to the media (Domaradzka, 2018). In the case of East Belitung, the anti-offshore mining movement benefited from technology in several ways. It provided activists with a medium for promoting their agendas, conveying their demands, and disseminating news, as well as access to databases and documents. Social media campaigns contributed significantly to their efforts to create and maintain solidarity amongst the people of Belitung, while online storage facilities and databases enabled them to effectively document their activities.

From this discussion, it may be concluded that open political access was a primary driver of the anti-offshore mining movement's success in East Belitung. Such political access was made possible by intermediation, through which activists were able to consolidate their demands (Heijden, 2006)

## 2. Elite Fragmentation

It is important to remember that the concept of political opportunity structures, as offered by Tarrow (1996), is not limited to formal structures; it also includes the conflict structures that can be exploited by movements. Conflict can create opportunities, as elites may support movements (by providing resources and political access, for instance) to advance their own interests and undermine their opponents (Tarrow, 1996).

In Bangka–Belitung, elite fragmentation existed at different levels. Within the provincial government, there existed fragmentation between the executive and legislative branches. At the same time, there was conflict between provincial and regency governments. In 2017–2018, during the peak of the conflict, the Governor of Bangka–Belitung was a member of the Gerindra Party, while the speaker of the Bangka–Belitung Parliament was a member of the Democratic Party of Indonesia–Struggle (PDIP)—the leader of the opposition coalition. These parties' disputes were exacerbated by Indonesia's national dynamics, including the rising tensions that followed Jakarta's 2017 gubernatorial election and preceded the country's 2019 national election. The opposition coalition, led by PDIP, openly criticised the governor's policies regarding offshore mining. This coalition also provided activists with the political access they needed to voice their demands (interview with activist, December 2018).

Further fragmentation occurred between the provincial and regency governments. Law No. 23 of 2014 resulted in regency governments' authority in mining matters being divested to the provincial level. As such, offshore mining solely benefited the provincial government (by providing revenue). Regencies, meanwhile, lost both a significant source of revenue as well as a strategic interest in promoting mining. Individual officials, similarly, lost access to the personal profits that illegal mining and smuggling had provided (interview with activist, December 2018).

While the debate over offshore mining was reaching its apogee, Belitung was developing its tourism industry. This sector's interests were often opposed to those of the mining industry, to the point that the environmental degradation caused by offshore mining would prove disastrous to Belitung's efforts to develop a tourism economy. Many miners, who had long-established mutualistic relationships with local politicians, had already diversified their interests and sought other livelihoods. As the result of regency governments' and local politicians' diminishing interest in mining Belitung, many opposed the provincial government by providing the anti-offshore mining movement with political access and resources, thereby facilitating activists' efforts to voice their demands.

The situation in Bangka, conversely, was different. Elite fragmentation was driven not by pro- and anti-mining discourses, but by questions of access (Erman, 2010). Such fragmentation was most tangible in the years following the fall of the New Order regime, when frictions emerged between parties/coalitions and levels of government (i.e. the provincial government vis-à-vis the Bangka Regency government). These elites allied themselves with entrepreneurs and local residents, thereby creating fragmentation within communities themselves. Lines

were drawn between miners with different political affiliations, as well as between miners and non-miners (Erman, 2010), without distinguishing between onshore and offshore mining. As no elites were against offshore mining, the anti-offshore mining movement had fewer opportunities to make themselves heard.

Based on the above, it may be concluded that the elites were fragmented on the issue of offshore mining in Belitung, but consolidated in Bangka.

### 3. Alliances with Influential Elites

When politicians and civil society movements share an ideology, they are generally more receptive to establishing an alliance (Wahlstrom, 2006). During these alliances, politicians tend to provide movements with resources and spaces for articulating their demands. In Indonesia, such ideological interests are often secondary to pragmatic ones—i.e., rent-seeking and voter support consolidation (Berenschot & Aspinall, 2019). In East Belitung, the anti-offshore mining movement was able to ally itself with several influential figures, including the Regents of Belitung and East Belitung, members of the East Belitung Parliament, members of the opposition (PDIP), the National Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Institution, and the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (interview with activist, December 2018).

Broadly speaking, elites contributed to the anti-offshore mining movement in East Belitung in three ways: providing resources to activists, creating spaces in which activists could convey their aspirations, and supporting activists' demands in formal decision-making processes. As such, activists' alliances with political elites were foundational for activists' successful opposition to offshore. Activists' alliance with local regents is evidenced in three ways: their official statements of political support, their leadership of demonstrations, and their formal requests that the governor end all suction vessel operations (interview with activist, January 2019). PDIP—which formed the opposition—provided activists with space to voice their aspirations, and ensured that the Coastal and Small Islands Bylaw ultimately provided no space for offshore mining in Belitung. Through their alliance with the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, finally, activists were able to bring the issue of offshore mining to the national level, thereby drawing the attention of a broader range of stakeholders.

As stated by Berenschot and Aspinall (2019), most political elites are driven primarily by electoral interests; economic interests, though secondary, are also significant. Offshore mining was perceived as crucial, and thus it was a hot-button issue in Belitung's executive and legislative elections. Between 2016 and 2018, it was commonplace for politicians—both incumbents and their challengers—to openly reject offshore mining (interview with activist, December 2018). Politicians' electoral interests coincided with activists' goals, and this facilitated the establishment of alliances between them.

Conversely, the anti-offshore mining movement in Bangka was unable to ally itself with influential elites, as opposition to offshore mining was not seen as electorally significant. Rather, elites sought to establish alliances with miners and other supporters of offshore mining (interview

with activist, December 2018). It may thus be concluded that, while alliances with influential elites existed in Belitung, no such alliances were present in Bangka.

## Clientelist Political Settlement in Extraction: Bangka's Success, Belitung's Failure

Clientelist political settlement is characterised by the paternalistic distribution of political and economic resources, personal compliance mechanisms, and power being wielded by formal and non-formal institutions—often in violation of existing regulations. Clientelist political settlement does not concern itself with the legality and illegality, exclusivity and inclusivity, or justice and injustice of its approach. It prioritises solely the distribution of resources to ensure long-term political stability, as such stability is essential for business development (Khan, 2010).

The liberalisation and deregulation of tin in the early 2000s resulted in widespread political instability and fragmentation in Bangka, as diverse actors competed for access to the tin market and its profits (Erman, 2009). The national government competed with local governments; the provincial government competed with regency governments; governments at all levels competed with communities; and private-sector actors competed with communities (Zulkarnain, 2005). During this period, actors used diverse regulations to legitimise their own interests, and thus all coalitions had to involve government agencies (as those with regulatory authority). The concepts of legality and illegality, thus, were produced within this context of continued contestation (Erman, 2008).

Ultimately, two coalitions dominated public discourse. The first consisted of the Governor of Bangka–Belitung, two political parties (Golkar and the United Development Party), and PT Timah. The second, meanwhile, consisted of the Regent of Bangka, PDIP (which included in its ranks many entrepreneurs of Chinese heritage), the Bangka–Belitung Police, and Hendri Lie's tin conglomerate (Erman, 2007). Each coalition had expansive networks, ranging from the highest to the lowest levels. After Bangka was divided into five regencies, and after authority was divested to local governments through Law No. 4 of 2009, these coalitions fragmented into smaller, stabler ones. Although these coalitions' specific actors changed rapidly, the local bourgeoisie consistently wielded power.

The local bourgeoisie, enriched by the tin sector, were able to coordinate politicians, bureaucrats, and officials from the national to the regency level. Their business networks reached into the transportation, plantation, and accommodation industries; one tin entrepreneur even owned an airline. These entrepreneurs formed a shadow state, one capable of controlling formal institutions, co-opting local communities to ensure their loyalty, and curtail anti-mining activism through clientelist political settlement practices (Erman, 2007).

Even as elites advocated settlement mechanisms that benefited all involved, many in the community remained passive, acting only as the clients of specific patrons. Many sought to maximise their profit, without distinguishing between onshore and offshore mining. As such,

elites did not concern themselves with changing communities' minds or attempting other settlement approaches. Several mechanisms were used: providing legal protection, providing mining area, and purchasing tin (both legal and illegal) from miners. Patrons also provided social assistance to local residents who lived in poverty (Erman, 2007; Erman, 2010).

The clientelist political settlement practiced in Bangka in the 2000s strongly affected the island's dynamics in subsequent years. Clientelist mechanisms, characterised as exclusive, spoils-driven, and personalised, were again used to control discourse over offshore mining. Again, local communities were co-opted. They were included in the tin value chain, permitted to operate in the area, provided capital loans, and involved in the sale of tin—both legal and illegal (Erman, 2007). Such paternalism divided communities, stemming the rise of consolidated opposition to offshore mining activities. Those movements that did emerge were unorganised, sporadic, and temporary, and thus failed (in many cases) to ensure their demands were heard by the government.

While the local bourgeoisie in Bangka successfully blocked resistance by co-opting local communities, such clientelism was ineffective in Belitung. The failure of clientelist political settlement in Belitung may be attributed to three factors: the absence of local bourgeoisie, the strength of environmental issues, and the rise of tourism as an alternative revenue source.

### 1. The Absence of Local Bourgeoisie

As in Bangka, the tin collectors of Belitung attempted to achieve political settlement by providing legal protection, ensuring access to mining areas, and purchasing tin ore. However, they lacked the power, capital, and networks of their peers in Bangka; Belitung's largest collector was still a client of a collector in Bangka. At this point, it is important to note that the tin trade in Bangka–Belitung follows a clan model. Each clan consists of miners at the bottom, who sell their tin to sub-collectors (at the sub-district level); above these sub-collectors are collectors (at the regency level), smelter owners, and exporters. Relationships are paternalistic, with those higher in the hierarchy being the patrons of those below them (Nugraha, 2020). For further detail, see Chart 1 below.

**Figure 1. The Clan Model in Bangka-Belitung**

Miner
Miner
Miner
Miner
Miner
Miner

Sub-collector
Sub-collector
Sub-collector

Collector

Bourgeoisie in Bangka

Self-owned smelters
Colleague-owned smelters
Export
Smuggling

*Source: Author's Analysis (2021)*

In Bangka, these business relationships are mature and built on a foundation of loyalty. Such loyalty is lacking in Belitung. Miners and sub-collectors are willing to sell to whichever collector offers the best price. Weak business ties, consequently, the bourgeoisie in Belitung were unable to co-opt local communities or curb anti-mining activities.

## 2. Environmental Issues: A Means for Consolidation

Environmental issues were broadly used by activists in Belitung to justify their opposition to offshore mining. In doing so, they gained access to transnational actors with an interest in promoting sustainable and environmentally friendly extraction techniques (Diprose, et al., 2020). As an issue, "the environment" is universal, and thus able to attract the participation and support of people with diverse interests—including those whose livelihoods were not directly affected by offshore mining—such as fishermen and tourism actors (Sholihin, 2019). The following paragraph provides an example of how activists mobilise public support by voicing environmental issues on a local talk show.

> *Onshore mining is damaging, but the rehabilitation process is not nearly as complicated as offshore mining. Onshore mines can be repurposed, used as new economic resources. But at sea, after the damage has been done, it will last for hundreds of years. The seas cannot be used after being mined* (People's Forum against Offshore Mining, 2018)

In such environmental messages, humanity and nature are positioned as two elements of a single whole. When humans harm nature, they will inexorably be affected as well. This may not be immediate; the consequences of human action may only be felt years or decades in the future (Dewi, 2015). Such arguments

were repeatedly voiced by activists to strengthen their anti-offshore mining message (interview with activist, December 2018).

Buttressing their arguments, activists regularly urged residents to "learn from Bangka's experiences" with offshore mining and the pollution it caused (Kumparan, October 2018). As further empirical evidence of mining's long-term effects, activists noted that Belitung's widespread flooding in 2017 could be traced to its history of tin mining (detik.com, July 2017). Through such environmental messages, activists were able to mobilise the people of Belitung against offshore mining, thereby countering the local bourgeoisie's attempt at clientelist political settlement (Sholihin, 2019).

### 3. The Rise of Tourism as an Alternative Economic Resource

Inexorably tied with Belitung's tourism industry is *Laskar Pelangi*, a 2008 film adapted from the novel of the same name by Andrea Hirata (a Belitung-born author), which showcased the beauty of the island's beaches even as it explored the issue of social marginalisation. Within four years of the film's release, the tourism industry had grown rapidly, drawing the attention of the local government, private sector, and communities. The national government even included Belitung in its strategic tourism-development program, "Ten New Balis" (Sholihin, 2019)

This rapid and massive response shows that tourism was quickly accepted as a new industry, one unexpected in a region with a lengthy history of tin mining. Its actors quickly imagined a new form of welfare, one that involved not the mining sector but the tourism industry. They recognised that Belitung's natural beauty, particularly its coasts, would be central to developing tourism in the island. As such, they sought to protect Belitung's coasts from the environmental consequences of offshore mining. As one tourism actor, who had also been involved in the anti-mining movement, explained:

> *Don't say that tourism and mining can occur simultaneously. Look at Bangka. Has its tourism industry developed? Belitung… I'm active in the tourism sector, and [in the future] my great-grandchildren could become involved in tourism. What about mining? After the tin is gone, it's over* (local tourism entrepreneur, December 2018).

The above statement implies that offshore mining and (maritime) tourism have contradictory goals. The people of Belitung, disenchanted with tin mining, had identified tourism as having significant potential, and they thus chose to prioritise the development of the sector over further tin exploitation (Sholihin, 2019). This was a third reason for the failure of clientelist political settlement in Belitung.

## Discussion and Conclusion

The above analysis has produced arguments that, in conjunction, answer this article's research question: "Why did the anti-offshore mining movement fail in Bangka, but succeed in East Belitung?" Evidence has shown that, in the extractive industries, political opportunity structures

and settlements are closely intertwined with historical factors as well as local economic and political dynamics. Environmental issues, long recognised as an external factor, likewise have local dimensions that influence political opportunity structures and settlements—at least to some extent.

This article's greatest contribution to the literature on political opportunity structures in Indonesia lies in its application of the concepts offered by Tarrow (1996) to identify similarities and differences at the sub-national level. This comparative study has found that Bangka and Belitung both provide open political access (to formal structures), but differ in their elite fragmentation (conflict structures) and movements' ability to ally themselves with influential elites.

Approaches that focus solely on formal structures, emphasising open political access, are insufficiently refined for unitary republics such as Indonesia. When the highest authority lies with the central government, local governments lack the power to transform public demands into policy. Using the political channels made available through Indonesia's decentralisation, the people of Belitung and Bangka enjoyed the same political access in voicing their demands. However, the level of acceptance varied; the provincial government was seen as more receptive to the demands of Belitung than those of Bangka.

Combining such a formal approach with one that recognises conflict structures and alliances with influential elites, meanwhile, offers a ready means of understanding how these factors influence movements' success. As Indonesia has decentralised, the political and economic dimensions of its local governments have diverged, a condition shaped by variations in the socio-political configurations of the country's different provinces and regencies. In the case of Bangka–Belitung, these socio-political configurations coincided with geographic separateness, thereby exacerbating elite fragmentation while simultaneously facilitating alliances. Below, Table 1 summarises this study's findings of political opportunity structures at the sub-national level.

**Table 1. Different Dimensions of POS, Bangka and Belitung**

| POS Dimension | Bangka | Belitung |
|---|---|---|
| Political access | Open | Open |
| Elite fragmentation | Consolidated | Fragmented |
| Alliances with influential elites | Not present | Present |

*Source: Author's analysis (2021)*

Next, this comparative study of Bangka and Belitung has explored why elites' clientelist political settlement succeeded in one place but failed elsewhere, as well as the implications of this finding for the development of democracy in Indonesia. Just as narrow political settlement successfully curbed conflict and separatism in Riau (Diprose & Azca, 2020), clientelist political settlement—using both legal and illegal means, with personal and exclusive mechanisms—was effective in safeguarding the extractive industry in Bangka. This study has shown that the skill of tin brokers and collectors (collectively,

the local bourgeoisie) was a determinant factor in the success and failure of political settlement. In Bangka, the local bourgeoisie successfully blocked opposition to offshore mining. Conversely, in Belitung, the local bourgeoisie were unable to effectively use clientelist political settlement to curtail conflict in East Belitung.

Elites' limited skill was far from the only factor, however, Economic and environmental factors also contributed to the failure of clientelist political settlement in Belitung. The strength of environmental issues, in conjunction with the diversification of the local economy, resulted in offshore tin mining being dismissed. Table 2 summarises this article's findings regarding the dynamics of political settlement in Bangka–Belitung

**Table 2. Clientelist Political Settlement: Successful in Bangka, Unsuccessful in Belitung**

| Contributing Factor | Bangka | Belitung | Implication |
|---|---|---|---|
| Local Bourgeoisie | Successful | Failed | Failure of Clientelist Political Settlement in Belitung |
| Environmental Issues | Weak | Strong | Failure of Clientelist Political Settlement in Belitung |
| New Economic Resources | Not present | Present | Failure of Clientelist Political Settlement in Belitung |

*Source: Author's Analysis (2021)*

Although clientelist political settlement can help manage conflict, it does not address its substance. In Bangka, although resistance to offshore mining was neither extensive nor institutionalised, the root of the conflict—the contestation between the mining and fishing industries—went unresolved. Sporadic resistance, primarily involving individuals whose livelihoods depended on fishing, has continued. It is possible that, with an appropriate trigger, such sporadic resistance could develop into a broader movement.

Finally, as shown by the case of Bangka–Belitung, clientelist political settlement can reduce conflict. At the same time, however, this practice restricts civil society movements, thereby fettering democratic development. As such, it would be better to employ a capitalist approach to political settlement (Khan, 2010), one characterised by legal, impersonal, and inclusive mechanisms. This is necessary to ensure that, in the extractive industry, political settlement does not only further the interests of local elites, but also those of the general public. In this manner, public participation in policymaking would increase, thereby positively contributing to the development of Indonesian democracy.

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Book Review

# Participation without democracy: Containing conflict in Southeast Asia

Ashari Cahyo Edi[1]

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**Participation without democracy: Containing conflict in Southeast Asia**

*Author: Garry Rodan*

*Cornell University Press, 2018*

In *Participation Without Democracy,* Garry Rodan argues that, when responding to the dynamics and contradictions inherent to capitalist development, regimes—representing coalitions of interests and the ruling/dominant political elites—'invent' ways to contain conflicts with societal entities (i.e., opposition parties, civil societies, labour unions) in a way that mitigates political harm.

This argument is based on two propositions. First, the development of capitalism has caused inequality to deepen. Both ruling politico-economic elites and marginal groups find that the inequality and disruption inherent in capitalism creates political challenges, which, as a consequence, demands mitigation strategies. Second, established coalitions of interests handle political dissent by moving beyond binary scenarios, rather than simply opening political participation or applying coercive means (crackdowns, arrests, etc.). While elites design institutions of participation and representation as a means of domesticating dissent and conflict, marginal groups may reject them or use these channels to reach beyond being co-opted. Opposition parties, radical NGOs, and marginal groups all seek to utilise such institutions for their transformative agendas. In short, ruling elites and marginal groups engage in participating institutions with different goals in mind.

With these two propositions, Rodan introduces the Modes of Participation (MOPs) framework. MOPs resonate with the interests of the ruling elites, embodied in representation and participation institutions. Because power struggles produce winners and losers, MOPs inevitably tend to be *"privileging, marginalizing, or excluding particular interests or conflicts from political processes"* (p. 28).

[1] PhD student at the Department of Political Science, University at Albany, State University of New York.

Rodan's MOP framework indicates that, while literature on capitalism and democracy is abundant, its direction is not linearly. Although some regimes eventually exhibit certain authoritarian characters, Rodan argues that we must avoid overemphasising why these "hybrid regimes" do not possess certain democratic features, but rather understand what those regimes actually do. As readers will see in the three cases he discusses—Singapore, the Philippines, and Malaysia—dynamic conflicts of interest have resulted, for instance, in the decisions among the oligarchs in the Philippines to expand participation through the Party-List System. It was in the interest of the family dynasties that dominated mainstream parties to show their goodwill by setting a 20% quota for marginal groups to canalize political participation among them, including those who could become insurgents or mobilise collective movements.

In short, Rodan asserts that MOPs have been strategically adopted by regimes in Singapore, the Philippines, and Malaysia to contain potential opponents by channelling them into manageable sites while simultaneously fragmenting their collective power potential. Rodan rightly cites Schattschneider: "He who determines what politics is about runs the country, because the definition of the alternatives is the choice of conflicts, and the choice of conflicts allocates power" (p. 66 as quoted in Rodan, p. 23). For Rodan, "the way institutions shape the exploitation, use, and suppression of specific conflicts is fundamental to political strategy" (p. 23).

MOPs have two components. First is the ideology of participation: the Philippines' *populist* (accentuating a straight people–leader nexus with the expense of "the curtailment of political pluralism and tendencies toward authoritarianism," p. 30), Malaysia's *particularist* ("emphasizing the right to representation of discrete communities and identities based on ethnicity, race, religion, geography, gender, and culture," p. 32) and Singapore's *consultative ideology* (problem-solving and technocratic oriented participation at the expense of depoliticisation).

Second are the institutional modes of participation. The ruling elites incorporate societal entities in state affairs to channel, contain, and control political pressure and fragmentise civil society movements. *Participation Without Democracy* focuses on the combination of (1) the sites of participation, including the state, the trans-state sponsored, and the autonomous; (2) two levels of inclusions, i.e. individual and collective (p. 34).

Rodan's strengths are his synthesis, which involves a clear yet straightforward nexus between the interest-based, institutional, and ideational arguments. In short, he implies that the ideological and institutional mechanisms of these modes of participation originate from the interest coalitions that exist among the ruling elites. Both ideas and institutions are created to 'mitigate' the conflicts inherent within capitalism and development (i.e., labour's concerns with industrial relations and general welfare).[2] This line of argument has

[2] Building on the Murdoch School's social conflict, the MOP approach focuses on the "struggles over who can participate in political decision-making, how and on what basis, as

a rationalist flavour, viewing ideas and institutions as instruments for serving the ruling elites' interests.

In his explanation, Rodan presents an in-depth causal analysis as well as a detailed description of entities/actors in their contexts. For example, when discussing the fragmenting effects of bottom-up budgeting among the MOPs of the Philippines, Rodan examines what regimes *"actually do"* (p. 5). The introduction of participatory budgeting seems to have enabled the state to open some decisions to other social entities, from which the liberal and moderate can benefit and through which they can pursue their goals. Rodan also covers the dynamics within civil society, mapping the current and diverging ideological and strategic choices among liberal, radical, and revolutionary civil society as well as their contrasting coalitions. He explores civil society groups' internal and constructed views on participatory budgeting to understand how, for instance, radical decisions are made to handle participation and "restrain patronage politics", to "temper the market", and to cultivate and consolidate the poor and marginalized both within and without the state (p. 159). This also supports Rodan's position that the three modes of participation—regardless of their original function to serve the ruling elites—also offer oppositional entities the opportunity to achieve their own goals.

Another illustration of MOPs at works is the Singapore case, through which Rodan convincingly shows how the consultative ideology works. As the leftist movement was destroyed by the regime in the 1960s, the technocratic elites within the People's Action Party enjoyed political ascendancy. As capitalism's development started to produce inequality and subsequently dissent among the opposition, the regime introduced two MOPs to contain conflict. In 1990, it introduced the nominated members of parliament (NMP) system, intended to obviate "the formation of alliances among independent organizations and/or with opposition parties" (p. 91). Five years beforehand, the techno-PAP regime had also introduced feedback units: Reaching Everyone for Active Citizenry@Home (REACH) and the Our Singapore Conversation (OSC). Despite the various means and ways offered by these feedback channels, the regime's nature of engagement has remained highly controlled. Consultations are tightly monitored, and what can and cannot be discussed is determined by the government. Indeed, attendance is invitation only; it is not open to everyone. While NMP is intended to stop the rise of potential collective movements, the feedback units (REACH and OSC) are aimed at individualising citizen engagement with the state.

The last case is the particularist ideology of representation in Malaysia, illustrated by Rodan through two MOPs: the National Economic Consultative Councils (1989–1990 and 1999–2000) and

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the principal issue at stake in both democratic and authoritarian regimes" (Rodan & Baker, 2020). Further application of this social conflict approach in topics such as extractive industries, agrarian relations, gender, labor migration, environmental degradation, and aid's political economy is elaborated in Carol, Hameiri, and Jones (Eds) (2020).

the Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections (Gabungan Philihantaya Bersih dan Adil, Bersih) movement. NECC was state-sponsored, while Bersih was autonomously initiated by civil society and opposition parties. However, due to the dominant ideology of *particularist* representation, both failed. For example, the NECC was designed to mitigate any detrimental effects from the 1972 National Economic Policy. For many the NEP had entrenched Malaysia's affirmative policy that benefited the ethnic Malays, and thus the NECC was adopted out of recognition of Malaysia's diversified economy; it was thought a means of channelling grievances within and without the ruling party coalition. The NECC was designed as a consultative forum, whose orientation is technocratic.

Nevertheless, NECC was a failure. Unexpectedly, consultations began wildly questioning the regime's race-based economic development policy, hence threatening its very foundation. The NECC case validates Rodan's argument that, although this MOP was designed to serve the interests of the regime, marginal groups were nonetheless able to utilise it strategically to pursue their goals. As for the Bersih Coalition, it too failed; particularist ideologies fragmented the CSOs and opposition parties, and as such their collective goal could not be realised.

Examination of three participation ideologies, their practice, and the level of inclusion in Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines shows the book's other strength: its ability to examine the historical institutional trajectories through which the politico-economic interests of the ruling elites are embedded in the development of capitalism, and thus respond and adapt to dissatisfaction with its effects. Looking to the author's curriculum vitae, it is evident that *Participation Without Democracy* is based on an accumulated and saturated understanding of capitalism's development, regime development, and the nature of state–society relations in Southeast Asia in general, and in the three countries discussed in particular.

Reading *Participation Without Democracy* reminds us that repression can be used to constrain an already fragmented population, as shown in the case of Burma (Callahan, 2004) and as reflected in Antlov's (2003) discussion of the legacy of consensus (*mufakat)* and harmony as norms in political contestation.

Callahan's discussion on the Burma case illustrates that the use of extreme ideologies, citizens-as-enemies, and repression mechanisms to not only minimise but also violently eliminate power contestation against the state. *Participation Without Democracy* reminds us that the anti-democratic mode of participation is not always manifested through the extreme restriction and repression of political dissidents or the denial of election results; at times, it may include civil society, or even—as in Singapore (p. 91–92)—provide space for critical voices for the sake of the regime's credibility. If *Participation Without Democracy* had discussed Burma, perhaps it would argue that the junta should have 'learned' to be politicians—as New Order Indonesia had done previously—so that it could better constrain and control political contestation by diverting it into controllable avenues.

In the case of decentralized Indonesia, Antlov (2004) discusses the proliferation of citizen involvement in the early years of decentralisation both within

state institutions and avenues initiated by civil society. In terms of ideology, Antlov asserts that New Order's 'anti-politics' legacy continued to constrain political contestation in newly opened participation spaces, either *invited spaces* or *popular avenues* (Cornwall, 2004). The political elites promote harmony and consensus (*mufakat*) as noble things while framing political dissent and contestation as not part of Indonesian tradition. Antlov also reminds us of the danger of these newly opened participation spaces' apolitical nature, which have provided traditional power-holders with new ways to access power. As such, his analysis—initiated two years after decentralisation began in Indonesia—warned us that "[We] need to look closely at who is involved in village council and citizens' forum meetings, at who controls the agenda, how decisions are reached, and who benefits from the decisions that are made" (p. 84).

Despite the strengths of *Participation Without Democracy*, several topics can be expanded. First, the book implies that the interests of the ruling elites are relatively stable. It is worth exploring historical moments and critical junctures in which ruling elites may be uncertain about their interests (Blyth, 2002). At such moments, they may seek and adopt new ideas (ideology) from which they craft new institutions to serve their interests better.

Secondly, from policy feedback theory (Mettler and SoRelle, 2018), it is interesting to research the effect of MOPs on citizens. What have they learned? How does such learning affect their view of political elites, political institutions, the state, and politics in general? To what extent do those experiences and lessons affect their future political participation, not just in relation to the existing MOPs but in a broader sense? Using an interpretive approach to understand how citizens achieve understanding, interpretation, and consciousness, they decide how they should engage in state affairs.

Finally, the same approach is also useful for understanding MOPs hosted by entities other than the state, including corporations. Many have argued that, to mitigate surrounding communities' grievances regarding social and environmental injuries, corporations—especially extractive industries—have adopted various participatory modes of development planning under the umbrella of corporate social responsibility. Similar questions, such as whose interest are served, which community members are invited, which subjects are discussed, how issues are discussed, and so forth, are all valuable for understanding how power is exercised on platforms that have been promoted as 'democratic'. The MOP framework, thus, can help reveal the political impact caused by profitmaking entities (Edi, 2020).

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A tribute to our teacher:
Cornelis Lay (6 September 1959 – 5 August 2020) i-ii

Azifah R. Astrina

Political Scandal and Public Figure:
A Survey of the Effect of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama and Veronica Tan's Divorce Scandal on the Political Attitude of "Ahokers" 111-124

Arum Sekar Cendani, Pulung Setiosuci Perbawani

Contesting Welfare Discourses in Post-New Order Indonesia 125-157

Dimpos Manalu

The Moluccas' Surviving Aristocracy in Indonesian Politics:
Fragmentation and Land-based Political Support 159-186

Bayu Dardias Kurniadi

Shackled by Patriarchy and Poverty:
Women's Experiences with Domestic Violence in North Central Timor and North Sumatra 187-202

Smita Tanaya

Why have Anti-Offshore Tin Mining Movements Failed in Bangka but Succeeded in East Belitung? Political Opportunity Structures and Political Settlement in the Context of Indonesia's Democratic Future 203-227

Eko Bagus Sholihin

Book Review
Participation without democracy:
Containing conflict in Southeast Asia 229-234

Ashari Cahyo Edi